Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jose Efrain Vega, Petitioner v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

APPENDIX “A”

Case: 21-20621

Document: 00516378914

Page: 1

Date Filed: 07/01/2022

SJntteb States Court of appeals;

for tlje Jftftf) Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 1, 2022

No. 21-20621

Lyle W, Cayce

Clerk

Jose Efrain Vega,

Petitioner—Appellant,

versus

Bobby Lumpkin, Director^ Texas Department ofCriminal Justicey

Correctional Institutions Division,

Respondent—Appellee.

Application for Certificate of Appealability from the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4-.13-CV-2714

ORDER:

Jose Efrain Vega, Texas prisoner # 01296101, seeks a certificate of

appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 petition challenging his conviction of aggravated sexual assault of a

child. He raises two claims: (1) the district court erred in not considering new

evidence he presented which, he alleges, shows that could not have

committed the offense, and (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to raise an objection or request a hearing regarding outcry

witness testimony under Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure.

Case: 21-20621

Document: 00516378914

Page: 2

Date Filed: 07/01/2022

No. 21-20621

To obtain a COA, Vega must make “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). This standard is satisfied “by demonstrating that

jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller~El

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Vega has failed to make the required

showing.

Accordingly, his motion for a COA is DENIED.

Andrew S. Oldham

United States Circuit Judge

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APPENDIX “B”

United States District Court

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE EFRAIN VEGA,

TDCJ #1296101,

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Petitioner,

VS.

October 18, 2021

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-2714

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BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director,

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Texas Department of Criminal Justice - §

Correctional Institutions Division,

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Respondent.

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FINAL JUDGMENT

For reasons set out in the Court’s Memorandum and Order, this federal habeas

corpus proceeding is dismissed with prejudice.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this Final Judgment to the partiles.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on

i£~

.2021.

DAVID HITTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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V

United States District Court

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JOSE EFRAIN VEGA,

TDCJ #1296101,

Petitioner,

vs.

October 18, 2021

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

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CIVIL ACTION NO. PI-13-2714

BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, i

Texas Department of Criminal Justice - §

Correctional Institutions Division,

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Respondent.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

State inmate Jose Efrain Vega has filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a conviction from Harris County, Texas,

for aggravated sexual assault of a child. This federal habeas corpus proceeding was

dismissed previously for want of prosecution (Dkt. # 9) and reinstated in 2020 (Dkt.

# 36). The respondent has filed an answer to the petition (Dkt, # 53) and Vega has

filed more than one reply (Dkts. # 62, # 63, # 66). After considering all of the

pleadings, the state court records, and the applicable law, the petition will be denied

and this action will be dismissed for the reasons discussed below.

1 The Court substitutes Bobby Lumpkin, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice - Correctional Institutions Division, as the proper party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 25(d).

. v

I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A local grand jury returned an indictment against Vega in Harris County Case

No. 974863, charging him with aggravated sexual assault of a child, D.A., who was

Vega’s step-daughter. A jury in the 208th District Court of Harris County, Texas,

found Vega guilty as charged. See Dkt. #48-5, at 54. The trial court sentenced him

to serve 18 years’ imprisonment. Id.

Vega raised two grounds on direct appeal, arguing that: (1) he was denied

effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to raise proper

objections to hearsay testimony from three outcry witnesses; and (2) the trial court

erred by sustaining the State’s objection based on relevancy and denying defense

counsel the opportunity to question one of the outcry witnesses about her “bias or

interest.” See Dkt. # 48-1, at 4. The intermediate court of appeals rejected both

claims after summarizing the evidence presented at trial as follows:

When D.A. was approximately six years old, [Vega] touched

D.A.’s legs underneath her pajamas and “rubbed [his hand] against

[her] private part”[] [Vega] then took off D.A.’s pants and had sex

with her. D.A. began to cry, and [Vega] showed her a gun and

threatened to harm her and her mother. D.A. remained silent because

she was afraid that appellant would harm her mother. When D.A. was

approximately nine years old, [Vega] pulled D.A.’s pants off and

applied cream to her “private area” with his hand. D.A. did not report

this incident either because she was afraid of [Vega].

When she was nine years old, D.A. moved away from [Vega]

and her mother to live with her aunt, Mary Hernandez, for about a year.

When she was 11, D.A. moved again to live with her aunt, Bonita

Garcia, at which time she told Garcia that she had been raped by Alex,

her aunt Norma Castillo’s (“Norma”) boyfriend, not [Vega]. In

December 2003, when D.A. was 13 years old, she told her mother, Dora

Castillo (“Dora”), another aunt, Norma, and her grandmother,

Esperanza Arredondo, that she had been sexually assaulted. She

initially told them that “Alex” had raped her. When Arredondo took

D.A. into another room alone and instructed her to tell the truth, D.A.

admitted that [Vega] had assaulted her.

Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intention to use a childabuse victim’s hearsay statement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.

38.072 (Vernon 2005). The notice referenced three outcry witnesses:

“Dora Castillo, Norma Castillo, and Lisa Holcomb.” At trial, Dora,

Norma, and Arredondo testified regarding D.A.’s statement to them

about [Vega’s] having sexually assaulted her.

Vega v. State, No. 01-05-00358-CR, 2006 WL 407821, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Feb. 23, 2006, pet. refd) (footnote omitted). Specifically, the court of

appeals concluded that Vega failed to show that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel or that his defense counsel’s strategy was unreasonable and that Vega did

not preserve error for appeal with regard to his claim of error by the trial court. See

id., 2006 WL 407821, at *4-5.

Vega filed two state applications for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his

conviction under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Vega’s

first application was dismissed as premature because his direct appeal was still

pending when it was filed. See Dkt. #48-21, at 2. In his second state habeas

application, Vega raised three ineffective-assistance claims regarding his counsel’s

failure to properly object or challenge testimony given by the outcry witnesses at

trial. See Dkt. #48-27, at 13; Dkt. #48-27, at 43-55. Both of Vega’s defense

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attorneys submitted affidavits in response to these claims. See Dkt. # 47-27, at 74;

Dkt. # 48-27, at 77-78. The state habeas corpus court, which also presided over

Vega’s trial, entered detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending

that relief be denied. See Dkt. 48-27, at 81 -86. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

agreed and denied Vega’s application without a written order based on the trial

court’s findings on June 12, 2013. See Dkt. 48-27, at 2.

On September 4,2013, Vega executed the federal petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that is pending in this case. See Dkt. #1. Similar to

the claims that were rejected on state habeas corpus review, Vega alleges that he was

denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys failed to: (1) request

an Article 38.072 hearing to challenge the introduction of testimony from three

outcry witnesses; (2) object to outcry testimony from the victim’s grandmother,

Esperanza Arredondo; and (3) make an offer of proof for purposes of preserving

error regarding Arredondo’s bias or prejudice as a witness. See Dkt. # 1, at 6-7; Dkt.

#2, at 3-7.

Shortly after his federal habeas petition was filed, the Court dismissed this

action after correspondence was returned undeliverable, advising that Vega was no

longer in custody at the address he provided. See Dkts. # 8, # 9, # 10. Subsequently,

Vega submitted a letter explaining that he had been released on parole from TDCJ

and deported to Mexico. See Dkt. #16. Although the Court sent him a docket sheet

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in 2016, advising Vega that his case had been dismissed, he did not contact the Court

again or seek to reopen this case until 2017. See Dkt. #19.

After requesting briefing from Vega on whether he was entitled to relief from

the dismissal order, the Court reinstated his case to the active docket in 2020, and

requested an answer from the respondent after learning that Vega had returned to

state custody on a parole violation following his federal conviction for illegal reentry

into the United States.2 See Dkt. #39, at 2. The respondent has filed an answer,

arguing that Vega is not entitled to federal habeas relief because his claims are

without merit. See Dkt. #53, at 21-39. The respondent also objects to the Court’s

previous order, reinstating this case after such a long period of delay by the

petitioner. Id. at 7-16.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Vega’s ineffective-assistance claims were rejected by the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals, which adopted written findings and conclusions of law made by

the trial court on state habeas corpus review. Claims that have been adjudicated on

the merits in state court are subject to the legal standard found in the Antiterrorism

2 Court records reflect that Vega (fonner BOP #80083-379) was convicted of the illegalreentry charges, which were filed against him in 2014, and sentenced to 46 months in

federal prison in a judgment entered on June 8, 2015. See United States v. Jose Efrain

Vega-Vega, Crim. No. 5:15-cr-35 (S.D. Tex.). His appeal from that judgment was

dismissed as frivolous in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Vega-Vega, No. 1540770 (5th Cir. Feb. 17 2016). Public records indicate that Vega was released from the

Bureau of Prisons and returned to TDCJ to continue serving his state prison sentence

sometime in 2018.

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and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this

standard, a federal habeas corpus court may not grant relief unless the state court’s

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that the AEDPA imposes a “highly

deferential standard” which “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit

of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (cleaned up). A federal

habeas corpus court “must defer to reasonable state-court decisions.” Dunn v.

Reeves, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (2021) (per curiam). To qualify as

“unreasonable” a state court’s conclusion “must be objectively unreasonable, not

merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312,

316 (2015) (citation omitted). This high bar is satisfied only where the petitioner

shows that “the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended

in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

A state court’s factual determinations are also entitled to deference on federal

habeas corpus review. Findings of fact are “presumed to be correct” unless the

petitioner rebuts those findings with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254(e)(1). Where a claim presents a question of fact, a petitioner cannot obtain

federal habeas relief unless he shows that the state court’s denial of relief “was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A federal habeas corpus court

“may not characterize these state-court factual determinations as unreasonable

‘merely because [it] would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.5”

Brumfield v. Cam, 576 U.S. 305, 313-14 (2015) (quoting Woodv. Allen, 558 U.S.

290, 301 (2010)). “Instead, § 2254(d)(2) requires that [a federal court] accord the

state trial court substantial deference.” Id.

in.

DISCUSSION

The record confirms that the state habeas corpus court rejected Vega’s claims

after entering findings of fact and concluding that he was not denied effective

assistance of counsel under the well-established standard found in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Dkt. MS-27, at 84. To prevail under the

Strickland standard, a criminal defendant “must show: (1) ‘that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) that the

deficiency was ‘prejudicial to the defense.5” Hughes v. Vannoy, 7 F.4th 380, 387

(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anaya v. Lumpkin, 976 F.3d 545, 550-51 (5th Cir. 2020)

and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692).

Review of counsel’s performance is a “highly deferential” inquiry in which

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“counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance” and that the

challenged conduct was the product of reasoned trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 690. “This analysis is ‘doubly deferential5 when, as here, a state court has decided

that counsel performed adequately.” Dunn, 141 S. Ct. at 2410 (citations omitted).

Specifically, a federal court considering an ineffective-assistance claim under the

AEDPA standard of review “may grant relief only if every fairminded jurist would

agree that every reasonable lawyer would have made a different decision.” Id, at

2411 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).

A.

Failure to Object or Request a Hearing (Claims 1 and 3)

In two related claims, Vega contends that his defense counsel was deficient

for failing to raise an objection or request a hearing under Article 38.072 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth procedures for presenting testimony

about a child sexual assault victim’s outcry statement. See Dkt. # 2, at 3, 5-6.

Specifically, Article 38.072 requires that: (1) the State give.notice of the intent to

offer an outcry statement before trial; (2) the defendant is notified of the identity of

the outcry witness and given a written summary of the outcry witness’ testimony;

(3) the trial court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that

the outcry statement is reliable based on the time, content, and circumstances of the

statement; and (4) the child testifies or is made available to testify. See Tex. Code.

Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 38.072, § 2(b).

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At trial, the State presented testimony from the victim, D.A., who described

how Vega sexually assaulted her while she was still a child. See Dkts. # 48-12, at

13-94; 48-13, at 1-27.

The State also presented testimony from three outcry

witnesses: the victim’s mother, Dora Castillo; the victim’s aunt, Norma Castillo; and

the victim’s grandmother, Esperanza Arredondo. See Dkts. # 48-13, at 27-60; Dkt.

# 48-14, at 78-100; 48-15, at 1-9, 33-52. Although the State filed a written notice

before trial that it intended to present outcry testimony from Dora Castillo and

Norma Castillo, as required by Article 38.072, the notice did not mention Arredondo.

See Dkt. # 48-4, at 47-48. Vega contends that his attorneys were deficient for failing

to object to lack of notice regarding Arredondo or to request a hearing on the

admissibility of the outcry witness testimony. See id.

Both of Vega’s attorneys, lead counsel Chadrick Henderson and co-counsel

Chaun Hubbard, submitted an affidavit to the state habeas corpus court in response

to his allegations of ineffective assistance. Henderson stated that he learned well

before trial that all three of the outcry witnesses would testify and that he was not

surprised when the State put ArTedondo on the stand because he was “on notice” of

the identity of the witnesses and the content of their testimony. See Dkt. # 48-27, at

77. Hubbard agreed that, based on pretrial discussions with the prosecution, they

were not surprised when Arredondo was called to testify or by the content of her

testimony. See id. at 74. Hubbard explained further that he did not request a hearing

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under Article 38.072 or object to the Arredondo’s absence from the State’s notice

because the reliability of the outcry testimony was not an issue. Id. at 78. Because

the outciy witness testimony indicated that the victim initially identified another

perpetrator (Alex), he wanted to focus on the complainant’s credibility and an

Article 38.072 hearing “was not the proper forum for that.” Id. at 78. Therefore,

counsel made a “strategic decision not to object to any of the outcry witnesses

because each provided evidence that the complainant initially said that Alex was the

perpetrator and not my client.” Id.

The state habeas corpus court found that each of the outcry witnesses

acknowledged on cross-examination that the victim had indicated initially that she

was sexually assaulted by Alex, not Vega. See Dkt. # 48-27, at 82. After finding

that Henderson and Hubbard’s affidavits were “credible,” the state habeas corpus

court found further that they had adequate notice prior to trial that Arredondo would

testify as an outcry witness and the content of her testimony. See id. at 83. The state

habeas corpus court also found that the decision not to object was based on sound

trial strategy because, based on pre-trial investigation showing that the victim

initially provided the name of a different perpetrator, counsel believed that this

testimony would undercut the victim’s credibility. See id. Based on these findings,

which are presumed correct on federal review, the state habeas corpus court

concluded that counsel’s strategic decision not to object to the outcry witnesses or

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request a hearing under Article 38.072, but instead to use their testimony to undercut

the victim’s credibility, was objectively reasonable. See id. at 84.

Strategic decisions made by counsel during the course of trial are entitled to

substantial deference in the hindsight of federal habeas review. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689 (emphasizing that “[j]udiciai scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be

highly deferential” and that “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting

effects of hindsight”). The Supreme Court has emphasized that strategic decisions

are entitled to a “strong presumption” of reasonableness. Richter, 562 U.S. at 104.

“[A] conscious and informed decision on trial tactics and strategy cannot be the basis

for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that it

permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness.” Pape v. Thaler, 645 F.3d 281,

291 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Vega does not establish that the testimony given by the outcry witnesses was

unreliable or inadmissible such that an Article 38.072 hearing would have been

beneficial and he does not show that his counsel lacked notice that Arredondo was

going to testify. Moreover, Vega does not demonstrate that counsel's trial strategy

was unsound or that every reasonable lawyer would have made a different decision

about whether to object or request an Article 38.072 under the circumstances. As a

result, he fails to establish to overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s

performance was adequate and not deficient. Because he further fails to show that

the state habeas corpus court’s decision was unreasonable, Vega is not entitled to

relief on Claims 1 or 3.

B.

Failure to Make an Offer of Proof (Claim 2)

Vega’s remaining claim concerns defense counsel’s cross-examination of

Arredondo, who had expressed skepticism during her direct testimony when the

victim initially identified another family member (Alex) as the perpetrator. When

defense counsel attempted to question Arredondo regarding her disbelief that Alex

could be the perpetrator by asking Arredondo whether she “liked” Alex, the State

objected based on relevance and the trial court sustained that objection. Dkt. # 4815, at 48. Vega claims that counsel was deficient for failing to “make an offer of

proof’ or demonstrate that the testimony was “relevant to the issue of [Arredondo’s]

bias or prejudice” as a witness. See Dkt. # 2, at 4. Vega argues that he was

prejudiced by the error because, by failing to make an offer of proof, counsel did not

preserve error for appeal regarding whether the trial court properly sustained the

State’s objection. See id.

Hubbard, who cross-examined Arredondo at trial, explained that she did not

make an offer of proof because she had none to make. Dkt. # 48-27, at 74. Hubbard

also explained her strategy when cross-examining Arredondo, noting that she

pursued additional questions after the State’s objection was sustained in an effort to

clarify Arredondo’s belief that Alex was not the perpetrator:

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On cross-examination my objective was for Ms. Arredondo to

make three acknowledgements. First, that the complainant initially

indicated that a family member Alex had sexually assaulted her.

Second, there were periods of time when Alex did not come into contact

with the complainant. Third, she simply decided it was not Alex based

on her belief and without any investigation.

In the context of this third objective I asked “Do you like Alex?”

I did not know what the answer to this question would be. If she said

“yes” I would likely have tried to probe that this was the reason she did

not investigate further. If she said “no” I had no evidence to the

contrary with which to impeach her or make an offer of proof.

Therefore, I did not follow up on this question after the court sustained

the State’s objection. Additionally, I felt that I achieved my third

objective based on Ms. Arredondo’s answers to my queries, “You don’t

want to believe it was Alex, do you?” and “And you’ve decide that it

wasn’t Alex,” that were asked immediately after the court sustained the

State’s objection. As a result, I felt it was unnecessary to make the

“like” inquiry again.

Dkt. # 48-27, at 74. Counsel’s explanation is supported by the trial transcript of her

cross-examination, which attacked Arredondo’s belief that Alex could not have been

the perpetrator. See Dkt. # 48-15, at 48-49. Based on this explanation, which the

state habeas corpus court found to be “credible,” the state habeas corpus court

concluded that defense counsel acted “reasonably when she did not attempt to make

an offer of proof’ about whether Arredondo liked or disliked Alex and that Vega

was not prejudiced because counsel’s strategy on cross-examination developed

Arredondo’s previous testimony that the victim initially identified someone else as

the person who sexually assaulted her. See Dkt. # 48-27, at 84, 85.

Vega does not provide any information showing that defense counsel had

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evidence, but failed to make an offer of proof regarding whether Arredondo harbored

any particular feelings about the individual whom the victim initially identified as

the perpetrator. The Fifth Circuit has “made clear that conclusory allegations of

ineffective assistance of counsel do not raise a constitutional issue in a federal habeas

proceeding,” Collier v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 577, 587 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Miller v.

Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000); Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012

(5th Cir. 1983)).

The record supports the state court’s findings and conclusions, demonstrating

' that defense counsel successfully elicited testimony from all three outcry witnesses

about the victim initially identifying Alex as the person who sexually assaulted her.

See Diet. #48-14 at 23-24; Dkt. #48-15 at 1-6,47-49. Vega does not otherwise show

that defense counsel’s chosen strategy was ill-conceived or that if an offer of proof

had been made, preserving error for appeal, the result of his direct appeal would have

been different. Because Vega does not demonstrate deficient performance or actual

prejudice, he fails to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective or that the state

court’s decision to deny relief was objectively unreasonable. Vega is not entitled to

relief on this claim or any other allegation raised in his petition, which is denied.

IV,

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a district court

to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a fmal order that is

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adverse to the petitioner. A certificate of appealability will not issue unless the

petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate “that reasonable

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims

debatable or wrong.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). The petitioner must show not only that

“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of

the denial of a constitutional right,” but also that they “would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its [] ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

Because jurists of reason would not debate whether the ruling in this case was

correct, a certificate of appealability will not issue.

V.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the federal habeas corpus petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Jose Efrain Vega (Dkt. #1) is DENIED and this case is

DISMISSED with prejudice. A certificate of appealability shall not issue.

The Clerk will provide, a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the parties.

C£*r is-

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on

, 2021.

DAVID HITTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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APPENDIX “C”

Case 4:13-cv-02714 Document 65 Filed on 09/10/21 in TXSD Page 1 of 1

United States District Court

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

September 13, 2021

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

Jose Efrain Vega

TDCJ #1296101

Plaintiff,

V.

William Stephens,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION: 4 :13-2714

ORDER

Jose Efraim Vega moves this Court for leave to file

supplemental evidence. The Court hereby

Orders that Mr. Vega may file the supplemental evidence within

30 days of the date of this order.

The motion (Docket #64) is GRANTED.

Signed this

ID

day of September, 2021.

David Hittner

United States District Judge