Respondents Brief — Turlock Irrigation District, et al., Petitioners v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 8, 2023
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No. 22-616
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT and
MODESTO IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PETITIONERS,
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JULIE GANTENBEIN
WATER AND POWER
LAW GROUP PC
2140 Shattuck Avenue,
Suite 801
Berkeley, CA 94704
Tel.: (510) 296-5588
JGantenbein@
waterpowerlaw.com
LENA H. HUGHES
Counsel of Record
ALEXANDRA M. AVVOCATO
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
250 West 55th Street
New York, NY 10019
Tel.: (212) 336-4152
LHughes@mofo.com
AAvvocato@mofo.com
ANDREW MCALEER HAWLEY
WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW CENTER
1037 NE 65th Street, No. 343
Seattle, WA 98115
Tel.: (206) 487-7250
hawley@westernlaw.org
JOSEPH R. PALMORE
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
2100 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel.: (202) 887-6940
JPalmore@mofo.com
BRYAN WILSON
Counsel for Respondents
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
American Whitewater,
755 Page Mill Road
California Sportfishing
Palo Alto, CA 94304
Protection Alliance, Friends Tel.: (650) 813-5603
of the River, and Sierra Club BWilson@mofo.com
Counsel for Respondent
MARCH 8, 2023
Tuolumne River Trust
================================================================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
QUESTION PRESENTED
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act provides that
no federal “license or permit shall be granted” for specified activities if a State has “denied” a required waterquality certification. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). But such
federal license or permit may issue if the required certification “has been obtained or has been waived.” Ibid.
Waiver occurs only if the State “fails or refuses to act
on a request for certification” within one year of its submission. Ibid. The question presented is whether a
State “fails or refuses to act” when it timely denies a
request for certification without prejudice to its refiling.
ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
FOR TUOLUMNE RIVER TRUST
Tuolumne River Trust is a non-profit organization
founded in 1981 to promote stewardship of the Tuolumne River through education, community outreach,
habitat restoration projects, and outdoor adventures
for its members along the Tuolumne River. Tuolumne
River Trust is incorporated and organized under the
laws of California. Tuolumne River Trust certifies that
it has no parent corporation and that no publicly held
corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
FOR AMERICAN WHITEWATER,
CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING PROTECTION
ALLIANCE, FRIENDS OF THE RIVER,
AND THE SIERRA CLUB
American Whitewater is a non-profit corporation
incorporated and organized under the laws of the State
of Missouri. It does not have a parent corporation and
is not publicly held.
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance is a
non-profit corporation incorporated and organized under the laws of the State of California. California
Sportfishing Protection Alliance does not have a parent corporation and is not publicly held.
iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS –
Continued
Friends of the River is a non-profit corporation incorporated and organized under the laws of the State
of California. Friends of the River does not have a parent corporation and is not publicly held.
The Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation incorporated and organized under the laws of the State of
California. The Sierra Club does not have a parent corporation and is not publicly held.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED...................................
i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS ....
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
vi
STATEMENT .......................................................
1
A.
Legal Background ......................................
1
B.
Factual Background ..................................
2
C.
Procedural History ....................................
6
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ...... 10
I.
THE PETITION IMPLICATES NO
CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY.................... 10
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION
IS CORRECT ............................................. 13
A. The Board “Acted” On Petitioners’
Requests And Thus Did Not Waive
Section
401’s
Certification
Requirement ........................................ 13
1. The plain language of Section 401’s
waiver provision shows the Board
did not waive certification .............. 13
2. The structure of Section 401
demonstrates that no waiver
occurred .......................................... 16
3. Denials without prejudice serve
Section 401’s purpose ...................... 17
B. Petitioners’ Arguments Are Without
Merit .................................................... 18
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
1. Petitioners’ theory equating “denial”
with “waiver” cannot be squared
with the text of Section 401 ............ 18
2. Petitioners’ attacks on a State’s
motivations for denying requests
are irrelevant and factually
unsupported .................................... 21
III.
THE PETITION DOES NOT RAISE
AN IMPORTANT ISSUE REQUIRING
IMMEDIATE REVIEW, AND THIS CASE
IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING
THE QUESTION PRESENTED ................ 24
A. The Petition Does Not Raise An
Important Issue Requiring Immediate
Review ................................................. 25
B. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For
Resolving The Question Presented ..... 27
CONCLUSION..................................................... 30
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC,
643 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ........................ 2, 21, 27
Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd.,
912 F.3d 746 (4th Cir. 2019) ....................................15
Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Bd. of Env’t Prot.,
595 A.2d 438 (Me. 1991).................................... 16, 28
Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. FERC,
43 F.4th 920 (9th Cir. 2022) .............................. 12, 15
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
568 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ....................14
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 21-16958, 2023 WL 2129631
(9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2023) ...................................... 14, 27
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC,
857 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2017) .............................. 1, 24
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC,
913 F.3d 1099
(D.C. Cir. 2019) .........................7, 8, 12, 13, 18, 20, 26
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) ...................................................1
Keating v. FERC,
927 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1991) .............................. 1, 17
Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee,
No. 18-cv-5005 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2018)...............14
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Long Lake Energy Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t
of Env’t Conservation,
164 A.D.2d 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) ......................28
Louisiana v. Am. Rivers,
142 S. Ct. 1347 (2022) .............................................14
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. N.C. Dep’t
of Env’t Quality,
990 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 2021) .............................. 12, 15
N.C. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. FERC,
3 F.4th 655 (4th Cir. 2021) .................................. 8, 19
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense,
138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ...............................................13
Nev. Irrigation Dist. et al. v. Cal. State
Water Res. Control Bd. et al.,
No. 22-743 (U.S. Feb. 6, 2023) .................................12
New York State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v.
FERC,
991 F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2021) ......................... 11, 15, 18
New York State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v.
FERC,
884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018) ............................... 11, 15
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t
of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700 (1994) ...................................................1
S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Env’t Prot.,
547 U.S. 370 (2006) ......................................... 1, 2, 24
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
909 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2018) ....................................17
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
In re the Petition of Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency for Review of the
Denial of Waste Discharge Requirements,
Order No. WQ 2014-0154, 2014 WL 5148275
(Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Sept. 23,
2014) ........................................................................22
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res.
Control Bd.,
No. CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021) ............... 6, 29
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States,
579 U.S. 176 (2016) .................................................24
STATUTES
16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. .................................................3
16 U.S.C. § 808(c)(1) ......................................................3
16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) .......................................................10
33 U.S.C. § 1341 ............................................................1
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) .................................................. 1, 15
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) ................................... 2, 3, 13, 17
33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) ........................................................5
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq. ..............................4
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21067 .........................................4
Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080 .......................................25
Cal. Water Code § 13160...............................................4
Cal. Water Code § 13160(b)(2) .......................... 5, 23, 25
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES
40 C.F.R. § 121.8(a) .....................................................14
“Act,” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary (1971).....................................................13
Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality
Certification Improvement Rule,
87 Fed. Reg. 35318 (proposed June 9, 2022) ..........15
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-940 (1970) ..............................28
H.R. Rep. No. 92-911 (1972) .......................................18
Notice of Opportunity to Respond to Petitions for
Reconsideration of Water Quality Certification
for Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project and La
Grange Hydroelectric Project, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Project Nos. 2299 and
14581 (2021), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/
waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_
quality_cert/docs/lagrange/dplg-petitions-notice.
pdf ............................................................................29
STATEMENT
A.
Legal Background
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA) “to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” S.D. Warren
Co. v. Maine Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 385 (2006).
While the CWA “establishes a regulatory ‘partnership’ between the Federal Government and the source
State,” Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489-90
(1987), the States remain “the prime bulwark in the
effort to abate water pollution.” Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 857 F.3d 388, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
“One of the primary mechanisms through which
the states may assert the broad authority reserved to
them is the certification requirement set out in section
401” of the CWA. Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616, 622
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341). That section
“requires an applicant for a federal license or permit to
conduct any activity ‘which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters’” to obtain a water
quality “certification” from the State in which the
discharge originates. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v.
Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 707 (1994) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)). In that certification, the State
certifies that the applicant’s activity “will not violate
certain water quality standards, including those set by
the State’s own laws.” S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 374.
But “[i]f the State . . . fails or refuses to act on a request
for certification, within a reasonable period of time
2
(which shall not exceed one year) after receipt of
such request, the certification requirements” “shall be
waived with respect to such Federal application.” 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). A “State’s decision on a request for
Section 401 certification is generally reviewable only
in State court.” Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC,
643 F.3d 963, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
B.
Factual Background
Petitioners operate two hydroelectric projects located on the Tuolumne River in California—the Don
Pedro Project and the La Grange Project. Turlock
Irrigation District, Modesto Irrigation District, “Declaratory Order On Waiver Of Water Quality Certification,”
174 FERC ¶ 61,042, ¶1 (Jan. 19, 2021) (“Declaratory
Order”), Pet. App. 40a-41a. By altering the natural hydrologic flow regime of the river and blocking fish passage, those projects adversely affect the health of the
Tuolumne River watershed, its biological and aesthetic
resources, and its recreational opportunities. JA06920693, 1245, 1293-1294, 1562-1564;1 see also S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 385. For instance, recreational opportunities in the Tuolumne River watershed depend
upon healthy populations of fish and other aquatic
species. JA0692. Yet, because of insufficient flows,
the anadromous fish populations in the watershed are
extremely low. JA0693, 1330. The projects thus directly implicate the interests of respondents, which are
non-profit organizations committed to protecting the
1
Citations to “JA__” are to the parties’ Joint Appendix filed
with the D.C. Circuit below. D.C. Cir. No. 21-1120, Dkt. 1934418.
3
non-developmental values of the Tuolumne River watershed, as well as that of their members, who use the
river. JA753-819, 1725-1779, 1999-2011.
Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has authority
to license certain non-federal hydroelectric facilities
for terms of 30 to 50 years. 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq. A
licensee is required to reapply for a new license two
years before license expiration. 16 U.S.C. § 808(c)(1).
In April 2014, petitioners applied for a new license to
continue operating the Don Pedro Project; that license
expired in April 2016. Declaratory Order ¶2, Pet. App.
41a. In October 2017, petitioners filed for an original
license for the already constructed, but unlicensed,
La Grange Project after FERC found that this project
also requires licensing. Id. ¶3, Pet. App. 41a-42a.
As both projects “may result in any discharge into
the navigable waters” (33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)), petitioners were also required to obtain Section 401 water
quality certifications from the California State Water
Resources Control Board (“the Board”). On January
26, 2018, petitioners applied for water quality certifications from the Board for both projects. Declaratory
Order ¶5, Pet. App. 42a-43a.
In their requests, petitioners announced their intention to serve as “[l]ead [a]gencies” for purposes of
completing environmental review under the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”). Pet. App. 99a,
103a. Under the CEQA, “‘[l]ead agency’ means the
public agency which has the principal responsibility
for carrying out or approving a project which may have
4
a significant effect upon the environment.” Cal. Pub.
Res. Code § 21067. Until a June 2020 amendment,
state law prohibited the Board from issuing a Section
401 certification before the lead agency had completed
the CEQA process. Cal. Water Code § 13160 (2020)
(amending Cal. Water Code § 13160 (1976)); see Cal.
Pub. Res. Code § 21000 et seq.
On January 24, 2019—within one year of receiving
the requests—the Board denied petitioners’ requests
without prejudice. Declaratory Order ¶6, Pet. App.
43a-44a; Pet. App. 94a-96a. The Board explained that
it could not issue certification before completion of the
CEQA process, and that petitioners had “not begun”
that process. Pet. App. 95a. The Board also explained
that FERC had not completed its review of the projects under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”). Declaratory Order ¶6, Pet. App. 43a-44a;
Pet. App. 94a-96a.
On April 22, 2019, petitioners again requested water quality certifications for the projects. Declaratory
Order ¶8, Pet. App. 44a-45a. On April 20, 2020—again
within one year of receiving petitioners’ new requests—the Board denied the requests without prejudice. Id. ¶9, Pet. App. 45a; Pet. App. 83a-89a. The
Board explained again that it “may not issue a certification until the requirements for compliance
with” CEQA are met, and that petitioners still had
“not begun the CEQA process” for either project. Pet.
App. 84a, 88a. Nor had FERC completed its NEPA environmental process for either project. Pet. App. 84a85a, 88a. The Board also concluded that, for both
5
projects, “the proposed activity does not comply with
applicable water quality standards and other appropriate requirements”—which “may be grounds for denial of an application for certification.” Pet. App. 85a,
89a. The Board encouraged petitioners to submit “new
request[s] for certification.” Pet. App. 85a, 89a.
On July 20, 2020, petitioners submitted third requests for water quality certifications but withdrew
them in November 2020. Declaratory Order ¶¶10-11,
Pet. App. 45a-46a.
On January 15, 2021, the Board granted certifications for the two projects. Pet. App. 4a-5a. The Board’s
certification was based on the 2020 amendment to the
California Water Code, which authorized the Board to
issue certifications before completion of the CEQA process “if the state board determines that waiting until
completion of that environmental review to issue the
certificate or statement poses a substantial risk of
waiver of the state board’s certification authority under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or any
other federal water quality control law.” Cal. Water
Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020); see Declaratory Order ¶11
& n.25, Pet. App. 46a.
The CWA allows state certifications to set conditions on the proposed activity. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). Under that authority, the Board’s certification set several
conditions for petitioners’ continued operation of the
projects. Pet. App. 5a. One condition requires petitioners to maintain instream flows of 200 cubic feet per
second from July through January. JA2054. These
6
flows are necessary “to maintain recreational beneficial uses” of the river and to protect the river’s health.
JA2054, 2079-2080. Without them, the river’s water
temperature would rise; its water quality would drop;
predatory fish species would proliferate while the
salmon population would dwindle; and access to recreational boating would be slashed. JA2054-2055.
Petitioners are currently challenging the Board’s
imposition of conditions in California state court. Pet.
App. 5a n.3; see Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water
Res. Control Bd., No. CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct., Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021).
C.
Procedural History
In October 2020—before petitioners had withdrawn their third request for a water quality certification and before the Board had issued its
certification—they petitioned FERC for an order declaring that the Board had waived its certification authority for both dams by denying petitioners’ requests
without prejudice in January 2019 and April 2020. Declaratory Order ¶1, Pet. App. 40a-41a. Respondent organizations and the Board opposed the petition. Pet.
App. 47a.
1. FERC denied the petition. Declaratory Order
¶1, Pet. App. 41a. It concluded that the Board did
not waive its authority under Section 401(a)(1) because it acted on petitioners’ requests within the
one-year deadline by denying them without prejudice.
Id. ¶¶20-36, Pet. App. 53a-66a.
7
First, FERC rejected petitioners’ argument that
the Board’s denials without prejudice were indistinguishable from the scheme in Hoopa Valley Tribe v.
FERC, 913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In Hoopa Valley,
the D.C. Circuit held that “a state waives its Section
401 authority when, pursuant to an agreement between the state and applicant, an applicant repeatedly
withdraws-and-resubmits its request for water quality
certification over a period of time greater than one
year.” Id. at 1103. FERC explained that, unlike that
case, here the Board “acted on” the certification requests by denying them. Declaratory Order ¶28, Pet.
App. 60a. Moreover, there was “no record evidence”
that the Board and petitioners “engaged in actions
amounting to an agreement, formal or functional, to
circumvent Section 401’s statutory deadline.” Ibid.
FERC then concluded that, “[b]ased on the plain
language of the statute,” the Board’s denials qualified as actions. Id. ¶33, Pet. App. 64a. FERC declined to entertain petitioners’ argument that “a
non-substantive action, even if styled as a ‘denial,’
cannot constitute a valid ‘action’” because that “would
effectively nullify the statute’s waiver provision.” Id.
¶29, Pet. App. 61a (quoting petition). It explained that
this argument—which challenged “the validity of ” the
Board’s action—was “a question that turns on state
law” and was thus outside FERC’s purview. Id. ¶32,
Pet. App. 63a; see id. ¶32, Pet. App. 64a (“[I]t is not the
Commission’s role to review the appropriateness of a
state’s decision to deny certification.”). And petitioners
had not shown that they had “attempted and been
8
thwarted in an attempt to seek review of the Board’s”
decisions in state court, or that state-court review was
otherwise “foreclosed.” Id. ¶34, Pet. App. 65a.
2. FERC reached the same conclusions in an order denying rehearing. Pet. App. 11a-28a. Again,
FERC concluded that petitioners “provide[d] no support for their claim that the plain language of section
401 requires a state certifying agency to address the
technical merits of the request for water quality certification in order to satisfy the requirement that a
state act on a request within one year.” Pet. App. 19a.
And again, FERC explained that petitioners had not
demonstrated that the Board’s denials were unreviewable in state court. Pet. App. 21a-22a. FERC found
petitioners’ reliance on EPA’s Clean Water Act Section
401 Certification Rule (advanced for the first time on
rehearing) forfeited. Pet. App. 23a (citing 85 Fed Reg.
42210 (July 13, 2020)). Finally, FERC reiterated its
conclusion that there was no evidence of a “coordinated
scheme” to extend the one-year deadline such that
Hoopa Valley was applicable. Pet. App. 24a-28a.
3. The court of appeals denied petitioners’ petitions for review. Pet. App. 10a. The court “agree[d]
with FERC that the California Board did not waive its
certification authority under section 401(a)(1) and that
FERC’s ruling is not contrary to Hoopa Valley.” Pet.
App. 6a. Hoopa Valley, the court explained, was a case
in which state agencies took “no action at all.” Ibid.
(quoting N.C. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. FERC, 3 F.4th
655, 669 (4th Cir. 2021)) (emphasis in original). Such
circumstances were “not present in this case,” where
9
the Board acted “within the meaning of Section
401(a)(1).” Pet. App. 7a. That was true for both denials
as well as the later grant with conditions. Ibid. In so
holding, the court emphasized that the Board had denied both requests because they lacked the required
documentation and were thus not “complete” or “ready
for review.” Pet. App. 7a-8a & n.5. The denials were
“without prejudice” because petitioners “could apply
again” and “the Board’s decision did not have preclusive effect.” Pet. App. 8a n.7.
Finally, the court was unmoved by petitioners’ “slippery slope” argument that state agencies could “extend
the time for decision indefinitely” through denials
without prejudice. Pet. App. 8a-9a. It noted FERC’s
statement that courts might “find repeated denials
without prejudice, particularly those that do not rest
on any substantive conclusions, to be the equivalent of
the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme.” Pet. App. 9a
(quoting Pet. App. 65a). Also, such denials might violate state law. Pet. App. 9a n.8. Finally, the court noted
that petitioners’ interpretation of the statute could
lead to the opposing danger of “gamesmanship”: applicants “could file certification requests lacking sufficient documentation,” thus forcing a State to choose
between granting certification without necessary information or waiving its authority. Pet. App. 10a.
The court denied petitioners’ petition for rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 71a-72a.
10
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The petition does not claim any division of authority on the question presented, and there is none. Indeed, to the extent the courts of appeals have
addressed this issue, they agree that denials without
prejudice constitute an “action” rather than a waiver.
Petitioners thus seek only error correction where there
is none, advancing an atextual reading of the Clean
Water Act under which denial of a certification request
constitutes inaction on it. Even if there were a division
of authority or any error below, certiorari would be unwarranted. Petitioners fail to establish that the issue
is one of ongoing importance, particularly given the
amendment to the California law at issue here and the
lack of evidence that States are circumventing the
CWA’s requirements without any check. And the
availability of state remedies—including remedies
that petitioners are currently pursuing—makes this
case a particularly poor vehicle for resolving the question presented. Certiorari should be denied.
I.
THE PETITION IMPLICATES NO CONFLICT
OF AUTHORITY
There is no conflict in the courts of appeals on the
question presented, and petitioners do not claim otherwise. Petitions for review of FERC orders may be filed
not only in the D.C. Circuit but also in any court of
appeals where a licensee or public utility is located or
has its principal place of business. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b).
Other courts of appeals thus may address the question
11
presented. If a division emerges, the Court may grant
review at that time. Doing so now is unnecessary.
To the extent other courts of appeals have touched
on this subject, they agree with the D.C. Circuit. In
New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“New York I”), for example, the Second Circuit held
that a state agency failed to act on a certification application within one year of receiving it and thus
waived its certification authority. The state agency
had argued that “the review process under Section
401 begins only once . . . a state agency[ ] deems an application ‘complete.’” Id. at 455. It contended that
starting the one-year clock upon application receipt
would “force [the agency] to render premature decisions” and “impede a state from working with the applicant to refile in accordance with its [state]
requirements.” Id. at 456. In addressing this concern,
the Second Circuit explained that “[i]f a state deems
an application incomplete, it can simply deny the application without prejudice—which would constitute
‘acting’ on the request under the language of Section
401.” Ibid. The Second Circuit reiterated this interpretation three years later. See New York State Dep’t
of Env’t Conservation v. FERC, 991 F.3d 439, 450 n.11
(2d Cir. 2021) (“New York II”) (“As we stated in New
York I, states can deny an application without prejudice within the one-year deadline, which will presumably prompt the applicant to resubmit the application
with additional material.”).
12
Two other circuits have echoed this understanding. In California State Water Resources Control Board
v. FERC, 43 F.4th 920 (9th Cir. 2022), petition for certiorari docketed (Feb. 8, 2023), the Ninth Circuit explained that a board’s statement “that it was fully
prepared to ‘deny certification without prejudice’” because the applicants had not completed the CEQA process did “not suggest that the State Board was
motivated to delay certification.” Id. at 933.2 And in
Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, 990 F.3d 818 (4th
Cir. 2021), the Fourth Circuit held that a state agency
“properly denied certification” when it found that a
proposed activity fell short of substantive state requirements, but issued the denial “without prejudice
to” the applicant “re-submitting its application at a
later time.” Id. at 829.
There is thus no unsettled question or split of
authority on whether denial without prejudice of a
certification request constitutes an “act” within the
meaning of Section 401(a). Review by this Court of the
question would be unwarranted.
2
The petition for certiorari in that case challenges a separate
aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that is not at issue here:
whether California waived its certification authority by (according to petitioners there) “establishing” a withdraw-and-refile
practice similar to that in Hoopa Valley. Pet. i, Nev. Irrigation
Dist. et al. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. et al., No. 22-743
(U.S. Feb. 6, 2023).
13
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS
CORRECT
A. The Board “Acted” On Petitioners’
Requests And Thus Did Not Waive
Section 401’s Certification Requirement
1. The plain language of Section 401’s
waiver provision shows the Board
did not waive certification
The court of appeals correctly concluded that the
“Board did not waive its certification authority under
section 401(a)(1).” Pet. App. 6a. When a statute’s
terms are “unambiguous,” a court’s “inquiry begins
with the statutory text, and ends there as well.” Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 631
(2018) (citation omitted). The language of Section
401’s waiver provision is unambiguous. It states:
[i]f the State, interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case may be, fails or refuses to
act on a request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed
one year) after receipt of such request, the certification requirements of this subsection
shall be waived with respect to such Federal
application.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added). Because “act”
is not defined in the statute, it has its ordinary meaning, which is either “to take action” or “to give a decision or award.”
“Act,” Webster’s Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary (1971). In other words, “Section
401 requires state action within a reasonable period of
time, not to exceed one year.” Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d
14
at 1104 (emphasis added). Here, the Board timely
“acted” within any ordinary meaning of that term because it denied petitioners’ requests within a year of
receipt. Pet. App. 83a-89a, 94a-96a. Under the plain
language of Section 401, the Board did not waive its
authority; it exercised it. Pet. App. 7a (“Each time
the California Board denied certification, the Board
‘act[ed].’”).
That the Board denied petitioners’ requests without prejudice does not alter the conclusion that denial
is an action. Section 401 contains no language delimiting what types of denials qualify as “actions.” It
would be especially illogical to conclude that denials
without prejudice are not possible “actions,” because
denials of water quality certifications typically are
without prejudice to renewed requests. Denials with
prejudice are rare. See, e.g., Complaint ¶163, Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee, No. 18-cv-5005 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 3, 2018) (challenging Washington Department of
Ecology’s denial “with prejudice” as unprecedented).
Indeed, EPA’s current Clean Water Act Section 401
Rule allows for denials only without prejudice. See 40
C.F.R. § 121.8(a) (“A certification denial shall not preclude a project proponent from submitting a new certification request, in accordance with the substantive
and procedural requirements of this part.”).3 It is thus
3
Although a district court vacated that rule, In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, 568 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2021),
this Court stayed that vacatur, Louisiana v. Am. Rivers, 142
S. Ct. 1347 (2022), and the Ninth Circuit recently reversed it, In
re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958, 2023 WL 2129631
(9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2023). EPA has since proposed a new Rule that,
15
unsurprising that all the other circuits to have addressed this issue agree with the D.C. Circuit that a
State “acts” within the meaning of Section 401 when it
denies a water-quality-certification request without
prejudice. See New York I, 884 F.3d at 456; New York
II, 991 F.3d at 450 n.11; Mountain Valley Pipeline, 990
F.3d at 829; Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 F.4th
at 933; see also Pet. App. 7a (court of appeals relying on
New York I and New York II).
Nor do a State’s grounds for denial—substantive
or procedural—affect whether the denial is an “action.”
Nothing in the statute suggests that a State has failed
to “act” when it has denied the request for procedural
inadequacies. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). In fact, the statute says nothing about the grounds on which states
may deny water-quality-certification requests, Declaratory Order ¶32, Pet. App. 63a-64a, and largely leaves
it to the States to establish the certification process.
See Appalachian Voices v. State Water Control Bd.,
912 F.3d 746, 754 (4th Cir. 2019) (“State Agencies have
broad discretion when developing the criteria for their
Section 401 Certification.”). For that reason, courts
while not preserving this language, will clarify that a State’s “denial of certification” constitutes an “act” so long as the denial identifies certain basic information about the project and “explain[s]
why the certifying authority cannot certify that the activity as a
whole will comply with water quality requirements.” Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality Certification Improvement
Rule, 87 Fed. Reg. 35318 (proposed June 9, 2022) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 121, 122, & 124). Nowhere does the proposed
Rule suggest that a denial without prejudice that meets these requirements would not qualify as an act.
16
have repeatedly concluded that States may, consistent
with applicable state law, deny water-quality-certification requests on procedural grounds. See, e.g., Bangor
Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 595 A.2d 438, 443
(Me. 1991) (“Because Bangor Hydro did not provide the
information within the time allotted for review the
Board properly denied certification.”).
Any other result would leave States without recourse in the face of deficient water-quality-certification requests. States are not meant to certify that a
proposed activity will comply with applicable standards when they have not been provided sufficient information to make that determination. But such
curable deficiencies typically do not warrant preclusive
denials either. And if denials without prejudice waived
the certification requirement, applicants could bypass
their Section 401 burden simply by submitting deficient requests. As the court of appeals determined
here, see Pet. App. 10a, nothing in the language of Section 401 puts States in such a counterintuitive bind.
2. The structure of Section 401
demonstrates that no waiver occurred
Section 401’s structure also forecloses petitioners’
position. In addition to explaining when its certification requirement is waived, Section 401 says the following:
No license or permit shall be granted until the
certification required by this section has been
obtained or has been waived as provided in
the preceding sentence. No license or permit
17
shall be granted if certification has been denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Administrator, as the case may be.
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added). The statute
thus expressly distinguishes between a waiver (first
sentence) and a denial (second sentence). Cf. Sierra
Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 909 F.3d 635, 652
(4th Cir. 2018) (holding that “under Section 1341(a)(1),
‘certification’ does not encompass ‘waiver,’ as the certification requirements do not even apply when a state
has waived its certification authority”). While a waiver
paves the way for a federal approval, a denial blocks it.
Interpreting a denial of certification as itself a waiver
illogically pits the provisions of Section 401 against
themselves.
3. Denials without prejudice
Section 401’s purpose
serve
The plain meaning of the waiver provision also coheres with Section 401’s purpose. Under the CWA, the
States are the “prime bulwark in the effort to abate
water pollution.” Keating, 927 F.2d at 622 (citation
omitted). And “[o]ne of the primary mechanisms
through which the states may assert the broad authority reserved to them is the certification requirement
set out in section 401 of the Act.” Ibid. “Through this
requirement, Congress intended that the states would
retain the power to block, for environmental reasons,
local water projects that might otherwise win federal
approval.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
18
Congress included Section 401’s waiver provision
not to force state certifications of unsupported requests, but to ensure that federal applications were not
frustrated by “sheer inactivity by the State.” H.R. Rep.
No. 92-911 at 122 (1972); see New York II, 991 F.3d at
448 (explaining that Congress “require[d] affirmative
state action ‘within a reasonable period of time’ in order to prevent delay due to a certifying state’s passive
refusal or failure to act”); see also Hoopa Valley, 913
F.3d at 1104 (“California and Oregon’s deliberate and
contractual idleness defies . . . [Section 401’s] requirement.”). When a State denies an applicant’s water
quality certification—whether because the project
could never meet the State’s water quality standards
or because the applicant has failed to provide sufficient
information to show that it could—it is the State’s
deliberate decision-making, not “sheer inactivity” or
“idleness,” that forestalls the project. Contra Pet. 24
(arguing that the Board’s denials constituted “dalliance or unreasonable delay” (quoting 115 Cong. Rec.
9264)).
B. Petitioners’ Arguments Are Without
Merit
1. Petitioners’ theory equating “denial”
with “waiver” cannot be squared
with the text of Section 401
Petitioners’ contrary “statutory reading” of Section 401, Pet. 23, is difficult to parse. They contend
that “[w]hen a State implements a scheme to delay its
decision on a certification by issuing pro forma
19
documents purporting to deny the request every 364
days, and then making clear that the requestor must
resubmit the request if it ever wants to obtain the necessary Section 401 certification, that is not an ‘act’ under Section 401, but a scheme to avoid taking any ‘act.’”
Pet. 23. This statement appears to align with the arguments petitioners made below that an “act” is not an
“act” when it is taken for certain improper purposes.
See Pet. App. 7a, 24a-28a, 60a. Not only does that theory have no factual support here, see infra pp. 21-24,
but it is also completely untethered from the statutory
text. Indeed, just a breath later, petitioners insist that
a State must “give an actual ‘yes’ or ‘no’” in order to act.
Pet. 24. That is, of course, exactly what happened here:
the Board twice said “no,” which “had the legal effect
under section 401 of precluding FERC from issuing licenses to” petitioners. Pet. App. 8a (court of appeals’
reasoning). Nowhere do petitioners offer a competing
definition of the terms “act” or “deny” that would support their contrary reading.
Petitioners also suggest that a State fails to act
when it tells a requestor that it “must resubmit the request if the requester ever hopes to obtain certification.” Pet. 22-23. Such a message simply describes the
obvious consequence of a without-prejudice denial; the
applicant must try again if it wants approval. And, in
any event, “it must take more than routine informational” communications to “lead to a finding of waiver
under § 401.” N.C. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 3 F.4th at
675.
20
To the extent petitioners continue to rely on the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hoopa Valley, see Pet. 21, the
court of appeals squarely rejected such reliance, Pet.
App. 6a, and any purported intra-circuit conflict would
not be a basis for review here. In Hoopa Valley, California and Oregon had entered into a written agreement with the applicant to “defer the one-year
statutory limit for Section 401 approval by annually
withdrawing-and-resubmitting the [same] water quality certification requests.” 913 F.3d at 1101. On a petition for review of FERC’s decision finding no waiver,
the D.C. Circuit held that this “deliberate and contractual idleness” constituted a waiver of the States’ Section 401 authority. Id. at 1103-05. In so holding, the
court emphasized that the States had taken no action
on the requests for over a decade and that the applicants “never intended to submit a ‘new request’” for the
states to act upon. Id.
As the court of appeals had no trouble finding
here, “[t]hose circumstances are not present in this
case.” Pet. App. 7a. Rather, “[e]ach time the California
Board denied certification, the Board ‘act[ed]’ within
the meaning of section 401(a)(1).” Ibid. The court also
correctly observed that, unlike the “complete” requests
at issue in Hoopa Valley, petitioners’ requests here
“were not complete” and “not ready for review, which is
why the California Board denied them.” Pet. App. 8a.
21
2. Petitioners’ attacks on a State’s
motivations for denying requests are
irrelevant and factually unsupported
In lieu of providing textual or legal support for
their interpretation of Section 401, petitioners argue
that a plain reading of the statute would permit states
to deny certification requests for improper reasons
(although petitioners never suggest what those reasons might be). See Pet. 25 (arguing that under
FERC’s orders, a State could “completely evade Section 401’s one-year rule for as long as it desires”). In
support of this theory, petitioners suggest that the
Board’s denials here were erroneous in various ways.
To start, this is not an argument that the Board
failed to act—it is an argument that the Board acted
wrongfully. This argument is thus irrelevant to Section 401’s plain meaning. Section 401’s waiver provision “requires only that a State ‘act’ within one year of
an application.” Alcoa Power, 643 F.3d at 974. When a
State denies a request, it has acted—regardless of its
intent in that denial. Supra pp. 13-18.
Even if this argument were relevant, it is unsupported by the record. Petitioners presented no evidence that the Board’s denials were intended to
indefinitely evade Section 401’s deadline or to accomplish any other improper purpose. Declaratory Order
¶28, Pet. App. 60a; see Pet. App. 8a-9a. The Board’s denials instead reflected simple “compli[ance] with State
law.” Pet. App. 9a n.8. As the court of appeals had no
trouble recognizing, the “reason” for the denials was
22
that petitioners had not started the CEQA process,
meaning that the “Board lacked information that it
needed to grant certification.” Pet. App. 7a n.5. And
the Board further explained that it “relies on the environmental document prepared” through the CEQA
process to make “its own determination as to whether
and with what conditions to grant the certification.”
Pet. App. 84a, 88a. There is no mystery about the
Board’s reasons for its actions.
That the Board had certified that petitioners’ requests were “complete,” Pet. 10, does not alter this conclusion: Under California law, “the application being
deemed complete only means that the application has
fulfilled the minimum requirements of the State Water
Board certification regulations.” In re the Petition of
Foothill/Eastern Transportation Corridor Agency for
Review of the Denial of Waste Discharge Requirements,
Order No. WQ 2014-0154, 2014 WL 5148275, at *1 n.6
(Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. Sept. 23, 2014).
“Fulfillment of this requirement by an applicant does
not mean, and should not be construed to mean, that
the applicable regional water quality control board or
the State Water Board has received sufficient information to make its determination.” Ibid.
Petitioners also argue that the Board’s denials
could not actually have been based on lack of sufficient information because the Board later granted
the requests without petitioners having submitted
any new information. Pet. 29. But petitioners’ brief
buries the critical intervening factor: California’s 2020
amendment expressly permitting the Board to grant a
23
certification request before completion of the CEQA
process. Cal. Water Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020). The
Board’s subsequent grant of certification simply applied that new law.
Accordingly, the prospect that States can indefinitely deny requests for whatever reason they “desire[ ],” Pet. 25, exists only in petitioners’ imagination.
That is why the court of appeals rejected this “slippery
slope” argument as implausible. Pet. App. 9a. These
facts also make clear that the “100 years’ delay” hypothetical petitioners depict is not a legitimate concern.
Pet. 17. To avoid such denials, applicants need only
provide the State with the information it requires for
a grant of certification. Contra Pet. 17 (suggesting that
a “requester’s failure to supply any relevant waterquality-related information” is irrelevant to the interpretation of Section 401). Petitioners knew the Board
required information generated through the CEQA
process to make its certification and that it was petitioners’ responsibility to complete that process. Supra
pp. 3-5. Yet as of April 2020, petitioners had not
started the CEQA process—even though the Board
had explained as early as April 2019 that petitioners
could not obtain certification without its completion.
Any delay on petitioners’ projects resulted from their
own inaction, not the Board’s.
Finally, petitioners raise a policy argument against
a plain-text reading of Section 401. They challenge the
underlying principle that States can invoke state law
to deny Section 401 certification. Pet. 26 (“Section
401’s one-year rule is a federal limit on a State’s ability
24
to delay federally licensed projects. If the only limit on
the State’s delay is to be found in state law . . . that is
not a federal limit at all.”) (emphasis omitted). But, of
course, such “policy arguments cannot supersede the
clear statutory text.” Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.
United States, 579 U.S. 176, 192 (2016).
In any event, this policy argument is misguided.
The “federal limit” on state authority that Section 401
poses is simply a time limit; it does not limit the scope
of a State’s authority to block projects that are inconsistent with state law. Indeed, “unilateral” action by a
State to block federal licenses (Pet. 23) is a feature of
the statutory scheme Congress enacted, not a flaw.
Supra pp. 1-2, 17-18. The state certification requirement—including the state laws that inform whether
an applicant may receive certification—is “essential in
the scheme to preserve state authority to address the
broad range of pollution” that might affect water quality, S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at 386, and ensures that
States remain “the prime bulwark in the effort to
abate” that pollution, Del. Riverkeeper, 857 F.3d at
393-94.
III. THE PETITION DOES NOT RAISE AN
IMPORTANT
ISSUE
REQUIRING
IMMEDIATE REVIEW, AND THIS CASE
IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING
THE QUESTION PRESENTED
Even if there were a split of authority on this issue—and even if petitioners’ arguments had merit—
certiorari would be unwarranted. Petitioners have
25
failed to establish that the issue presented is important or urgent enough to justify intervention by this
Court. Even if they had, the procedural history of this
case makes this petition a particularly bad vehicle for
resolving the question presented.
A. The Petition Does Not Raise An Important
Issue Requiring Immediate Review
For at least three reasons, the issue presented is
of minimal importance or urgency.
First, the Board’s denials were the product of a
California state-law requirement that no longer exists.
The Board may now issue certifications before completion of the CEQA process. See Cal. Water Code
§ 13160(b)(2) (2020); Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21080; Pet.
App. 36a. FERC Commissioner Danly, who dissented
on rehearing, lauded this amendment, saying California had “heeded the court’s guidance and revised their
procedures in order to comply with the reinvigorated
one-year deadline.” Pet. App. 36a. Petitioners candidly
acknowledge that their complaint is with “California
law at the relevant time” and “then-extant state law.”
Pet. 28-29. And they do not suggest that any other
states’ schemes resemble the old California law. The
argument that there is now a “nationwide” danger of
similar conduct occurring, Pet. 19, is thus wholly unsupported.
Second, petitioners’ sole argument for this case’s
importance—that States “have proven all too eager to
abuse the Section 401 certification process,” Pet. 20—
is unfounded. See supra pp. 19-23. The only evidence
26
petitioners raise of improper state practices is the
“withdrawal-and-resubmission” practice in Hoopa
Valley. Pet. 20-21. But that problem was solved in
Hoopa Valley itself.4 Petitioners also cite the statistic
from that case that “27 of the 43 then-pending ‘licensing applications before FERC were awaiting a state’s
water quality certification, and four of those had been
pending for more than a decade.’” Pet. 21 (quoting
Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104). But without any information as to why those applications remained pending, this fact is irrelevant to determining the risk (if
any) of improper state-driven delays. And, as FERC
explained here, “[i]t may be that the courts will find
repeated denials without prejudice, and particularly
those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions,
to be the equivalent of the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme” invalidated in Hoopa Valley. Pet. App. 65a.
If this Court wishes to guard against state abuse of
certification authority, it should wait for a case (1) that
actually involves such abuse and (2) where neither
FERC nor a court of appeals did anything to remedy it.
Third, EPA rulemaking could ultimately be relevant to the question presented, but it is not complete.
As noted above, petitioners argued to FERC that
EPA’s 2020 Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification
4
Petitioners’ amici likewise contend that “[s]ome States”—
although they name only one: New York—“have employed various
tactics to evade compliance with the one-year limitation.” Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of Am. Amicus Br. 13. But every example
they cite (id. at 13-14) resulted in a FERC finding of waiver, showing that FERC is already enforcing Section 401’s deadline without
any intervention by this Court.
27
Rule supported their position, but FERC found that argument forfeited. Pet. App. 23a. (The Ninth Circuit recently ordered that rule reinstated. In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958, 2023 WL 2129631
(9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2023).) EPA also has proposed a rule
that, if adopted, would further clarify the meaning of a
denial under Section 401. See supra p. 14 n.3. It would
be premature for this Court to intervene while the
status of relevant rules is in flux (and in a case where
the petitioners forfeited an argument based on those
rules).
B. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For Resolving
The Question Presented
Even if the issue petitioners raise is of sufficient
importance or urgency, this is not the right case
through which to address that issue.
First, petitioners’ grievance ultimately boils down
to a challenge to the validity of the Board’s action: that
is, to the propriety of denying a certification request
when the requestors have not complied with state-law
requirements. Not only does that claim depart from
their ostensible question presented—what qualifies
as an “act”—but it also involves an issue that is expressly reserved for state courts. “[A] State’s decision
on a request for Section 401 certification is generally
reviewable only in State court, because the breadth of
State authority under Section 401 results in most challenges to a certification decision implicating only questions of State law.” Alcoa Power, 643 F.3d at 971. That
is especially true for denials of certification because
28
the CWA says nothing about the grounds on which a
State may deny certification requests, leaving the matter to state law. Accordingly, “[i]f a state refuses to
give a certification, the courts of that state are the forum in which the applicant must challenge that refusal if the applicant wishes to do so.” H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 91-940 at 56-57 (1970). That is where other applicants have challenged States’ denials of their requests
without prejudice due to insufficient information. See,
e.g., Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 595 A.2d at 443; Long
Lake Energy Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation, 164 A.D.2d 396, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
Here, petitioners never established they could
not obtain relief from the Board’s denials in state
court because they never attempted to do so. Pet.
App. 15a (FERC making this observation). Instead,
they attempted to have FERC decide this question of
California state court jurisdiction, but FERC was “unconvinced” by petitioners’ argument that California
law “foreclosed” any attempt to seek review of withoutprejudice denials. Pet. App. 21a. Even if this Court
were otherwise inclined to consider the issue presented here, it should wait for a case where an applicant actually shows that state judicial review is
foreclosed. Pet. App. 22a (“Without successfully establishing that the Board’s denials without prejudice
are not reviewable in state court, it remains unseen
whether such denials render section 401’s one-year
deadline ‘superfluous’ or otherwise violate section
401.”).
29
Second, the Board eventually granted petitioners’
certification requests, albeit with conditions. Pet. App.
4a-5a. Petitioners are not in fact trapped in the endless-delay dilemma they describe; the Board rendered
a decision on certification. In fact, it is petitioners who
are extending the certification process through two
separate proceedings. First, petitioners are currently
challenging the Board’s decision through a suit in
state court. See Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct., Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021).
Second,
petitioners petitioned the Board for reconsideration
of its decision. See Cal. Water Res. Control Bd.,
Notice of Opportunity to Respond to Petitions for
Reconsideration of Water Quality Certification for
Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project and La Grange
Hydroelectric Project, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Project Nos. 2299 and 14581 (2021).5 Petitioners have provided this Court with no information
on the status of those related proceedings, both of
which appear actively ongoing. Any forthcoming decision on those challenges, including any determinations
regarding the validity of the Board’s actions, could affect the significance of the decision below and petitioners’ need for certification—yet another reason why this
case is in a poor posture for resolution by this Court.
5
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/
programs/water_quality_cert/docs/lagrange/dplg-petitions-notice.
pdf.
30
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JULIE GANTENBEIN
WATER AND POWER
LAW GROUP PC
2140 Shattuck Avenue,
Suite 801
Berkeley, CA 94704
Tel.: (510) 296-5588
JGantenbein@
waterpowerlaw.com
LENA H. HUGHES
Counsel of Record
ALEXANDRA M. AVVOCATO
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
250 West 55th Street
New York, NY 10019
Tel.: (212) 336-4152
LHughes@mofo.com
AAvvocato@mofo.com
ANDREW MCALEER HAWLEY
WESTERN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW CENTER
1037 NE 65th Street, No. 343
Seattle, WA 98115
Tel.: (206) 487-7250
hawley@westernlaw.org
JOSEPH R. PALMORE
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
2100 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Tel.: (202) 887-6940
JPalmore@mofo.com
BRYAN WILSON
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
Counsel for Respondents
755 Page Mill Road
American Whitewater,
Palo Alto, CA 94304
California Sportfishing
Protection Alliance, Friends Tel.: (650) 813-5603
of the River, and Sierra Club BWilson@mofo.com
MARCH 8, 2023
Counsel for Respondent
Tuolumne River Trust
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.