Respondents Brief — Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc., Petitioner v. Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Supreme Court briefMay 5, 2023
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No. 22-605
In the Supreme Court of the United States
MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY INC., PETITIONER
v.
DENIS R. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY
ERIC P. BRUSKIN
MEEN GEU OH
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals’ judgment upholding a
federal agency’s denial of a petition for rulemaking
should be vacated under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
(I)
ADDITIONAL RELATED PROCEEDING
United States Court of Appeals (Fed. Cir.):
Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. v. Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, No. 20-2086 (June 17, 2022)
(II)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinion below ................................................................................ 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statement ...................................................................................... 1
Argument....................................................................................... 9
Conclusion ................................................................................... 16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018) .................................. 16
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) .............................. 11
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) ......................... 2
Knox v. Service Employees International
Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012) ...................... 10, 11
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ....................... 11
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v.
Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019) ........................ 11
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)........................... 14
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) ........................................ 16
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,
340 U.S. 36 (1950) ........................................................... 9, 11
Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901 (1957) ............. 16
Statutes and regulations:
Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4,
105 Stat. 11 ............................................................................ 2
sec. 2(a)(1), § 316(a)(1), 105 Stat. 11 ................................ 3
sec. 2(a)(1), § 316(a)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 11 ........................... 3
sec. 2(a)(1), § 316(a)(2)(A)-(C), 105 Stat. 11 .................... 3
sec. 2(a)(1), § 316(a)(3), 105 Stat. 12 ................................ 3
(III)
IV
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Page
Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019,
Pub. L. No. 116-23, § 3(a), 133 Stat. 969 ............................. 4
Veterans Agent Orange Exposure Equity
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-168, Tit. IV,
136 Stat. 1780:
§ 403, 136 Stat. 1780 .......................................................... 9
§ 403(b)(3), 136 Stat. 1781 ................................................. 9
Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-275, § 505(b), 110 Stat. 3342 ..................... 3
5 U.S.C. 553(e) ......................................................................... 4
38 U.S.C. 101(16) ..................................................................... 2
38 U.S.C. 101(29) ..................................................................... 3
38 U.S.C. 501 ............................................................................ 3
38 U.S.C. 501(d) ....................................................................... 4
38 U.S.C. 1110 .......................................................................... 2
38 U.S.C. 1112 .......................................................................... 2
38 U.S.C. 1113(b) ..................................................................... 2
38 U.S.C. 1116 .......................................................................... 2
38 U.S.C. 1116-1118 ................................................................. 2
38 U.S.C. 1116(d)(5) ........................................................... 9, 10
38 U.S.C. 1116B ....................................................................... 4
38 U.S.C. 5107(a) ..................................................................... 2
38 C.F.R.:
Section 3.307(a)(6)(iii) ....................................................... 2
Section 3.307(a)(6)(iv)........................................................ 4
Section 3.307(a)(6)(v)......................................................... 4
Miscellaneous:
58 Fed. Reg. 29,107 (May 19, 1993) ....................................... 3
76 Fed. Reg. 4245 (Jan. 25, 2011) ........................................... 3
80 Fed. Reg. 35,246 (June 19, 2015) ....................................... 4
83 Fed. Reg. 53,179 (Oct. 22, 2018) ........................................ 4
V
Miscellaneous—Continued:
Page
Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice
(11th ed. 2019) ..................................................................... 12
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 22-605
MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY INC., PETITIONER
v.
DENIS R. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-20a)
is reported at 38 F.4th 154.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
June 17, 2022. A petition for rehearing was denied on
September 23, 2022 (Pet. App. 46a-47a). The petition
for a writ of certiorari was filed on December 19, 2022.
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
STATEMENT
Petitioner filed a petition asking the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) to issue a rule related to certain
service-connected disability compensation benefits.
The VA denied the petition. Pet. App. 21a-35a. The
(1)
2
court of appeals denied the petition for review. Id. at
1a-20a.
1. Wartime veterans are entitled to seek compensation for disabilities arising from their time in service. 38
U.S.C. 1110; see Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,
431 (2011). A veteran applying for such benefits generally must establish, among other requirements, that his
disability is “ ‘service-connected,’ ” meaning that it was
“incurred or aggravated” in the “line of duty.” 38
U.S.C. 101(16); see 38 U.S.C. 5107(a). As to certain
types of claims, however, Congress has determined that
requiring the veteran to establish a service connection
could be overly burdensome. In those circumstances,
Congress has instead directed that, when veterans who
served in particular places at particular times develop
particular disabilities, those disabilities are presumed
to be service-connected. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. 1112, 11161118. The inapplicability of any such presumption, however, does not by itself bar a veteran from benefits,
since a veteran who is not entitled to a statutory presumption generally may offer individualized proof that
his own disability is service-connected. See 38 U.S.C.
1113(b).
The Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105
Stat. 11, establishes one such presumption. See 38
U.S.C. 1116. Agent Orange is an herbicide (composed
of equal parts 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, the latter of which contains
dioxin, a highly toxic contaminant) that was widely used
by the U.S. military for tactical defoliation during the
Vietnam War. Pet. App. 2a. The Agent Orange Act provides that “a veteran who, during active military, naval,
or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during
the Vietnam era and has a disease” listed in the statute
3
or in regulations promulgated by the VA generally
“shall be presumed to have been exposed during such
service to an herbicide agent containing dioxin or
2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid” and “to any other
chemical compound in an herbicide agent.” Sec. 2(a)(1),
§ 316(a)(3), 105 Stat. 12; see § 316(a)(2)(A)-(C), 105 Stat.
11 (listing diseases); § 316(a)(1)(B), 105 Stat. 11 (authorizing the VA to adopt regulations specifying “additional
disease[s]”). The Agent Orange Act further provides
that, if one of those listed diseases manifests “in a veteran who, during active military, naval, or air service,
served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam
era,” that disease “shall be considered to have been incurred in or aggravated by such service.” § 316(a)(1),
105 Stat. 11. Congress later changed the relevant service period from “during the Vietnam era” to “during
the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on
May 7, 1975.” Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-275, § 505(b), 110 Stat. 3342; cf.
38 U.S.C. 101(29) (defining “Vietnam era” to encompass
a different time period). Following notice-and-comment rulemaking, the VA promulgated regulations to
implement the Agent Orange Act. 58 Fed. Reg. 29,107,
29,109 (May 19, 1993) (final rule); see 38 C.F.R.
3.307(a)(6)(iii).
In 2011, citing inter alia its general rulemaking authority under 38 U.S.C. 501, the VA extended the presumption of herbicide exposure to “[a] veteran who,
during active military, naval, or air service, served between April 1, 1968, and August 31, 1971, in a unit that,
as determined by the Department of Defense, operated
in or near the Korean DMZ in an area in which herbicides are known to have been applied during that period.” 76 Fed. Reg. 4245, 4248 (Jan. 25, 2011) (final
4
rule); see 38 C.F.R. 3.307(a)(6)(iv). Congress later enacted a statute to similar effect. Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-23, § 3(a),
133 Stat. 969; see 38 U.S.C. 1116B.
In 2015, again citing inter alia its general rulemaking authority, the VA further extended the regulation
to cover “[a]n individual who performed service in the
Air Force or Air Force Reserve under circumstances in
which the individual concerned regularly and repeatedly operated, maintained, or served onboard C-123 aircraft known to have been used to spray an herbicide
agent during the Vietnam era.” 80 Fed. Reg. 35,246,
35,248 (June 19, 2015) (interim final rule); 83 Fed. Reg.
53,179, 53,182 (Oct. 22, 2018) (adopting interim final rule
as final rule); see 38 C.F.R. 3.307(a)(6)(v).
2. On December 3, 2018, petitioner requested that
the VA engage in rulemaking to promulgate new regulations extending “the presumption of Agent Orange exposure to veterans serving on Guam from January 9,
1962 through December 31, 1980 and on Johnston Island from January 1, 1972 until September 30 1977.”
Pet. App. 51a; see id. at 51a-54a; see also 5 U.S.C.
553(e); 38 U.S.C. 501(d). Petitioner later amended its
request to change the starting date for Guam veterans
to August 15, 1958, C.A. App. 2152, and to include veterans who served in American Samoa, Pet. App. 48a;
C.A. App. 2087, 2152-2153.
In support of its request, petitioner included affidavits from servicemembers who claimed to have seen
Agent Orange in Guam during the relevant time, along
with reports “confirming the presence of dioxin on
Guam” and “trace [a]mounts” of 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid. Pet.
App. 48a-49a; see id. at 51a-52a. Petitioner also averred
5
that Johnston Island “was a storage site for Agent Orange drums between 1972 and 1977,” during which time
“corrosion caused significant leakage which seeped into
the grounds,” causing “rampant” contamination. Id. at
52a-53a.
3. The VA denied petitioner’s request for rulemaking. Pet. App. 21a-35a. The VA explained that the Department of Defense (DoD), “working closely with the
VA,” id. at 22a, had completed “an extensive review of
records concerning the use, testing, storage, and transportation of tactical herbicides,” and had “found no evidence of Agent Orange or other tactical herbicides on
Guam,” id. at 23a. The VA observed that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) had conducted a similar review and had “found no evidence of tactical herbicides on Guam after reviewing DoD documents and
other government records, and interviewing Veterans
who alleged Agent Orange exposure while serving on
Guam.” Ibid.
The VA further explained that the trace levels of 2,4dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid that were found in soil samples on the island
were “expected” because those chemicals “were components of commercial herbicides that were commonly
used on foreign and stateside military bases, in Guam
and elsewhere, for standard vegetation and weed control.” Pet. App. 23a. The VA observed that “[c]ommercial products containing” those chemicals “continue to
be sold in the United States and throughout the world.”
Ibid. “Thus,” the VA concluded, “the presence of trace
levels” of those chemicals “cannot be construed as evidence of the presence of Agent Orange or tactical herbicides in such locations.” Id. at 24a. Petitioner contended that “the difference between tactical herbicides
6
and commercial herbicides ‘is of no moment.’ ” Ibid. In
rejecting that contention, the VA explained that “Congress established [the] presumptive service connection”
because of “the uniquely high risk of exposure, and corresponding risk to Service members’ health, posed by
large-scale application of herbicides for the deliberate
purpose of eliminating plant cover for the enemy, as was
done in the Republic of Vietnam”—not to address the
“routine use of standard commercial herbicides” that
are “commonly used worldwide for standard vegetation
and weed control.” Id. at 24a-25a (citation omitted).
The VA acknowledged that its regulation “recognizes two other specific situations where the risk of exposure was high for an ascertainable group of people:
Veterans who served in or near the Korean demilitarized zone where herbicides were known to have been
applied, and individuals whose duty regularly and repeatedly brought them into contact with the C-123 aircraft that conducted Agent Orange spray missions in
Vietnam.” Pet. App. 26a. But the VA explained that
“[t]he exposure scenario [petitioner] would like included in the presumption is not comparable” to those
situations, both of which “directly relate to the deliberate application of herbicides for a tactical military purpose on a broad scale.” Ibid. The VA observed that
“[e]xpanding the regulation as [petitioner] urge[d]
would leave no principled reason why all military personnel throughout the United States and the world
whose bases engaged in standard vegetation and weed
control or contained trace amounts of dioxin would not
qualify for a [service-connection] presumption.” Ibid.;
see id. at 33a n.3 (observing that petitioner’s June 2020
letter to the agency recognized as much).
7
The VA further explained that affidavits and photographs that petitioner had submitted in support of its
request did not establish the widespread use of Agent
Orange that would justify a presumption of exposure for
every veteran who had served in Guam. Pet. App. 27a28a. The VA emphasized, however, that individual servicemembers, including the affiants, retained “the opportunity to establish that any current disabilities were
the result of herbicide exposure in service.” Id. at 28a.
Finally, the VA explained that, although “nearly
25,000 barrels of Agent Orange were moved to Johnston
Island” and stored there from 1972 to 1977, testing
showed that “concentrations of [2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid] in ambient air and water samples on Johnston Island” were
“ ‘well below permissible levels,’ ” perhaps because of
the “densely compacted coral” at the storage site, “the
storage location,” and “wind patterns.” Pet. App. 30a31a (citation omitted). The VA explained that “DoD’s
extensive review of records concerning the use, testing,
storage, and transportation of tactical herbicides found
no evidence of Agent Orange or any other tactical herbicide having been present on American Samoa.” Id. at
32a.
4. The court of appeals denied petitioner’s petition
for review. Pet. App. 1a-20a.
Petitioner argued that, in denying the petition for
rulemaking, the VA had “misinterpreted the Agent Orange Act as applying only to tactical herbicides—not
commercial ones.” Pet. App. 12a. In rejecting that argument, the court of appeals explained that the statute
“provide[s] a decent example reflecting the kinds of circumstances that have merited presumptions in the
past,” and that the VA reasonably had “looked to those
8
circumstances, compared them to Guam’s, [and] found
them not comparable.” Id. at 12a-13a. “That comparison and judgment,” the court concluded, “did not rest
on any misconception about what the Act itself does.”
38 F.4th at 161; see Pet. App. 13a. The court further
explained that, “even assuming (for argument’s sake)
that the Act itself does not distinguish between tactical
and commercial herbicides when giving its presumptions, the VA did not rest its denial [of rulemaking]
on any contrary understanding of the Act.” Ibid.
“Rather,” the court observed, the VA had “rested its denial on the view that Congress gave those presumptions
because it was concerned about the spraying of millions
of gallons of tactical herbicides—and that Guam did
not present comparable circumstances.” Pet. App.
13a.
The court of appeals also rejected petitioner’s contention that the VA’s denial of rulemaking “ ‘lacked a rational basis in this record’ and was therefore arbitrary
and capricious.” Pet. App. 15a (citation omitted). The
court explained that it was not “arbitrary (or capricious,
or irrational) for the VA to rely on the GAO’s and DoD’s
no-evidence findings” in determining that “the nature
and extent of herbicide activity in Guam” did not “ ‘warrant[] a presumption of exposure for all veterans’ who
served there during the relevant period.” Ibid. (brackets and citation omitted). The court also observed that
the VA had “explicitly considered” the affidavits that
petitioner had submitted, and it held that the VA’s “giving more weight to the DoD’s and GAO’s findings” was
not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 15a-16a. Finally, the
court explained that the VA had adequately explained
why the trace levels of 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid
and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid found on Guam
9
and Johnston Island “did not warrant presuming exposure for every single veteran who served” in those areas
“during the relevant period.” Id. at 16a; see id. at 16a18a.
5. Approximately two months after the court of appeals issued its decision, Congress enacted the Veterans Agent Orange Exposure Equity Act of 2022, Pub.
L. No. 117-168, Tit. IV, § 403, 136 Stat. 1780. As relevant here, that statute, which petitioner calls the
“PACT Act,” amends the Agent Orange Act to extend
the presumptions of herbicide exposure and service
connection to cover “active military, naval, air, or space
service * * * performed on Guam or American Samoa,
or in the territorial waters thereof, during the period
beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on July 31,
1980, or served on Johnston Atoll or on a ship that called
at Johnston Atoll during the period beginning on January 1, 1972, and ending on September 30, 1977.”
§ 403(b)(3), 136 Stat. 1781 (38 U.S.C. 1116(d)(5)).
After the PACT Act was enacted, petitioner moved
the court of appeals to vacate its decision and petitioned
the court for rehearing. C.A. Doc. 60 (Aug. 29, 2022);
C.A. Doc. 61 (Aug. 29, 2022). The court summarily denied both requests. Pet. App. 46a-47a.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner contends (Pet. 9-17) that enactment of the
PACT Act has mooted its challenge to the Secretary’s
denial of the petition for rulemaking, and that this
Court should therefore grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari and vacate the judgment below under United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). Intervening events that postdate a court of appeals decision
justify Munsingwear vacatur only if (1) those events
have rendered the case moot and (2) but for the moot-
10
ness, the decision would have warranted this Court’s review. Neither of those prerequisites is satisfied here.
For the same reason, petitioner’s alternative request
(Pet. 17-26) for plenary review likewise should be denied.
1. a. “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to
the prevailing party.” Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “As
long as the parties have a concrete interest, however
small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not
moot.” Id. at 307-308 (brackets and citation omitted).
This case is not moot. That is most obvious given the
difference between what petitioner requested from the
VA and what Congress subsequently enacted. The
PACT Act extends the presumptions of herbicide exposure and service connection to certain servicemembers
who served on Guam or American Samoa between January 9, 1962, and July 31, 1980. 38 U.S.C. 1116(d)(5).
Petitioner, in contrast, asked for the relevant service
period for eligible individuals to begin on August 15,
1958. Pet. App. 21a, 33a; C.A. App. 2152. Petitioner’s
request, if granted, would thereby extend the presumptions to a larger class of veterans than the statute does.
Although petitioner labels that difference “marginal[]”
and “immaterial,” Pet. 12, this Court has made clear
that any remaining “concrete interest, however small,”
prevents a case from becoming moot, Knox, 567 U.S. at
307 (citation omitted).
Petitioner contends (Pet. 12) that its petition for
rulemaking was a “solely procedural” request untethered to the substantive scope of any resulting rule. But
petitioner’s request to initiate rulemaking remains un-
11
fulfilled by the agency, which has not initiated new rulemaking, and it could be granted if petitioner prevailed
in this litigation. Put differently, it would not be “impossible,” Knox, 567 U.S. at 307, for a court to grant petitioner meaningful relief. If the agency’s denial of the
petition for rulemaking were held to be arbitrary and
capricious, a court could (for example) remand to the
agency to reconsider the petition free of the flawed rationales that underlay the earlier denial, which could in
turn result in the initiation of rulemaking proceedings.
Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518, 525-526
(2007). And while the PACT Act may make that resolution unlikely, that does not render the case moot. Cf.
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660 (2019) (explaining that, even if
“[u]ltimate recovery on [the plaintiff ’s] demand may be
uncertain or even unlikely,” a case is not moot if there
remains “any chance” of recovery).
b. Even if this case were moot, vacatur under Munsingwear would be unwarranted. Vacatur of a lower
court’s decision because of intervening mootness is generally available only to “those who have been prevented
from obtaining the review to which they are entitled.”
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712 (2011) (quoting
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 39). It therefore has long
been the position of the United States that, when a case
becomes moot after a court of appeals enters its judgment, but before this Court acts on a petition for a writ
of certiorari, Munsingwear vacatur is appropriate only
if the question presented would have warranted this
Court’s review if the case had remained live. See, e.g.,
U.S. Br. in Opp. at 5-8, Velsicol Chemical Corp. v.
United States, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978) (No. 77900); Gov’t Pet. for Cert. at 16-17, Yellen v. United
12
States House of Representatives, 142 S. Ct. 332 (2021)
(No. 20-1738); see also Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice 19-28 & n.34 (11th ed. 2019) (listing cases). Only in that circumstance does a post-appeal
mooting event deprive the losing party of any further
appellate review that it would otherwise have received.
For reasons explained immediately below, this case
does not satisfy that requirement.
2. The court of appeals correctly upheld the VA’s denial of the petition for rulemaking, and its decision does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or another
court of appeals. Further review is not warranted.
a. The court of appeals correctly held that the VA’s
denial of the petition for rulemaking was not based on
an incorrect interpretation of the Agent Orange Act.
Petitioner argued below that the VA had denied the petition because it “misinterpreted the Agent Orange Act
as applying only to tactical herbicides—not commercial
ones.” Pet. App. 12a; see Pet. C.A. Br. 30 (“In VA’s
view, the Agent Orange Act applies only to so-called tactical herbicides, and according to VA, only commercial
herbicides were used on Guam and Johnston Island.”).
But as the court correctly recognized (Pet. App. 12a14a), the VA did not base its denial on any such misinterpretation.
Nowhere did the VA state that the Agent Orange Act
forbids extending the presumptions of herbicide exposure and service connection to servicemembers who had
sufficiently high exposures only to commercial herbicides. See 38 F.4th at 162 (“[T]he VA’s denial did not
claim that the VA lacked authority to grant the petition.”); Pet. App. 14a; cf. Pet. App. 21a-35a. Rather, the
VA merely explained that the statute does not require
extending the presumptions to the circumstances pro-
13
posed by petitioner, in particular because the Agent Orange Act requires those presumptions “solely for Veterans who served in Vietnam.” Id. at 25a. Nevertheless, the VA recognized that it could invoke its general
rulemaking authority to extend the presumptions of
herbicide exposure and service connection to circumstances beyond those required by the Agent Orange Act
itself. Indeed, the VA observed that it already had done
so twice by regulation. See id. at 26a.
As the VA explained, “a presumption is an exception
to the general burden of proof, designed for unique situations, such as where evidence of a toxic or environmental exposure, and associated health risk, are strong
in the aggregate, but hard to prove on an individual basis.” C.A. Doc. 20, at 87 (Apr. 15, 2021); see Pet. App.
28a-29a. The VA further explained that “[p]resumptions are a blunt tool, contemplate false positives, and,
in the area of potential exposure to toxic substances,
should be employed only when the evidence demonstrates risk of exposure at meaningful levels.” Pet. App.
29a. The VA concluded that a presumption was unwarranted for the “exposure scenario” that petitioner had
identified, id. at 26a, because petitioner had not adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the class
of affected veterans suffered a widespread “risk of exposure at meaningful levels,” id. at 29a; because extending the regulatory presumptions would “implicate”
“false positives,” ibid.; and because petitioner’s proposal generally was not “comparable” to the other circumstances in which the VA had determined that presumptions of herbicide exposure and service connection
were warranted, id. at 26a.
Petitioner does not challenge those conclusions in
this Court. Instead, petitioner argues (Pet. 22-26) that
14
the court of appeals violated the rule announced in SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), by upholding the
VA’s denial of rulemaking on grounds that the agency
itself had not invoked. According to petitioner, the VA
“based [its] denial of [petitioner’s] petition on statutory
interpretation of the Agent Orange Act whereas the
Federal Circuit based its denial of review on the exercise of the Secretary’s policy discretion under 38 U.S.C.
§ 501.” Pet. 22. That contention is incorrect.
As noted above, the VA never claimed that it lacked
statutory authority to issue the regulation that petitioner had requested. See Pet. App. 14a. To the contrary, the agency made clear that, although the Agent
Orange Act itself establishes a presumption of herbicide
exposure and service connection “solely [for] Veterans
who served in Vietnam,” the VA had previously invoked
its general rulemaking authority to extend the presumptions to certain “Veterans who served in or near
the Korean demilitarized zone” and to “individuals
whose duty regularly and repeatedly brought them into
contact with the C-123 aircraft that conducted Agent
Orange spray missions.” Id. at 25a-26a. The VA then
explained that “[e]xpanding the regulation as [petitioner had] urge[d]” would “go far beyond” both “Congress’s intent in passing the Agent Orange Act” and the
“VA’s intent to cover comparable scenarios in the current regulation.” Id. at 26a.
That discussion makes clear that the VA denied the
petition for rulemaking not because it construed the
Agent Orange Act to forbid extending the presumptions
to the circumstances petitioner had identified, but because (1) the statute does not require extending the presumptions in that manner, and (2) the “exposure scenario” that petitioner had identified was not sufficiently
15
“comparable” to the circumstances covered by existing
statutory and regulatory presumptions so as to warrant
the exercise of the VA’s discretionary rulemaking authority to extend the regulation in the manner petitioner had proposed. Pet. App. 26a. Consistent with
Chenery, the VA defended its decision to deny the petition for rulemaking on those very grounds, see Gov’t
C.A. Br. 29-30, with which the court of appeals agreed,
see Pet. App. 12a-14a.
b. Except for its invocation of Chenery, supra, petitioner does not contend that the decision below conflicts
with any decision of this Court or another court of appeals. And whether or not the PACT Act formally
moots this case, it is a strong reason for this Court to
deny plenary review. Petitioner agrees (Pet. 11) that
its “interests” have been “satisfied as a result of the
PACT Act.” That result substantially diminishes the
importance of this case. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 16) that
it “is now forced to adhere to a judgment which [it] can
no longer challenge on the merits,” but petitioner does
not explain what that judgment forces it to do. The
court of appeals simply denied a petition for review of
the VA’s denial of a petition for rulemaking. Nothing in
the court’s judgment precludes petitioner from filing a
new petition for rulemaking, including to implement the
PACT Act.
c. Petitioner briefly contends (Pet. 14-17) that the
court of appeals erred in refusing to grant rehearing
and vacate its own final judgment. That contention
lacks merit. Rehearing is a purely discretionary remedy, and petitioner cites no authority holding that a
court of appeals must grant rehearing in circumstances
like these. Petitioner likewise cites no authority holding
that an appellate court must vacate its own final judg-
16
ment if Congress later enacts a statute addressing the
same topic. Cf. Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792
(2018) (per curiam) (explaining that vacatur is a casespecific equitable remedy); U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co.
v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994)
(same). And to the extent petitioner contends that the
court of appeals “diverged from the standard practice
of its own precedent,” Pet. 17; see Pet. 15, any such divergence would not warrant this Court’s review. See
Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957)
(per curiam) (“It is primarily the task of a Court of Appeals to reconcile its internal difficulties.”).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY
ERIC P. BRUSKIN
MEEN GEU OH
Attorneys
MAY 2023
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.