Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Shaun Michael Farrington, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefOct 29, 2022

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Case No. ____________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Shaun Farrington,

Petitioner,

Vs.

The United States,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Courts of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Elizabeth Araguas

NIDEY ERDAHL MEIER & ARAGUÁS, PLC

425 2nd Street SE, Suite 1000

Cedar Rapids, IA 52401

Tel.: (319) 369-0000

Fax: (319) 369-6972

E-mail: earaguas@eiowalaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions and Orders

8th Circuit Court of Appeals Judgment,............................................................................. 1a

United States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington, (August 01, 2022)

No. 21-2974

8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion, .............................................................................. 3a

United States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington, (August 01, 2022)

No. 21-2974

The United States District Court of the S.D. of Iowa Judgement,....................................... 11a

United States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington, (August 18, 2021)

No. 3:20-cr-00006-001

United States District Court Opinion on Defendants Motion to Suppress, .......................... 18a

United States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington, (January 28, 2021)

No. 3:20-cr-00006-JAJ-SBJ

Magistrate Recommendation to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, .................................... 30a

United States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington, (August 18, 2021)

No. 3:20-cr-00006-001

Trial and Hearing Excerpts

Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing ......................................................................... 46a

United States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington, (November 9, 2020)

No. 3:20-cr-00006-001

Transcript Excerpt of Juror Selection ................................................................................ 108a

United States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington, (February 10, 2021)

No. 3:20-cr-00006-001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________________

No: 21-2974

___________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

Shaun Michael Farrington

Defendant - Appellant

______________________________________________________________________________

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

(3:20-cr-00006-JAJ-1)

______________________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

Before COLLOTON, MELLOY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

This appeal from the United States District Court was submitted on the record of the

district court, briefs of the parties and was argued by counsel.

After consideration, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the district

court in this cause is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

August 01, 2022

Order Entered in Accordance with Opinion:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

____________________________________

/s/ Michael E. Gans

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Adopted April 15, 2015

Effective August 1, 2015

Revision of Part V of the Eighth Circuit Plan to Implement the Criminal Justice Act of

1964.

V. Duty of Counsel as to Panel Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc, and Certiorari

Where the decision of the court of appeals is adverse to the defendant in whole or in part, the

duty of counsel on appeal extends to (1) advising the defendant of the right to file a petition for

panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc in the court of appeals and a petition for writ

of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, and (2) informing the defendant of

counsel's opinion as to the merit and likelihood of the success of those petitions. If the defendant

requests that counsel file any of those petitions, counsel must file the petition if counsel

determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petition would satisfy the

standards of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a)

or Supreme Court Rule 10, as applicable. See Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5 (1994) (per

curiam); 8th Cir. R. 35A.

If counsel declines to file a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc requested by the

defendant based upon counsel's determination that there are not reasonable grounds to do so,

counsel must so inform the court and must file a written motion to withdraw. The motion to

withdraw must be filed on or before the due date for a petition for rehearing, must certify that

counsel has advised the defendant of the procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for

rehearing, and must request an extension of time of 28 days within which to file pro se a petition

for rehearing. The motion also must certify that counsel has advised the defendant of the

procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for writ of certiorari.

If counsel declines to file a petition for writ of certiorari requested by the defendant based on

counsel's determination that there are not reasonable grounds to do so, counsel must so inform

the court and must file a written motion to withdraw. The motion must certify that counsel has

advised the defendant of the procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for writ of certiorari.

A motion to withdraw must be accompanied by counsel's certification that a copy of the motion

was furnished to the defendant and to the United States.

Where counsel is granted leave to withdraw pursuant to the procedures of Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), counsel's duty of representation is

completed, and the clerk's letter transmitting the decision of the court will notify the defendant of

the procedures for filing pro se a timely petition for panel rehearing, a timely petition for

rehearing en banc, and a timely petion for writ of certiorari.

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-2974

___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

Shaun Michael Farrington

Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

____________

Submitted: April 12, 2022

Filed: August 1, 2022

____________

Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Shaun Michael Farrington of possession with intent to

distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He appeals the district court’s 1 denials

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, then Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa, now retired, adopting the Report and

Recommendation of the Honorable Stephen B. Jackson, Jr., United States Magistrate

Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, with respect to the motion to suppress.

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of his motion to suppress evidence, his motion to strike a juror for cause, and his

motion to admit a portion of a video recording. We affirm.

In October 2019, Henry County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Jesse Bell was

surveilling a vehicle as part of a drug investigation. He watched Farrington and

Stefani Goodwin leave a motel, approach the vehicle, and place several bags into the

car. They entered the vehicle, and Farrington drove away. Because Farrington’s

driver’s license was suspended, Investigator Bell asked Sergeant David Wall to

conduct a traffic stop. Sergeant Wall stopped the vehicle at approximately 6:46 p.m.,

and his drug-detection dog, Uno, signaled that he had detected drugs. Sergeant Wall

then searched the vehicle and discovered drug paraphernalia and four lockboxes.

Farrington was arrested, the lockboxes were seized and transported to an evidence

shed at the sheriff’s office, and the vehicle was separately towed to the sheriff’s

office. Prior to 10:00 p.m., Sergeant Wall had Uno conduct a sniff test around the

lockboxes, and Uno signaled that he detected drugs. The officers then obtained a

search warrant for the lockboxes, and the search revealed methamphetamine.

Sergeant Wall testified that the time between the sniff test at the sheriff’s office and

the issuance of the search warrant was about two hours.

Farrington was indicted for possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He moved to suppress the evidence derived from the

traffic stop, the seizure of the lockboxes, and the sniff test of the lockboxes. The

district court denied the motion.

Farrington also brought a motion in limine to exclude a twelve-second excerpt

of a jail video-call recording between Farrington and Goodwin that was recorded

two months after Farrington’s arrest. In the call, Farrington states: “I’m the fucking

lawyer, you just remember that. . . . There’s a reason why the lockboxes were

lockboxes.” Farrington requested in the alternative that the district court admit a

longer portion of the video call, about one and a half minutes in length, to provide

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context for the recorded statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 106. The district

court admitted the twelve-second recording but denied Farrington’s motion to admit

the additional portion.

After jury selection but before trial commenced, a juror informed the district

court that, upon reflection, she realized that she recognized the name of a

Government witness, Detective Traishondus Bunch. Detective Bunch served as a

Rule 404(b) witness at Farrington’s trial, testifying that Farrington had engaged in

drug-related activity in the past. The district court questioned the juror, and she

explained that between three and four years ago, she had corresponded with

Detective Bunch by email about drug activity occurring in the parking lot outside of

her residence. She had emailed Detective Bunch about once or twice a week during

a nine-month period, reporting her observations of drug activity. About three years

before Farrington’s trial, she moved away from the residence and had no further

contact with Detective Bunch. The district court asked the juror if there was

“anything about those experiences that causes you any concern in your own mind

about your ability to be fair to both sides in this case?” The juror responded, “No,

sir.” The district court then asked, “Are you willing to wait and listen to Officer

Bunch’s testimony before deciding whether you believe it?” The juror answered,

“Yes.” The defense moved to strike the juror for cause, but the district court denied

the motion.

Farrington was convicted on both counts. He appeals the district court’s

denials of his motion to suppress, his motion to strike the juror for cause, and his

motion to admit an additional portion of the recording under Rule 106.

II.

Farrington argues his motion to suppress should have been granted because

the seizure, hours-long detention, and “dog sniff search” of the lockboxes violated

the Fourth Amendment. “On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we

review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear

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error.” United States v. Slim, 34 F.4th 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks and brackets omitted).

“The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures,”

and warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall under an exception

to the warrant requirement. United States v. Castellanos, 518 F.3d 965, 969 (8th

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The automobile exception permits

warrantless searches of an automobile and seizures of contraband where there is

“probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband.” United States

v. Evans, 830 F.3d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 2016). Such searches may lawfully reach

“places in which there is probable cause to believe that [contraband] may be found,”

including containers discovered within the automobile. California v. Acevedo, 500

U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991).

United States v. Johns controls this case. See 469 U.S. 478 (1985). In Johns,

customs officers smelled marijuana coming from two trucks and observed suspicious

packages through the windows. Id. at 480-81. The officers brought the trucks to a

Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) facility, “placed the packages in a DEA

warehouse rather than immediately opening them,” and then DEA agents conducted

a warrantless search of the packages “three days after they were removed” from the

trucks. Id. at 481, 486. The Court upheld the three-day detention and the search,

explaining that “[t]here is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle”—

including the containers found within it—“occur contemporaneously with [the

vehicle’s] lawful seizure.” Id. at 484, 487-88. It rejected the position that

“warrantless searches of containers” are permissible “only if the search occurs

immediately as part of the vehicle inspection or soon thereafter.” Id. at 484 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[i]nasmuch as the Government was entitled to

seize the packages and could have searched them immediately without a warrant

. . . the warrantless search three days after the packages were placed in the DEA

warehouse was reasonable . . . .” Id. at 487.

Substantially the same facts are present here, except that the delay was several

hours—not three days—and the police obtained a warrant prior to opening and

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searching the lockboxes. Even if the second sniff test constituted a search under the

Fourth Amendment, but see United States v. Pulido-Ayala, 892 F.3d 315, 318 (8th

Cir. 2018) (“The use of [a] drug-sniffing dog on the exterior of a vehicle during a

valid traffic stop is not a search and does not infringe upon any Fourth Amendment

rights.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); United States v. Burston,

806 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that the “use of a drug-sniffing

dog did not constitute a search subject to the Fourth Amendment because the sniff

occurred in a common hallway and the police officers were lawfully present”), a

warrantless search would have been permissible under Johns. See 469 U.S. at 48788.

Farrington argues that the seizure and detention of the lockboxes was

unreasonable under United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). But “Place had

nothing to do with the automobile exception and is inapposite.” See Acevedo, 500

U.S. at 578 (noting that the Supreme Court has consistently “explained that

automobile searches differ from other searches” and has denied the applicability of

cases that “do not concern automobiles or the automobile exception” to cases

involving the automobile exception). Therefore, the district court did not err in

denying Farrington’s motion to suppress.

III.

Farrington claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to strike

the juror who had previously corresponded with Detective Bunch. We review the

denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause for abuse of discretion. Moran v. Clarke,

443 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2006). “Appellants must clear a high hurdle to obtain

reversal . . . .” Id. “To challenge for cause, a party must show actual partiality

growing out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case.” United States

v. Tibesar, 894 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1990) (brackets omitted). “Essentially, . . . a

juror must profess his inability to be impartial and resist any attempt to rehabilitate

his position” for a party to show actual partiality. Moran, 443 F.3d at 650-51.

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Here, there was no abuse of discretion because the juror stated that she could

remain fair and would listen to Detective Bunch’s testimony before deciding if she

believed it. See id. at 651 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it denied a motion to strike jurors who had “acknowledged difficulty being

impartial” but “consistently stated that they could be impartial”). Moreover, this

case does not an involve an “extreme situation[]” where juror partiality might be

implied, such as when a “juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial

or the criminal transaction.” See United States v. Needham, 852 F.3d 830, 840 (8th

Cir. 2017).

Farrington challenges the district court’s announcement that it was ruling

under the standard set forth in United States v. McCaw, 92 F. App’x 372 (8th Cir.

2004) (per curiam), a case referring to United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th

Cir. 1998). McCaw and Tucker addressed, respectively, motions for a mistrial and

a new trial based on alleged concealed juror bias, and those cases were governed by

a standard requiring a showing of juror dishonesty in addition to partiality. See

McCaw, 92 F. App’x at 372-73; Tucker, 137 F.3d at 1026. This case, by contrast,

involves a motion to strike a juror for cause and requires a showing only of actual

partiality. See Tibesar, 894 F.2d at 319. Assuming the district court erred by

requiring juror dishonesty in addition to actual partiality, any error was harmless

because the juror’s explicit statement of impartiality defeats Farrington’s attempt to

show actual impartiality. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity,

or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).

IV.

Last, Farrington argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to

admit a portion of the jail video-call recording under Federal Rule of Evidence 106.

We review a district court’s decision about the admissibility of evidence under Rule

106 for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 375 F.3d

797, 802 (8th Cir. 2004).

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Rule 106 provides that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or

recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of

any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought

to be considered at the same time.” This “rule of completeness” is “designed in part

to avoid misleading impressions created by taking matters out of context.” RamosCaraballo, 375 F.3d at 802. “Additional parts of [a] recording can be admitted if

they are necessary to (1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion

in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) [e]nsure a fair and impartial

understanding.” McCoy v. Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 593 F.3d 737, 74647 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he party urging admission

has the burden to specify the portion of the testimony that is relevant to the issue at

trial and that qualifies or explains portions already admitted.” United States v.

Aungie, 4 F.4th 638, 646-47 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Farrington argues that the twelve-second recording of him telling Goodwin

“I’m the fucking lawyer, you just remember that. . . . There’s a reason why the

lockboxes were lockboxes,” created a false impression because it lacked context. At

trial, the Government used Farrington’s statement in the recording to suggest that

Farrington “knew what was inside the lockboxes” and believed they could “keep his

and Stefani Goodwin’s methamphetamine hidden from the police.” This accorded

with Goodwin’s testimony that Farrington used lockboxes “[b]ecause then [law

enforcement would] have to file for a warrant in order to get to [them].”

Farrington claims that the “partial recording and the Government’s

characterization of it . . . gave a misleading and unfair understanding of the meaning

of Mr. Farrington’s statement to the jury.” But he offers no explanation of how the

recording was misleading. He states that the additional portion contextualizes the

“lawyer” comment by showing that it was “in response to Ms. Goodwin offering to

retain private counsel.” He further states that the additional portion explains the

“lockboxes” comment by showing that Farrington had “a belief based at least in part

[on] conversations with counsel regarding the search of the locked containers.” But

neither suggestion is inconsistent with how the Government used the recording at

trial. To the contrary, Farrington’s counsel admitted at the pretrial hearing that the

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additional portion reveals Farrington’s belief that “this case is going to be thrown

out of court” because lockboxes were used. Rather than provide necessary context

to correct a false impression, that evidence would only reinforce the Government’s

characterization of the recording and Goodwin’s testimony. Furthermore, the

district court reviewed the entire video and did not “find anything . . . that places

[the admitted portion] into context.” Because Farrington has not shown how the

additional portion is necessary to explain or contextualize the admitted portion,

correct a misleading impression, or ensure a fair and impartial understanding, we

hold that there was no abuse of discretion, much less a clear one, in excluding it. See

Aungie, 4 F.4th at 647 (“[T]he rule of completeness does not apply because [the

defendant] fails to specify how the admitted text messages distorted or misled the

jury without the addition of the missing texts.”); McCoy, 593 F.3d at 747 (holding

that “without further explanation, [the appellant] did not meet its burden under Rule

106” where its counsel did not “specify why the district court should admit the entire

report”).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Farrington’s convictions.

______________________________

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

DAVENPORT DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

No. 3:20-cr-00006-JAJ-SBJ

vs.

SHAUN MICHAEL FARRINGTON,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

REGARDING DEFENDANT’S

OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

____________________

On October 5, 2020, the defendant filed his Motion To Suppress Traffic Stop And

Subsequent Evidence And Request For Hearing [Dkt. No. 81], and on October 9, 2020, he

filed a supplement to that Motion with a supporting brief [Dkt. No. 86]. The government

filed its Response To Motion To Suppress [Dkt. No. 89] on October 23, 2020, and the

defendant filed his Reply [Dkt. No. 95] on November 5, 2020. On October 22, 2020, the

defendant’s Motion To Suppress was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen

B. Jackson, Jr., for the purpose of conducting any necessary proceedings and hearing and

for submission of a report and recommendation regarding disposition of the Motion to the

undersigned. Judge Jackson held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion on November 9,

2020. See Minutes [Dkt. No. 98]. After the hearing, the government filed a Supplemental

Response [Dkt. No. 102] on November 9, 2020, and the defendant filed a Final Reply In

Support Of Motion To Suppress [Dkt. No. 105] on November 12, 2020. On December 16,

2020, Judge Jackson filed his Report And Recommendation On Defendant’s Motion To

Suppress [Dkt. No. 110] recommending that the defendant’s Motion To Suppress be

denied. This case is now before the court on the defendant’s December 30, 2020,

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Objections To Report And Recommendation [Dkt. No. 115]. The government filed no

response to the defendant’s Objections.

The defendant did not request a transcript of the hearing before Judge Jackson, as

required by both the applicable local rule and the applicable Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure. See LCrR 59 (“A party asserting such objections must arrange promptly for

the transcription of all portions of the record the district court judge will need to rule on

the objections.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(2) (“Unless the district judge directs otherwise,

the objecting party must promptly arrange for transcribing the record, or whatever portions

of it the parties agree to or the magistrate judge considers sufficient.”). The court deems

the defendant’s failure to request a transcript to be a waiver of review of the transcript by

this court. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(2) (“Failure to object in accordance with this rule

waives a party’s right to review.”). Nevertheless, in addition to reviewing the parties’

written submissions and Judge Jackson’s Report And Recommendation, the court has

reviewed an unedited realtime transcript of the hearing before Judge Jackson.

For the reasons stated below, the defendant’s December 30, 2020, Objections To

Report And Recommendation [Dkt. No. 115] are OVERRULED; Judge Jackson’s

December 16, 2020, Report And Recommendation On Defendant’s Motion To Suppress

[Dkt. No. 110] is ACCEPTED; and the defendant’s October 5, 2020, Motion To Suppress

Traffic Stop And Subsequent Evidence And Request For Hearing [Dkt. No. 81], as

supplemented on October 9, 2020 [Dkt. No. 86], is DENIED.

INTRODUCTION

Factual Background

Defendant Shaun Michael Farrington does not object to any specific factual findings

by Judge Jackson. The court will not repeat all of Judge Jackson’s findings, however.

Rather, the court will focus on matters relevant to Farrington’s objections.

In early September of 2019, Deputy Jesse Bell, an investigator with the Henry

County Sheriff’s Office became aware of Farrington and his co-defendant being involved

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in methamphetamine sales. Surveillance of Farrington and his co-defendant indicated that

they were likely making deliveries of narcotics by car. Deputy Bell also determined

Farrington’s driver’s license was suspended. On October 2, 2019, Deputy Bell observed

Farrington and his co-defendant depart on another suspected drug delivery run. Deputy

Bell contacted Sergeant Wall, also of the Henry County Sheriff’s Office, to advise him that

Farrington was driving a vehicle with a suspended license and to request that he make a

traffic stop, as Sergeant Wall was in uniform in a marked squad car, while Deputy Bell was

not.

Sergeant Wall stopped the vehicle after confirming that Farrington was driving, with

his co-defendant in the passenger seat. As Judge Jackson found,

At the stop, Sergeant Wall identified Defendant as the

driver and [his co-defendant] as the front seat passenger. No

one else was in the car. Sergeant Wall confirmed Defendant

did not have a valid driver’s license and made the decision to

run Uno [his K-9] around the vehicle as he was aware of

Deputy Bell’s investigation on the car. In addition, prior to the

K-9 open air sniff, Sergeant Wall took note of multiple

cellphones in the car, a torch lighter in the center console cup

holder area and a camera mounted to the rear-view mirror.

Based on his experience investigating drug cases, Sergeant

Wall testified a torch style lighter is used to make

methamphetamine and individuals involved in drug trafficking

often have multiple cell phones. He further indicated these

items are odd for people to have in their vehicles.

***

Sergeant Wall estimated he initiated the open-air sniff

about a minute to minute and a half after the initial encounter

with Defendant. Uno gave a passive alert, by sitting at the

driver’s side rear door near a folded down back seat. Sergeant

Wall told Defendant the vehicle would be searched. According

to Sergeant Wall, Defendant became a little bit more agitated

and blurted out the vehicle did not belong to him. An unused

methamphetamine pipe was found in [the co-defendant’s]

purse. In the trunk of the vehicle, Sergeant Wall found a large

red scale, multiple individual baggies and locked containers

within brief-case style bags. The locked containers were

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approximately six by six to six by twelve inches big. Each was

secured by a lock with a code, similar to a bicycle lock. Both

Defendant and [his co-defendant] denied knowledge or

possession of the locked containers. Sergeant Wall testified, if

he had the means to at the time, he would have opened and

searched the containers immediately.

Sergeant Wall contacted Deputy Bell to brief him on the

traffic stop. From this the decision was made to remove the

containers from the vehicle, bring them to the Sherriff’s Office

and have an open-air dog sniff performed on them. Sergeant

Wall did this with Uno, who alerted to all four containers. He

testified it is not uncommon for him to remove items from a

vehicle and have Uno do an open-air sniff around those items.

A state search warrant was then obtained for the containers. A

search of the containers revealed a significant amount of

methamphetamine.

Report And Recommendation, 7-8.

Farrington was indicted on January 15, 2020, along with his co-defendant, in Count

1, for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A) and 846 and, in Count 2, for possession with the intent to distribute

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Trial in this

matter is set to begin on February 1, 2021.

The Report And Recommendation

In his Report And Recommendation, Judge Jackson concluded, first, that the traffic

stop was appropriate.

Report And Recommendation at 12.

Although Farrington

challenged the stop in his Motion, Farrington does not now object to Judge Jackson’s

conclusion that the stop was appropriate.

Turning to seizure of the locked containers from the vehicle, Judge Jackson began

by setting out the applicable standards, as follows:

The “automobile exception” to the Fourth

Amendment’s warrant requirement established in Carroll v.

United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) applies to searches of

vehicles that are supported by probable cause to believe that

the vehicle contains contraband. United States v. Ross, 456

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U.S. 798, 808 (1982). The probable-cause determination must

be based on objective facts. Id. The Ross Court notes that

Carroll held that “contraband goods concealed and illegally

transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched

for without a warrant.” Id. at 820 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at

153). The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus

is not defined by the nature of the container in which the

contraband is secreted. Id. at 824. Rather, it is defined by the

object of the search and the places in which there is probable

cause to believe that it may be found. Id.

Report And Recommendation, 12.

Then, recognizing that the government challenged Farrington’s standing to

challenge the search of the vehicle and the seizure of containers from it, Judge Jackson

observed,

The defendant moving to suppress has the burden of

proving a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area

searched. United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, 256 (8th Cir.

1994); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n. 1 (1978);

United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir. 1991). We

adhere to these cases and to the general rule that Fourth

Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other

constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.

Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969); Simmons

v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Jones v. United

States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); cf. Tileston v. Ullman, 318

U.S. 44, 46 (1943). Factors relevant to the determination of

standing include: ownership, possession and/or control of the

area searched or item seized; historical use of the property or

item; ability to regulate access; the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the search; the existence or nonexistence of a

subjective anticipation of privacy; and the objective

reasonableness of the expectation of privacy considering the

specific facts of the case. Gomez, 16 F.3d at 256. If a defendant

fails to prove a sufficiently close connection to the relevant

places or objects searched, he has no standing to claim that they

were searched or seized illegally. Id.

Report And Recommendation at 12-13.

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In the part of the Report And Recommendation to which Farrington specifically

objects, Judge Jackson concluded as follows:

Concerning the question of standing, by his own words,

Defendant denied ownership of the vehicle and denied

possessing the locked containers. There was no evidence

Defendant had a key to the locked containers, a possessory

interest in the locked containers, a possessory interest in the

vehicle, the ability to exclude others from the vehicle or

whether he took precautions to maintain privacy within the

vehicle. On the other hand, law enforcement was aware from

tracking the vehicle for several days [that] Defendant had been

in possession of the vehicle during that time. His denial of

ownership of the vehicle only occurred when he was notified

the vehicle was going to be searched. Examining the totality of

the circumstances surrounding the search and the objective

reasonableness of the expectation of privacy, it is arguable

Defendant has not met his burden to show standing and that he

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and/or

locked containers.

Regardless, even if Defendant has standing, law

enforcement had probable cause to seize the locked containers

pending further investigation. Deputy Bell had information

Defendant and [his co-defendant] were trafficking drugs based

on the GPS tracking information received about the vehicle in

the days before the vehicle was stopped by officers on October

2, 2019. Defendant was driving the vehicle of a known drug

trafficker. A certified drug dog, Uno, alerted to the area of the

vehicle containing the locked containers. Sergeant Wall

testified if the containers had not been locked, he would have

searched them at the scene.

Instead, the locked containers were removed from the

vehicle and transported to the Henry County Sherriff’s Office

and placed in the evidence shed. From there, Uno was deployed

around the containers, alerting again to the presence of

contraband. A state search warrant was then obtained to open

and search the locked containers. Sergeant Wall testified it is

not uncommon for him to remove items from a vehicle and

have Uno do an open-air sniff around those items. During this

time, Defendant was in custody at the Henry County Jail for

driving with a suspended license. Defendant was not released

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from custody from the time of his initial arrest up at the traffic

stop to the time he was taken into custody upon the indictment

in this case. For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge

determines the warrantless seizure of the locked containers

was not unreasonable merely because law enforcement

removed the locked containers from the vehicle and

transported them to the Henry County Sherriff’s Office

evidence shed, rather than immediately opening them at the

scene of the traffic stop.

Report And Recommendation, 13-15 (emphasis added).

Consequently, Judge Jackson recommended that Farrington’s Motions to Suppress

Traffic Stop and Subsequent Evidence and Request for Hearing [Dkts. 81 and 86] be

denied.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Standard Of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), a district judge may designate a magistrate

judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the

court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of various matters,

including motions to suppress evidence in criminal cases. Further,

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party

may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings

and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of

the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions

of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the

court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.

The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the

matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 59(b); LCrR 59.

Here, Farrington makes two objections to Judge Jackson’s Report And

Recommendation: “First, Mr. Farrington objects to the finding that the warrantless seizure

of containers found in the vehicle he was driving falls under the Carroll exception to the

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warrant requirement. Secondly, Mr. Farrington objects to the Court’s determination that

he lacked standing to object to the search and seizure of that vehicle.” Def.’s Obj. [Dkt.

No. 115], 1. The court will conduct a de novo review of both parts of the Report And

Recommendation to which Farrington objects, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), albeit in reverse

order.

Standing

Farrington argues that, contrary to the government’s assertions, he has standing to

assert his challenges to the search and seizure at issue, because testimony at the hearing

established that he had possession, control, and the ability to regulate access to the vehicle

from which the containers were seized. He argues that his lawful possession and his

reasonable expectation of privacy were established by the record and supported by the

testimony of Deputy Bell and Sergeant Wall at the hearing.

Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to consideration of the merits of a challenge

to a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. White, 962

F.3d 1052, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 2020). Indeed, Judge Jackson addressed the issue of standing

before he considered the merits of Farrington’s challenge to seizure of the locked

containers, as shown in the excerpts of the Report And Recommendation quoted, above.

See Report And Recommendation at 13-15.

Judge Jackson also properly considered various factors as relevant to the question

of standing. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained,

Fourth Amendment standing is “useful shorthand for

capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth

Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief

for an unconstitutional search,” but it does not implicate

Article III jurisdiction. Byrd v. United States, ––– U.S. –––,

138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530, 200 L.Ed.2d 805 (2018). We must

determine whether [the defendant] “had a legitimate

expectation of privacy in the area searched or the item seized.”

United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, 256 (8th Cir. 1994)

(citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–44, 99 S.Ct. 421,

58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). There is no “single metric or

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exhaustive list of considerations,” but a defendant’s

expectation of privacy must be grounded in property law or

understandings that are recognized by society. Byrd, 138 S. Ct.

at 1527. The defendant bears this burden by a preponderance

of the evidence. See United States v. Anguiano, 795 F.3d 873,

878 (8th Cir. 2015).

United States v. Bettis, 946 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2020), and compare Report And

Recommendation at 12-13.

Contrary to Farrington’s assertions, however, Judge Jackson did not hold that

Farrington did not have standing. Rather, as set out, above, Judge Jackson considered the

evidence on both sides of the question, then stated that “it is arguable Defendant has not

met his burden to show standing and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

vehicle and/or locked containers.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Judge Jackson then

assumed that Farrington had met his burden, so he considered the merits of Farrington’s

challenge. Id. (“Regardless, even if Defendant has standing, law enforcement had probable

cause to seize the locked containers pending further investigation.”). This court, likewise,

will simply assume, for the sake of argument, that Farrington has standing to challenge the

seizure of the containers and turn to the merits of that challenge.

Farrington’s objection to Judge Jackson’s conclusion regarding standing is

overruled.

Seizure Of The Containers

In support of his objection to Judge Jackson’s finding on the merits of the seizure

of the containers, Farrington argues that the Report And Recommendation provides no

authority for the proposition that luggage or other containers may be seized from vehicles

without a warrant, because he argues that the caselaw dealing with seizure of containers is

distinct from that dealing with searches and seizures of vehicles. Farrington argues that

this case is controlled by United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983), concerning a

seizure of luggage, rather than cases concerning searches and seizures of vehicles, such as

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,

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809 (1982). Here, Farrington argues that the law enforcement officers exceeded the scope

of the seizure authorized by Place and that there was no exception to the warrant

requirement. Specifically, he argues that after the search and impound of the vehicle, the

containers, which were not apparent as contraband, were improperly seized separately,

without justification, when the vehicle was otherwise impounded and immobilized.

Contrary to Farrington’s assertions, the applicable law, here, is the law for search of

a vehicle. Once officers have sufficient objective indicia of possible criminal activity that

justifies further investigation, including such things as a drug dog’s alert to a car, the

officers have probable cause to search the car. United States v. Stringer, 739 F.3d 391, 395

(8th Cir. 2014). Furthermore, “the officers [ar]e permitted to search the vehicle and any

closed containers therein without a warrant, based on the automobile exception to the

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.

798, 820–21 (1982), which in turn discusses the scope of the Carroll exception). As Judge

Jackson noted, in Ross, the Supreme Court observed,

The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not

defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband

is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and

the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it

may be found.

Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. In other words, the probable cause to search the vehicle provides

the probable cause to search and seize a closed container in the vehicle that might contain

contraband.

In contrast, Place, on which Farrington relies, did not involve containers in a vehicle

at all. Rather, it involved the seizure of bags from an airline passenger upon his arrival in

New York from Miami. Place, 462 U.S. at 699. It is true that Place stands for the

proposition that the seizure of personal property from the possession of a person ordinarily

requires a warrant based on probable cause, or “exigencies of the circumstances” requiring

seizure while seeking a warrant, or the presence of “some other recognized exception to

the warrant requirement.” Id. at 701. The Court in Place also recognized that it was

appropriate to apply Terry-stop standards, allowing seizure based on reasonable,

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articulable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the personal property contains

contraband, in order to seek a warrant to search the personal property. Id. at 702. The

Court found “that the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type

investigative stop,” because of “[t]he length of the detention of respondent’s luggage,” and

“the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the place to which they were

transporting his luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what

arrangements would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation dispelled the

suspicion.” Id. at 709-10.

What is important, here, however, is the Court’s discussion in Place concerning its

prior holding in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979). See Place, 462 U.S. at

702 n.3. In Sanders, the Court had held that law enforcement officers could properly seize

luggage from a person, where they had probable cause to believe the luggage contained

marijuana and they had probable cause to believe the luggage was about to be driven away

in a taxi, but the Court held the officers “violated the Fourth Amendment in immediately

searching the luggage rather than first obtaining a warrant authorizing the search.” Id. The

Court explained that the holding in Sanders was “not affected by our recent decision in

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).”

Id. Thus, the Court in Place recognized that its standards for the search and seizure of

luggage in a person’s direct possession, are not applicable to the seizure or search of closed

containers in a vehicle, where law enforcement officers have probable cause to search the

vehicle, because the latter situation is controlled by the standards in Ross.

In the circumstances presented, here, Ross does not require that law enforcement

officers have probable cause as to a particular closed container in a vehicle that is separate

from the probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband before they may

seize or search the closed container. Thus, as Judge Jackson concluded, Sergeant Wall

could have immediately opened the locked containers at the scene of the traffic stop, if he

had had the means to do so. The decision not to do so at the side of busy highway as night

was falling was entirely reasonable. Moreover, by instead seizing the closed containers—

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which Sgt. Wall was entitled to do under Ross—and not searching them until separate

probable cause had been established by a K-9 alert to the specific containers and a warrant

had been obtained, the law enforcement officers acted with commendable caution and

actually provided greater Fourth Amendment protection than they were required to

provide.

Farrington’s objection to Judge Jackson’s conclusion regarding the propriety of the

seizure of the closed containers is overruled.

III.

CONCLUSION

Upon the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that

the defendant’s December 30, 2020, Objections To Report And

Recommendation [Dkt. No. 115] are overruled;

Judge Jackson’s December 16, 2020, Report And Recommendation On

Defendant’s Motion To Suppress [Dkt. No. 110] is accepted; and

the defendant’s October 5, 2020, Motion To Suppress Traffic Stop And

Subsequent Evidence And Request For Hearing [Dkt. No. 81], as supplemented on October

9, 2020 [Dkt. No. 86], is denied.

DATED this 28th day of January, 2021.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

SHAUN MICHAEL FARRINGTON,

Defendant.

)

CASE NO. 3:20-cr-00006

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

SUPPRESS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………….…2

II.

FINDINGS OF FACT……………………….………………………………………….….2

A. TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY JESSE BELL…………………………………………..3

B. TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT DAVID WALL…………………………………….6

III.

ANALYSIS...………………...………………………………………………………….…8

A. THE TRAFFIC STOP..…………………………………..…………………………...8

B. SEIZURE OF THE LOCKED CONTAINERS………….…………………………...12

IV.

RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER……………………………………….…………..16

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I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant’s Motions to Suppress Traffic

Stop and Subsequent Evidence and Request for Hearing (Dkts. 81 and 86) and brief in support

(Dkt. 86-1), filed October 5, 2020 and October 9, 2020, respectively. The government resisted the

motion on October 23, 2020. Dkt. 89. Defendant filed a reply brief in support of his motion on

November 5, 2020. Dkt. 95. The matter was referred to this Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) for report and recommendation by Chief Judge John A. Jarvey. Dkt. 87. Trial is

set for February 1, 2021. Dkt. 107.

An evidentiary hearing was held on November 9, 2020. Dkt. 98. The government appeared

by Assistant U.S. Attorney Caleb J. Copley. Defendant appeared personally and with his attorneys,

Elizabeth Araguas and Charles Paul. Testimony was received from Henry County Deputy Jesse

Bell and Henry County Sergeant David Wall. Id. The Court received two exhibits offered by the

government without objection: Exhibit 1 – Driver’s License Photo of Defendant and Exhibit 2 –

Booking Photo of Defendant. Id. The parties were allowed to file post-hearing briefs. Id. The

government submitted a supplemental response (Dkt. 102) on November 9, 2020 and Defendant

filed a final reply (Dkt. 105) on November 12, 2020.

The Court considers the matter to be fully submitted. This Magistrate Judge has carefully

considered the record evidence, including the exhibits admitted, the briefs filed by both parties,

the arguments and statements of counsel and submits the following report. As set forth below,

based on the facts presented and applicable law, it is recommended that the motion be denied.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A criminal complaint was filed on December 16, 2019, against Defendant and Stefani

Goodwin, alleging possession with the intent to distribute at least fifty grams of methamphetamine

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in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). Dkt. 3. Subsequently, Defendant was

indicted on January 15, 2020, along with Goodwin, in Count 1 of conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) and 846 and in Count 2 of

possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)

and 841(b)(1)(A). Dkt. 33.

Testimony of Deputy Jesse Bell

Deputy Jesse Bell of the Henry County Sheriff’s Office testified. Deputy Bell is the

investigator for Henry County Deputy’s Office, responsible for investigation of general crimes and

narcotics. He has been a deputy with Henry County since June 2013 and investigator since May

2017. He has received surveillance training, a narcotic officer two-week training course and

informant management training. He has been a member of the Southeast Iowa Narcotics Task

Force since July 2019. Previously, he served with the Mt. Pleasant Police Department beginning

in July 2010.

As a part of his duties, on March 31, 2019, Deputy Bell became aware of a suspected drug

trafficking house in New London, Iowa, as well as a 2010 Ford Fusion registered to an Emily

Richardson. In June 2019, during an interview with law enforcement, Richardson admitted to

living at this house. Shortly thereafter, in July 2019 as part of a separate methamphetamine

investigation, Deputy Bell applied for and received Facebook records which showed Richardson

was trafficking narcotics with other individuals. On August 28, 2019, Deputy Bell obtained a state

warrant authorizing installation of a GPS tracker for the 2010 Ford Fusion. The tracker was

installed on the vehicle the next day and information received from it showed the vehicle being in

Burlington, Washington and Henry County, Iowa. At that time, Deputy Bell knew Burlington to

be a major source of methamphetamine.

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In early September, Deputy Bell became aware of the Defendant and Goodwin being

involved in methamphetamine sales. This information came to Deputy Bell from Facebook

messages he received from another individual. Within those messages, Defendant discusses with

this individual delivery of drugs to Defendant and drug quantities. These messages also implicated

Goodwin. On September 30, 2019, Richardson’s vehicle was seen at the Super 8 Motel in

Burlington, Iowa, which is known to Deputy Bell as a drug trafficking location. Surveillance was

conducted on the vehicle and Deputy Bell observed a male and female approach it. He did not

know who the individuals were but knew they were not Richardson or her boyfriend. Using the

GPS tracker, Deputy Bell was able to determine the 2010 Ford Fusion left the motel at 6:15 p.m.

on September 30, returning to Burlington on October 1 at 12:45 p.m. The tracking shows the

vehicle made multiple stops for short periods of time, indicating to him based on his experience in

drug investigations, likely delivery of narcotics.

On October 1, 2019, the 2010 Ford Fusion was picked up on visual surveillance by other

law enforcement and followed to a Dick’s Sporting Goods store in Burlington. When Deputy Bell

arrived, the vehicle was parked at the store. Deputy Bell observed the same male and same female

he had seen at the motel on September 30, return to the vehicle. Deputy Bell testified that, after he

had seen these people at the motel on September 30, he undertook further investigation to identify

them. The GPS tracker showed the vehicle made a stop at a residence in Iowa City. Deputy Bell

checked with Johnson County drug force task members and learned the vehicle was at or near

Defendant’s residence. With this information, Deputy Bell reviewed Defendant’s driver’s license

and determined Defendant was the male he saw on September 30 with the vehicle at the motel and

on October 1 with the vehicle at the store. A copy of Defendant’s driver’s license photo was

admitted as government’s Exhibit 1. From this information, he confirmed Defendant’s address on

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his driver’s license matched the residence he had noted the vehicle stopping near in Iowa City.

Deputy Bell also determined Defendant’s driver’s license was suspended. Deputy Bell further

testified he was able to identify the female as Goodwin.

Deputy Bell followed the vehicle from the store back to the motel. He saw Defendant and

Goodwin go into the motel, carrying a backpack, numerous other bags and a blue plastic tote. The

GPS tracker showed the vehicle left Burlington at 6:00 p.m. that evening, returning at 2:42 p.m.

the next day, October 2. During that time, the vehicle again made multiple short stops. The vehicle

stayed at the motel on October 2 until about 6:10 p.m. Deputy Bell picked up visual surveillance

of the vehicle again and saw the vehicle leave the motel. He identified Defendant as driving the

vehicle from the motel. Deputy Bell estimated he was 200-300 feet from Defendant, watching

through binoculars from a parking lot with an unobstructed view. He saw Defendant and Goodwin

placing several bags into the back-seat trunk area of the vehicle before leaving the motel. Deputy

Bell followed the vehicle as it left the motel, westbound on Highway 34 towards Mt. Pleasant. At

that time, he contacted Sergeant Wall to advise him Defendant was driving the vehicle with a

suspended license and requested he make a traffic stop, as Sergeant Wall was in uniform in a

marked squad car while Deputy Bell was not.

Deputy Bell testified he was not present for the traffic stop performed by Sergeant Wall.

However, he was aware the vehicle was towed to the Henry County Sherriff’s Office, along with

locked containers seized from the vehicle. Those containers were placed in the evidence shed at

the Sherriff’s Office. A drug dog sniffed each of the locked containers and alerted to them.

Subsequent to this, Deputy Bell applied for a state search warrant to open the locked containers.

Based on dispatch records, Deputy Bell believes the traffic stop occurred at approximately 6:46

p.m. and he would have sought the search warrant between that time and 10:00 p.m. After the

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traffic stop, Defendant was placed under arrest for driving on a suspended license and booked into

the Henry County Jail. He remained in custody through his indictment in this case.

A copy of Defendant’s arrest booking photo from that evening was admitted as

government’s Exhibit 2. Deputy Bell testified Defendant’s driver’s license photo, Exhibit 1 and

Defendant’s arrest booking photo, Exhibit 2, except for some facial hair that is a little more

prevalent, look similar to him. Further, by looking at these photos, he can identify Defendant.

Testimony of Sergeant David Wall

Sergeant David Wall of the Henry County Sherriff’s Department testified. He is a K-9

handler for the department and has been with the department since 2017. Previously he was a

police officer with the city of Fairfield. Sergeant Wall testified when he is on duty, he typically

wears his uniform, drives a marked squad car and is with his K-9, Uno, and this was the case on

October 2, 2019. That evening, Deputy Bell asked him to make a traffic stop on the vehicle because

the driver, Defendant, was operating with a suspended driver’s license. Deputy Bell gave him

Defendant’s name. Sergeant Wall testified he became aware of Deputy Bell’s investigation a week

or two before the traffic stop and was aware it involved a suspected methamphetamine trafficking

situation.

Sergeant Wall looked up Defendant’s driver’s license photo and identified Exhibit 1 as the

same photo he viewed that day. Prior to making the stop, Sergeant Wall pulled up parallel to

Defendant on the four-lane highway they were on to confirm Defendant was, in fact, the driver of

the vehicle. He looked over at Defendant, who turned his head and looked directly at Sergeant

Wall. Nothing obstructed his view of Defendant, nor did the vehicle have tinted windows.

Sergeant Wall indicated Defendant had on a baseball cap, but this did not obstruct his view, either.

Sergeant Wall then initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle.

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At the stop, Sergeant Wall identified Defendant as the driver and Stephanie Goodwin as

the front seat passenger. No one else was in the car. Sergeant Wall confirmed Defendant did not

have a valid driver’s license and made the decision to run Uno around the vehicle as he was aware

of Deputy Bell’s investigation on the car. In addition, prior to the K-9 open air sniff, Sergeant Wall

took note of multiple cellphones in the car, a torch lighter in the center console cup holder area

and a camera mounted to the rear-view mirror. Based on his experience investigating drug cases,

Sergeant Wall testified a torch style lighter is used to make methamphetamine and individuals

involved in drug trafficking often have multiple cell phones. He further indicated these items are

odd for people to have in their vehicles.

Sergeant Wall testified Uno is certified to find the odor of methamphetamine, heroin,

ecstasy, cocaine and marijuana. He and Uno were certified in 2013 through Mid-Michigan

Kennels. Sergeant Wall and Uno undertake an annual certification from an independent

organization and were certified on the date of this stop. When Uno alerts to a vehicle, he makes

his final indication by sitting - what is called a passive alert. Sergeant Wall testified he and Uno

have performed hundreds of open-air sniffs around vehicles.

Sergeant Wall estimated he initiated the open-air sniff about a minute to minute and a half

after the initial encounter with Defendant. Uno gave a passive alert, by sitting at the driver’s side

rear door near a folded down back seat. Sergeant Wall told Defendant the vehicle would be

searched. According to Sergeant Wall, Defendant became a little bit more agitated and blurted out

the vehicle did not belong to him. An unused methamphetamine pipe was found in Goodwin’s

purse. In the trunk of the vehicle, Sergeant Wall found a large red scale, multiple individual baggies

and locked containers within brief-case style bags. The locked containers were approximately six

by six to six by twelve inches big. Each was secured by a lock with a code, similar to a bicycle

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lock. Both Defendant and Goodwin denied knowledge or possession of the locked containers.

Sergeant Wall testified, if he had the means to at the time, he would have opened and searched the

containers immediately.

Sergeant Wall contacted Deputy Bell to brief him on the traffic stop. From this the decision

was made to remove the containers from the vehicle, bring them to the Sherriff’s Office and have

an open-air dog sniff performed on them. Sergeant Wall did this with Uno, who alerted to all four

containers. He testified it is not uncommon for him to remove items from a vehicle and have Uno

do an open-air sniff around those items. A state search warrant was then obtained for the

containers. A search of the containers revealed a significant amount of methamphetamine.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant seeks to suppress all physical evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop on

October 2, 2019 and all evidence obtained by search warrants obtained subsequent to the stop

based upon evidence recovered during the stop. Dkts. 81, 86, 95 and 105. Defendant contends the

traffic stop was not justified because it was not supported by specific, articulable facts. Dkt. 86-1,

p. 4. In addition, Defendant argues law enforcement was not justified in the seizure of the locked

containers from the vehicle driven by Defendant. Id, pp. 7-8.

The government resists the motion in each particular. Dkts. 89, 102. The Court addresses

each of Defendant’s arguments in turn.

The Traffic Stop.

The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and a

traffic stop constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants. U.S. Const. amend. IV, United States

v. Sanchez, 955 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 2020), Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007).

Regarding pretextual stops:

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“An officer has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop when he observes

even a minor traffic violation. ‘This is true even if a valid traffic stop is a

pretext for other investigation.’ ” United States v. Coney, 456 F.3d 850, 85556 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v.

Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2002)); see Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding that an

officer's subjective intentions for conducting a traffic stop “play no role in

ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); United States v.

Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1109 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he

constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual

motivations of the officer involved, and the subjective intentions of the

officer making the stop are irrelevant in determining the validity of the

stop.”); United States v. Andrews, 465 F.3d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (“[T]he fourth amendment is not violated if an objectively good

reason for a traffic stop exists, whatever the actual subjective motive of the

officer making the stop may have been.”); United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d

479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding a traffic stop for failing to wear seatbelts

is valid “even if the police would have ignored the traffic violation but for

their suspicion that greater crimes are afoot”).

United States v. Sallis, 507 F.3d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 2007).

As such, a traffic stop must be justified by “reasonable suspicion ... that criminal activity

may be afoot.” United States v. Sanchez, 955 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 2020), United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When an officer makes a routine

traffic stop, the officer is entitled to conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances that initially prompted the stop.” Sanchez, 955 F.3d at 674, United States v. Lyons,

486 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The reasonable

suspicion inquiry asks “whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Sanchez, 955 F.3d at 674, United States v. Walker, 771 F.3d 449,

450 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“A police officer who observes a traffic violation has probable cause to stop the vehicle

and its driver.” United States v. Nassar, 546 F.3d 569, 570 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.

Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2007)); see United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498,

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500 (8th Cir. 1990) (“When an officer observes a traffic offense—however minor—he has

probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.”) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106

(1977)). “If there is an ‘articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that

an automobile is not registered,’ a traffic stop on that basis is not unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.” United States v. Chartier, 772 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). In Chartier, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an

officer properly stopped a vehicle after determining the vehicle's registered owner did not have a

valid license to drive despite not “affirmatively identify[ing]” the driver. Id. at 543.

Defendant argues the traffic stop was not justified because it was not supported by specific,

articulable facts. Dkt. 86-1. In his view, nothing in the reports or affidavits filed by the officers

provides information as to how they could have positively identified Defendant. Id., p. 4.

Defendant contends he looked significantly different from the picture used to identify him, did not

identify himself at the traffic stop and carried no photo identification. Dkt. 81, p. 2, Dkt. 86, p. 2.

The traffic stop is a hunch from Defendant’s perspective, and cannot be the basis of reasonable

suspicion, so all evidence flowing from the stop should be suppressed. Dkt. 86-1, p. 5. He further

asserts the visual identification based solely on an out of date driving record photograph is both

entirely subjective and not sufficiently reliable. Dkt. 81, p. 3, Dkt. 86, p. 3. He notes the law

enforcement officers who identified Defendant had no previous encounters with him. Dkt. 86-1,

p. 5. Further, when he identified Defendant, Sergeant Wall was travelling at highway speeds and

Defendant was wearing a baseball cap. Id.

The government argues Defendant’s rights were not violated during the traffic stop. Dkt.

89, pp. 5-13. In fact, the government emphasizes, in this case, the only issue for the court is to

determine is whether the totality of the circumstances supported the traffic stop. Dkt. 89, p. 6.

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Sergeant Wall had reasonable suspicion to stop the car and positively identified Defendant. Dkt.

89, pp. 5-7. The traffic stop was not based on a hunch but on specific, articulable reasons, supported

by probable cause. Dkt. 89, p.7.

This Magistrate Judge concludes the traffic stop in this case was appropriate. A traffic

violation, no matter how minor, provides probable cause to support a traffic stop. Here, the stop

was based on a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing – Defendant

was driving the vehicle while his driver’s license was suspended. Sergeant Bell positively

identified Defendant and did so by deliberately pulling up alongside the vehicle. He knew

Defendant had a suspended driver’s license. Sergeant Wall reviewed Defendant’s driver’s license

photograph through the State of Iowa. Sergeant Wall pulled up parallel to the 2010 Ford Fusion

and Defendant looked right at him. He testified the vehicle did not have tinted windows and

Defendant’s hat did not obstruct his face.

Sergeant Wall testified he had a clear view of Defendant. Whether the driver’s license

photograph looked “significantly different” than Defendant did when he was stopped is a matter

of degree and not a determinative factor on this issue. Police officers frequently view photographs

of people to identify individuals, using their training and experience to match facial characteristics.

Sergeant Wall has been an officer with the Henry County Sheriff’s Office since 2017 and was

previously with the City of Fairfield Police Department.

In addition, this Magistrate Judge has compared the driver’s license photo of Defendant

(Exhibit 1) to the booking photo of Defendant from that evening (Exhibit 2). The similarity of

Defendant’s appearance on the day of the traffic stop to his appearance in the driver’s license photo

is significant. Finally, it is notable Deputy Bell had previously identified Defendant through his

investigation into the prior route of the vehicle. From his investigation, he determined the

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Case 3:20-cr-00006-JAJ-SBJ Document 110 Filed 12/16/20 Page 12 of 16

previously unknown operator of the vehicle to be the Defendant. Then, prior to the traffic stop by

Sergeant Wall, Deputy Bell positively identified the driver of the vehicle at that time on October

2, 2019 to be Defendant. For all these reasons, the traffic stop was appropriate.

SEIZURE OF THE LOCKED CONTAINERS.

The “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement established

in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) applies to searches of vehicles that are supported

by probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.

798, 808 (1982). The probable-cause determination must be based on objective facts. Id. The Ross

Court notes that Carroll held that “contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an

automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant.” Id. at 820 (quoting Carroll

267 U.S. at 153). The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the

nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Id. at 824. Rather, it is defined by the

object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.

Id.

A dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United

States v. Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10). “[A]n

alert or indication by a properly trained and reliable drug dog provides probable cause for the arrest

and search of a person or for the search of a vehicle.” United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 967

(8th Cir. 2010), see United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United

States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 374 (6th Cir. 2006).

The defendant moving to suppress has the burden of proving a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the area searched. United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, 256 (8th Cir. 1994); Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n. 1 (1978); United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir.

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Case 3:20-cr-00006-JAJ-SBJ Document 110 Filed 12/16/20 Page 13 of 16

1991). We adhere to these cases and to the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal

rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. Alderman v.

United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968);

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); cf. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).

Factors relevant to the determination of standing include: ownership, possession and/or control of

the area searched or item seized; historical use of the property or item; ability to regulate access;

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search; the existence or nonexistence of a

subjective anticipation of privacy; and the objective reasonableness of the expectation of privacy

considering the specific facts of the case. Gomez, 16 F.3d at 256. If a defendant fails to prove a

sufficiently close connection to the relevant places or objects searched, he has no standing to claim

that they were searched or seized illegally. Id.

Defendant contends law enforcement was not justified in the seizure of the locked

containers as neither danger nor risk of disappearance existed to support their seizure from the

vehicle driven by Defendant. Dkt. 86-1, pp. 7-8. As the driver, Defendant had a reasonable

expectation of privacy, and has standing to challenge the seizure and search of the containers found

in the trunk. Dkt. 105, pp. 4-6. Finally, there exists no applicable warrant exception to justify law

enforcement’s seizure of the locked containers found in the vehicle. Dkt. 105, pp. 6-7. At hearing,

Defendant indicated he was contesting only the second dog sniff of the locked containers and

argued putting the locked containers in an evidence locker was not the appropriate way to handle

them.

Regarding the locked containers, the government contends Defendant does not have

standing to challenge the seizure of the containers from the vehicle. Dkt. 89., pp. 8-9. Additionally,

based on the positive alert by the drug dog, probable cause existed to believe contraband was

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Case 3:20-cr-00006-JAJ-SBJ Document 110 Filed 12/16/20 Page 14 of 16

present, which authorized a warrantless search of the vehicle. Dkt. 89, pp. 9-13. The government

contends the automobile exception justifies seizing the locked containers in the same manner it

authorized a warrantless search of the vehicle in the first place. Dkt. 102, p. 5.

Concerning the question of standing, by his own words, Defendant denied ownership of

the vehicle and denied possessing the locked containers. There was no evidence Defendant had a

key to the locked containers, a possessory interest in the locked containers, a possessory interest

in the vehicle, the ability to exclude others from the vehicle or whether he took precautions to

maintain privacy within the vehicle. On the other hand, law enforcement was aware from tracking

the vehicle for several days of Defendant had been in possession of the vehicle during that time.

His denial of ownership of the vehicle only occurred when he was notified the vehicle was going

to be searched. Examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search and the

objective reasonableness of the expectation of privacy, it is arguable Defendant has not met his

burden to show standing and that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and/or

locked containers.

Regardless, even if Defendant has standing, law enforcement had probable cause to seize

the locked containers pending further investigation. Deputy Bell had information Defendant and

Goodwin were trafficking drugs based on the GPS tracking information received about the vehicle

in the days before the vehicle was stopped by officers on October 2, 2019. Defendant was driving

the vehicle of a known drug trafficker. A certified drug dog, Uno, alerted to the area of the vehicle

containing the locked containers. Sergeant Wall testified if the containers had not been locked, he

would have searched them at the scene.

Instead, the locked containers were removed from the vehicle and transported to the Henry

County Sherriff’s Office and placed in the evidence shed. From there, Uno was deployed around

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the containers, alerting again to the presence of contraband. A state search warrant was then

obtained to open and search the locked containers. Sergeant Wall testified it is not uncommon for

him to remove items from a vehicle and have Uno do an open-air sniff around those items. During

this time, Defendant was in custody at the Henry County Jail for driving with a suspended license.

Defendant was not released from custody from the time of his initial arrest up at the traffic stop to

the time he was taken into custody upon the indictment in this case. For these reasons, the

Magistrate Judge determines the warrantless seizure of the locked containers was not unreasonable

merely because law enforcement removed the locked containers from the vehicle and transported

them to the Henry County Sherriff’s Office evidence shed, rather than immediately opening them

at the scene of the traffic stop.

To the extent Defendant suggests the drug dog employed in this case was not reliable or

the open-air sniff conducted was irregular, for a full report and recommendation, this Magistrate

Judge addresses those matters and determines any such arguments have no merit. In this case,

Sergeant Wall testified credibly to the certification of the drug dog, Uno, his ongoing training with

him and the method and manner of the open-air sniffs conducted in this case. A drug dog is

considered reliable when it has been “trained and certified to detect drugs and a detailed account

of the dog's track record or education is unnecessary.” United States v. Olivera–Mendez, 484 F.3d

505, 512 (8th Cir. 2007). In addition, the facts surrounding the alerts by Uno in this case, suggest

a reasonably prudent person would think a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.

See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013) (the appropriate inquiry is “whether all the facts

surrounding a dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably

prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime”).

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IV.

RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

IT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED, that Defendant’s Motions to Suppress Traffic

Stop and Subsequent Evidence and Request for Hearing (Dkt. 81 and 86) be denied.

IT IS ORDERED, the parties have until December 30, 2020 to file written objections to

the Report and Recommendation, pursuant to pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Crim. P.

59(b)(2), and L.Cr.R. 59.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 16th day of December, 2020.

__________________________________________

STEPHEN B. JACKSON, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

45a

1 of 62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

DAVENPORT DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)

)

PLAINTIFF, )

) CRIMINAL ACTION

VS.

) FILE NO. 3:20-cr-00006

)

SHAUN MICHAEL FARRINGTON,) TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION

)

DEFENDANT. )

_________________________)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEPHEN B. JACKSON, JR.

Monday, November 9, 2020 11:05 a.m.

Davenport, Iowa 52801

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT:

CALEB COPLEY

ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

131 E. Fourth Street

Davenport, Iowa 52801

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

ELIZABETH ARAGUAS

CHARLES DAVID PAUL

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

452 2nd Street SE, #1000

Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401

DEBRA M. THORNBURG, CSR, RPR, CRR

FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE

131 EAST FOURTH STREET

DAVENPORT, IOWA 52801

PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY, TRANSCRIPT

PRODUCED BY CAT

46a

I N D E X

WITNESS

For the Government:

Jesse Bell

EXAMINATION

PAGE

By Mr. Copley

By Ms. Araguas

By Mr. Copley

By Mr. Paul

EXHIBITS

Received

David Wall

Government's No. 1 - photo

Government's No. 2 - booking photo

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

LORI BURGESS, RMR

47a

P R O C E E D I N G S

(Following proceedings were held in open court

with the Court, counsel, and the defendant present)

THE COURT:

Good morning.

This case is United

States of America v. Shaun Michael Farrington.

No. 320-cr-6.

the motion to suppress filed by Mr. Farrington.

Government appears today by Assistant U.S. Attorney Caleb

Copley.

attorney, Liz Araguas.

Today is the date and time set for hearing on

Mr. Copley, I

assume you plan on witness testimony today.

witnesses do you have?

MR. COPLEY:

Just two, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. COPLEY:

He is, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

The

Shaun Farrington appears personally with his

Couple things before we begin.

This is Case

How many

And is your other witness

outside?

Good.

I also understand

that your first witness has some very important things that

may be going on at any moment that we can't predict and so

good luck to him and his wife especially with that, and he

may have his cellphone on the stand in case he gets a

call.

MR. COPLEY:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Absolutely.

48a

I appreciate it.

Ms. Araguas, I'm also aware of your motion

concerning co-counsel.

touch base with CJA panel members, but that will be

processed within the next week to seven or ten days, but

that is something on my radar, and I'm working on that.

MS. ARAGUAS:

I'll be taking that up.

I need to

Could I ask a brief question about

that, your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MS. ARAGUAS:

I just want to clarify, I had just

filed a limited appearance for Mr. Paul from our office

today just because he would be here today and had prepped

this, so even if the Court does not appoint him, that's

fine.

Mr. Paul to be part of the hearing today and sit at counsel

table if the Court is okay with that pending whether or not

he would be appointed.

I would just like to ask the Court's permission for

THE COURT:

today?

MS. ARAGUAS:

But he did file a limited appearance

Yes, our assistant did this

morning.

THE COURT:

Any objection, Mr. Copley?

MR. COPLEY:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Yes, I think that's perfectly fine.

MS. ARAGUAS:

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Okay.

49a

Next before we begin with

hearing today, this is the first appearance of Mr.

Farrington since revisions to Rule of Criminal Procedure 5

(f) and so pursuant to that rule, I am ordering the United

States to disclose to the defendant all exculpatory

evidence, that is, evidence that favors the defendant or

casts doubt on the United States' case to the defendant as

required by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny.

in a timely manner may result in consequences including but

not limited to exclusion of evidence, adverse jury

instructions, dismissal of charges, contempt proceedings,

disciplinary action or sanctions by the Court.

Not doing so

Mr. Copley, do you confirm you fully understand

the obligations of the Government to disclose all such

exculpatory evidence to the defendant?

MR. COPLEY:

I do, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And do you understand the possible

consequences of failing to disclose exculpatory evidence in

a timely manner?

MR. COPLEY:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Ms. Araguas, do you confirm that you

understand the rights of Defendant's exculpatory evidence

being disclosed in a timely manner to the defendant?

MS. ARAGUAS:

THE COURT:

I am, your Honor.

I'll enter an order consistent with 5

(f) as I'm required to do as well.

50a

With that, I have a

question for the parties just in terms of clarifying or

lasering in on the issues, and I'm going to direct it to

you, Ms. Araguas.

Government suggested that really the only issues that from

their perspective you are raising in the suppression motion

is an inappropriateness concerning the traffic stop of Mr.

Farrington and also whether the seizure of the locked

containers was justified.

characteristic?

In the Government's response, the

MR. PAUL:

Do you agree with that

Your Honor, if I may respond, the

traffic stop, we could agree with the Government's

characterization of that issue.

because any search or seizure has to be justified at its

initiation, the seizure became the first link in the chain

that then goes to the continued seizure, the dog sniff and

the search warrant.

of the locked packages separate from the car, that would

invalidate everything else down the chain.

As far as the seizure,

If there's any issue with that seizure

THE COURT:

Well, are you raising issues with

certifications of K-9 or that the alert was not valid or

things of that nature?

your pleading.

MR. PAUL:

Because that's not super clear from

Not right now, your Honor.

We would

reserve the option to ask -- if information were to come up

today that would bring more issues to light, we may ask to

51a

brief those issues, but the -- frankly, the record of the

stop and search is sparse and right now we are not seeing

any issues with the dog certification or the search.

THE COURT:

was lacking to search the car?

MR. PAUL:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Are you arguing that probable cause

was lacking to search the locked containers?

MR. PAUL:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Anything that you want to address in

that regard, Mr. Copley?

MR. COPLEY:

Your Honor, the only thing I would

ask of the Court is on, I believe it was, Friday the

defendant filed a reply brief in support of the motion to

suppress.

I did work over the weekend on a brief response

to that.

I do believe there are some important cases that I

cited in that case -- or, in my response brief that I would

like to file, and I do believe it would help guide the Court

in reaching its decision.

later than the end of the day today, and I would just ask

permission of the Court to file that and, in the

alternative, if the Court does not want a filing, I would

just like the opportunity at the end of this hearing to

summarize those arguments if that pleases the Court

better.

I could have that on file by no

52a

THE COURT:

All right.

I'll allow the Government

to file a sur-reply by the end of business today.

And Ms. Araguas, Mr. Paul, would you like some

time since -- would you like some time to respond to that?

MS. ARAGUAS:

Yes, your Honor.

I think two

additional business days after, so if Mr. Copley is filing

today, if we could have until Thursday.

THE COURT:

Close of business on Thursday?

MS. ARAGUAS:

THE COURT:

Yes, please.

Okay.

That will be fine.

Mr. Paul,

could you just state and spell your first and last names for

your appearance for the record for our reporter too?

MR. PAUL:

Yes, your Honor.

Charles C-h-a-r-l-e-s

Paul P-a-u-l.

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you very much.

the traffic stop and probable cause is lacking to search the

locked containers and then also seize the containers.

that correct?

MS. ARAGUAS:

That's correct, your Honor.

I would

just like to clarify something that Mr. Paul mentioned.

When he mentions that we might challenge a sniff, it's not

the sniff at the scene but there's a second dog sniff of the

locked containers.

remain on the defense side about what happened once the

containers were removed from the vehicle and then

There's a lot of questions that still

53a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

processed.

THE COURT:

Well, I'm a little concerned because

where do we stop in this kind of never-ending suggestion of

these issues and so I need to issue report and

recommendation.

propose we address that?

I want it to be inclusive, so how do you

MR. PAUL:

Your Honor, once it's shown by evidence

that the search of the locked containers was warrantless, it

will be the Government's responsibility to show that they

were justified at the time they searched those containers.

THE COURT:

We'll come back to these at the end of

this hearing today, and you can set forth exactly what it is

that you're contesting so that we're square on those things.

Mr. Copley, you may proceed with your evidence.

MR. COPLEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

The

Government calls Jesse Bell to the witness stand.

JESSE BELL, WITNESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, SWORN

THE COURT:

You may take your mask off while

you're testifying.

You may proceed.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. COPLEY:

record.

Good morning, sir.

Please state your name again for the

Jesse Bell.

54a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

What is your occupation, sir?

Deputy sheriff.

And what county do you work for?

Henry County.

Where is Henry County?

Southeast Iowa.

What do you do as a deputy for the Henry County

sheriff's office?

I'm the investigator for the office.

And what sort of crimes do you investigate?

General crimes but also narcotic investigations.

Do you have any specialized training or certifications

for drug cases?

Yes.

Can you just walk us through those?

I have surveillance training.

officer two-week training course, informant management.

on-the-job training in order to become a drug

investigator?

Yes.

Now, obviously in Southeast Iowa we have the Southeast

Iowa Narcotics Task Force.

force?

I've been to narcotic

And would it be fair to say that there's also some

Are you a member of that task

Yes.

55a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

How long have you been a member?

Since July of 2019.

How long have you been an investigator with the Henry

County sheriff's office?

Since May of 2017.

How long have you been a deputy with the Henry County

sheriff's office?

Since June of 2013.

And does that encompass all of your law enforcement

experience to date?

July of 2010, prior to that.

And is that the length of your law enforcement?

Yes.

Okay.

about March 31, 2019, was law enforcement made aware and

subsequently you made aware of a suspected drug house in New

London, Iowa?

Yes.

And where is New London, Iowa, in regards to Henry

County?

County.

2010 Ford Fusion with Iowa license plate HZS 769?

No.

I was with the Mt. Pleasant Police Department since

Thank you.

Directing your attention to on or

It's on the eastern portion of the central area of Henry

As part of that investigation, were you made aware of a

56a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

Yes.

And who is that Ford Fusion registered to?

Emily Richardson.

And what did you or officers know about Emily Richardson

at that time?

In March?

Sure.

really all you knew about that Ford Fusion, is that it was

registered to her?

was registered to her, but the initial information for that

residence of traffic -- drug traffic was made aware in

March.

aware of an interview with Ms. Richardson around that

time?

Yes.

And did she make any admissions about living at that

drug house?

Yes.

Moving forward to on or about August 26, 2019 and

September 4, 2019, did you apply for and receive Facebook

records as part of a separate methamphetamine investigation

with ties to that New London house?

Yes.

Let's start there.

March 31, 2019, is that

I don't know exactly when I became aware that that

Okay.

Now let's move forward to June of 2019.

Are you

The sheriff spoke with her.

She said she was residing there.

Yes, in July I did.

57a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

Okay.

showed or what they told us?

showed that Emily Richardson was trafficking narcotics.

with or working with others to traffic in narcotics?

Yes.

At some point did you obtain a State of Iowa search

warrant for her silver Ford Fusion?

Yes.

And would that have been on or about August 28, 2019?

I believe so.

Would that tracker have been installed around that

time?

warrant was signed.

tracker, where was she involved with methamphetamine

distribution?

can recall?

up into Washington County a little bit.

time was a fairly large source of methamphetamine for the

State of Iowa?

And can you tell us about what those records

They received -- facebook records in that investigation

Would it be fair to say that she was either conspiring

Yes.

I believe I affixed the tracker the day after the

And in terms of just general information about that GPS

What portions of the State of Iowa, if you

I believe it was just our Henry County, Burlington and

Would it be safe to say that Burlington, Iowa, at this

58a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

Yes.

Now, during this same time frame, so we're kind of

talking end of August, beginning of September 2019, did the

defendant in this case and his co-defendant start to pop up

on your radar?

Yes.

And particularly this defendant, Shaun Farrington, were

you aware of him being involved with methamphetamine

sales?

Yes.

And let's talk about that.

primary source around this time frame that you were aware

of?

another individual, and within those messages Shaun

Farrington was asking this individual to deliver to him.

co-defendant, Stephanie Goodwin?

Yes.

Are there conversations about drug prices in those

messages?

The specific ones with Shaun, I don't recall.

Okay.

that discussed in those messages?

What was, kind of, the

In early September, I received Facebook messages with

Okay.

And do those Facebook records also implicate his

Do you know about quantities and drug debts?

Yes, quantities.

59a

Was

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

Okay.

On September 30, 2019, did you find and/or see

Ms. Richardson's car?

Yes.

Where was it?

At the Super 8 Motel in Burlington.

And through the course of your time with the Southeast

Iowa Narcotics Task Force, do you know anything about that

Super 8 Motel?

yes.

trafficking hotel in Burlington?

It's known for drugs.

Did you conduct surveillance on that car?

On the 30th?

Yes.

What did you see?

I observed a male and female subject come to the car and

both the male and female I knew not to being Emily

Richardson or her boyfriend at the time, Tyler Carpenter.

Did the car eventually leave the motel?

That night it did, but not while I was watching.

What time did it leave, approximately?

that, let me take a step back.

We've conducted drug investigations at that hotel,

Would it be fair to say that it's a known drug

60a

Before I ask

Was the GPS tracker still on

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

the car?

Yes.

So you were still able to monitor that car and where it

was going with the GPS tracker?

Yes.

Would it be fair to say that the car left that motel at

approximately 5:55 p.m. that night?

remember the exact times.

If you could, I would appreciate it.

So from analysis on my report, it appears to leave

Burlington approximately 6:15 p.m.

area of the Super 8 Motel?

does not appear to come back to Burlington until

approximately 12:45 the next day, on the 1st.

P.m.?

P.m., yes.

Okay.

records, that the car made multiple stops while being gone

for that time?

Yes.

And would it be fair to say that those stops were for

shorter periods of time?

I wouldn't -- I could refer to my GPS report.

I don't

And approximately when does the car return back to the

From analysis on my report, it doesn't -- the vehicle

Would it be fair to say, according to your

61a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

Several locations, yes.

What does that indicate to you, if anything, as someone

who is involved with drug investigations?

periods of time is likely delivering narcotics.

approximately 12:45 p.m.

again.

day?

Yes.

And at some point was it followed to --

Someone that travels to multiple locations for short

Now, you said the car came back on October 1 at

That's when you picked up on it

Did you conduct visual surveillance on the car that

THE COURT:

Excuse me.

I believe you said p.m.?

P.m.

October 1, 12:45 p.m.

THE COURT:

12:45 a.m. or p.m.?

Thank you.

Was the car followed to a Dick's Sporting Goods in

Burlington?

Yes.

Now, when the two people in -- let me ask you this.

you see the car leave the motel and go to Dick's?

No.

When did you pick up on it or when did you see it

again?

the case, or helping surveil, and once the vehicle arrived

Did

I became involved -- other detectives were helping with

62a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

at Dick's Sporting Goods is when I arrived, once it was

already parked there.

able to identify them?

had seen on the 30th at the Super 8 at the vehicle.

people?

Shaun Farrington and verified that the subject I watched on

the 30th and now on the 1st was Shaun Farrington.

Would that be fair to say?

Yes.

Why did you ask dispatch for a photo of Shaun

Farrington?

or her boyfriend that I knew at the time to be occupying the

vehicle, one of the stops the GPS tracker had made with the

vehicle was at a residence in Iowa City, and upon checking

with the Johnson County Drug Task Force members, I learned

that it was at or near Shaun Farrington's residence.

photo that you received for Shaun Farrington if I showed it

to you here in court today?

And when the people came back out to the car, were you

I observed that was it the same male and female that I

And what steps did you take to try and identify those

I subsequently received a driver's license photo of

And I'm assuming you got that photo from dispatch.

So after I'd identified that it was not Emily Richardson

Okay.

And would you recognize the driver's license

63a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

Yes.

Investigator Bell, I'm going to hand you what's been

marked as Government's Exhibit 1 for identification.

recognize that photograph?

Yes.

What is it?

It's a driver's license photo of Shaun Farrington.

And is that a fair and accurate copy of the driver's

license photo of Shaun Farrington that you received on or

about October 31 of 2019?

Yes.

It's a little blurrier, but it is it.

MR. COPLEY:

Do you

Your Honor, we'd offer proposed

Government's Exhibit 1.

THE COURT:

MS. ARAGUAS:

THE COURT:

Any objection?

No, your Honor.

Government's 1 is received.

BY MR. COPLEY:

and the person you saw both on September 30 and October 1

leaving the Dick's Sporting Goods, do you see that person in

the courtroom here today?

Yes.

Can you identify them by an article of clothing that

they're wearing?

The individual that is shown in Government's Exhibit 1

Orange top.

64a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

MR. COPLEY:

Your Honor, I'd ask that the record

reflect this witness has identified the defendant, Shaun

Farrington.

THE COURT:

The record will reflect.

BY MR. COPLEY:

bit shorter now than it was back on October 31?

Yes.

It's been cut.

Okay.

Did you end up following the car from Dick's

Sporting Goods back to the motel?

On October 1, yes.

Okay.

person, the female, were you able to identify her?

Yes.

And who was that?

We found that to be Stephanie Goodwin.

Okay.

Motel, did you observe the defendant and his co-defendant

going into the hotel after that?

Yes.

Were they carrying anything?

Yes.

recollection, they carried a backpack as well as numerous

bags and a blue plastic tote.

Would it be fair to say that Mr. Farrington's hair is a

And before we talk about that further, the other

Now, the -- once the car got back to the Super 8

They carried -- referring to my report for

Did the defendants leave the Super 8 Motel that evening,

65a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

on October 1?

left Burlington at approximately 6 p.m.

And when did it come back to the Super 8 Motel?

At approximately 2:42 p.m. on October 2.

And same as before, would it be fair to say that there

were numerous short-in-duration stops throughout that time

period?

Yes.

Okay.

car on October 2, 2019?

Yes.

Would it be fair to say that from 2:43 a.m. until

approximately 6:10 p.m. on October 2, that that car stayed

at the motel?

It appeared to, yes, from GPS analysis.

And did you see the car leave the Super 8 Motel on

October 2?

Yes.

Who was driving?

Shaun Farrington.

The same Shaun Farrington you'd seen throughout the

couple days before that?

Yes.

How far away were you from Mr. Farrington,

Yes, referring to my -- the GPS analysis, the vehicle

Did you again perform visual surveillance on that

Would that be fair to say?

66a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

approximately?

lot, the casino parking lot, watching.

in on people getting in and out of the car?

Yes, I had binoculars I was using.

And nothing obstructed your view of the defendant

getting in and out of the car in the driver's seat?

No.

Did the defendants, either one of them, place anything

into the car before they left?

evening, they were carrying several bags and put them in the

back seat in the trunk area.

Motel?

Yes.

And what were you able to confirm about the defendant's

driver's license status, if anything?

that Farrington had a suspended driver's license in Iowa.

the State of Iowa?

Yes.

What did you do with that information?

Two to three hundred feet, maybe?

I was in the parking

Did you have any binoculars that kind of helped you zoom

Yes.

Okay.

When they left, exited the hotel on October 2 that

Did you follow the car once it left the Super 8

On October 1 when I requested it from dispatch, I found

Which would make it illegal for him to drive a car in

67a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

I contacted Sergeant David Wall.

And what was the purpose of contacting him?

To advise him that Shaun Farrington with a suspended

driver's license was driving a car.

and drove westbound on Highway 34 towards Mt. Pleasant.

squad car?

No.

Were you working in an undercover capacity?

Yes.

Was Sergeant Wall driving a marked Henry County

sheriff's office car?

Yes.

Wearing a full uniform?

Yes.

Did you ask him to make the traffic stop as a marked

officer?

Yes.

And is that what happened?

Yes.

Now, the course of the, I guess, stop at the scene, were

you there for any of that?

At the scene?

Yes.

No, I was not.

And let me ask you this.

68a

They left the casino

Were you driving a marked

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

So Sergeant Wall would be the best person to testify as

to interactions with the defendant at the scene?

Yes.

Okay.

that car, and the car was also towed back to the Henry

County sheriff's office.

Yes.

And there were some lockboxes that were seized from the

car?

Yes.

Okay.

it back to the Henry County sheriff's office?

the -- our narcotics K-9, Bree, sniffed each container.

And did the dog alert to the containers?

Yes.

What happened after that?

Then I applied for a State search warrant to open the

containers.

traffic stop on the car was initiated, when Sergeant Wall

pulled that car over?

I believe it was approximately 6:46 p.m.

And are you familiar with the dispatch records for this

incident?

Now, as you know, some items were seized from

Is that correct?

What happened with those lockboxes when they made

They were placed in our back evidence shed and then

Investigator Bell, do you recall approximately when the

69a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

Our call for service?

Yes.

Sorry.

Sergeant Wall was officially cleared from that call or, you

know, told he could go do something else?

the exact time without the call for service in front of me,

and I don't believe I have it.

you applied for, received the search warrant during that

time frame?

Yes.

And the locked containers would have been searched in

that time frame?

Yes.

Now, the defendant, what happened to him after the

traffic stop?

and transported to the sheriff's office.

And was he booked into the Henry County Jail?

Yes.

Did he remain in jail that entire evening?

Yes.

In fact, did he remain in the custody of the Henry

What do those records tell us about when

I believe it was close to 10 p.m., but I don't remember

So even if we assume 10:00, would it be fair to say that

He was placed under arrest for driving under suspension

70a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

County Jail until we indicted him as part of this case?

I believe so, yes.

I'm gonna show you -- would you recognize a booking

photo of the defendant that night if I were to show it to

you?

Yeah.

Investigator Bell, I've handed you what's been marked as

proposed Government's Exhibit 2 for identification.

are we looking at there?

facility.

defendant from October 2, 2019?

It is a booking photo of Shaun Farrington at our old

Is that a fair and accurate booking photo of the

I believe so, yes.

MR. COPLEY:

What

Your Honor, I'd offer proposed

Government's Exhibit 2.

THE COURT:

MS. ARAGUAS:

THE COURT:

Any objection?

No objection, your Honor.

2 is received.

BY MR. COPLEY:

admitted as Government's Exhibit 1 and put it next to

Government's Exhibit 2.

appears to be a little more prevalent in Government's

Exhibit 1, would you say these two photos look similar, to

Investigator Bell, I've handed you what's already been

Outside of some facial hair that

71a

JESSE BELL - DIRECT

you?

Yes.

Looking at either one of those photos, are you able to

identify Shaun Farrington?

Yes.

Now, as part of this investigation, did you ever

interview Stephanie Richardson or the registered owner of

that Ford Fusion?

Emily Richardson.

Yes, I did.

When did you interview her?

October 25, 2019.

Now, in the defendant's response to -- or, Defendant's

reply brief in support of their motion to suppress, on one

of the pages there the defendant states that Ms. Richardson

stated she rented the silver Ford Fusion to Ms. Goodwin for

$500 a week.

2019?

No.

On page 6 of that filing, the defendant states that

subsequent interviews of Richardson, the vehicle owner,

elicited a description of a rental agreement entered into

between Richardson and Goodwin for Goodwin's use of the car.

Again, did you know that information on October 2, 2019?

My apologies.

Did you know that information on October 2,

72a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

No.

So the information about this rental agreement, that was

obtained on October 25, 2019, as you stated, correct?

Yes.

MR. COPLEY:

I have no further

questions for this witness, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Who is gonna examine this witness for

Mr. Farrington?

MS. ARAGUAS:

I will, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Okay.

You can proceed.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MS. ARAGUAS:

Good morning, Deputy Bell.

Hello.

I'd like to start by asking you about -- some specifics

about your identification of Mr. Farrington.

through how exactly you went from September 30 of 2019 not

knowing who he was until October 2 and having a name to put

with his face.

or her boyfriend at the time.

again and so then I started trying to think who may be in

the vehicle, and since one of the locations the GPS analysis

showed that it stopped near his residence, what I believed

was his residence, I thought that it might be him, as I had

So take me

So September 30 I found that it was not Emily Richardson

73a

October 1 discovered that

JESSE BELL - CROSS

information that he was also trafficking narcotics.

several stops using her vehicle, allegedly, to distribute

methamphetamine, right, prior to Mr. Farrington's arrest?

Yes.

And did you check on the -- any white males that may

have been at any of those residences or did you have some

information that allowed you to hone in on Mr. Farrington?

Mr. Farrington was on September 26, the GPS had went to his

residence and then I believe it went there a couple times

that day and then again, which led me to believe right then

on the 30th and the 1st and the 2nd that it -- or, I guess,

the time the 1st, that it may be him driving.

that he was the resident -- a resident of that address?

No.

So you were -- you'd received word from another law

enforcement agency?

and then also when I got his driver's license information on

the 1st, it showed that it was that trailer court, I

believe, that was on his license.

was that the only one where you checked to see who lives

And you mentioned that Ms. Richardson herself had made

I did not.

The only information that I used to check on

Did you have lease information or a deed that would show

Yes, that that was his -- likely where he was staying,

And just to be clear, of all of Ms. Richardson's stops,

74a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

there and could this person that I'm seeing be the person

that lives at this residence?

to September 30, but on September -- or, on September 30,

October 1, he is the only one that I checked on right

then.

Mr. Farrington at the Super 8 Motel, can you describe for us

what type of vehicle were you in?

undercover, but did this vehicle have a camera mounted, like

a squad camera inside of it?

No.

Okay.

No.

Did you use any video recording devices to record

Ms. Goodwin or Mr. Farrington as they went in and out of the

Super 8 Motel?

digital camera.

Attorney's office?

I believe they were.

Did you obtain any records or any surveillance footage

from the Super 8?

I don't recall exactly what I looked into on her prior

Thank you.

When you were surveilling Ms. Goodwin and

I understand you were

It was an unmarked truck.

Did you have your body cam with you?

On October 1, one of the days I took pictures with a

Okay.

And have those pictures been provided to the U.S.

I'd have to double-check.

No.

75a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

Did you see Ms. Goodwin conduct a drug transaction with

a man known by a street name as Action Jackson at the Super

Can I refer to my surveillance notes?

Yes, but could you please clarify what you're looking at

when you are looking?

observe -- at the time I didn't know it was her, but then I

subsequently determined it was her, meet with a black male

subject at the vehicle, and I don't know who the subject

was.

methamphetamine from that black male subject?

male, yes.

date.

that you might have witnessed at the Super 8 with that other

male.

black male.

Ms. Richardson, the owner of the vehicle.

first interview with her ever in your work with the task

force?

So on my surveillance notes dated on September 30, I did

Did you come to understand that she was procuring

I did learn that she was obtaining meth from a black

Again, I don't remember who that was on that

And Mr. Farrington played no part in the transaction

Is that correct?

Correct.

Okay.

It appeared it was just the female and the

You stated that in June of 2019 you interviewed

76a

Was that your

JESSE BELL - CROSS

I did not speak to her in June.

Which officer did?

I believe it was Sheriff McNamee.

Do you know where that interview took place?

I believe it was at the residence in New London, 302

East Jefferson.

the sheriff of Henry County?

Yes.

Do you know if he recorded that interview with Ms.

Richardson?

I do not.

Do you know if the sheriff typically wears a body cam

for recording video in the field?

I do not believe he wears a body cam.

Do you know if it's usually his practice to have any

type of recording device when he's in the field?

That I do not know.

You've mentioned an awareness that Mr. Farrington was

part of meth distribution.

was a meth user himself?

That I did not, I don't believe.

Okay.

part of meth distribution and not simply small-scale

consumption?

And I didn't catch the sheriff's last name, but is that

Do you know that Mr. Farrington

What was the basis for your awareness that he was

77a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

His name had surfaced in drug investigations that I was

made aware of.

Can you be more specific?

One specific one was the Facebook messages that I

received with another subject where he was asking the

subject to deliver to him.

Manning?

Yes.

And is there just one conversation between the two of

them from September 1 of 2019 that you're referring to?

sorry.

conversation between the two of them on Facebook messenger

that you are referring to?

In that specific instance, yes.

And in that conversation, neither of them uses any

specific words for drugs.

Just the quantities.

Okay.

There's some relation.

relation is, off the top of my head.

Farrington's detention and subsequent arrest?

I believe so, yes.

And it's sort of my understanding from reviewing the

And that subject -- is that subject named Katie

I'll ask an easier question.

I'm

Is it just one

Is that correct?

Is Ms. Manning Stephanie Goodwin's sister?

I don't recall exactly what the

Did Sergeant Wall call you from the scene of Mr.

78a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

discovery that we have in this case that you were sort of

the manager of this entire investigation.

fair characterization of the hierarchy here?

The case agent of the drug investigation, yes.

I'd like to ask you some questions about the seizure of

the locked containers from the vehicle Mr. Farrington was

driving.

placed is at the sheriff's department.

grounds there?

our old facility.

facility there was our main sheriff's office building, the

office and the jail, and in the back there's a driveway with

a large shed and that's our -- was our evidence shed and

garage area, and that's where the containers were taken from

the scene to there.

type of other evidence processed in this shed?

you drive in and that's a big area, and then there's a wall

with two doors that are locked and that's where the actual

evidence shed is that only certain people have access to or

did at that time.

on the locked containers in that shed?

Yes.

Would that be a

You said the shed where these containers were

Is it on your main

So just to be clear, in October of 2019 we were at

We've since moved, but at the old

And you described this as an evidence shed.

Was all

In the evidence -- so there's a big garage door where

Were you the officer in charge of performing the sniff

79a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

No.

Who was?

Sergeant Wall.

Okay.

shed?

Yes.

Did either you or Sergeant Wall have your body cameras

on or any other type of recording device going when that

sniff took place?

I did not.

Is there a camera in that shed or was there in that

evidence shed?

No.

Did you create any reports beyond, the affidavit that

you filed to get the search warrant, about the sniff that

took place in the shed?

what was located afterwards.

Ms. Goodwin was not, correct?

Correct.

And who made that call not to arrest Ms. Goodwin that

evening?

arrest her.

No.

So the same dog performed the sniff in that

It just would have been my traffic stop report from

Okay.

So Mr. Farrington was arrested on October 2, but

I don't recall exactly who determined to arrest or not

80a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

And she was interviewed that evening by law

enforcement?

Yes.

And is it true that the county attorney was called in to

give her some disclaimers about, you know, not promising

anything during that interview?

time.

And did the interview take place inside the jail?

It's -- at our old facility, it's a small facility, so

the interview room is also like our booking room and OWI

processing room, and that's where it was taking place.

The assistant county attorney was present at that

What type of recording was taken of that interview?

MR. COPLEY:

Your Honor, I'm going to object at

this point to relevance only because that interview took

place after the traffic stop so anything that happened after

that has no bearing on whether or not officers had probable

cause to arrest her.

prep of trial at this point.

THE COURT:

This seems like cross-examination in

It does sound like that to me, Ms.

Araguas.

not a discovery deposition, so what's the relevance of this

line of questioning?

This is focused on suppression issues.

MS. ARAGUAS:

This is

Your Honor, there are a lot of

questions remaining, and there appears to be a lot of

81a

JESSE BELL - CROSS

missing pieces of discovery here.

statements that evening that could be relevant to the stop.

It could be relevant to what was contained in the vehicle,

her relationship with Mr. Farrington.

the defense that there seems to be no recording of this even

though it took place at the jail and the county attorney's

office participated.

recording.

It's concerning to

We'd simply like to know if there is a

THE COURT:

MS. ARAGUAS:

Ms. Goodwin made

You simply want to know what?

If there was a recording taken and

who was present for this interview.

THE COURT:

Well, this is not discovery.

This is

a suppression hearing, so let's focus on those issues, so

I'll give you some leeway, but keep that in mind, please.

MS. ARAGUAS:

Thank you.

Would the Court allow me

to simply ask if there was a recording taken of that

interview?

THE COURT:

You can go ahead and ask your next

question.

MS. ARAGUAS:

Thank you.

BY MS. ARAGUAS:

night?

I don't believe so.

Had you ever interviewed Ms. Goodwin prior to the arrest

Was there a recording taken of the interview that

82a

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

on October 2?

I don't believe so.

Had you ever interviewed or came in contact with Mr.

Farrington prior to his arrest on October 2 of 2019?

I don't believe so.

MS. ARAGUAS:

I don't have any other questions for

this witness, your Honor.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr. Copley, anything further?

MR. COPLEY:

Nothing based off that.

THE COURT:

Okay.

wishes.

Thank you.

Deputy, you're excused.

Good luck.

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

Call your next witness.

MR. COPLEY:

Yes, your Honor.

Thanks.

The Government

calls David Wall.

THE COURT:

Ms. Araguas, are you going to do

cross-examination on this witness or will Mr. Paul?

MS. ARAGUAS:

Mr. Paul will, with the Court's

permission.

THE COURT:

Step forward, sir.

you'll take your oath from our clerk.

Best

Yes.

Before you take your seat,

DAVID WALL, WITNESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, SWORN

83a

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. COPLEY:

record.

David Wall.

What is your occupation, sir?

Sheriff's deputy with the Henry County sheriff's

office.

Say that again?

Sheriff's department with the Henry County sheriff's

office.

sheriff's office?

Since 2017.

What did you do prior to working with the Henry County

sheriff's office?

I was a police officer for the city of Fairfield.

And what is your primary assignment as a deputy with the

Henry County sheriff's office?

I'm the K-9 handler and the sergeant.

What shift do you typically work?

An evening shift typically.

Okay.

wearing here in court today?

Good morning, sir.

Please state your name again for the

How long have you been a deputy with the Henry County

The hours vary.

And do you typically wear the same uniform you're

Similar.

It's my -- one is a little bit more lax.

84a

It's

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

not as fancy as this one.

issued to deputies with the Henry County sheriff's office

when you're working?

Yes, sir.

Do you typically drive a marked squad car?

Yes, I do.

And what's your dog's name?

Uno.

And is Uno typically with you when you're working?

Yes.

Were you working as a deputy with the Henry County

Sheriff's office on October 2 of 2019?

Yes, I was.

And in the early evening hours of that day or that

shift, I guess, were you asked to make a traffic stop on a

silver Ford Fusion?

Yes.

And what was the reasoning for the traffic stop?

That the driver of the vehicle was operating the vehicle

with a suspended driver's license.

And was it Investigator Bell who informed you of that?

Yes, it was.

Did you also confirm that prior to making the traffic

stop?

Okay.

This is the court uniform.

But you're typically wearing a standard uniform

85a

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

Yes, I did.

Did you confirm the identity of the person driving the

car prior to making the traffic stop?

Yes, I did.

What information were you given to help you make that

determination?

was Shaun Farrington, and I also looked up the driver's

license photo through the State of Iowa that he had.

today?

Yes.

Sergeant Wall, I've handed you what's been admitted as

Government's Exhibit 1.

that you looked up to try and figure out who the driver of

the car was?

Yes, it was.

Okay.

driving the car?

would be the driver's side of the vehicle, perpendicular

with it, and I looked over at the driver, who turned his

head and looked right directly at me.

got a full --

Investigator Bell had informed me that the driver's name

Would you recognize that photo if I showed it to you

Is that the photo that you were --

And how did you confirm that the defendant was

We were on a four-lane highway, and I pulled up to what

So literally, the driver turned like this to you and you

86a

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

Yes, sir.

Anything obstructing your view, tinted windows, anything

like that?

No, there wasn't.

And the driver of that car and the person in that

photograph, Government's Exhibit 1, do you see that person

in this courtroom?

Yes, I do.

Can you identify them by an article of clothing that

they're wearing?

An orange shirt.

MR. COPLEY:

Your Honor, I'd ask that the record

reflect this witness has identified the defendant, Shaun

Farrington.

THE COURT:

It will reflect.

So with the information in mind that this defendant was

driving with a suspended license, what did you do?

I initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle.

Okay.

And did you --

THE COURT:

Can I interject a question --

MR. COPLEY:

Sorry.

THE COURT:

-- so that I'm straight for the

record?

Deputy, while you said you pulled up perpendicular

to the car --

87a

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

THE WITNESS:

THE COURT:

sense.

you were on a highway.

MR. COPLEY:

Parallel.

Okay.

That makes more

I don't know if it would be possible to do that if

All right.

Thank you.

At least not safely.

BY MR. COPLEY:

Did you make contact with the driver of the car?

Yes, I did.

Was there anyone else in the car?

There was a female in the passenger seat.

Did you identify her?

Yes, I did.

And what was her name, if you recall?

Goodwin?

Stephanie Goodwin.

him the reason for the stop?

Yes, I did.

Did the defendant deny that he was Shaun Farrington?

No.

Did he act surprised that you were identifying him as

Shaun Farrington?

never openly said anything about it.

Was it Stephanie

I was gonna say, I remember the last name.

Yes, it was

When you made contact with the defendant, did you tell

His face seemed like he was kind of startled, but he

88a

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

Never gave you a fake name or anything like that?

No, he didn't.

Did the defendant have a valid driver's license?

No, he did not.

And at some point the decision was made to run your dog

around the car.

Yes.

And why did you do that?

Um, Investigator Bell and I had -- I knew he had been

working an investigation on this vehicle for narcotics

trafficking.

raised your suspicions a little bit that something else

might be going on here?

Yes, there was.

Okay.

There was multiple cellphones in the vehicle.

torch lighters in the center console, cup holder area.

There was also a camera mounted to the rear-view mirror of

the vehicle.

of the car?

went both ways or if it just went one way.

with the camera, but you could tell it was a video camera

Is that correct?

Was there anything plain view in the car that kind of

There was also other indicators.

Tell us about those.

There was

So it would have been recording what was going on inside

I never really noticed which way it was going, if it

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I never messed

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

mounted to the rear-view mirror.

officer, have you had opportunities to investigate drug

cases?

Yes.

Specifically methamphetamine cases?

Yes.

What about a torch-style lighter is significant for

purposes of methamphetamine?

It's commonly used to smoke with.

And is it common, based on your training and experience,

for individuals involved in drug trafficking to have

multiple cellphones?

Yes.

Okay.

with you at that time?

Yes, he was.

Approximately are we talking just a couple of minutes?

Hours?

defendant at the driver's door did you say hey, I'm gonna

run my dog around the car?

Minute, minute and a half.

Tops?

Yeah.

It wasn't very long.

Okay.

And tell us about Uno.

Sergeant Wall, in your time as a law enforcement

Now, you told us your dog's name is Uno.

Uno was

How long after you first made contact with the

How long was that?

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Is it a he or a she?

DAVID WALL - DIRECT

It's a he.

What are his certifications for drug detection?

He is certified to find the odor of methamphetamine,

heroin, Ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana.

Did you train with Uno?

Yes.

Where did you guys get certified from?

We were certified in 2013 through Mid Michigan

Kennels.

certifications or training that you guys have to do as part

of that?

organization that certifies us.

Uno to this date?

Yes, sir.

Including back on October 2, 2019?

Yes.

So if Uno alerts on a car, what sort of behaviors does

he display?

when he makes his final indication.

explain it.

Okay.

And I'm assuming there are some follow-up

Yes, sir.

Okay.

Yearly we go through an outside independent

And have you maintained those certifications with

He's what they would call a passive alert, so he sits

That's the best way to

And you said you and Uno were certified in 2013?

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DAVID WALL - DIRECT

Yes.

K-9 unit.

of free air sniffs around cars before October 2?

Yes, hundreds.

Did Uno alert in this case?

Yes, he did.

And where did Uno alert?

He alerted on the driver's side rear door.

And with that alert in mind, did you inform the

defendants that you were going to search the car?

Yes, I did.

Did the defendant's behavior change after you told him

you were going to search the car?

Yes.

And tell us what changed.

Just seemed a a little bit more agitated, is all.

Did he say anything about the car?

Said the car did not belong to him.

Was that prompted to him?

No.

So he just kind of blurted out, car doesn't belong to

me?

Yes.

Okay.

That's when we first initially got teamed up as a

Would it be fair to say that you and Uno had done a lot

During the search of the car -- that was on the

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DAVID WALL - DIRECT

side of the road?

Yes.

You said this is a four-lane highway?

It was on Highway 218.

Dark at that time?

It was starting to become dark.

Is that a fairly busy highway in your area of town?

It can be.

Okay.

it, preliminary search of the car?

out that were found, there was an actually unused meth pipe

in the passenger's purse and then as you got to the trunk of

the vehicle is where most of the items that were found -- do

you want me to list off everything?

Yeah.

In the trunk there was -- first thing that stuck out was

a scale.

also multiple individual baggies and then locked

containers.

relates to drug trafficking?

buying it or selling it.

Yes.

What did you find during the, I guess I'll call

Um, as we were searching the vehicle, things that stuck

Okay.

Why don't you go ahead.

There was a large red scale and then there was

What's the relevance of a digital scale as it

They use it to weigh out their product when they're

And what about the baggies?

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DAVID WALL - DIRECT

That's what they're packaged in and used to split up

large amounts.

These lockboxes, how big were they?

Um, they varied in size, but they were all roughly about

six inches by six inches, maybe 6 by 12.

Did you ask the defendants about the lockboxes?

Yes, I asked both of them.

What did they say?

Denied having any knowledge or possession of them.

Was there any way for you to get into those lockboxes on

the side of the road?

Absolutely not.

And why is that?

They were locked.

Locked with, like, a passcode-type thing?

Yeah.

kind of combo lock codes.

a way of getting into those lockboxes on the side of the

road, would you have done that?

Yes.

Okay.

investigator Bell about the car and the lockboxes?

Yes.

And what decision was made after talking with him?

They were all locked like number, like bicycle

Certainly if the defendants provided a means or you had

At some point did you have a conversation with

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DAVID WALL - DIRECT

To seize those boxes.

And where did you take them?

To the sheriff's office.

And did you run Uno around the lockboxes again at the

police station?

Yes, I did.

And what did Uno do?

He alerted to all four boxes.

Is that something you've done in the past with Uno where

evidence has been taken out of a car and then you take it

back to the police station and run the dogs around it.

that something you've done before?

had him run around items, yes.

So that's not uncommon for you to do?

No.

Okay.

obtained for the lock cases?

Yes.

And would it be fair to say that there was a fairly

substantial amount of methamphetamine found in those lock

cases?

Yes, there was.

Now, where were the lock cases -- and I think you

mentioned this, but where were they at in the car itself?

I've removed items from the vehicle and set them out and

And you said after that that a search warrant was

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DAVID WALL - CROSS

They were in bags, like, just, like, I guess,

brief-case-type-style bags.

area of the trunk?

All the baggage was in the trunk of the vehicle.

Would it be fair to say that that was the general area

of the vehicle that Uno alerted to?

the driver's side was actually down, folded down.

Were they in the front seat, back seat, trunk?

Yes, especially because the back seat of the vehicle on

Okay.

MR. COPLEY:

What

Thank you.

I have no further

questions for you.

THE COURT:

cross-examination?

MR. PAUL:

Mr. Paul, do you have

Yes, your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. PAUL:

Hello, Sergeant Wall.

Hi.

When did you become involved in this investigation?

When?

Yes.

I would probably have to say in the late stages of

Investigator Bell's investigation.

Could you give me an approximate date?

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DAVID WALL - CROSS

Maybe like a week or two weeks before the actual date of

the traffic stop he let me know that he was keeping eyes on

this vehicle, this certain vehicle.

investigation?

Yes, because he works -- he's our task force officer.

So when you said that you pulled over this vehicle

because the driver had a suspended driver's license, you

were aware at that time that this was a suspected

methamphetamine trafficking situation?

Yes.

And so that probably colored your interpretation of the

camera, the torch lighter, the cellphones?

most people usually do not have in their vehicle.

So it had no affect?

No.

Okay.

October 2?

call card.

look at the actual call card to give you the exact time.

And at what time did Uno alert?

Again, I don't know the exact time.

the call card.

He wasn't sure yet.

And you were aware that it was a narcotics

No, I wouldn't say that.

I mean, that's odd things that

What time did you initiate the traffic stop on

I can't tell you the exact time without looking at the

It was roughly, I believe, 6:00, 7.

97a

I'd have to

It's all logged on

DAVID WALL - CROSS

You said it was approximately a minute after, I believe,

Deputy Alplara -- am I getting that name right?

Alplara?

Yeah.

You're gonna have to rephrase your question.

understand what you're asking.

Was it about a minute after the other deputy appeared?

No.

the initial time of contact and speaking with everybody.

with you on October 2?

At what point in time?

What were all the manners he communicated with you?

He called me on the cellphone and then also through our

car radios.

So he didn't send you any text messages?

I don't believe so.

As you pulled alongside the Ford Fusion, what is the

driver wearing?

baseball-style cap, and then maybe a white shirt.

all I could see.

And you were driving in a truck, correct?

No.

Ford Explorer, so does that sit higher than the

Is that correct?

It was probably less than that.

I don't

I was saying from

How did Detective -- I'm sorry, Deputy Bell communicate

I remember he had a dark blue hat on, like just normal

A Ford Explorer.

That's

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DAVID WALL - CROSS

Fusion?

Yeah, a little bit.

So you're looking down.

would have probably obstructed your view.

No, it did not.

Okay.

interview Goodwin?

That was not until after all the items were located.

He called you and said, I'd like to interview

Ms. Goodwin?

the items we had found to let him know what was going on and

update him on everything, and that's when he said that,

yes.

And he told you not to arrest her?

At that time there was nothing to arrest her for.

But you did inform her -- you recall informing her that

she was not under arrest, that she was just going down to

the sheriff's office to be interviewed by the investigator,

correct?

Yes.

Did Deputy Bell communicate with you on that day because

he knew you were a K-9 officer?

It's possible, yes.

What time did you arrest Mr. Farrington?

He's got a hat on, so that

When did Bell inform you that he wanted to

Actually, I called him after the traffic stop and all

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DAVID WALL - CROSS

That would be in the call card as well, but it was after

everything had been located as we were finishing up.

you submitted to both the state and the state court?

No, I did not.

What time did you lead Uno around the locked

containers?

them.

Was it after the interview with Goodwin?

I didn't interview her, so I don't know what time the

interview actually took place.

Was Deputy Bell present?

When we ran around the containers?

Yes.

Yes, he was.

He was?

Yes.

Did you create any report regarding the dog sniff of the

locked containers?

It's in the call for service that we initiated.

How long between the dog sniff and the issuance of the

search warrant on the locked containers?

time.

Did you create any report other than the narrative that

Um, it was after we got to the sheriff's office with

I can give you a guess, but I don't know the exact

100a

DAVID WALL - CROSS

What's your guess?

Until when the search warrant was issued and granted?

Yep.

Two, maybe an hour and a half, two hours.

Okay.

methamphetamine pipe that you found in the car, correct?

It was in Ms. Goodwin's purse.

Did you cite -- you have no information whatsoever about

the interview with Ms. Goodwin?

No, I do not.

The trunk of that vehicle was pretty cluttered,

correct?

cluttered.

back, so that was about it.

was at least five bags, maybe more?

That sounds about right.

Lots of loose items?

Yeah.

When you -- you had a body camera on at the stop.

that correct?

Yes, I did.

Did you have that body camera turned on when you ran Uno

around the locked containers?

You mentioned that there was an unused

I mean, I guess it just depends on your definition of

I remember there was a laundry basket in the

So there was a laundry basket with laundry in it.

101a

There

I don't think I did.

You realized when you were running Uno around those

locked containers that was going to be used as justification

for a search and possibly a search warrant, correct?

Yes.

And you had your body camera still on you?

Yes.

And you didn't turn it on?

No.

I must not have thought about it.

MR. PAUL:

No further questions, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Copley?

MR. COPLEY:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

You can step down, Deputy.

You're excused.

Any other evidence from the Government?

MR. COPLEY:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Any evidence from Mr. Farrington?

MS. ARAGUAS:

Thank you.

Not aside from the legal argument

we've already submitted, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

Would you do me a favor

and now that the evidence has been presented, distill for me

the contentions you have in support of your motion to

suppress?

MS. ARAGUAS:

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

What I mean is specifically what it is

102a

you're alleging was improper or in violation of the 4th

Amendment.

MS. ARAGUAS:

Just to create a bookend for the

Court, we're asking the Court to suppress all evidence

contained in those locked containers.

some -- some squishiness in terms of how Mr. Farrington was

identified out of the grand scope of any white male in

Southeast Iowa on that date, that Terry and its progeny call

for objective and specific facts in order to identify

someone and detain them.

We still feel there's

As to the containers, we don't understand why law

enforcement would choose to put those in a squad car, then

bring them to a shed, then have an unrecorded second dog

sniff.

exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless search and

not the correct way to process that and it was a violation

of our client's rights in the Fourth Amendment

THE COURT:

It didn't fit in with any of the well-defined

What is the proper way to process

that?

MS. ARAGUAS:

Well, your Honor, the officer could

have left the locked containers in the vehicle for a later

inventory search.

warrant at the scene, but placing them in the squad car and

then we sort of lose sight of them and how they were

processed at that point, putting them in an evidence locker

The officer could have sought out a

103a

was not the appropriate way to deal with that.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Copley, anything further?

MR. COPLEY:

No, your Honor.

I do believe my

supplemental resistance will address those concerns, and

I'll just leave my argument to that.

THE COURT:

Okay.

That will be filed by the end

of business today and then Mr. Farrington has an opportunity

to file a response by the end of business on November 12,

correct?

MS. ARAGUAS:

November 12.

Thursday, I believe, is

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Yes.

All right.

Thank you for confirming

that.

Anything further, Mr. Copley?

MR. COPLEY:

Yes, your Honor.

Just briefly.

I've

never had a motion to suppress before, so I know you do a

report and recommendation to Judge Jarvey.

is trial in this matter is scheduled for November 30, so I

just -- I don't know your time frame and I don't want to put

any pressure on you.

able to get that done before that in terms of just trial

prep for both sides.

THE COURT:

My only question

I just don't know if you felt you'd be

The parties are going to have to

address the trial date.

Obviously you have 14 days to

104a

object to my ruling and, you know, I've gotta have some time

to get my ruling done, so if you're not gonna be ready for

the 30th or you're concerned about that, we are on a tight

time frame to get it done before then even without an

objection and then, if there is an objection, for Judge

Jarvey to rule on that objection.

Defendant's gonna file something by Thursday, the 12th, that

gives little time, so if you want to talk about that with

each other and file an appropriate motion in that regard, we

can take that up too.

MR. COPLEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Was there a question you had as well,

If you're gonna file --

Ms. Araguas?

MS. ARAGUAS:

Yes.

I feel bad we're on a time

crunch and it's a holiday and time crunch with the COVID,

but that was a concern for the defense.

THE COURT:

Just to lay it out there so both of

you know, I need to see what's filed today.

I need to see

what's filed Thursday.

to provide a report and recommendation that includes factual

findings.

a little bit lengthier than you might receive because it

needs to be considered by the District Judge.

14 days to object to that, just as you would any other

report and recommendation.

I need to distill that, and I need

That's part of the process, so that can often be

105a

Then you have

If there's an objection, there needs to be

specific basis stated for it and in particular the

particular findings that you dispute so then that would go

to the District Judge who would need some time to do that,

so we're probably not in a good situation to have all that

done within the next period of time for a November 30 trial

date, but that's also for your information so you understand

the process too.

MR. COPLEY:

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Copley?

MR. COPLEY:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Ms. Araguas?

MS. ARAGUAS:

THE COURT:

(Wherein the hearing concluded at 12:14 p.m.)

Thank you.

Not for the defendant, your Honor.

We're adjourned.

106a

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

I, Debra Thornburg, a Certified Shorthand Reporter of

the State of Iowa and Federal Official Realtime Court

Reporter in and for the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Iowa, do hereby certify, pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, that the

foregoing is a correct transcript of the stenographically

reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and

that the transcript page format is in conformity with the

regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

/s/ Debra M. Thornburg

Debra M. Thornburg

Official Court Reporter

United States District Court

Southern District of Iowa

Date:

107a

February 4, 2021

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA

EASTERN DIVISION

- - - - - - - - - - - - - X

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

Plaintiff,

vs.

SHAUN MICHAEL FARRINGTON, :

Defendant.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - X

Case No. 3:20-cr-06

TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL

Volume 1

Courtroom 242, Second Floor

U.S. Courthouse

131 East Fourth Street

Davenport, Iowa

Wednesday, February 10, 2021

8:32 a.m.

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE JOHN A. JARVEY, Chief Judge

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

TORRIE SCHNEIDER, ESQ.

CALEB COPLEY, ESQ.

United States Attorney's Office

U.S. Courthouse

131 East Fourth Street, Suite 310

Davenport, Iowa 52801

For the Defendant:

ELIZABETH ARAGUAS, ESQ.

CHARLES D. PAUL, ESQ.

Nidey, Erdahl, Meier & Araguas, PLC

425 Second Street SE, Suite 1000

Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401

TONYA R. GERKE, CSR, RDR, CRR

United States Courthouse

123 East Walnut Street, Room 197

Des Moines, Iowa 50309

108a

(Jury selection is contained in a separate volume.)

(Proceedings reconvened outside the presence of the

jury.)

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

So the juror in question, Ms. Wolfswinkel,

is coming up, and the record can reflect that we're outside the

presence of the other jurors.

counsel are.

The defendant is present, and all

(Juror Wolfswinkel entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT:

Good morning.

Come on forward.

Maybe if

you'd just have a seat in the jury box, that would be great.

You are Ms. Wolfswinkel?

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

I'm Judge Jarvey.

Have a seat.

course, I wasn't here for jury selection.

I'm going to preside

over the trial.

Monday jury selection, and I recall from that transcript that

you recognized a name was familiar to you, but you didn't

remember why.

I did have a chance to read a transcript of the

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

Yes.

And that you sent us an e-mail later -Yes.

-- saying that you had gone back, looked

at your e-mails and that you recognized the name further.

you tell us a little bit more about that?

109a

Would

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

Yes.

So in my prior residence, I

lived in a condo association, and where I lived, there was a lot

of drug activity in the parking lot which kind of led me to move

from that residence.

THE COURT:

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

Use that microphone if you would.

Sorry.

That's all right.

And I got to the point where I was

calling the police department often just with license plates and

what I was seeing, and so they came and talked to me a time or

two, and eventually Officer Bunch just gave me his work e-mail

so I could just send e-mails with what I was seeing, so probably

once or twice a week I was sending him e-mails just of license

plates and activity that I was seeing in the parking lot.

THE COURT:

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

How long ago was this?

about three years ago.

THE COURT:

sending the e-mails?

And for what period of time were you

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

I moved from that residence just

Probably nine months'ish.

Did you meet with him in person?

I met with an officer in person,

but I don't remember if I met with him in person.

THE COURT:

Thanks.

And after that have you seen him

or talked to him or heard about him since then?

110a

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

I have not.

THE COURT:

Good.

Yeah.

Is there anything about

those experiences that causes you any concern in your own mind

about your ability to be fair to both sides in this case?

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

No, sir.

Are you willing to wait and listen to

Officer Bunch's testimony before deciding whether you believe

it?

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Are there additional questions that

you wanted me to ask?

MS. ARAGUAS:

Good.

Just briefly, Your Honor.

We just

wondered if -- just to be clear, that Ms. Wolfswinkel had never

served as a witness in any prosecutions from her calls or

anything like that.

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

I have not.

Anything else?

Anything from the

Government?

MR. COPLEY:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you very much, ma'am.

Appreciate

it.

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

JUROR WOLFSWINKEL:

THE COURT:

Yes, very much.

Appreciate the additional information.

Absolutely.

You can take her back.

111a

(Juror Wolfswinkel exited the courtroom.)

THE COURT:

any motion from the defendant?

MS. ARAGUAS:

strike Ms. Wolfswinkel as a juror.

procedurally allowed, but if there was a way to make her the

alternate, we would be open to that as well instead of

Mr. Steinhauer I believe is our alternate.

She's gone.

Your Honor, we would renew our motion to

THE COURT:

in order to have her excused?

I'm also not sure if this is

And so what do you think you need to show

MS. ARAGUAS:

In light of that, is there

Well, we believe that she, because she

was calling in drug tips, is going to have prejudice against our

client and maybe prejudice against -- she clearly had to move

from her residence because of her perception of drug activity,

was participating in drug investigation.

concerning for her and expensive and inconvenient for her to

have to move because of that, and we are concerned that she

unconsciously may have bias against people involved in the drug

trade.

THE COURT:

Mr. Copley?

MR. COPLEY:

I'm sure that was very

Thank you.

Your Honor, we would certainly resist.

This is now the second time that Ms. Wolfswinkel -- after

hearing it from Judge Jackson when asked about concerns about

serving on a drug case, she said no originally or did not put

112a

her hand up.

She has now had additional time to think about it,

reflect on the relationship with Officer Bunch, still has no

concerns.

very genuine, and she did not seem to even stutter or struggle

with the concept of serving on a drug case.

with those problems that spoke up.

she needed to be rehabilitated, we believe that has been done.

The relationship between her and Officer Bunch has been

concluded for at least three years.

able and willing to serve on this jury.

I would submit to the Court that her answers were

THE COURT:

We did have jurors

Certainly to any extent that

We believe she is perfectly

The standard in this situation is set

forth in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision of the

United States versus McCaw, M-c-C-a-w.

case referring to its decision in United States versus Tucker.

Under that standard, the motion to excuse the juror is denied.

All right.

It's a federal appendix

So we'll just stand at ease here until we

find out that the juror orientation is done, and then we'll

begin.

preliminary instructions, and we'll be ready to go.

We'll have the jurors' preliminary oath and the

Thank you.

MR. COPLEY:

(Recess at 8:38 a.m.)

(The jury entered the courtroom, and proceedings

Thank you, Your Honor.

reconvened at 8:50 a.m.)

THE COURT:

the jurors' oath.

So if the jurors will remain standing for

Everyone else can be seated.

113a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.