Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Turlock Irrigation District, et al., Petitioners v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 4, 2023
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No. ______
In the Supreme Court of the United States
TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT and
MODESTO IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PETITIONERS,
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, et. al.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CHARLES R. SENSIBA
MORGAN M. GERARD
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
401 9th Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
KEVIN M. LEROY
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe St.,
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
misha.tseytlin@
troutman.com
Attorneys for Petitioners
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a State can avoid “waiv[ing]” its oneyear “period of time” in which “to act” on a “request
for certification” under Section 401 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)—thus rendering Section
401’s one-year rule meaningless—by declaring in pro
forma letters every 364 days that the request is
“denied” and must be resubmitted if the applicant
ever wants to obtain a Section 401 certification, and
then repeating this every 364 days for as many years
as a State wishes to delay.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
Turlock Irrigation District and Modesto Irrigation
District are the Petitioners here and were the
Petitioners below.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is
the Respondent here and was the Respondent below.
The California State Water Resources Control
Board, the Tuolumne River Trust, American
Whitewater, the California Sportfishing Protection
Alliance, the Friends of the River, and the Sierra Club
and its Mother Lode Chapter are also Respondents
here and were Intervenors for Respondent the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission below.
iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS
Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioners provide the
following corporate disclosure statements:
Petitioner Turlock Irrigation District is a
governmental water agency formed under the laws of
the State of California. Therefore, a corporate
disclosure statement is not required.
Petitioner Modesto Irrigation District is a
governmental water agency formed under the laws of
the State of California. Therefore, a corporate
disclosure statement is not required.
iv
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from the following proceedings:
•
Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto
Irrigation District, “Declaratory Order On
Waiver Of Water Quality Certification,”
174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Jan. 19, 2021);
•
Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto
Irrigation District, “Notice Of Denial Of
Rehearing By Operation Of Law And
Providing For Further Consideration,” 174
FERC ¶ 62,175 (Mar. 22, 2021);
•
Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto
Irrigation District, “Order Addressing
Arguments Raised On Rehearing,” 175
FERC ¶ 61,144 (May 21, 2021);
•
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC, No.211120 (D.C. Cir. June 17, 2022);
•
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC, No.211120, Dkt.1962263, 2022 WL 4086378
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (per curiam).
The following cases are the only proceedings in
state or federal trial or appellate courts, or in this
Court, directly related to this case within the meaning
of this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii): Turlock Irrigation
District & Modesto Irrigation District v. State Water
Resources Control Board & Eileen Sobeck,
No.CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct. for Tuolumne Cnty.,
v
filed May 11, 2021), and City and County of San
Francisco v. State Water Resources Control Board &
Eileen Sobeck, No. CV63828 (Cal. Super. Ct. for
Tuolumne Cnty., filed May 14, 2021).
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ........................ ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS ........ iii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...... iv
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .................1
DECISIONS BELOW..................................................4
JURISDICTION ..........................................................4
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................4
STATEMENT ..............................................................5
A. Legal Background .......................................5
B. Factual And Procedural Background .........8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .......17
I. Whether Section 401’s One-Year Rule Is A
Meaningless Formality Is An Important
Question Of Federal Law That This Court
Should Resolve ...............................................17
II. FERC’s Ruling That States Can Render
Section 401’s One-Year Rule Meaningless
By Issuing Pro Forma Letters Purporting
To Deny The Requests Every 364 Days And
Then Requiring Resubmittal Is Wrong .........22
III. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Resolving
The Question Presented .................................28
CONCLUSION ..........................................................30
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387 (2012) ............................................. 19
California v. FERC,
495 U.S. 490 (1990) ............................................... 5
Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303 (2009) ........................3, 18, 22, 24, 25
County of Los Angeles v. Shalala,
192 F.3d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ..................... 11, 18
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid,
141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021)......................................... 22
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502 (2009) ....................................... 11, 18
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co.,
381 U.S. 90 (1965) ................................................. 5
First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n,
328 U.S. 152 (1946) ............................................... 5
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC,
913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............... 12, 13, 21
Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1 (2004)..................................... 22, 24, 25
viii
Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos,
860 F.3d 696 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............................... 7
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995)................................. 22, 24, 25
Pereira v. Sessions,
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018)......................................... 22
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
138 S. Ct. 816 (2018)........................................... 22
S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot.,
547 U.S. 370 (2006) ..................................... 5, 6, 24
SEC v. Chenery Corporation,
318 U.S. 80 (1943) ..................................... 3, 26, 28
Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,
142 S. Ct. 1783 (2022)......................................... 22
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC,
36 F.4th 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ............................. 4
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,
139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019)......................................... 19
Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009)............................................. 19
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ........................................... 19
ix
Statutes And Rules
5 U.S.C. § 706 ........................................................... 27
15 U.S.C. § 717 ..................................................... 7, 18
16 U.S.C. § 791a ......................................................... 5
16 U.S.C. § 797 ............................................... 5, 11, 18
16 U.S.C. § 799 ........................................................... 5
16 U.S.C. § 808 ........................................................... 5
16 U.S.C. § 817 ............................................... 5, 11, 18
28 U.S.C. § 1254 ......................................................... 4
33 U.S.C. § 1341 ........................ i, 1, 4, 6, 7, 18, 23, 24
Cal. Water Code § 13160 (2020) .............................. 11
Regulations
18 C.F.R. § 5.6 ............................................................ 6
18 C.F.R. § 5.8 ............................................................ 6
18 C.F.R. § 5.13 .......................................................... 6
18 C.F.R. § 5.14 .......................................................... 6
18 C.F.R. § 5.15 .......................................................... 6
18 C.F.R. § 5.17 .......................................................... 6
18 C.F.R. § 5.19 .......................................................... 6
18 C.F.R § 5.22 ........................................................... 6
x
18 C.F.R. § 5.23 .......................................................... 6
18 C.F.R. § 5.25 .......................................................... 6
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23, § 3837 ................................. 28
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23, § 3856 ................................. 28
Agency Decisions
Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto Irrigation
District,
174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2021).................................... 4
Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto Irrigation
District,
174 FERC ¶ 62,175 (2021).................................... 4
Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto Irrigation
District,
175 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2021).................................... 4
Other Authorities
115 Cong. Rec. 9264 (Apr. 16, 1969)....... 1, 2, 3, 7, 19,
21, 24, 27, 30
Cal. Water Boards, Revised [CEQA] Initial Study
And Environmental Checklist (Nov. 9, 2016) .... 28
S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971)......................................... 24
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Hydropower Explained
(Mar. 16, 2022) .................................................... 20
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Energy Facts
Explained (June 10, 2022) .................................. 20
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act prohibits the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
from issuing a license or relicense for a federal
hydropower or interstate natural gas project until the
State in which any discharge from the project
originates issues a “certification” that the project
complies with the State’s water-quality standards. 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Section 401 places a critical oneyear time limit on this state power: a State waives its
authority by “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to act on a request
for certification” within “one year.” Id. Through this
time limit, Congress prohibited States from delaying
these federally licensed or permitted projects through
“dalliance or unreasonable delay.” 115 Cong. Rec.
9264 (Apr. 16, 1969).
FERC—the body charged with overseeing States’
compliance with Section 401 for federal hydropower
and interstate natural gas pipeline projects
throughout the Nation—has now rendered this oneyear limit a meaningless formality, such that any
State can now delay these federal projects
nationwide, for as many years or decades as the State
pleases (or, indeed, forever). In particular, in the
orders below, FERC provided that States can issue
pro forma letters to applicants every 364 days
purporting to deny Section 401 certification requests
and telling the applicants that they must resubmit
their requests—thereby restarting the one-year clock,
over and over again—if the applicant ever wants to
2
obtain a Section 401 certification. As FERC conceded
below, under its now-binding approach, any State can
delay a federal project through such a scheme for “100
years,” so long as this scheme complies with state law.
But that is just another way of saying that Section
401’s federal rule is now utterly meaningless under
FERC’s approach, given that every State can now
choose at its own option to delay a federal project
through “dalliance or unreasonable delay,” 115 Cong.
Rec. 9264, for as many years as it wants—or, indeed,
kill any federal hydropower or interstate natural gas
project with endless 364-days-at-a-time delays—with
the requestor having no recourse under federal law.
This Court should grant this Petition and review
FERC’s decision, now affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, to
render Section 401’s one-year rule meaningless for
hydropower and interstate natural gas projects
nationwide. FERC’s orders below allow States to
delay these activities indefinitely, achieving the very
“dalliance or unreasonable delay” that Congress
designed Section 401’s one-year rule to avoid. Id.
Such delays would be disastrous for our Nation’s
economy, given the vital roles that hydropower and
natural gas play in energy production and
consumption across the country. Further, FERC’s
orders are plainly incorrect. A State labeling a
request “denied” every 364 days, while directing the
requester to resubmit the same request for as many
years as the State desires, is not an “act” under
Section 401.
Otherwise, Section 401’s one-year
deadline would be a meaningless formality, contrary
3
to “one of the most basic interpretive canons” that no
statutory language should be interpreted as
“inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”
Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)
(citations omitted; brackets omitted).
This case is an ideal vehicle for addressing this
Question Presented. FERC’s orders provide that any
document that a State labels a “denial” is an “act”
under Section 401, and thus, under SEC v. Chenery
Corporation, 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943), this conclusion is
the only grounds upon which those orders may be
reviewed. And while the egregiousness of Respondent
the California State Water Resources Control Board’s
(“Board”) actions are not relevant under Chenery, it is
worth noting that this case presents exactly the type
of “dalliance or unreasonable delay,” 115 Cong. Rec.
9264, that Congress enacted Section 401’s one-year
rule to stop. The Board denied Petitioners’ first
certification requests 363 days after submission,
directed resubmittal, and then denied Petitioners’
resubmitted, substantively identical requests after
364 days. Those repeated denials did not engage in
any way with the merits of Petitioners’ voluminous
environmental-review evidence that supported their
certification requests, nor did the State need any
additional evidence to issue its certifications, as the
Board definitively showed by subsequently issuing
those certifications sua sponte, without receiving any
new information from Petitioners.
This Court should grant the Petition.
4
DECISIONS BELOW
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion below upholding the
orders of FERC is reported at Turlock Irrigation Dist.
v. FERC, 36 F.4th 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2022), and it is
reproduced at Appendix A to the Petition,
Pet.App.1a–10a. The D.C. Circuit’s order denying
rehearing en banc is unreported, but it is available at
2022 WL 4086378, and is reproduced at Appendix E
to the Petition, Pet.App.71a–72a. The orders of FERC
are reported at 175 FERC ¶ 61,144; 174 FERC
¶ 62,175; and 174 FERC ¶ 61,042, and they are
reproduced at Appendices B–D to the Petition,
Pet.App.11a–70a.
JURISDICTION
The D.C. Circuit entered its judgment on June 17,
2022, Pet.App.1a, and denied Petitioners’ timely
petition for rehearing en banc on September 6, 2022,
Pet.App.71a. On November 29, 2022, the Chief
Justice extended the time within which to file this
Petition to and including January 4, 2023, and this
Petition is filed by that deadline. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The relevant portion of Section 401 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, is reproduced at
Appendix F to the Petition, Pet.App.73a.
5
STATEMENT
A. Legal Background
Congress enacted the Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 791a, et seq., as “a complete scheme of
national regulation” for “the water resources of the
Nation,” First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 180 (1946); see also California
v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1990). This Act
represents Congress’ exercise of “comprehensive
control over those uses of the Nation’s water resources
in which the Federal Government ha[s] a legitimate
interest,” including for “hydroelectric power.” Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 98
(1965). FERC, in turn, has the exclusive authority to
issue licenses “for the purpose of constructing,
operating, and maintaining” hydropower projects on
navigable waters or on federal lands. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 797(e), 808(a), 817(1); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd.
of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006); Pet.App.2a.
Thus, in order to operate a hydropower project
lawfully on such waters or lands, the Federal Power
Act requires the project owner to apply to FERC for a
license and then a relicense at the end of each
license’s term. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 799, 808(e). This
FERC licensing or relicensing requirement applies to
“about half of all hydroelectric power in the United
States.” See Pet.App.2a n.1.
Obtaining a hydropower license or relicense from
FERC is a multi-step, multiyear process that affords
6
numerous opportunities for impacted States to
participate. See 18 C.F.R. § 5.6–.25. The applicant
must prepare a pre-application document that
identifies existing technical and scientific information
relating to the project, including its effects on water
quality. See id. § 5.6. From this, FERC determines
under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) what issues the applicant must address in
an environmental study plan, also allowing States to
comment and request specific environmental studies.
See id. §§ 5.8–.13. Then, FERC issues that study plan
for the applicant to complete, see id. § 5.13(c); accord
id. § 5.15—affording an additional comment period
for the States, see id. § 5.14—after which the
applicant prepares and submits a draft license
application and then a final license application, see id.
§§ 5.15, .17–.19. Thereafter, FERC issues a draft
environmental impact study under NEPA, accepts
additional comments from the States, and finally
publishes a final environmental impact study for the
project. See id. §§ 5.22–.23, .25.
The license and relicense requirement at issue
here is Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341. Under Section 401, FERC may not grant a
hydropower license or relicense unless the applicant
obtains a “certification” from the State in which any
“discharge” from the project “originates” that the
project will comply with federal water-quality
standards, unless the State waives its statutory right.
Id. § 1341(a)(1); S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 373–74;
Pet.App.2a. Section 401’s waiver component, in turn,
7
provides that a State “waive[s]” its certification
authority “[i]f the State . . . fails or refuses to act on a
request for certification, within a reasonable period of
time (which shall not exceed one year) after receipt of
such request.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis
added).
When a State waives its certification
authority under this one-year rule, FERC may then
proceed to consider the applicant’s hydropower
license application without a state certification,
although even after such a waiver, FERC must still
give consideration to the State’s water-quality
recommendations. See id.; Millennium Pipeline Co. v.
Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Section
401’s one-year rule thus time-limits the State’s power
to delay federal licensing through the certification
process. This is crucial because while Congress
allowed for state participation in the federal licensing
process through Section 401 certification, Congress
foreclosed States’ “dalliance or unreasonable delay” of
that process. 115 Cong. Rec. 9264.
FERC also has the statutory responsibility to
issue certificates of public convenience and necessity
for interstate natural gas pipelines under Section 7 of
the Natural Gas Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 717, et seq.
Section 401’s State certification requirement and the
attendant no-more-than-one-year waiver rule apply
to those certificates as well. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
8
B. Factual And Procedural Background
1. This case arises out of Petitioners’ licensing and
relicensing applications with FERC for two
hydropower
projects
located
in
California.
Pet.App.2a–4a.
Among other licensing and
relicensing steps required of Petitioners, Petitioners
sought to obtain water-quality certifications from the
Board under Section 401.
Pet.App.2a–4a.
As
explained immediately below, Petitioners submitted
substantively identical certification requests to the
Board over a more-than-two-year period, at the
Board’s repeated direction, which requests the Board
denied every 363 or 364 days after submission, while
directing Petitioners to resubmit the same requests.
Petitioners submitted their initial certification
requests to the Board on January 26, 2018, supported
by voluminous environmental-review documents that
Petitioners had compiled as part of the licensing
process described above. Pet.App.42a–43a, 97a–
104a. The Board confirmed these requests met “the
application filing requirements set forth in [the
California Code of Regulations].” Pet.App.42a–43a,
JA1632–33.1 The Board then purported to deny the
requests 363 days later in a short pro forma letter,
Pet.App.43a–44a, 94a–96a. This pro forma letter
contained “no judgment on the technical merits” of
1 Citations of “JA__” are of the parties’ Joint Appendix filed
with the D.C. Circuit below. D.C. Cir. No.21-1120, Dkt.1934418.
9
Petitioners’ projects or engagement with Petitioners’
supporting environmental-review evidence at all, but
rather just pointed vaguely to the processes under
NEPA and the California Environmental Quality Act
(“CEQA”), which processes were as-yet-unfinished.
Pet.App.95a–96a. This short letter concluded by
stating that “to maintain an active certification
application, [Petitioners] will need to request
certification for the [p]rojects.” Pet.App.95a.
Petitioners then resubmitted substantively
identical certification requests to the Board on April
22, 2019, in the form of brief renewal letters,
supported by the very same environmental-review
evidence from Petitioners’ prior submissions.
Pet.App.44a–45a, 90a–93a.
The Board again
confirmed that these requests met “the application
filing requirements specified in [the California Code
of Regulations].” JA1635–37, 1638–40. Then, the
Board purported to deny these requests via pro forma
letters 364 days later. Pet.App.45a, 83a–89a. Here
again, the Board’s letters referenced generally the asyet-unfinished NEPA and CEQA processes as the
reason for the denial and then “encourage[d]
[Petitioners] to submit a new request for
certification.” Pet.App.84a–85a, 88a.2
2 These pro forma letters also stated that, “at this time, the
proposed activity does not comply with applicable water quality
standards and other appropriate requirements.” Pet.App.85a,
10
Finally, on July 20, 2020, Petitioners resubmitted
for a third time with the Board their substantively
identical requests for certification, again in the form
of request-renewal letters supported by the very same
environmental-review evidence. Pet.App.45a–46a,
78a–82a. And again, as with the first two sets of
submissions, the Board certified that these requests
were “complete.” JA1641–43, 1644–46. Petitioners
thereafter withdrew these certification requests from
the Board and began the agency proceedings before
FERC. Pet.App.4a–5a.
After Petitioners withdrew their substantively
identical requests from the Board, the Board
purported to issue sua sponte Section 401
certifications for Petitioners’ projects on December 1,
2020—although the CEQA process had not yet
concluded and, indeed, the Board had gained no
information at all from any such process. Pet.App.4a–
5a, 46a & n.25; JA1780–888, JA1890–998. Put
another way, the Board issued Section 401
certifications without receiving any new supporting
evidence from Petitioners in any respect,
demonstrating that the Board never needed
additional information in order to act on Petitioners’
certification requests.
See Pet.App.46a; accord
Pet.App.4a–5a. The Board claimed that it could issue
89a. But the letters did not contain any “elaboration” on which
standard or requirement the projects had purportedly not met,
Pet.App.45a, or on how the projects had not met those unnamed
standards or requirements.
11
those certifications, despite the lack of completion of
the CEQA process, due to a “June 2020 amendment
to the California Water Code” authorizing it “to issue
certifications before completion of CEQA review,
where waiting until completion of CEQA review
presents a substantial risk of waiver of certification.”
Pet.App.46a & n.25 (citation omitted); Cal. Water
Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020). The Board’s sua sponte
certifications were voluminous, comprising over 100
pages, demonstrating that the Board had been
working on these certifications for more than a year
and had denied Petitioners’ requests simply to buy
itself more time. See JA1780–888, JA1890–998.
These certifications imposed numerous burdensome
conditions on Petitioners’ projects; “some forty-five”
conditions in total. Pet.App.5a.
2. In the FERC proceedings below, Petitioners
sought a declaration from FERC that the Board had
waived the State’s Section 401 certification authority
by denying Petitioners’ requests every 363 or 364 days
and then requiring Petitioners to resubmit without
actually needing any additional information. See
Pet.App.5a–6a, 40a–41a, 54a–55a. FERC denied
Petitioners’ claims of waiver in a declaratory order,
Pet.App.38a, and then reaffirmed that denial in an
order on Petitioners’ request for rehearing,
Pet.App.11a—orders that are FERC precedent,
applicable nationwide, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 817(1);
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009); accord County of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192
F.3d 1005, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
12
In holding that the Board “did not waive its
authority under section 401,” FERC’s declaratory
order concluded that any time that a State labels a
request “denied” within the one-year deadline, it has
“act[ed]” on that request and avoided waiver, full stop.
Pet.App.55a, 58a–60a. So here, in FERC’s view, “by
denying [Petitioners’] applications without prejudice”
with its pro forma letters, the Board “acted on” those
requests within the meaning of Section 401, without
any further inquiry. Pet.App.45a, 60a. FERC
admitted that “[i]t may be that the courts will find
repeated denials without prejudice, and particularly
those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions,”
do trigger waiver, but it said that FERC itself would
not do so.
Pet.App.65a. FERC reaffirmed its
interpretation of Section 401 in its order on rehearing.
See Pet.App.17a–23a.
Commissioner Danly dissented from FERC’s
order on rehearing, explaining that States have
historically engaged in two schemes to evade
Section 401’s one-year deadline when they want to
have “[m]ore [t]ime” to consider a request than the
one-year limit affords. Pet.App.33a–34a (Danly,
Comm’r, dissenting) (citations omitted). The first is
the
“withdrawal-and-resubmission
scheme”
condemned by Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d
1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019), where States would coordinate
with requesters so that the requesters would
withdraw and resubmit their requests just before the
one-year deadline. Pet.App.31a (Danly, Comm’r,
dissenting) (discussing Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at
13
1104). The second is the scheme at issue here,
Pet.App.33a–34a (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting), where
a State will “deny[ ] the application” either with or
“without prejudice” while inviting the requester to
resubmit the same application year after year, see
Pet.App.21a–22a. The second scheme at issue here
achieves the same dilatory result as the first scheme
and thus triggered waiver under Section 401.
Pet.App.33a–34a (Danly, Comm’r., dissenting). “Like
the
withdrawal-resubmission
scheme
found
impermissible in Hoopa Valley, the Board in this case
twice denied [Petitioners’] application in what
appears to be an attempt to override the statute’s oneyear deadline thereby affording itself additional time
to act.”
Pet.App.31a–32a (Danly, Comm’r.,
dissenting). That is, the Board “received [Petitioners’
first] application,” “acknowledged receipt,” “found
[that it] met the filing requirements,” “identified the
one-year deadline,” and then “did not request
additional information.” Pet.App.31a–32a (Danly,
Comm’r., dissenting). Nevertheless, “just two days
before the one-year deadline, the Board denied the
application without prejudice.”
Pet.App.31a–32a
(Danly, Comm’r., dissenting). And then “the Board
did it all again” after receiving Petitioners’
“substantively unchanged” second certification
requests, denying those 364 days after receipt.
Pet.App.32a–33a (Danly, Comm’r., dissenting).
Commissioner Danly also observed that the “timing”
of the Board’s “ultimate approval” of Petitioners’
requests “bears note,” coming only “after [Petitioners]
filed their petition for finding waiver [with FERC] and
14
had withdrawn their third request.” Pet.App.32a–
33a (Danly, Comm’r., dissenting).
3. Petitioners petitioned the D.C. Circuit for
review of FERC’s orders, and the D.C. Circuit entirely
affirmed FERC’s orders in a written opinion issued
after oral argument.
In a revealing exchange at oral argument, FERC’s
counsel conceded that the orders’ interpretation of
Section 401 rendered the statutory one-year rule
meaningless for any State that wanted that result:
JUDGE WALKER: Let me ask one more
hypothetical, imagine that . . . California
passes a statute that says we require an
environmental impact assessment that will
take us 100 years to do. And because of this
one-year, [Section] 401 deadline, we’re
instructing the [Board] every 363 days, to
deny and require the petitioner to refile for
100 years . . . . [Y]ou think that that scheme
would be legal?
FERC: I don’t know that it would
contradict Section 401, because Section 401
doesn’t go [there]. But, however, I certainly
think that would probably prompt
Congress to amend its law to say,
look, we—
15
JUDGE WALKER: I’m sure Congress will be
right on that with FERC at the top of their
agenda.
FERC:
Well,
regardless
of
the
practicalities, I mean, this is, again, this is
a . . . certification power that Congress has
given and it can condition it, or it can take
it away. And here, Congress decided to
leave it at . . . if you deny certification, then
FERC’s responsibility is to consider
whether it was within the—
Oral Argument Audio at 29:45–31:15 (Apr. 11, 2021).3
Thus, under FERC’s interpretation of Section 401, a
State can delay acting on a request for certification for
a century (or more), without running afoul of Section
401’s one-year rule, so long as the scheme complies
with the State’s own laws and is implemented with
pro forma letters issued every 364 days. Id.
Remarkably, and notwithstanding FERC’s
concession that its interpretation renders Section
401’s one-year rule meaningless, the D.C. Circuit
affirmed FERC’s orders below. Pet.App.6a–7a. The
D.C. Circuit held that FERC was correct to conclude
that “[e]ach time the California Board denied
Available at https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/
recordings.nsf/DocsByRDate?OpenView&count=100&SKey=20
2204 (see link for No.21-1120) (all websites last visited
Jan. 3, 2023).
3
16
certification, the Board ‘act[ed]’ within the meaning of
section 401(a)(1)”—with no further inquiry either
required or allowed. Pet.App.7a (second brackets in
original). In other words, the D.C. Circuit approved
FERC’s conclusion that every time a State issues a
document labeled a “denial” of a certification request,
the State has taken an “act” under Section 401, and
thus evaded waiver under the one-year rule. See
Pet.App.7a–8a. In reaching this decision, the D.C.
Circuit rejected Petitioners’ core argument that this
bright-line interpretation allows “State agencies [to]
extend the time for decision indefinitely by denying
one certification request after another without
prejudice, thus nullifying section 401’s one-year
limit.” Pet.App.8a–9a (emphasis added). The D.C.
Circuit asserted that an “opposing slope”—namely,
that Petitioners’ interpretation of Section 401 leads to
“gamesmanship”—presents “just as bad (or even
worse) consequences,” without even acknowledging
Petitioners’ arguments rebutting these concerns. See
generally Pet.App.9a–10a. Finally, the D.C. Circuit
explained in a short footnote that a State’s need to
“comply[ ] with State law . . . may” serve as a sort of
backstop, limiting when a State could engage in a
scheme like the Board’s here. Pet.App.9a n.8
The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for
rehearing en banc. Pet.App.71a–72a.
17
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I.
Whether Section 401’s One-Year Rule Is A
Meaningless Formality Is An Important
Question Of Federal Law That This Court
Should Resolve
A. FERC’s orders below, now affirmed by the D.C.
Circuit, render Section 401’s one-year rule
meaningless for all federal hydropower and interstate
natural gas projects nationwide. See Pet.App.18a–
22a, 54a–65a; see also Pet.App.6a–7a; infra Part II.B.
This is because, under FERC’s orders, a State wishing
to delay acting on any certification request associated
with any federally licensed or permitted activity need
only “deny[ ]” that request in pro forma letters every
364 days, while directing the requester to resubmit
the same request if it wants any chance to move
forward with its project. See Pet.App.58a–60a. As
FERC admitted below, its position means that a State
may repeat that scheme “every 363 days . . . for 100
years,” so long as that is lawful under state law. Oral
Argument Audio, supra, at 29:45–31:15. Nothing
about FERC’s interpretation of Section 401 depends
upon, for example, the requester’s failure to supply
any relevant water-quality-related information. See
Pet.App.58a–60a, 65a; accord Pet.App.6a–7a.
FERC’s interpretation of Section 401 makes
Section 401’s one-year waiver rule a dead letter. All
that a State must do to evade Section 401’s one-year
rule completely, for as long as the State desires, is to
18
issue pro forma letters labeling a request “denied”
every 364 days, while telling the requester to
resubmit the exact same request, over and over again,
if it ever hopes to obtain the mandatory Section 401
certification. See supra pp.8–10. Thus, as long as the
relevant state bureaucrat possesses a calendar and
authority to act under state law, Section 401’s oneyear waiver rule would never operate against the
State, no matter how many years the State wishes to
delay action. Contra Corley, 556 U.S. at 314.
FERC’s gutting of Section 401’s one-year rule now
applies to all federal hydropower and interstate
natural gas projects across the country under FERC’s
authority, given FERC’s nationwide jurisdiction, see
16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 817(1); 15 U.S.C. § 717(b), and the
Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement that
FERC apply its precedent consistently to all future
cases, see Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515;
accord Shalala, 192 F.3d at 1022. So, under the
current state of the law and absent this Court’s
intervention and reversal, any State may rely on
these FERC decisions to delay acting on Section 401
certification requests for as many years as the State
desires—or, indeed, forever, if it wants to kill the
project completely—without ever triggering waiver.
All a State needs to do is deny the requests every 364
days and require the requester to resubmit. Further,
every Section 401 requester must comply with that
state scheme if it ever hopes to obtain a license, given
that FERC may not issue a license to the requester
19
until the requirements of Section 401 are either
satisfied or waived. § 1341(a)(1).
B. Whether the States may nullify Section 401’s
federal one-year rule in the trivially easy-to-replicate
manner that FERC has now authorized nationwide is
an important question calling out for this Court’s
immediate review. Under the Supremacy Clause,
“[the] Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2, notwithstanding the laws or actions of any State
to the contrary, see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
387, 399 (2012). Yet, FERC has empowered the
States to nullify Section 401’s one-year waiver rule for
hydropower projects generating “about half of all
hydroelectric power in the United States,” see
Pet.App.2a n.1, as well as for all interstate natural
gas projects, see supra pp.7–8. Whether States may
do this in the face of federal law is a “question” of
“significance,” as this Court regularly recognizes in
cases dealing with federal-state conflict. See, e.g.,
Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894,
1901 (2019); Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394 (“important
questions concerning the interaction of state and
federal power”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
563 (2009).
Rendering Section 401’s one-year deadline
meaningless for all federal hydropower and interstate
natural gas pipeline projects is deeply significant,
warranting this Court’s review. Section 401’s one-
20
year deadline serves an important purpose by
stopping a State’s “dalliance or unreasonable delay”
of the federal licensing process, 115 Cong. Rec. 9264—
including a State pocket-vetoing pending licenses by
labeling Section 401 certification requests “denied”
every 364 days, while directing resubmission of those
same requests year after year. Federal hydropower
projects are vital to our Nation’s long-term, cleanenergy market since, in 2021, hydropower accounted
for 19% of the Nation’s renewable-energy
consumption, see U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S.
Energy Facts Explained (June 10, 2022),4 for 31.5% of
our utility-scale renewable energy generation, and for
6.3% of our utility-scale total electricity generation,
see U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Hydropower Explained
(Mar. 16, 2022).5 And natural gas is likewise
important to our Nation’s energy requirements, as it
comprised 32% the country’s total energy
consumption in 2021. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S.
Energy Facts Explained, supra.
So, given the
significant roles of hydropower and natural gas in
meeting our Nation’s energy needs, allowing States to
delay federal hydropower or interstate natural gas
projects indefinitely would be disastrous.
Some States have proven all too eager to abuse
the Section 401 certification process to delay federal
4 Available at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-ener
gy-facts/.
5 Available at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/hydrop
ower/.
21
projects and will take advantage of the scheme that
FERC blessed in this case with relish, as these States’
prior conduct illustrates. In Hoopa Valley, the D.C.
Circuit rejected certain States’ so-called “withdrawaland-resubmission scheme” under Section 401, where
these States would coordinate with certification
requesters to withdraw their requests just before the
one-year deadline and then have the requestors
resubmit the very same requests immediately, buying
the States more time to “act.” Pet.App.31a (Danly,
Comm’r, dissenting) (discussing Hoopa Valley, 913
F.3d at 1104). In the course of concluding that this
scheme triggered waiver under Section 401, Hoopa
Valley explained that “it is now commonplace for
states to use Section 401 to hold federal licensing
hostage” far beyond Section 401’s “one-year
maximum.” Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104. For
example, at the time of Hoopa Valley, 27 of the 43
then-pending “licensing applications before FERC
were awaiting a state’s water quality certification,
and four of those had been pending for more than a
decade.” Id. Now, based on FERC’s orders below, any
State wishing to evade Section 401’s one-year
deadline may do so unilaterally for as many years as
it wants to delay—or, indeed, forever—obtaining the
very same “dalliance or unreasonable delay” observed
in Hoopa Valley. Id. (quoting 115 Cong. Rec. 9264).
22
II. FERC’s Ruling That States Can Render
Section 401’s One-Year Rule Meaningless By
Issuing Pro Forma Letters Purporting To
Deny The Requests Every 364 Days And
Then Requiring Resubmittal Is Wrong
A. This Court interprets statutes according to
their text, understanding that text in light of the
statutory structure and context, as well as the
statutory purpose. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.
Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct.
2105, 2110–11 (2018); see Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,
142 S. Ct. 1783, 1792 (2022). “[O]ne of the most basic
interpretative canons” is “that a statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,
so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void
or insignificant.” Corley, 556 U.S. at 314 (citations
omitted; brackets omitted); see Rubin v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 825 (2018). So where
Congress provides “words of limitation” in a statute,
the Court will not interpret those limiting words to be
a “mere sham” that will “never run [their] course,”
N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995), or to be
“practically devoid of significance,” Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
B. Applying these statutory-interpretation
principles to Section 401’s waiver provision, issuing
pro forma denial letters to requesters every 364 days
and telling the requester that it must resubmit the
request if the requester ever hopes to obtain
23
certification, is not an “act” under Section 401 that
avoids waiver of the State’s authority. § 1341(a)(1).
A State’s scheme purporting to deny a request
every 364 days in pro forma letters and then requiring
resubmittal is not an “act” under Section 401. Section
401 provides that a State has “one year” to “act” on a
certification request, with the State’s “fail[ure] or
refus[al]” to “act” within that year resulting in the
waiver of the requirement to obtain a certification
from the State. § 1341(a)(1). Therefore, a State has a
maximum of “one year” to “act” on a request for
certification, otherwise it has “waived” its
certification authority. Id. When a State implements
a scheme to delay its decision on a certification by
issuing pro forma documents purporting to deny the
request every 364 days, and then making clear that
the requestor must resubmit the request if it ever
wants to obtain the necessary Section 401
certification, that is not an “act” under Section 401,
but a scheme to avoid taking any “act.”
The manifest purpose of Section 401 supports this
statutory reading, further demonstrating that a
State’s unilateral scheme to avoid Section 401’s oneyear rule by issuing pro forma denial letters every 364
days and then requiring resubmittal is not an “act”
under Section 401. By requiring States to “act” on a
request within “one year,” or else waive their
authority, Congress designed Section 401 to empower
States to participate in the federal-licensing process
without allowing them to derail or unduly delay the
24
process. See § 1341(a)(1). So, while Section 401
affords States the “authority . . . to act to deny a
permit,” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 69 (1971), it does not
permit a State’s “dalliance or unreasonable delay” of
the federal-permitting process, 115 Cong. Rec. 9264.
If a State is to exercise its Section 401 authority, it
must give an actual “‘yes’ or ‘no’” within the one-year
deadline. 115 Cong. Rec. 9264. And if a State is to
deny a request for certification, it must issue “an
affirmative denial” before that one-year period
elapses. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 69; see generally S.D.
Warren, 547 U.S. at 380. Thus, Section 401 requires
the State to “act in one way or the other within the
prescribed time,” with anything else “constitut[ing] a
waiver of the certification required as to that State.”
115 Cong. Rec. 9264 (emphasis added).
FERC’s contrary interpretation of “act” under
Section 401 would impermissibly render Section 401’s
one-year limitation either “inoperative” and “void,” or
“insignificant,” Corley, 556 U.S. at 314, or “practically
devoid of significance,” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12. If a
State “act[s]” under Section 401 whenever it issues a
pro forma document labeled a “denial” every 364 days,
and then tells the applicant that it must resubmit if
it ever wants a Section 401 certification—regardless
of the circumstances at issue—that would mean that
Section 401’s one-year rule would “never run its
course,” N.Y. State Conf., 514 U.S. at 655, or would be
“practically devoid of significance,” Leocal, 543 U.S. at
12. Congress does not draft statutory “limitation[s]”
25
like this to be a “mere sham” in that way. N.Y. State
Conf., 514 U.S. at 655.
Tellingly, FERC conceded before the D.C. Circuit
that, under FERC’s orders below, any State could
delay a decision on a certification request for as long
as it wants by simply enshrining that scheme in state
law. As FERC admitted, its interpretation of Section
401 would allow a State to “pass[ ] a statute” that
“require[s] an environmental impact assessment that
will take [ ] 100 years to do” and that further
“instruct[s] the [Board] every 363 days, to deny and
require the petitioner to refile for 100 years,” with no
trigger of waiver. Oral Argument Audio, supra, at
29:45–31:15. Thus, under FERC’s orders, any State
may completely evade Section 401’s one-year rule for
as long as it desires, which shows that FERC’s
interpretation of Section 401 impermissibly renders
the one-year rule completely “insignificant.” Corley,
556 U.S. at 314; see also N.Y. State Conf., 514 U.S. at
655; Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12.
Notably, neither FERC nor the D.C. Circuit
offered any meaningful response to Petitioners’ core
argument that FERC’s interpretation makes Section
401’s one-year rule utterly meaningless for any State
that does not want to be limited by Section 401’s
federal limit. FERC defaulted entirely on this point,
saying that while courts may ultimately find waiver
under certain circumstance, FERC would not do so.
Pet.App.65a. For its part, the D.C. Circuit’s only
response came in a short footnote, where it asserted
26
that whether the one-year limit would have any
meaning under FERC’s reading “may depend on
whether the State agency, in issuing denials, is
complying with State law, which in turn may depend
on the State agency’s reasons for denying the
applications.” Pet.App.9a n.8; accord Pet.App.22a.
But that gives the game away. Section 401’s one-year
rule is a federal limit on a State’s ability to delay
federally licensed projects. If the only limit on the
State’s delay is to be found in state law—as the D.C.
Circuit concluded in the just-discussed footnote—that
is not a federal limit at all. A State that wants more
than a year to act on a Section 401 certification can
just change its state law to authorize such delay, and
there would be nothing that any federal court could
do about that under FERC’s orders.
The D.C. Circuit also speculated that Petitioners’
interpretation of Section 401 could lead to
“gamesmanship”
by
requesters,
who
could
strategically submit “certification requests lacking
sufficient documentation,” with the D.C. Circuit
repeating FERC’s utterly false assertion that
Petitioners had argued that a State’s certification
decision must be “‘on the merits’” to ever be an “act”
under Section 401. Pet.App.9a–10a (quoting FERC’s
brief verbatim, with no citation whatsoever to any
submission by Petitioners taking this position). But
the issue in this petition for review challenging
FERC’s orders is whether FERC’s categorical
interpretation of Section 401 is correct. See Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. at 87. Should this Court grant review
27
and then require the D.C. Circuit to set aside FERC’s
orders as contrary to Section 401, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2), FERC could choose to take into account the
D.C. Circuit’s “gamesmanship” concerns on remand,
to the extent that FERC were to conclude that the
“gamesmanship” worry that the D.C. Circuit raised
had any relevance to the situation here.
In any event, nothing about Petitioners’ actual
interpretation of Section 401 below leads to
“gamesmanship” in any case. Petitioners explained
below that, under their interpretation of Section 401,
a State “act[s]” on a certification request under
Section 401 when it denies that request in a situation
where, for example, the requestor fails to supply the
State with requisite supporting water quality-related
information, which information will already have
been developed during the lengthy, pre-certificationrequest-submission FERC licensing process. D.C.
Cir. Dkt.1936399 at 18–19 (citation omitted); D.C.
Cir. Dkt.1936398 at 46–47; see supra p.6. If a
requestor fails to submit that readily available
information, the State can (and presumably would)
deny that certification request within the one-year
limit, at which point the applicant would simply
resubmit its application with that water-quality
information now properly attached. That statutorilypermissible sequence would result in no possible
“gamesmanship” by requestors, Pet.App.10a, while
not opening the door to “dalliance or unreasonable
delay” by States, 115 Cong. Rec. 9264.
28
III. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Resolving
The Question Presented
This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the
Question Presented. FERC rested its orders below
solely upon its interpretation of Section 401, see
Pet.App.18a–22a, 54a–65a, and thus this is the only
ground upon which the federal courts may review
FERC’s orders under Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87. So
while FERC’s supporting parties attempted to raise
before the D.C. Circuit certain (meritless) fact-specific
arguments to defend the Board’s actions in issuing its
pro forma letters, those arguments are irrelevant
under Chenery, given that FERC did not rely upon
them when issuing its agency decisions.
In any event, considering the facts of this case
only further illustrates the danger of FERC’s
approach to the Section 401’s one-year rule.
California law at the relevant time required
Petitioners first to complete the CEQA process in
order to obtain certification, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23,
§ 3856(f), while directing the Board to issue withoutprejudice denials to Petitioners until they completed
that CEQA process, id. § 3837(b)(2). But given
CEQA’s many, time-consuming requirements, see,
e.g., Cal. Water Boards, Revised [CEQA] Initial Study
And Environmental Checklist at 8–42 (Nov. 9, 2016),6
Available at https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/rwqcb9/
board_info/agendas/2016/Nov/item9c/Item_9_SD5_Revised_CE
QA_Initial_Study_and_Environmental_Checklist.pdf.
6
29
complicated projects like those at issue here take far
more than one year to complete the CEQA process.
So, under the then-extant state law, California
already effectively provided that projects like
Petitioners’ would take more than a year to evaluate
for purposes of the issuance of Section 401
certifications, despite Section 401’s one-year deadline.
In other words, California had by statute mandated a
more-than-one-year timeline for it to “act” on a
certification request, just as FERC conceded at oral
argument below its reading of Section 401 permits.
See Oral Argument Audio, supra, at 29:45–31:15.
And this is not a case where the requester failed
to submit to the State information that the State
needed to decide whether the project would comply
with its water-quality standards under Section 401.
As explained above, Petitioners supported each of
their substantively identical certification requests to
the Board with the exact same environmental
evidence, never supplementing that voluminous
evidence with the Board in any way. Supra pp.8–12.
Although the Board’s pro forma denial letters claimed
that it could not review these requests until
Petitioners had completed the requirements under
NEPA and CEQA, supra pp.8–10, the Board
subsequently issued lengthy certifications to
Petitioners without receiving any additional waterquality information whatsoever—including under the
NEPA and CEQA processes that its pro forma letters
had repeatedly invoked, supra pp.10–11.
This
showed in the most conclusive terms imaginable that
30
the Board’s stated reasons for its pro forma denials
were just an attempt to buy itself more time, precisely
the kind of “dalliance or unreasonable delay” that
Section 401’s one-year rule stops.
115 Cong.
Rec. 9264.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the Petition.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES R. SENSIBA
MORGAN M. GERARD
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
401 9th Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004
January 2023
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
KEVIN M. LEROY
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe St.,
Ste. 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
misha.tseytlin@
troutman.com
Attorneys for
Petitioners
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,
FILED JUNE 17, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
A ppendix B — order of the
united states federal energy
regulatory commission, filed
may 21, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11a
Appendix c — NOTICE OF DENIAL OF
REHEARING of the UNITED STATES
OF A M ER IC A F EDER A L EN ER GY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, filed
MARCH 22, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38a
APPENDIX d — ORDER OF THE UNITED
S T A T E S O F A M E R IC A F E D E R A L
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
DATED JANUARY 19, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40a
Appendix e — order of the United
states court of appeals FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,
filed september 6, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71a
Appendix f — relevant statutory
provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73a
ii
Table of Appendices
Page
APPENDIX G — REQUEST FOR SECTION
401 CERTIFICATION FOR DON PEDRO
PROJECT, DATED JULY 20, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 78a
Appendix H — Request For Section
401 Certification For La Grange
Project, DATED JULY 20, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 80a
A ppendix I — Denial W ithout
Prejudice Of Water Qualit y
Certification Letter For Don
Pedro Project, Dated April 20, 2020 . . . 83a
A ppendix j — Denial W ithout
Prejudice Of Water Qualit y
Certification L etter For L a
Grange Project, Dated April 20, 2020 . . 87a
Appendix k — Request For Section
401 Certification For La Grange
Project, Dated April 22, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . 90a
Appendix L — Request For Section
401 Certification For Don Pedro
Project, Dated April 22, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . 92a
A ppendix M — Denial W ithout
Prejudice Of Water Qualit y
Certification Letter For Don
Pedro And La Grange Projects,
Dated January 24, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94a
iii
Table of Appendices
Page
Appendix N — Request For Section
401 Certification For Don Pedro
Project, Dated January 26, 2018 . . . . . . . .97a
Appendix O — Request For Section
401 Certification For La Grange
Project, Dated January 26, 2018 . . . . . . . 101a
1a
A OF THE
APPENDIXAppendix
A — ORDER
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,
FILED JUNE 17, 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 11, 2022
Decided June 17, 2022
No. 21-1120
TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND
MODESTO IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
v.
Petitioners,
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION,
Respondents,
AMERICAN WHITEWATER, et al.,
Intervenors.
Consolidated with 20-1121
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Before: Wilkins and Walker, Circuit Judges, and
Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
Randolph.
2a
Appendix A
Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge: An applicant for a
federal license to operate a hydroelectric facility must
seek a State certification that the facility’s discharges
will comply with the water quality standards specified in
federal law. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The State may grant
the applicant’s request outright, or it may grant the
request subject to conditions relating to water quality, or
it may deny the request, or it may fail to act. If the State
agency denies certification, no federal license, or at least
no federal long-term license, may issue. See id. § 1341(d).
This case presents questions about the directive in
section 401 of the Clean Water Act that if “the State . . .
fails or refuses to act on a request for certification” within
one year from receiving the request, the State “shall”
be deemed to have waived its authority to grant or deny
water quality certification. Id. § 1341(a)(1).
The Federal Energ y Reg ulator y Commission
decides whether to license private, municipal and State
hydroelectric projects subject to federal jurisdiction.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 817(1).1 This case arose from a
combined licensing and relicensing proceeding for two
hydroelectric facilities in California. The administrative
record is as follows.
1. FERC has licensing authority over only non-federal
hydroelectric projects. Federally-owned hydroelectric projects,
which generate about half of all hydroelectric power in the United
States, “are managed primarily by the U.S. Department of the
Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation [] and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers . . ..” K elsi Bracmort et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42579,
Hydropower: Federal and Nonfederal Investment 2, 6 (2015).
3a
Appendix A
Both of the hydroelectric facilities — the Don
Pedro Project and the La Grange Project — are on the
Tuolumne River in central California. The Turlock and
Modesto Irrigation Districts own the facilities. FERC’s
predecessor agency granted a fifty-year license to operate
the Don Pedro Project. The license expired in 2016. The
other, quite smaller project — La Grange — has operated
since the 1890’s but in 2012 FERC decided that La Grange
was subject to federal licensing authority. We upheld
FERC’s decision in Turlock Irrigation District v. FERC,
786 F.3d 18, 415 U.S. App. D.C. 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
In 2017, the Districts filed with FERC a new license
application for the La Grange Project and an amended
relicensing application for the Don Pedro Project.
On January 26, 2018, the Districts filed certification
requests for both projects with the California State Water
Resources Control Board. On January 24, 2019 — 363 days
later — the California Board denied the requests “without
prejudice.” The California Board gave two reasons.
The first: “FERC has not yet completed its National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental analysis
for the Projects.” J.A. 820. The second: “the Districts, as
lead agencies for the Projects, have not begun the CEQA
[California Environmental Quality Act] process. Without
completion of the CEQA process, the State Water Board
cannot issue a certification.” Id. The Board added that its
denial was not a “judgment on the technical merits.” Id.
On April 22, 2019, the Districts sent the Board
“substantively unchanged” certification requests for the
4a
Appendix A
Projects. Turlock Irrigation Dist. & Modesto Irrigation
Dist., 174 FERC ¶ 61,042, at P. 8 (2021) (“Declaratory
Order”). On April 20, 2020 — 364 days later — the Board
again denied the requests “without prejudice.” The Board
gave the same explanation as it had before. 2
The Districts sent a third certification request for both
projects to the California Board in July 2020. In October
of that year, while these requests were pending, the
Districts filed a petition with FERC seeking a declaratory
order that the California Board had waived section
401(a)(1)’s State certification requirement. One month
later, the Districts informed the California Board that
they were withdrawing their certification applications.
Despite the Districts’ withdrawal of these requests, in
January 2021 the California Board granted certification
2. The California Board’s full reasoning was the following:
The Districts are the lead agencies for the Project for
purposes of CEQA compliance, but they have not begun
the CEQA process. As a responsible agency, the State
Water Board relies on the environmental document
prepared by the lead agency, but makes its own
determination as to whether and with what conditions
to grant the certification, taking into consideration the
information provided in the lead agency’s document.
(Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21080.1, subd. (a), 21002.1,
subd. (d).) The State Water Board may not issue a
certification until the requirements for compliance
with CEQA are met. Additionally, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission has not yet completed its
National Environmental Policy Act environmental
process for the Project.
J.A. 1159.
5a
Appendix A
for both Projects. 3 Although the Districts had still not
completed the CEQA process for the Projects, California
law had changed to allow the California Board to grant
certification prior to the completion of that process.
Declaratory Order, at P. 11 & n.25; see Cal. Water Code
§ 13160(b)(2) (2020).
The Districts object to the conditions — some fortyfive — that the California Board imposed in granting their
requests for certification. If the California Board did not
waive its certification authority under section 401(a)(1),
those conditions would be mandatory. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d). On the other hand, if the California Board had
waived its section 401(a)(1) authority, the conditions would
become only “recommendations” for FERC to consider
in developing the terms and conditions of the Districts’
federal licenses under Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C.
§ 803(a). Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, Off. of Energy
P rojects , Div. of Hydropower Licensing, P reparing
Environmental Documents: Guidelines for A pplicants,
Contractors, and Staff 10 (2008).
FERC denied the Districts’ petition for a declaratory
order. Declaratory Order, at PP. 1, 20-35. The Districts
petitioned for rehearing which FERC denied. Turlock
Irrigation Dist. & Modesto Irrigation Dist., 175 FERC
3. The Districts are challenging the Board’s action in California
State court. See Petitioners Br. iii; California Board Intervenor Br.
19; Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No.
CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct., Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021).
6a
Appendix A
¶ 61,144, at PP. 11-21 (2021) (“Rehearing Order”).4 FERC
reasoned that the California Board, “by denying the
applications without prejudice, indeed acted on [] them
. . ..” Declaratory Order, at P. 28. FERC relied on section
401’s “plain language,” which requires that a State
“act” on a certification request within one year. Id. at
P. 33; Rehearing Order, at P. 11. FERC distinguished
the California Board’s denials without prejudice from
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S.
App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019), which FERC said involved
“a coordinated withdrawal and resubmittal scheme”
that allowed the State agencies to not act and still avoid
waiver. Rehearing Order, at PP. 16. Because section 401
requires only action within a year to avoid waiver, FERC
also rejected the Districts’ argument that the California
Board’s denials were “invalid” as a matter of federal law
because they were “on non-substantive grounds” and not
“on the technical merits of the certification requests.”
Declaratory Order, at PP. 30-32; see Rehearing Order,
at P. 11.
We agree with FERC that the California Board did
not waive its certification authority under section 401(a)(1)
and that FERC’s ruling is not contrary to Hoopa Valley.
The Fourth Circuit accurately described Hoopa Valley
as a case in which “the state agencies and the license
applicant entered into a written agreement that obligated
the state agencies, year after year, to take no action at all
on the applicant’s § 401 certification request.” N.C. Dep’t
of Env’t Quality v. FERC, 3 F.4th 655, 669 (4th Cir. 2021).
4. Commissioner James P. Danly dissented from the denial of
rehearing.
7a
Appendix A
Those circumstances are not present in this case. Each
time the California Board denied certification, the Board
“act[ed]” within the meaning of section 401(a)(1). See N.Y.
State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450,
456 (2d Cir. 2018); N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v.
FERC, 991 F.3d 439, 450 n.11 (2d Cir. 2021). And when the
Board granted the third application subject to conditions,
it “act[ed]” once more. Contrast this with Hoopa Valley.
The action contemplated in section 401(a)(1) is action by
the State agency. Yet the response of the State agencies to
the certification requests in Hoopa Valley was not action,
but inaction. 5 By agreement, the applicant filed and then
withdrew its certification request before the one-year
period expired, a ritual repeated for more than ten years.
Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1101-02, 1104.6 There was no
5. That was also the situation in Placer County Water Agency,
167 FERC ¶ 61,056 (2019), on reh’g, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2019),
as FERC pointed out in its Declaratory Order, at P. 24, and in
its Rehearing Order, at P. 18, in this case. In Placer County,
e-mails showed that the state agency “elicit[ed] a withdrawal and
resubmission” of the certification application shortly before the oneyear deadline. Declaratory Order, at P. 24.
And “inaction” also described how FERC dealt with a different
deadline in a different statute. See Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC,
964 F.3d 1, 13, 448 U.S. App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).
There, FERC granted rehearing solely “for the purpose of affording
additional time to consider the merits of a rehearing request.”
Rehearing Order, at P. 11. The denials in this case occurred for a
different reason, namely that the California Board lacked information
that it needed to grant certification. This included the completion of
the CEQA process, which the Districts had not even begun.
6. The evidence in Hoopa Valley tended to show that the
applicant did not want an immediate license that would have
8a
Appendix A
such agreement between the Districts and the California
Board. The court’s opinion in Hoopa Valley stressed
that the applicant’s “water quality certification request
has been complete and ready for review for more than a
decade.” Id. at 1105. Here, the Districts’ requests were
not complete and they were not ready for review, which
is why the California Board denied them. The Board’s
denials were “without prejudice,” 7 but those rulings still
had the legal effect under section 401 of precluding FERC
from issuing licenses to the Districts during the period
preceding the Board’s grant of the certifications. See 33
U.S.C. § 1341(d).
The Districts’ answer to these points is that if we
uphold FERC’s ruling, State agencies could extend the
required decommissioning some of the project’s dams in line with
current federal environmental standards. See PacifiCorp, 147 FERC
¶ 61,216, at PP. 3-5, 11 n.11, 17 (2014). The applicant may have been
using this delay tactic in the hope of obtaining federal funding before
being required to decommission the dams. See id. at PP. 5, 12-13 &
n.13. And the applicant had an incentive to delay: while awaiting
relicensing, FERC must issue annual licenses that allow for the
continued operation of hydroelectric projects under the terms of the
existing, expired license. See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1). The applicant’s
expired license was issued in 1954 and presumably included far fewer
environmental conditions than are required under current federal
law. PacifiCorp, at P. 11 & n.11.
7. In context, the words “without prejudice” signified that the
Districts could apply again, and that the Board’s decision did not
have preclusive effect. This would have been evident from the Board’s
reasoning even without the quoted words, which is doubtless why
the Districts’ counsel stated at oral argument that “nothing” in their
case depended on “the words without prejudice.” Oral Arg. 7:22-23.
9a
Appendix A
time for decision indefinitely by denying one certification
request after another without prejudice, thus nullifying
section 401’s one-year limit. The Districts’ argument
takes the familiar form of the slippery slope. But as with
any slippery slope argument, its power to persuade is a
function of the plausibility of its predictions.
In response to the Districts’ argument in the
administrative proceedings FERC stated: “It may be that
the courts will find repeated denials without prejudice,
particularly those that do not rest on any substantive
conclusions, to be the equivalent of the withdrawal-andresubmittal scheme.” Declaratory Order, at P. 33. 8 FERC
continued: “Given, however, that the state in this case
appears to have satisfied the statutory mandate for action,
we are not prepared to conclude based on the record before
us that the state has waived its section 401 authority.” Id.
It is also important to recognize that slippery slope
arguments often can be turned against themselves.
Potentially, for each slippery slope there is an opposing
slope. “As in all arguments from consequences, drawing
attention to the [supposed] bad outcomes of one course of
action is not enough; one has to show that the alternative
courses of action don’t have just as bad (or even worse)
consequences themselves.” David Enoch, Once You Start
Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You’re on a Very
Slippery Slope, 21 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 629, 636 (2001).
8. Whether the Districts’ hypothetical is plausible may depend
on whether the State agency, in issuing denials, is complying with
State law, which in turn may depend on the State agency’s reasons
for denying the applications.
10a
Appendix A
Counsel for FERC put the opposing slope this way.
What the Districts propose could lead to “gamesmanship.”
Respondent Br. 35. Applicants could file certification
requests lacking sufficient documentation. “That would
leave the State in an untenable position.” Id. Given the
Districts’ contention “that a within-one-year denial must
be ‘on the merits’ to avoid waiver . . . the State would
be stuck with the Hobson’s choice of either granting
certification [without necessary information] or waiving
its power to” decide. Id.
In deciding not to adopt the Districts’ proposed
interpretation of section 401(a)(1) FERC thus made what
can only be regarded as a quite rational judgment. The
Districts’ remaining arguments do not merit discussion
and have been denied for the reasons given by FERC.
The petitions for judicial review are denied.
11a
B the united
Appendix B —Appendix
order of
states federal energy regulatory
commission, filed may 21, 2021
175 FERC ¶ 61,144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Project Nos. 2299-087, 14581-004
Turlock Irrigation District
Modesto Irrigation District
Before Commissioners: Richard Glick, Chairman; Neil
Chatterjee, James P. Danly, Allison Clements, and
Mark C. Christie.
ORDER ADDRESSING ARGUMENTS
RAISED ON REHEARING
(May 21, 2021)
1. On February 18, 2021, Turlock Irrigation District
and Modesto Irrigation District (collectively, the Districts)
filed a request for rehearing of the Commission’s January
19, 2021 Declaratory Order on Waiver of Water Quality
Certification, 1 which denied the Districts’ petition
requesting the Commission to declare that the California
State Water Resources Control Board (California Board
or Board) waived its authority under section 401(a)(1)
1. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2021)
(Declaratory Order).
12a
Appendix B
of the Clean Water Act (CWA)2 to issue water quality
certification for relicensing the Don Pedro Project No.
2299 and licensing the La Grange Project No. 14581.
2. Pursuant to Allegheny Defense Project v. FERC, 3
the rehearing request filed in this proceeding may be
deemed denied by operation of law. However, as permitted
by section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act, 4 we are
modifying the discussion in the Declaratory Order and
continue to reach the same result in this proceeding, as
discussed below. 5
I.
Background
3. The Districts are co-licensees for the 168-megawatt
Don Pedro Project No. 2299.6 On April 28, 2014, the
Districts filed an application for a new license to continue
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
3. 964 F.3d 1, 448 U.S. App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(Allegheny).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a) (“Until the record in a proceeding shall
have been filed in a court of appeals, as provided in subsection (b),
the Commission may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such
manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in
part, any finding or order made or issued by it under the provisions
of this chapter.”).
5. Allegheny, 964 F.3d at 16-17. The Commission is not changing
the outcome of the Declaratory Order. See Smith Lake Improvement
& Stakeholders Ass’n v. FERC, 809 F.3d 55, 56-57, 420 U.S. App.
D.C. 400 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
6. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 31 FPC 510 (1964), aff’d sub nom.
Cal. v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965).
13a
Appendix B
to operate and maintain the Don Pedro Project. On
October 11, 2017, the Districts filed an application for an
original license to continue to operate and maintain the
unlicensed 4.7-megawatt La Grange Project.7
4. Under section 401(a)(1) of the CWA, any applicant
seeking a federal license for an activity that “may result
in any discharge into the navigable waters,” such as
a Commission-issued hydroelectric license, must first
seek water quality certification from the state or states
in which a discharge may occur. 8 However, certification
requirements shall be waived if the state “fails or refuses
to act on a request for certification, within a reasonable
period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after
receipt of such request.” 9
5. On January 26, 2018, the Districts filed applications
for water quality certification for the projects with the
California Board, which the Board received on the same
day: the Board recognized January 26, 2019, as the
one-year deadline to act on the requests.10 On January
24, 2019, the Board denied the Districts’ applications
7. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 141 FERC ¶ 62,211 (2012), reh’g
denied, 151 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2015), aff’d, Turlock Irrigation Dist.
v. FERC, 786 F.3d 18, 415 U.S. App. D.C. 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(establishing that the unlicensed La Grange Project was required
to be licensed).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
9. Id.
10. See Districts Petition for Declaratory Order at attachment
B (filed October 2, 2020) (the Board’s February 15, 2018 Receipt
Letter accepting the applications) (Petition).
14a
Appendix B
without prejudice, noting that the Commission had not
completed its review under the National Environmental
Policy Act, that the Districts had not begun the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) process, and that the
Board could not issue certification prior to completion
of the CEQA process.11 The Board further explained
that denial without prejudice was not a judgment on the
technical merits of the Districts’ applications, and that
the Districts would need to re-request certification in
order to maintain an active certification application.12 On
April 22, 2019, the Districts submitted to the Board what
they described as “substantively unchanged” requests for
certification for the projects, which the Board again denied
without prejudice on April 20, 2020.13 On July 20, 2020, the
Districts refiled their request and stated that the third
request was identical to the first and second requests for
certification.14 On October 2, 2020, the Districts jointly
filed a petition asking that the Commission declare that
the Board waived its authority to issue certification for
the projects, and subsequently withdrew their July 20,
2020 requests for certification on November 19, 2020.15
On January 15, 2021, the California Board issued water
quality certifications for the projects.16
11. Petition at attachment C (the Board’s January 24, 2019 Denial).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 10.
15. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
16. See Board Filing Notifying the Commission of the January
15, 2021 Water Quality Certificate Issuance Project Nos. 2299 and
14581(filed January 19, 2021).
15a
Appendix B
6. In the Declaratory Order, the Commission found
that the California Board, by denying the applications
without prejudice, satisfied CWA section 401’s requirement
that a state certifying agency act on an application within
one year.17 The Commission further reasoned that because
the Board acted on the Districts’ applications, neither the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Hoopa Valley
Tribe v. FERC,18 nor subsequent Commission opinions
applying Hoopa Valley, compelled a waiver finding here.19
In addition, the Commission determined that the validity
of the California Board’s decision to deny certification is a
question for California state court, and that the Districts
had not shown that these denials were unreviewable in
state court. 20
II. Procedural Issues
7. On January 29, 2021, two weeks after the California
Board issued final water quality certification, California
Sportfishing Protection Alliance, Tuolumne River Trust,
Trout Unlimited, American Whitewater, Merced River
Conservation Committee, Friends of the River, Golden
West Women Flyfishers and Central Sierra Environmental
Resource Center (collectively, Conservation Groups) filed
a motion requesting the Commission direct the Districts
17. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶¶ 28, 33.
18. 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S. App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(Hoopa Valley).
19. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶¶ 28, 33.
20. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.
16a
Appendix B
to resubmit their requests for water quality certification
with the Board. 21 On February 12, 2021, the Board filed
an answer to Conservation Groups’ motion, stating that
as it had issued final certification for the Don Pedro and
La Grange projects Conservation Groups’ motion was
moot, and that questions regarding the validity of the
Board’s action are matters of state, not federal, law and
are therefore not within the Commission’s purview. 22
8. We deny Conservation Groups’ motion. Given that
the California Board has issued certification for the
Don Pedro and La Grange projects (which Conservation
Groups fail to reference in their request), and that we
have declined to find the Board waived its authority
to issue certification, we agree with the Board that
Conservation Groups’ request is now moot. As we stated
in the Declaratory Order, questions regarding the validity
of the Board’s actions here -- be they denials without
prejudice, or issuance of certification after an application
has been withdrawn -- are “squarely within the state
court’s purview.” 23
21. See Conservation Groups Motion for Directive, Project Nos.
2299-082 and 14581-002 (Filed January 29, 2021).
22. See Board Motion to Intervene and Answer Project Nos.
2299-082 and 14581-002 at 11-16 (filed February 12, 2021).
23. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 32.
17a
Appendix B
III. Discussion
A. The California Board Acted on the Districts’
Application
9. On rehearing, the Districts assert that “the key
error in the Commission’s analysis” in the Declaratory
Order was finding that “by denying the applications
without prejudice, [the California Board] indeed acted
on them.” 24 The Districts contend that denying an
application without prejudice does not constitute acting
on the application for the purposes of section 401 and
that therefore not only is the holding in Hoopa Valley
applicable to this proceeding, but Hoopa Valley also
compels a finding of waiver in this instance.25 The Districts
aver that the Board, by issuing denials without prejudice
that did not address the technical merits of the Districts’
applications, and are not reviewable in state court, clearly
did not “act” on the Districts’ applications in the manner
Congress intended when drafting section 401. 26 Rather,
the Districts argue that the Board never intended to grant
or deny certification and only sought to evade section 401’s
one-year deadline. 27 The Districts further assert that the
legislative history of section 401 “confirms definitively”
that denial without prejudice does not constitute an act
24. See Districts Rehearing Request at 11 (citing Declaratory
Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 28).
25. See Districts Rehearing Request at 10-19.
26. Id.
27. Id.
18a
Appendix B
“sufficient ... to avoid waiver,” as Congress’ goal in adding
the waiver provision to section 401 was to prevent “sheer
inactivity” by the state. 28
10. The Districts argue that here, denial without
prejudice is equivalent to withdrawal and resubmittal
because under California regulations “denial without
prejudice is not a decision on the merits” and therefore
cannot constitute a denial under federal law. 29 In support,
the Districts note that California regulations provide
that where “the federal period for certification will
expire before” the certifying agency can review the
application, the agency may either deny the application
without prejudice, or direct the applicant to withdraw
the application. 30 The Districts further contend that that
the Board’s denials without prejudice are akin to the
Commission’s previous practice of issuing tolling orders,
deemed invalid in Allegheny, 31 as the goal in each instance
was simply to “delay the process.” 32
11. The Districts’ arguments are not compelling. As the
Commission explained in the Declaratory Order, the court
in Hoopa Valley found that “section 401 does not define
28. Id. at 13-14.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23 § 3831(h) (2020)).
31. 964 F.3d 1, 448 U.S. App. D.C. 1.
32. See Districts Rehearing Request at 13.
19a
Appendix B
‘failure to act’ or ‘refusal to act.’”33 The Districts argue
that because denial without prejudice “is not a decision on
the merits” it therefore “cannot be a ‘denial’ as a matter
of federal law.” 34 But aside from these assertions, the
Districts provide no support for their claim that the plain
language of section 401 requires a state certifying agency
to address the technical merits of the request for water
quality certification in order to satisfy the requirement
that a state act on a request within one year. Further, in
proceedings prior to Hoopa Valley, the Board referenced
denial without prejudice as a potential consequence if
applications were not withdrawn and resubmitted. 35 That
the Board appears to have historically regarded denial
without prejudice as a definite agency action, as opposed to
withdrawal and resubmittal by the applicant, casts doubt
on the Districts’ argument that the Board, and California
regulations, treat denial without prejudice and withdrawal
33. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33 (citing Hoopa
Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104). Further, the Commission explained that
it is “reluctant to read meaning into the statute that Congress
intended the terms ‘failure to act’ or ‘refusal to act’ to encompass
a state’s denial of certification without prejudice, especially as our
interpretation of the CWA is entitled to no deference.” Id.
34. See Districts Rehearing Request at 12.
35. See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co., 172 FERC ¶ 61,066, at ¶ 25
(2020) (where the Board “mention[ed] denial without prejudice
as a possibility if [the applicant] failed to provide supplemental
information in a timely manner”); see also Placer Cnty. Water
Agency, 167 FERC ¶ 61,056, at ¶ 6 n.6 (Placer County), reh’g denied
169 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2019) (featuring emailed exchanges from 2014
wherein the Board requested the applicant withdraw and resubmit its
application “[t]o prevent denial of your request without prejudice”).
20a
Appendix B
and resubmittal as one and the same. 36 Regarding the
Districts’ arguments that the Board’s denials are the
same as the tolling orders, 37 the court in Allegheny stated
that tolling orders involved grants of rehearing explicitly
for the purpose of affording additional time to consider
the merits of the rehearing request. 38 Such a scenario is
entirely inapposite to this proceeding, which involves a
state certifying agency’s denial of a request for water
quality certification. 39
12. The Districts, repeating arguments made in
their Petition,40 allege that the California Board’s denials
without prejudice do not constitute acting on an application
36. See Districts Rehearing Request at 12-13. In addition,
in response to the Districts’ arguments relying on California
regulations, the Commission notes that the California Code of
Regulations does not appear to treat withdrawal and resubmittal
and denial without prejudice as one and the same. The California
Code of Regulations defines denial without prejudice as a “form
of denial” resulting from an “inability to grant certification for
procedural rather than substantive reasons.” See Cal. Code Regs.
tit. 23 § 3837(b)(2) (2020). While the California Code of Regulations
suggests withdrawal and resubmittal as an alternative to denial
without prejudice, they refer to denial without prejudice as a denial.
See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23 §§ 3831, 3835 (2020).
37. Id. at 13.
38. Allegheny, 964 F.3d at 13-14.
39. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶¶ 6-9 (explaining
the California Board’s rationale for denying the Districts’ requests).
40. Compare Districts Rehearing Request at 18-19 with
Petition at 29-30.
21a
Appendix B
under section 401 because they are not reviewable in state
court, asserting that “[u]nder California law, because the
denials were without prejudice, they are not considered
final agency actions.”41 However, as we found in the
Declaratory Order, the Districts have not demonstrated
that they have “attempted and been thwarted in an
attempt to seek review” of the Board’s denials. 42 On
rehearing, the Districts rely on the same trio of California
state court cases cited in the Petition, which the Districts
allege demonstrate that in California, denials without
prejudice are not considered final agency action and
are therefore unreviewable.43 Having already examined
these cases, the Commission remains unconvinced that
“the state court cases cited by the Districts persuasively
establish that the Districts’ ability to challenge the
Board’s denial of the Districts’ requests for certification
is foreclosed.”44 The Districts have not provided evidence
which persuades the Commission that an attempt by the
Districts to seek state court review of the denials would
41. Districts Rehearing Request at 18.
42. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 34. The
Commission notes that on February 16, 2021, the Districts filed a
“Petition for Reconsideration and Request for Stay” of their water
quality certificates with the Board. See Districts, Filing, Project
Nos. 2299 and 14581 (February 24, 2021).
43. Compare Districts Rehearing Request at 18, n.74, with
Petition at 29, n.97 (citing SJCBC, LLC v. Horwedel, 201 Cal. App.
4th 339, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 85, 92 (Ct. App. 2011); McHugh v. Cnty of
Santa Cruz, 33 Cal. App. 3d 533, 109 Cal. Rptr. 149, 153 (Ct. App.
1973); Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry, 18 Cal. App. 3d 415, 95
Cal. Rptr. 860, 871 (Ct. App. 1971)).
44. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 34.
22a
Appendix B
fail solely because the denials were without prejudice.
Without successfully establishing that the Board’s denials
without prejudice are not reviewable in state court, it
remains unseen whether such denials render section
401’s one-year deadline “superfluous” or otherwise violate
section 401.45 Regarding the Districts’ legislative history
arguments, nothing in the legislative history suggests
that a conclusive action such as denial (with or without
prejudice) is equivalent to the concern regarding “sheer
inactivity” identified in the legislative history.
13. The Districts further aver that their petition only
asked the Commission to find that the Board failed to act
under section 401 as a matter of federal law, and clarify
that they do not wish for the Commission “to opine on
state law” regarding the validity of the Board’s denials.46
Whether the Board acted under federal law pursuant
to CWA section 401 is the precise question answered
by the Commission in the Declaratory Order,47 as the
Commission found that “the appropriateness of a state’s
decision to deny certification” is “squarely within the state
court’s purview.”48 Accordingly, there is no disagreement
over this issue.49
45. See Districts Rehearing Request at 13-17.
46. Id. at 22-23.
47. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 28.
48. Id. at ¶ 32.
49. The Commission notes that it proffers no opinion as to
whether the Board’s denials are valid under California Code of
Regulations or California law, and only references the California
Code of Regulations in response to the Districts’ arguments.
23a
Appendix B
14. The Districts, for the first time on rehearing, assert
that the California Board’s denials without prejudice
would be insufficient under the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule.50
The Environmental Protection Agency published its Final
Rule in the Federal Register on July 13, 2020, and the rule
became effective on September 11, 2020. 51 As the Board’s
denials were all issued prior to the Final Rule’s effective
date, application of the Final Rule to the Board’s actions
in this proceeding would violate the Administrative
Procedure Act’s general rule against retroactivity. 52
Moreover, the Districts had ample opportunity to present
this argument in the their October 2, 2020 Petition, and
offer no explanation for why they failed to do so. The
Commission looks with disfavor on parties raising issues
for the first time on rehearing that could have been raised
earlier, in part because other parties are not permitted
to respond to requests for rehearing. 53 Therefore, we will
not address the Districts’ argument on this issue. 53
50. See Districts Rehearing Request at 17-18 (arguing that the
Board’s denials were insufficient under the Final Rule, as they did
not describe the specific information missing from the Districts’
requests) (citing 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020) (Final Rule)).
51. Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210.
52. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining a rule as an agency
statement with “future effect”).
53. See, e.g., S. Shore Energy, LLC, 168 FERC ¶ 61,118, at ¶ 12
& n.39 (2019) (citing Calpine Oneta Power v. Am. Elec. Power Serv.
Corp., 114 FERC ¶ 61,030, at ¶ 7 (2006) (“The Commission looks with
disfavor on parties raising new issues on rehearing. Such behavior
is disruptive to the administrative process because it has the effect
24a
Appendix B
B. No Coordinated Scheme to Evade Section 401’s
One-Year Deadline
15. The Districts argue that the Commission “erred
in inferring there was no coordinated scheme” to extend
section 401’s one-year deadline, and assert that in doing
so the Commission “arbitrarily and capriciously holds
the Districts to a higher standard than applicants in past
proceedings, without explanation.”54 The Districts contend
the California Board engaged in such coordination by
twice accepting as complete “substantively unchanged
applications” only to later deny the applications as
deficient, while “invit[ing] the Districts to submit a new
application.”55 In addition, the Districts assert that it was
arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to consider
the fact that the Board issued its first denial without
prejudice prior to the D.C. Circuit’s issuing its opinion in
Hoopa Valley. 56
of moving the target for parties seeking a final administrative
decision.”)); cf. 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(c)(3) (“[a]ny request for rehearing
must ... [s]et forth the matters relied upon by the party requesting
rehearing, if rehearing is sought based on matters not available for
consideration by the Commission at the time of the final decision or
final order.”); 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(d)(1) (“The Commission will not
permit answers to requests for rehearing.”).
54. See Districts Rehearing Request at 19.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Id. at 21.
25a
Appendix B
16. As an initial matter, as we found in the Declaratory
Order57 and reiterate here,58 because the California Board
acted on the Districts’ requests for certification within
one year of receipt, the holding in Hoopa Valley does not
control here; accordingly, the Commission need not assess
whether a coordinated withdrawal and resubmittal scheme
took place. Regardless, were the Commission to consider
the Districts’ argument that there was a coordinated
scheme in this proceeding akin to that present in Hoopa
Valley and subsequent Commission proceedings, the
Districts’ arguments would still fail, as discussed below.
17. Hoopa Valley involved a proceeding where the
California Board entered into a formal, written agreement
with an applicant for water quality certification that
required the applicant to annually withdraw and resubmit
its application for certification, for the purpose of avoiding
section 401’s one-year deadline. 59 In evaluating those
circumstances, the court in Hoopa Valley held that indeed
“a state waives its Section 401 authority when, pursuant
to an agreement between the state and applicant, an
applicant repeatedly withdraws and resubmits its request
for water quality certification over a period of time greater
than one year.”60
57. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 28.
58. See supra ¶¶ 9-11.
59. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1101-03.
60. Id. at 1103.
26a
Appendix B
18. In Placer County, an applicant repeatedly withdrew
and refiled its request for water quality certification over
several years, often after the California Board emailed the
applicant and directly requested the applicant withdraw
its application in order to avoid section 401’s one-year
deadline.61 In finding that the Board’s actions constituted
waiver, the Commission determined that Hoopa Valley
does not require a formal agreement between a licensee
and a state certifying agency, but that exchanges between
entities could amount to an ongoing agreement.62 Although
the parties in Placer County did not enter into a formal,
written agreement as in Hoopa Valley, the Commission
determined that the state and the licensee had formed a
functional agreement by working together to ensure that
withdrawal and resubmission would take place each year,
thus delaying a certification decision by over six years.63
19. Citing several Commission orders,64 the Districts
contend that the Commission has previously held that
accepting an applicant’s withdrawal and resubmittal
letters “is enough to show coordination” and that we have
“also found a coordinated scheme” where the certifying
agency “communicated about, requested, and expected”
61. 167 FERC ¶ 61,056 at ¶ 6.
62. Placer Cnty. Water Agency, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 at ¶¶ 16, 18.
63. Id.
64. See Districts Rehearing Request at 20 (citing S. Cal. Edison
Co., 170 FERC ¶ 61,135, at ¶ 25 (2020) (S. Cal. Edison); Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co., 172 FERC ¶ 61,065, at ¶¶ 21-22 (2020); S. Feather Water
& Power Agency, 171 FERC ¶ 61,242, at ¶¶ 22-23 (2020); Merced
Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,240, at ¶ 22 (2020)).
27a
Appendix B
an applicant’s withdrawal and resubmittal.65 The Districts
assert that, in this case, the California Board has engaged
in a coordinated scheme by accepting “substantively
unchanged applications” as complete after having denied
the applications without prejudice and then inviting, or
once encouraging, the Districts to reapply.66
20. As the Commission has found previously, mere
acceptance of an application that has been withdrawn and
resubmitted is insufficient to find waiver where it cannot
be shown that the withdrawal and resubmittal is made
“at the behest of the state certifying agency to delay a
certification decision.”67 In this proceeding, there is no
record evidence showing that the Board communicated
about, expected, requested, or encouraged68 the Districts
to withdraw and resubmit their applications for the
purpose of avoiding waiver, or that the Districts ever
withdrew and resubmitted their applications as a result
65. See id. (quoting S. Cal. Edison, 170 FERC ¶ 61,135 at ¶ 25
(internal quotations omitted, emphasis added).
66. See Districts Rehearing Request at 20.
67. See, e.g., Vill. of Morrisville, Vt., 173 FERC ¶ 61,156, at
¶ 21 (2020); KEI (Maine) Power Management (III) LLC, 173 FERC
¶ 61,069, at ¶¶ 42-46 (2020).
68. The Commission notes that the Board’s sole instance of
encouragement was limited the Board’s April 20, 2020 denial without
prejudice where the Board stated that the Districts may submit
a new request for certification, with no reference to the Districts
withdrawing and resubmitting their application, or the waiver
provision of section 401. See Petition at attachment C (the Board’s
April 20, 2020 denial letter).
28a
Appendix B
of any such exchanges; therefore, we continue to find that
no coordinated scheme took place.69 As this proceeding
features none of the circumstances that were present in
prior instances in which the Commission has found waiver
post-Hoopa Valley, there is no basis for finding that the
Commission has held the Districts “to a higher standard
than past applicants in prior proceedings.” 70
21. Finally, the Districts assert that the Commission’s
consideration of the fact that the California Board denied
their application without prejudice, instead of directing
them to withdraw and resubmit, prior to the issuance of
the opinion in Hoopa Valley is “arbitrary and capricious
because it is irrelevant” and contend that “[i]t does
not matter when the Board tried to stop the clock; it
matters only that it tried to do so.” 71 To the contrary, we
continue to find that the Board denial of the Districts’
application without prejudice, instead of instructing the
Districts to withdraw and resubmit their applications,
prior to the Hoopa Valley holding that such coordinated
schemes result in waiver, is relevant to and supports
the Commission’s finding that the Board did not seek
to engage in a coordinated scheme in this proceeding.
Indeed, at the time of denial, the court had not yet ruled
that coordinated withdrawal and resubmittal schemes
resulted in waiver.
69. There is no record evidence and the dissent does not cite
to any record evidence to infer that the Board intended to override
section 401’s waiver provision. See Dissent at ¶ 3.
70. See Districts Rehearing Request at 19.
71. See id. at 20-21.
29a
Appendix B
The Commission orders:
(A) In response to the Districts’ request for rehearing,
the Declaratory Order is hereby modified and the result
sustained, as discussed in the body of this order.
(B) Conservation Groups’ Motion for Directive is
denied.
By the Commission. Commissioner Danly is dissenting
with a separate statement attached.
(SEAL)
Debbie-Anne A. Reese,
Deputy Secretary
30a
Appendix B
DANLY, Commissioner, dissenting:
1. I dissent from today’s order on rehearing reaffirming
the Commission’s finding that the California State Water
Resources Control Board (Board) did not waive its ability
to issue a water quality certification to Turlock Irrigation
District and Modesto Irrigation District (Districts).
Although I initially voted for not finding waiver,1 after
considering the material raised in the request for
rehearing and reviewing the filings in the proceeding, it
is now my view that our prior finding—reaffirmed here—
contravenes section 401 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).
2. CWA section 401 delegates to states the authority
to issue water quality certifications for the construction
or operation of facilities that may discharge into navigable
waters within their jurisdiction. 2 While broad, that
delegation is not limitless. Congress required states
to “establish procedures for public notice in the case
of all applications” and permitted states to establish
“procedures for public hearings in connection with specific
1. See Turlock Irrigation Dist., 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2021)
(Declaratory Order). To the extent that the Commission signaled
in Merced Irrigation District that denial without prejudice for the
purpose of extending the one-year deadline is considered an “act”
under CWA section 401, I voted for that order in error. See Merced
Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,240, at ¶ 32 (2020) (“We note that to
the extent a state lacks sufficient information to act on a certification
request, it has a remedy: it can deny certification. Delay beyond the
statutory deadline, however, is not an option.”).
2. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
31a
Appendix B
applications.” 3 Then, in order to “curb a state’s ‘dalliance
or unreasonable delay,’”4 Congress provided that if a
state “fails or refuses to act on a request for certification,
within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed
one year) after receipt of such request, the certification
requirements of this subsection shall be waived with
respect to such Federal application.”5 In Hoopa Valley
Tribe v. FERC (Hoopa Valley), the court found that
“[w]hile the statute does not define ‘failure to act’ or
‘refusal to act,’ the states’ efforts . . . constitute such
failure and refusal within the plain meaning of these
phrases” because “the withdrawal-and-resubmission
scheme could be used to indefinitely delay federal licensing
proceedings.”6
3. Like the withdrawal-resubmission scheme found
impermissible in Hoopa Valley, the Board in this case
twice denied the Districts’ application in what appears to
be an attempt to override the statute’s one-year deadline
thereby affording itself additional time to act. The Board
received the application, acknowledged receipt, found the
Districts’ application met the filing requirements set forth
in the California Code of Regulations, and identified the
3. Id.
4. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1104, 439 U.S.
App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 9264 (1969))
(emphasis omitted).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
6. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.
32a
Appendix B
one-year deadline for certification.7 The Board did not
request additional information. And just two days before
the one-year deadline, the Board denied the application
without prejudice stating that environmental review
under the National Environmental Policy Act and the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) had not
been completed and the Board therefore could not issue its
certification. 8 The Board also explained that the Districts
would need to request certification “[i]n order to maintain
an active certification application.” 9
4. Then, after the Districts filed their application
“substantively unchanged,”10 the Board did it all again,
denying the application just two days before the deadline
but this time adding, “without elaboration, that ‘the
proposed activity does not comply with applicable water
quality standards and other appropriate requirements.’”11
7. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 5.
8. See id. ¶ 6; see also Merced Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC
¶ 61,240 at ¶ 22 (“Moreover, the Commission found unavailing the
Board’s assertion that it could not issue a water quality certification
until the CEQA process was complete, which often takes more than
one year, and determined that the general principle from Hoopa
Valley still applied.”) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 170 FERC ¶ 61,232,
at ¶¶ 31-33 (2020)).
9. Districts Petition at attachment C (Board January 24, 2019
Denial Letter).
10. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 8 (citation
omitted).
11. Id. ¶ 9 (quoting District Petition at attachment C (Board
April 20, 2020 Denial Letters)).
33a
Appendix B
Despite finding that the proposed activity did not comply
with applicable standards, the Board issued a water
quality certification for the Districts’ third request,
which was “identical to the first and second requests
for certification.”12 The timing of the ultimate approval
also bears note: it occurred after the Districts filed their
petition for finding waiver and had withdrawn their third
request.
5. Whether the Board explicitly suggests withdrawal
and resubmission, or styles its suggestion as a denial
without prejudice, removing the applicant’s complicity, the
result is the same: the Board’s denial without prejudice in
this case “usurp[s] FERC’s control over whether and when
a federal license will issue”13 and is intended to override
the waiver provision “created ‘to prevent a State from
indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding.’”14
Indeed, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has stated in guidance, under the heading, “When More
12. Id. ¶ 10.
13. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.
14. Id. at 1104-05 (citing Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v.
FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 972-73, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 425 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 701-02, 429
U.S. App. D.C. 403 (D.C. Cir. 2017)); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t
Conservation v. FERC, 991 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Section
401 was intended to curb conduct by certifying states that upsets
the regulatory balance set by Congress.”) (citation omitted); id. at
450 (“[W]e are bound by what we believe to be Congress’ intention
expressed in the text of Section 401 and reinforced in its legislative
history to reduce flexibility in favor of protecting the overall federal
licensing regime.”).
34a
Appendix B
Time is Needed,” that “states have tended to take two
approaches”: (1) suggesting the applicant withdraw and
resubmit its application and (2) denying the application
without prejudice.15 EPA explicitly declined to endorse
either approach as consistent with CWA section 401.16
6. The Commission does not dispute that denials
without prejudice could be used to override the waiver
provision.17 Rather, the Commission argues that the
15. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Wetlands,
Oceans and Watersheds, Clean Water Act Section 401: A Water
Quality Protection Tool for States and Tribes, 13 (2010), https://
eelp.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/section-401-of-the-cleanwater-actfrom-trump-to-biden/ (linking to Clean Water Act Section 401: A
Water Quality Protection Tool for States and Tribes under the
term “interim guidance”) (2010 Guidance) (emphasis added). The
2010 Guidance was rescinded and replaced in 2019 with an updated
guidance, which recommended, “the state or tribe not delay action
on a certification request until a NEPA review is complete unless
the request is submitted at or near the conclusion of the NEPA
process.” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Act
Section 401 Guidance for Federal Agencies, States, and Authorized
Tribes, 5 (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-06/
documents/cwa_section_401_guidance.pdf (2019 Guidance). The 2019
Guidance is no longer in effect. See U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, CWA Section 401 Certification, https://www.epa.gov/cwa401/clean-water-act-section-401-guidance-federal-agencies-statesand-authorized-tribes.
16. 2010 Guidance at 13 n.70 (“This handbook does not endorse
either of the two approaches, but emphasizes the need for coordination
regarding necessary information early in the certification process in
order to avoid denial or withdrawal due to data gaps.”).
17. See Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at 33.
35a
Appendix B
Board’s denial without prejudice in this case constituted
an “act” because “section 401 does not define ‘failure to
act’ or ‘refusal to act’”18 and the Commission is “reluctant”
to interpret such phrases as encompassing a denial
without prejudice when its interpretation is entitled to no
deference.19 This argument is essentially the same as that
made by the Commission, and that the Hoopa Valley court
rejected, in support of the withdrawal-and-resubmission
scheme constituting an “act”: “The Act therefore speaks
solely to state action or inaction, rather than the repeated
withdrawal and refiling of applications.” 20 This argument
is no more compelling because the state treats withdrawalresubmission and denial without prejudice differently. 21
Those may be different labels but both are used to achieve
the same result. The rights of the Districts to potentially
appeal (so long as they have exhausted all administrative
remedies) the denial in state court does not cure the fact
that the denial without prejudice is a procedural device
used to override the one-year deadline. 22
7. I cannot fault my colleagues for their reluctance
to reduce a state’s flexibility to issue water quality
18. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 175 FERC ¶ 61,144, at ¶ 11 (2021)
(quoting Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33).
19. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33.
20. PacifiCorp, 149 FERC ¶ 61,038, at ¶ 20 (2014), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S. App. D.C.
304 (emphasis in original).
21. See Turlock Irrigation Dist., 175 FERC ¶ 61,144 at ¶ 11.
22. See id.
36a
Appendix B
certifications. Indeed, my inclination in such cases is
always to allow the state instrumentality to act as it sees
fit under the statutory scheme enacted by Congress and
let aggrieved parties seek redress in state court. The
federal courts, however, have spoken. They have stated
that procedural schemes that work an extension of the
one-year deadline constitute failures or refusals to act.
And, in fact, here the state heeded the court’s guidance
and revised their procedures in order to comply with the
reinvigorated one-year deadline. 23 The Board’s repeated
denials without prejudice are essentially the same as the
scheme in Hoopa Valley. The court has instructed us as
to our duty and I see no reason to wait for the issue to
reach the courts before finding waiver as the Commission
suggests, my respect for the states’ independence
notwithstanding. 24
23. See Board January 19, 2021 Water Quality Certification
at 18 (“On June 29, 2020, Governor Newsome signed into law
amendments to the Water Code that provide the State Water Board
with the authority to issue certifications before completion of CEQA
review, where waiting until completion of CEQA review presents a
substantial risk of wavier of certification authority.”).
24. See Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33 (“It may
be that the courts will find repeated denials without prejudice, and
particularly those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions,
to be the equivalent of the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme.”).
The Board has denied without prejudice water quality certifications
in eight other proceedings: (1) Yuba-Bear Hydroelectric Project No.
2266 (Accession No. 20190205-0043), (2) Merced River Hydroelectric
Project No. 2179 (Accession No. 20190429-0020), (3) Merced Falls
Hydroelectric Project No. 2467 (Accession No. 20190429-0020), (4)
Yuba River Project No. 2246 (Accession No. 20190822-5016), (5) Deer
Creek Project No. 14530 (Accession No. 20181217-0025), (6) Upper
37a
Appendix B
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
James P. Danly
Commissioner
North Fork Feather River Hydroelectric Project No. 2105 (Accession
No. 20190228-0019), (7) Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project No. 2299
(Accession No. 20190206-0011), and (8) La Grange Hydroelectric
Project No. 14581 (Accession No. 20190206-0011).
38a
Appendix c —Appendix
NOTICECOF DENIAL OF
REHEARING of the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, filed MARCH 22, 2021
174 FERC ¶ 62,175
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Turlock Irrigation District Project Nos. 2299-087
Modesto Irrigation District
14581-004
NOTICE OF DENIAL OF REHEARING BY
OPERATION OF LAW AND PROVIDING FOR
FURTHER CONSIDERATION
(March 22, 2021)
Rehear ing has been timely requested of the
Commission’s order issued on January 19, 2021, in this
proceeding. Turlock Irrigation District., 174 FERC
¶ 61,042 (2021). In the absence of Commission action on
the request for rehearing within 30 days from the date
the request was filed, the request for rehearing (and any
timely requests for rehearing filed subsequently)1 may be
deemed denied. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a); 18 C.F.R. § 385.713
(2020); Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 964 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (en banc).
1. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy &
Ancillary Servs. Into Mkts. Operated by Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator
& Cal. Power Exch., 95 FERC ¶ 61,173 (2001).
39a
Appendix C
As provided in 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a), the rehearing
request of the above-cited order filed in this proceeding
will be addressed in a future order to be issued consistent
with the requirements of such section. As also provided
in 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a), the Commission may modify or set
aside its above-cited order, in whole or in part, in such
manner as it shall deem proper. As provided in 18 C.F.R.
§ 385.713(d), no answers to the rehearing request will be
entertained.
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
40a
APPENDIX d —Appendix
ORDER D
OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION,
DATED JANUARY 19, 2021
174 FERC ¶ 61,042
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Before Commissioners: James P. Danly, Chairman;
Neil Chatterjee, Richard Glick,
Allison Clements, and
Mark C. Christie
Turlock Irrigation District
Modesto Irrigation District
Project Nos. 2299-082,
14581-002
DECLARATORY ORDER ON WAIVER
OF WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION
(Issued January 19, 2021)
1. On October 2, 2020, Turlock Irrigation District and
Modesto Irrigation District (the Districts), licensees for
the Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project No. 2299 (Don Pedro
Project) and applicants for the unlicensed La Grange
Hydroelectric Project No. 14581 (La Grange Project),
jointly filed a petition for declaratory order. The Districts
request that the Commission declare that the California
State Water Resources Control Board (California Board
or Board) waived its authority under section 401(a)(1)
41a
Appendix D
of the Clean Water Act (CWA)1 to issue water quality
certifications for relicensing the Don Pedro Project and
for licensing the La Grange Project. This order denies
the petition.
I.
Background
2. The 168-megawatt Don Pedro Project is located
on the Tuolumne River in Tuolumne County, California.
The Commission’s predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission, issued a 50-year original license for the Don
Pedro Project on March 10, 1964. 2 The Districts filed a
timely application for a new license to continue to operate
and maintain the Don Pedro Project on April 28, 2014. 3
The license expired on April 30, 2016, and the Districts
continue to operate the Don Pedro Project under an annual
license.4
3. The 4.7-megawatt La Grange Project is located
on the Tuolumne River in Stanislaus and Tuolumne
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
2. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 31 FPC 510 (1964), aff’d sub nom.
California v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965). The license authorized
construction of a new dam and reservoir that submerged existing,
unlicensed project facilities constructed in 1923. The license was
effective as of the first day of the month in which the Districts
accepted it, which did not occur until May 1965 after judicial review.
3. The Districts filed an amended license application for the
Don Pedro Project on October 11, 2017.
4. Notice of Authorization for Continued Project Operation
(May 5, 2016).
42a
Appendix D
Counties, California, immediately downstream of the Don
Pedro Project. On December 19, 2012, Commission staff
issued an order finding that the existing, unlicensed La
Grange Project requires licensing because it is located on
a navigable river and occupies federal land. 5 On October
11, 2017, the Districts filed an application for an original
license to continue to operate and maintain the La Grange
Project.
4. Pursuant to public notices issued by the Commission,
the deadline for filing motions to intervene in the Don
Pedro Project relicense proceeding and the La Grange
Project license proceeding was January 29, 2018.6
5. The Districts requested water quality certification
for each project on January 26, 2018, and the California
Board received the requests the same day.7 On January
5. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 141 FERC ¶ 62,211 (2012), reh’g
denied, 151 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2015), aff’d, Turlock Irrigation Dist. v.
FERC, 786 F.3d 18, 415 U.S. App. D.C. 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
6. See November 30, 2017 Notices of Application Accepted for
Filing issued for Project Nos. 2299-082 and 14581-002. A second
intervention period followed Commission staff’s issuance of the
draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). See February 11,
2019 Notice of Availability of the Draft EIS for the Don Pedro and
La Grange Projects (setting April 12, 2019, as the deadline for filing
comments on the draft EIS); 18 C.F.R. § 380.10(a) (2020) (deeming
timely any motion to intervene filed on the basis of, and within the
comment period for, a draft EIS).
7. As required by section 5.23(b)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s
regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 5.23(b)(1)(ii) (2020), the Districts filed a copy
of the requests with the Commission, including proof of the date of
receipt of the request.
43a
Appendix D
29, 2018, the Board provided preliminary certification
conditions for the projects. 8 Thereafter, in a February
15, 2018 letter to the Districts acknowledging receipt
of the certification applications, the Board stated
that the Districts’ applications met the application
filing requirements set forth in the California Code of
Regulations (California Code),9 and identified January 26,
2019, as the one-year deadline for certification action.10
6. On January 24, 2019, the California Board denied
without prejudice the Districts’ applications.11 The Board’s
denial letter stated that the Commission had not completed
its review under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), that the Districts had not started the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) process, and that the
Board could not issue certification prior to completion
of the CEQA process.12 Explaining that “denial without
8. The California Board provided comments and preliminary
terms and conditions for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects in
response to the Commission’s November 30, 2017 Notice of Ready
for Environmental Analysis.
9. Districts’ October 2, 2020 Petition for Declaratory Order at
attachment B (California Board’s February 15, 2018 Receipt Letter)
(citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 3856) (Petition).
10. Id.
11. Petition at attachment C (California Board’s January 24,
2019 Denial Letter).
12. Id. The Board has explained that, at the time of the January
2019 certification denial, it “could not determine compliance with
water quality standards and issue water quality certification until
environmental documentation had been prepared evaluating the
44a
Appendix D
prejudice carries with it no judgment on the technical
merits of the activity,” the Board notified the Districts of
the need to re-request certification in order to maintain
active certification applications for the projects.13
7. On January 25, 2019, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit)
issued an opinion in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC,14 ruling
that, where a state and an applicant agree to repeatedly
withdraw and refile the same water quality certification
request, the state has waived its certification authority.
8. On April 22, 2019, the Districts submitted to the
California Board their second requests for water quality
certification for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.
The Districts noted that, aside from an updated procedural
background, their letters requesting certification were
“substantively unchanged” from their initial requests.15
In its May 21, 2019 letters to the Districts acknowledging
receipt of the applications, the Board again stated that
potential environmental impacts of the proposed project and any
feasible mitigation measures.” California Board’s October 29, 2020
Motion to Intervene and Comments on Petition at 20 (California
Board’s October 29 Comments).
13. See id.
14. 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S. App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Hoopa
Valley) (rejecting a coordinated withdrawal-and-resubmission
scheme between the applicant and the state certifying agency).
15. Petition at 8.
45a
Appendix D
the applications met the application filing requirements,16
and identified April 22, 2020, as the one-year deadline for
certification action.17
9. On April 20, 2020, the California Board denied
without prejudice the Districts’ second certification
requests.18 The Board noted that it “may not issue a
certification until the requirements for compliance with
CEQA are met,” and that the Commission had not yet
completed its NEPA process. Further, the Boards’ letters
stated, without elaboration, that “the proposed activity
does not comply with applicable water quality standards
and other appropriate requirements.”19 In its denial letter
for each project, the Board “encourage[d] the Districts to
submit a new request for certification.” 20
10. On July 20, 2020, the Districts submitted to the
California Board their third requests for water quality
certification for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.
Again, the Districts stated that, aside from updating the
procedural background, their third requests were identical
to the first and second requests for certification. 21 In its
16. Id. at attachment B (California Board’s May 21, 2019 Receipt
Letters) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 3856).
17. Id.
18. Id. at attachment C (California Board’s April 20, 2020
Denial Letters).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 10.
46a
Appendix D
August 18, 2020 letters to the Districts acknowledging
receipt of the applications, the Board again notified the
Districts that the applications met the application filing
requirements, 22 and identified July 20, 2021, as the oneyear deadline for certification action. 23
11. On October 2, 2020, the Districts filed the instant
petition. They subsequently withdrew their third requests
for certification, on November 19, 2020. 24 On December
1, 2020, the California Board filed draft certifications for
the projects. 25
II. Procedural Issues
12. On November 6, 2020, the Commission issued
public notice of the Districts’ petition, establishing
22. Id. at attachment B (California Board’s August 18, 2020
Receipt Letters) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 3856).
23. Id.
24. Districts’ November 20, 2020 Copy of Withdrawal of
Requests for Water Quality Certification.
25. California Board’s December 1, 2020 Copy of Draft Water
Quality Certification for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.
Notwithstanding that the Districts had not initiated the CEQA
process as of the date of the draft certification (i.e., November 30,
2020), the California Board explained that, pursuant to a June
2020 amendment to the California Water Code, the Board is now
authorized to issue certifications before completion of CEQA
review, “where waiting until completion of CEQA review presents
a substantial risk of waiver of certification.” Id. (citing Cal. Water
Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020)); see also Petition, Attachment F (providing
copy of Cal. Water Code § 13160 and Assembly Bill No. 92).
47a
Appendix D
December 7, 2020, as the deadline for filing interventions
and comments on the petition. 26 Before the Commission
issued that notice, the California Board filed comments
and a motion to inter vene on October 29, 2020. 27
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, Tuolumne
River Trust, Trout Unlimited, American Whitewater,
Merced River Conservation Committee, Friends of
the River, Golden West Women Flyfishers and Central
Sierra Environmental Resource Center (collectively,
Conservation Groups) filed initial comments on November
2, 2020. On November 13, 2020, the Districts filed an
answer in opposition to the California Board’s motion
to intervene. On November 30, 2020, the Districts filed
an answer to the California Board’s and Conservation
Groups’ comments. On December 7, 2020, Sierra Club filed
comments and a motion to intervene, and the Conservation
Groups filed supplemental comments. All commenters
oppose the petition.
13. In support of its motion to intervene, the California
Board first points to the Commission’s recent practice of
publicly noticing the filing of a petition for declaratory
order regarding waiver of water quality certification under
section 401. 28 Those notices of petitions, the Board states,
26. 85 Fed. Reg. 72,646 (Nov. 13, 2020).
27. The California Board subsequently filed a second request
to intervene, which included, “out of an abundance of caution,” a
request to incorporate by reference its October 29, 2020 motion to
intervene and comments, which preceded the Commission’s public
notice of the Districts’ petition. California Board’s December 4, 2020
Notice of Intervention, Motion to Intervene, and Comments at 2-3.
28. California Board’s October 29 Comments at 10.
48a
Appendix D
have provided an opportunity for entities to file notices
of intervention, motions to intervene, or protests and the
Commission has accepted as timely any interventions
filed during the time period established by the notice.
Therefore, the Board asserts, its intervention should be
considered timely. Second, the California Board states
that its intervention should be granted to allow the Board
to “exercise its statutorily recognized duties with respect
to Section 401 water quality certification” and in light of its
“statutory responsibilities to protect the quality of waters
of the state in the public interest.” 29 Third, because its
actions are the target of the Districts’ petition, the Board
states that denying intervention would be unfair, as no
other party can adequately represent the Board’s interest
in preserving its authority under section 401 of the CWA. 30
Fourth, the Board asserts that it had good cause for not
intervening earlier in the license proceedings for the Don
Pedro and La Grange Projects because it had no reason
to believe its authority to deny or condition certification
would be jeopardized and because it could not foresee
the ramifications of the yet-to-be-issued Hoopa Valley
opinion. Good cause is further established, the California
Board asserts, because it had no reason to anticipate that
its denials of certification would be reviewed in a forum
other than state court and because the Board has been
an active participant in the license proceedings. 31 The
Board urges the Commission to “unconditionally confirm,
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 13-14 (noting its January 29, 2018 filing of general
comments and preliminary terms and conditions in response to the
Commission’s November 30, 2017 Notice of Application).
49a
Appendix D
recognize, or grant party and intervenor status” to it in
this proceeding, and asserts that limiting the scope of its
participation as intervenor would be inconsistent with the
Commission’s regulations and the Commission’s practice
addressing similar petitions. 32
14. The Districts filed an answer opposing the
California Board’s motion to intervene. 33 They urge the
Commission to deny the Board’s late motion to intervene
in the license proceedings for the Don Pedro and La
Grange Projects. First, the Districts argue that by failing
to intervene after having two previous opportunities to do
so, the Board slept on its rights and should not be allowed
to intervene now. 34 Second, the Districts deem the Board’s
argument that it could not have foreseen the Hoopa Valley
result as unavailing because, as the Districts note, issues
concerning certification conditions and waiver arise with
relative frequency in Commission license proceedings. 35
Third, the Districts claim that allowing the Board to
32. Id. at 14.
33. Districts’ November 13, 2020 Answer in Opposition to Late
Motion to Intervene.
34. Id. at 2-3. The Board had the opportunity to timely intervene
on two prior occasions: after the Commission accepted the Districts’
license applications for the projects and after Commission staff
issued the draft EIS. See November 30, 2017 Notices of Application
Accepted for Filing issued for Project Nos. 2299-082 and 14581-002
(establishing January 29, 2018, as the deadline for filing motions to
intervene) and 18 C.F.R. § 380.10(a) (deeming timely any motion to
intervene filed on the basis of, and within the comment period for,
a draft EIS).
35. Id. at 3-4.
50a
Appendix D
intervene in the licensing proceedings would prejudice the
Districts and cause undue burden, because the Districts
have relied on the fact that the Board, given its current
lack of party status, would be unable to seek rehearing
of any license that the Commission may issue for the Don
Pedro or La Grange Projects. 36 However, the Districts
state that they do not oppose the Board’s intervention in
a separately sub-docketed proceeding for the Districts’
petition for declaratory order seeking waiver of water
quality certification. 37
15. The Secretary’s public notice explained that because
the Districts’ petition is part of the licensing proceedings
for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects, any person who
intervened in either proceeding is already a party to the
licensing proceeding. 38 The notice further explained that,
generally, the filing of a petition for a declaratory order
involving an issue arising from the licensing proceeding,
such as waiver of certification, does not trigger a new
opportunity to intervene.39 Accordingly, the notice directed
any person seeking to become a party at this stage in the
license proceedings to file a motion to intervene out-of-time,
pursuant to Rule 214(b)(3) and (d) of the Commission’s Rules
of Practice and Procedure, that provides justification by
reference to the factors set forth in Rule 214(d).40
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 1, 5.
38. Secretary’s November 6, 2020 Notice of Petition for
Declaratory Order at n.1.
39. Id.
40. 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(3) and (d) (2020).
51a
Appendix D
16. The California Board and Sierra Club, the only
entities that filed motions to intervene in the petition
proceeding (both of which were timely and neither of
which was opposed), became parties in that proceeding
by operation of the Commission’s rules of practice and
procedure.41 However, as the notice made clear, any entity
seeking to also intervene in the licensing proceedings
would have to justify late intervention in accordance with
our regulations.42
17. After considering the Rule 214(d) factors, we find
that neither the California Board nor the Sierra Club
has demonstrated good cause for intervening late in the
licensing proceedings. As both entities were aware, water
quality issues generally, and water quality certification in
specific, are matters that arise in all licensing proceedings.
Nonetheless, neither entity elected to timely intervene.
18. The California Board asserts that good cause
exists for its failure to inter vene in the licensing
proceedings because it had no reason to believe its
certification authority would be jeopardized nor could it
anticipate the implications of the Hoopa Valley opinion.
We disagree. The Board’s actions do not amount to good
cause, but rather, constitute sleeping on its rights.43 In any
41. See id. § 385.214(c).
42. See Idaho Power Co., 171 FERC ¶ 61,238, at ¶¶ 11-14 (2020).
43. Participants in Commission proceedings may not sit back
and wait to see how issues might be resolved before deciding whether
to intervene to protect their interests. See Cal. Trout v. FERC, 572
F.3d 1003, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (Cal. Trout); Idaho Power Co., 171
FERC ¶ 61,238 at ¶ 17 n.27, (citing Cal. Trout, 572 F.3d at 1022 (“[T]
52a
Appendix D
case, to the extent that the Board’s interest in preserving
its statutory authority to issue water quality certification
for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects is a compelling
interest not adequately represented by any other party
to the license proceedings,44 that interest is completely
protected by the Board’s status as a party to the limited
proceeding on the petition.45 In addition, granting late
intervention in the underlying licensing proceedings
could disrupt the proceeding and cause prejudice to, or
additional burdens on, existing parties.
19. The same is true of Sierra Club, which in any case
lacks the statutory concerns expressed by the Board.
he Commission has steadfastly and consistently held that a person
who has actual or constructive notice that his interests might be
adversely affected by a proceeding, but who fails to intervene in
a timely manner, lacks good cause under Rule 214.”); Bradwood
Landing, LLC, 126 FERC ¶ 61,035, at ¶¶ 11, 16 (2009) (denying late
intervention to movant who claimed that scientific studies made
it more aware of its interests in the proceeding); Cent. Neb. Pub.
Power & Irrigation Dist., 125 FERC ¶ 61,192, at ¶ 12 (2008) (“The
Commission expects parties to intervene in a timely manner based on
the reasonably foreseeable issues arising from the applicant’s filings
and the Commission’s notice of proceedings.” (emphasis added));
Broadwater Energy, LLC, 124 FERC ¶ 61,225, at ¶ 13 (2008) (“Those
entities with interests they intend to protect are not entitled to wait
until the outcome of a proceeding and then file a motion to intervene
once they discover the outcome conflicts with their interests.”)).
44. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(d)(1)(iii).
45. We recently clarified that the Commission may, but need
not, establish separate sub-dockets for petitions filed in licensing
proceedings. Idaho Power Co., 171 FERC ¶ 61,238 at ¶ 13. As a result,
our decision is not influenced by the fact that separate subdockets
are not used in this case.
53a
Appendix D
Although Sierra Club argues that it did not anticipate
the Districts’ “novel decision” to file a petition seeking
waiver on the basis of the Board twice denying the
Districts’ requests for certification,46 as was true of the
Board, Sierra Club was aware that issues regarding
water quality, including any related to certification,
would arise in the licensing proceedings and has not
explained it failure to timely intervene to address those
matters. Moreover, Sierra Club’s limited interest in this
proceeding47 —opposition to the Districts’ petition seeking
waiver of certification—is adequately represented by its
timely intervention in the proceeding on the petition.
III. Discussion
20. Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA requires that an
applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct
activities that may result in a discharge into the navigable
waters of the United States, such as the Districts’
operation of the Don Pedro and the La Grange Projects,
must provide the licensing or permitting agency a water
quality certification from the state in which the discharge
originates or evidence of waiver thereof.48 If the state
46. See Sierra Club’s December 7, 2020 Comments and Motion
to Intervene at 8, 9 (Sierra Club Comments).
47. Sierra Club Comments at 3 (“The outcome of these CWA
Section 401 agency implementation matters is clearly a significant
program concern of the Sierra Club”) and 7 (“Our major interest
here is the Commission’s national implementation of its water quality
certification legal responsibilities”).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Section 401(d) of the CWA provides
that a certification and the conditions contained therein shall become
54a
Appendix D
“fails or refuses to act on a request for certification, within
a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one
year) after receipt of such request,” then certification is
waived.49 Further, the licensing or permitting agency may
not grant a license or permit until certification has been
granted or waived. 50
21. The Districts contend that, by twice denying
certification without prejudice and encouraging application
resubmittal, the California Board relied on a tactic that
is not only indistinguishable from the withdrawal-andresubmission scheme rejected by the Hoopa Valley court,
but also inconsistent with section 401(a) of the CWA. The
California Board argues that we should not find waiver
because: (1) Hoopa Valley is not applicable; (2) treating
the Board’s denial of certification as waiver would be
inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA; (3)
the Districts failed to exhaust their administrative and
judicial remedies; and (4) the Districts’ unclean hands
preclude equitable relief. 51 The Conservation Groups and
Sierra Club also argue that Hoopa Valley is inapplicable.52
a condition of any federal license that is issued. Id. § 1341(d). See
City of Tacoma, Wash. v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53, 373 U.S. App. D.C. 117
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tacoma).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
50. Id.
51. See California Board’s October 29 Comments.
52. Conservation Groups’ November 2, 2020 Comments at 1622; Sierra Club Comments at 6.
55a
Appendix D
22. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the
California Board did not waive its authority under section
401.
A.
Hoopa Valley and Commission Precedent
23. In Hoopa Valley, the D.C. Circuit found that “a
state waives its Section 401 authority when, pursuant to an
agreement between the state and applicant, an applicant
repeatedly withdraws-and-resubmits its request for
water quality certification over a period of time greater
than one year.” 53 The court concluded that where a
licensee each year sent a letter indicating withdrawal of
its certification request and resubmission of the same, 54
“[s]uch an arrangement does not exploit a statutory
loophole; it serves to circumvent [FERC’s] congressionally
granted authority over the licensing, conditioning, and
developing of a hydropower project.” 55 In fact, “[b]y
shelving water quality certifications, the states usurp
FERC’s control over whether and when a federal
license will issue. Thus, if allowed, the withdrawal-andresubmission scheme could be used to indefinitely delay
federal licensing proceedings and undermine FERC’s
jurisdiction to regulate such matters.”56
53. 913 F.3d at 1103.
54. In Hoopa Valley, the court noted that before each calendar
year passed, the applicant sent a “letter indicating withdrawal of
its water quality certification request and resubmission of the very
same . . . in the same one-page letter . . . .” Id. at 1104 (emphasis in
original).
55. Id.
56. Id.
56a
Appendix D
24. Following Hoopa Valley, the Commission found
in a series of orders that the California Board waived its
section 401 authority. In the first case, Placer County
Water Agency, 57 the Commission found that the record
showed that the entities worked to ensure that the
withdrawal and refiling happened each year, 58 given that
the licensee submitted evidence that the state sent it emails
about each upcoming one-year deadline for the purpose of
eliciting a withdrawal and resubmission. 59 We concluded
that these exchanges between the entities could amount to
an ongoing agreement and that, coupled with the fact that
Placer County never filed a new application, caused lengthy
delay and amounted to the state waiving its certification
authority.60 Thereafter, in Southern California Edison
Co.,61 Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,62 Nevada Irrigation
57. 167 FERC ¶ 61,056, reh’g denied, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2019)
(Placer County).
58. Placer County, 167 FERC ¶ 61,056 at ¶ 12.
59. Placer County, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 at ¶ 17.
60. Id. ¶¶ 12, 18.
61. 170 FERC ¶ 61,135, modified, 172 FERC ¶ 61,066 (2020) (S.
Cal. Edison) (finding that the California Board waived its section 401
authority for relicensing six projects that comprise the Big Creek
hydroelectric system where the Board staff sent annual emails to
the licensee noting the upcoming one-year deadline and explicitly
requested withdrawal and resubmittal over multiple years).
62. 170 FERC ¶ 61,232, modified, 172 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2020)
(Pacific Gas & Elec.) (finding waiver where the record showed
the California Board expected the applicant to withdraw and
refile its certification application and the applicant cooperated by
simultaneously withdrawing and refiling the same water quality
certification application for nine years).
57a
Appendix D
District,63 Yuba County Water Agency,64 South Feather
Water & Power Agency,65 Merced Irrigation District,66
and Pacific Gas & Electric,67 the Commission again found
that the California Board waived its authority to issue a
water quality certification where the applicant withdrew
and refiled its application numerous times, even when
an explicit agreement was not in place. The Commission
found unpersuasive the arguments that the licensee, as the
respective lead agency for CEQA, controlled the timing
for the CEQA analysis, and reiterated that the “state’s
reason for delay is immaterial.”68 Further, the Commission
reaffirmed that section 401 of the CWA is clear, and that
failure to act within the oneyear time limit is dispositive,
regardless of whether the timing of the water quality
certification, even if it extends beyond one year, would
not disrupt the relicensing proceeding.69
63. 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 (2020), modified, 172 FERC ¶ 61,082
(2020).
64. 171 FERC ¶ 61,139, reh’g denied, 172 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2020)
(Yuba County).
65. 171 FERC ¶ 61,242 (2020) (South Feather).
66. 171 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2020).
67. 172 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2020).
68. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 at ¶ 28; Yuba
County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at ¶ 25; Merced Irrigation District., 171
FERC ¶ 61,240 at ¶ 32; South Feather, 171 FERC ¶ 61,242 at ¶ 31.
69. See Nevada Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 at ¶ 29;
Yuba County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at ¶ 27; Merced Irrigation Dist.,
171 FERC ¶ 61,240 at ¶ 32; South Feather, 171 FERC ¶ 61,242 at ¶ 31.
58a
Appendix D
25. In other instances, the Commission has not found
waiver. In KEI (Maine) Power Management (III) LLC,70
the Commission found on rehearing that the Maine
Department of Environmental Protection did not waive its
certification authority where the applicant withdrew and
refiled its application to give itself time to negotiate fish
passage measures with resource agencies. Most recently,
in Village of Morrisville, Vermont,71 the Commission
found that the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources did
not waive its certification authority where the applicant
twice withdrew and refiled its application to give itself
time to review study reports, consider alternatives,
and conduct a cost benefit analysis. In both cases, the
Commission found insufficient evidence of the state
certifying agency encouraging or supporting withdrawal
and resubmittal, and that the record reflected the genesis
of withdrawal and resubmittal to be on the applicant’s
desire to avoid receiving a certification with conditions
to which it objected.72
B. Application of Hoopa Valley and Commission
Precedent to the Licensing Proceedings for the
Don Pedro and La Grange Projects
26. The Districts argue that the California Board’s
letters denying certification without prejudice are a
70. 171 FERC ¶ 62,043 (delegated order), modified, 173 FERC
¶ 61,069 (2020) (KEI Power).
71. 173 FERC ¶ 61,156 (2020) (Vill. of Morrisville).
72. See KEI Power, 171 FERC ¶ 62,043 at ¶¶ 42-46; Vill. of
Morrisville, 173 FERC ¶ 61,156 at ¶¶ 21-23.
59a
Appendix D
tolling mechanism that is “indistinguishable from”
and the “functional equivalent” of the withdraw-andresubmit arrangement that the D.C. Circuit rejected
in Hoopa Valley.73 Specifically, the Districts argue that
the California Board’s actions are impermissible under
Hoopa Valley because: (1) the Board’s letters, by denying
certification without prejudice and encouraging application
resubmittal, amount to a coordinated scheme for the
purposes of extending the CWA’s statutory deadline;
(2) the Districts have continued to re-submit the same
request for certification following the Board’s denials; (3)
the Board’s letters denying certification without prejudice
frustrate the same policy concerns articulated by the court
in Hoopa Valley; and (4) the Board’s regulations treat
withdrawal-and-resubmittal and denial without prejudice
letters as interchangeable tolling mechanisms.74
27. The California Board responds that the limited
holding of Hoopa Valley is not applicable in these
circumstances because: (1) there is no withdrawal-andresubmittal; (2) there is no formal agreement between
the Board and the Districts explicitly requiring abeyance
of the Board’s review of the Districts’ requests for
certification; and (3) there is no “coordinated . . . scheme”
to indefinitely delay or otherwise halt the Board’s
processing of the Districts’ requests for certification.75
73. Petition at 11, 14.
74. Id. at 14-23.
75. California Board’s October 29 Comments at 16.
60a
Appendix D
28. Due to the fact the Board, by denying the
applications without prejudice, indeed acted on the them,
as opposed to the serial withdrawal-and-resubmittal of
certification requests in a number of the cases discussed
above, we agree with the California Board that the
holding of Hoopa Valley is not dispositive here. That
the Districts’ first requests for certification were denied
without prejudice, one day before the court issued its
opinion in Hoopa Valley, rather than the Districts
withdrawing and resubmitting their application, refutes
the argument that the Board engaged in a coordinated
scheme to evade the waiver period. Unlike the cases where
the Commission found that the state certifying agency
had waived its authority under section 401, here, there is
no record evidence that the Districts and the California
Board engaged in actions amounting to an agreement,
formal or functional, to circumvent section 401’s statutory
deadline. Accordingly, Hoopa Valley and the subsequent
Commission orders in which we found waiver where
applicants engaged in serial withdrawal and resubmittal
of their applications do not dictate a finding of waiver in
this case.
C.
Validity of the California Board’s Denials
under Section 401(a) of the Clean Water Act
29. Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA, in relevant part,
states:
If the State, interstate agency, or Administrator,
as the case may be, fails or refuses to act on a
request for certification, within a reasonable
61a
Appendix D
period of time (which shall not exceed one year)
after receipt of such request, the certification
requirements of this subsection shall be waived
with respect to such Federal application. No
license or permit shall be granted until the
certification required by this section has been
obtained or has been waived as provided in
the preceding sentence. No license or permit
shall be granted if certification has been
denied by the State, interstate agency, or the
Administrator, as the case may be.76
With regard to the state certifying agency’s role, the
Hoopa Valley court put it succinctly: “Section 401 requires
state action within a reasonable period of time, not to
exceed one year.” 77 Here, on both occasions, the Board
“acted” prior to the expiration of the one-year statutory
deadline by denying without prejudice the Districts’
requests for certification. No party disputes this. Rather,
the Districts urge the Commission to find that the
Board’s letters denying certification without prejudice
are invalid actions under section 401(a) of the CWA.78
The Districts argue that “a non-substantive action, even
if styled as a ‘denial,’ cannot constitute a valid ‘action on a
request for certification’” under section 401(a) because it
would effectively nullify the statute’s waiver provision.79
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
77. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.
78. See Petition at 24-32.
79. Id. at 24.
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Accordingly, the Districts urge the Commission to find that
the Board has waived its authority to issue certifications
for the licensing of the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.
30. The Districts also contend that the Commission
is obligated to determine whether the Board’s denial of
certification is valid as a matter of federal law. 80 Following
the Districts’ logic, if the Board’s denials of certification
on non-substantive grounds, rather than on the technical
merits of the certification requests, are invalid actions
under federal law, then the Commission must conclude
that the Board has waived its certification authority. 81
31. The California Board contests the Districts’
characterization of the Commission’s obligations, asserting
that there is no reason for the Commission to distinguish
between a denial based on inadequate information (i.e., a
non-substantive denial) and a denial based on the technical
merits of a certification request. 82 Contrary to the
Districts’ position, the Board contends that the validity of
a state’s decision to grant or deny certification is grounded
in state law, rather than by reference to federal law. 83
Moreover, the Board distinguishes the cases proffered
80. Id. at 24-26 (citing Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC,
643 F.3d 963, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 425 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Alcoa); Tacoma,
460 F.3d 53, 373 U.S. App. D.C. 117; Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616,
288 U.S. App. D.C. 344 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Keating)).
81. See Petition at 26.
82. See California Board’s October 29 Comments at 24-25.
83. Id. at 25 (citing Keating, 927 F.2d at 622).
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Appendix D
by the Districts as instances where the court found that
the Commission was required to review state-issued
certifications to ensure compliance with the requirements
of section 401. 84 Responding to the Districts’ claim that a
state certifying agency’s denial of certification is limited
to “substantive denials of certification on the merits,”
the Board argues that the Districts attempt “to insert
language and intent into Section 401 that does not exist”
and notes that “Section 401 contains no such limitation.”85
32. We agree with the California Board that the
validity of its action—denial of certification pursuant to
state water quality standards—is a question that turns
on state law. 86 The cases cited by the Districts do not
convince us that the Commission’s review is warranted,
or appropriate, when a state denies certification. As
the California Board points out, the cases cited by the
Districts concern the validity of certifications issued by
the state; none address the validity of a state’s denial of
certification. 87 As the D.C. Circuit explained, a state’s
84. Id. at 25-26.
85. Id. at 26.
86. See Tacoma, 460 F.3d at 67 (“[T]he decision whether to
issue a section 401 certification generally turns on questions of state
law. FERC’s role is limited to awaiting, and then deferring to, the
final decision of the state. Otherwise, the state’s power to block the
project would be meaningless.” (citing Keating, 927 F.2d at 622)).
87. See Alcoa, 643 F.3d at 968 (whether state-issued certification
that was not effective until the applicant satisfied a bond requirement
therein complied with the requirements of section 401); Tacoma,
460 F.3d at 68 (whether state-issued certification facially satisfied
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Appendix D
decision to grant or deny a request for section 401 water
quality certification is “generally reviewable only in State
court, because the breadth of State authority under [s]ection
401 results in most challenges to a certification decision
implicating only questions of State law.”88 A state-issued
certification “is reviewable in federal court, however, at
least to the extent Section 401 itself imposes requirements
that a State must satisfy in order for a certification to be a
‘certification required by this section.’”89 Because section
401 contains no explicit requirements restricting a state’s
authority to deny certification, we conclude that it is not
the Commission’s role to review the appropriateness of
a state’s decision to deny certification. This review falls
squarely within the state court’s purview. Whether the
mere statement that the Districts’ proposals violate
state water quality standards, without more, is sufficient
justification for denying certification is a matter for a state
court to determine.
33. Moreover, as the Hoopa Valley court observed,
section 401 does not define “failure to act” or “refusal to
act.”90 Based on the plain language of the statute, we find
that on both occasions the California Board, in denying
certification, “acted” on the Districts’ request within one
section 401(a)(1)’s public notice requirements); Keating, 927 F.2d at
624-25 (whether subsequent revocation of state-issued certification
satisfied the terms of section 401(a)(3)).
88. Alcoa, 643 F.3d at 971 (citing Tacoma, 460 F.3d at 67).
89. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)).
90. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.
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Appendix D
year. We are reluctant to read meaning into the statute that
Congress intended the terms “failure to act” or “refusal to
act” to encompass a state’s denial of certification without
prejudice, especially as our interpretation of the CWA is
entitled to no deference.91 It may be that the courts will
find repeated denials without prejudice, and particularly
those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions, to be
the equivalent of the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme.
Given, however, that the state in this case appears to have
satisfied the statutory mandate for action, we are not
prepared to conclude based on the record before us that
the state has waived its section 401 authority.
34. We are sympathetic to the Districts’ argument that
they are left without any state-level recourse following
the Board’s issuance of letters denying certification
without prejudice, because the letters do not constitute
final administrative actions and are thus non-reviewable
in California state courts.92 However, it is not clear from
the record before us that the Districts have attempted
and been thwarted in an attempt to seek review of the
Boards’ letters. Nor do the state court cases cited by the
Districts persuasively establish that the Districts’ ability
to challenge the Board’s denial of the Districts’ requests
for certification is foreclosed.93
91. Id. at 1102 (“[B]ecause FERC is not the agency charged
with administering the CWA, the [c]ourt owes no deference to its
interpretation of Section 401 or its conclusion regarding the states’
waiver.”) (citing Alcoa, 643 F.3d at 972).
92. See Petition at 28-30.
93. See Petition at 29 n.97 (citing SJCBC, LLC v. Horwedel,
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Appendix D
36. For the reasons discussed above, we find that the
California Board did not waive its authority under the
CWA to issue certifications for the Don Pedro and La
Grange licensing proceedings.94
201 Cal. App. 4th 339, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(medical marijuana dispensary operators not required to exhaust
administrative remedies due to inability to initiate administrative
review procedure following nuisance abatement orders); McHugh v.
Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 33 Cal. App. 3d 533, 109 Cal. Rptr. 149 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973) (taxpayer failed to exhaust administrative remedies in
appealing real property taxes for several assessment years); Bleeck
v. State Board of Optometry, 18 Cal. App. 3d 415, 95 Cal. Rptr. 860
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (optometrist failed to exhaust administrative
remedies in seeking to transfer several branch office licenses because
applications were still pending before state optometry board)); see
also Districts’ November 30 Answer at 8, n.30 (citing Cal. Water
Impact Network v. Newhall Cty. Water Dist., 161 Cal. App. 4th 1464,
75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (adequacy of water
supply assessment not subject to direct judicial review and could only
be reviewed as part of challenge to CEQA-required environmental
impact report following city approval of development project)). To
the contrary, the California Board states that “[t]here is no basis for
concluding that denial without prejudice is not a final agency action
subject to exhaustion of administrative remedies and judicial action.”
California Board’s October 29 Comments at 26.
94. Because we find that the California Board did not waive
certification, we need not address its remaining arguments regarding
the Districts’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies and unclean
hands, which we have rejected in previous proceedings. See, e.g.,
Yuba County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at ¶ 28 (finding that the applicant
need not exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking waiver
determination from the Commission); Pacific Gas & Electric, 170
FERC ¶ 61,232 at ¶ 43 (same); S. Cal. Edison, 172 FERC ¶ 61,066 at
¶ 33 (same); see also Yuba County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at 25 (finding
unpersuasive the argument that applicant benefitted from its own
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Appendix D
D.
Request for Dismissal of Licensing Applications
36. The Conservation Groups assert that the Districts’
licensing applications for the Don Pedro and La Grange
Projects should be dismissed.95 Citing Swift River Co.96
and Creamer and Noble Energy, Inc.,97 the Conservation
Groups state that Commission precedent mandates
dismissal in situations, such as here, where the state has
denied certification and no timely appeal of the denial or
an active certification request is pending 90 days after
the state’s denial of certification.98
37. It is the Commission’s policy that, if a license
applicant informs the Commission within 90 days from
the date of a denial of water quality certification that it
has filed a timely appeal of the denial or a new request for
certification, the Commission keeps the license application
on file until the applicant has exhausted its remedies on
administrative and judicial appeal, so long as the applicant
continues to demonstrate, through periodic status reports,
inaction); Nevada Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 at ¶ 28
(same); S. Cal. Edison, 172 FERC ¶ 61,066 at ¶ 36 (noting that, with
respect to the “coordinated withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme,”
the California Board’s hands are in the same state as the applicant’s).
95. Conservation Groups’ December 7, 2020 Supplemental
Comments at 5, 13.
96. 41 FERC ¶ 61,146 (1987).
97. 93 FERC ¶ 61,044 (2000).
98. See Conservation Groups’ December 7, 2020 Supplemental
Comments at 5.
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Appendix D
due diligence in pursuing these remedies. However, if the
second certification request is denied, the Commission
will dismiss the license application, unless the appeal of
the first denial is pending.99 This policy was developed
in the context of applications for original license, under
the rationale that, “[a]t some point, the public interest in
freeing up potential sites for hydroelectric development
or for other purposes will outweigh the private interest in
maintaining the application on file while repeated requests
for certification are pursued.”100
38. As the Commission explained in West Penn
Power Co.,101 this rationale does not apply with respect
to a relicense application, which involves an existing
project that continues to operate under annual license
or Administrative Procedure Act authority102 pending
relicensing. In addition, if a relicense application for a
major project is dismissed after the FPA section 15(c)
statutory deadline for such applications,103 it cannot be
refiled.104 For this reason, the Commission has given
relicense applications greater flexibility than original
license applications with respect to circumstances that
99. See City of Harrisburg, Pa., 45 FERC ¶ 61,053 (1988).
100. North Star Hydro Ltd., 58 FERC ¶ 61,266, at 61,844 (1992).
101. 74 FERC ¶ 61,287, at 61,913 n.14 (1996) (West Penn).
102. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c).
103. See 16 U.S.C. § 808(c)(1).
104. See 18 C.F.R. § 16.9(b)(4) (2020).
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Appendix D
can cause an application to be dismissed.105 In light of the
special considerations attending relicense applications,
Commission staff does not dismiss such applications
after two certification denials. We find that the special
considerations due relicense applications are similarly
compelling in the context of an original license application
for an existing, unlicensed project that requires licensing,
such as the La Grange Project. Dismissal of such a
license application would in effect shut down an existing,
operational project. Moreover, allowing greater latitude
to original license applications for existing, unlicensed
projects that require licensing does not implicate the same
site banking concerns that the new project dismissal policy
was intended to curtail. Accordingly, we are not dismissing
the licensing applications for the Don Pedro or La Grange
Projects at this time.
The Commission orders:
(A)
Turlock Irrigation District and Modesto
Irrigation District’s October 2, 2020 petition for
declaratory order is denied.
(B)
The California State Water Resources
Control Board’s motion to intervene out-of-time in
the licensing proceedings is denied. The California
Board’s participation as an int
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