Respondents Brief — Turlock Irrigation District, et al., Petitioners v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 8, 2023

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No. 22-616

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT and

MODESTO IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PETITIONERS,

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY

REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JULIE GANTENBEIN

WATER AND POWER

LAW GROUP PC

2140 Shattuck Avenue,

Suite 801

Berkeley, CA 94704

Tel.: (510) 296-5588

JGantenbein@

waterpowerlaw.com

LENA H. HUGHES

Counsel of Record

ALEXANDRA M. AVVOCATO

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

250 West 55th Street

New York, NY 10019

Tel.: (212) 336-4152

LHughes@mofo.com

AAvvocato@mofo.com

ANDREW MCALEER HAWLEY

WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW CENTER

1037 NE 65th Street, No. 343

Seattle, WA 98115

Tel.: (206) 487-7250

hawley@westernlaw.org

JOSEPH R. PALMORE

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

2100 L Street, NW

Washington, DC 20037

Tel.: (202) 887-6940

JPalmore@mofo.com

BRYAN WILSON

Counsel for Respondents

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

American Whitewater,

755 Page Mill Road

California Sportfishing

Palo Alto, CA 94304

Protection Alliance, Friends Tel.: (650) 813-5603

of the River, and Sierra Club BWilson@mofo.com

Counsel for Respondent

MARCH 8, 2023

Tuolumne River Trust

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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 401 of the Clean Water Act provides that

no federal “license or permit shall be granted” for specified activities if a State has “denied” a required waterquality certification. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). But such

federal license or permit may issue if the required certification “has been obtained or has been waived.” Ibid.

Waiver occurs only if the State “fails or refuses to act

on a request for certification” within one year of its submission. Ibid. The question presented is whether a

State “fails or refuses to act” when it timely denies a

request for certification without prejudice to its refiling.

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

FOR TUOLUMNE RIVER TRUST

Tuolumne River Trust is a non-profit organization

founded in 1981 to promote stewardship of the Tuolumne River through education, community outreach,

habitat restoration projects, and outdoor adventures

for its members along the Tuolumne River. Tuolumne

River Trust is incorporated and organized under the

laws of California. Tuolumne River Trust certifies that

it has no parent corporation and that no publicly held

corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

FOR AMERICAN WHITEWATER,

CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION

ALLIANCE, FRIENDS OF THE RIVER,

AND THE SIERRA CLUB

American Whitewater is a non-profit corporation

incorporated and organized under the laws of the State

of Missouri. It does not have a parent corporation and

is not publicly held.

California Sportfishing Protection Alliance is a

non-profit corporation incorporated and organized under the laws of the State of California. California

Sportfishing Protection Alliance does not have a parent corporation and is not publicly held.

iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS –

Continued

Friends of the River is a non-profit corporation incorporated and organized under the laws of the State

of California. Friends of the River does not have a parent corporation and is not publicly held.

The Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation incorporated and organized under the laws of the State of

California. The Sierra Club does not have a parent corporation and is not publicly held.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED...................................

i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS ....

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

vi

STATEMENT .......................................................

1

A.

Legal Background ......................................

1

B.

Factual Background ..................................

2

C.

Procedural History ....................................

6

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ...... 10

I.

THE PETITION IMPLICATES NO

CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY.................... 10

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION

IS CORRECT ............................................. 13

A. The Board “Acted” On Petitioners’

Requests And Thus Did Not Waive

Section

401’s

Certification

Requirement ........................................ 13

1. The plain language of Section 401’s

waiver provision shows the Board

did not waive certification .............. 13

2. The structure of Section 401

demonstrates that no waiver

occurred .......................................... 16

3. Denials without prejudice serve

Section 401’s purpose ...................... 17

B. Petitioners’ Arguments Are Without

Merit .................................................... 18

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

1. Petitioners’ theory equating “denial”

with “waiver” cannot be squared

with the text of Section 401 ............ 18

2. Petitioners’ attacks on a State’s

motivations for denying requests

are irrelevant and factually

unsupported .................................... 21

III.

THE PETITION DOES NOT RAISE

AN IMPORTANT ISSUE REQUIRING

IMMEDIATE REVIEW, AND THIS CASE

IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING

THE QUESTION PRESENTED ................ 24

A. The Petition Does Not Raise An

Important Issue Requiring Immediate

Review ................................................. 25

B. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For

Resolving The Question Presented ..... 27

CONCLUSION..................................................... 30

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC,

643 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ........................ 2, 21, 27

Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd.,

912 F.3d 746 (4th Cir. 2019) ....................................15

Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Bd. of Env’t Prot.,

595 A.2d 438 (Me. 1991).................................... 16, 28

Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. FERC,

43 F.4th 920 (9th Cir. 2022) .............................. 12, 15

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

568 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ....................14

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 21-16958, 2023 WL 2129631

(9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2023) ...................................... 14, 27

Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC,

857 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................. 1, 24

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC,

913 F.3d 1099

(D.C. Cir. 2019) .........................7, 8, 12, 13, 18, 20, 26

Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) ...................................................1

Keating v. FERC,

927 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .............................. 1, 17

Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee,

No. 18-cv-5005 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2018)...............14

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Long Lake Energy Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t

of Env’t Conservation,

164 A.D.2d 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) ......................28

Louisiana v. Am. Rivers,

142 S. Ct. 1347 (2022) .............................................14

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. N.C. Dep’t

of Env’t Quality,

990 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2021) .............................. 12, 15

N.C. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. FERC,

3 F.4th 655 (4th Cir. 2021) .................................. 8, 19

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense,

138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ...............................................13

Nev. Irrigation Dist. et al. v. Cal. State

Water Res. Control Bd. et al.,

No. 22-743 (U.S. Feb. 6, 2023) .................................12

New York State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v.

FERC,

991 F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2021) ......................... 11, 15, 18

New York State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v.

FERC,

884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018) ............................... 11, 15

PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t

of Ecology,

511 U.S. 700 (1994) ...................................................1

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Env’t Prot.,

547 U.S. 370 (2006) ......................................... 1, 2, 24

Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

909 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2018) ....................................17

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

In re the Petition of Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency for Review of the

Denial of Waste Discharge Requirements,

Order No. WQ 2014-0154, 2014 WL 5148275

(Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Sept. 23,

2014) ........................................................................22

Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res.

Control Bd.,

No. CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct.,

Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021) ............... 6, 29

Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. 176 (2016) .................................................24

STATUTES

16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. .................................................3

16 U.S.C. § 808(c)(1) ......................................................3

16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) .......................................................10

33 U.S.C. § 1341 ............................................................1

33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) .................................................. 1, 15

33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) ................................... 2, 3, 13, 17

33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) ........................................................5

Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq. ..............................4

Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21067 .........................................4

Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080 .......................................25

Cal. Water Code § 13160...............................................4

Cal. Water Code § 13160(b)(2) .......................... 5, 23, 25

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES

40 C.F.R. § 121.8(a) .....................................................14

“Act,” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate

Dictionary (1971).....................................................13

Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality

Certification Improvement Rule,

87 Fed. Reg. 35318 (proposed June 9, 2022) ..........15

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-940 (1970) ..............................28

H.R. Rep. No. 92-911 (1972) .......................................18

Notice of Opportunity to Respond to Petitions for

Reconsideration of Water Quality Certification

for Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project and La

Grange Hydroelectric Project, Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission Project Nos. 2299 and

14581 (2021), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/

waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_

quality_cert/docs/lagrange/dplg-petitions-notice.

pdf ............................................................................29

STATEMENT

A.

Legal Background

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA) “to

restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” S.D. Warren

Co. v. Maine Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 385 (2006).

While the CWA “establishes a regulatory ‘partnership’ between the Federal Government and the source

State,” Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489-90

(1987), the States remain “the prime bulwark in the

effort to abate water pollution.” Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 857 F.3d 388, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

“One of the primary mechanisms through which

the states may assert the broad authority reserved to

them is the certification requirement set out in section

401” of the CWA. Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616, 622

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341). That section

“requires an applicant for a federal license or permit to

conduct any activity ‘which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters’” to obtain a water

quality “certification” from the State in which the

discharge originates. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v.

Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 707 (1994) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)). In that certification, the State

certifies that the applicant’s activity “will not violate

certain water quality standards, including those set by

the State’s own laws.” S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 374.

But “[i]f the State . . . fails or refuses to act on a request

for certification, within a reasonable period of time

2

(which shall not exceed one year) after receipt of

such request, the certification requirements” “shall be

waived with respect to such Federal application.” 33

U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). A “State’s decision on a request for

Section 401 certification is generally reviewable only

in State court.” Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC,

643 F.3d 963, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

B.

Factual Background

Petitioners operate two hydroelectric projects located on the Tuolumne River in California—the Don

Pedro Project and the La Grange Project. Turlock

Irrigation District, Modesto Irrigation District, “Declaratory Order On Waiver Of Water Quality Certification,”

174 FERC ¶ 61,042, ¶1 (Jan. 19, 2021) (“Declaratory

Order”), Pet. App. 40a-41a. By altering the natural hydrologic flow regime of the river and blocking fish passage, those projects adversely affect the health of the

Tuolumne River watershed, its biological and aesthetic

resources, and its recreational opportunities. JA06920693, 1245, 1293-1294, 1562-1564;1 see also S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 385. For instance, recreational opportunities in the Tuolumne River watershed depend

upon healthy populations of fish and other aquatic

species. JA0692. Yet, because of insufficient flows,

the anadromous fish populations in the watershed are

extremely low. JA0693, 1330. The projects thus directly implicate the interests of respondents, which are

non-profit organizations committed to protecting the

1

Citations to “JA__” are to the parties’ Joint Appendix filed

with the D.C. Circuit below. D.C. Cir. No. 21-1120, Dkt. 1934418.

3

non-developmental values of the Tuolumne River watershed, as well as that of their members, who use the

river. JA753-819, 1725-1779, 1999-2011.

Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has authority

to license certain non-federal hydroelectric facilities

for terms of 30 to 50 years. 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. A

licensee is required to reapply for a new license two

years before license expiration. 16 U.S.C. § 808(c)(1).

In April 2014, petitioners applied for a new license to

continue operating the Don Pedro Project; that license

expired in April 2016. Declaratory Order ¶2, Pet. App.

41a. In October 2017, petitioners filed for an original

license for the already constructed, but unlicensed,

La Grange Project after FERC found that this project

also requires licensing. Id. ¶3, Pet. App. 41a-42a.

As both projects “may result in any discharge into

the navigable waters” (33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)), petitioners were also required to obtain Section 401 water

quality certifications from the California State Water

Resources Control Board (“the Board”). On January

26, 2018, petitioners applied for water quality certifications from the Board for both projects. Declaratory

Order ¶5, Pet. App. 42a-43a.

In their requests, petitioners announced their intention to serve as “[l]ead [a]gencies” for purposes of

completing environmental review under the California

Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”). Pet. App. 99a,

103a. Under the CEQA, “‘[l]ead agency’ means the

public agency which has the principal responsibility

for carrying out or approving a project which may have

4

a significant effect upon the environment.” Cal. Pub.

Res. Code § 21067. Until a June 2020 amendment,

state law prohibited the Board from issuing a Section

401 certification before the lead agency had completed

the CEQA process. Cal. Water Code § 13160 (2020)

(amending Cal. Water Code § 13160 (1976)); see Cal.

Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq.

On January 24, 2019—within one year of receiving

the requests—the Board denied petitioners’ requests

without prejudice. Declaratory Order ¶6, Pet. App.

43a-44a; Pet. App. 94a-96a. The Board explained that

it could not issue certification before completion of the

CEQA process, and that petitioners had “not begun”

that process. Pet. App. 95a. The Board also explained

that FERC had not completed its review of the projects under the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”). Declaratory Order ¶6, Pet. App. 43a-44a;

Pet. App. 94a-96a.

On April 22, 2019, petitioners again requested water quality certifications for the projects. Declaratory

Order ¶8, Pet. App. 44a-45a. On April 20, 2020—again

within one year of receiving petitioners’ new requests—the Board denied the requests without prejudice. Id. ¶9, Pet. App. 45a; Pet. App. 83a-89a. The

Board explained again that it “may not issue a certification until the requirements for compliance

with” CEQA are met, and that petitioners still had

“not begun the CEQA process” for either project. Pet.

App. 84a, 88a. Nor had FERC completed its NEPA environmental process for either project. Pet. App. 84a85a, 88a. The Board also concluded that, for both

5

projects, “the proposed activity does not comply with

applicable water quality standards and other appropriate requirements”—which “may be grounds for denial of an application for certification.” Pet. App. 85a,

89a. The Board encouraged petitioners to submit “new

request[s] for certification.” Pet. App. 85a, 89a.

On July 20, 2020, petitioners submitted third requests for water quality certifications but withdrew

them in November 2020. Declaratory Order ¶¶10-11,

Pet. App. 45a-46a.

On January 15, 2021, the Board granted certifications for the two projects. Pet. App. 4a-5a. The Board’s

certification was based on the 2020 amendment to the

California Water Code, which authorized the Board to

issue certifications before completion of the CEQA process “if the state board determines that waiting until

completion of that environmental review to issue the

certificate or statement poses a substantial risk of

waiver of the state board’s certification authority under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or any

other federal water quality control law.” Cal. Water

Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020); see Declaratory Order ¶11

& n.25, Pet. App. 46a.

The CWA allows state certifications to set conditions on the proposed activity. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). Under that authority, the Board’s certification set several

conditions for petitioners’ continued operation of the

projects. Pet. App. 5a. One condition requires petitioners to maintain instream flows of 200 cubic feet per

second from July through January. JA2054. These

6

flows are necessary “to maintain recreational beneficial uses” of the river and to protect the river’s health.

JA2054, 2079-2080. Without them, the river’s water

temperature would rise; its water quality would drop;

predatory fish species would proliferate while the

salmon population would dwindle; and access to recreational boating would be slashed. JA2054-2055.

Petitioners are currently challenging the Board’s

imposition of conditions in California state court. Pet.

App. 5a n.3; see Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water

Res. Control Bd., No. CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct., Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021).

C.

Procedural History

In October 2020—before petitioners had withdrawn their third request for a water quality certification and before the Board had issued its

certification—they petitioned FERC for an order declaring that the Board had waived its certification authority for both dams by denying petitioners’ requests

without prejudice in January 2019 and April 2020. Declaratory Order ¶1, Pet. App. 40a-41a. Respondent organizations and the Board opposed the petition. Pet.

App. 47a.

1. FERC denied the petition. Declaratory Order

¶1, Pet. App. 41a. It concluded that the Board did

not waive its authority under Section 401(a)(1) because it acted on petitioners’ requests within the

one-year deadline by denying them without prejudice.

Id. ¶¶20-36, Pet. App. 53a-66a.

7

First, FERC rejected petitioners’ argument that

the Board’s denials without prejudice were indistinguishable from the scheme in Hoopa Valley Tribe v.

FERC, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In Hoopa Valley,

the D.C. Circuit held that “a state waives its Section

401 authority when, pursuant to an agreement between the state and applicant, an applicant repeatedly

withdraws-and-resubmits its request for water quality

certification over a period of time greater than one

year.” Id. at 1103. FERC explained that, unlike that

case, here the Board “acted on” the certification requests by denying them. Declaratory Order ¶28, Pet.

App. 60a. Moreover, there was “no record evidence”

that the Board and petitioners “engaged in actions

amounting to an agreement, formal or functional, to

circumvent Section 401’s statutory deadline.” Ibid.

FERC then concluded that, “[b]ased on the plain

language of the statute,” the Board’s denials qualified as actions. Id. ¶33, Pet. App. 64a. FERC declined to entertain petitioners’ argument that “a

non-substantive action, even if styled as a ‘denial,’

cannot constitute a valid ‘action’” because that “would

effectively nullify the statute’s waiver provision.” Id.

¶29, Pet. App. 61a (quoting petition). It explained that

this argument—which challenged “the validity of ” the

Board’s action—was “a question that turns on state

law” and was thus outside FERC’s purview. Id. ¶32,

Pet. App. 63a; see id. ¶32, Pet. App. 64a (“[I]t is not the

Commission’s role to review the appropriateness of a

state’s decision to deny certification.”). And petitioners

had not shown that they had “attempted and been

8

thwarted in an attempt to seek review of the Board’s”

decisions in state court, or that state-court review was

otherwise “foreclosed.” Id. ¶34, Pet. App. 65a.

2. FERC reached the same conclusions in an order denying rehearing. Pet. App. 11a-28a. Again,

FERC concluded that petitioners “provide[d] no support for their claim that the plain language of section

401 requires a state certifying agency to address the

technical merits of the request for water quality certification in order to satisfy the requirement that a

state act on a request within one year.” Pet. App. 19a.

And again, FERC explained that petitioners had not

demonstrated that the Board’s denials were unreviewable in state court. Pet. App. 21a-22a. FERC found

petitioners’ reliance on EPA’s Clean Water Act Section

401 Certification Rule (advanced for the first time on

rehearing) forfeited. Pet. App. 23a (citing 85 Fed Reg.

42210 (July 13, 2020)). Finally, FERC reiterated its

conclusion that there was no evidence of a “coordinated

scheme” to extend the one-year deadline such that

Hoopa Valley was applicable. Pet. App. 24a-28a.

3. The court of appeals denied petitioners’ petitions for review. Pet. App. 10a. The court “agree[d]

with FERC that the California Board did not waive its

certification authority under section 401(a)(1) and that

FERC’s ruling is not contrary to Hoopa Valley.” Pet.

App. 6a. Hoopa Valley, the court explained, was a case

in which state agencies took “no action at all.” Ibid.

(quoting N.C. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. FERC, 3 F.4th

655, 669 (4th Cir. 2021)) (emphasis in original). Such

circumstances were “not present in this case,” where

9

the Board acted “within the meaning of Section

401(a)(1).” Pet. App. 7a. That was true for both denials

as well as the later grant with conditions. Ibid. In so

holding, the court emphasized that the Board had denied both requests because they lacked the required

documentation and were thus not “complete” or “ready

for review.” Pet. App. 7a-8a & n.5. The denials were

“without prejudice” because petitioners “could apply

again” and “the Board’s decision did not have preclusive effect.” Pet. App. 8a n.7.

Finally, the court was unmoved by petitioners’ “slippery slope” argument that state agencies could “extend

the time for decision indefinitely” through denials

without prejudice. Pet. App. 8a-9a. It noted FERC’s

statement that courts might “find repeated denials

without prejudice, particularly those that do not rest

on any substantive conclusions, to be the equivalent of

the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme.” Pet. App. 9a

(quoting Pet. App. 65a). Also, such denials might violate state law. Pet. App. 9a n.8. Finally, the court noted

that petitioners’ interpretation of the statute could

lead to the opposing danger of “gamesmanship”: applicants “could file certification requests lacking sufficient documentation,” thus forcing a State to choose

between granting certification without necessary information or waiving its authority. Pet. App. 10a.

The court denied petitioners’ petition for rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 71a-72a.

10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The petition does not claim any division of authority on the question presented, and there is none. Indeed, to the extent the courts of appeals have

addressed this issue, they agree that denials without

prejudice constitute an “action” rather than a waiver.

Petitioners thus seek only error correction where there

is none, advancing an atextual reading of the Clean

Water Act under which denial of a certification request

constitutes inaction on it. Even if there were a division

of authority or any error below, certiorari would be unwarranted. Petitioners fail to establish that the issue

is one of ongoing importance, particularly given the

amendment to the California law at issue here and the

lack of evidence that States are circumventing the

CWA’s requirements without any check. And the

availability of state remedies—including remedies

that petitioners are currently pursuing—makes this

case a particularly poor vehicle for resolving the question presented. Certiorari should be denied.

I.

THE PETITION IMPLICATES NO CONFLICT

OF AUTHORITY

There is no conflict in the courts of appeals on the

question presented, and petitioners do not claim otherwise. Petitions for review of FERC orders may be filed

not only in the D.C. Circuit but also in any court of

appeals where a licensee or public utility is located or

has its principal place of business. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b).

Other courts of appeals thus may address the question

11

presented. If a division emerges, the Court may grant

review at that time. Doing so now is unnecessary.

To the extent other courts of appeals have touched

on this subject, they agree with the D.C. Circuit. In

New York State Department of Environmental

Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018)

(“New York I”), for example, the Second Circuit held

that a state agency failed to act on a certification application within one year of receiving it and thus

waived its certification authority. The state agency

had argued that “the review process under Section

401 begins only once . . . a state agency[ ] deems an application ‘complete.’” Id. at 455. It contended that

starting the one-year clock upon application receipt

would “force [the agency] to render premature decisions” and “impede a state from working with the applicant to refile in accordance with its [state]

requirements.” Id. at 456. In addressing this concern,

the Second Circuit explained that “[i]f a state deems

an application incomplete, it can simply deny the application without prejudice—which would constitute

‘acting’ on the request under the language of Section

401.” Ibid. The Second Circuit reiterated this interpretation three years later. See New York State Dep’t

of Env’t Conservation v. FERC, 991 F.3d 439, 450 n.11

(2d Cir. 2021) (“New York II”) (“As we stated in New

York I, states can deny an application without prejudice within the one-year deadline, which will presumably prompt the applicant to resubmit the application

with additional material.”).

12

Two other circuits have echoed this understanding. In California State Water Resources Control Board

v. FERC, 43 F.4th 920 (9th Cir. 2022), petition for certiorari docketed (Feb. 8, 2023), the Ninth Circuit explained that a board’s statement “that it was fully

prepared to ‘deny certification without prejudice’” because the applicants had not completed the CEQA process did “not suggest that the State Board was

motivated to delay certification.” Id. at 933.2 And in

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, 990 F.3d 818 (4th

Cir. 2021), the Fourth Circuit held that a state agency

“properly denied certification” when it found that a

proposed activity fell short of substantive state requirements, but issued the denial “without prejudice

to” the applicant “re-submitting its application at a

later time.” Id. at 829.

There is thus no unsettled question or split of

authority on whether denial without prejudice of a

certification request constitutes an “act” within the

meaning of Section 401(a). Review by this Court of the

question would be unwarranted.

2

The petition for certiorari in that case challenges a separate

aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that is not at issue here:

whether California waived its certification authority by (according to petitioners there) “establishing” a withdraw-and-refile

practice similar to that in Hoopa Valley. Pet. i, Nev. Irrigation

Dist. et al. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. et al., No. 22-743

(U.S. Feb. 6, 2023).

13

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS

CORRECT

A. The Board “Acted” On Petitioners’

Requests And Thus Did Not Waive

Section 401’s Certification Requirement

1. The plain language of Section 401’s

waiver provision shows the Board

did not waive certification

The court of appeals correctly concluded that the

“Board did not waive its certification authority under

section 401(a)(1).” Pet. App. 6a. When a statute’s

terms are “unambiguous,” a court’s “inquiry begins

with the statutory text, and ends there as well.” Nat’l

Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 631

(2018) (citation omitted). The language of Section

401’s waiver provision is unambiguous. It states:

[i]f the State, interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case may be, fails or refuses to

act on a request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed

one year) after receipt of such request, the certification requirements of this subsection

shall be waived with respect to such Federal

application.

33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added). Because “act”

is not defined in the statute, it has its ordinary meaning, which is either “to take action” or “to give a decision or award.”

“Act,” Webster’s Seventh New

Collegiate Dictionary (1971). In other words, “Section

401 requires state action within a reasonable period of

time, not to exceed one year.” Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d

14

at 1104 (emphasis added). Here, the Board timely

“acted” within any ordinary meaning of that term because it denied petitioners’ requests within a year of

receipt. Pet. App. 83a-89a, 94a-96a. Under the plain

language of Section 401, the Board did not waive its

authority; it exercised it. Pet. App. 7a (“Each time

the California Board denied certification, the Board

‘act[ed].’”).

That the Board denied petitioners’ requests without prejudice does not alter the conclusion that denial

is an action. Section 401 contains no language delimiting what types of denials qualify as “actions.” It

would be especially illogical to conclude that denials

without prejudice are not possible “actions,” because

denials of water quality certifications typically are

without prejudice to renewed requests. Denials with

prejudice are rare. See, e.g., Complaint ¶163, Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee, No. 18-cv-5005 (W.D. Wash.

Jan. 3, 2018) (challenging Washington Department of

Ecology’s denial “with prejudice” as unprecedented).

Indeed, EPA’s current Clean Water Act Section 401

Rule allows for denials only without prejudice. See 40

C.F.R. § 121.8(a) (“A certification denial shall not preclude a project proponent from submitting a new certification request, in accordance with the substantive

and procedural requirements of this part.”).3 It is thus

3

Although a district court vacated that rule, In re Clean

Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2021),

this Court stayed that vacatur, Louisiana v. Am. Rivers, 142

S. Ct. 1347 (2022), and the Ninth Circuit recently reversed it, In

re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958, 2023 WL 2129631

(9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2023). EPA has since proposed a new Rule that,

15

unsurprising that all the other circuits to have addressed this issue agree with the D.C. Circuit that a

State “acts” within the meaning of Section 401 when it

denies a water-quality-certification request without

prejudice. See New York I, 884 F.3d at 456; New York

II, 991 F.3d at 450 n.11; Mountain Valley Pipeline, 990

F.3d at 829; Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 F.4th

at 933; see also Pet. App. 7a (court of appeals relying on

New York I and New York II).

Nor do a State’s grounds for denial—substantive

or procedural—affect whether the denial is an “action.”

Nothing in the statute suggests that a State has failed

to “act” when it has denied the request for procedural

inadequacies. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). In fact, the statute says nothing about the grounds on which states

may deny water-quality-certification requests, Declaratory Order ¶32, Pet. App. 63a-64a, and largely leaves

it to the States to establish the certification process.

See Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd.,

912 F.3d 746, 754 (4th Cir. 2019) (“State Agencies have

broad discretion when developing the criteria for their

Section 401 Certification.”). For that reason, courts

while not preserving this language, will clarify that a State’s “denial of certification” constitutes an “act” so long as the denial identifies certain basic information about the project and “explain[s]

why the certifying authority cannot certify that the activity as a

whole will comply with water quality requirements.” Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality Certification Improvement

Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. 35318 (proposed June 9, 2022) (to be codified

at 40 C.F.R. pts. 121, 122, & 124). Nowhere does the proposed

Rule suggest that a denial without prejudice that meets these requirements would not qualify as an act.

16

have repeatedly concluded that States may, consistent

with applicable state law, deny water-quality-certification requests on procedural grounds. See, e.g., Bangor

Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 595 A.2d 438, 443

(Me. 1991) (“Because Bangor Hydro did not provide the

information within the time allotted for review the

Board properly denied certification.”).

Any other result would leave States without recourse in the face of deficient water-quality-certification requests. States are not meant to certify that a

proposed activity will comply with applicable standards when they have not been provided sufficient information to make that determination. But such

curable deficiencies typically do not warrant preclusive

denials either. And if denials without prejudice waived

the certification requirement, applicants could bypass

their Section 401 burden simply by submitting deficient requests. As the court of appeals determined

here, see Pet. App. 10a, nothing in the language of Section 401 puts States in such a counterintuitive bind.

2. The structure of Section 401

demonstrates that no waiver occurred

Section 401’s structure also forecloses petitioners’

position. In addition to explaining when its certification requirement is waived, Section 401 says the following:

No license or permit shall be granted until the

certification required by this section has been

obtained or has been waived as provided in

the preceding sentence. No license or permit

17

shall be granted if certification has been denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Administrator, as the case may be.

33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute

thus expressly distinguishes between a waiver (first

sentence) and a denial (second sentence). Cf. Sierra

Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 909 F.3d 635, 652

(4th Cir. 2018) (holding that “under Section 1341(a)(1),

‘certification’ does not encompass ‘waiver,’ as the certification requirements do not even apply when a state

has waived its certification authority”). While a waiver

paves the way for a federal approval, a denial blocks it.

Interpreting a denial of certification as itself a waiver

illogically pits the provisions of Section 401 against

themselves.

3. Denials without prejudice

Section 401’s purpose

serve

The plain meaning of the waiver provision also coheres with Section 401’s purpose. Under the CWA, the

States are the “prime bulwark in the effort to abate

water pollution.” Keating, 927 F.2d at 622 (citation

omitted). And “[o]ne of the primary mechanisms

through which the states may assert the broad authority reserved to them is the certification requirement

set out in section 401 of the Act.” Ibid. “Through this

requirement, Congress intended that the states would

retain the power to block, for environmental reasons,

local water projects that might otherwise win federal

approval.” Ibid. (emphasis added).

18

Congress included Section 401’s waiver provision

not to force state certifications of unsupported requests, but to ensure that federal applications were not

frustrated by “sheer inactivity by the State.” H.R. Rep.

No. 92-911 at 122 (1972); see New York II, 991 F.3d at

448 (explaining that Congress “require[d] affirmative

state action ‘within a reasonable period of time’ in order to prevent delay due to a certifying state’s passive

refusal or failure to act”); see also Hoopa Valley, 913

F.3d at 1104 (“California and Oregon’s deliberate and

contractual idleness defies . . . [Section 401’s] requirement.”). When a State denies an applicant’s water

quality certification—whether because the project

could never meet the State’s water quality standards

or because the applicant has failed to provide sufficient

information to show that it could—it is the State’s

deliberate decision-making, not “sheer inactivity” or

“idleness,” that forestalls the project. Contra Pet. 24

(arguing that the Board’s denials constituted “dalliance or unreasonable delay” (quoting 115 Cong. Rec.

9264)).

B. Petitioners’ Arguments Are Without

Merit

1. Petitioners’ theory equating “denial”

with “waiver” cannot be squared

with the text of Section 401

Petitioners’ contrary “statutory reading” of Section 401, Pet. 23, is difficult to parse. They contend

that “[w]hen a State implements a scheme to delay its

decision on a certification by issuing pro forma

19

documents purporting to deny the request every 364

days, and then making clear that the requestor must

resubmit the request if it ever wants to obtain the necessary Section 401 certification, that is not an ‘act’ under Section 401, but a scheme to avoid taking any ‘act.’”

Pet. 23. This statement appears to align with the arguments petitioners made below that an “act” is not an

“act” when it is taken for certain improper purposes.

See Pet. App. 7a, 24a-28a, 60a. Not only does that theory have no factual support here, see infra pp. 21-24,

but it is also completely untethered from the statutory

text. Indeed, just a breath later, petitioners insist that

a State must “give an actual ‘yes’ or ‘no’” in order to act.

Pet. 24. That is, of course, exactly what happened here:

the Board twice said “no,” which “had the legal effect

under section 401 of precluding FERC from issuing licenses to” petitioners. Pet. App. 8a (court of appeals’

reasoning). Nowhere do petitioners offer a competing

definition of the terms “act” or “deny” that would support their contrary reading.

Petitioners also suggest that a State fails to act

when it tells a requestor that it “must resubmit the request if the requester ever hopes to obtain certification.” Pet. 22-23. Such a message simply describes the

obvious consequence of a without-prejudice denial; the

applicant must try again if it wants approval. And, in

any event, “it must take more than routine informational” communications to “lead to a finding of waiver

under § 401.” N.C. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 3 F.4th at

675.

20

To the extent petitioners continue to rely on the

D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hoopa Valley, see Pet. 21, the

court of appeals squarely rejected such reliance, Pet.

App. 6a, and any purported intra-circuit conflict would

not be a basis for review here. In Hoopa Valley, California and Oregon had entered into a written agreement with the applicant to “defer the one-year

statutory limit for Section 401 approval by annually

withdrawing-and-resubmitting the [same] water quality certification requests.” 913 F.3d at 1101. On a petition for review of FERC’s decision finding no waiver,

the D.C. Circuit held that this “deliberate and contractual idleness” constituted a waiver of the States’ Section 401 authority. Id. at 1103-05. In so holding, the

court emphasized that the States had taken no action

on the requests for over a decade and that the applicants “never intended to submit a ‘new request’” for the

states to act upon. Id.

As the court of appeals had no trouble finding

here, “[t]hose circumstances are not present in this

case.” Pet. App. 7a. Rather, “[e]ach time the California

Board denied certification, the Board ‘act[ed]’ within

the meaning of section 401(a)(1).” Ibid. The court also

correctly observed that, unlike the “complete” requests

at issue in Hoopa Valley, petitioners’ requests here

“were not complete” and “not ready for review, which is

why the California Board denied them.” Pet. App. 8a.

21

2. Petitioners’ attacks on a State’s

motivations for denying requests are

irrelevant and factually unsupported

In lieu of providing textual or legal support for

their interpretation of Section 401, petitioners argue

that a plain reading of the statute would permit states

to deny certification requests for improper reasons

(although petitioners never suggest what those reasons might be). See Pet. 25 (arguing that under

FERC’s orders, a State could “completely evade Section 401’s one-year rule for as long as it desires”). In

support of this theory, petitioners suggest that the

Board’s denials here were erroneous in various ways.

To start, this is not an argument that the Board

failed to act—it is an argument that the Board acted

wrongfully. This argument is thus irrelevant to Section 401’s plain meaning. Section 401’s waiver provision “requires only that a State ‘act’ within one year of

an application.” Alcoa Power, 643 F.3d at 974. When a

State denies a request, it has acted—regardless of its

intent in that denial. Supra pp. 13-18.

Even if this argument were relevant, it is unsupported by the record. Petitioners presented no evidence that the Board’s denials were intended to

indefinitely evade Section 401’s deadline or to accomplish any other improper purpose. Declaratory Order

¶28, Pet. App. 60a; see Pet. App. 8a-9a. The Board’s denials instead reflected simple “compli[ance] with State

law.” Pet. App. 9a n.8. As the court of appeals had no

trouble recognizing, the “reason” for the denials was

22

that petitioners had not started the CEQA process,

meaning that the “Board lacked information that it

needed to grant certification.” Pet. App. 7a n.5. And

the Board further explained that it “relies on the environmental document prepared” through the CEQA

process to make “its own determination as to whether

and with what conditions to grant the certification.”

Pet. App. 84a, 88a. There is no mystery about the

Board’s reasons for its actions.

That the Board had certified that petitioners’ requests were “complete,” Pet. 10, does not alter this conclusion: Under California law, “the application being

deemed complete only means that the application has

fulfilled the minimum requirements of the State Water

Board certification regulations.” In re the Petition of

Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency for

Review of the Denial of Waste Discharge Requirements,

Order No. WQ 2014-0154, 2014 WL 5148275, at *1 n.6

(Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Sept. 23, 2014).

“Fulfillment of this requirement by an applicant does

not mean, and should not be construed to mean, that

the applicable regional water quality control board or

the State Water Board has received sufficient information to make its determination.” Ibid.

Petitioners also argue that the Board’s denials

could not actually have been based on lack of sufficient information because the Board later granted

the requests without petitioners having submitted

any new information. Pet. 29. But petitioners’ brief

buries the critical intervening factor: California’s 2020

amendment expressly permitting the Board to grant a

23

certification request before completion of the CEQA

process. Cal. Water Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020). The

Board’s subsequent grant of certification simply applied that new law.

Accordingly, the prospect that States can indefinitely deny requests for whatever reason they “desire[ ],” Pet. 25, exists only in petitioners’ imagination.

That is why the court of appeals rejected this “slippery

slope” argument as implausible. Pet. App. 9a. These

facts also make clear that the “100 years’ delay” hypothetical petitioners depict is not a legitimate concern.

Pet. 17. To avoid such denials, applicants need only

provide the State with the information it requires for

a grant of certification. Contra Pet. 17 (suggesting that

a “requester’s failure to supply any relevant waterquality-related information” is irrelevant to the interpretation of Section 401). Petitioners knew the Board

required information generated through the CEQA

process to make its certification and that it was petitioners’ responsibility to complete that process. Supra

pp. 3-5. Yet as of April 2020, petitioners had not

started the CEQA process—even though the Board

had explained as early as April 2019 that petitioners

could not obtain certification without its completion.

Any delay on petitioners’ projects resulted from their

own inaction, not the Board’s.

Finally, petitioners raise a policy argument against

a plain-text reading of Section 401. They challenge the

underlying principle that States can invoke state law

to deny Section 401 certification. Pet. 26 (“Section

401’s one-year rule is a federal limit on a State’s ability

24

to delay federally licensed projects. If the only limit on

the State’s delay is to be found in state law . . . that is

not a federal limit at all.”) (emphasis omitted). But, of

course, such “policy arguments cannot supersede the

clear statutory text.” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.

United States, 579 U.S. 176, 192 (2016).

In any event, this policy argument is misguided.

The “federal limit” on state authority that Section 401

poses is simply a time limit; it does not limit the scope

of a State’s authority to block projects that are inconsistent with state law. Indeed, “unilateral” action by a

State to block federal licenses (Pet. 23) is a feature of

the statutory scheme Congress enacted, not a flaw.

Supra pp. 1-2, 17-18. The state certification requirement—including the state laws that inform whether

an applicant may receive certification—is “essential in

the scheme to preserve state authority to address the

broad range of pollution” that might affect water quality, S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 386, and ensures that

States remain “the prime bulwark in the effort to

abate” that pollution, Del. Riverkeeper, 857 F.3d at

393-94.

III. THE PETITION DOES NOT RAISE AN

IMPORTANT

ISSUE

REQUIRING

IMMEDIATE REVIEW, AND THIS CASE

IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING

THE QUESTION PRESENTED

Even if there were a split of authority on this issue—and even if petitioners’ arguments had merit—

certiorari would be unwarranted. Petitioners have

25

failed to establish that the issue presented is important or urgent enough to justify intervention by this

Court. Even if they had, the procedural history of this

case makes this petition a particularly bad vehicle for

resolving the question presented.

A. The Petition Does Not Raise An Important

Issue Requiring Immediate Review

For at least three reasons, the issue presented is

of minimal importance or urgency.

First, the Board’s denials were the product of a

California state-law requirement that no longer exists.

The Board may now issue certifications before completion of the CEQA process. See Cal. Water Code

§ 13160(b)(2) (2020); Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080; Pet.

App. 36a. FERC Commissioner Danly, who dissented

on rehearing, lauded this amendment, saying California had “heeded the court’s guidance and revised their

procedures in order to comply with the reinvigorated

one-year deadline.” Pet. App. 36a. Petitioners candidly

acknowledge that their complaint is with “California

law at the relevant time” and “then-extant state law.”

Pet. 28-29. And they do not suggest that any other

states’ schemes resemble the old California law. The

argument that there is now a “nationwide” danger of

similar conduct occurring, Pet. 19, is thus wholly unsupported.

Second, petitioners’ sole argument for this case’s

importance—that States “have proven all too eager to

abuse the Section 401 certification process,” Pet. 20—

is unfounded. See supra pp. 19-23. The only evidence

26

petitioners raise of improper state practices is the

“withdrawal-and-resubmission” practice in Hoopa

Valley. Pet. 20-21. But that problem was solved in

Hoopa Valley itself.4 Petitioners also cite the statistic

from that case that “27 of the 43 then-pending ‘licensing applications before FERC were awaiting a state’s

water quality certification, and four of those had been

pending for more than a decade.’” Pet. 21 (quoting

Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104). But without any information as to why those applications remained pending, this fact is irrelevant to determining the risk (if

any) of improper state-driven delays. And, as FERC

explained here, “[i]t may be that the courts will find

repeated denials without prejudice, and particularly

those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions,

to be the equivalent of the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme” invalidated in Hoopa Valley. Pet. App. 65a.

If this Court wishes to guard against state abuse of

certification authority, it should wait for a case (1) that

actually involves such abuse and (2) where neither

FERC nor a court of appeals did anything to remedy it.

Third, EPA rulemaking could ultimately be relevant to the question presented, but it is not complete.

As noted above, petitioners argued to FERC that

EPA’s 2020 Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification

4

Petitioners’ amici likewise contend that “[s]ome States”—

although they name only one: New York—“have employed various

tactics to evade compliance with the one-year limitation.” Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. Amicus Br. 13. But every example

they cite (id. at 13-14) resulted in a FERC finding of waiver, showing that FERC is already enforcing Section 401’s deadline without

any intervention by this Court.

27

Rule supported their position, but FERC found that argument forfeited. Pet. App. 23a. (The Ninth Circuit recently ordered that rule reinstated. In re Clean

Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958, 2023 WL 2129631

(9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2023).) EPA also has proposed a rule

that, if adopted, would further clarify the meaning of a

denial under Section 401. See supra p. 14 n.3. It would

be premature for this Court to intervene while the

status of relevant rules is in flux (and in a case where

the petitioners forfeited an argument based on those

rules).

B. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For Resolving

The Question Presented

Even if the issue petitioners raise is of sufficient

importance or urgency, this is not the right case

through which to address that issue.

First, petitioners’ grievance ultimately boils down

to a challenge to the validity of the Board’s action: that

is, to the propriety of denying a certification request

when the requestors have not complied with state-law

requirements. Not only does that claim depart from

their ostensible question presented—what qualifies

as an “act”—but it also involves an issue that is expressly reserved for state courts. “[A] State’s decision

on a request for Section 401 certification is generally

reviewable only in State court, because the breadth of

State authority under Section 401 results in most challenges to a certification decision implicating only questions of State law.” Alcoa Power, 643 F.3d at 971. That

is especially true for denials of certification because

28

the CWA says nothing about the grounds on which a

State may deny certification requests, leaving the matter to state law. Accordingly, “[i]f a state refuses to

give a certification, the courts of that state are the forum in which the applicant must challenge that refusal if the applicant wishes to do so.” H.R. Conf. Rep.

No. 91-940 at 56-57 (1970). That is where other applicants have challenged States’ denials of their requests

without prejudice due to insufficient information. See,

e.g., Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 595 A.2d at 443; Long

Lake Energy Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation, 164 A.D.2d 396, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).

Here, petitioners never established they could

not obtain relief from the Board’s denials in state

court because they never attempted to do so. Pet.

App. 15a (FERC making this observation). Instead,

they attempted to have FERC decide this question of

California state court jurisdiction, but FERC was “unconvinced” by petitioners’ argument that California

law “foreclosed” any attempt to seek review of withoutprejudice denials. Pet. App. 21a. Even if this Court

were otherwise inclined to consider the issue presented here, it should wait for a case where an applicant actually shows that state judicial review is

foreclosed. Pet. App. 22a (“Without successfully establishing that the Board’s denials without prejudice

are not reviewable in state court, it remains unseen

whether such denials render section 401’s one-year

deadline ‘superfluous’ or otherwise violate section

401.”).

29

Second, the Board eventually granted petitioners’

certification requests, albeit with conditions. Pet. App.

4a-5a. Petitioners are not in fact trapped in the endless-delay dilemma they describe; the Board rendered

a decision on certification. In fact, it is petitioners who

are extending the certification process through two

separate proceedings. First, petitioners are currently

challenging the Board’s decision through a suit in

state court. See Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct., Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021).

Second,

petitioners petitioned the Board for reconsideration

of its decision. See Cal. Water Res. Control Bd.,

Notice of Opportunity to Respond to Petitions for

Reconsideration of Water Quality Certification for

Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project and La Grange

Hydroelectric Project, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission Project Nos. 2299 and 14581 (2021).5 Petitioners have provided this Court with no information

on the status of those related proceedings, both of

which appear actively ongoing. Any forthcoming decision on those challenges, including any determinations

regarding the validity of the Board’s actions, could affect the significance of the decision below and petitioners’ need for certification—yet another reason why this

case is in a poor posture for resolution by this Court.

5

https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/

programs/water_quality_cert/docs/lagrange/dplg-petitions-notice.

pdf.

30

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JULIE GANTENBEIN

WATER AND POWER

LAW GROUP PC

2140 Shattuck Avenue,

Suite 801

Berkeley, CA 94704

Tel.: (510) 296-5588

JGantenbein@

waterpowerlaw.com

LENA H. HUGHES

Counsel of Record

ALEXANDRA M. AVVOCATO

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

250 West 55th Street

New York, NY 10019

Tel.: (212) 336-4152

LHughes@mofo.com

AAvvocato@mofo.com

ANDREW MCALEER HAWLEY

WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW CENTER

1037 NE 65th Street, No. 343

Seattle, WA 98115

Tel.: (206) 487-7250

hawley@westernlaw.org

JOSEPH R. PALMORE

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

2100 L Street, NW

Washington, DC 20037

Tel.: (202) 887-6940

JPalmore@mofo.com

BRYAN WILSON

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

Counsel for Respondents

755 Page Mill Road

American Whitewater,

Palo Alto, CA 94304

California Sportfishing

Protection Alliance, Friends Tel.: (650) 813-5603

of the River, and Sierra Club BWilson@mofo.com

MARCH 8, 2023

Counsel for Respondent

Tuolumne River Trust

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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