Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Terron Gerhard Dizzley, Petitioner v. Melvin Garrett

FILED

AUG 0 5 2022

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT. U.S.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Terron Dizzley

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

Melvin Garrett

— RESPONDENTS)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Terron Dizzley, 359480

(Your Name)

4460 Broad River Road

(Address)

Columbia, South Carolina 29210

(City, State, Zip Code)

(Phone Number)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether The United States Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit, affirmance of the District Court's

order that the State law determines the time of accrual for filing a civil action under 42 U. S. C. A. 81983

is erroneous and contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court law?

LIST OF PARTIES

E 4 All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

RELATED CASES

State v Terron Dizzley, 2009-GS-22-00778

Terron Dizzley v State, 2015-CP-22-00845

Dizzley v Cartledge, 2017 WL 92886979

. Terron Dizzley v Warden Stephan, 8:20-CV-00126-SAL

Terron Dizzley v Warden Stephan, No. 21-6329

Terron Dizzley v Scott Hixon, 2:20-CV-02613-SAL

ii

Table of Contents

Questions Presented

i-

List of Parties and Related Cases

n

Table of Contents

111 IV

Index of Appendices

m-iv

Table of Authoritories

v-vi

Opinion Below

1

Jurisdiction.

1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

2-3

Statement of Case

4

Reasons for Granting the Writ of Certiorari

10

I.

Plaintiff contends that The United States Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit,

affirmance of the District Court’s order that the State law determines the time of

accrual for filing a civil action under 42 U. S. C. A. 8 1983 is erroneous and

contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court law.

16

Conclusion

Appendix.

iii

Appendix A Decision from Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

Appendix B

Decision of The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Petiton for Rehearing

Appendix C Decision from The United States District

Appendix D Arrest Warrant

Appendix E

Investigative Report, Private Investigator Bennie L. Webb of The Palmetto

Center for Law and Justice

Appendix F Trial 2014 Transcript of Testimony Investigtor Melvin Garrett

Appendix G

Investigative Reports of Statement from Aundry Evans, Sr. and Naomi Alston

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v Ferbar Corp. of Cal.. 522 U. S. 192(1997) 11

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964)

6

Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly. 550 U. S. 544 (2007)

13

Bell v Hood. 327 U. S. 678 (1946

15

Canter v American and Ocean Inst. Cos, of New York. 327 U. S. 554 (1929)

15

Cox v Stanton. 529 F. 2d 47 (1975 4th Cir.5

11

Credit Suisse Securities (USF-) LLC v Simmonds. 566 U. S. 221 (2012)

14

El. Du Pontde Nemours and Co. v Kolon Indus..Inc.. 637 F. 3d 535,440 (2011 4fh Cir.).

13

Erickson v Pardus. 551 U. S. 89, 94 (2007)

13

Exploration Co. v U. S.. 247 U. S. 435 (1918)

14

Franks v. Delaware. 438 U. S. 154(1978).

6,10

Giordenello v. U. S.. 357 U. S. 480 (1958)

5

Homberg v Armbrict 327 U. S. 392 (1946)

13

Illinois v. Gates. 462 U. S. 239 (1983)

6

Mallev v. Briggs. 475 U. S. 335 (1986)

6

Nasim v Warden. Md. House of Corn. 64 F. 3d 951, 955 (1995 4th Cir.)

12

Nerck and Co., Inc., v Reynolds. 559 U. S. 633 (2010)

14

Rawlings vRav. 312 U. S. 96 (1941)

11

Ryals v Montgomery Co.. 515 Fed. Appx. 75 (2013 3r. Cir.)

12

Rvals. supra. 515 Fed. Appx. 75 (2013 3rd Cir.)

13

U. S. v Doe. 703 F. 2d. 745 (1983,3rd Cir.)

9

U.S.v Kubrick. 444 U. S. Ill, 122-224(1979

11

v

Wallace v Kato. 549 U. S. 384 (20071

11

West v. Cabell. 153 U. S. 78 (1894)

9

Whitelev v. Warden. Wvo. State Pen.. 401 U. S. 560(19

6

Wong SunvU. S. ,371 (1963)

6

VI

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix

the petition and is

reported at 21-68-73

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix

the petition and is

A

C

[x] reported at 2:19-CV-00530-RVH

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[ 1 For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix_____ to the petition and is

[ ] reported at

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the __

court

appears at Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at____

; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

1.

to

to

JURISDICTION

[*) For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was 02-02-2022______________ _

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

50 A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: 05-10-2022

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix B

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including______

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

C ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix______

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including____

(date) on

(date) in

Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The following statutory and constitutional provisions are involved in this

case.

U. S. CONST., AMEND IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U. S. CONST., AMEND VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.

U. S. CONST., AMEND XIII Section 1.

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof

the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any

place subject to their jurisdiction..

U. S. CONST., AMEND XIV

Section 1.

All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

2

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

28 U. S. C. A. 8 1651

3

STATEMENT OF CASE

Plaintiff contends that according to the United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment,

s?

the only variable that separates the crime of kidnapping, from a lawful arrest is “probable cause.

Plaintiff contends that the record shows that on December 11, 2008, Investigator Melvin

Garrett of the Georgetown, South Carolina Police Department applied for an arrest warrant for

Plaintiff Terron Gerhard Dizzley, for murder without probable cause and prepared an affidavit

in the arrest warrant that does not provide any information at all that would enable a magistrate

judge to determine probable cause. Thus, according to the Fourth Amendment, Petitioner’s

arrest warrant is constitutionally deficient. After hiring a Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb,

it was also found that Investigator Garrett made “false declarations” to the magistrate to obtain

Petitioner’s arrest warrant. See: Exhibits.

Plaintiff contends that an evaluation of his arrest warrant, compared to The Fourth

Amendment, and clearly established United States Supreme Court law proofs that his arrest

warrant is constitutionally deficient. Whereas, Plaintiff arrest warrants only recite no more than

elements of the crime charged, and only states that Petitioner allegedly committed the crime

charged without any personal knowledge of the complaining officer, Investigator Garrett.

ARREST WARRANT AFFADAVIT IN GIORDENELLO v. U. S.

“The undersigned complainant (Finley) being duly sworn state: That on or about January

26, 1956, at Huston, Texas in the Southern District of Texas, Veto Giordenello did receive,

conceal, etc. narcotic drugs, to - wit: heroin, hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful

impartation; in violation of Section 174, Title 21, U. S. Code.”

Petitioner contends that The United States Supreme Court in Giordenello has determined

that the above arrest warrant affidavit in Giardiello’s arrest warrant was constitutionally

4

deficient. See: Giordenello v. U. S.. 357 U. S. 480 (1958) “ Under Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, complaint merely charging the concealment of heroin without knowledge of it’s

illegal impartation in violation of designated statute and containing no affirmative allegations

that the complaining officer spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein and

not indicating any sources for the officer’s belief and not setting fourth any other sufficient bases

upon which a finding of probable cause could be made and did not authorize U. S. Commissioner

to issue a warrant for arrest of defendant, and the deficiencies could not be cured by

Commissioner’s reliance upon a presumption that the complaint was made on personal

knowledge of complaining officer. The Commissioner should not accept without question the

complainant’s mere conclusion that the person whose arrest they sought had committed the

crime.” See: Arrest Warrant of Terron Dizzley.

ARREST WARRANT AFFIDAVIT OF TERRON GERHARD DIZZLEY

“That on or about December 1, 2008, at approximately 10:30 p.m. at 899 Oakland Road

in the County of Georgetown, while at the Paradise Club/First and Ten Sports Barr, one Terron

Gerhard Dizzley did, with malice and forethought cause the death of Aundry Evans, Jr. by

shooting him about the body multiple times with a handgun. This being against the peace and

dignity of The State of South Carolina and a violation of South Carolina Code of Law 16-030010.12080088 / Inv. M. Garrett / Inv. D. Morris”.

Plaintiff contends that a comparison of his affidavit in his arrest warrant with the affidavit

in the arrest warrant in Giordenello shows that they are identical and provide no sufficient basis

for which a finding of probable cause could be made. Therefore, The United States Supreme

Court has determined that such affidavit as in Petitioner’s arrest warrant is constitutionally

deficient under The Fourth Amendment, which results in an unlawful seizure, false

5

imprisonment and unlawful pre-trial detainment. See: Illinois v. Gates. 462 U. S. 239 (1983), “

Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine

probable cause; his actions cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.”

Whitelev v. Warden. Wyo. State Pen., 401 U. S. 560 (1971), “ Complaint signed by county

sheriff which recited that defendant, and another

did and there unlawfully break and enter particular locked and sealed building was not sufficient

to support independent judgment of disinterested magistrate and was not sufficient showing of

probable cause for issuance of arrest warrant. Before warrant for either arrest or search warrant

can be issued, judicial officer must be supplied with sufficient information to support

independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant.” Malley v. Briggs. 475 U. S.

335 (1986); Beck v. Ohio. 379 U. S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. U. S.. 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Franks

v. Delaware. 438 U. S. 154(1978).

FALSE DECLARATIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE

Petitioner contends that the truth, which was also omitted from the affidavit is that the

entire investigation of his case rested solely on an alleged hearsay statement by victim that “ D”

or “Little D” was the person who shot him. Witnesses who alleged that the victim made this

statement indicated that he never stated to them who this “D” or “Litttle D” was, no description,

or whether this individual is white, black, Hispanic, male, female, etc., and the witnesses

indicated that the individual had on a mask and could not be identified.

Petitioner contends that he hired a Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb, to investigate

his arrest warrant. According to Bennie L. Webb’s Investigative report, on April 26, 2018, he

spoke to Investigator Garrett and Investigator Garrett informed Investigator Webb that he told

the Magistrate that he had statements from Naomi Alston and Aundry Evans, Sr. that victim told

6

them that “Terron Dizzley” shot him. However, such statements do not exist, and Investigator

Garrett admitted this, in Petitioner’s second trial of 2014. Therefore, Investigator Garrett

intentionally made “false declarations” to the magistrate , which was used to obtain Petitioner’s

arrest warrant, without providing any information in the arrest warrant’s affidavit which would

establish probable cause. See: exhibits

See: Exhibit 1. Aundrv Evans. Sr.: Investigative Report of Investigator Nelson on December 1.

2008 at 11:20 p.m. at the hospital in Georgetown. S. C. . “When asked who shot him , the victim

responded he was speaking with his father and did not wish to speak with me. When asked again,

victim stated someone just came in and shot him and asked me to leave .... Victim's father then

exited the room. I inquired if his son had disclosed any information to him, to which Mr. Evans.

Sr. stated “ he had not” ,..

See: Exhibit 3. However, the next day, December 2.2008.0500, “Aundrv. Sr. stated that his

son had informed him in The Georgetown Hospital that “Little D” was the individual who shot

him. Mr. Evans. Sr. did not know who “Little D” was”.

The totality of the circumstances of Aundry Evans, Sr.’s statements: proves that; (1) None of

them stated that his son told him that Terron Dizzley shot him. (2) Evans, Sr. gave two

statements that are inconsistent as to the material point; ( 3) Aundry Evans, Sr.’s statements

clearly reveal that if his son (victim) did make the statement “Little D” shot him, he never

indicated who this “Little D” was.” Whereas, the incident report states that: “Mr. Evans. Sr. did

not know who “Little D” was.”

See: Exhibit 2. Naomi Alston: Investigator Nelson’s Incident Report. 12 - 1 - 2008.11:20

p.m.. second Page. “I responded to the ER where I attempted to speak to the victim, and he

would not cooperate and would not provide any information.....”. “I then went to the waiting

7

room where the victim’s fiance’, Naomi Alston, provided me with the victim’s information and

also stated the victim told her that the male that shot him was called “Little D”. Alston stated

that “she believed” the suspect’s name was Tyron Dibsly, but “she knew” he was called “Little

D.”

See also: Trial, 2012, Tr. P. 98, L25 - P. 99, LI - 2.

25. Q. Did he talk about the identity of the shooter at all

1.

in the hospital to you?

2. A. He didn't.

Investigator Garrett, Trial of 2014. P. 550. L6 —15

6. Q. And in terms of why, you were, you were trying to find

7. Terron Dizzley. You had, you had already heard, at least,

8. that Naomi Alston claimed that Terron Dizzley, that he

9. identified Terron Dizzley as the person that shot him? You

10. knew that; right?

11. A. No. What I heard was that he identified a person by the

12. name of “Little D” that shot him.

13. Q. Well, “Little D” , but then you said “Little D” you

14. wanted someone to confirm that “Little D” was Terron Dizzley?

15. A. That’s correct.

See also: Trial of 2014. Tr.P. 544. LI - 21 specially P. 545. L19 - 21.

19. A “After identifying who

20. “we thought”, was Little D. of course, we went to try to track

21. him down and speak with him.

8

Investigator Nelson, (2014, Tr. P. 482, L6 - P. 483, LI - 4); Investigator Nelson testified in

Plaintiff s trial that he asked Aundry Evans, Jr., several times at the hospital on the night of

December 1, 2008, did he know who shot him and Aundry would not provide any information.

Officer Jarred Bardon. (2014. Tr. P. 463. L18 - 201

18. Q. Yeah. Did the victim make any statements to you

19. regarding who he thought shot him?

20. A “He did not.”

Plaintiff contends that had Investigator, Melvin Garrett, provided the truth to the

magistrate, that his entire investigation rested solely on a vague nickname (s), “D” and “Little

D”, which did not identify anyone, pursuant to an alleged “hearsay statement”, then such an

arrest warrant would have been considered as a “John Doe” warrant, therefore, would be

constitutionally deficient. U. S. v Doe. 703 F. 2d. 745 (1983, 3rd Cir.), “Describing its subject as

“John Doe, a/k/a Ed” was constitutionally insufficient and that insufficiency was not cured by

fact that law enforcement agency who executed warrant had independent knowledge that

defendant was person for whom warrant was intended. The “John Doe Warrant” in this case

does not reduce to a tolerable level the number of potential subjects: anyone with the first name,

“Ed” - and, therefore, must be thousands of “Ed” in the Pittsburg area - is fair game.” See: West

v. Cabell. 153 U. S. 78 (1894),4A warrant for the arrest of James West without other description

of the person intended, give no authority to arrest a person whose name is V. M. West or Vandy

West, and who have never been known as James West; and it is immaterial that such person was

the one the commissioner had in mind he issued the warrant.”

The omission of this truth was misleading and its inclusion and circumstances

surrounding these witnesses’ statements would have defeated probable cause. Whereas, Plaintiff

9

has never gone by the names “D” nor “Little D”, and there must be thousands of individuals

with the nickname “D”. Because the arrest warrant’s affidavit does not state any probable cause,

at all, there is nothing for the court to consider as any remaining content of the affidavit to

determine if it is still sufficient to establish probable cause. See: Franks v. Delaware. 438 U. S.

154(1978).

Plaintiff contends that on March 4, 2019, he filed this civil action on Investigator Melvin

Garrett for violation of his civil rights under The Fourth Amendment of The United States

Constitution for kidnapping, unlawful seizure, false imprisonment, unlawful pre-trial detainment,

and fraud upon the court. Plaintiff contends that although this civil action was filed within the

three years of when he had knowledge of the fact of his injury and when he had a complete and

present cause of action, which meets the requirements of clearly established federal law as to the

time when a civil rights action accrues, The United States District Court abused its discretion by

misapplying the law by using state laws to determine when Plaintiffs civil action accrues. As a

result of The District Court’s misapplication of the law, Plaintiffs civil rights action was

dismissed as barred by statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed The District Court’s judgment to

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and The Court of Appeals affirmed

The District Court's judgment without ruling on the merits of Plaintiff s case.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

ARGUMENT 1

Plaintiff contends that The United States Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit,

affirmance of the District Court’s order that the State law determines the time of accrual for

filing a civil action under 42 U. S. C. A. 8 1983 is erroneous and contrary to clearly established

United States Supreme Court law.

10

Plaintiff contends that, although the time limitation for civil action under section 1983 is

barred from state law, The District Court incorrectly applied it. Plaintiff contends that The

District Court also applied state law to decide when his cause of action accrued. According to

clearly established United States Supreme Court law, this was error. The time of accrual of a

civil rights action is a question of federal law, which accrues when plaintiff knows or has reasons

to know of the injury which is the basis of the action, or when he/she is put on notice to make

reasonable inquiry and inquiries which would reveal existence of a colorable claim such when

plaintiff has facts of the injury and who caused it. U. S. v Kubrick. 444 U. S. Ill, 122 - 224

(1979); Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v Ferbar Coro, of Cal.. 522 U.

S. 192 (1997); Rawlings v Rav. 312 U. S. 96 (1941); Wallace v Kato. 549 U. S. 384 (2007),

“While we never stated so expressly, the accrual date of a Section 1983 cause of action is a

question of federal law that is not resolved by reference of state law.”

Therefore, The District Court’s judgment which was affirmed by the United States Court

of Appeals that Plaintiffs civil action against Investigator Melvin Garrett of the Georgetown

County Sherriff s Department of South Carolina for kidnapping unlawful seizure, unlawful pre­

trial detainment, and false imprisonment is barred by the statute of limitation on the grounds

that: “regardless” of Plaintiff s “underlying allegations of the Section 1983 claim, “ that “South

Carolina allows thee years for a plaintiff to bring a personal injury action. S. C. Code Ann. 8 153-530 (5),”is erroneous and contrary to

Plaintiff also contends that The United States Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit,

affirmance of the District Court’s order that the State law determines the time of accrual for

filing a civil action under 42 U. S. C. A. 8 1983 is erroneous and contrary its own Fourth Circuit

and other circuits court laws. Cox v Stanton. 529 F. 2d 47 (1975 4th Cir.), “the district court held

11

that the relevant statute of limitations for a suit under a Federal Statute, such as section 1983,

which has no provision limiting the time in which an action must be brought must be borrowed

from the analogous state statutes of limitations. Neither party disputes The District Court’s

selection of the state’s three-year limitations applicable to actions upon a liability created by

statute. The district court, however, also applied state law to decide when the plaintiffs cause of

action accrued. The court determined that under North Carolina law, her cause of action accrued

at the time sterilization operation and consequently the three-year limitation period had run

before the suit was filed. This was error. The time of accrual of a civil rights action is a question

of federal law. Federal law holds that the time of accrual occurs when the plaintiff knows or has

a reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Nasim v Warden. Md. House of

Corr., 64 F. 3d 951, 955 (1995 4th Cir.) Rvals v Montgomery Co., 515 Fed. Appx. 75 (2013 3r.

Cir.), “State prisoner filed suit under 8 1983 against county, county attorney, his criminal

attorney, and others for false arrest and false imprisonment, based on assertions that magistrate

signature on criminal complaint was forged by detective. The Court of Appeals held that: (1)

two-year limitations under Pennsylvania law governing prisoner’s claims for false arrest and

false imprisonment began to run to run from the date he discovered alleged forgery, and; (2)

Two-year limitations period was not tolled until hand writing examiner agreed that magistrate’s

signature on criminal complaint did not appear to be authentic. Ryals’ false arrest and false

imprisonments claims are governed by the two-year limitations period filed in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.

8 5524 (2). However, under federal law, 8 1983 claims accrue “when the plaintiff has a complete

and present cause of action.”

12

Plaintiff contends that The District Court’s order stating that: “Plaintiff had failed to

allege any misconduct by defendant to conceal the cause of action or cause plaintiff to mis the

filing deadline”, which would support Plaintiffs argument of fraud, and concealment which

would toll the time limitation for filing his civil action suit until he discovered the fraud is an

erroneous assessment of the evidence and clearly established Federal law.

When ruling on a civil action, “a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations

enclosed in the complaint.” Erickson v Pardus. 551 U. S. 89, 94 (2007); Bell Atlantic Corp. v

Twomblv. 550 U. S. 544 (2007); El. Du Pontde Nemours and Co. v Kolon Indus.. Inc.' 637 F. 3d

535,440(2011 4th Cir.).

Plaintiff contends that the record shows that he has provided The U. S. District and The

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit with evidence which proves that: (1)

Investigator Garrett’s unlawful actions of obtaining Plaintiffs arrest amounted to fraud “upon

the court”, fabricating evidence, by making “false declarations” to the magistrate to obtain

Plaintiffs arrest warrant; (2) Investigator Melvin Garrett concealed the fabricated information

and “false declarations” made to the magistrate and omitted this information, along with the

exculpatory evidence, from Plaintiffs affidavit in his arrest warrant, which was discovered by

Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb. Therefore, according to clearly established Federal law,

as to the time as to when a civil right accrues when Plaintiff has been injured by fraud and

concealment, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. See

Rvals, supra. 515 Fed. Appx. 75 (2013 3rd Cir.); Homberg v Armbrict 327 U. S. 392 (1946),

“where a Plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remained in ignorance of it without any thought

or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of statute of limitations did not begin to run until

the fraud is discovered, though there may be no special circumstances or efforts or part of party

13

committing fraud to conceal it from other party.” Exploration Co. v U. S.. 247 U. S. 435 (1918),

“where patents to public land obtained through fraud, and fraud was concealed until more than

six years after issuance, suit may be maintained thereafter, not withstanding Act March 3, 1891,

26 Stat. 1099, declaring that suits by the United States to conceal patents hereafter issued shall

only be brought within six years after date of issuance [46 U. S. C. A. 8 1166], as limitations do

not begin, until discover of the fraud.” Credit Suisse Securities (USF) LLC v Simmonds. 566 U.

S. 221 (2012); Nerck and Co.. Inc., v Reynolds. 559 U. S. 633 (2010).

Plaintiff contends that the record shows that he provided The United States District Court

and The United States Courts for the Fourth Circuit, with information which proves that on

February 10, 2017, at his first PCR hearing, Plaintiff and his court-appointed lawyer, James K.

Faulk, addressed to The Honorable Judge Nettles that Plaintiff had never received a complete

discovery, despite diligently requesting through attorneys and through pro se motions. The

Honorable Judge Nettles granted a continuance, and funds to obtain Plaintiffs discovery. After

obtaining a portion of his discovery from Attorney James K. Faulk, of which contained

Plaintiffs arrest warrant, an inmate, who was experienced in knowledge of Fourth Amendment

claims, informed Plaintiff that his arrest warrant lacked probable cause. After reasonable in

researching this matter, Plaintiff became aware of his injury.

Plaintiff then hire Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb, to further investigate this matter.

After receiving Private Investigator Webb’s Investigative Report, which revealed that

Investigator Melvin Garrett made “false declarations” to the magistrate to obtain Plaintiffs arrest

warrant, Plaintiffs became that he had a complete and present cause of action against

Investigator Melvin Garrett of The Georgetown County Sheriffs Department of South Carolina

for kidnapping, unlawful seizure, unlawful pre-trial detainment, false imprisonment, and fraud

14

upon the court. On March 4,2019, Plaintiffs filed this civil action. Therefore, Plaintiffs civil

action was filed within the three years of when he had knowledge of the fact of his injury, who

caused it, and when he had a complete and present cause of action.

Therefore, according to clearly established United States Supreme Court law, as to the

time of when a civil rights actions accrues, Plaintiffs civil rights action is not barred by statute

of limitations.

Plaintiff contends The United States of Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

affirmance of The District Court’s order that his civil against Investigator Melvin Garrett for

kidnapping, unlawful seizure, unlawful pre-trial detainment, false imprisonment, and fraud upon

the court is barred by the statute of limitations without ruling on the merits of Plaintiffs case was

contrary to Bell v Hood. 327 U. S. 678 (1946), “Action against FBI officers for damages for

illegal arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful searches and seizures of property... calls for a

judgment on the “merits” and not for a dismissal for want ofjurisdiction. Where federally

protected right has been invaded, courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the

necessary relief, and federal courts may use “any” available remedy to make good the wrong

done”. Canter v American and Ocean Inst. Cos, of New York. 327 U. S. 554 (1929), “ Where the

record shows that an appeal was regularly taken, the case “must” be heard on its merits.”

15

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, a Writ of Certiorari should be issued to review the judgment and

opinion of The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Date:

A

~)

<2 0 21

Respectfully submitted,

nO.

Terron Dizzley, 35948

4460 Broad River Road

Columbia, SC 29210

16