Respondents Brief — United States, et al., Petitioners v. Texas, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 18, 2022

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No. 22-58

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

STATE OF TEXAS AND STATE OF LOUISIANA.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General of

Louisiana

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third St.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

(225) 326-6766

Additional counsel listed

with signature block

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney

General

JUDD E. STONE II

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Judd.Stone@oag.texas.gov

(512) 936-1700

QU E S TIO NS PR E S E NTE D

1. Whether the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s

Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration

Law.

2. Whether the Guidelines are contrary to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), or otherwise violate the

Administrative Procedure Act.

3. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) prevents the entry of

an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the Guidelines

under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

(I)

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented ......................................................... I

Table of Authorities ........................................................ IV

Introduction....................................................................... 1

Statement .......................................................................... 2

I. Legal Framework.................................................. 2

II. Factual Background .............................................. 5

III. Prior Proceedings.................................................. 7

A. Preliminary injunction and first appeal ......... 7

B. Subsequent trial and vacatur .......................... 8

C. The Fifth Circuit’s stay denial........................ 9

D. This Court’s stay denial ................................ 10

Summary of Argument ................................................... 11

Argument......................................................................... 12

I. The District Court Correctly Concluded

that the States Have Standing ........................... 12

A. The States suffered a redressable injury

traceable to the Final Memorandum ........... 13

B. This Court should not make States

disfavored litigants in its standing

analysis ........................................................... 17

C. The States have parens patriae standing.... 23

II. The Final Memorandum Is Substantively

and Procedurally Invalid .................................... 24

A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to

the INA’s detention mandates...................... 24

B. The Final Memorandum is arbitrary

and capricious ................................................ 34

C. The Final Memorandum is procedurally

invalid for lack of notice and comment ........ 36

III

III. The District Court’s Remedy Was Lawful ........ 39

A. The APA authorizes vacatur ......................... 40

B. The INA does not bar vacatur of the

Final Memorandum ....................................... 43

C. If the district court erred, this Court

should vacate or enjoin the Final

Memorandum ................................................. 47

Conclusion ....................................................................... 49

IV

TA BLE O F AU T HO R I TIE S

Page(s)

Cases:

Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. S.C.R.A.P.,

422 U.S. 289 (1975) ....................................................... 46

In re Aiken County,

725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ...................................... 31

Alaska v. Dep’t of Transp.,

868 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ...................................... 37

Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.

Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez,

458 U.S. 592 (1982) ................................................. 17, 23

Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

523 U.S. 224 (1998) ....................................................... 44

Aragon v. Tillerson,

240 F. Supp. 3d 99 (D.D.C. 2017) ................................ 41

Arizona v. United States,

567 U.S. 387 (2012) ....................................................... 17

Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian,

140 S. Ct. 1335 (2020) ................................................... 33

Azar v. Allina Health Servs.,

139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019) ................................................... 38

Biden v. Texas,

142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022) ............................................. 44, 47

Bowen v. Massachusetts,

487 U.S. 879 (1988) ....................................................... 22

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,

141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) ............................................. 12, 15

California v. Arizona,

452 U.S. 431 (1981) ....................................................... 43

V

Page(s)

Cases (ctd.):

California v. Texas,

141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021) ................................................... 19

Campos v. INS,

62 F.3d 311 (9th Cir. 1995) .......................................... 28

City of Chicago v. Morales,

527 U.S. 41 (1999) ......................................................... 30

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,

568 U.S. 398 (2013) ....................................................... 12

Cooper v. Harris,

137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017) ................................................... 16

Cream Wipt Food Prods. Co. v. Fed. Sec. Adm’r,

187 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1951) .......................................... 40

Crowley Caribbean Transp. v. Pena,

37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ........................................ 31

Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.,

137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) ................................................ 12-13

Data Mktg. P’ship, LP v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

45 F.4th 846 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................... 42, 46

Demore v. Kim,

538 U.S. 510 (2003) .............................................. passim

Dep’t of Com. v. New York,

139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) ............................................. 18, 19

DHS v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,

140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) .......................................... passim

DHS v. Thuraissigiam,

140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) ................................................... 17

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,

547 U.S. 388 (2006) ................................................. 46, 48

VI

Page(s)

Cases (ctd.):

FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,

141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) ............................................. 34, 35

Florida v. Mellon,

273 U.S. 12 (1927) ............................................. 19, 20, 23

Fogo De Chao (Holdings), Inc. v. DHS,

211 F. Supp. 3d 31 (D.D.C. 2016) ................................ 41

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,

139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) ................................................... 19

Galvez v. Lewis,

56 F. Supp. 2d 637 (E.D. Va. 1999) ......................... 4, 31

Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez,

142 S. Ct. 2057 (2022) ................................................... 46

Matter of Garvin-Noble,

21 I. & N. Dec. 672 (BIA 1997) ............................... 5, 36

Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA,

290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ...................................... 38

Georgia v. Stanton,

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868) ........................................... 22

Genco Op. No. 93-80,

1993 WL 1504027 *3 (Oct. 8, 1993) ............................... 4

Gerber v. Norton,

294 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ...................................... 36

Getty v. Fed. Sav. & Loan,

805 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .................................... 36

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,

140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020) ................................................... 27

Harmon v. Thornburgh,

878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ................................ 42, 46

VII

Page(s)

Cases (ctd.):

Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821 (1985) ................................................... 1, 30

INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc.,

502 U.S. 183 (1991) ....................................................... 44

Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,

478 U.S. 221 (1986) ....................................................... 29

Jennings v. Rodriguez,

138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) ..................................... 5, 24, 26, 44

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,

141 S. Ct. 2271 (2021) ........................................... 2, 5, 26

Kenney v. Glickman,

96 F.3d 1118 (8th Cir. 1996) ........................................ 31

Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. 162 (2016) ....................................................... 30

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

568 U.S. 519 (2013) ....................................................... 33

Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ................................................... 36

Kucana v. Holder,

558 U.S. 233 (2010) ................................................. 27, 28

Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,

410 U.S. 614 (1973) ....................................................... 15

Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n,

497 U.S. 871 (1990) ....................................................... 42

Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC,

575 U.S. 480 (2015) ................................................. 46, 47

Massachusetts v. EPA,

549 U.S. 497 (2007) .............................................. passim

VIII

Page(s)

Cases (ctd.):

Massachusetts v. Laird,

400 U.S. 886 (1970) ....................................................... 20

Massachusetts v. Mellon,

262 U.S. 447 (1923) ....................................................... 23

McLouth Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas,

838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988) .................................... 38

Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020) ................................................... 30

Medellín v. Texas,

552 U.S. 491 (2008) ....................................................... 34

Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,

561 U.S. 139 (2010) ................................................. 42, 46

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.

State Farm,

463 U.S. 29 (1983) ......................................................... 34

Murphy v. NCAA,

138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) ................................................... 18

Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy,

758 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ................................. 37 39

Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) .................................... 42

Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior,

538 U.S. 803 (2003) ....................................................... 38

New York v. United States,

505 U.S. 144 (1992) ....................................................... 18

NFIB v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519 (2012) .................................................. 20-21

Nielsen v. Preap,

139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) ............................................ passim

IX

Page(s)

Cases (ctd.):

Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418 (2009) ....................................................... 48

O.A. v. Trump,

404 F. Supp. 3d 109 (D.D.C. 2019) .............................. 43

OSG Bulk Ships v. United States,

132 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ...................................... 31

Patel v. Garland,

142 S. Ct. 1614 (2022) ................................................... 27

Printz v. United States,

521U.S. 898 (1997) ........................................................ 20

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.

Amalgamated Bank,

566 U.S. 639 (2012) ....................................................... 32

Raines v. Byrd,

521 U.S. 811 (1997) ........................................... 15, 21, 22

Rapanos v. United States,

547 U.S. 715 (2006) ....................................................... 39

Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,

525 U.S. 471 (1999) ........................................... 30, 43, 48

Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter,

567 U.S. 182 (2012) ....................................................... 31

Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.,

141 S. Ct. 691 (2021) ..................................................... 46

Sarnoff v. Connally,

457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1972) ........................................ 20

Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,

418 U.S. 208 (1974) ....................................................... 20

Smith v. Berryhill,

139 S. Ct. 1765 (2019) .............................................. 46-47

X

Page(s)

Cases (ctd.):

Soler v. Scott,

942 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1991) ........................................ 28

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

578 U.S. 330 (2016) ....................................................... 21

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,

467 U.S. 883 (1984) ....................................................... 15

Territory of Guam v. United States,

141 S. Ct. 1608 (2021) ................................................... 33

Texas v. United States,

14 F.4th 332 (5th Cir. 2021) ........................................... 7

Texas v. United States,

24 F.4th 407 (5th Cir. 2021) ........................................... 7

Texas v. United States,

555 F. Supp. 3d 351 (S.D. Tex. 2021) ...................... 7, 43

Texas v. United States,

No. 21-40618, 2022 WL 517281

(5th Cir. Feb. 11, 2022) ............................................... 7-8

Texas v. United States,

No. 6:21-cv-00016, 2021 WL 1309766

(S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2021) .................................................. 7

Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez,

545 U.S. 748 (2005) ................................................. 10, 30

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ................................................... 23

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

578 U.S. 590 (2016) ....................................................... 37

U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,

400 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ........................................ 37

XI

Page(s)

Cases (ctd.):

United States v. Smith,

27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).............................. 31

United States v. Texas,

579 U.S. 547 (2016) ....................................................... 19

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ......................................................... 1

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,

141 S. Ct. 792 (2021) ......................................... 13, 14, 15

V.I. Tel. Corp. v. FCC,

444 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ...................................... 41

Wyoming v. Oklahoma,

502 U.S. 437 (1992) ....................................................... 20

Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678 (2001) ..................................................... 4, 5

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules:

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3....................................................... 31

5 U.S.C.:

§ 553(b) .......................................................................... 36

§ 553(b)(A) ..................................................................... 38

§ 702 ............................................................. 16, 17, 20, 21

§ 703 ............................................................................... 47

§ 705 ............................................................................... 40

§ 706 ......................................................................... 16, 40

§ 706(1) .......................................................................... 41

§ 706(2) .................................................................. passim

§ 706(2)(A) ............................................................... 34, 40

§ 706(2)(C) ..................................................................... 27

XII

Page(s)

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules (ctd.):

6 U.S.C.:

§ 202 ............................................................................... 27

§ 202(5) .............................................................. 27, 32, 39

§ 225 ............................................................................... 28

8 U.S.C.:

§ 1103(a) ........................................................................ 39

§ 1182(a)(2) .................................................................... 25

§ 1182(a)(2)(H) .............................................................. 25

§ 1221 ............................................................................. 43

§ 1226 ........................................................... 25, 26, 27, 29

§ 1226(a) ....................................................................... 2, 5

§ 1226(a)(1)-(2) ................................................................ 2

§ 1226(c) ................................................................ passim

§ 1226(c)(1) ........................................................... passim

§ 1226(c)(1)(A) ............................................................... 25

§ 1226(c)(1)(D) ................................................................ 2

§ 1226(c)(2) ................................................................ 3, 25

§ 1226(e)................................................................... 26, 27

§ 1231 .................................................................... passim

§ 1231(a) .......................................................... I, 4, 24, 26

§ 1231(a)(1)(A)........................................................... 2, 26

§ 1231(a)(2) ........................................................... passim

§ 1231(h) ...................................................... 26, 27, 28, 29

§ 1232 ............................................................................. 43

§ 1252(a) (1982) ............................................................... 3

§ 1252(a)(2) (1988)........................................................... 3

§ 1252(a)(2)(A) .............................................................. 28

§ 1252(f) ....................................................... 43, 44, 46, 47

§ 1252(f)(1) ............................................................ passim

XIII

Page(s)

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules (ctd.):

8 U.S.C.:

§ 1252(f)(2)..................................................................... 45

§ 1252(g) ........................................................................ 29

28 U.S.C. § 1651 .................................................................. 47

Immigration and Nationality Technical

Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.

103-416 Stat. 4305 ......................................................... 28

Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) ............................ 22

Pub. L. No. 104-108, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) ........................ 4

S. Ct. R. 14.1(a) ................................................................... 27

Other Authorities:

140 Cong. Rec. 28,441 (1994) ............................................. 28

A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE

INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) ... 33, 44, 45

Administration Lawsuit Tracker, CENTER

FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,

https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/camp

aigns/trump_lawsuits/ (last visited Oct.

17, 2022) ......................................................................... 21

Administrative Procedure Act,

S. Doc. No. 79-248 (1946) ............................................. 41

Am. Civil Liberties Union, Press Release:

ACLU Has Filed 400 Legal Actions

Against Trump Administration Union

(Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/pressreleases/aclu-has-filed-400-legal-actionsagainst-trump-administration..................................... 21

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) ......................... 40

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) ....................... 43

XIV

Page(s)

Other Authorities (ctd.):

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ..................... 45

CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE

& PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2022) .................................. 19, 22

GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE

(3d ed. 2011) ............................................................ 33, 43

H.R. 1915, 104th Cong. § 306(a) (1995) ............................ 45

H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1 (1996) .................................. 45

H.R. Rep. No. 104-828 (1996) ...................................... 28, 45

HOWARD C. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON THE

LAW RELATING TO INJUNCTIONS (1909) .................... 45

INS Issues Detention Guidelines After

Expiration of TPCR, 75 No. 42

Interpreter Releases 1508 (Nov. 2, 1998) .................... 4

John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules,

72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893 (2004) .............................. 39

Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy,

104 VA. L. REV. 933 (2018) ..................................... 41, 46

Mila Sohoni, The Power to Vacate a Rule,

88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2020) ............................ 41

Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in

Administrative Law,

117 COLUM. L. REV. 253 (2017) ................................... 40

Oral Arg. Tr., Nielsen v. Preap, No. 16-1363,

2018 WL 4922082 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018)................. 4-5, 36

Pet. Br., Demore v. Kim, No. 01-1491,

2002 WL 31016560 (U.S. Aug. 29, 2002) ...................... 5

Pet. Br., Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204,

2016 WL 5404637 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2016) ........................ 5

XV

Page(s)

Other Authorities (ctd.):

Pet. Br., Nielsen v. Preap, No. 16-1363,

2018 WL 2554770 (U.S. Jun. 1, 2018) ........................... 4

Pet. Br., Reno v. Ma, No. 00-38, 2000 WL

1784982 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2000) ................................... 5, 36

Reply Br., Albence v. Guzman Chavez, No. 19-897,

2020 WL 3124376 (Mar. 14, 2020) ............................... 36

INT RO D U C TIO N

“Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that the agency

administers.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833

(1985). Agencies lack the “power to revise clear statutory

terms” even when the agency believes those terms “turn

out not to work in practice.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v.

EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014). Through the Immigration

and Nationality Act, Congress has mandated that the

Executive must detain specific criminal aliens (e.g., aggravated felons) at a specific time (upon release from

criminal custody) for a specific duration (during the removal period). Congress has also required the Executive

to detain aliens subject to final orders of removal pending their removal.

The Executive would rather not. In September 2021,

DHS issued Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (“Final Memorandum”), JA.110-20,

which dispensed with Congress’s “bright lines or categories” in favor of an “assessment of the individual and the

totality of the facts and circumstances” for any alien who

might be “a current threat to public safety.” JA.113.

DHS further created a “continuous” and “rigorous review” process to ensure “personnel’s enforcement decisions” comply with the Final Memorandum, JA.118—not

with the categories that Congress created or that this

Court has repeatedly described as mandatory.

When Congress requires the Executive to act, the

Executive lacks the authority to disregard that instruction. This Court should affirm the district court’s judgment that the Final Memorandum harms States, is substantively and procedurally unlawful, and must be vacated.

(1)

2

ST ATE ME N T

I. Legal Framework

A. The INA makes detention mandatory for some aliens and discretionary for others. For example, detention

is ordinarily discretionary for aliens arrested under 8

U.S.C. § 1226(a): “On a warrant issued by the Attorney

General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a

[removal] decision.” 1 There, “the Attorney General” “may

continue to detain the arrested alien” and “may release

the alien on” either a bond subject to conditions or “conditional parole.” Id. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).

But Congress made detention of other aliens mandatory. For example, Congress has commanded that “[t]he

Attorney General shall take into custody any alien” who

has committed certain serious crimes, including aggravated felonies, human trafficking, and certain gun crimes.

Id. § 1226(c)(1); JA.473 & n.10. Likewise, section

1231(a)(2) provides that “the Attorney General shall detain” an alien ordered removed “[d]uring the removal period,” which is defined as the 90 days after the alien is ordered removed, id. § 1231(a)(1)(A).

Congress has sometimes reinforced the mandatory

nature of these obligations by specifying when or for how

long the Executive must detain covered aliens. For example, criminal aliens subject to section 1226(c) must be detained “when the alien is released” from criminal custody.

Id. § 1226(c)(1)(D). Aliens subject to section 1231(a)(2)

shall be detained “during the removal period” after entry

of a final removal order. Id. § 1231(a)(2).

Although the INA “refer[s] to the Attorney General, Congress

has also empowered the Secretary of Homeland Security to enforce”

that statute. Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280 n.1

(2021).

1

3

Congress has occasionally underscored the mandatory

nature of detention obligations by restricting the Executive’s power to release aliens subject to those detention

obligations. For example, section 1226(c)(2) sets forth a

narrow circumstance when an alien subject to section

1226(c)(1)’s mandatory detention obligation may be released: when the alien’s release is necessary to provide

protection to a witness or individual cooperating with a

major criminal investigation (or their families or close associates) and the Executive finds “that the alien will not

pose a danger to the safety of other persons or property

and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceedings.”

B. “Congress adopted” these mandates “against a

backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS, DHS’s predecessor organization, to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518

(2003). Congress found that “[c]riminal aliens were the

fastest growing segment of the federal prison population”

and “a rapidly rising share of state prison populations as

well.” Id. Congress also had “evidence that one of the major causes of the INS’[s] failure to remove deportable

criminal aliens was the agency’s failure to detain those aliens during deportation proceedings.” Id. at 519.

To address these deficiencies, Congress removed the

Executive’s previous discretion regarding the arrest and

detention of certain criminal aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)

(1982). Starting in 1988, Congress directed that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien convicted

of an aggravated felony upon completion of the alien’s sentence for such conviction.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (1988).

Later, in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), “Congress expanded mandatory detention past aggravated felons to

other criminal aliens.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 521.

4

Section 1231(a)(2) was also a part of IIRIRA and was

“enacted against the same backdrop” of Executive failures. JA.360. Section 1231(a) “is part of a statute that has

as its basic purpose effectuating an alien’s removal.”

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001). It “prevent[s] deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to

or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the

chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528.

C. Even before IIRIRA, INS understood that statutes

providing that it “shall take into custody” an alien meant

that the Executive “is statutorily precluded from exercising discretion either to release the alien upon his or her

release from incarceration or to refrain from instituting

deportation proceedings.” Genco Op. No. 93-80 (INS),

1993 WL 1504027, at *3 (Oct. 8, 1993).

To address the Executive’s concerns that section

1226(c)’s detention mandate might overwhelm detention

capacity, Congress “enacted a two-year grace period for

application of the criminal detention provisions in” section

1226(c). Galvez v. Lewis, 56 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (E.D. Va.

1999). During that grace period, insufficient bed space

could excuse INS’s mandatory duties under section

1226(c). Pub. L. No. 104-108, § 303, 110 Stat. 3009–586

(1996). INS sought to extend the two-year period, but

Congress refused, and the mandate took effect. INS Issues Detention Guidelines After Expiration of TPCR, 75

No. 42 Interpreter Releases 1508, 1508 (Nov. 2, 1998).

D. Since IIRIRA, every Administration before this

one has reaffirmed its understanding that section 1226(c)

“eliminate[s] all discretion” and imposes a “duty to arrest

. . . criminal alien[s].” Pet. Br. at *17, *23, Nielsen v.

Preap, No. 16-1363, 2018 WL 2554770 (U.S. Jun. 1, 2018);

see also, e.g., Oral Arg. Tr. at *6-7, Nielsen v. Preap, No.

5

16-1363, 2018 WL 4922082 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2018); Pet. Br. at

*1, *7, *11-12, *28, *30, *34, Jennings v. Rodriguez, No.

15-1204, 2016 WL 5404637 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2016); Pet. Br.

at *2, Demore v. Kim, No. 01-1491, 2002 WL 31016560

(U.S. Aug. 29, 2002); Pet. Br. at *26-28, Reno v. Ma, No.

00-38, 2000 WL 1784982 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2000); Matter of

Garvin-Noble, 21 I. & N. Dec. 672, 678 (BIA 1997).

And this Court has agreed, holding that section

1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of aliens who may

not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings v. Rodriguez,

138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018). Because “Congress has decided” that the discretionary section 1226(a) “procedure

is too risky in some instances,” Congress “adopted a special rule” that those “who have committed certain dangerous crimes and those with connections to terrorism” must

be “arrested ‘when [they are] released’ from custody on

criminal charges.” Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959

(2019); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-20.

Likewise, this Court has confirmed that “[d]uring the

removal period, detention is mandatory” under section

1231(a)(2). Johnson, 141 S. Ct. at 2281; see Zadvydas, 533

U.S. at 683.

II. Factual Background

DHS now claims the discretion that previous administrations acknowledged Congress withheld. The Final

Memorandum is the culmination of DHS’s efforts to claim

such discretion.

In January 2021, “then-Acting Secretary of Homeland

Security David Pekoske issued a memorandum titled Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities.” JA.300.

The January Memorandum “announced substantial

changes to the enforcement of the Nation’s immigration

laws.” JA.300. In lieu of directing the detention of all

6

aliens subject to Congress’s mandatory-detention obligations, the January Memorandum declared that “the Department’s priorities shall be” aliens suspected of terrorism, aliens who had recently unlawfully entered the

United States, and aggravated felons determined to be

public-safety threats. JA.300-01.

Then, “on February 18, 2021, Acting ICE Director Tae

Johnson issued a memorandum titled Interim Guidance:

Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities.” JA.302. Like the January Memorandum, the February Memorandum made aliens “who pose[] a threat to

public safety and have been convicted of an aggravated

felony or are involved with criminal gangs” a “public

safety priority” but did not instruct officers to arrest or

detain other aliens subject to section 1226(c) or section

1231(a)(2). JA.303-04 (quotation marks omitted).

Following these two interim memoranda, in September 2021, “Secretary Mayorkas issued the Final Memorandum from DHS,” which “rescind[ed] the January and

February Memoranda” and became effective in November 2021. JA.306 (quotation marks omitted). The Final

Memorandum “identifies the same three priority enforcement categories as the previous two memoranda: national

security, border security, and public safety.” JA.306. But

“[u]nlike the February Memorandum, the Final Memorandum’s priorities are not presumptively subject to enforcement action.” JA.306-07. And “the Final Memorandum’s public safety priority no longer presumptively subjects aliens convicted of aggravated felonies to enforcement action, including detention.” JA.307.

Under the Final Memorandum, immigration “enforcement,” “including detention, is not to be determined according to any bright lines or categories.” JA.113. Personnel cannot “rely on the fact of conviction or the result of a

7

database search alone when deciding to enforce the law.”

JA.308. Instead, they must “to the fullest extent possible,

obtain and review the entire criminal and administrative

record and other investigative information to learn of the

totality of the facts and circumstances of the [alien’s] conduct at issue.” JA.308. The Final Memorandum neither

“instruct[s] officers to prioritize aliens convicted of” numerous crimes covered by section 1226(c), nor requires

the mandatory arrest or detention of these individuals.

JA.308. Instead, aliens subject to statutory detention

mandates receive the same “totality of the facts and circumstances” inquiry as other aliens. JA.307-08.

The Final Memorandum also establishes “rigorous”

and “expeditious review of the enforcement actions

taken” by personnel to ensure compliance. JA.309. This

review provides “an entirely new avenue of redress in the

event [aliens] are removed or detained in a manner that

conflicts with” the Final Memorandum. JA.454-55.

III. Prior Proceedings

A. Preliminary injunction and first appeal

The States first challenged the January Memorandum

as contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally invalid. Texas v. United States, No. 6:21-cv-00016,

2021 WL 1309766 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2021). The States

sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of

the January and February Memoranda, 2021 WL 6331026

(S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2021), which the district court granted,

Texas v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 3d 351 (S.D. Tex.

2021).

A Fifth Circuit panel stayed that injunction, Texas v.

United States, 14 F.4th 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2021), but the en

banc court vacated that stay, Texas v. United States, 24

F.4th 407, 408 (5th Cir. 2021). Petitioners dismissed their

appeal upon issuance of the Final Memorandum. Texas v.

8

United States, No. 21-40618, 2022 WL 517281 (5th Cir.

Feb. 11, 2022).

B. Subsequent trial and vacatur

The States then filed an amended complaint asserting

that the Final Memorandum was contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally invalid. JA.72. The

States moved to enjoin the Final Memorandum’s enforcement or to postpone its effective date. Texas v. United

States, No. 6:21-cv-00016 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2021), ECF

No. 111. The district court consolidated the hearing on the

States’ motion with the trial on the merits. JA.293 n.11.

After trial, the district court concluded that the States

had standing, JA.323-29, and that no obstacle prevented

judicial review of the Final Memorandum, JA.330-68. It

then concluded that the Final Memorandum was contrary

to law, JA.369-74, arbitrary and capricious, JA.374-82,

and procedurally invalid, JA.382-89. The court vacated

the Final Memorandum, JA.393-400, but declined to enter

injunctive relief, JA.400-02.

In reaching these conclusions, the district court made

numerous findings of fact. It found that “when viewed in

[the] light of the previous Memoranda and how they were

implemented and enforced by DHS supervisors,” many

ICE officers and agents viewed the Final Memorandum

as binding. JA.317. It likewise found that “officers do not

have discretion to go outside the enforcement priorities.”

JA.315. Consequently, the court found that the “Final

Memorandum increases the number of aliens with criminal convictions and aliens with final orders of removal released into the United States.” JA.317.

The district court likewise found that this increase imposes costs on the States. JA.318-24. It explained that the

Final Memorandum caused DHS to rescind immigration

detainers—“administrative notice[s] from DHS” that

9

DHS “intends to take custody of a removable alien detained by [another] jurisdiction upon their release,”

JA.299—at dramatically higher rates. JA.311-13. And the

district court found that numerous criminal aliens with rescinded detainers had reoffended, failed to comply with

state parole conditions, or simply disappeared. JA.314.

C. The Fifth Circuit’s stay denial

DHS sought a stay, which the Fifth Circuit denied in

a 32-page published opinion. JA.451-86. Regarding standing, the Fifth Circuit agreed that “the uncontroverted evidence shows that the Final Memo shifted the cost of incarcerating or paroling certain criminal aliens from DHS

to Texas,” and that the “[S]tate incurs substantial costs

associated with criminal recidivism, the rate of which is

significant among the illegal alien population according to

evidence presented in the district court.” JA.459-60. The

Fifth Circuit also noted that “Texas has actually absorbed, or at least will imminently absorb, the costs of

providing public education and state-sponsored

healthcare to aliens who would otherwise have been removed pursuant to federal statutory law.” JA.460. The

Fifth Circuit concluded that petitioners were unlikely to

show that the district court clearly erred when it found

that the Final Memorandum was a cause of Texas’s costs,

or that “Texas’s costs would be eased if DHS stopped rescinding detainers pursuant to the Final Memo.” JA.464.

The Fifth Circuit determined that the district court

had jurisdiction to vacate the Final Memorandum notwithstanding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) because vacatur and injunctive relief are distinct remedies, and because vacatur,

unlike an injunction, “does nothing but re-establish the

status quo absent the unlawful agency action.” JA.466.

The Fifth Circuit then concluded that “DHS’s three

defenses of the Final Memo on its merits [we]re also likely

10

to fail.” JA.472. First, the Fifth Circuit concluded that sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) mandate detention. JA.47477. It rejected petitioners’ appeal to prosecutorial discretion based on Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S.

748 (2005), because Castle Rock was “distinguishable on

its facts” and because DHS’s view of Castle Rock was “untenable and wholly unsupported” by the “plain text of the

INA.” JA.477-78.

Second, the Fifth Circuit concluded that DHS was

likely arbitrary and capricious. As an initial matter, DHS

considered recidivism among all aliens rather than the

criminal aliens whom Congress required to be detained

for public safety. JA.480-81. Moreover, DHS failed to adequately consider the costs that the Final Memorandum

imposed on the States. JA.482. And, rather than considering the States’ reliance interests, “[i]n a single paragraph

citing no evidence,” DHS “concluded that the States” had

“no reliance interests in the enforcement of federal criminal immigration law according to the governing statutes.”

JA.483.

Third, the Fifth Circuit determined that the Final

Memorandum likely required notice and comment.

JA.484. Rather than an informal policy statement, “[b]oth

the language found within and the mechanisms of implementing” the Final Memorandum “establish[ed] that it

[was] indeed binding” and “remov[ed] DHS personnel’s

discretion to stray from the guidance or take enforcement

action against an alien on the basis of a conviction alone.”

JA.484.

D. This Court’s stay denial

After the Fifth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal,

DHS sought a stay from this Court. JA.487. This Court

denied that application but construed it as a petition for

certiorari before judgment, which was granted. JA.487.

11

SU M MA RY O F A RGU ME NT

I. The States have standing. As the district court

correctly found, the States bear costs related to law

enforcement, recidivism, healthcare, and education that

are traceable to the Final Memorandum and redressable

by vacatur. That is all this Court’s longstanding

precedents require. Petitioners do not forthrightly ask

this Court to revisit those precedents—let alone attempt

to carry the heavy burden of overcoming stare decisis.

That should end the matter.

Without admitting that their position would require

this Court to overturn several of its precedents,

petitioners invite this Court to make States disfavored

litigants for purposes of Article III standing. This Court

should decline that invitation. Contrary to petitioners’

insistence, the States’ theory of standing is not

unbounded; rather, to successfully sue the federal

government, States must overcome the same hurdles as

other litigants—albeit with some amount of special

solicitude under certain circumstances owing to their

unique place in the federal system. Massachusetts v.

EPA (Massachusetts), 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). That

States challenge unlawful executive action is in part a

consequence of the APA’s broadly available cause of

action and sovereign-immunity waiver, which Congress

may revisit at any time.

II. On the merits, the Final Memorandum is unlawful

for three independent reasons. First, it is contrary to law

because sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2) mandate

detention, as this Court has repeatedly stated. DHS

identifies no INA provision that prevents this Court

from reaching that conclusion. Second, the Final

Memorandum is arbitrary and capricious because it

failed to consider important aspects of the problems

12

criminal aliens create, including recidivism and States’

reliance interests. Third, the Final Memorandum is

procedurally invalid because it was not adopted through

notice-and-comment procedures, which are required

where agency action substantively changes a regulatory

regime.

III. Finally, section 1252(f)(1) does not bar vacatur of

the Final Memorandum—the only relief the district

court ordered—for two reasons. First, petitioners’

contention that the APA does not authorize vacatur at all

ignores text, context, and decades of practice and

precedent. Second, section 1252(f)(1)’s prohibition on

orders that “enjoin or restrain” the operation of portions

of the INA does not bar vacatur. Vacatur and injunctive

relief are different remedies with different consequences

that require different showings. And, as this Court has

explained, vacatur is the less drastic remedy. Should this

Court disagree, it should enter relief for the States as

section 1252(f)(1) expressly allows.

ARGU ME N T

I. The District Court Correctly Concluded that the

States Have Standing.

The States have standing under a straightforward

application of this Court’s precedents. “To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)

(citation omitted). This Court reviews the district court’s

post-trial findings of fact for clear error. Brnovich v.

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2349 (2021).

And only one State need establish standing, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518, for which even a modest monetary

loss can suffice, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S.

13

Ct. 973, 983 (2017); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,

141 S. Ct. 792, 801-02 (2021).

A. The States suffered a redressable injury

traceable to the Final Memorandum.

1. After making extensive factual findings, the district court concluded that “Texas has suffered a concrete

and particularized, actual injury” both “[a]s to its finances” and “as parens patriae.” JA.326. As the district

court explained, “[t]he Final Memorandum increases the

number of aliens with criminal convictions and aliens

with final orders of removal released into the United

States” and thereby increases the States’ incarceration

costs, JA.317-18, costs associated with recidivism,

JA.319-20, education costs, JA.320-21, and healthcare

costs, JA.322-23.

DHS’s newfound practice of regularly rescinding immigration detainers makes these harms plain. Consistent with the Executive’s mandatory detention obligations, until “fiscal year 2020, detainers” were rarely rescinded, and “no more than a dozen detainers were

dropped per year” between 2017 and 2020. JA.311. But

“[f]rom January 20, 2021 through February 15, 2022,

ICE rescinded detainers on 170 criminal aliens” in Texas

and reissued only 29. JA.311. “Of the 141 criminal aliens

whose detainers remained rescinded, 55 were serving a

sentence for . . . serious drug offenses.” JA.312. More

than two-thirds of those 141 were ultimately paroled,

each inflicting costs on the State. JA.318-19. Of even

greater concern, “[a]t the time this case was tried,” 17 of

those paroled “had failed to comply with their parole supervision and four had committed new criminal offenses.” JA.312. “At least one remain[ed] at large in

Texas with a warrant for his arrest.” JA.312. As the Fifth

14

Circuit noted, this “detainer data” was “uncontroverted.” JA.459.

More broadly, “[t]he number of convicted criminal aliens in ICE custody per day has dropped dramatically in

the months” between the January Memorandum and

trial. JA.313. And “[t]he same decline is also evident in

removals carried out by ICE” which “make clear that the

Final Memorandum is dramatically impacting civil immigration enforcement.” JA.315-16. This places Texans at

risk from recidivism by “increas[ing] the number of aliens with criminal convictions and aliens with final orders

of removal released into the United States.” JA.317.

Again, the Fifth Circuit noted that “evidence show[ing]”

this effect of the Final Memorandum was “uncontroverted.” JA.459.

The district court also found these injuries traceable

to the Final Memorandum and redressable by its vacatur. The Final Memorandum has “led to aliens remaining

in [Texas’s] custody longer than they otherwise would,

which imposes additional costs on the State.” JA.327. “It

has also caused, and continues to cause,” both “increases

in the number of criminal aliens and aliens with final orders of removal released into Texas,” and “increases in

Texas’s expenditures on public services such as

healthcare and education.” JA.327-28.

That is all this Court’s standing precedents require.

The Final Memorandum causes the States real, particularized, and concrete harms, Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at

799-800, which are traceable to the Final Memorandum,

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18, and are redressable

by vacatur, Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at 801. Moreover,

vacatur need not completely address the States’ harms;

“the ability to effectuate a partial remedy satisfies the

15

redressability requirement.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

2. Petitioners attempt to avoid this conclusion in

three ways, none of which has merit.

First, petitioners contend (at 18-20) that the States

have no interest in “‘procuring enforcement of the immigration laws’ against third parties.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v.

NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 (1984). But this is not the interest that the States asserted or that the district court

found. Instead, the States assert an interest in avoiding

the harms caused by the Final Memorandum to their

fiscs and residents. Supra pp. 8-9, 13-14. These are “legally and judicially cognizable” injuries of the sort repeatedly recognized by this Court. Raines v. Byrd, 521

U.S. 811, 819 (1997).

Moreover, the States do not challenge any individual

decision made by DHS, but the Final Memorandum and

its consequences. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,

618 (1973), is not to the contrary. There, this Court explained that “if appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result in the jailing of the child’s father,” but

the “prospect that prosecution” would redress the plaintiff’s injuries was “speculative.” Id. Here, by contrast,

citing numerous findings of facts, the district court and

court of appeals concluded that the States’ injuries could

be redressed by vacatur of the Final Memorandum.

JA.327-28; JA.464.

Second, petitioners bemoan (at 20-21) various factual

findings of the district court. But they cannot—and

scarcely attempt to—show that those factual findings are

clearly erroneous. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2349. At most,

petitioners suggest that the evidence is amenable to multiple interpretations, but “the very premise of clear error

review is that there are often two permissible . . . views

16

of the evidence.” Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468

(2017) (quotation marks omitted). DHS’s disagreement

with the view taken by the district court does not show

that the court clearly erred.

Third, petitioners contend (at 22) that the district

court erred in finding the States have standing at least

as to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This simply ignores findings that

“[t]he Final Memorandum increases the number of aliens . . . with final orders of removal released into the

United States,” JA.317; see also JA.327, which “has

caused, and continues to cause, increases in Texas’s expenditures on public services such as healthcare and education,” JA.327-28. Again, DHS fails to show that the

district court clearly erred in making these findings.

3. Even if the States had not shown standing under

the test applicable to every other litigant—and they

have—“States are not normal litigants for purposes of

invoking federal jurisdiction,” Massachusetts, 549 U.S.

at 518, and are therefore “entitled to special solicitude in

[this Court’s] standing analysis,” id. at 520. Although the

States do not need special solicitude to establish standing here, they nonetheless benefit from it.

A State that has a procedural right to challenge a

given action, which affects one of the State’s quasi-sovereign interests, will receive special solicitude. Id. at 51620. Massachusetts had a procedural right to challenge

the EPA’s decision not to regulate certain greenhouse

gases under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 519-20. The States

here have a concomitant right under the APA. See 5

U.S.C. §§ 702, 706. And, just as in Massachusetts, the

States’ challenge involves an agency’s failure to protect

certain formerly “sovereign prerogatives [that] are now

lodged in the Federal Government.” 549 U.S. at 519.

These include the sovereign “power to admit or exclude

17

aliens,” DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982

(2020), and the “quasi-sovereign interest[s] in the health

and well-being—both physical and economic—of [their]

residents in general,” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.

Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).

DHS’s contrary contention (at 23) that special solicitude is about protecting sovereign territory is meritless.

Although Massachusetts involved state lands, this

Court’s analysis was not so limited. 549 U.S. at 516-20.

Control over immigration is a “sovereign prerogative”

just as much as a sovereign’s control over its territory,

Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982, which now resides

with the federal government, Arizona v. United States,

567 U.S. 387, 398-400 (2012).

Although the INA does not give third parties a procedural right to challenge immigration enforcement or

policy, the APA gives those adversely affected by DHS’s

actions such a right. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. States “bear[]

many of the consequences of unlawful immigration,”

which is why this Court recognized “the importance of

immigration policy to the States.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at

397. They are entitled to special solicitude in cases like

this one.

B. This Court should not make States disfavored

litigants in its standing analysis.

1. DHS asks (at 11-18) this Court to create a rule that

States may only challenge federal actions that affect the

States directly or when the State is the “object of the

challenged action.” Doing so would require this Court to

ignore or overturn several cases.

Petitioners’ object-of-the-challenged-action rule ignores the bedrock principle that the federal government

may not regulate the States directly. “[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress

18

the power to regulate individuals, not States.” New York

v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). “[C]onspicuously absent from the list of powers given to Congress is

the power to issue direct orders to the governments of

the States.” Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478

(2018). A rule prohibiting States from suing the federal

government unless the federal government has directly

regulated States is, at first approximation, a rule that

States may not sue at all. 2

That constitutional flaw aside, DHS argues (at 11-13)

that no matter how much harm a State might suffer because of executive action, that State lacks standing so

long as that injury is imposed indirectly. That ignores

that the injury in Massachusetts arose indirectly: Massachusetts based its injury on the possibility that the

EPA’s decision whether to regulate greenhouse gases

might contribute to a rise in sea levels, which might contribute to the erosion of its shoreline. Massachusetts, 549

U.S. at 522-23. Because petitioners assert that such a

downstream effect is non-cognizable, accepting petitioners’ argument would require overruling Massachusetts.

So, too, with this Court’s recent decision in Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019),

where a State “assert[ed] a number of injuries—diminishment of political representation, loss of federal funds,

degradation of census data, and diversion of resources—

all of which turn[ed] on their expectation that reinstating

a citizenship question will depress the census response

rate and lead to an inaccurate population count.” Id. at

Nor do petitioners explain how their principle would operate

elsewhere. They do not address whether it would control a State’s

standing to sue its sister States or foreign states, officials, or corporations. A principle that operates solely to disadvantage States litigating against the federal government is no principle at all.

2

19

2565. The change in the census did not directly affect or

act on the State. Nevertheless, this Court concluded that

the downstream consequences—including loss of federal

funds—would be “the predictable effect of Government

action on the decisions of third parties,” and that these

injuries could support standing. Id. at 2566. If petitioners’ theory is correct, this holding is also wrong.

Other cases suggest the same result. DACA at most

indirectly affected the University of California. DHS v.

Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020).

DAPA likewise indirectly injured Texas, yet an equally

divided Court affirmed a judgment holding the program

unlawful. United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. 547, 548

(2016). And petitioners’ theory vitiates numerous decisions by the lower federal courts, which have consistently “recogniz[ed] standing to protect proprietary interests” and “sovereign interests”—even from indirect

harm. 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.11.1 & nn.4-5 (3d ed. 2022).

Even when this Court has decided that States lacked

standing, it has employed its ordinary standing analysis.

E.g., California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2113 (2021).

DHS never asks this Court to overrule any—let alone

all—of these cases. For good reason: it cannot meet its

burden to overcome stare decisis. E.g., Franchise Tax

Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019).

2. Petitioners fail to ground their direct-injury rule in

precedent or even sound policy.

a. DHS’s reliance (at 12-13) on Florida v. Mellon, 273

U.S. 12, 18 (1927), is misplaced. There, a State challenged

the collection of federal inheritance taxes when state law

barred such taxes. Id. at 15. This Court resolved the case

on the merits by concluding that, as a law “passed by

Congress in pursuance of its power to lay and collect

20

taxes,” the federal inheritance tax was “the supreme law

of the land.” Id. at 17. Only then did the Court describe

the State’s theory of injury as “purely speculative, and,

at most, only remote and indirect.” Id. at 18. Florida has

little relevance here, where the district court found that

the States have suffered concrete harms from the Final

Memorandum. Supra pp. 8-9. The States’ standing arises

from these concrete harms and not, as petitioners contend, from the “derivative effects” of federalism, Pet. Br.

12 (citing Printz v. United States, 521U.S. 898, 920

(1997)), or from a generalized “injur[y]” to State economies, id. at 13 (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S.

437, 448 (1992)).

This Court’s unreasoned order in Massachusetts v.

Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970), is similarly distinguishable

for at least three reasons. First, that case involved a bill

of complaint regarding the legality of the Vietnam War,

which was a nonjusticiable political question. E.g.,

Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1972)

(per curiam) (collecting authorities). That doctrine is not

at issue here. Second, Massachusetts had, at most, a generalized harm arising from that War. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974).

By contrast, the district court found here that the States

suffered specific, particularized harms not shared by the

public at large. Supra pp. 8-9. Third, it is unclear what

cause of action Massachusetts could have asserted. Here,

the APA provides a cause of action. 5 U.S.C. § 702.

b. Petitioners’ less-relevant policy objections fare no

better. DHS complains (at 16-17) that States sometimes

challenge executive actions, pointing to litigation

brought in recent years by California and Texas. But as

the scope of the federal government has expanded to

reach nearly every aspect of daily life, NFIB v. Sebelius,

21

567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012) (plurality op.), it should come as

no surprise that executive actions injure States with increasing frequency.

In any event, the number of lawsuits against the federal government filed by States pales in comparison to

some other litigants. While DHS complains (at 16) that

California filed 122 lawsuits against the Trump Administration and Washington filed 82, the Center for Biological Diversity boasted that it “resisted the Trump administration in every way possible” through “266 lawsuits

against the Trump administration from its inception to

its last day.” Administration Lawsuit Tracker, CENTER

BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.biologiFOR

caldiversity.org/campaigns/trump_lawsuits/ (last visited

Oct. 17, 2022). And the ACLU filed at least “400 legal actions against the Trump administration.” Am. Civil Liberties Union, Press Release: ACLU Has Filed 400 Legal

Actions Against Trump Administration (Aug. 17, 2020),

https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-has-filed-400legal-actions-against-trump-administration. Even if the

Executive must respond to an increase in politically salient lawsuits, singling out States for disfavored treatment

would not remedy the problem.

Petitioners (at 15-17) lament the “startling implications” of the States’ standing. But petitioners’ quarrel is

with the cause of action that the APA provides to those

“suffering legal wrong[s] because of agency action.” 5

U.S.C. § 702. Tellingly, petitioners do not contend that

the APA has “statutorily grant[ed] the right to sue to a

plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting

Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3)). Moreover, the APA supplies the States with not only a cause of action, but also a

waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity.

22

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 912 (1988). Thus,

petitioners’ quarrel is with choices Congress made in the

APA—not the States’ views on Article III standing.

3. Finally, DHS contends (at 13-15) that various historical analogues suggest that indirect effects of federal

regulations are not cognizable injuries. At the outset,

this argument is foreclosed by this Court’s precedents.

Supra pp. 18-19.

But it is also ahistorical. For example, DHS suggests

(at 14) that the absence of a State judicial challenge to

the Alien and Sedition Acts illustrates that the States believed they lacked standing to challenge those laws. It is

unclear what, if anything, that absence signifies. It may

have reflected the fact that, save for a brief window between 1801 and 1802, Congress did not statutorily vest

the federal courts with federal-question jurisdiction until

1875. 13D CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3561 (3d ed. 2022). It may have reflected beliefs that the federal government enjoyed sovereign immunity or that States lacked a cause of action,

problems that the APA did not resolve until 1946, Pub.

L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237. It could have been for any

number of other partisan or practical reasons, or for no

reason at all.

And contrary to petitioners’ assertions (at 15), neither Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1868),

nor Raines, 521 U.S. at 826, are analogous. Georgia rejected a challenge to the legality of Reconstruction as a

nonjusticiable question, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 77, and

Raines refused to recognize a group of legislators’ arguments for standing based on the “meaning” and “integrity” of their votes, 521 U.S. at 825. Not even petitioners

claim that the legality of the Final Memorandum is a political question, and the States’ standing rests on

23

concrete financial injuries—not abstract claims of political power.

By contrast, “certain harms readily qualify as concrete injuries under Article III.” TransUnion LLC v.

Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204 (2021). “The most obvious

are traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms

and monetary harms.” Id. The States have shown, and

the district court found, that the Final Memorandum inflicts traditional monetary harms on the States. That is

enough to establish the States’ standing, and this Court

should reject petitioners’ attempts to require more.

C. The States have parens patriae standing.

A State has parens patriae standing to protect its

quasi-sovereign interests in “the health and well-being of

its residents,” including their “economic and commercial

interests.” Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609. Here, the States seek

to protect the health and well-being of their residents by

protecting them from criminal aliens that Congress has

ordered detained. They thus have standing as much as

Puerto Rico did to protect its residents from labor-market discrimination. Id. at 608-09.

Massachusetts v. Mellon (Mellon), 262 U.S. 447

(1923), is not to the contrary. That case addressed only

suits seeking to protect citizens “from the operation of

[federal] statutes.” Id. at 485. Here, the States seek “to

assure [their] residents that they will have the full benefit of federal laws designed to address” the problems

caused by criminal aliens that Congress has ordered detained. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609-10. Moreover, this Court

has already clarified that no quasi-sovereign interests

were implicated in Mellon. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at

520 n.17. Mellon is therefore of little use to petitioners

here, where the States have proven harms to the health

and well-being of their residents at trial.

24

II. The Final Memorandum Is Substantively and

Procedurally Invalid.

The district court also correctly found that the Final

Memorandum violates the APA in three ways: (1) it contravenes the plain text of sections 1226(c) and 1231(a),

(2) it is arbitrary and capricious because it failed to reasonably address important aspects of the problem it purports to solve and failed to consider the States’ important

reliance interests, and (3) it did not undergo notice and

comment.

A. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the

INA’s detention mandates.

The Final Memorandum is contrary to sections

1226(c) and 1231(a).

1. Section 1226(c) provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who” has committed

certain crimes “when the alien is released” from criminal

custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). This provision ensures

that these aliens—who are subject to removal—will be

detained “during removal proceedings” instead of

threatening public safety. Demore, 538 U.S. at 517-18.

This Court has described this provision as mandatory.

Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 958-59; id. at 973-74 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring); id. at 973 (Thomas, J., concurring in

part); Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 847; Demore, 538 U.S. at

517-18.

The Final Memorandum contravenes this mandate in

two ways. First, it misconstrues a mandatory obligation

as a discretionary one by instructing immigration personnel to make “an assessment of the individual and the

totality of the facts and circumstances” relevant to detention or immigration enforcement. JA.113. Section

1226’s mandatory obligation allows no such latitude:

Congress has already determined that the only relevant

25

“fact or circumstance” to detention under that section is

the fact an alien has committed a relevant crime.

Second, it instructs immigration personnel to consider extra-statutory “mitigating factors” when determining whether to detain an alien subject to mandatory

detention, such as an alien’s “lengthy presence in the

United States,” “mental condition that may have contributed to the criminal conduct,” or the “time since an offense” was committed. JA.114-15. Again, Congress has

already determined the facts and circumstances which

might mitigate the need for detention. The Executive

may release an alien subject to section 1226(c)’s detention mandate “only if that release is necessary to” protect a witness or individual cooperating with a criminal

investigation (or the immediate family or close associates

of such a person), and even then, only when the alien has

demonstrated that he will not endanger public safety and

will appear for any scheduled proceeding. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c)(2). Read in tandem with section 1226(c)’s detention mandate, this exclusive avenue for release forecloses

reliance on other considerations to justify releasing an

alien subject to mandatory detention.

An example illustrates the Final Memorandum’s illegality. Suppose a State is prepared to release an alien

convicted of trafficking underage children. Section 1226

requires DHS to detain this alien. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c)(1)(A) (applying to aliens who have committed

offenses under “section 1182(a)(2) of this title”); id. at

§ 1182(a)(2)(H) (human traffickers). Under the Final

Memorandum, however, an immigration officer cannot

treat the fact of the trafficker’s conviction as a “bright

line[]” requiring detention. JA.113. Instead, the immigration official must investigate whether there are “mitigating factors,” such as whether the trafficker has a

26

“physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment,” JA.114, or the trafficker has previously exercised

“workplace or tenant rights,” JA.117. And even though

nothing in section 1226(c)’s detention mandate makes

those facts relevant, if the immigration officer fails to

weigh these considerations, the Final Memorandum

gives the trafficker a right to administrative review.

JA.310.

2. Similarly, section 1231(a) provides that “when an

alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of

90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). And “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2). Like section 1226, detention under

section 1231 is mandatory. Johnson, 141 S. Ct. at 2281.

But the Final Memorandum directs immigration officers

to exercise the same forms of “discretion” outlined above

in the “execution of removal orders,” JA.111, which the

district court found has resulted in the release of aliens

subject to removal orders, see JA.312; JA.317.

3. Petitioners first respond (at 25-27) that statutory

bars in sections 1226(e) and 1231(h) “preclude” review of

the Final Memorandum. Not so.

a. Section 1226(e) provides that “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application

of this section shall not be subject to review.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(e). But this Court has said that section 1226(e)’s

limitation “applies only to discretionary decisions about

the application of § 1226 to particular cases.” Nielsen,

139 S. Ct. at 962. It does not preclude challenges involving DHS’s systemic application of section 1226’s “statutory framework.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 841; Demore,

538 U.S. at 516-17. Petitioners’ reliance on the supposed

“breadth” of section 1226(e)’s subsidiary limitations

27

“regarding” “any” given alien are thus misplaced. Pet.

Br. 25 (quoting Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1622

(2022)). In any event, petitioners forfeited any reliance

on section 1226(e) by failing to raise (or even to cite) it in

their stay application, which petitioners invited the

Court to construe as a petition for certiorari before judgment. S. Ct. R. 14.1(a).

DHS attempts (at 26) to distinguish those precedents

because they involved “habeas review,” a context in

which this Court requires a “particularly clear statement” for Congress to foreclose review. But this Court

likewise requires a clear statement to foreclose challenges to “administrative action,” including for “legislation regarding immigration.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S.

233, 251-52 (2010); see also Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr,

140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069 (2020). So this is no distinction at

all.

Petitioners also have another problem: they claim (at

2) that the Final Memorandum is an exercise of authority

under 6 U.S.C. § 202(5). That does not change the merits

equation—statutory “limitations” like section 1226(c)

may preclude petitioners’ exercise of authority under

other statutes. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). But petitioners’ reliance on 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) has fatal ramifications for their

reviewability argument: section 1226(e)’s bar on review

applies only to actions taken “under th[at] section.” 8

U.S.C. § 1226(e) (emphasis added). If, as DHS claims, the

Final Memorandum is an action taken under section 202

of Title 6, then review of that action cannot be barred by

a limitation that textually applies only to section 1226 of

Title 8.

b. Section 1231(h) also does not bar this challenge. It

provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to

create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that

28

is legally enforceable by any party against the United

States or its agencies or officers or any other person.”

8 U.S.C. § 1231(h). Nothing in this provision mentions,

much less forecloses, judicial review. Congress knows

how to limit judicial review. For example, it has provided

that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” multiple

types of immigration orders, “[n]owithstanding any

other provision of law.” Id. at § 1252(a)(2)(A). That use of

“disparate” language must be treated as “intentional[].”

Kucana, 558 U.S. at 249.

History and context also show that section 1231(h)

was designed to overturn the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 1231’s predecessor statute, which that

court interpreted as giving removable aliens a judicially

enforceable right to speedy removal. Soler v. Scott, 942

F.2d 597, 601-04 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress responded in

1994 by amending the INA through the Immigration and

Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L.

No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305. Section 225 of that statute

included language similar to now-section 1231(h) renouncing the creation of any “substantive or procedural

right” by section 1231’s predecessor. Id.

The Ninth Circuit recognized the upshot: the “intended target of section 225 . . . must have been our

Ninth Circuit law allowing” aliens to seek speedy removal. Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1995).

The legislative record also reflects this purpose. See 140

Cong. Rec. 28,441 (1994). In IIRIRA, Congress transferred this provision to now-section 1231(h). And it again

indicated that the provision was intended to prevent

what the Ninth Circuit had previously enabled—alien

suits seeking speedy removal. See H.R. Rep. No. 104828, at 219 (1996).

29

DHS does not dispute this context. Instead, it contends (at 26-27) that section 1231(h) applies to “any

party,” not just aliens challenging a slow removal. Here,

context shows that Congress meant to foreclose aliens

from claiming a “substantive or procedural right” to fast

removal—not to foreclose States from challenging the

Final Memorandum. 3

4. Petitioners’ five merits arguments regarding section 1226 and two merits arguments regarding section

1231 are also wrong.

a. First, DHS asserts (at 27) that section 1226(c) “applies only during the pendency of removal proceedings.”

Petitioners say (at 28) this matters because they have

“absolute discretion” whether to initiate removal proceedings and detain aliens before removal. But section

1226(c)’s text does not contain petitioners’ “removal proceedings” limitation: it instructs that “[t]he Attorney

General shall take into custody” classes of aliens “when

the alien is released” from criminal custody. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c)(1). It is textually irrelevant whether petitioners

intend to initiate removal proceedings; the statute requires detention when the alien is released from criminal

custody.

Second, petitioners argue (at 28) that section

1226(c)’s detention mandate should not be read to “displace [their] traditional discretion over decisions to apprehend individuals not yet in custody.” To whatever extent such discretion exists in other contexts, it cannot be

Petitioners’ reliance (at 27) on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) is also misplaced. The States are not raising claims “by or on behalf of any

alien” per section 1252(g), and that section provides no “clear and

convincing evidence of legislative intention to preclude review.” Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4

(1986).

3

30

squared here with the statute’s “mandatory language:

‘shall,’” which imposes “an obligation.” Me. Cmty. Health

Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1320 (2020);

Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162,

171 (2016). Nor can it be reconciled with Congress deeming it “too risky” to release aliens that section 1226(c) covers. Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 959.

Third, petitioners argue (at 28-29) that Congress

does not lightly abrogate DHS’s enforcement discretion.

As history shows, Congress did not do so lightly—it did

so “against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS,

DHS’s predecessor organization, to deal with increasing

rates of criminal activity by aliens.” Demore, 538 U.S. at

518. Congress considered this “wholesale failure” exceptionally serious and “had before it evidence that one of the

major causes of the INS’[s] failure to remove deportable

criminal aliens was the agency’s failure to detain those aliens during deportation proceedings.” Id. at 519. It therefore remedied that failure by making such detention mandatory.

Petitioners’ contrary authority is inapposite. One

cited case did not involve executive enforcement discretion at all, but a claim that a city ordinance violated due

process. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 46

(1999). Petitioners’ remaining authorities involved challenges to individual non-enforcement decisions—not

regulations that change an enforcement scheme altogether. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 751 (addressing an

alleged “fail[ure] to respond properly” to violations of a

restraining order); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823 (“investigatory and enforcement actions” regarding lethal-injection

drugs); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,

525 U.S. 471, 472-73 (1999) (individual aliens’ challenges

to immigration decisions).

31

This Court has never held that an agency’s generally

applicable rules about how or whether it will enforce the

law in toto are beyond scrutiny as exercises of putative

enforcement discretion. Cf. OSG Bulk Ships v. United

States, 132 F.3d 808, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kenney v.

Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996); Crowley

Caribbean Transp. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir.

1994). Rightly so: any such theory of “enforcement discretion” would conflict with the Executive’s obligation to

see the laws faithfully executed. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3;

see also United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1203,

1229 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (Paterson, J.) (Executive “cannot

suspend [a statute’s] operation, dispense with its application, or prevent its effect . . . . If he could do so, he

could repeal the law, and would thus invade the province

assigned to the legislature.”).

Fourth, petitioners contend (at 29-30) that Congress

has not appropriated the funds necessary to detain all aliens required by section 1226(c)(1). But Congress excused the Executive’s failure to comply with section

1226(c)(1)’s detention mandate only during the “two-year

grace period” following IIRIRA. Galvez, 56 F. Supp. at

641. INS asked for an extension, but Congress refused.

See INS Issues Detention Guidelines, supra. On DHS’s

theory, Congress’s grace period was superfluous because petitioners retained the authority to excuse their

own noncompliance indefinitely. This Court has already

rejected that theory. See Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 969-70.

Instead, Congress enacted the grace period understanding that funding problems alone do not permit the Executive to re-write congressional commands. In re Aiken

County, 725 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh,

J.); see also Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 567 U.S.

182, 189 (2012).

32

In any event, this Court should view petitioners’

claims about their inability to comply with section

1226(c) skeptically. The district court found that “the

Government has not acted in good faith” regarding its

“insufficient resources and limited detention capacity.”

JA.358-59. And while “blam[ing] Congress for [its] deficiency” in bed space, petitioners have “persistently underutilized existing detention facilities,” JA.359, and

have “submitted two budget requests in which [they]

ask[] Congress to cut those very resources and capacity

by 26%,” JA.358.

Fifth, petitioners are wrong (at 29-30) that 6 U.S.C.

§ 202(5)’s general grant of authority to establish “immigration enforcement policies and priorities” overrides

section 1226(c). When one statute gives a “general permission” that is “contradicted by a specific prohibition”

in another, the “contradiction” is “eliminate[d]” by construing the “specific provision” as “an exception to the

general one.” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012). Whatever general

authority DHS possesses is limited by section 1226(c).

b. Petitioners’ arguments regarding section 1231 are

likewise meritless. First, petitioners contend (at 31) that,

although section 1231(a)(2) mandates detention, it does

not “speak to apprehension.” Said differently, petitioners argue that aliens who are detained must stay detained, but aliens need not be arrested in the first place.

This argument depends on petitioners’ interpretation of

the term “detain” to mean something akin to “keep in

custody” only. And that, in turn, depends on a “strange”

inference about Congress’s intent—namely, that it would

inexplicably “forbid the release of aliens who need not be

arrested in the first place.” Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 970.

33

DHS’s reading ignores that the word “detain” is often

understood to mean “arrest.” See GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 270 (3d ed. 2011). Petitioners note

(at 31) that other INA sections use “detention” in conjunction with “apprehension” and “arrest,” and contend

that detention must not include arrests. But this observation cuts the other way: it shows that Congress used

“apprehension” and “arrest” to denote taking one into

custody. There is nothing remarkable about Congress

using “detain” for the same purpose. “Though one might

wish it were otherwise,” legislators “more than rarely

use the same word to denote different concepts, and often (out of a misplaced pursuit of stylistic elegance) use

different words to denote the same concept.” A. SCALIA

& B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF

LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012); see also Kirtsaeng v. John

Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 540 (2013).

Second, DHS contends (at 32) that in all events it may

release at least some aliens with removal orders because

section 1231(a)(2)’s “second sentence” provides that

DHS may “under no circumstance” release aliens with a

removal order who have committed certain crimes. Accordingly, they say section 1231(a)(2)’s first sentence—

providing that petitioners “shall detain the alien”—must

provide discretion to release other types of aliens or the

second sentence is superfluous. But the second sentence

reflects “belt-and-suspenders caution,” which is not

atypical. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Christian, 140 S. Ct.

1335, 1350 n.5 (2020); Territory of Guam v. United

States, 141 S. Ct. 1608, 1615 (2021). The subset of aliens

subject to section 1231(a)(2)’s second sentence includes

those convicted of serious crimes and terrorists. It was

prudent for Congress to emphasize that no matter what

contingencies may arise, terrorists must not be released.

34

Petitioners’ claim that they have unbridled discretion to

release other aliens subject to section 1231(a)(2) is contrary to law and thus a violation of the APA. 4

B. The Final Memorandum is arbitrary and

capricious.

The Final Memorandum is also arbitrary and capricious, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), because it lacks a “reasonable

and reasonably explained” justification, FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021).

1. First, the Final Memorandum failed to consider

“recidivism among the relevant population at issue in

this case,” namely aliens subject to sections 1226(c) and

1231(a)(2). JA.481. That is “an important aspect of the

problem,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.

State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), because the high

rates of abscondment and recidivism are the reasons

Congress enacted section 1226(c) in the first place. See

Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.

Petitioners nonetheless contend (at 34) that the Final

Memorandum considers this issue by allowing immigration officers to weigh criminal attributes as “aggravating” factors in their case-by-case analysis. See JA.146.

But petitioners miss the core problem: the Final Memorandum’s requirement that immigration officers weigh

these factors at all instead of following Congress’s mandates. JA.113. DHS offered no reasonable explanation

for that decision.

Petitioners also contend (at 34) that they consulted

recidivism data. That data ostensibly shows that “reconviction rates drop off significantly for” certain

Petitioners’ reliance (at 32) on past Executive practice must

yield to the INA. “[P]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.”

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008).

4

35

individuals. JA.147. But that is a non-sequitur—that

some criminal aliens may not recidivate does not explain

why DHS has decided to ignore Congress’s instructions

as to covered criminal aliens. Congress was plainly aware

when it enacted section 1226(c) that not every alien it ordered detained would recidivate if released, but Congress ordered them detained nonetheless. Even assuming DHS had discretion to override that judgment, it has

no “reasonable and reasonably explained” basis for doing

so. Prometheus, 141 S. Ct. at 1158.

Second, the Final Memorandum failed to account for

the States’ reliance interests. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913.

DHS recognized that the Final Memorandum implicated

State reliance interests, including “costs related to additional incarceration” of affected aliens, “post-release supervision” of those aliens, and the additional education,

healthcare, and social-services costs that the States

would have to absorb due to the Final Memorandum’s

extra-statutory framework. JA.141; JA.150. But DHS

did not meaningfully address why it rejected those reliance interests.

Petitioners insist (at 35) that DHS addressed the

States’ reliance interests because DHS’s “Considerations Memo includes an entire section entitled ‘Impact on

States.’” But much of that section does not even address

reliance interests. To the contrary, DHS admitted that

they it didn’t address costs because it found the question

“uniquely difficult.” JA.150-51. Instead of attempting to

determine the States’ costs, DHS asserted that there

was “good reason to believe that any effects” were “unlikely to be significant.” JA.153.

Ultimately, DHS dismissed the States’ concerns in a

single paragraph stating that “no such reasonable reliance interests exist” because (1) DHS was “unaware of

36

any State that has materially changed its position to its

detriment as a result of” previous policies, and (2) reliance would be “unreasonable in [the] light of” the Executive’s history of enforcement discretion. JA.154-55.

This so-called analysis was inadequate. The statement “that a factor was considered” is “not a substitute

for considering” it. Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 185

(D.C. Cir. 2002); Getty v. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 805 F.2d

1050, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The first rationale is also legally defective: the same was true in Regents, nevertheless this Court found the failure to consider State reliance interests fatal. See 140 S. Ct. at 1914. And the second rationale fails because DHS has repeatedly disclaimed the discretion it now insists upon. 5 It was reasonable for the States to rely on the federal government’s decades-long interpretation that section 1226(c)

mandates detention. DHS’s failure to consider those interests as well as other aspects of the problem render the

Final Memorandum arbitrary and capricious.

C. The Final Memorandum is procedurally

invalid for lack of notice and comment.

The Final Memorandum is procedurally invalid because DHS never undertook notice-and-comment procedures.

1. Agency actions with “the force and effect of law”

must generally be promulgated through notice and comment. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2420 (2019); 5

U.S.C. § 553(b). Agency actions promulgating a “substantive regulatory change” fall within this category.

Supra pp. 4-5; cf., e.g., Reply Br. at *7, Albence v. Guzman

Chavez, No. 19-897, 2020 WL 3124376 (Mar. 14, 2020); Oral Arg. Tr.

at *9, Nielsen, 2018 WL 4922082; Pet. Br. at *26, Reno, 2000 WL

1784982; Matter of Garvin-Noble, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 678.

5

37

U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir.

2005). This includes agency actions that create a “safe

harbor” preventing the agency from taking enforcement

actions, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578

U.S. 590, 598-99 (2016), “set forth bright-line tests to

shape and channel agency enforcement,” Alaska v. Dep’t

of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1989), or purport

to “alter[] the immigration laws” affecting removability

on a class-wide basis, Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1927

(Thomas, J., concurring in part).

The Final Memorandum substantively changes the

regulatory regime in multiple respects. It functionally

confers a safe harbor on removable aliens by limiting immigration officers’ authority to detain them, JA.112, and

removing “bright lines” that the INA establishes,

JA.113. It implements mechanisms that significantly tie

immigration officers’ hands. See JA.311. And it provides

aliens a right of review if they believe their rights under

the Final Memorandum were violated. JA.309-10.

The Final Memorandum also contains the hallmark

of any rule: “[i]t commands, it requires, it orders, it dictates.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243,

252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.). It instructs immigration officers: “[w]hether a noncitizen poses a current

threat to public safety is not to be determined according

to any bright lines.” JA.113. That determination instead

“requires an assessment of the individual.” Id. “[P]ersonnel must evaluate the individual and the totality of the

facts.” JA.115. And officers “must ensure that enforcement actions . . . do not lead to inequitable outcomes.”

JA.116. Even petitioners invoke the Final Memorandum’s “uniform[ity].” Pet. Br. 37.

Petitioners contend (at 37) that the Final Memorandum does not “create any right or benefit, substantive or

38

procedural, enforceable at law” because the Final Memorandum asserted as much. JA.120. But “courts have

long looked to the contents of the agency’s action, not the

agency’s self-serving label, when deciding whether statutory notice-and-comment demands apply.” Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (2019).

2. Petitioners are also wrong that the Final Memorandum was exempt from notice and comment as either

a “general statement[] of policy” or a “rule[] of agency

organization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b)(A). “Agencies have never been able to avoid notice and comment simply by mislabeling their substantive pronouncements.” Azar, 139 S. Ct. at 1812.

Policy statements are agency actions that merely “inform the public of [the agency’s] views on the proper application” of statutes and rules it administers. Nat’l Park

Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 809 (2003).

They “do[] not have a present-day binding effect,” “do[]

not impose any rights and obligations,” and “genuinely

leave[] the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion.” McLouth Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas,

838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (cleaned up). But the

Final Memorandum has practical binding effect on all

immigration officers. Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d

377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Final Memorandum strips

away the “discretion” that immigration officers previously had to follow the plain text of the statutory commands of sections 1226(c) and 1231(a)(2), without considering multiple extra-statutory factors. JA.113. And it imposes obligations on immigration officers to rigorously

abide by, and document their compliance with, the Final

Memorandum’s priorities—subject to a right for aliens

to have their enforcement decisions reviewed. Insofar as

Congress “vested” the Secretary of Homeland Security

39

with delegated authority over subordinates regarding

immigration enforcement, Pet. Br. 38 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§ 1103(a) and 6 U.S.C. § 202(5)), petitioners all but concede the Final Memorandum’s binding effect, see John

F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 893, 916 (2004) (general statements of policy must

be “wholly nonbinding”).

3. Petitioners counter (at 39) that “agencies routinely

adopt important enforcement policies without notice and

comment.” Of course, there is no “adverse possession”

rule of administrative law that would legitimize a

longstanding failure to follow this APA requirement. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006). Moreover, an explanation about how the agency will exercise

“broad enforcement discretion” may not always require

notice and comment. See Nat’l Mining, 758 F.3d at 252.

But that is only when the agency “merely explains how

[it] will enforce a statute or regulation,” id.—not where

it announces new binding rules that change the existing

regulatory regime. Cf. id. at 253.

III. The District Court’s Remedy Was Lawful.

The APA authorizes, and the INA does not prohibit,

vacating the Final Memorandum. The APA’s “set aside”

authority allows vacatur of unlawful agency actions, as

courts have held for decades. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Because

that remedy is distinct from injunctive relief, the INA’s

bar on certain lower-court injunctions does not apply to

the district court’s order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). But if this

Court holds otherwise, it should vacate the Final Memorandum or enjoin its enforcement as section 1252(f)(1) allows.

40

A. The APA authorizes vacatur.

The APA provides that a “reviewing court shall . . .

hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and

conclusions found to be” “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Courts have long relied on the “set

aside” authority to vacate unlawful agency actions.

Nonetheless, petitioners argue (at 40-44) that the APA

does not authorize vacatur. Petitioners are wrong.

1. A court “set[s] aside agency action” by vacating it.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2). When Congress adopted the APA, “set

aside” meant “to cancel, annul, or revoke.” BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 1612 (3d ed. 1933). The APA “reflected a

consensus that judicial review of agency action should be

modeled on appellate review of trial court judgments.”

Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative

Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 258 (2017). Just five years

after the APA’s enactment, the Third Circuit explained

that section 706(2) “affirmatively provides for vacation of

agency action.” Cream Wipt Food Prods. Co. v. Fed. Sec.

Adm’r, 187 F.2d 789, 790 (3d Cir. 1951).

This interpretation harmonizes the “set aside” authority with the rest of the APA. It would be illogical for

the APA to allow a court to “postpone the effective date

of an agency action” during litigation, 5 U.S.C. § 705, but

be powerless to terminate that action if the court concludes the action is “unlawful,” id. § 706(2). Likewise,

section 706(1) suggests that section 706(2) authorizes vacatur. The former allows courts to “compel” agency action while the latter authorizes the inverse. 5 U.S.C.

§ 706. 6

Relatedly, petitioners provide (at 42-43) an incomplete picture

of the APA’s legislative history. For example, a committee report

6

41

2. Petitioners contend (at 40) that section 706(2) is

merely a rule of decision and does not authorize vacatur.

But “‘[s]et aside’ usually means ‘vacate.’” V.I. Tel. Corp.

v. FCC, 444 F.3d 666, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2006). DHS claims

(at 41) that its interpretation is necessary because section 706(2) covers “agency action, findings, and conclusions,” and a court cannot “vacate an agency’s ‘findings’

and ‘conclusions.’” Yet courts routinely do just that. See,

e.g., Aragon v. Tillerson, 240 F. Supp. 3d 99, 120 (D.D.C.

2017) (conclusion); Fogo De Chao (Holdings), Inc. v.

DHS, 211 F. Supp. 3d 31, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding).

Petitioners’ interpretation also makes section 706(2)’s

“hold unlawful” command superfluous. Congress would

not have required courts to both “hold unlawful and set

aside” rules if a court could “set aside” a rule by merely

deeming it unlawful. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

Petitioners argue (at 41) that courts cannot vacate

statutes and claim their interpretation “aligns ordinary

judicial review of agency action with judicial review of

legislation.” But “the [APA] establishes a unique form of

judicial review that differs from judicial review of statutes.” Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 950 (2018); see also Mila Sohoni, The Power to Vacate a Rule, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV.

1121, 1191-92 (2020).

Against this backdrop, vacatur violates no equitable

principles. Contra Pet. Br. 43. Petitioners’ concern (at

43-44) for the “now-familiar problems with nationwide

injunctions” is similarly misplaced. Whatever the propriety of a nationwide injunction in any given case, vacatur

finds its legitimacy in statutory text. District courts,

cited by petitioners paraphrases section 706 as involving the “review

and invalidation of agency action.” Administrative Procedure Act,

S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 40 (1946) (emphasis added).

42

including the court below, have abided this Court’s instruction against injunctions where “a less drastic remedy” “such as partial or complete vacatur” redresses the

injury. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S.

139, 165-66 (2010); JA.400-02. This Court has applied the

same principle. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916 n.7.

3. If accepted, petitioners’ interpretation would upend decades of APA decisions. For more than 30 years,

vacatur has been “the ordinary result” when the D.C.

Circuit “determines that agency regulations are unlawful.” Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 495 n.21

(D.C. Cir. 1989). Elsewhere, vacatur is the “default rule.”

E.g., Data Mktg. P’ship, LP v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 45

F.4th 846, 859 (5th Cir. 2022). And this Court has affirmed lower court decisions vacating administrative action. See, e.g., Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901 & 1916 n.7.

Petitioners’ argument also clashes with Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). See generally Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Lujan’s five-Justice

majority observed that an “entire” agency program is

“affected” by a successful “challenge[] under the APA.”

Id. at 890 n.2. Similarly, Lujan’s four-Justice dissent explained that when a “plaintiff prevails” in APA litigation,

“the result is that the rule is invalidated, not simply that

the court forbids its application to a particular individual.” 497 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Against

this authority, petitioners cite no case adopting their interpretation. The district court correctly applied section

706(2) to vacate the Final Memorandum. 7

Petitioners suggest (at 44 n.6) that if the Final Memorandum

is vacated, vacatur should apply only to the parties. This atextual

argument raises unanswerable questions. “[H]ow could this Court

7

43

B. The INA does not bar vacatur of the Final

Memorandum.

Section 1252(f)(1)’s “[l]imit on injunctive relief” provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall

have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the

operation of” sections 1221-1232 of Title 8. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(f)(1). The district court correctly concluded that

this restriction did not prevent it from vacating the Final

Memorandum. JA.400; JA.447-50.

1. “By its plain terms, and even by its title,” section

1252(f)(1) “is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.” Reno, 525 U.S. at 481. Section 1252(f) confines itself to injunctions through its reference to remedies that “enjoin or restrain.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). As

“common doublets in legal writing” “restrain and enjoin”

are often used as “coupled synonyms.” GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE, supra, at 295-96. Indeed, dictionaries contemporaneous to the passage of section

1252(f)(1) defined “enjoin” as “restrain by injunction.”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 550 (7th ed. 1999).

“Enjoin” and “restrain,” independently and as a doublet, refer to injunctive relief. This Court has entered injunctions against parties in its original-jurisdiction

docket by holding that they are “enjoined and restrained.” E.g., California v. Arizona, 452 U.S. 431, 432

(1981). The doublet also frequently appears on district

court injunctions like the preliminary injunction entered

in this case. Texas, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 441.

vacate the Rule with respect to the . . . plaintiffs in this case without

vacating the Rule writ large? What would it mean to ‘vacate’ a rule

as to some but not other members of the public?” O.A. v. Trump,

404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 153 (D.D.C. 2019).

44

At times, “enjoin” and “restrain” refer to injunctions

and restraining orders as distinct from one another. For

example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) describes

the subject of a “preliminary injunction” or “temporary

restraining order” as a party “enjoined or restrained.”

Whether treated as synonyms or references to two types

of injunctive relief, “enjoin or restrain” as used in section

1252(f)(1) specifies injunctive relief.

Subsection 1252(f)’s title, “Limit on injunctive relief,”

confirms this interpretation. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f). “[T]he

heading of a section” is a “tool available for the resolution

of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.” AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (cleaned

up). Almendarez-Torres held that another portion of Title 8 authorized a penalty in part because the relevant

portion was titled “Criminal penalties.” Id. Similarly,

INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc.,

502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991), held that an immigration regulation’s “generic reference to ‘employment’ should be

read as a reference to the ‘unauthorized employment’

identified in the paragraph’s title.” Here, section

1252(f)’s “title—‘Limit on injunctive relief’—makes clear

the narrowness of [the statute’s] scope.” Biden v. Texas,

142 S. Ct. 2528, 2539 (2022). It “prohibits . . . injunctive

relief.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 851.

2. Petitioners (at 47-48) stretch section 1252(f) by giving “enjoin” and “restrain” independent meanings

through the rule against surplusage. But an interpretation that section 1252(f) refers to injunctions and restraining orders alike prevents surplusage. And in any

event, “that canon can be appropriately discounted”

“[w]hen a drafter has engaged in the retrograde practice

of stringing out synonyms and near-synonyms.” SCALIA,

supra, at 179. “Sometimes drafters do repeat themselves

45

and do include words that add nothing of substance . . . .

Doublets and triplets abound in legalese.” Id. at 176-77.

Section 1252(f)(1)’s employment of a common doublet is

highlighted by a House report characterizing the section.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 161 (1996). The report

twice describes the section as covering only orders that

“enjoin” despite the draft statute’s “enjoin or restrain”

text. Id.

Moreover, interpreting “enjoin or restrain” in section

1252(f)(1) as referring either to injunctions and temporary restraining orders or as a common legal doublet addresses petitioners’ concern (at 47-48) for “interpretive

problems” in section 1252(f)(2). Subsection (f)(2)

emerged out of a conference committee more than a year

after subsection (f)(1) was originally proposed and uses

only “enjoin.” Compare H.R. 1915, 104th Cong. § 306(a)

(1995), with H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 67 (1996). But “enjoin” can mean “restrain,” supra p. 44, and can be synonymous with “enjoin and restrain.” Subsections (f)(1) and

(2) cover the same orders: injunctive relief.

3. Contrary to DHS’s contention (at 45), a court does

not enter injunctive relief or do something “practically

equivalent” when it vacates agency action. “[A]n injunction is a judicial process or mandate operating in personam by which, upon certain established principles of equity, a party is required to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (11th ed.

2019) (quoting 1 HOWARD C. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON THE

LAW RELATING TO INJUNCTIONS § 1, at 2-3 (1909)).

Vacatur does not operate in personam, and it does

not involve coercion as petitioners (at 47) assert. Vacatur

operates against a challenged action, is self-executing,

and is accomplished through the court’s order. It operates “in the same way that an appellate court formally

46

revokes an erroneous trial-court judgment.” Mitchell,

supra, at 1012.

Nor does vacatur “require[] officials” to do or “refrain” from anything. Pet. Br. 45 (quoting Garland v.

Aleman Gonzalez, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2065 (2022)) (cleaned

up). Like the revocation of a court order, judicial annulment of administrative action may alter a party’s conduct, but it does not order anyone to do anything. Vacatur is thus not “coercive.” Pet. Br. 46 (quoting Aberdeen

& Rockfish R.R. v. S.C.R.A.P., 422 U.S. 289, 307 (1975)).

The two remedies differ in additional ways. “An

injunction is a[n] . . . extraordinary remedy,” Monsanto,

561 U.S. at 165, while vacatur is “the ordinary result,”

Harmon, 878 F.2d at 495 n.21. Injunctions “should not

be granted as a matter of course,” Monsanto, 561 U.S. at

165, but vacatur is the “default,” Data Mktg. P’ship, LP,

45 F.4th at 859. Injunctions require showing “an

irreparable injury,” and both “the public interest” and

“the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and

defendant” must favor injunctive relief. eBay Inc. v.

MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Vacatur’s

“less drastic remedy,” Monsanto, 561 U.S. at 165,

requires none of those showings.

4. Whatever ambiguity exists in section 1252(f) favors

the States’ interpretation permitting vacatur. “[T]his

Court applies a ‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC v.

EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). “This

default rule is ‘well-settled,’ and Congress is presumed

to legislate with it in mind.” Salinas v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.,

141 S. Ct. 691, 698 (2021) (citation omitted). “[T]he burden for rebutting it is ‘heavy,’” and is met “when a statute’s language or structure demonstrates that Congress

wanted an agency to police its own conduct.” Smith v.

47

Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1776-77 (2019) (quoting Mach

Mining, 575 U.S. at 486). Here, section 1252(f)’s title and

text both confirm the opposite. Petitioners’ argument

“would likely insulate virtually every rule related to the

INA from judicial review,” JA.449, and should be rejected.

C. If the district court erred, this Court should

vacate or enjoin the Final Memorandum.

This Court should provide a remedy if it agrees with

the States as to their standing and the merits but accepts

either of petitioners’ remedy arguments. If the APA does

not authorize vacatur, this Court should enter an injunction as only it can. See Biden, 142 S. Ct. at 2538-39. If the

APA authorizes vacatur but section 1252(f)(1) precludes

the district court’s vacatur of the Final Memorandum,

this Court should vacate the Memorandum.

1. Section 1252(f)(1) does not restrict this Court’s authority on its own terms. Biden, 142 S. Ct. at 2539-40.

The All Writs Act authorizes this Court to issue injunctions, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and nothing in the APA limits vacatur to district courts, 5 U.S.C. §§ 703, 706(2). The live

complaint seeks both remedies as well as declaratory relief. JA.107; see also JA.393. Petitioners (at 48) concede

that those remedies are always available from this Court.

2. The States are entitled to vacatur for the reasons

discussed in Part II. If vacatur is unavailable, this Court

should permanently enjoin petitioners’ implementation

and enforcement of the Final Memorandum. A plaintiff

seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that

remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,

are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,

considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and

48

(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a

permanent injunction. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.

The States satisfy all four requirements. First, the

States have suffered an irreparable injury for the same

reasons they have suffered an injury-in-fact. Supra pp. 13-15. The Final Memorandum has and will inflict significant unrecoverable financial costs on the

States, including healthcare, education, and correctional

services. Second, remedies at law are inadequate. Sovereign immunity prevents the States from recovering

money damages from petitioners. Third, the balance-ofhardships and public-interest elements merge where, as

here, the government is the defendant. Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). Just as “[t]here is always a public interest in prompt execution of removal orders,” there

is always a public interest in the detention of criminal aliens consistent with Congress’s mandates. Id. at 436.

Such aliens’ non-detention “‘permits and prolongs a continuing violation of United States law.’” Id. (quoting

Reno, 525 U.S. at 490) (cleaned up).

49

C O NC LU SIO N

The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted.

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General of

Louisiana

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Solicitor General

JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN

Deputy Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third St.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

(225) 326-6766

OCTOBER 2022

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER

First Assistant Attorney

General

JUDD E. STONE II

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ARI CUENIN

BENJAMIN D. WILSON

Deputy Solicitors General

ERIC J. HAMILTON

RYAN S. BAASCH

Assistant Solicitors General

OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Judd.Stone@oag.texas.gov

(512) 936-1700

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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