Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Turlock Irrigation District, et al., Petitioners v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 4, 2023

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No. ______

In the Supreme Court of the United States

TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT and

MODESTO IRRIGATION DISTRICT, PETITIONERS,

v.

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, et. al.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHARLES R. SENSIBA

MORGAN M. GERARD

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

401 9th Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KEVIN M. LEROY

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe St.,

Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

misha.tseytlin@

troutman.com

Attorneys for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a State can avoid “waiv[ing]” its oneyear “period of time” in which “to act” on a “request

for certification” under Section 401 of the Clean Water

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)—thus rendering Section

401’s one-year rule meaningless—by declaring in pro

forma letters every 364 days that the request is

“denied” and must be resubmitted if the applicant

ever wants to obtain a Section 401 certification, and

then repeating this every 364 days for as many years

as a State wishes to delay.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Turlock Irrigation District and Modesto Irrigation

District are the Petitioners here and were the

Petitioners below.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is

the Respondent here and was the Respondent below.

The California State Water Resources Control

Board, the Tuolumne River Trust, American

Whitewater, the California Sportfishing Protection

Alliance, the Friends of the River, and the Sierra Club

and its Mother Lode Chapter are also Respondents

here and were Intervenors for Respondent the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission below.

iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS

Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Petitioners provide the

following corporate disclosure statements:

Petitioner Turlock Irrigation District is a

governmental water agency formed under the laws of

the State of California. Therefore, a corporate

disclosure statement is not required.

Petitioner Modesto Irrigation District is a

governmental water agency formed under the laws of

the State of California. Therefore, a corporate

disclosure statement is not required.

iv

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

•

Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto

Irrigation District, “Declaratory Order On

Waiver Of Water Quality Certification,”

174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (Jan. 19, 2021);

•

Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto

Irrigation District, “Notice Of Denial Of

Rehearing By Operation Of Law And

Providing For Further Consideration,” 174

FERC ¶ 62,175 (Mar. 22, 2021);

•

Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto

Irrigation District, “Order Addressing

Arguments Raised On Rehearing,” 175

FERC ¶ 61,144 (May 21, 2021);

•

Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC, No.211120 (D.C. Cir. June 17, 2022);

•

Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC, No.211120, Dkt.1962263, 2022 WL 4086378

(D.C. Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (per curiam).

The following cases are the only proceedings in

state or federal trial or appellate courts, or in this

Court, directly related to this case within the meaning

of this Court’s Rule 14.1(b)(iii): Turlock Irrigation

District & Modesto Irrigation District v. State Water

Resources Control Board & Eileen Sobeck,

No.CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct. for Tuolumne Cnty.,

v

filed May 11, 2021), and City and County of San

Francisco v. State Water Resources Control Board &

Eileen Sobeck, No. CV63828 (Cal. Super. Ct. for

Tuolumne Cnty., filed May 14, 2021).

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ......................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ........................ ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS ........ iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ...... iv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI .................1

DECISIONS BELOW..................................................4

JURISDICTION ..........................................................4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................4

STATEMENT ..............................................................5

A. Legal Background .......................................5

B. Factual And Procedural Background .........8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .......17

I. Whether Section 401’s One-Year Rule Is A

Meaningless Formality Is An Important

Question Of Federal Law That This Court

Should Resolve ...............................................17

II. FERC’s Ruling That States Can Render

Section 401’s One-Year Rule Meaningless

By Issuing Pro Forma Letters Purporting

To Deny The Requests Every 364 Days And

Then Requiring Resubmittal Is Wrong .........22

III. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Resolving

The Question Presented .................................28

CONCLUSION ..........................................................30

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Arizona v. United States,

567 U.S. 387 (2012) ............................................. 19

California v. FERC,

495 U.S. 490 (1990) ............................................... 5

Corley v. United States,

556 U.S. 303 (2009) ........................3, 18, 22, 24, 25

County of Los Angeles v. Shalala,

192 F.3d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ..................... 11, 18

Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid,

141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021)......................................... 22

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009) ....................................... 11, 18

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co.,

381 U.S. 90 (1965) ................................................. 5

First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power

Comm’n,

328 U.S. 152 (1946) ............................................... 5

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC,

913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ............... 12, 13, 21

Leocal v. Ashcroft,

543 U.S. 1 (2004)..................................... 22, 24, 25

viii

Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos,

860 F.3d 696 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............................... 7

N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield

Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

514 U.S. 645 (1995)................................. 22, 24, 25

Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018)......................................... 22

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

138 S. Ct. 816 (2018)........................................... 22

S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot.,

547 U.S. 370 (2006) ..................................... 5, 6, 24

SEC v. Chenery Corporation,

318 U.S. 80 (1943) ..................................... 3, 26, 28

Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,

142 S. Ct. 1783 (2022)......................................... 22

Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. FERC,

36 F.4th 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ............................. 4

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,

139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019)......................................... 19

Wyeth v. Levine,

555 U.S. 555 (2009)............................................. 19

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ........................................... 19

ix

Statutes And Rules

5 U.S.C. § 706 ........................................................... 27

15 U.S.C. § 717 ..................................................... 7, 18

16 U.S.C. § 791a ......................................................... 5

16 U.S.C. § 797 ............................................... 5, 11, 18

16 U.S.C. § 799 ........................................................... 5

16 U.S.C. § 808 ........................................................... 5

16 U.S.C. § 817 ............................................... 5, 11, 18

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ......................................................... 4

33 U.S.C. § 1341 ........................ i, 1, 4, 6, 7, 18, 23, 24

Cal. Water Code § 13160 (2020) .............................. 11

Regulations

18 C.F.R. § 5.6 ............................................................ 6

18 C.F.R. § 5.8 ............................................................ 6

18 C.F.R. § 5.13 .......................................................... 6

18 C.F.R. § 5.14 .......................................................... 6

18 C.F.R. § 5.15 .......................................................... 6

18 C.F.R. § 5.17 .......................................................... 6

18 C.F.R. § 5.19 .......................................................... 6

18 C.F.R § 5.22 ........................................................... 6

x

18 C.F.R. § 5.23 .......................................................... 6

18 C.F.R. § 5.25 .......................................................... 6

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23, § 3837 ................................. 28

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23, § 3856 ................................. 28

Agency Decisions

Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto Irrigation

District,

174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2021).................................... 4

Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto Irrigation

District,

174 FERC ¶ 62,175 (2021).................................... 4

Turlock Irrigation District & Modesto Irrigation

District,

175 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2021).................................... 4

Other Authorities

115 Cong. Rec. 9264 (Apr. 16, 1969)....... 1, 2, 3, 7, 19,

21, 24, 27, 30

Cal. Water Boards, Revised [CEQA] Initial Study

And Environmental Checklist (Nov. 9, 2016) .... 28

S. Rep. No. 92-414 (1971)......................................... 24

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Hydropower Explained

(Mar. 16, 2022) .................................................... 20

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Energy Facts

Explained (June 10, 2022) .................................. 20

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Section 401 of the Clean Water Act prohibits the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)

from issuing a license or relicense for a federal

hydropower or interstate natural gas project until the

State in which any discharge from the project

originates issues a “certification” that the project

complies with the State’s water-quality standards. 33

U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Section 401 places a critical oneyear time limit on this state power: a State waives its

authority by “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to act on a request

for certification” within “one year.” Id. Through this

time limit, Congress prohibited States from delaying

these federally licensed or permitted projects through

“dalliance or unreasonable delay.” 115 Cong. Rec.

9264 (Apr. 16, 1969).

FERC—the body charged with overseeing States’

compliance with Section 401 for federal hydropower

and interstate natural gas pipeline projects

throughout the Nation—has now rendered this oneyear limit a meaningless formality, such that any

State can now delay these federal projects

nationwide, for as many years or decades as the State

pleases (or, indeed, forever). In particular, in the

orders below, FERC provided that States can issue

pro forma letters to applicants every 364 days

purporting to deny Section 401 certification requests

and telling the applicants that they must resubmit

their requests—thereby restarting the one-year clock,

over and over again—if the applicant ever wants to

2

obtain a Section 401 certification. As FERC conceded

below, under its now-binding approach, any State can

delay a federal project through such a scheme for “100

years,” so long as this scheme complies with state law.

But that is just another way of saying that Section

401’s federal rule is now utterly meaningless under

FERC’s approach, given that every State can now

choose at its own option to delay a federal project

through “dalliance or unreasonable delay,” 115 Cong.

Rec. 9264, for as many years as it wants—or, indeed,

kill any federal hydropower or interstate natural gas

project with endless 364-days-at-a-time delays—with

the requestor having no recourse under federal law.

This Court should grant this Petition and review

FERC’s decision, now affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, to

render Section 401’s one-year rule meaningless for

hydropower and interstate natural gas projects

nationwide. FERC’s orders below allow States to

delay these activities indefinitely, achieving the very

“dalliance or unreasonable delay” that Congress

designed Section 401’s one-year rule to avoid. Id.

Such delays would be disastrous for our Nation’s

economy, given the vital roles that hydropower and

natural gas play in energy production and

consumption across the country. Further, FERC’s

orders are plainly incorrect. A State labeling a

request “denied” every 364 days, while directing the

requester to resubmit the same request for as many

years as the State desires, is not an “act” under

Section 401.

Otherwise, Section 401’s one-year

deadline would be a meaningless formality, contrary

3

to “one of the most basic interpretive canons” that no

statutory language should be interpreted as

“inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)

(citations omitted; brackets omitted).

This case is an ideal vehicle for addressing this

Question Presented. FERC’s orders provide that any

document that a State labels a “denial” is an “act”

under Section 401, and thus, under SEC v. Chenery

Corporation, 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943), this conclusion is

the only grounds upon which those orders may be

reviewed. And while the egregiousness of Respondent

the California State Water Resources Control Board’s

(“Board”) actions are not relevant under Chenery, it is

worth noting that this case presents exactly the type

of “dalliance or unreasonable delay,” 115 Cong. Rec.

9264, that Congress enacted Section 401’s one-year

rule to stop. The Board denied Petitioners’ first

certification requests 363 days after submission,

directed resubmittal, and then denied Petitioners’

resubmitted, substantively identical requests after

364 days. Those repeated denials did not engage in

any way with the merits of Petitioners’ voluminous

environmental-review evidence that supported their

certification requests, nor did the State need any

additional evidence to issue its certifications, as the

Board definitively showed by subsequently issuing

those certifications sua sponte, without receiving any

new information from Petitioners.

This Court should grant the Petition.

4

DECISIONS BELOW

The D.C. Circuit’s opinion below upholding the

orders of FERC is reported at Turlock Irrigation Dist.

v. FERC, 36 F.4th 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2022), and it is

reproduced at Appendix A to the Petition,

Pet.App.1a–10a. The D.C. Circuit’s order denying

rehearing en banc is unreported, but it is available at

2022 WL 4086378, and is reproduced at Appendix E

to the Petition, Pet.App.71a–72a. The orders of FERC

are reported at 175 FERC ¶ 61,144; 174 FERC

¶ 62,175; and 174 FERC ¶ 61,042, and they are

reproduced at Appendices B–D to the Petition,

Pet.App.11a–70a.

JURISDICTION

The D.C. Circuit entered its judgment on June 17,

2022, Pet.App.1a, and denied Petitioners’ timely

petition for rehearing en banc on September 6, 2022,

Pet.App.71a. On November 29, 2022, the Chief

Justice extended the time within which to file this

Petition to and including January 4, 2023, and this

Petition is filed by that deadline. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant portion of Section 401 of the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, is reproduced at

Appendix F to the Petition, Pet.App.73a.

5

STATEMENT

A. Legal Background

Congress enacted the Federal Power Act, 16

U.S.C. § 791a, et seq., as “a complete scheme of

national regulation” for “the water resources of the

Nation,” First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power

Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 180 (1946); see also California

v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1990). This Act

represents Congress’ exercise of “comprehensive

control over those uses of the Nation’s water resources

in which the Federal Government ha[s] a legitimate

interest,” including for “hydroelectric power.” Fed.

Power Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 98

(1965). FERC, in turn, has the exclusive authority to

issue licenses “for the purpose of constructing,

operating, and maintaining” hydropower projects on

navigable waters or on federal lands. 16 U.S.C.

§§ 797(e), 808(a), 817(1); S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd.

of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006); Pet.App.2a.

Thus, in order to operate a hydropower project

lawfully on such waters or lands, the Federal Power

Act requires the project owner to apply to FERC for a

license and then a relicense at the end of each

license’s term. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 799, 808(e). This

FERC licensing or relicensing requirement applies to

“about half of all hydroelectric power in the United

States.” See Pet.App.2a n.1.

Obtaining a hydropower license or relicense from

FERC is a multi-step, multiyear process that affords

6

numerous opportunities for impacted States to

participate. See 18 C.F.R. § 5.6–.25. The applicant

must prepare a pre-application document that

identifies existing technical and scientific information

relating to the project, including its effects on water

quality. See id. § 5.6. From this, FERC determines

under the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”) what issues the applicant must address in

an environmental study plan, also allowing States to

comment and request specific environmental studies.

See id. §§ 5.8–.13. Then, FERC issues that study plan

for the applicant to complete, see id. § 5.13(c); accord

id. § 5.15—affording an additional comment period

for the States, see id. § 5.14—after which the

applicant prepares and submits a draft license

application and then a final license application, see id.

§§ 5.15, .17–.19. Thereafter, FERC issues a draft

environmental impact study under NEPA, accepts

additional comments from the States, and finally

publishes a final environmental impact study for the

project. See id. §§ 5.22–.23, .25.

The license and relicense requirement at issue

here is Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1341. Under Section 401, FERC may not grant a

hydropower license or relicense unless the applicant

obtains a “certification” from the State in which any

“discharge” from the project “originates” that the

project will comply with federal water-quality

standards, unless the State waives its statutory right.

Id. § 1341(a)(1); S.D. Warren, 547 U.S. at 373–74;

Pet.App.2a. Section 401’s waiver component, in turn,

7

provides that a State “waive[s]” its certification

authority “[i]f the State . . . fails or refuses to act on a

request for certification, within a reasonable period of

time (which shall not exceed one year) after receipt of

such request.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis

added).

When a State waives its certification

authority under this one-year rule, FERC may then

proceed to consider the applicant’s hydropower

license application without a state certification,

although even after such a waiver, FERC must still

give consideration to the State’s water-quality

recommendations. See id.; Millennium Pipeline Co. v.

Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Section

401’s one-year rule thus time-limits the State’s power

to delay federal licensing through the certification

process. This is crucial because while Congress

allowed for state participation in the federal licensing

process through Section 401 certification, Congress

foreclosed States’ “dalliance or unreasonable delay” of

that process. 115 Cong. Rec. 9264.

FERC also has the statutory responsibility to

issue certificates of public convenience and necessity

for interstate natural gas pipelines under Section 7 of

the Natural Gas Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 717, et seq.

Section 401’s State certification requirement and the

attendant no-more-than-one-year waiver rule apply

to those certificates as well. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341.

8

B. Factual And Procedural Background

1. This case arises out of Petitioners’ licensing and

relicensing applications with FERC for two

hydropower

projects

located

in

California.

Pet.App.2a–4a.

Among other licensing and

relicensing steps required of Petitioners, Petitioners

sought to obtain water-quality certifications from the

Board under Section 401.

Pet.App.2a–4a.

As

explained immediately below, Petitioners submitted

substantively identical certification requests to the

Board over a more-than-two-year period, at the

Board’s repeated direction, which requests the Board

denied every 363 or 364 days after submission, while

directing Petitioners to resubmit the same requests.

Petitioners submitted their initial certification

requests to the Board on January 26, 2018, supported

by voluminous environmental-review documents that

Petitioners had compiled as part of the licensing

process described above. Pet.App.42a–43a, 97a–

104a. The Board confirmed these requests met “the

application filing requirements set forth in [the

California Code of Regulations].” Pet.App.42a–43a,

JA1632–33.1 The Board then purported to deny the

requests 363 days later in a short pro forma letter,

Pet.App.43a–44a, 94a–96a. This pro forma letter

contained “no judgment on the technical merits” of

1 Citations of “JA__” are of the parties’ Joint Appendix filed

with the D.C. Circuit below. D.C. Cir. No.21-1120, Dkt.1934418.

9

Petitioners’ projects or engagement with Petitioners’

supporting environmental-review evidence at all, but

rather just pointed vaguely to the processes under

NEPA and the California Environmental Quality Act

(“CEQA”), which processes were as-yet-unfinished.

Pet.App.95a–96a. This short letter concluded by

stating that “to maintain an active certification

application, [Petitioners] will need to request

certification for the [p]rojects.” Pet.App.95a.

Petitioners then resubmitted substantively

identical certification requests to the Board on April

22, 2019, in the form of brief renewal letters,

supported by the very same environmental-review

evidence from Petitioners’ prior submissions.

Pet.App.44a–45a, 90a–93a.

The Board again

confirmed that these requests met “the application

filing requirements specified in [the California Code

of Regulations].” JA1635–37, 1638–40. Then, the

Board purported to deny these requests via pro forma

letters 364 days later. Pet.App.45a, 83a–89a. Here

again, the Board’s letters referenced generally the asyet-unfinished NEPA and CEQA processes as the

reason for the denial and then “encourage[d]

[Petitioners] to submit a new request for

certification.” Pet.App.84a–85a, 88a.2

2 These pro forma letters also stated that, “at this time, the

proposed activity does not comply with applicable water quality

standards and other appropriate requirements.” Pet.App.85a,

10

Finally, on July 20, 2020, Petitioners resubmitted

for a third time with the Board their substantively

identical requests for certification, again in the form

of request-renewal letters supported by the very same

environmental-review evidence. Pet.App.45a–46a,

78a–82a. And again, as with the first two sets of

submissions, the Board certified that these requests

were “complete.” JA1641–43, 1644–46. Petitioners

thereafter withdrew these certification requests from

the Board and began the agency proceedings before

FERC. Pet.App.4a–5a.

After Petitioners withdrew their substantively

identical requests from the Board, the Board

purported to issue sua sponte Section 401

certifications for Petitioners’ projects on December 1,

2020—although the CEQA process had not yet

concluded and, indeed, the Board had gained no

information at all from any such process. Pet.App.4a–

5a, 46a & n.25; JA1780–888, JA1890–998. Put

another way, the Board issued Section 401

certifications without receiving any new supporting

evidence from Petitioners in any respect,

demonstrating that the Board never needed

additional information in order to act on Petitioners’

certification requests.

See Pet.App.46a; accord

Pet.App.4a–5a. The Board claimed that it could issue

89a. But the letters did not contain any “elaboration” on which

standard or requirement the projects had purportedly not met,

Pet.App.45a, or on how the projects had not met those unnamed

standards or requirements.

11

those certifications, despite the lack of completion of

the CEQA process, due to a “June 2020 amendment

to the California Water Code” authorizing it “to issue

certifications before completion of CEQA review,

where waiting until completion of CEQA review

presents a substantial risk of waiver of certification.”

Pet.App.46a & n.25 (citation omitted); Cal. Water

Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020). The Board’s sua sponte

certifications were voluminous, comprising over 100

pages, demonstrating that the Board had been

working on these certifications for more than a year

and had denied Petitioners’ requests simply to buy

itself more time. See JA1780–888, JA1890–998.

These certifications imposed numerous burdensome

conditions on Petitioners’ projects; “some forty-five”

conditions in total. Pet.App.5a.

2. In the FERC proceedings below, Petitioners

sought a declaration from FERC that the Board had

waived the State’s Section 401 certification authority

by denying Petitioners’ requests every 363 or 364 days

and then requiring Petitioners to resubmit without

actually needing any additional information. See

Pet.App.5a–6a, 40a–41a, 54a–55a. FERC denied

Petitioners’ claims of waiver in a declaratory order,

Pet.App.38a, and then reaffirmed that denial in an

order on Petitioners’ request for rehearing,

Pet.App.11a—orders that are FERC precedent,

applicable nationwide, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 817(1);

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515

(2009); accord County of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192

F.3d 1005, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

12

In holding that the Board “did not waive its

authority under section 401,” FERC’s declaratory

order concluded that any time that a State labels a

request “denied” within the one-year deadline, it has

“act[ed]” on that request and avoided waiver, full stop.

Pet.App.55a, 58a–60a. So here, in FERC’s view, “by

denying [Petitioners’] applications without prejudice”

with its pro forma letters, the Board “acted on” those

requests within the meaning of Section 401, without

any further inquiry. Pet.App.45a, 60a. FERC

admitted that “[i]t may be that the courts will find

repeated denials without prejudice, and particularly

those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions,”

do trigger waiver, but it said that FERC itself would

not do so.

Pet.App.65a. FERC reaffirmed its

interpretation of Section 401 in its order on rehearing.

See Pet.App.17a–23a.

Commissioner Danly dissented from FERC’s

order on rehearing, explaining that States have

historically engaged in two schemes to evade

Section 401’s one-year deadline when they want to

have “[m]ore [t]ime” to consider a request than the

one-year limit affords. Pet.App.33a–34a (Danly,

Comm’r, dissenting) (citations omitted). The first is

the

“withdrawal-and-resubmission

scheme”

condemned by Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d

1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019), where States would coordinate

with requesters so that the requesters would

withdraw and resubmit their requests just before the

one-year deadline. Pet.App.31a (Danly, Comm’r,

dissenting) (discussing Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at

13

1104). The second is the scheme at issue here,

Pet.App.33a–34a (Danly, Comm’r, dissenting), where

a State will “deny[ ] the application” either with or

“without prejudice” while inviting the requester to

resubmit the same application year after year, see

Pet.App.21a–22a. The second scheme at issue here

achieves the same dilatory result as the first scheme

and thus triggered waiver under Section 401.

Pet.App.33a–34a (Danly, Comm’r., dissenting). “Like

the

withdrawal-resubmission

scheme

found

impermissible in Hoopa Valley, the Board in this case

twice denied [Petitioners’] application in what

appears to be an attempt to override the statute’s oneyear deadline thereby affording itself additional time

to act.”

Pet.App.31a–32a (Danly, Comm’r.,

dissenting). That is, the Board “received [Petitioners’

first] application,” “acknowledged receipt,” “found

[that it] met the filing requirements,” “identified the

one-year deadline,” and then “did not request

additional information.” Pet.App.31a–32a (Danly,

Comm’r., dissenting). Nevertheless, “just two days

before the one-year deadline, the Board denied the

application without prejudice.”

Pet.App.31a–32a

(Danly, Comm’r., dissenting). And then “the Board

did it all again” after receiving Petitioners’

“substantively unchanged” second certification

requests, denying those 364 days after receipt.

Pet.App.32a–33a (Danly, Comm’r., dissenting).

Commissioner Danly also observed that the “timing”

of the Board’s “ultimate approval” of Petitioners’

requests “bears note,” coming only “after [Petitioners]

filed their petition for finding waiver [with FERC] and

14

had withdrawn their third request.” Pet.App.32a–

33a (Danly, Comm’r., dissenting).

3. Petitioners petitioned the D.C. Circuit for

review of FERC’s orders, and the D.C. Circuit entirely

affirmed FERC’s orders in a written opinion issued

after oral argument.

In a revealing exchange at oral argument, FERC’s

counsel conceded that the orders’ interpretation of

Section 401 rendered the statutory one-year rule

meaningless for any State that wanted that result:

JUDGE WALKER: Let me ask one more

hypothetical, imagine that . . . California

passes a statute that says we require an

environmental impact assessment that will

take us 100 years to do. And because of this

one-year, [Section] 401 deadline, we’re

instructing the [Board] every 363 days, to

deny and require the petitioner to refile for

100 years . . . . [Y]ou think that that scheme

would be legal?

FERC: I don’t know that it would

contradict Section 401, because Section 401

doesn’t go [there]. But, however, I certainly

think that would probably prompt

Congress to amend its law to say,

look, we—

15

JUDGE WALKER: I’m sure Congress will be

right on that with FERC at the top of their

agenda.

FERC:

Well,

regardless

of

the

practicalities, I mean, this is, again, this is

a . . . certification power that Congress has

given and it can condition it, or it can take

it away. And here, Congress decided to

leave it at . . . if you deny certification, then

FERC’s responsibility is to consider

whether it was within the—

Oral Argument Audio at 29:45–31:15 (Apr. 11, 2021).3

Thus, under FERC’s interpretation of Section 401, a

State can delay acting on a request for certification for

a century (or more), without running afoul of Section

401’s one-year rule, so long as the scheme complies

with the State’s own laws and is implemented with

pro forma letters issued every 364 days. Id.

Remarkably, and notwithstanding FERC’s

concession that its interpretation renders Section

401’s one-year rule meaningless, the D.C. Circuit

affirmed FERC’s orders below. Pet.App.6a–7a. The

D.C. Circuit held that FERC was correct to conclude

that “[e]ach time the California Board denied

Available at https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/

recordings.nsf/DocsByRDate?OpenView&count=100&SKey=20

2204 (see link for No.21-1120) (all websites last visited

Jan. 3, 2023).

3

16

certification, the Board ‘act[ed]’ within the meaning of

section 401(a)(1)”—with no further inquiry either

required or allowed. Pet.App.7a (second brackets in

original). In other words, the D.C. Circuit approved

FERC’s conclusion that every time a State issues a

document labeled a “denial” of a certification request,

the State has taken an “act” under Section 401, and

thus evaded waiver under the one-year rule. See

Pet.App.7a–8a. In reaching this decision, the D.C.

Circuit rejected Petitioners’ core argument that this

bright-line interpretation allows “State agencies [to]

extend the time for decision indefinitely by denying

one certification request after another without

prejudice, thus nullifying section 401’s one-year

limit.” Pet.App.8a–9a (emphasis added). The D.C.

Circuit asserted that an “opposing slope”—namely,

that Petitioners’ interpretation of Section 401 leads to

“gamesmanship”—presents “just as bad (or even

worse) consequences,” without even acknowledging

Petitioners’ arguments rebutting these concerns. See

generally Pet.App.9a–10a. Finally, the D.C. Circuit

explained in a short footnote that a State’s need to

“comply[ ] with State law . . . may” serve as a sort of

backstop, limiting when a State could engage in a

scheme like the Board’s here. Pet.App.9a n.8

The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for

rehearing en banc. Pet.App.71a–72a.

17

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

Whether Section 401’s One-Year Rule Is A

Meaningless Formality Is An Important

Question Of Federal Law That This Court

Should Resolve

A. FERC’s orders below, now affirmed by the D.C.

Circuit, render Section 401’s one-year rule

meaningless for all federal hydropower and interstate

natural gas projects nationwide. See Pet.App.18a–

22a, 54a–65a; see also Pet.App.6a–7a; infra Part II.B.

This is because, under FERC’s orders, a State wishing

to delay acting on any certification request associated

with any federally licensed or permitted activity need

only “deny[ ]” that request in pro forma letters every

364 days, while directing the requester to resubmit

the same request if it wants any chance to move

forward with its project. See Pet.App.58a–60a. As

FERC admitted below, its position means that a State

may repeat that scheme “every 363 days . . . for 100

years,” so long as that is lawful under state law. Oral

Argument Audio, supra, at 29:45–31:15. Nothing

about FERC’s interpretation of Section 401 depends

upon, for example, the requester’s failure to supply

any relevant water-quality-related information. See

Pet.App.58a–60a, 65a; accord Pet.App.6a–7a.

FERC’s interpretation of Section 401 makes

Section 401’s one-year waiver rule a dead letter. All

that a State must do to evade Section 401’s one-year

rule completely, for as long as the State desires, is to

18

issue pro forma letters labeling a request “denied”

every 364 days, while telling the requester to

resubmit the exact same request, over and over again,

if it ever hopes to obtain the mandatory Section 401

certification. See supra pp.8–10. Thus, as long as the

relevant state bureaucrat possesses a calendar and

authority to act under state law, Section 401’s oneyear waiver rule would never operate against the

State, no matter how many years the State wishes to

delay action. Contra Corley, 556 U.S. at 314.

FERC’s gutting of Section 401’s one-year rule now

applies to all federal hydropower and interstate

natural gas projects across the country under FERC’s

authority, given FERC’s nationwide jurisdiction, see

16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 817(1); 15 U.S.C. § 717(b), and the

Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement that

FERC apply its precedent consistently to all future

cases, see Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515;

accord Shalala, 192 F.3d at 1022. So, under the

current state of the law and absent this Court’s

intervention and reversal, any State may rely on

these FERC decisions to delay acting on Section 401

certification requests for as many years as the State

desires—or, indeed, forever, if it wants to kill the

project completely—without ever triggering waiver.

All a State needs to do is deny the requests every 364

days and require the requester to resubmit. Further,

every Section 401 requester must comply with that

state scheme if it ever hopes to obtain a license, given

that FERC may not issue a license to the requester

19

until the requirements of Section 401 are either

satisfied or waived. § 1341(a)(1).

B. Whether the States may nullify Section 401’s

federal one-year rule in the trivially easy-to-replicate

manner that FERC has now authorized nationwide is

an important question calling out for this Court’s

immediate review. Under the Supremacy Clause,

“[the] Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be

the supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. Const. art. VI,

cl. 2, notwithstanding the laws or actions of any State

to the contrary, see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.

387, 399 (2012). Yet, FERC has empowered the

States to nullify Section 401’s one-year waiver rule for

hydropower projects generating “about half of all

hydroelectric power in the United States,” see

Pet.App.2a n.1, as well as for all interstate natural

gas projects, see supra pp.7–8. Whether States may

do this in the face of federal law is a “question” of

“significance,” as this Court regularly recognizes in

cases dealing with federal-state conflict. See, e.g.,

Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894,

1901 (2019); Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394 (“important

questions concerning the interaction of state and

federal power”); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,

563 (2009).

Rendering Section 401’s one-year deadline

meaningless for all federal hydropower and interstate

natural gas pipeline projects is deeply significant,

warranting this Court’s review. Section 401’s one-

20

year deadline serves an important purpose by

stopping a State’s “dalliance or unreasonable delay”

of the federal licensing process, 115 Cong. Rec. 9264—

including a State pocket-vetoing pending licenses by

labeling Section 401 certification requests “denied”

every 364 days, while directing resubmission of those

same requests year after year. Federal hydropower

projects are vital to our Nation’s long-term, cleanenergy market since, in 2021, hydropower accounted

for 19% of the Nation’s renewable-energy

consumption, see U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S.

Energy Facts Explained (June 10, 2022),4 for 31.5% of

our utility-scale renewable energy generation, and for

6.3% of our utility-scale total electricity generation,

see U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Hydropower Explained

(Mar. 16, 2022).5 And natural gas is likewise

important to our Nation’s energy requirements, as it

comprised 32% the country’s total energy

consumption in 2021. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S.

Energy Facts Explained, supra.

So, given the

significant roles of hydropower and natural gas in

meeting our Nation’s energy needs, allowing States to

delay federal hydropower or interstate natural gas

projects indefinitely would be disastrous.

Some States have proven all too eager to abuse

the Section 401 certification process to delay federal

4 Available at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-ener

gy-facts/.

5 Available at https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/hydrop

ower/.

21

projects and will take advantage of the scheme that

FERC blessed in this case with relish, as these States’

prior conduct illustrates. In Hoopa Valley, the D.C.

Circuit rejected certain States’ so-called “withdrawaland-resubmission scheme” under Section 401, where

these States would coordinate with certification

requesters to withdraw their requests just before the

one-year deadline and then have the requestors

resubmit the very same requests immediately, buying

the States more time to “act.” Pet.App.31a (Danly,

Comm’r, dissenting) (discussing Hoopa Valley, 913

F.3d at 1104). In the course of concluding that this

scheme triggered waiver under Section 401, Hoopa

Valley explained that “it is now commonplace for

states to use Section 401 to hold federal licensing

hostage” far beyond Section 401’s “one-year

maximum.” Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104. For

example, at the time of Hoopa Valley, 27 of the 43

then-pending “licensing applications before FERC

were awaiting a state’s water quality certification,

and four of those had been pending for more than a

decade.” Id. Now, based on FERC’s orders below, any

State wishing to evade Section 401’s one-year

deadline may do so unilaterally for as many years as

it wants to delay—or, indeed, forever—obtaining the

very same “dalliance or unreasonable delay” observed

in Hoopa Valley. Id. (quoting 115 Cong. Rec. 9264).

22

II. FERC’s Ruling That States Can Render

Section 401’s One-Year Rule Meaningless By

Issuing Pro Forma Letters Purporting To

Deny The Requests Every 364 Days And

Then Requiring Resubmittal Is Wrong

A. This Court interprets statutes according to

their text, understanding that text in light of the

statutory structure and context, as well as the

statutory purpose. Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.

Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct.

2105, 2110–11 (2018); see Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon,

142 S. Ct. 1783, 1792 (2022). “[O]ne of the most basic

interpretative canons” is “that a statute should be

construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,

so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void

or insignificant.” Corley, 556 U.S. at 314 (citations

omitted; brackets omitted); see Rubin v. Islamic

Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 825 (2018). So where

Congress provides “words of limitation” in a statute,

the Court will not interpret those limiting words to be

a “mere sham” that will “never run [their] course,”

N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995), or to be

“practically devoid of significance,” Leocal v. Ashcroft,

543 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).

B. Applying these statutory-interpretation

principles to Section 401’s waiver provision, issuing

pro forma denial letters to requesters every 364 days

and telling the requester that it must resubmit the

request if the requester ever hopes to obtain

23

certification, is not an “act” under Section 401 that

avoids waiver of the State’s authority. § 1341(a)(1).

A State’s scheme purporting to deny a request

every 364 days in pro forma letters and then requiring

resubmittal is not an “act” under Section 401. Section

401 provides that a State has “one year” to “act” on a

certification request, with the State’s “fail[ure] or

refus[al]” to “act” within that year resulting in the

waiver of the requirement to obtain a certification

from the State. § 1341(a)(1). Therefore, a State has a

maximum of “one year” to “act” on a request for

certification, otherwise it has “waived” its

certification authority. Id. When a State implements

a scheme to delay its decision on a certification by

issuing pro forma documents purporting to deny the

request every 364 days, and then making clear that

the requestor must resubmit the request if it ever

wants to obtain the necessary Section 401

certification, that is not an “act” under Section 401,

but a scheme to avoid taking any “act.”

The manifest purpose of Section 401 supports this

statutory reading, further demonstrating that a

State’s unilateral scheme to avoid Section 401’s oneyear rule by issuing pro forma denial letters every 364

days and then requiring resubmittal is not an “act”

under Section 401. By requiring States to “act” on a

request within “one year,” or else waive their

authority, Congress designed Section 401 to empower

States to participate in the federal-licensing process

without allowing them to derail or unduly delay the

24

process. See § 1341(a)(1). So, while Section 401

affords States the “authority . . . to act to deny a

permit,” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 69 (1971), it does not

permit a State’s “dalliance or unreasonable delay” of

the federal-permitting process, 115 Cong. Rec. 9264.

If a State is to exercise its Section 401 authority, it

must give an actual “‘yes’ or ‘no’” within the one-year

deadline. 115 Cong. Rec. 9264. And if a State is to

deny a request for certification, it must issue “an

affirmative denial” before that one-year period

elapses. S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 69; see generally S.D.

Warren, 547 U.S. at 380. Thus, Section 401 requires

the State to “act in one way or the other within the

prescribed time,” with anything else “constitut[ing] a

waiver of the certification required as to that State.”

115 Cong. Rec. 9264 (emphasis added).

FERC’s contrary interpretation of “act” under

Section 401 would impermissibly render Section 401’s

one-year limitation either “inoperative” and “void,” or

“insignificant,” Corley, 556 U.S. at 314, or “practically

devoid of significance,” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12. If a

State “act[s]” under Section 401 whenever it issues a

pro forma document labeled a “denial” every 364 days,

and then tells the applicant that it must resubmit if

it ever wants a Section 401 certification—regardless

of the circumstances at issue—that would mean that

Section 401’s one-year rule would “never run its

course,” N.Y. State Conf., 514 U.S. at 655, or would be

“practically devoid of significance,” Leocal, 543 U.S. at

12. Congress does not draft statutory “limitation[s]”

25

like this to be a “mere sham” in that way. N.Y. State

Conf., 514 U.S. at 655.

Tellingly, FERC conceded before the D.C. Circuit

that, under FERC’s orders below, any State could

delay a decision on a certification request for as long

as it wants by simply enshrining that scheme in state

law. As FERC admitted, its interpretation of Section

401 would allow a State to “pass[ ] a statute” that

“require[s] an environmental impact assessment that

will take [ ] 100 years to do” and that further

“instruct[s] the [Board] every 363 days, to deny and

require the petitioner to refile for 100 years,” with no

trigger of waiver. Oral Argument Audio, supra, at

29:45–31:15. Thus, under FERC’s orders, any State

may completely evade Section 401’s one-year rule for

as long as it desires, which shows that FERC’s

interpretation of Section 401 impermissibly renders

the one-year rule completely “insignificant.” Corley,

556 U.S. at 314; see also N.Y. State Conf., 514 U.S. at

655; Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12.

Notably, neither FERC nor the D.C. Circuit

offered any meaningful response to Petitioners’ core

argument that FERC’s interpretation makes Section

401’s one-year rule utterly meaningless for any State

that does not want to be limited by Section 401’s

federal limit. FERC defaulted entirely on this point,

saying that while courts may ultimately find waiver

under certain circumstance, FERC would not do so.

Pet.App.65a. For its part, the D.C. Circuit’s only

response came in a short footnote, where it asserted

26

that whether the one-year limit would have any

meaning under FERC’s reading “may depend on

whether the State agency, in issuing denials, is

complying with State law, which in turn may depend

on the State agency’s reasons for denying the

applications.” Pet.App.9a n.8; accord Pet.App.22a.

But that gives the game away. Section 401’s one-year

rule is a federal limit on a State’s ability to delay

federally licensed projects. If the only limit on the

State’s delay is to be found in state law—as the D.C.

Circuit concluded in the just-discussed footnote—that

is not a federal limit at all. A State that wants more

than a year to act on a Section 401 certification can

just change its state law to authorize such delay, and

there would be nothing that any federal court could

do about that under FERC’s orders.

The D.C. Circuit also speculated that Petitioners’

interpretation of Section 401 could lead to

“gamesmanship”

by

requesters,

who

could

strategically submit “certification requests lacking

sufficient documentation,” with the D.C. Circuit

repeating FERC’s utterly false assertion that

Petitioners had argued that a State’s certification

decision must be “‘on the merits’” to ever be an “act”

under Section 401. Pet.App.9a–10a (quoting FERC’s

brief verbatim, with no citation whatsoever to any

submission by Petitioners taking this position). But

the issue in this petition for review challenging

FERC’s orders is whether FERC’s categorical

interpretation of Section 401 is correct. See Chenery

Corp., 318 U.S. at 87. Should this Court grant review

27

and then require the D.C. Circuit to set aside FERC’s

orders as contrary to Section 401, see 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2), FERC could choose to take into account the

D.C. Circuit’s “gamesmanship” concerns on remand,

to the extent that FERC were to conclude that the

“gamesmanship” worry that the D.C. Circuit raised

had any relevance to the situation here.

In any event, nothing about Petitioners’ actual

interpretation of Section 401 below leads to

“gamesmanship” in any case. Petitioners explained

below that, under their interpretation of Section 401,

a State “act[s]” on a certification request under

Section 401 when it denies that request in a situation

where, for example, the requestor fails to supply the

State with requisite supporting water quality-related

information, which information will already have

been developed during the lengthy, pre-certificationrequest-submission FERC licensing process. D.C.

Cir. Dkt.1936399 at 18–19 (citation omitted); D.C.

Cir. Dkt.1936398 at 46–47; see supra p.6. If a

requestor fails to submit that readily available

information, the State can (and presumably would)

deny that certification request within the one-year

limit, at which point the applicant would simply

resubmit its application with that water-quality

information now properly attached. That statutorilypermissible sequence would result in no possible

“gamesmanship” by requestors, Pet.App.10a, while

not opening the door to “dalliance or unreasonable

delay” by States, 115 Cong. Rec. 9264.

28

III. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Resolving

The Question Presented

This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the

Question Presented. FERC rested its orders below

solely upon its interpretation of Section 401, see

Pet.App.18a–22a, 54a–65a, and thus this is the only

ground upon which the federal courts may review

FERC’s orders under Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87. So

while FERC’s supporting parties attempted to raise

before the D.C. Circuit certain (meritless) fact-specific

arguments to defend the Board’s actions in issuing its

pro forma letters, those arguments are irrelevant

under Chenery, given that FERC did not rely upon

them when issuing its agency decisions.

In any event, considering the facts of this case

only further illustrates the danger of FERC’s

approach to the Section 401’s one-year rule.

California law at the relevant time required

Petitioners first to complete the CEQA process in

order to obtain certification, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23,

§ 3856(f), while directing the Board to issue withoutprejudice denials to Petitioners until they completed

that CEQA process, id. § 3837(b)(2). But given

CEQA’s many, time-consuming requirements, see,

e.g., Cal. Water Boards, Revised [CEQA] Initial Study

And Environmental Checklist at 8–42 (Nov. 9, 2016),6

Available at https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/rwqcb9/

board_info/agendas/2016/Nov/item9c/Item_9_SD5_Revised_CE

QA_Initial_Study_and_Environmental_Checklist.pdf.

6

29

complicated projects like those at issue here take far

more than one year to complete the CEQA process.

So, under the then-extant state law, California

already effectively provided that projects like

Petitioners’ would take more than a year to evaluate

for purposes of the issuance of Section 401

certifications, despite Section 401’s one-year deadline.

In other words, California had by statute mandated a

more-than-one-year timeline for it to “act” on a

certification request, just as FERC conceded at oral

argument below its reading of Section 401 permits.

See Oral Argument Audio, supra, at 29:45–31:15.

And this is not a case where the requester failed

to submit to the State information that the State

needed to decide whether the project would comply

with its water-quality standards under Section 401.

As explained above, Petitioners supported each of

their substantively identical certification requests to

the Board with the exact same environmental

evidence, never supplementing that voluminous

evidence with the Board in any way. Supra pp.8–12.

Although the Board’s pro forma denial letters claimed

that it could not review these requests until

Petitioners had completed the requirements under

NEPA and CEQA, supra pp.8–10, the Board

subsequently issued lengthy certifications to

Petitioners without receiving any additional waterquality information whatsoever—including under the

NEPA and CEQA processes that its pro forma letters

had repeatedly invoked, supra pp.10–11.

This

showed in the most conclusive terms imaginable that

30

the Board’s stated reasons for its pro forma denials

were just an attempt to buy itself more time, precisely

the kind of “dalliance or unreasonable delay” that

Section 401’s one-year rule stops.

115 Cong.

Rec. 9264.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES R. SENSIBA

MORGAN M. GERARD

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

401 9th Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

January 2023

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

KEVIN M. LEROY

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe St.,

Ste. 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

misha.tseytlin@

troutman.com

Attorneys for

Petitioners

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,

FILED JUNE 17, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

A ppendix B — order of the

united states federal energy

regulatory commission, filed

may 21, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11a

Appendix c — NOTICE OF DENIAL OF

REHEARING of the UNITED STATES

OF A M ER IC A F EDER A L EN ER GY

REGULATORY COMMISSION, filed

MARCH 22, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38a

APPENDIX d — ORDER OF THE UNITED

S T A T E S O F A M E R IC A F E D E R A L

ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,

DATED JANUARY 19, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40a

Appendix e — order of the United

states court of appeals FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,

filed september 6, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71a

Appendix f — relevant statutory

provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73a

ii

Table of Appendices

Page

APPENDIX G — REQUEST FOR SECTION

401 CERTIFICATION FOR DON PEDRO

PROJECT, DATED JULY 20, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 78a

Appendix H — Request For Section

401 Certification For La Grange

Project, DATED JULY 20, 2020 . . . . . . . . . . . . 80a

A ppendix I — Denial W ithout

Prejudice Of Water Qualit y

Certification Letter For Don

Pedro Project, Dated April 20, 2020 . . . 83a

A ppendix j — Denial W ithout

Prejudice Of Water Qualit y

Certification L etter For L a

Grange Project, Dated April 20, 2020 . . 87a

Appendix k — Request For Section

401 Certification For La Grange

Project, Dated April 22, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . 90a

Appendix L — Request For Section

401 Certification For Don Pedro

Project, Dated April 22, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . 92a

A ppendix M — Denial W ithout

Prejudice Of Water Qualit y

Certification Letter For Don

Pedro And La Grange Projects,

Dated January 24, 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94a

iii

Table of Appendices

Page

Appendix N — Request For Section

401 Certification For Don Pedro

Project, Dated January 26, 2018 . . . . . . . .97a

Appendix O — Request For Section

401 Certification For La Grange

Project, Dated January 26, 2018 . . . . . . . 101a

1a

A OF THE

APPENDIXAppendix

A — ORDER

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,

FILED JUNE 17, 2022

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 2022

Decided June 17, 2022

No. 21-1120

TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND

MODESTO IRRIGATION DISTRICT,

v.

Petitioners,

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY

COMMISSION,

Respondents,

AMERICAN WHITEWATER, et al.,

Intervenors.

Consolidated with 20-1121

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Before: Wilkins and Walker, Circuit Judges, and

Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

Randolph.

2a

Appendix A

Randolph, Senior Circuit Judge: An applicant for a

federal license to operate a hydroelectric facility must

seek a State certification that the facility’s discharges

will comply with the water quality standards specified in

federal law. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The State may grant

the applicant’s request outright, or it may grant the

request subject to conditions relating to water quality, or

it may deny the request, or it may fail to act. If the State

agency denies certification, no federal license, or at least

no federal long-term license, may issue. See id. § 1341(d).

This case presents questions about the directive in

section 401 of the Clean Water Act that if “the State . . .

fails or refuses to act on a request for certification” within

one year from receiving the request, the State “shall”

be deemed to have waived its authority to grant or deny

water quality certification. Id. § 1341(a)(1).

The Federal Energ y Reg ulator y Commission

decides whether to license private, municipal and State

hydroelectric projects subject to federal jurisdiction.

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 817(1).1 This case arose from a

combined licensing and relicensing proceeding for two

hydroelectric facilities in California. The administrative

record is as follows.

1. FERC has licensing authority over only non-federal

hydroelectric projects. Federally-owned hydroelectric projects,

which generate about half of all hydroelectric power in the United

States, “are managed primarily by the U.S. Department of the

Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation [] and the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers . . ..” K elsi Bracmort et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42579,

Hydropower: Federal and Nonfederal Investment 2, 6 (2015).

3a

Appendix A

Both of the hydroelectric facilities — the Don

Pedro Project and the La Grange Project — are on the

Tuolumne River in central California. The Turlock and

Modesto Irrigation Districts own the facilities. FERC’s

predecessor agency granted a fifty-year license to operate

the Don Pedro Project. The license expired in 2016. The

other, quite smaller project — La Grange — has operated

since the 1890’s but in 2012 FERC decided that La Grange

was subject to federal licensing authority. We upheld

FERC’s decision in Turlock Irrigation District v. FERC,

786 F.3d 18, 415 U.S. App. D.C. 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

In 2017, the Districts filed with FERC a new license

application for the La Grange Project and an amended

relicensing application for the Don Pedro Project.

On January 26, 2018, the Districts filed certification

requests for both projects with the California State Water

Resources Control Board. On January 24, 2019 — 363 days

later — the California Board denied the requests “without

prejudice.” The California Board gave two reasons.

The first: “FERC has not yet completed its National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental analysis

for the Projects.” J.A. 820. The second: “the Districts, as

lead agencies for the Projects, have not begun the CEQA

[California Environmental Quality Act] process. Without

completion of the CEQA process, the State Water Board

cannot issue a certification.” Id. The Board added that its

denial was not a “judgment on the technical merits.” Id.

On April 22, 2019, the Districts sent the Board

“substantively unchanged” certification requests for the

4a

Appendix A

Projects. Turlock Irrigation Dist. & Modesto Irrigation

Dist., 174 FERC ¶ 61,042, at P. 8 (2021) (“Declaratory

Order”). On April 20, 2020 — 364 days later — the Board

again denied the requests “without prejudice.” The Board

gave the same explanation as it had before. 2

The Districts sent a third certification request for both

projects to the California Board in July 2020. In October

of that year, while these requests were pending, the

Districts filed a petition with FERC seeking a declaratory

order that the California Board had waived section

401(a)(1)’s State certification requirement. One month

later, the Districts informed the California Board that

they were withdrawing their certification applications.

Despite the Districts’ withdrawal of these requests, in

January 2021 the California Board granted certification

2. The California Board’s full reasoning was the following:

The Districts are the lead agencies for the Project for

purposes of CEQA compliance, but they have not begun

the CEQA process. As a responsible agency, the State

Water Board relies on the environmental document

prepared by the lead agency, but makes its own

determination as to whether and with what conditions

to grant the certification, taking into consideration the

information provided in the lead agency’s document.

(Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21080.1, subd. (a), 21002.1,

subd. (d).) The State Water Board may not issue a

certification until the requirements for compliance

with CEQA are met. Additionally, the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission has not yet completed its

National Environmental Policy Act environmental

process for the Project.

J.A. 1159.

5a

Appendix A

for both Projects. 3 Although the Districts had still not

completed the CEQA process for the Projects, California

law had changed to allow the California Board to grant

certification prior to the completion of that process.

Declaratory Order, at P. 11 & n.25; see Cal. Water Code

§ 13160(b)(2) (2020).

The Districts object to the conditions — some fortyfive — that the California Board imposed in granting their

requests for certification. If the California Board did not

waive its certification authority under section 401(a)(1),

those conditions would be mandatory. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1341(d). On the other hand, if the California Board had

waived its section 401(a)(1) authority, the conditions would

become only “recommendations” for FERC to consider

in developing the terms and conditions of the Districts’

federal licenses under Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C.

§ 803(a). Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, Off. of Energy

P rojects , Div. of Hydropower Licensing, P reparing

Environmental Documents: Guidelines for A pplicants,

Contractors, and Staff 10 (2008).

FERC denied the Districts’ petition for a declaratory

order. Declaratory Order, at PP. 1, 20-35. The Districts

petitioned for rehearing which FERC denied. Turlock

Irrigation Dist. & Modesto Irrigation Dist., 175 FERC

3. The Districts are challenging the Board’s action in California

State court. See Petitioners Br. iii; California Board Intervenor Br.

19; Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No.

CV63819 (Cal. Super. Ct., Tuolumne County, filed May 11, 2021).

6a

Appendix A

¶ 61,144, at PP. 11-21 (2021) (“Rehearing Order”).4 FERC

reasoned that the California Board, “by denying the

applications without prejudice, indeed acted on [] them

. . ..” Declaratory Order, at P. 28. FERC relied on section

401’s “plain language,” which requires that a State

“act” on a certification request within one year. Id. at

P. 33; Rehearing Order, at P. 11. FERC distinguished

the California Board’s denials without prejudice from

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S.

App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019), which FERC said involved

“a coordinated withdrawal and resubmittal scheme”

that allowed the State agencies to not act and still avoid

waiver. Rehearing Order, at PP. 16. Because section 401

requires only action within a year to avoid waiver, FERC

also rejected the Districts’ argument that the California

Board’s denials were “invalid” as a matter of federal law

because they were “on non-substantive grounds” and not

“on the technical merits of the certification requests.”

Declaratory Order, at PP. 30-32; see Rehearing Order,

at P. 11.

We agree with FERC that the California Board did

not waive its certification authority under section 401(a)(1)

and that FERC’s ruling is not contrary to Hoopa Valley.

The Fourth Circuit accurately described Hoopa Valley

as a case in which “the state agencies and the license

applicant entered into a written agreement that obligated

the state agencies, year after year, to take no action at all

on the applicant’s § 401 certification request.” N.C. Dep’t

of Env’t Quality v. FERC, 3 F.4th 655, 669 (4th Cir. 2021).

4. Commissioner James P. Danly dissented from the denial of

rehearing.

7a

Appendix A

Those circumstances are not present in this case. Each

time the California Board denied certification, the Board

“act[ed]” within the meaning of section 401(a)(1). See N.Y.

State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450,

456 (2d Cir. 2018); N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v.

FERC, 991 F.3d 439, 450 n.11 (2d Cir. 2021). And when the

Board granted the third application subject to conditions,

it “act[ed]” once more. Contrast this with Hoopa Valley.

The action contemplated in section 401(a)(1) is action by

the State agency. Yet the response of the State agencies to

the certification requests in Hoopa Valley was not action,

but inaction. 5 By agreement, the applicant filed and then

withdrew its certification request before the one-year

period expired, a ritual repeated for more than ten years.

Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1101-02, 1104.6 There was no

5. That was also the situation in Placer County Water Agency,

167 FERC ¶ 61,056 (2019), on reh’g, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2019),

as FERC pointed out in its Declaratory Order, at P. 24, and in

its Rehearing Order, at P. 18, in this case. In Placer County,

e-mails showed that the state agency “elicit[ed] a withdrawal and

resubmission” of the certification application shortly before the oneyear deadline. Declaratory Order, at P. 24.

And “inaction” also described how FERC dealt with a different

deadline in a different statute. See Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC,

964 F.3d 1, 13, 448 U.S. App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).

There, FERC granted rehearing solely “for the purpose of affording

additional time to consider the merits of a rehearing request.”

Rehearing Order, at P. 11. The denials in this case occurred for a

different reason, namely that the California Board lacked information

that it needed to grant certification. This included the completion of

the CEQA process, which the Districts had not even begun.

6. The evidence in Hoopa Valley tended to show that the

applicant did not want an immediate license that would have

8a

Appendix A

such agreement between the Districts and the California

Board. The court’s opinion in Hoopa Valley stressed

that the applicant’s “water quality certification request

has been complete and ready for review for more than a

decade.” Id. at 1105. Here, the Districts’ requests were

not complete and they were not ready for review, which

is why the California Board denied them. The Board’s

denials were “without prejudice,” 7 but those rulings still

had the legal effect under section 401 of precluding FERC

from issuing licenses to the Districts during the period

preceding the Board’s grant of the certifications. See 33

U.S.C. § 1341(d).

The Districts’ answer to these points is that if we

uphold FERC’s ruling, State agencies could extend the

required decommissioning some of the project’s dams in line with

current federal environmental standards. See PacifiCorp, 147 FERC

¶ 61,216, at PP. 3-5, 11 n.11, 17 (2014). The applicant may have been

using this delay tactic in the hope of obtaining federal funding before

being required to decommission the dams. See id. at PP. 5, 12-13 &

n.13. And the applicant had an incentive to delay: while awaiting

relicensing, FERC must issue annual licenses that allow for the

continued operation of hydroelectric projects under the terms of the

existing, expired license. See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1). The applicant’s

expired license was issued in 1954 and presumably included far fewer

environmental conditions than are required under current federal

law. PacifiCorp, at P. 11 & n.11.

7. In context, the words “without prejudice” signified that the

Districts could apply again, and that the Board’s decision did not

have preclusive effect. This would have been evident from the Board’s

reasoning even without the quoted words, which is doubtless why

the Districts’ counsel stated at oral argument that “nothing” in their

case depended on “the words without prejudice.” Oral Arg. 7:22-23.

9a

Appendix A

time for decision indefinitely by denying one certification

request after another without prejudice, thus nullifying

section 401’s one-year limit. The Districts’ argument

takes the familiar form of the slippery slope. But as with

any slippery slope argument, its power to persuade is a

function of the plausibility of its predictions.

In response to the Districts’ argument in the

administrative proceedings FERC stated: “It may be that

the courts will find repeated denials without prejudice,

particularly those that do not rest on any substantive

conclusions, to be the equivalent of the withdrawal-andresubmittal scheme.” Declaratory Order, at P. 33. 8 FERC

continued: “Given, however, that the state in this case

appears to have satisfied the statutory mandate for action,

we are not prepared to conclude based on the record before

us that the state has waived its section 401 authority.” Id.

It is also important to recognize that slippery slope

arguments often can be turned against themselves.

Potentially, for each slippery slope there is an opposing

slope. “As in all arguments from consequences, drawing

attention to the [supposed] bad outcomes of one course of

action is not enough; one has to show that the alternative

courses of action don’t have just as bad (or even worse)

consequences themselves.” David Enoch, Once You Start

Using Slippery Slope Arguments, You’re on a Very

Slippery Slope, 21 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 629, 636 (2001).

8. Whether the Districts’ hypothetical is plausible may depend

on whether the State agency, in issuing denials, is complying with

State law, which in turn may depend on the State agency’s reasons

for denying the applications.

10a

Appendix A

Counsel for FERC put the opposing slope this way.

What the Districts propose could lead to “gamesmanship.”

Respondent Br. 35. Applicants could file certification

requests lacking sufficient documentation. “That would

leave the State in an untenable position.” Id. Given the

Districts’ contention “that a within-one-year denial must

be ‘on the merits’ to avoid waiver . . . the State would

be stuck with the Hobson’s choice of either granting

certification [without necessary information] or waiving

its power to” decide. Id.

In deciding not to adopt the Districts’ proposed

interpretation of section 401(a)(1) FERC thus made what

can only be regarded as a quite rational judgment. The

Districts’ remaining arguments do not merit discussion

and have been denied for the reasons given by FERC.

The petitions for judicial review are denied.

11a

B the united

Appendix B —Appendix

order of

states federal energy regulatory

commission, filed may 21, 2021

175 FERC ¶ 61,144

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Project Nos. 2299-087, 14581-004

Turlock Irrigation District

Modesto Irrigation District

Before Commissioners: Richard Glick, Chairman; Neil

Chatterjee, James P. Danly, Allison Clements, and

Mark C. Christie.

ORDER ADDRESSING ARGUMENTS

RAISED ON REHEARING

(May 21, 2021)

1. On February 18, 2021, Turlock Irrigation District

and Modesto Irrigation District (collectively, the Districts)

filed a request for rehearing of the Commission’s January

19, 2021 Declaratory Order on Waiver of Water Quality

Certification, 1 which denied the Districts’ petition

requesting the Commission to declare that the California

State Water Resources Control Board (California Board

or Board) waived its authority under section 401(a)(1)

1. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2021)

(Declaratory Order).

12a

Appendix B

of the Clean Water Act (CWA)2 to issue water quality

certification for relicensing the Don Pedro Project No.

2299 and licensing the La Grange Project No. 14581.

2. Pursuant to Allegheny Defense Project v. FERC, 3

the rehearing request filed in this proceeding may be

deemed denied by operation of law. However, as permitted

by section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act, 4 we are

modifying the discussion in the Declaratory Order and

continue to reach the same result in this proceeding, as

discussed below. 5

I.

Background

3. The Districts are co-licensees for the 168-megawatt

Don Pedro Project No. 2299.6 On April 28, 2014, the

Districts filed an application for a new license to continue

2. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

3. 964 F.3d 1, 448 U.S. App. D.C. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc)

(Allegheny).

4. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a) (“Until the record in a proceeding shall

have been filed in a court of appeals, as provided in subsection (b),

the Commission may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such

manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in

part, any finding or order made or issued by it under the provisions

of this chapter.”).

5. Allegheny, 964 F.3d at 16-17. The Commission is not changing

the outcome of the Declaratory Order. See Smith Lake Improvement

& Stakeholders Ass’n v. FERC, 809 F.3d 55, 56-57, 420 U.S. App.

D.C. 400 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

6. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 31 FPC 510 (1964), aff’d sub nom.

Cal. v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965).

13a

Appendix B

to operate and maintain the Don Pedro Project. On

October 11, 2017, the Districts filed an application for an

original license to continue to operate and maintain the

unlicensed 4.7-megawatt La Grange Project.7

4. Under section 401(a)(1) of the CWA, any applicant

seeking a federal license for an activity that “may result

in any discharge into the navigable waters,” such as

a Commission-issued hydroelectric license, must first

seek water quality certification from the state or states

in which a discharge may occur. 8 However, certification

requirements shall be waived if the state “fails or refuses

to act on a request for certification, within a reasonable

period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after

receipt of such request.” 9

5. On January 26, 2018, the Districts filed applications

for water quality certification for the projects with the

California Board, which the Board received on the same

day: the Board recognized January 26, 2019, as the

one-year deadline to act on the requests.10 On January

24, 2019, the Board denied the Districts’ applications

7. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 141 FERC ¶ 62,211 (2012), reh’g

denied, 151 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2015), aff’d, Turlock Irrigation Dist.

v. FERC, 786 F.3d 18, 415 U.S. App. D.C. 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

(establishing that the unlicensed La Grange Project was required

to be licensed).

8. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

9. Id.

10. See Districts Petition for Declaratory Order at attachment

B (filed October 2, 2020) (the Board’s February 15, 2018 Receipt

Letter accepting the applications) (Petition).

14a

Appendix B

without prejudice, noting that the Commission had not

completed its review under the National Environmental

Policy Act, that the Districts had not begun the California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) process, and that the

Board could not issue certification prior to completion

of the CEQA process.11 The Board further explained

that denial without prejudice was not a judgment on the

technical merits of the Districts’ applications, and that

the Districts would need to re-request certification in

order to maintain an active certification application.12 On

April 22, 2019, the Districts submitted to the Board what

they described as “substantively unchanged” requests for

certification for the projects, which the Board again denied

without prejudice on April 20, 2020.13 On July 20, 2020, the

Districts refiled their request and stated that the third

request was identical to the first and second requests for

certification.14 On October 2, 2020, the Districts jointly

filed a petition asking that the Commission declare that

the Board waived its authority to issue certification for

the projects, and subsequently withdrew their July 20,

2020 requests for certification on November 19, 2020.15

On January 15, 2021, the California Board issued water

quality certifications for the projects.16

11. Petition at attachment C (the Board’s January 24, 2019 Denial).

12. Id.

13. Id.

14. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 10.

15. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.

16. See Board Filing Notifying the Commission of the January

15, 2021 Water Quality Certificate Issuance Project Nos. 2299 and

14581(filed January 19, 2021).

15a

Appendix B

6. In the Declaratory Order, the Commission found

that the California Board, by denying the applications

without prejudice, satisfied CWA section 401’s requirement

that a state certifying agency act on an application within

one year.17 The Commission further reasoned that because

the Board acted on the Districts’ applications, neither the

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in Hoopa Valley

Tribe v. FERC,18 nor subsequent Commission opinions

applying Hoopa Valley, compelled a waiver finding here.19

In addition, the Commission determined that the validity

of the California Board’s decision to deny certification is a

question for California state court, and that the Districts

had not shown that these denials were unreviewable in

state court. 20

II. Procedural Issues

7. On January 29, 2021, two weeks after the California

Board issued final water quality certification, California

Sportfishing Protection Alliance, Tuolumne River Trust,

Trout Unlimited, American Whitewater, Merced River

Conservation Committee, Friends of the River, Golden

West Women Flyfishers and Central Sierra Environmental

Resource Center (collectively, Conservation Groups) filed

a motion requesting the Commission direct the Districts

17. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶¶ 28, 33.

18. 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S. App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(Hoopa Valley).

19. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶¶ 28, 33.

20. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.

16a

Appendix B

to resubmit their requests for water quality certification

with the Board. 21 On February 12, 2021, the Board filed

an answer to Conservation Groups’ motion, stating that

as it had issued final certification for the Don Pedro and

La Grange projects Conservation Groups’ motion was

moot, and that questions regarding the validity of the

Board’s action are matters of state, not federal, law and

are therefore not within the Commission’s purview. 22

8. We deny Conservation Groups’ motion. Given that

the California Board has issued certification for the

Don Pedro and La Grange projects (which Conservation

Groups fail to reference in their request), and that we

have declined to find the Board waived its authority

to issue certification, we agree with the Board that

Conservation Groups’ request is now moot. As we stated

in the Declaratory Order, questions regarding the validity

of the Board’s actions here -- be they denials without

prejudice, or issuance of certification after an application

has been withdrawn -- are “squarely within the state

court’s purview.” 23

21. See Conservation Groups Motion for Directive, Project Nos.

2299-082 and 14581-002 (Filed January 29, 2021).

22. See Board Motion to Intervene and Answer Project Nos.

2299-082 and 14581-002 at 11-16 (filed February 12, 2021).

23. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 32.

17a

Appendix B

III. Discussion

A. The California Board Acted on the Districts’

Application

9. On rehearing, the Districts assert that “the key

error in the Commission’s analysis” in the Declaratory

Order was finding that “by denying the applications

without prejudice, [the California Board] indeed acted

on them.” 24 The Districts contend that denying an

application without prejudice does not constitute acting

on the application for the purposes of section 401 and

that therefore not only is the holding in Hoopa Valley

applicable to this proceeding, but Hoopa Valley also

compels a finding of waiver in this instance.25 The Districts

aver that the Board, by issuing denials without prejudice

that did not address the technical merits of the Districts’

applications, and are not reviewable in state court, clearly

did not “act” on the Districts’ applications in the manner

Congress intended when drafting section 401. 26 Rather,

the Districts argue that the Board never intended to grant

or deny certification and only sought to evade section 401’s

one-year deadline. 27 The Districts further assert that the

legislative history of section 401 “confirms definitively”

that denial without prejudice does not constitute an act

24. See Districts Rehearing Request at 11 (citing Declaratory

Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 28).

25. See Districts Rehearing Request at 10-19.

26. Id.

27. Id.

18a

Appendix B

“sufficient ... to avoid waiver,” as Congress’ goal in adding

the waiver provision to section 401 was to prevent “sheer

inactivity” by the state. 28

10. The Districts argue that here, denial without

prejudice is equivalent to withdrawal and resubmittal

because under California regulations “denial without

prejudice is not a decision on the merits” and therefore

cannot constitute a denial under federal law. 29 In support,

the Districts note that California regulations provide

that where “the federal period for certification will

expire before” the certifying agency can review the

application, the agency may either deny the application

without prejudice, or direct the applicant to withdraw

the application. 30 The Districts further contend that that

the Board’s denials without prejudice are akin to the

Commission’s previous practice of issuing tolling orders,

deemed invalid in Allegheny, 31 as the goal in each instance

was simply to “delay the process.” 32

11. The Districts’ arguments are not compelling. As the

Commission explained in the Declaratory Order, the court

in Hoopa Valley found that “section 401 does not define

28. Id. at 13-14.

29. Id. at 12.

30. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23 § 3831(h) (2020)).

31. 964 F.3d 1, 448 U.S. App. D.C. 1.

32. See Districts Rehearing Request at 13.

19a

Appendix B

‘failure to act’ or ‘refusal to act.’”33 The Districts argue

that because denial without prejudice “is not a decision on

the merits” it therefore “cannot be a ‘denial’ as a matter

of federal law.” 34 But aside from these assertions, the

Districts provide no support for their claim that the plain

language of section 401 requires a state certifying agency

to address the technical merits of the request for water

quality certification in order to satisfy the requirement

that a state act on a request within one year. Further, in

proceedings prior to Hoopa Valley, the Board referenced

denial without prejudice as a potential consequence if

applications were not withdrawn and resubmitted. 35 That

the Board appears to have historically regarded denial

without prejudice as a definite agency action, as opposed to

withdrawal and resubmittal by the applicant, casts doubt

on the Districts’ argument that the Board, and California

regulations, treat denial without prejudice and withdrawal

33. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33 (citing Hoopa

Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104). Further, the Commission explained that

it is “reluctant to read meaning into the statute that Congress

intended the terms ‘failure to act’ or ‘refusal to act’ to encompass

a state’s denial of certification without prejudice, especially as our

interpretation of the CWA is entitled to no deference.” Id.

34. See Districts Rehearing Request at 12.

35. See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co., 172 FERC ¶ 61,066, at ¶ 25

(2020) (where the Board “mention[ed] denial without prejudice

as a possibility if [the applicant] failed to provide supplemental

information in a timely manner”); see also Placer Cnty. Water

Agency, 167 FERC ¶ 61,056, at ¶ 6 n.6 (Placer County), reh’g denied

169 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2019) (featuring emailed exchanges from 2014

wherein the Board requested the applicant withdraw and resubmit its

application “[t]o prevent denial of your request without prejudice”).

20a

Appendix B

and resubmittal as one and the same. 36 Regarding the

Districts’ arguments that the Board’s denials are the

same as the tolling orders, 37 the court in Allegheny stated

that tolling orders involved grants of rehearing explicitly

for the purpose of affording additional time to consider

the merits of the rehearing request. 38 Such a scenario is

entirely inapposite to this proceeding, which involves a

state certifying agency’s denial of a request for water

quality certification. 39

12. The Districts, repeating arguments made in

their Petition,40 allege that the California Board’s denials

without prejudice do not constitute acting on an application

36. See Districts Rehearing Request at 12-13. In addition,

in response to the Districts’ arguments relying on California

regulations, the Commission notes that the California Code of

Regulations does not appear to treat withdrawal and resubmittal

and denial without prejudice as one and the same. The California

Code of Regulations defines denial without prejudice as a “form

of denial” resulting from an “inability to grant certification for

procedural rather than substantive reasons.” See Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 23 § 3837(b)(2) (2020). While the California Code of Regulations

suggests withdrawal and resubmittal as an alternative to denial

without prejudice, they refer to denial without prejudice as a denial.

See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 23 §§ 3831, 3835 (2020).

37. Id. at 13.

38. Allegheny, 964 F.3d at 13-14.

39. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶¶ 6-9 (explaining

the California Board’s rationale for denying the Districts’ requests).

40. Compare Districts Rehearing Request at 18-19 with

Petition at 29-30.

21a

Appendix B

under section 401 because they are not reviewable in state

court, asserting that “[u]nder California law, because the

denials were without prejudice, they are not considered

final agency actions.”41 However, as we found in the

Declaratory Order, the Districts have not demonstrated

that they have “attempted and been thwarted in an

attempt to seek review” of the Board’s denials. 42 On

rehearing, the Districts rely on the same trio of California

state court cases cited in the Petition, which the Districts

allege demonstrate that in California, denials without

prejudice are not considered final agency action and

are therefore unreviewable.43 Having already examined

these cases, the Commission remains unconvinced that

“the state court cases cited by the Districts persuasively

establish that the Districts’ ability to challenge the

Board’s denial of the Districts’ requests for certification

is foreclosed.”44 The Districts have not provided evidence

which persuades the Commission that an attempt by the

Districts to seek state court review of the denials would

41. Districts Rehearing Request at 18.

42. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 34. The

Commission notes that on February 16, 2021, the Districts filed a

“Petition for Reconsideration and Request for Stay” of their water

quality certificates with the Board. See Districts, Filing, Project

Nos. 2299 and 14581 (February 24, 2021).

43. Compare Districts Rehearing Request at 18, n.74, with

Petition at 29, n.97 (citing SJCBC, LLC v. Horwedel, 201 Cal. App.

4th 339, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 85, 92 (Ct. App. 2011); McHugh v. Cnty of

Santa Cruz, 33 Cal. App. 3d 533, 109 Cal. Rptr. 149, 153 (Ct. App.

1973); Bleeck v. State Board of Optometry, 18 Cal. App. 3d 415, 95

Cal. Rptr. 860, 871 (Ct. App. 1971)).

44. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 34.

22a

Appendix B

fail solely because the denials were without prejudice.

Without successfully establishing that the Board’s denials

without prejudice are not reviewable in state court, it

remains unseen whether such denials render section

401’s one-year deadline “superfluous” or otherwise violate

section 401.45 Regarding the Districts’ legislative history

arguments, nothing in the legislative history suggests

that a conclusive action such as denial (with or without

prejudice) is equivalent to the concern regarding “sheer

inactivity” identified in the legislative history.

13. The Districts further aver that their petition only

asked the Commission to find that the Board failed to act

under section 401 as a matter of federal law, and clarify

that they do not wish for the Commission “to opine on

state law” regarding the validity of the Board’s denials.46

Whether the Board acted under federal law pursuant

to CWA section 401 is the precise question answered

by the Commission in the Declaratory Order,47 as the

Commission found that “the appropriateness of a state’s

decision to deny certification” is “squarely within the state

court’s purview.”48 Accordingly, there is no disagreement

over this issue.49

45. See Districts Rehearing Request at 13-17.

46. Id. at 22-23.

47. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 28.

48. Id. at ¶ 32.

49. The Commission notes that it proffers no opinion as to

whether the Board’s denials are valid under California Code of

Regulations or California law, and only references the California

Code of Regulations in response to the Districts’ arguments.

23a

Appendix B

14. The Districts, for the first time on rehearing, assert

that the California Board’s denials without prejudice

would be insufficient under the Environmental Protection

Agency’s Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule.50

The Environmental Protection Agency published its Final

Rule in the Federal Register on July 13, 2020, and the rule

became effective on September 11, 2020. 51 As the Board’s

denials were all issued prior to the Final Rule’s effective

date, application of the Final Rule to the Board’s actions

in this proceeding would violate the Administrative

Procedure Act’s general rule against retroactivity. 52

Moreover, the Districts had ample opportunity to present

this argument in the their October 2, 2020 Petition, and

offer no explanation for why they failed to do so. The

Commission looks with disfavor on parties raising issues

for the first time on rehearing that could have been raised

earlier, in part because other parties are not permitted

to respond to requests for rehearing. 53 Therefore, we will

not address the Districts’ argument on this issue. 53

50. See Districts Rehearing Request at 17-18 (arguing that the

Board’s denials were insufficient under the Final Rule, as they did

not describe the specific information missing from the Districts’

requests) (citing 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020) (Final Rule)).

51. Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210.

52. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining a rule as an agency

statement with “future effect”).

53. See, e.g., S. Shore Energy, LLC, 168 FERC ¶ 61,118, at ¶ 12

& n.39 (2019) (citing Calpine Oneta Power v. Am. Elec. Power Serv.

Corp., 114 FERC ¶ 61,030, at ¶ 7 (2006) (“The Commission looks with

disfavor on parties raising new issues on rehearing. Such behavior

is disruptive to the administrative process because it has the effect

24a

Appendix B

B. No Coordinated Scheme to Evade Section 401’s

One-Year Deadline

15. The Districts argue that the Commission “erred

in inferring there was no coordinated scheme” to extend

section 401’s one-year deadline, and assert that in doing

so the Commission “arbitrarily and capriciously holds

the Districts to a higher standard than applicants in past

proceedings, without explanation.”54 The Districts contend

the California Board engaged in such coordination by

twice accepting as complete “substantively unchanged

applications” only to later deny the applications as

deficient, while “invit[ing] the Districts to submit a new

application.”55 In addition, the Districts assert that it was

arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to consider

the fact that the Board issued its first denial without

prejudice prior to the D.C. Circuit’s issuing its opinion in

Hoopa Valley. 56

of moving the target for parties seeking a final administrative

decision.”)); cf. 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(c)(3) (“[a]ny request for rehearing

must ... [s]et forth the matters relied upon by the party requesting

rehearing, if rehearing is sought based on matters not available for

consideration by the Commission at the time of the final decision or

final order.”); 18 C.F.R. § 385.713(d)(1) (“The Commission will not

permit answers to requests for rehearing.”).

54. See Districts Rehearing Request at 19.

55. Id. at 20.

56. Id. at 21.

25a

Appendix B

16. As an initial matter, as we found in the Declaratory

Order57 and reiterate here,58 because the California Board

acted on the Districts’ requests for certification within

one year of receipt, the holding in Hoopa Valley does not

control here; accordingly, the Commission need not assess

whether a coordinated withdrawal and resubmittal scheme

took place. Regardless, were the Commission to consider

the Districts’ argument that there was a coordinated

scheme in this proceeding akin to that present in Hoopa

Valley and subsequent Commission proceedings, the

Districts’ arguments would still fail, as discussed below.

17. Hoopa Valley involved a proceeding where the

California Board entered into a formal, written agreement

with an applicant for water quality certification that

required the applicant to annually withdraw and resubmit

its application for certification, for the purpose of avoiding

section 401’s one-year deadline. 59 In evaluating those

circumstances, the court in Hoopa Valley held that indeed

“a state waives its Section 401 authority when, pursuant

to an agreement between the state and applicant, an

applicant repeatedly withdraws and resubmits its request

for water quality certification over a period of time greater

than one year.”60

57. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 28.

58. See supra ¶¶ 9-11.

59. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1101-03.

60. Id. at 1103.

26a

Appendix B

18. In Placer County, an applicant repeatedly withdrew

and refiled its request for water quality certification over

several years, often after the California Board emailed the

applicant and directly requested the applicant withdraw

its application in order to avoid section 401’s one-year

deadline.61 In finding that the Board’s actions constituted

waiver, the Commission determined that Hoopa Valley

does not require a formal agreement between a licensee

and a state certifying agency, but that exchanges between

entities could amount to an ongoing agreement.62 Although

the parties in Placer County did not enter into a formal,

written agreement as in Hoopa Valley, the Commission

determined that the state and the licensee had formed a

functional agreement by working together to ensure that

withdrawal and resubmission would take place each year,

thus delaying a certification decision by over six years.63

19. Citing several Commission orders,64 the Districts

contend that the Commission has previously held that

accepting an applicant’s withdrawal and resubmittal

letters “is enough to show coordination” and that we have

“also found a coordinated scheme” where the certifying

agency “communicated about, requested, and expected”

61. 167 FERC ¶ 61,056 at ¶ 6.

62. Placer Cnty. Water Agency, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 at ¶¶ 16, 18.

63. Id.

64. See Districts Rehearing Request at 20 (citing S. Cal. Edison

Co., 170 FERC ¶ 61,135, at ¶ 25 (2020) (S. Cal. Edison); Pac. Gas &

Elec. Co., 172 FERC ¶ 61,065, at ¶¶ 21-22 (2020); S. Feather Water

& Power Agency, 171 FERC ¶ 61,242, at ¶¶ 22-23 (2020); Merced

Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,240, at ¶ 22 (2020)).

27a

Appendix B

an applicant’s withdrawal and resubmittal.65 The Districts

assert that, in this case, the California Board has engaged

in a coordinated scheme by accepting “substantively

unchanged applications” as complete after having denied

the applications without prejudice and then inviting, or

once encouraging, the Districts to reapply.66

20. As the Commission has found previously, mere

acceptance of an application that has been withdrawn and

resubmitted is insufficient to find waiver where it cannot

be shown that the withdrawal and resubmittal is made

“at the behest of the state certifying agency to delay a

certification decision.”67 In this proceeding, there is no

record evidence showing that the Board communicated

about, expected, requested, or encouraged68 the Districts

to withdraw and resubmit their applications for the

purpose of avoiding waiver, or that the Districts ever

withdrew and resubmitted their applications as a result

65. See id. (quoting S. Cal. Edison, 170 FERC ¶ 61,135 at ¶ 25

(internal quotations omitted, emphasis added).

66. See Districts Rehearing Request at 20.

67. See, e.g., Vill. of Morrisville, Vt., 173 FERC ¶ 61,156, at

¶ 21 (2020); KEI (Maine) Power Management (III) LLC, 173 FERC

¶ 61,069, at ¶¶ 42-46 (2020).

68. The Commission notes that the Board’s sole instance of

encouragement was limited the Board’s April 20, 2020 denial without

prejudice where the Board stated that the Districts may submit

a new request for certification, with no reference to the Districts

withdrawing and resubmitting their application, or the waiver

provision of section 401. See Petition at attachment C (the Board’s

April 20, 2020 denial letter).

28a

Appendix B

of any such exchanges; therefore, we continue to find that

no coordinated scheme took place.69 As this proceeding

features none of the circumstances that were present in

prior instances in which the Commission has found waiver

post-Hoopa Valley, there is no basis for finding that the

Commission has held the Districts “to a higher standard

than past applicants in prior proceedings.” 70

21. Finally, the Districts assert that the Commission’s

consideration of the fact that the California Board denied

their application without prejudice, instead of directing

them to withdraw and resubmit, prior to the issuance of

the opinion in Hoopa Valley is “arbitrary and capricious

because it is irrelevant” and contend that “[i]t does

not matter when the Board tried to stop the clock; it

matters only that it tried to do so.” 71 To the contrary, we

continue to find that the Board denial of the Districts’

application without prejudice, instead of instructing the

Districts to withdraw and resubmit their applications,

prior to the Hoopa Valley holding that such coordinated

schemes result in waiver, is relevant to and supports

the Commission’s finding that the Board did not seek

to engage in a coordinated scheme in this proceeding.

Indeed, at the time of denial, the court had not yet ruled

that coordinated withdrawal and resubmittal schemes

resulted in waiver.

69. There is no record evidence and the dissent does not cite

to any record evidence to infer that the Board intended to override

section 401’s waiver provision. See Dissent at ¶ 3.

70. See Districts Rehearing Request at 19.

71. See id. at 20-21.

29a

Appendix B

The Commission orders:

(A) In response to the Districts’ request for rehearing,

the Declaratory Order is hereby modified and the result

sustained, as discussed in the body of this order.

(B) Conservation Groups’ Motion for Directive is

denied.

By the Commission. Commissioner Danly is dissenting

with a separate statement attached.

(SEAL)

Debbie-Anne A. Reese,

Deputy Secretary

30a

Appendix B

DANLY, Commissioner, dissenting:

1. I dissent from today’s order on rehearing reaffirming

the Commission’s finding that the California State Water

Resources Control Board (Board) did not waive its ability

to issue a water quality certification to Turlock Irrigation

District and Modesto Irrigation District (Districts).

Although I initially voted for not finding waiver,1 after

considering the material raised in the request for

rehearing and reviewing the filings in the proceeding, it

is now my view that our prior finding—reaffirmed here—

contravenes section 401 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).

2. CWA section 401 delegates to states the authority

to issue water quality certifications for the construction

or operation of facilities that may discharge into navigable

waters within their jurisdiction. 2 While broad, that

delegation is not limitless. Congress required states

to “establish procedures for public notice in the case

of all applications” and permitted states to establish

“procedures for public hearings in connection with specific

1. See Turlock Irrigation Dist., 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 (2021)

(Declaratory Order). To the extent that the Commission signaled

in Merced Irrigation District that denial without prejudice for the

purpose of extending the one-year deadline is considered an “act”

under CWA section 401, I voted for that order in error. See Merced

Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,240, at ¶ 32 (2020) (“We note that to

the extent a state lacks sufficient information to act on a certification

request, it has a remedy: it can deny certification. Delay beyond the

statutory deadline, however, is not an option.”).

2. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

31a

Appendix B

applications.” 3 Then, in order to “curb a state’s ‘dalliance

or unreasonable delay,’”4 Congress provided that if a

state “fails or refuses to act on a request for certification,

within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed

one year) after receipt of such request, the certification

requirements of this subsection shall be waived with

respect to such Federal application.”5 In Hoopa Valley

Tribe v. FERC (Hoopa Valley), the court found that

“[w]hile the statute does not define ‘failure to act’ or

‘refusal to act,’ the states’ efforts . . . constitute such

failure and refusal within the plain meaning of these

phrases” because “the withdrawal-and-resubmission

scheme could be used to indefinitely delay federal licensing

proceedings.”6

3. Like the withdrawal-resubmission scheme found

impermissible in Hoopa Valley, the Board in this case

twice denied the Districts’ application in what appears to

be an attempt to override the statute’s one-year deadline

thereby affording itself additional time to act. The Board

received the application, acknowledged receipt, found the

Districts’ application met the filing requirements set forth

in the California Code of Regulations, and identified the

3. Id.

4. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1104, 439 U.S.

App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing 115 Cong. Rec. 9264 (1969))

(emphasis omitted).

5. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

6. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.

32a

Appendix B

one-year deadline for certification.7 The Board did not

request additional information. And just two days before

the one-year deadline, the Board denied the application

without prejudice stating that environmental review

under the National Environmental Policy Act and the

California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) had not

been completed and the Board therefore could not issue its

certification. 8 The Board also explained that the Districts

would need to request certification “[i]n order to maintain

an active certification application.” 9

4. Then, after the Districts filed their application

“substantively unchanged,”10 the Board did it all again,

denying the application just two days before the deadline

but this time adding, “without elaboration, that ‘the

proposed activity does not comply with applicable water

quality standards and other appropriate requirements.’”11

7. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 5.

8. See id. ¶ 6; see also Merced Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC

¶ 61,240 at ¶ 22 (“Moreover, the Commission found unavailing the

Board’s assertion that it could not issue a water quality certification

until the CEQA process was complete, which often takes more than

one year, and determined that the general principle from Hoopa

Valley still applied.”) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 170 FERC ¶ 61,232,

at ¶¶ 31-33 (2020)).

9. Districts Petition at attachment C (Board January 24, 2019

Denial Letter).

10. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 8 (citation

omitted).

11. Id. ¶ 9 (quoting District Petition at attachment C (Board

April 20, 2020 Denial Letters)).

33a

Appendix B

Despite finding that the proposed activity did not comply

with applicable standards, the Board issued a water

quality certification for the Districts’ third request,

which was “identical to the first and second requests

for certification.”12 The timing of the ultimate approval

also bears note: it occurred after the Districts filed their

petition for finding waiver and had withdrawn their third

request.

5. Whether the Board explicitly suggests withdrawal

and resubmission, or styles its suggestion as a denial

without prejudice, removing the applicant’s complicity, the

result is the same: the Board’s denial without prejudice in

this case “usurp[s] FERC’s control over whether and when

a federal license will issue”13 and is intended to override

the waiver provision “created ‘to prevent a State from

indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding.’”14

Indeed, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

has stated in guidance, under the heading, “When More

12. Id. ¶ 10.

13. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.

14. Id. at 1104-05 (citing Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v.

FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 972-73, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 425 (D.C. Cir. 2011);

Millennium Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Seggos, 860 F.3d 696, 701-02, 429

U.S. App. D.C. 403 (D.C. Cir. 2017)); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Env’t

Conservation v. FERC, 991 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Section

401 was intended to curb conduct by certifying states that upsets

the regulatory balance set by Congress.”) (citation omitted); id. at

450 (“[W]e are bound by what we believe to be Congress’ intention

expressed in the text of Section 401 and reinforced in its legislative

history to reduce flexibility in favor of protecting the overall federal

licensing regime.”).

34a

Appendix B

Time is Needed,” that “states have tended to take two

approaches”: (1) suggesting the applicant withdraw and

resubmit its application and (2) denying the application

without prejudice.15 EPA explicitly declined to endorse

either approach as consistent with CWA section 401.16

6. The Commission does not dispute that denials

without prejudice could be used to override the waiver

provision.17 Rather, the Commission argues that the

15. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Wetlands,

Oceans and Watersheds, Clean Water Act Section 401: A Water

Quality Protection Tool for States and Tribes, 13 (2010), https://

eelp.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/section-401-of-the-cleanwater-actfrom-trump-to-biden/ (linking to Clean Water Act Section 401: A

Water Quality Protection Tool for States and Tribes under the

term “interim guidance”) (2010 Guidance) (emphasis added). The

2010 Guidance was rescinded and replaced in 2019 with an updated

guidance, which recommended, “the state or tribe not delay action

on a certification request until a NEPA review is complete unless

the request is submitted at or near the conclusion of the NEPA

process.” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Act

Section 401 Guidance for Federal Agencies, States, and Authorized

Tribes, 5 (2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2019-06/

documents/cwa_section_401_guidance.pdf (2019 Guidance). The 2019

Guidance is no longer in effect. See U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, CWA Section 401 Certification, https://www.epa.gov/cwa401/clean-water-act-section-401-guidance-federal-agencies-statesand-authorized-tribes.

16. 2010 Guidance at 13 n.70 (“This handbook does not endorse

either of the two approaches, but emphasizes the need for coordination

regarding necessary information early in the certification process in

order to avoid denial or withdrawal due to data gaps.”).

17. See Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at 33.

35a

Appendix B

Board’s denial without prejudice in this case constituted

an “act” because “section 401 does not define ‘failure to

act’ or ‘refusal to act’”18 and the Commission is “reluctant”

to interpret such phrases as encompassing a denial

without prejudice when its interpretation is entitled to no

deference.19 This argument is essentially the same as that

made by the Commission, and that the Hoopa Valley court

rejected, in support of the withdrawal-and-resubmission

scheme constituting an “act”: “The Act therefore speaks

solely to state action or inaction, rather than the repeated

withdrawal and refiling of applications.” 20 This argument

is no more compelling because the state treats withdrawalresubmission and denial without prejudice differently. 21

Those may be different labels but both are used to achieve

the same result. The rights of the Districts to potentially

appeal (so long as they have exhausted all administrative

remedies) the denial in state court does not cure the fact

that the denial without prejudice is a procedural device

used to override the one-year deadline. 22

7. I cannot fault my colleagues for their reluctance

to reduce a state’s flexibility to issue water quality

18. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 175 FERC ¶ 61,144, at ¶ 11 (2021)

(quoting Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33).

19. Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33.

20. PacifiCorp, 149 FERC ¶ 61,038, at ¶ 20 (2014), vacated and

remanded sub nom. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S. App. D.C.

304 (emphasis in original).

21. See Turlock Irrigation Dist., 175 FERC ¶ 61,144 at ¶ 11.

22. See id.

36a

Appendix B

certifications. Indeed, my inclination in such cases is

always to allow the state instrumentality to act as it sees

fit under the statutory scheme enacted by Congress and

let aggrieved parties seek redress in state court. The

federal courts, however, have spoken. They have stated

that procedural schemes that work an extension of the

one-year deadline constitute failures or refusals to act.

And, in fact, here the state heeded the court’s guidance

and revised their procedures in order to comply with the

reinvigorated one-year deadline. 23 The Board’s repeated

denials without prejudice are essentially the same as the

scheme in Hoopa Valley. The court has instructed us as

to our duty and I see no reason to wait for the issue to

reach the courts before finding waiver as the Commission

suggests, my respect for the states’ independence

notwithstanding. 24

23. See Board January 19, 2021 Water Quality Certification

at 18 (“On June 29, 2020, Governor Newsome signed into law

amendments to the Water Code that provide the State Water Board

with the authority to issue certifications before completion of CEQA

review, where waiting until completion of CEQA review presents a

substantial risk of wavier of certification authority.”).

24. See Declaratory Order, 174 FERC ¶ 61,042 at ¶ 33 (“It may

be that the courts will find repeated denials without prejudice, and

particularly those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions,

to be the equivalent of the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme.”).

The Board has denied without prejudice water quality certifications

in eight other proceedings: (1) Yuba-Bear Hydroelectric Project No.

2266 (Accession No. 20190205-0043), (2) Merced River Hydroelectric

Project No. 2179 (Accession No. 20190429-0020), (3) Merced Falls

Hydroelectric Project No. 2467 (Accession No. 20190429-0020), (4)

Yuba River Project No. 2246 (Accession No. 20190822-5016), (5) Deer

Creek Project No. 14530 (Accession No. 20181217-0025), (6) Upper

37a

Appendix B

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

James P. Danly

Commissioner

North Fork Feather River Hydroelectric Project No. 2105 (Accession

No. 20190228-0019), (7) Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project No. 2299

(Accession No. 20190206-0011), and (8) La Grange Hydroelectric

Project No. 14581 (Accession No. 20190206-0011).

38a

Appendix c —Appendix

NOTICECOF DENIAL OF

REHEARING of the UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY

COMMISSION, filed MARCH 22, 2021

174 FERC ¶ 62,175

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Turlock Irrigation District Project Nos. 2299-087

Modesto Irrigation District

14581-004

NOTICE OF DENIAL OF REHEARING BY

OPERATION OF LAW AND PROVIDING FOR

FURTHER CONSIDERATION

(March 22, 2021)

Rehear ing has been timely requested of the

Commission’s order issued on January 19, 2021, in this

proceeding. Turlock Irrigation District., 174 FERC

¶ 61,042 (2021). In the absence of Commission action on

the request for rehearing within 30 days from the date

the request was filed, the request for rehearing (and any

timely requests for rehearing filed subsequently)1 may be

deemed denied. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a); 18 C.F.R. § 385.713

(2020); Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC, 964 F.3d 1 (D.C.

Cir. 2020) (en banc).

1. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy &

Ancillary Servs. Into Mkts. Operated by Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator

& Cal. Power Exch., 95 FERC ¶ 61,173 (2001).

39a

Appendix C

As provided in 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a), the rehearing

request of the above-cited order filed in this proceeding

will be addressed in a future order to be issued consistent

with the requirements of such section. As also provided

in 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a), the Commission may modify or set

aside its above-cited order, in whole or in part, in such

manner as it shall deem proper. As provided in 18 C.F.R.

§ 385.713(d), no answers to the rehearing request will be

entertained.

Kimberly D. Bose,

Secretary.

40a

APPENDIX d —Appendix

ORDER D

OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY

REGULATORY COMMISSION,

DATED JANUARY 19, 2021

174 FERC ¶ 61,042

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: James P. Danly, Chairman;

Neil Chatterjee, Richard Glick,

Allison Clements, and

Mark C. Christie

Turlock Irrigation District

Modesto Irrigation District

Project Nos. 2299-082,

14581-002

DECLARATORY ORDER ON WAIVER

OF WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION

(Issued January 19, 2021)

1. On October 2, 2020, Turlock Irrigation District and

Modesto Irrigation District (the Districts), licensees for

the Don Pedro Hydroelectric Project No. 2299 (Don Pedro

Project) and applicants for the unlicensed La Grange

Hydroelectric Project No. 14581 (La Grange Project),

jointly filed a petition for declaratory order. The Districts

request that the Commission declare that the California

State Water Resources Control Board (California Board

or Board) waived its authority under section 401(a)(1)

41a

Appendix D

of the Clean Water Act (CWA)1 to issue water quality

certifications for relicensing the Don Pedro Project and

for licensing the La Grange Project. This order denies

the petition.

I.

Background

2. The 168-megawatt Don Pedro Project is located

on the Tuolumne River in Tuolumne County, California.

The Commission’s predecessor, the Federal Power

Commission, issued a 50-year original license for the Don

Pedro Project on March 10, 1964. 2 The Districts filed a

timely application for a new license to continue to operate

and maintain the Don Pedro Project on April 28, 2014. 3

The license expired on April 30, 2016, and the Districts

continue to operate the Don Pedro Project under an annual

license.4

3. The 4.7-megawatt La Grange Project is located

on the Tuolumne River in Stanislaus and Tuolumne

1. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

2. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 31 FPC 510 (1964), aff’d sub nom.

California v. FPC, 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965). The license authorized

construction of a new dam and reservoir that submerged existing,

unlicensed project facilities constructed in 1923. The license was

effective as of the first day of the month in which the Districts

accepted it, which did not occur until May 1965 after judicial review.

3. The Districts filed an amended license application for the

Don Pedro Project on October 11, 2017.

4. Notice of Authorization for Continued Project Operation

(May 5, 2016).

42a

Appendix D

Counties, California, immediately downstream of the Don

Pedro Project. On December 19, 2012, Commission staff

issued an order finding that the existing, unlicensed La

Grange Project requires licensing because it is located on

a navigable river and occupies federal land. 5 On October

11, 2017, the Districts filed an application for an original

license to continue to operate and maintain the La Grange

Project.

4. Pursuant to public notices issued by the Commission,

the deadline for filing motions to intervene in the Don

Pedro Project relicense proceeding and the La Grange

Project license proceeding was January 29, 2018.6

5. The Districts requested water quality certification

for each project on January 26, 2018, and the California

Board received the requests the same day.7 On January

5. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 141 FERC ¶ 62,211 (2012), reh’g

denied, 151 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2015), aff’d, Turlock Irrigation Dist. v.

FERC, 786 F.3d 18, 415 U.S. App. D.C. 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

6. See November 30, 2017 Notices of Application Accepted for

Filing issued for Project Nos. 2299-082 and 14581-002. A second

intervention period followed Commission staff’s issuance of the

draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). See February 11,

2019 Notice of Availability of the Draft EIS for the Don Pedro and

La Grange Projects (setting April 12, 2019, as the deadline for filing

comments on the draft EIS); 18 C.F.R. § 380.10(a) (2020) (deeming

timely any motion to intervene filed on the basis of, and within the

comment period for, a draft EIS).

7. As required by section 5.23(b)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s

regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 5.23(b)(1)(ii) (2020), the Districts filed a copy

of the requests with the Commission, including proof of the date of

receipt of the request.

43a

Appendix D

29, 2018, the Board provided preliminary certification

conditions for the projects. 8 Thereafter, in a February

15, 2018 letter to the Districts acknowledging receipt

of the certification applications, the Board stated

that the Districts’ applications met the application

filing requirements set forth in the California Code of

Regulations (California Code),9 and identified January 26,

2019, as the one-year deadline for certification action.10

6. On January 24, 2019, the California Board denied

without prejudice the Districts’ applications.11 The Board’s

denial letter stated that the Commission had not completed

its review under the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA), that the Districts had not started the California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) process, and that the

Board could not issue certification prior to completion

of the CEQA process.12 Explaining that “denial without

8. The California Board provided comments and preliminary

terms and conditions for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects in

response to the Commission’s November 30, 2017 Notice of Ready

for Environmental Analysis.

9. Districts’ October 2, 2020 Petition for Declaratory Order at

attachment B (California Board’s February 15, 2018 Receipt Letter)

(citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 3856) (Petition).

10. Id.

11. Petition at attachment C (California Board’s January 24,

2019 Denial Letter).

12. Id. The Board has explained that, at the time of the January

2019 certification denial, it “could not determine compliance with

water quality standards and issue water quality certification until

environmental documentation had been prepared evaluating the

44a

Appendix D

prejudice carries with it no judgment on the technical

merits of the activity,” the Board notified the Districts of

the need to re-request certification in order to maintain

active certification applications for the projects.13

7. On January 25, 2019, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit)

issued an opinion in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC,14 ruling

that, where a state and an applicant agree to repeatedly

withdraw and refile the same water quality certification

request, the state has waived its certification authority.

8. On April 22, 2019, the Districts submitted to the

California Board their second requests for water quality

certification for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.

The Districts noted that, aside from an updated procedural

background, their letters requesting certification were

“substantively unchanged” from their initial requests.15

In its May 21, 2019 letters to the Districts acknowledging

receipt of the applications, the Board again stated that

potential environmental impacts of the proposed project and any

feasible mitigation measures.” California Board’s October 29, 2020

Motion to Intervene and Comments on Petition at 20 (California

Board’s October 29 Comments).

13. See id.

14. 913 F.3d 1099, 439 U.S. App. D.C. 304 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Hoopa

Valley) (rejecting a coordinated withdrawal-and-resubmission

scheme between the applicant and the state certifying agency).

15. Petition at 8.

45a

Appendix D

the applications met the application filing requirements,16

and identified April 22, 2020, as the one-year deadline for

certification action.17

9. On April 20, 2020, the California Board denied

without prejudice the Districts’ second certification

requests.18 The Board noted that it “may not issue a

certification until the requirements for compliance with

CEQA are met,” and that the Commission had not yet

completed its NEPA process. Further, the Boards’ letters

stated, without elaboration, that “the proposed activity

does not comply with applicable water quality standards

and other appropriate requirements.”19 In its denial letter

for each project, the Board “encourage[d] the Districts to

submit a new request for certification.” 20

10. On July 20, 2020, the Districts submitted to the

California Board their third requests for water quality

certification for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.

Again, the Districts stated that, aside from updating the

procedural background, their third requests were identical

to the first and second requests for certification. 21 In its

16. Id. at attachment B (California Board’s May 21, 2019 Receipt

Letters) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 3856).

17. Id.

18. Id. at attachment C (California Board’s April 20, 2020

Denial Letters).

19. Id.

20. Id.

21. Id. at 10.

46a

Appendix D

August 18, 2020 letters to the Districts acknowledging

receipt of the applications, the Board again notified the

Districts that the applications met the application filing

requirements, 22 and identified July 20, 2021, as the oneyear deadline for certification action. 23

11. On October 2, 2020, the Districts filed the instant

petition. They subsequently withdrew their third requests

for certification, on November 19, 2020. 24 On December

1, 2020, the California Board filed draft certifications for

the projects. 25

II. Procedural Issues

12. On November 6, 2020, the Commission issued

public notice of the Districts’ petition, establishing

22. Id. at attachment B (California Board’s August 18, 2020

Receipt Letters) (citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 3856).

23. Id.

24. Districts’ November 20, 2020 Copy of Withdrawal of

Requests for Water Quality Certification.

25. California Board’s December 1, 2020 Copy of Draft Water

Quality Certification for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.

Notwithstanding that the Districts had not initiated the CEQA

process as of the date of the draft certification (i.e., November 30,

2020), the California Board explained that, pursuant to a June

2020 amendment to the California Water Code, the Board is now

authorized to issue certifications before completion of CEQA

review, “where waiting until completion of CEQA review presents

a substantial risk of waiver of certification.” Id. (citing Cal. Water

Code § 13160(b)(2) (2020)); see also Petition, Attachment F (providing

copy of Cal. Water Code § 13160 and Assembly Bill No. 92).

47a

Appendix D

December 7, 2020, as the deadline for filing interventions

and comments on the petition. 26 Before the Commission

issued that notice, the California Board filed comments

and a motion to inter vene on October 29, 2020. 27

California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, Tuolumne

River Trust, Trout Unlimited, American Whitewater,

Merced River Conservation Committee, Friends of

the River, Golden West Women Flyfishers and Central

Sierra Environmental Resource Center (collectively,

Conservation Groups) filed initial comments on November

2, 2020. On November 13, 2020, the Districts filed an

answer in opposition to the California Board’s motion

to intervene. On November 30, 2020, the Districts filed

an answer to the California Board’s and Conservation

Groups’ comments. On December 7, 2020, Sierra Club filed

comments and a motion to intervene, and the Conservation

Groups filed supplemental comments. All commenters

oppose the petition.

13. In support of its motion to intervene, the California

Board first points to the Commission’s recent practice of

publicly noticing the filing of a petition for declaratory

order regarding waiver of water quality certification under

section 401. 28 Those notices of petitions, the Board states,

26. 85 Fed. Reg. 72,646 (Nov. 13, 2020).

27. The California Board subsequently filed a second request

to intervene, which included, “out of an abundance of caution,” a

request to incorporate by reference its October 29, 2020 motion to

intervene and comments, which preceded the Commission’s public

notice of the Districts’ petition. California Board’s December 4, 2020

Notice of Intervention, Motion to Intervene, and Comments at 2-3.

28. California Board’s October 29 Comments at 10.

48a

Appendix D

have provided an opportunity for entities to file notices

of intervention, motions to intervene, or protests and the

Commission has accepted as timely any interventions

filed during the time period established by the notice.

Therefore, the Board asserts, its intervention should be

considered timely. Second, the California Board states

that its intervention should be granted to allow the Board

to “exercise its statutorily recognized duties with respect

to Section 401 water quality certification” and in light of its

“statutory responsibilities to protect the quality of waters

of the state in the public interest.” 29 Third, because its

actions are the target of the Districts’ petition, the Board

states that denying intervention would be unfair, as no

other party can adequately represent the Board’s interest

in preserving its authority under section 401 of the CWA. 30

Fourth, the Board asserts that it had good cause for not

intervening earlier in the license proceedings for the Don

Pedro and La Grange Projects because it had no reason

to believe its authority to deny or condition certification

would be jeopardized and because it could not foresee

the ramifications of the yet-to-be-issued Hoopa Valley

opinion. Good cause is further established, the California

Board asserts, because it had no reason to anticipate that

its denials of certification would be reviewed in a forum

other than state court and because the Board has been

an active participant in the license proceedings. 31 The

Board urges the Commission to “unconditionally confirm,

29. Id. at 11.

30. Id. at 12.

31. Id. at 13-14 (noting its January 29, 2018 filing of general

comments and preliminary terms and conditions in response to the

Commission’s November 30, 2017 Notice of Application).

49a

Appendix D

recognize, or grant party and intervenor status” to it in

this proceeding, and asserts that limiting the scope of its

participation as intervenor would be inconsistent with the

Commission’s regulations and the Commission’s practice

addressing similar petitions. 32

14. The Districts filed an answer opposing the

California Board’s motion to intervene. 33 They urge the

Commission to deny the Board’s late motion to intervene

in the license proceedings for the Don Pedro and La

Grange Projects. First, the Districts argue that by failing

to intervene after having two previous opportunities to do

so, the Board slept on its rights and should not be allowed

to intervene now. 34 Second, the Districts deem the Board’s

argument that it could not have foreseen the Hoopa Valley

result as unavailing because, as the Districts note, issues

concerning certification conditions and waiver arise with

relative frequency in Commission license proceedings. 35

Third, the Districts claim that allowing the Board to

32. Id. at 14.

33. Districts’ November 13, 2020 Answer in Opposition to Late

Motion to Intervene.

34. Id. at 2-3. The Board had the opportunity to timely intervene

on two prior occasions: after the Commission accepted the Districts’

license applications for the projects and after Commission staff

issued the draft EIS. See November 30, 2017 Notices of Application

Accepted for Filing issued for Project Nos. 2299-082 and 14581-002

(establishing January 29, 2018, as the deadline for filing motions to

intervene) and 18 C.F.R. § 380.10(a) (deeming timely any motion to

intervene filed on the basis of, and within the comment period for,

a draft EIS).

35. Id. at 3-4.

50a

Appendix D

intervene in the licensing proceedings would prejudice the

Districts and cause undue burden, because the Districts

have relied on the fact that the Board, given its current

lack of party status, would be unable to seek rehearing

of any license that the Commission may issue for the Don

Pedro or La Grange Projects. 36 However, the Districts

state that they do not oppose the Board’s intervention in

a separately sub-docketed proceeding for the Districts’

petition for declaratory order seeking waiver of water

quality certification. 37

15. The Secretary’s public notice explained that because

the Districts’ petition is part of the licensing proceedings

for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects, any person who

intervened in either proceeding is already a party to the

licensing proceeding. 38 The notice further explained that,

generally, the filing of a petition for a declaratory order

involving an issue arising from the licensing proceeding,

such as waiver of certification, does not trigger a new

opportunity to intervene.39 Accordingly, the notice directed

any person seeking to become a party at this stage in the

license proceedings to file a motion to intervene out-of-time,

pursuant to Rule 214(b)(3) and (d) of the Commission’s Rules

of Practice and Procedure, that provides justification by

reference to the factors set forth in Rule 214(d).40

36. Id. at 4.

37. Id. at 1, 5.

38. Secretary’s November 6, 2020 Notice of Petition for

Declaratory Order at n.1.

39. Id.

40. 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(b)(3) and (d) (2020).

51a

Appendix D

16. The California Board and Sierra Club, the only

entities that filed motions to intervene in the petition

proceeding (both of which were timely and neither of

which was opposed), became parties in that proceeding

by operation of the Commission’s rules of practice and

procedure.41 However, as the notice made clear, any entity

seeking to also intervene in the licensing proceedings

would have to justify late intervention in accordance with

our regulations.42

17. After considering the Rule 214(d) factors, we find

that neither the California Board nor the Sierra Club

has demonstrated good cause for intervening late in the

licensing proceedings. As both entities were aware, water

quality issues generally, and water quality certification in

specific, are matters that arise in all licensing proceedings.

Nonetheless, neither entity elected to timely intervene.

18. The California Board asserts that good cause

exists for its failure to inter vene in the licensing

proceedings because it had no reason to believe its

certification authority would be jeopardized nor could it

anticipate the implications of the Hoopa Valley opinion.

We disagree. The Board’s actions do not amount to good

cause, but rather, constitute sleeping on its rights.43 In any

41. See id. § 385.214(c).

42. See Idaho Power Co., 171 FERC ¶ 61,238, at ¶¶ 11-14 (2020).

43. Participants in Commission proceedings may not sit back

and wait to see how issues might be resolved before deciding whether

to intervene to protect their interests. See Cal. Trout v. FERC, 572

F.3d 1003, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (Cal. Trout); Idaho Power Co., 171

FERC ¶ 61,238 at ¶ 17 n.27, (citing Cal. Trout, 572 F.3d at 1022 (“[T]

52a

Appendix D

case, to the extent that the Board’s interest in preserving

its statutory authority to issue water quality certification

for the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects is a compelling

interest not adequately represented by any other party

to the license proceedings,44 that interest is completely

protected by the Board’s status as a party to the limited

proceeding on the petition.45 In addition, granting late

intervention in the underlying licensing proceedings

could disrupt the proceeding and cause prejudice to, or

additional burdens on, existing parties.

19. The same is true of Sierra Club, which in any case

lacks the statutory concerns expressed by the Board.

he Commission has steadfastly and consistently held that a person

who has actual or constructive notice that his interests might be

adversely affected by a proceeding, but who fails to intervene in

a timely manner, lacks good cause under Rule 214.”); Bradwood

Landing, LLC, 126 FERC ¶ 61,035, at ¶¶ 11, 16 (2009) (denying late

intervention to movant who claimed that scientific studies made

it more aware of its interests in the proceeding); Cent. Neb. Pub.

Power & Irrigation Dist., 125 FERC ¶ 61,192, at ¶ 12 (2008) (“The

Commission expects parties to intervene in a timely manner based on

the reasonably foreseeable issues arising from the applicant’s filings

and the Commission’s notice of proceedings.” (emphasis added));

Broadwater Energy, LLC, 124 FERC ¶ 61,225, at ¶ 13 (2008) (“Those

entities with interests they intend to protect are not entitled to wait

until the outcome of a proceeding and then file a motion to intervene

once they discover the outcome conflicts with their interests.”)).

44. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(d)(1)(iii).

45. We recently clarified that the Commission may, but need

not, establish separate sub-dockets for petitions filed in licensing

proceedings. Idaho Power Co., 171 FERC ¶ 61,238 at ¶ 13. As a result,

our decision is not influenced by the fact that separate subdockets

are not used in this case.

53a

Appendix D

Although Sierra Club argues that it did not anticipate

the Districts’ “novel decision” to file a petition seeking

waiver on the basis of the Board twice denying the

Districts’ requests for certification,46 as was true of the

Board, Sierra Club was aware that issues regarding

water quality, including any related to certification,

would arise in the licensing proceedings and has not

explained it failure to timely intervene to address those

matters. Moreover, Sierra Club’s limited interest in this

proceeding47 —opposition to the Districts’ petition seeking

waiver of certification—is adequately represented by its

timely intervention in the proceeding on the petition.

III. Discussion

20. Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA requires that an

applicant for a federal license or permit to conduct

activities that may result in a discharge into the navigable

waters of the United States, such as the Districts’

operation of the Don Pedro and the La Grange Projects,

must provide the licensing or permitting agency a water

quality certification from the state in which the discharge

originates or evidence of waiver thereof.48 If the state

46. See Sierra Club’s December 7, 2020 Comments and Motion

to Intervene at 8, 9 (Sierra Club Comments).

47. Sierra Club Comments at 3 (“The outcome of these CWA

Section 401 agency implementation matters is clearly a significant

program concern of the Sierra Club”) and 7 (“Our major interest

here is the Commission’s national implementation of its water quality

certification legal responsibilities”).

48. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Section 401(d) of the CWA provides

that a certification and the conditions contained therein shall become

54a

Appendix D

“fails or refuses to act on a request for certification, within

a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one

year) after receipt of such request,” then certification is

waived.49 Further, the licensing or permitting agency may

not grant a license or permit until certification has been

granted or waived. 50

21. The Districts contend that, by twice denying

certification without prejudice and encouraging application

resubmittal, the California Board relied on a tactic that

is not only indistinguishable from the withdrawal-andresubmission scheme rejected by the Hoopa Valley court,

but also inconsistent with section 401(a) of the CWA. The

California Board argues that we should not find waiver

because: (1) Hoopa Valley is not applicable; (2) treating

the Board’s denial of certification as waiver would be

inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA; (3)

the Districts failed to exhaust their administrative and

judicial remedies; and (4) the Districts’ unclean hands

preclude equitable relief. 51 The Conservation Groups and

Sierra Club also argue that Hoopa Valley is inapplicable.52

a condition of any federal license that is issued. Id. § 1341(d). See

City of Tacoma, Wash. v. FERC, 460 F.3d 53, 373 U.S. App. D.C. 117

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tacoma).

49. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

50. Id.

51. See California Board’s October 29 Comments.

52. Conservation Groups’ November 2, 2020 Comments at 1622; Sierra Club Comments at 6.

55a

Appendix D

22. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the

California Board did not waive its authority under section

401.

A.

Hoopa Valley and Commission Precedent

23. In Hoopa Valley, the D.C. Circuit found that “a

state waives its Section 401 authority when, pursuant to an

agreement between the state and applicant, an applicant

repeatedly withdraws-and-resubmits its request for

water quality certification over a period of time greater

than one year.” 53 The court concluded that where a

licensee each year sent a letter indicating withdrawal of

its certification request and resubmission of the same, 54

“[s]uch an arrangement does not exploit a statutory

loophole; it serves to circumvent [FERC’s] congressionally

granted authority over the licensing, conditioning, and

developing of a hydropower project.” 55 In fact, “[b]y

shelving water quality certifications, the states usurp

FERC’s control over whether and when a federal

license will issue. Thus, if allowed, the withdrawal-andresubmission scheme could be used to indefinitely delay

federal licensing proceedings and undermine FERC’s

jurisdiction to regulate such matters.”56

53. 913 F.3d at 1103.

54. In Hoopa Valley, the court noted that before each calendar

year passed, the applicant sent a “letter indicating withdrawal of

its water quality certification request and resubmission of the very

same . . . in the same one-page letter . . . .” Id. at 1104 (emphasis in

original).

55. Id.

56. Id.

56a

Appendix D

24. Following Hoopa Valley, the Commission found

in a series of orders that the California Board waived its

section 401 authority. In the first case, Placer County

Water Agency, 57 the Commission found that the record

showed that the entities worked to ensure that the

withdrawal and refiling happened each year, 58 given that

the licensee submitted evidence that the state sent it emails

about each upcoming one-year deadline for the purpose of

eliciting a withdrawal and resubmission. 59 We concluded

that these exchanges between the entities could amount to

an ongoing agreement and that, coupled with the fact that

Placer County never filed a new application, caused lengthy

delay and amounted to the state waiving its certification

authority.60 Thereafter, in Southern California Edison

Co.,61 Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,62 Nevada Irrigation

57. 167 FERC ¶ 61,056, reh’g denied, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 (2019)

(Placer County).

58. Placer County, 167 FERC ¶ 61,056 at ¶ 12.

59. Placer County, 169 FERC ¶ 61,046 at ¶ 17.

60. Id. ¶¶ 12, 18.

61. 170 FERC ¶ 61,135, modified, 172 FERC ¶ 61,066 (2020) (S.

Cal. Edison) (finding that the California Board waived its section 401

authority for relicensing six projects that comprise the Big Creek

hydroelectric system where the Board staff sent annual emails to

the licensee noting the upcoming one-year deadline and explicitly

requested withdrawal and resubmittal over multiple years).

62. 170 FERC ¶ 61,232, modified, 172 FERC ¶ 61,065 (2020)

(Pacific Gas & Elec.) (finding waiver where the record showed

the California Board expected the applicant to withdraw and

refile its certification application and the applicant cooperated by

simultaneously withdrawing and refiling the same water quality

certification application for nine years).

57a

Appendix D

District,63 Yuba County Water Agency,64 South Feather

Water & Power Agency,65 Merced Irrigation District,66

and Pacific Gas & Electric,67 the Commission again found

that the California Board waived its authority to issue a

water quality certification where the applicant withdrew

and refiled its application numerous times, even when

an explicit agreement was not in place. The Commission

found unpersuasive the arguments that the licensee, as the

respective lead agency for CEQA, controlled the timing

for the CEQA analysis, and reiterated that the “state’s

reason for delay is immaterial.”68 Further, the Commission

reaffirmed that section 401 of the CWA is clear, and that

failure to act within the oneyear time limit is dispositive,

regardless of whether the timing of the water quality

certification, even if it extends beyond one year, would

not disrupt the relicensing proceeding.69

63. 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 (2020), modified, 172 FERC ¶ 61,082

(2020).

64. 171 FERC ¶ 61,139, reh’g denied, 172 FERC ¶ 61,080 (2020)

(Yuba County).

65. 171 FERC ¶ 61,242 (2020) (South Feather).

66. 171 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2020).

67. 172 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2020).

68. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 at ¶ 28; Yuba

County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at ¶ 25; Merced Irrigation District., 171

FERC ¶ 61,240 at ¶ 32; South Feather, 171 FERC ¶ 61,242 at ¶ 31.

69. See Nevada Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 at ¶ 29;

Yuba County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at ¶ 27; Merced Irrigation Dist.,

171 FERC ¶ 61,240 at ¶ 32; South Feather, 171 FERC ¶ 61,242 at ¶ 31.

58a

Appendix D

25. In other instances, the Commission has not found

waiver. In KEI (Maine) Power Management (III) LLC,70

the Commission found on rehearing that the Maine

Department of Environmental Protection did not waive its

certification authority where the applicant withdrew and

refiled its application to give itself time to negotiate fish

passage measures with resource agencies. Most recently,

in Village of Morrisville, Vermont,71 the Commission

found that the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources did

not waive its certification authority where the applicant

twice withdrew and refiled its application to give itself

time to review study reports, consider alternatives,

and conduct a cost benefit analysis. In both cases, the

Commission found insufficient evidence of the state

certifying agency encouraging or supporting withdrawal

and resubmittal, and that the record reflected the genesis

of withdrawal and resubmittal to be on the applicant’s

desire to avoid receiving a certification with conditions

to which it objected.72

B. Application of Hoopa Valley and Commission

Precedent to the Licensing Proceedings for the

Don Pedro and La Grange Projects

26. The Districts argue that the California Board’s

letters denying certification without prejudice are a

70. 171 FERC ¶ 62,043 (delegated order), modified, 173 FERC

¶ 61,069 (2020) (KEI Power).

71. 173 FERC ¶ 61,156 (2020) (Vill. of Morrisville).

72. See KEI Power, 171 FERC ¶ 62,043 at ¶¶ 42-46; Vill. of

Morrisville, 173 FERC ¶ 61,156 at ¶¶ 21-23.

59a

Appendix D

tolling mechanism that is “indistinguishable from”

and the “functional equivalent” of the withdraw-andresubmit arrangement that the D.C. Circuit rejected

in Hoopa Valley.73 Specifically, the Districts argue that

the California Board’s actions are impermissible under

Hoopa Valley because: (1) the Board’s letters, by denying

certification without prejudice and encouraging application

resubmittal, amount to a coordinated scheme for the

purposes of extending the CWA’s statutory deadline;

(2) the Districts have continued to re-submit the same

request for certification following the Board’s denials; (3)

the Board’s letters denying certification without prejudice

frustrate the same policy concerns articulated by the court

in Hoopa Valley; and (4) the Board’s regulations treat

withdrawal-and-resubmittal and denial without prejudice

letters as interchangeable tolling mechanisms.74

27. The California Board responds that the limited

holding of Hoopa Valley is not applicable in these

circumstances because: (1) there is no withdrawal-andresubmittal; (2) there is no formal agreement between

the Board and the Districts explicitly requiring abeyance

of the Board’s review of the Districts’ requests for

certification; and (3) there is no “coordinated . . . scheme”

to indefinitely delay or otherwise halt the Board’s

processing of the Districts’ requests for certification.75

73. Petition at 11, 14.

74. Id. at 14-23.

75. California Board’s October 29 Comments at 16.

60a

Appendix D

28. Due to the fact the Board, by denying the

applications without prejudice, indeed acted on the them,

as opposed to the serial withdrawal-and-resubmittal of

certification requests in a number of the cases discussed

above, we agree with the California Board that the

holding of Hoopa Valley is not dispositive here. That

the Districts’ first requests for certification were denied

without prejudice, one day before the court issued its

opinion in Hoopa Valley, rather than the Districts

withdrawing and resubmitting their application, refutes

the argument that the Board engaged in a coordinated

scheme to evade the waiver period. Unlike the cases where

the Commission found that the state certifying agency

had waived its authority under section 401, here, there is

no record evidence that the Districts and the California

Board engaged in actions amounting to an agreement,

formal or functional, to circumvent section 401’s statutory

deadline. Accordingly, Hoopa Valley and the subsequent

Commission orders in which we found waiver where

applicants engaged in serial withdrawal and resubmittal

of their applications do not dictate a finding of waiver in

this case.

C.

Validity of the California Board’s Denials

under Section 401(a) of the Clean Water Act

29. Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA, in relevant part,

states:

If the State, interstate agency, or Administrator,

as the case may be, fails or refuses to act on a

request for certification, within a reasonable

61a

Appendix D

period of time (which shall not exceed one year)

after receipt of such request, the certification

requirements of this subsection shall be waived

with respect to such Federal application. No

license or permit shall be granted until the

certification required by this section has been

obtained or has been waived as provided in

the preceding sentence. No license or permit

shall be granted if certification has been

denied by the State, interstate agency, or the

Administrator, as the case may be.76

With regard to the state certifying agency’s role, the

Hoopa Valley court put it succinctly: “Section 401 requires

state action within a reasonable period of time, not to

exceed one year.” 77 Here, on both occasions, the Board

“acted” prior to the expiration of the one-year statutory

deadline by denying without prejudice the Districts’

requests for certification. No party disputes this. Rather,

the Districts urge the Commission to find that the

Board’s letters denying certification without prejudice

are invalid actions under section 401(a) of the CWA.78

The Districts argue that “a non-substantive action, even

if styled as a ‘denial,’ cannot constitute a valid ‘action on a

request for certification’” under section 401(a) because it

would effectively nullify the statute’s waiver provision.79

76. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

77. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.

78. See Petition at 24-32.

79. Id. at 24.

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Appendix D

Accordingly, the Districts urge the Commission to find that

the Board has waived its authority to issue certifications

for the licensing of the Don Pedro and La Grange Projects.

30. The Districts also contend that the Commission

is obligated to determine whether the Board’s denial of

certification is valid as a matter of federal law. 80 Following

the Districts’ logic, if the Board’s denials of certification

on non-substantive grounds, rather than on the technical

merits of the certification requests, are invalid actions

under federal law, then the Commission must conclude

that the Board has waived its certification authority. 81

31. The California Board contests the Districts’

characterization of the Commission’s obligations, asserting

that there is no reason for the Commission to distinguish

between a denial based on inadequate information (i.e., a

non-substantive denial) and a denial based on the technical

merits of a certification request. 82 Contrary to the

Districts’ position, the Board contends that the validity of

a state’s decision to grant or deny certification is grounded

in state law, rather than by reference to federal law. 83

Moreover, the Board distinguishes the cases proffered

80. Id. at 24-26 (citing Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC,

643 F.3d 963, 395 U.S. App. D.C. 425 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Alcoa); Tacoma,

460 F.3d 53, 373 U.S. App. D.C. 117; Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616,

288 U.S. App. D.C. 344 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Keating)).

81. See Petition at 26.

82. See California Board’s October 29 Comments at 24-25.

83. Id. at 25 (citing Keating, 927 F.2d at 622).

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Appendix D

by the Districts as instances where the court found that

the Commission was required to review state-issued

certifications to ensure compliance with the requirements

of section 401. 84 Responding to the Districts’ claim that a

state certifying agency’s denial of certification is limited

to “substantive denials of certification on the merits,”

the Board argues that the Districts attempt “to insert

language and intent into Section 401 that does not exist”

and notes that “Section 401 contains no such limitation.”85

32. We agree with the California Board that the

validity of its action—denial of certification pursuant to

state water quality standards—is a question that turns

on state law. 86 The cases cited by the Districts do not

convince us that the Commission’s review is warranted,

or appropriate, when a state denies certification. As

the California Board points out, the cases cited by the

Districts concern the validity of certifications issued by

the state; none address the validity of a state’s denial of

certification. 87 As the D.C. Circuit explained, a state’s

84. Id. at 25-26.

85. Id. at 26.

86. See Tacoma, 460 F.3d at 67 (“[T]he decision whether to

issue a section 401 certification generally turns on questions of state

law. FERC’s role is limited to awaiting, and then deferring to, the

final decision of the state. Otherwise, the state’s power to block the

project would be meaningless.” (citing Keating, 927 F.2d at 622)).

87. See Alcoa, 643 F.3d at 968 (whether state-issued certification

that was not effective until the applicant satisfied a bond requirement

therein complied with the requirements of section 401); Tacoma,

460 F.3d at 68 (whether state-issued certification facially satisfied

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Appendix D

decision to grant or deny a request for section 401 water

quality certification is “generally reviewable only in State

court, because the breadth of State authority under [s]ection

401 results in most challenges to a certification decision

implicating only questions of State law.”88 A state-issued

certification “is reviewable in federal court, however, at

least to the extent Section 401 itself imposes requirements

that a State must satisfy in order for a certification to be a

‘certification required by this section.’”89 Because section

401 contains no explicit requirements restricting a state’s

authority to deny certification, we conclude that it is not

the Commission’s role to review the appropriateness of

a state’s decision to deny certification. This review falls

squarely within the state court’s purview. Whether the

mere statement that the Districts’ proposals violate

state water quality standards, without more, is sufficient

justification for denying certification is a matter for a state

court to determine.

33. Moreover, as the Hoopa Valley court observed,

section 401 does not define “failure to act” or “refusal to

act.”90 Based on the plain language of the statute, we find

that on both occasions the California Board, in denying

certification, “acted” on the Districts’ request within one

section 401(a)(1)’s public notice requirements); Keating, 927 F.2d at

624-25 (whether subsequent revocation of state-issued certification

satisfied the terms of section 401(a)(3)).

88. Alcoa, 643 F.3d at 971 (citing Tacoma, 460 F.3d at 67).

89. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)).

90. Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104.

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Appendix D

year. We are reluctant to read meaning into the statute that

Congress intended the terms “failure to act” or “refusal to

act” to encompass a state’s denial of certification without

prejudice, especially as our interpretation of the CWA is

entitled to no deference.91 It may be that the courts will

find repeated denials without prejudice, and particularly

those that do not rest on any substantive conclusions, to be

the equivalent of the withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme.

Given, however, that the state in this case appears to have

satisfied the statutory mandate for action, we are not

prepared to conclude based on the record before us that

the state has waived its section 401 authority.

34. We are sympathetic to the Districts’ argument that

they are left without any state-level recourse following

the Board’s issuance of letters denying certification

without prejudice, because the letters do not constitute

final administrative actions and are thus non-reviewable

in California state courts.92 However, it is not clear from

the record before us that the Districts have attempted

and been thwarted in an attempt to seek review of the

Boards’ letters. Nor do the state court cases cited by the

Districts persuasively establish that the Districts’ ability

to challenge the Board’s denial of the Districts’ requests

for certification is foreclosed.93

91. Id. at 1102 (“[B]ecause FERC is not the agency charged

with administering the CWA, the [c]ourt owes no deference to its

interpretation of Section 401 or its conclusion regarding the states’

waiver.”) (citing Alcoa, 643 F.3d at 972).

92. See Petition at 28-30.

93. See Petition at 29 n.97 (citing SJCBC, LLC v. Horwedel,

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Appendix D

36. For the reasons discussed above, we find that the

California Board did not waive its authority under the

CWA to issue certifications for the Don Pedro and La

Grange licensing proceedings.94

201 Cal. App. 4th 339, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)

(medical marijuana dispensary operators not required to exhaust

administrative remedies due to inability to initiate administrative

review procedure following nuisance abatement orders); McHugh v.

Cnty. of Santa Cruz, 33 Cal. App. 3d 533, 109 Cal. Rptr. 149 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1973) (taxpayer failed to exhaust administrative remedies in

appealing real property taxes for several assessment years); Bleeck

v. State Board of Optometry, 18 Cal. App. 3d 415, 95 Cal. Rptr. 860

(Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (optometrist failed to exhaust administrative

remedies in seeking to transfer several branch office licenses because

applications were still pending before state optometry board)); see

also Districts’ November 30 Answer at 8, n.30 (citing Cal. Water

Impact Network v. Newhall Cty. Water Dist., 161 Cal. App. 4th 1464,

75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (adequacy of water

supply assessment not subject to direct judicial review and could only

be reviewed as part of challenge to CEQA-required environmental

impact report following city approval of development project)). To

the contrary, the California Board states that “[t]here is no basis for

concluding that denial without prejudice is not a final agency action

subject to exhaustion of administrative remedies and judicial action.”

California Board’s October 29 Comments at 26.

94. Because we find that the California Board did not waive

certification, we need not address its remaining arguments regarding

the Districts’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies and unclean

hands, which we have rejected in previous proceedings. See, e.g.,

Yuba County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at ¶ 28 (finding that the applicant

need not exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking waiver

determination from the Commission); Pacific Gas & Electric, 170

FERC ¶ 61,232 at ¶ 43 (same); S. Cal. Edison, 172 FERC ¶ 61,066 at

¶ 33 (same); see also Yuba County, 171 FERC ¶ 61,139 at 25 (finding

unpersuasive the argument that applicant benefitted from its own

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Appendix D

D.

Request for Dismissal of Licensing Applications

36. The Conservation Groups assert that the Districts’

licensing applications for the Don Pedro and La Grange

Projects should be dismissed.95 Citing Swift River Co.96

and Creamer and Noble Energy, Inc.,97 the Conservation

Groups state that Commission precedent mandates

dismissal in situations, such as here, where the state has

denied certification and no timely appeal of the denial or

an active certification request is pending 90 days after

the state’s denial of certification.98

37. It is the Commission’s policy that, if a license

applicant informs the Commission within 90 days from

the date of a denial of water quality certification that it

has filed a timely appeal of the denial or a new request for

certification, the Commission keeps the license application

on file until the applicant has exhausted its remedies on

administrative and judicial appeal, so long as the applicant

continues to demonstrate, through periodic status reports,

inaction); Nevada Irrigation Dist., 171 FERC ¶ 61,029 at ¶ 28

(same); S. Cal. Edison, 172 FERC ¶ 61,066 at ¶ 36 (noting that, with

respect to the “coordinated withdrawal-and-resubmittal scheme,”

the California Board’s hands are in the same state as the applicant’s).

95. Conservation Groups’ December 7, 2020 Supplemental

Comments at 5, 13.

96. 41 FERC ¶ 61,146 (1987).

97. 93 FERC ¶ 61,044 (2000).

98. See Conservation Groups’ December 7, 2020 Supplemental

Comments at 5.

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Appendix D

due diligence in pursuing these remedies. However, if the

second certification request is denied, the Commission

will dismiss the license application, unless the appeal of

the first denial is pending.99 This policy was developed

in the context of applications for original license, under

the rationale that, “[a]t some point, the public interest in

freeing up potential sites for hydroelectric development

or for other purposes will outweigh the private interest in

maintaining the application on file while repeated requests

for certification are pursued.”100

38. As the Commission explained in West Penn

Power Co.,101 this rationale does not apply with respect

to a relicense application, which involves an existing

project that continues to operate under annual license

or Administrative Procedure Act authority102 pending

relicensing. In addition, if a relicense application for a

major project is dismissed after the FPA section 15(c)

statutory deadline for such applications,103 it cannot be

refiled.104 For this reason, the Commission has given

relicense applications greater flexibility than original

license applications with respect to circumstances that

99. See City of Harrisburg, Pa., 45 FERC ¶ 61,053 (1988).

100. North Star Hydro Ltd., 58 FERC ¶ 61,266, at 61,844 (1992).

101. 74 FERC ¶ 61,287, at 61,913 n.14 (1996) (West Penn).

102. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c).

103. See 16 U.S.C. § 808(c)(1).

104. See 18 C.F.R. § 16.9(b)(4) (2020).

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Appendix D

can cause an application to be dismissed.105 In light of the

special considerations attending relicense applications,

Commission staff does not dismiss such applications

after two certification denials. We find that the special

considerations due relicense applications are similarly

compelling in the context of an original license application

for an existing, unlicensed project that requires licensing,

such as the La Grange Project. Dismissal of such a

license application would in effect shut down an existing,

operational project. Moreover, allowing greater latitude

to original license applications for existing, unlicensed

projects that require licensing does not implicate the same

site banking concerns that the new project dismissal policy

was intended to curtail. Accordingly, we are not dismissing

the licensing applications for the Don Pedro or La Grange

Projects at this time.

The Commission orders:

(A)

Turlock Irrigation District and Modesto

Irrigation District’s October 2, 2020 petition for

declaratory order is denied.

(B)

The California State Water Resources

Control Board’s motion to intervene out-of-time in

the licensing proceedings is denied. The California

Board’s participation as an int

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