Petitioners Brief — Department of Education, et al., Petitioners v. Myra Brown, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 4, 2023
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Nos. 22-506 and 22-535
In the Supreme Court of the United States
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA, ET AL.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MYRA BROWN, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
LISA BROWN
General Counsel
TOBY MERRILL
Deputy General Counsel
BRIAN SIEGEL
Assistant General Counsel
SOREN LAGAARD
NATASHA VARNOVITSKY
SUE LIN
Attorneys
Department of Education
Washington, D.C. 20202
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
BRIAN H. FLETCHER
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
YAIRA DUBIN
Assistants to the Solicitor
General
MICHAEL S. RAAB
THOMAS PULHAM
COURTNEY L. DIXON
SIMON C. BREWER
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether respondents have Article III standing.
2. Whether the Secretary of Education’s studentloan-relief plan exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, or was adopted in a
procedurally improper manner.
(I)
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
In Nebraska, petitioners (defendants-appellees below) are Joseph R. Biden, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Miguel Cardona, in his official
capacity as Secretary of Education; and the U.S. Department of Education. Respondents (plaintiffs-appellants
below) are the States of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Carolina.
In Brown, petitioners (defendants-appellants below)
are the U.S. Department of Education and Miguel Cardona, in his official capacity as Secretary of Education.
Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) are Myra
Brown and Alexander Taylor.
(II)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 2
Statutory and regulatory provisions involved ........................... 2
Statement ...................................................................................... 2
A. The HEROES Act .................................................... 3
B. HEROES Act relief during the COVID-19
pandemic .................................................................... 7
C. Proceedings below in Nebraska ............................ 11
D. Proceedings below in Brown.................................. 13
E. The Secretary’s extension of the payment
pause ......................................................................... 15
Summary of argument ............................................................... 16
Argument:
I. Respondents lack Article III standing ........................ 21
A. The States lack standing ........................................ 22
B. Brown and Taylor lack standing ........................... 31
II. The Secretary’s plan is lawful ...................................... 33
A. The HEROES Act authorizes the plan................. 34
1. The plain text of the HEROES Act
authorizes the plan ........................................... 34
2. Respondents’ attempt to exclude discharge
as a form of HEROES Act relief
contradicts the Act’s text ................................. 37
3. Respondents’ remaining statutory
arguments lack merit ....................................... 42
4. The major questions doctrine provides no
reason to depart from the statutory text ....... 46
B. The plan is reasonable and reasonably
explained .................................................................. 57
C. The Secretary’s action was procedurally
proper ....................................................................... 62
Conclusion ................................................................................... 65
Appendix — Statutory provisions........................................... 1a
(III)
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Page
Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l,
Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2082 (2020) ................................................. 28
Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. HHS,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ................................................... 48, 51
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592 (1982).............................................................. 31
American Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra,
142 S. Ct. 1896 (2022) ......................................................... 47
Azar v. Allina Health Servs.,
139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019) ......................................................... 47
Becerra v. Empire Health Found.,
142 S. Ct. 2354 (2022) ......................................................... 47
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).................................. 25
Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647 (2022) ................. 47, 52, 54
Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct. 2528 (2022)................................. 61
Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) .............................. 33
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King,
533 U.S. 158 (2001).............................................................. 30
Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10 (1993) ............ 40
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398 (2013).................................................. 23, 24, 27
Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021) .............................. 47
Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African
Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020)....................... 45
Department of Commerce v. New York,
139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) ................................................... 47, 61
DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ................................................... 59, 60
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) .............. 29
V
Cases—Continued:
Page
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,
572 U.S. 489 (2014).............................................................. 47
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
579 U.S. 211 (2016).............................................................. 60
FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
141 S. Ct. 1150 (2021) ......................................................... 58
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000)........................................................ 49, 53
FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n,
577 U.S. 260 (2016).............................................................. 58
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio
Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) ........................ 28, 29
Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927) .................................. 23
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) ............................. 48
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home
v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) ..................... 39, 47
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992)............................................ 21, 24, 25, 64
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) ................. 58
NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) ........................... 48, 49
National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) ................. 47
National Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones,
716 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ............................................. 61
Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.)
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) ....................................... 24
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) ....... 22, 23
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) .......................... 26, 27, 33
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ....................................... 21, 28, 31, 33
VI
Cases—Continued:
Page
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) ............................ 47
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) ...................... 37
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) ............. 24
United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC,
855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ............................................. 49
University of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338 (2013).............................................................. 45
Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014)........................................................ 48, 51
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ............................. 27, 28
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) .................................... 37
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) ............................ 44
West Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) .................................. 20, 48-51, 54, 55
Whitman v. American Trucking Assn’s,
531 U.S. 457 (2001).............................................................. 48
Statutes and regulations:
U.S. Const.:
Art. III ......................... 11, 14, 16, 17, 21, 24, 27, 28, 31, 33
§ 2, Cl. 1 ............................................................................ 21
Act of Sept. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-78,
119 Stat. 2043 ........................................................................ 6
Act of Sept. 30, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-93,
121 Stat. 999 .......................................................................... 7
Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. 701 et seq................................................... 20, 57, 62
5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) ............................................................ 57
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No.
117-2, § 9675(a), 135 Stat. 185-186..................................... 53
VII
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Page
COVID-19 Pandemic Education Relief Act of 2020,
Pub. L. No. 116-136, Div. A, Tit. III, Subtit. B,
§ 3513, 134 Stat. 404.............................................................. 8
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-90, Tit. V, § 540, 119 Stat. 2088
(49 U.S.C. 114 note) ............................................................ 64
20 U.S.C. 1071 to 1087-4.......................................................... 3
20 U.S.C. 1087aa-1087ii ........................................................... 3
Higher Education Act of 1965,
20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq. ............................................................ 3
Tit. IV ......................................................4, 5, 11, 38, 40, 54
20 U.S.C. 1070(b) ............................................................... 3
20 U.S.C. 1077(a)(2)(C) ................................................... 40
20 U.S.C. 1078(b)(1)(M) .................................................. 40
20 U.S.C. 1082 .................................................................... 3
20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(6) ..................................................... 4, 54
20 U.S.C. 1087 ............................................................ 11, 37
20 U.S.C. 1087(c) ............................................................. 54
20 U.S.C. 1087 (2018 & Supp. I 2019) ............................ 36
20 U.S.C. 1087a .................................................... 11, 37, 54
20 U.S.C. 1087a(b)(2) ...................................................... 54
20 U.S.C. 1087a-1087j ....................................................... 3
20 U.S.C. 1087e .......................................................... 11, 38
20 U.S.C. 1087e(f )............................................................ 40
20 U.S.C. 1087e(h) ........................................................... 54
20 U.S.C. 1087e(o) ........................................................... 40
20 U.S.C. 1087dd(c)(1)(F)(ii) .......................................... 54
20 U.S.C. 1087dd(e) ......................................................... 40
20 U.S.C. 1087dd(g) ....................................... 11, 36, 38, 55
Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-122, 115 Stat. 2386 ..... 4, 5, 42
VIII
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Page
§ 2(a)(1), 115 Stat. 2386 ..................................................... 5
§ 2(a)(2), 115 Stat. 2386 ..................................................... 5
§ 5, 115 Stat. 2388 .............................................................. 5
Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-76:
§ 2, 117 Stat. 904-905 ......................................................... 5
§ 6, 117 Stat. 908 ................................................................ 6
20 U.S.C. 1098bb ............................................................... 5
20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(1) ... 5, 6, 19, 34, 36, 38, 40, 41, 46, 50, 53, 55
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2) ......................... 5, 19, 35, 36, 37, 43
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2)(A) .................... 6, 35, 41, 45, 50, 56
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1) ...............................6, 14, 36, 62, 63
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(3) .......................................... 6, 36, 43
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(d) ..................................................... 6, 63
Persian Gulf Conflict Higher Education Assistance
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-25, Tit. III, 105 Stat. 93:
§ 327(a)(1), 105 Stat. 93 ..................................................... 4
§ 327(a)(2), 105 Stat. 93 ..................................................... 4
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2).......................................................... 35, 51
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(A)-(D) ................................................... 42
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(C) .......................................... 6, 42, 45, 63
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(D) .......................................... 6, 35, 43, 46
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(4)............................................................ 6, 35
26 U.S.C. 61(a)(11)-(12) ......................................................... 22
26 U.S.C. 108(f )(5) ................................................................. 22
42 U.S.C. 7410 ........................................................................ 64
50 U.S.C. 1621-1622 ................................................................. 6
Mo. Rev. Stat. (2022):
§ 173.360 ........................................................................... 29
§ 173.385(1)....................................................................... 29
IX
Statutes and regulations—Continued:
Page
§ 173.385(3)....................................................................... 30
§ 173.410 ........................................................................... 29
§ 173.425 ........................................................................... 29
34 C.F.R.:
Section 682.402. ................................................... 11, 36, 38
Section 685.212 .................................................... 11, 36, 38
Section 685.220 ................................................................ 12
Miscellaneous:
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ............................. 38
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID
Data Tracker (Dec. 30, 2022),
https://perma.cc/ZH65-9PX3 ............................................... 7
FEMA, COVID-19 Disaster Declarations
(Aug. 20, 2021), https://perma.cc/B7KA-W4KD ................ 7
68 Fed. Reg. 69,312 (Dec. 12, 2003) ....................................... 7
85 Fed. Reg. 79,856 (Dec. 11, 2020) ................................. 8, 44
87 Fed. Reg. 10,289 (Feb. 23, 2022) ..................................... 35
Notice of Debt Cancellation Legal Memorandum,
87 Fed. Reg. 52,943 (Aug. 30, 2022) .............................. 7, 41
87 Fed. Reg. 61,512 (Oct. 12, 2022) .......................... 11, 38, 44
H.R. 6800, 116th Cong., 2d Sess. § 150117(h) (2020).......... 53
H.R. 2034, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021) ............................. 53
Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.:
COVID-19 Loan Payment Pause and 0% Interest, https://studentaid.gov/ announcementsevents/covid-19/payment-pause-zero-interest
(last visited Jan. 4, 2023) ........................................... 26
Federal Student Aid Portfolio, https://
studentaid.gov/data-center/student/portfolio
(last visited Jan. 4, 2023) ............................................. 3
X
Miscellaneous—Continued:
Page
What are the benefits and downsides of loan
consolidation?, https://studentaid.gov/helpcenter/answers/article/pros-and-cons-ofconsolidation (last visited Jan. 4, 2023) ................... 26
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Use of the HEROES Act of 2003 to Cancel the
Principal Amounts of Student Loans,
2022 WL 3975075 (Aug. 23, 2022)............................ 7, 41, 44
Press Office, Newsroom, U.S. Senate, Press
Release, Menendez, Warren Bill to Make
Student Loan Relief Tax-Free Passes as Part of
COVID Relief Package, Clearing Hurdle for
Broad Loan Forgiveness (Mar. 6, 2021),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/warren-menendez-bill-to-make-studentloan-relief-tax-free-passes-as-part-of-covid-reliefpackage-clearing-a-hurdle-for-broad-loan-forgiveness (Mar. 6, 2021) ....................................................... 52
Press Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.:
Education Department Approves $5.8 Billion
Group Discharge to Cancel All Remaining
Loans for 560,000 Borrowers Who Attended
Corinthian (June 1, 2022), https://perma.
cc/MTW6-XABV .......................................................... 4
Secretary DeVos Cancels Student Loans, Resets
Pell Eligibility, and Extends Closed School
Discharge Period for Students Impacted by
Dream Center School Closures (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://perma.cc/FRT-6-WAWS ................................ 4
Proclamation No. 9994, 3 C.F.R. 56 (2020 comp.) ................ 7
S. 2235, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (2019) .................................. 52
XI
Miscellaneous—Continued:
Page
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Student Loans:
Education Has Increased Federal Cost Estimates
of Direct Loans by Billions due to Programmatic
and Other Changes (July 2022), https://www.gao.
gov/products/gao-22-105365 .......................................... 8, 51
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language (2002) ............................................ 43
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 22-506
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA, ET AL.
No. 22-535
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MYRA BROWN, ET AL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
OPINIONS BELOW
In Nebraska, the opinion of the court of appeals (J.A.
160-167) is reported at 52 F.4th 1044. The order of the
court of appeals granting an administrative stay (J.A.
158) is unreported. The order of the district court denying an injunction pending appeal (J.A. 157) is unreported. The opinion, memorandum, and order of the
district court (J.A. 135-151) is available at 2022 WL
11728905.
(1)
2
In Brown, the order of the court of appeals (J.A. 308)
is unreported. The order of the district court (J.A. 263297) is available at 2022 WL 1658525.
JURISDICTION
In Nebraska, the district court entered final judgment on October 20, 2022 (J.A. 152). Respondents appealed the same day (J.A. 153). The court of appeals’
jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1291. On November 18,
2022, petitioners applied to this Court for vacatur of the
court of appeals’ injunction. On December 1, 2022, the
Court treated the application as a petition for a writ of
certiorari before judgment and granted the petition
(J.A. 168). The Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C.
1254(1) and 2101(e).
In Brown, the district court entered final judgment
on November 10, 2022 (J.A. 298-299). Petitioners appealed the same day (J.A. 300-301). The court of appeals’ jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1291. On December 2, 2022, petitioners applied to this Court for a stay.
On December 12, 2022, the Court treated the application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment
and granted the petition (J.A. 309). The Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) and 2101(e).
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
Pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions are
reproduced at App., infra, 1a-8a.
STATEMENT
To protect student-loan borrowers affected by a national emergency from student-debt-related financial
harm, Congress provided the Secretary of Education
with authority to waive or modify statutory and regulatory provisions governing their student-loan obligations
3
under specified conditions. In August 2022, the Secretary announced a plan to use that statutory authority to
provide targeted debt relief to millions of student-loan
borrowers suffering the continuing economic fallout of
an unprecedented global pandemic. Respondents are
six States with policy objections to debt relief and two
borrowers who purport to want broader relief. They
filed suit seeking to bar the Secretary from providing
any relief to anyone.
A. The HEROES Act
1. The Department of Education administers federal student-aid programs under Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (Education Act), 20 U.S.C. 1070
et seq. Those programs include the William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program (Direct Loans), 20 U.S.C.
1087a-1087j, under which the federal government lends
money directly to student borrowers, and the Federal
Family Education Loan Program (Family Education
Loans), 20 U.S.C. 1071 to 1087-4, and Federal Perkins
Loan Program (Perkins Loans), 20 U.S.C. 1087aa1087ii, under which non-federal lenders issue loans to
student borrowers on terms set by the federal government. New loans are no longer issued under the latter
two programs, but prior loans under them remain outstanding. More than 43 million borrowers have outstanding loans under the three programs, and their
debts total roughly $1.63 trillion. Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Federal Student Aid
Portfolio, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/
portfolio (last visited Jan. 4, 2022).
The Education Act charges the Secretary of Education with “carry[ing] out” federal student-aid programs.
20 U.S.C. 1070(b). The Act grants the Secretary substantial “powers and responsibilities,” 20 U.S.C. 1082
4
(emphasis omitted), including authority to “compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim, lien, or demand” acquired in the Secretary’s performance of his
“functions, powers, and duties” in administering the Department’s portfolio of loans, 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(6). In
exercising that statutory authority, the Secretary has
many times discharged debts owed by student-loan borrowers, including on a class-wide basis and for substantial amounts.1
2. On several occasions, Congress has also specifically authorized the Secretary to grant student-loan relief to particular classes of borrowers. In 1991, for example, Congress enacted the Persian Gulf Conflict
Higher Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 102-25,
Tit. III, Pt. E, § 327(a)(1), 105 Stat. 93. That Act authorized the Secretary to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to” the studentaid programs under Title IV of the Education Act as
necessary to ensure that “the men and women serving
on active duty in connection with Operation Desert
Storm” were “not placed in a worse position financially
in relation to” their student loans “because of such service.” Ibid.
A decade later, in response to the September 11th
terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2001, Pub.
See, e.g., Press Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Education Department Approves $5.8 Billion Group Discharge to Cancel All Remaining Loans for 560,000 Borrowers Who Attended Corinthian
(June 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/MTW6-XABV; Secretary DeVos
Cancels Student Loans, Resets Pell Eligibility, and Extends Closed
School Discharge Period for Students Impacted by Dream Center
School Closures (Nov. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/FRT6-WAWS; see
also Order Granting Final Settlement Approval, Sweet v. Cardona,
No. 19-cv-3674, D. Ct. Doc. 345 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2022).
1
5
L. No. 107-122, 115 Stat. 2386, to “provide the Secretary
of Education with specific waiver authority to respond
to conditions in the national emergency declared by the
President on September 14, 2001,” ibid. This time, Congress authorized the Secretary to “waive or modify any
statutory or regulatory provision applicable to” the student-aid programs under Title IV of the Education Act
“as may be necessary to ensure that” borrowers affected by September 11 and later terrorist attacks are
not in a worse position in relation to their student loans.
§ 2(a)(1) and (2), 115 Stat. 2386; see § 5, 115 Stat. 2388.
In 2003, Congress extended and substantially expanded that authority by enacting the statute at issue
here, the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for
Students Act of 2003 (HEROES Act or Act), Pub. L. No.
108-76, § 2, 117 Stat. 904-905 (20 U.S.C. 1098bb). Like
its predecessors, the HEROES Act authorizes the Secretary to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory
provision applicable to the student financial assistance
programs” under Title IV of the Education Act. 20
U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1). But the HEROES Act does not
limit debt relief to borrowers affected by terrorist attacks; instead, it authorizes waiver or modification “as
the Secretary deems necessary in connection with a war
or other military operation or national emergency to
provide the waivers or modifications authorized by paragraph (2).” Ibid.
Paragraph 2, in turn, authorizes the Secretary “to
waive or modify” any Title IV provision “as may be necessary to ensure” that certain objectives are achieved.
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2). The first objective is that “recipients of student financial assistance under title IV of
the [Education] Act who are affected individuals are not
placed in a worse position financially in relation to that
6
financial assistance because of their status as affected
individuals.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2)(A). An “affected
individual” is defined to include any individual who “resides or is employed in an area that is declared a disaster area by any Federal, State, or local official in connection with a national emergency” or who “suffered direct economic hardship as a direct result of ” a “national
emergency.” 20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(C) and (D). Congress
defined “national emergency” as any “national emergency declared by the President of the United States.”
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(4); see 50 U.S.C. 1621-1622 (authorizing such declarations).
Several provisions of the HEROES Act underscore
Congress’s intent to authorize the Secretary to respond
quickly and fully to national emergencies. Congress
granted the Secretary authority to provide waivers or
modifications ‘‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, unless enacted with specific reference to [the HEROES Act].’’ 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1). The Secretary
need not act through notice and comment; instead, he
need only publish a notice in the Federal Register setting forth “the waivers or modifications * * * the Secretary deems necessary to achieve the purposes of this
section.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1). Nor need the Secretary comply with other procedural requirements that
would delay relief. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(d). And Congress
specifically provided that “[t]he Secretary is not required to exercise the waiver or modification authority
* * * on a case-by-case basis.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(3).
The HEROES Act was originally set to expire in
2005. § 6, 117 Stat. 908. In 2005, Congress extended it
for two years. Act of Sept. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-78,
119 Stat. 2043. And in 2007, Congress made the Act
7
permanent. Act of Sept. 30, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-93,
121 Stat. 999.
3. Since 2003, the Secretary has repeatedly invoked
the HEROES Act to provide categorical relief to borrowers affected by emergencies, including by waiving
the requirement that borrowers return overpayments
of certain grant funds; waiving the requirement that
service be uninterrupted to qualify for loan cancellation
on the basis of employment in certain occupations; extending the maximum period of forbearance for Perkins
loans and eligibility for deferment of Family Education
Loans; and requiring the Department to pay the interest that accrues during extended deferments. See 68
Fed. Reg. 69,312-69,318 (Dec. 12, 2003); Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Use of the HEROES Act
of 2003 to Cancel the Principal Amounts of Student
Loans, 2022 WL 3975075, at *4 (Aug. 23, 2022) (OLC
Op.); Notice of Debt Cancellation Legal Memorandum,
87 Fed. Reg. 52,943, 52,944 (Aug. 30, 2022).
B. HEROES Act Relief During The COVID-19 Pandemic
1. In March 2020, President Trump declared a national emergency in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Proclamation No. 9994, 3 C.F.R. 56 (2020 comp.). That
declaration remains in effect, and the government has
declared all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the
territories to be disaster areas. See FEMA, COVID-19
Disaster Declarations, https://perma.cc/B7KA-W4KD.
COVID-19 has killed more than one million Americans
and led to the hospitalization of millions more. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID Data
Tracker (Dec. 30, 2022), https://perma.cc/ZH65-9PX3.
The pandemic has also profoundly disrupted the Nation’s economy and inflicted severe economic harms, including mass layoffs, food insecurity, spikes in inflation,
8
rising delinquency rates on debt, and projected reductions in lifetime earnings for students who left school
during the pandemic. J.A. 234-239, 249-250. These
harms have disproportionately affected lower-income
households. J.A. 234-239, 245-253.
In response to the pandemic, the government provided substantial relief to borrowers with Departmentheld loans. In March 2020, then-Secretary of Education
Betsy DeVos invoked the HEROES Act to pause repayment obligations and suspend interest accrual on all
such loans. 85 Fed. Reg. 79,856, 79,857 (Dec. 11, 2020).
Congress directed the Secretary to extend those policies through September 2020. COVID-19 Pandemic
Education Relief Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-136, Div.
A, Tit. III, Subtit. B, § 3513, 134 Stat. 404. Both the
Trump and Biden Administrations then further extended these protections under the HEROES Act. See,
e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. at 79,857; J.A. 257-259. As of April
2022, the payment pause was estimated to have cost the
federal government $102 billion, or roughly $5 billion
per month. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Student
Loans: Education Has Increased Federal Cost Estimates of Direct Loans by Billions due to Programmatic
and Other Changes 14 (July 2022).
2. In August 2022, Secretary of Education Miguel
Cardona determined that the across-the-board pause on
all payments for all borrowers should come to an end.
But he also determined that despite the pause and other
COVID-19 relief measures, the resumption of repayment obligations would put many lower-income borrowers “at heightened risk of loan delinquency and default”
due to the pandemic. J.A. 257. The Secretary therefore
invoked the HEROES Act to adopt a two-pronged approach. He announced that he would extend the pause
9
a final time, through December 31, 2022. J.A. 259. And
to ensure that “borrowers are not in a worse position
financially due to the pandemic with regard to their
ability to repay their loans” when payment obligations
resume, the Secretary directed the Department to issue
up to $10,000 in student-loan relief to eligible borrowers
with a federal adjusted gross income below $125,000
($250,000 for borrowers filing jointly). J.A. 258-259.
Qualifying Pell Grant recipients, who tend to have fewer
resources and are at substantially greater risk of default, can receive up to $20,000. J.A. 258.
The supporting analysis on which the Secretary relied explained that additional relief beyond the payment
pause is necessary to ensure that affected borrowers
are not “in a worse position financially as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic.” J.A. 232. The Department analyzed historical data about borrowers who transitioned
back to repayment after periods of forbearance, including after other emergencies, and concluded that such
borrowers are typically at “elevated risk of delinquency
and default.” J.A. 234. Indeed, default rates increase
twentyfold after the period of non-payment ends, and
affected Pell Grant recipients experience even “larger
increases in default.” J.A. 234-235. That data suggests
that a pause on payments alone is not necessarily sufficient to alleviate the economic effects of a disaster on
the affected borrowers’ ability to repay their loans.
The Department also reviewed data specific to the
COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on borrowers, including borrower surveys, loan data, economic studies,
and credit analyses conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Federal Reserve Banks.
That data revealed rising delinquency rates on nonstudent-loan debt and commercially held student-loan
10
debt (which was not covered by the pause); high percentages of borrowers who anticipate difficulty making
loan payments; and acute inflationary pressures on
household budgets for “basic necessities, including energy, food, and shelter costs.” J.A. 235-239, 245, 249251. And the Department emphasized the substantial
penalties imposed on borrowers who are delinquent or
default on student-loan payments, including exposure
to involuntary collection methods; lost access to affordable or flexible repayment options; and 50-to-90-point
drops in credit scores that make insurance, rent, and
other financial products more expensive and limit employment opportunities. J.A. 239.
The Department explained that the proposed relief
was targeted to ameliorate these harms. J.A. 240-255.
As to the income eligibility threshold, the relevant economic data established that borrowers with incomes under $125,000, especially Pell Grant recipients, are at
“particular risk of being in a worse financial position because of the pandemic” and are far likelier to experience
financial hardship in repaying their loans when payments resume. J.A. 243, 245-253. Among other things,
such borrowers were disproportionately likely to become unemployed and experience material hardship
due to the pandemic, including food insecurity and difficulty making utility, rent, and mortgage payments.
J.A. 237, 248-253.
As to the amount of debt to be discharged, the Department concluded that “it should discharge an
amount of debt necessary to significantly decrease the
rates of delinquency and default.” J.A. 242. After considering borrower loan balances and the effectiveness
of various monthly payment reductions in reducing delinquency rates, the Department determined that
11
$10,000 in relief (and $20,000 for Pell Grant recipients)
would “mitigate the risk that delinquency and default
rates will rise above pre-pandemic levels.” J.A. 242-244.
On September 27, 2022, the Secretary implemented
that debt relief by waiving and modifying certain Title
IV statutory and regulatory provisions setting forth circumstances in which federal student-loan obligations
can be cancelled or discharged. See J.A. 261-262 (citing
20 U.S.C. 1087, 1087a, 1087e, 1087dd(g); 34 C.F.R.
682.402, 685.212); 87 Fed. Reg. 61,512 (Oct. 12, 2022).
C. Proceedings Below In Nebraska
1. The States of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Nebraska, and South Carolina filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, claiming that the plan exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority and is arbitrary and capricious. J.A. 1-44.
The district court dismissed the States’ suit for lack
of Article III standing. J.A. 135-151. The court rejected
the argument that the plan would deprive Iowa, Kansas,
Nebraska, and South Carolina of tax revenue. J.A. 150.
Those States argued that, because they had “chosen to
adopt [the federal] definition of taxable income in their
own tax codes,” and because the federal definition in
turn excludes certain discharges of student loans from
2021 to 2025, the Secretary’s plan would reduce the
taxes that the States would otherwise collect from borrowers in those years. Ibid. The court rejected that
argument as a self-inflicted harm, noting that the plan
does not affect the States’ “sovereign power to set
[their] own tax policy” and that the States remain “free
to propose and pass tax revenue plans as they see fit.”
Ibid.
The district court additionally rejected the argument
that the plan would cause financial harm to Arkansas
12
and Nebraska. J.A. 146-149. Those States argued that,
because the Secretary’s plan applies to Direct Loans
but not Family Education Loans, it creates an “incentive” for borrowers to “consolidate” (i.e., convert) their
Family Education Loans into Direct Loans. J.A. 146;
see 34 C.F.R. 685.220 (authorizing consolidation). The
States asserted that such consolidation would harm the
Arkansas Student Loan Authority, a state entity that
receives administrative fees for servicing Family Education Loans, and the Nebraska Investment Council, a
state entity that has invested in securities backed by
Family Education Loans. J.A. 147-149. The court rejected that argument, observing that the Department
had announced that “borrowers with federal student
loans not held by the Department cannot obtain the onetime student debt relief by consolidating those loans
into Direct Loans.” J.A. 146. The court explained that
there was accordingly no “ongoing incentive to consolidate.” J.A. 147.
The court also rejected Missouri’s argument that it
has standing because the Missouri Higher Education
Loan Authority (MOHELA), a state-created nonprofit
corporation that services federal student loans, would
suffer financial harms because of the plan. J.A. 142-146.
The court explained that MOHELA is a distinct legal
person from the State of Missouri; that it traditionally
has not been considered an “arm of the State”; that it
has the capacity to “sue and be sued in its own name”;
that it “retains financial independence” from the State;
and that the State has no legal obligation to pay MOHELA’s debts. J.A. 145; see J.A. 144-146. The court
accordingly concluded that Missouri lacks standing to
sue based on alleged harms to MOHELA. J.A. 146.
13
2. The States appealed, and the Eighth Circuit issued a nationwide injunction pending appeal. J.A. 160167. The court concluded that Missouri likely has
standing (and did “not address the standing of the other
States”). J.A. 164-165. The court reasoned that MOHELA, as a loan servicer, “obtains revenue from the accounts it services,” but that “the total revenue MOHELA recovers will decrease if a substantial portion of
its accounts are no longer active under the Secretary’s
plan.” J.A. 164. The court concluded that, since MOHELA has “financial obligations to the State treasury,”
the plan’s “financial impact on MOHELA” could lead to
“financial harm to the State.” Ibid.
On the merits, the Eighth Circuit did not conclude
that the States’ suit is likely to succeed; instead, its onesentence analysis stated only that the “merits of the appeal before this court involve substantial questions of
law which remain to be resolved.” J.A. 165 (citation
omitted). The court also stated that the “equities
strongly favor an injunction.” Ibid. The court issued a
universal injunction pending appeal prohibiting the Department from applying the plan to discharge any debt
for any borrower in any State. J.A. 165-167.
D. Proceedings Below In Brown
1. Myra Brown and Alexander Taylor are individuals with outstanding student loans. J.A. 269. Brown is
ineligible for relief under the plan because her loans are
held by commercial entities rather than the Department. Ibid. Taylor is eligible for $10,000 rather than
$20,000 in relief because he did not receive a Pell Grant.
Ibid.
Brown and Taylor sued the Department and the Secretary in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. J.A. 169-187. Their complaint asserted
14
a single claim: that the Department improperly promulgated the plan without notice-and-comment rulemaking and without engaging in the Education Act’s
negotiated-rulemaking process. J.A. 184-186.
2. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Brown and Taylor. J.A. 263-297. The court
first concluded that they have Article III standing to
raise their procedural challenge because they claim that
the lack of notice and comment deprived them of the opportunity to urge the Secretary to expand the plan’s eligibility criteria to provide greater debt relief. J.A. 276282.
Turning to the merits, the district court rejected
Brown and Taylor’s claim that the plan is procedurally
defective. J.A. 285-287. The court observed that the
HEROES Act expressly provides that the Secretary
need not act through notice and comment; instead, he
need only publish a notice in the Federal Register setting forth “the waivers or modifications * * * the Secretary deems necessary to achieve the purposes of this
section.” J.A. 286 (quoting 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1)). The
court rejected Brown and Taylor’s assertion that they
could establish that the plan falls outside the noticeand-comment exemption by showing that it exceeds the
Secretary’s statutory authority. J.A. 287.
Although Brown and Taylor had raised only a procedural claim, and although the district court had analyzed their standing only as to that claim, the court went
on to hold that the plan is substantively unlawful. J.A.
287-294. The court stated that, “because the [plan] is an
agency action of vast economic and political significance, the major-questions doctrine applies.” J.A. 291.
The court then concluded that the HEROES Act did not
authorize the plan with sufficient clarity to satisfy that
15
doctrine. J.A. 291-294. The court declared the plan unlawful and vacated it nationwide. J.A. 294-296.
3. The government appealed. J.A. 300-301. The
Fifth Circuit denied a stay pending appeal in an unreasoned, per curiam order. J.A. 308.
E. The Secretary’s Extension Of The Payment Pause
On November 22, 2022, in response to the orders in
these cases preventing implementation of the plan, the
Secretary extended the payment pause and suspension
of interest accrual. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Education, https://perma.cc/6T7Y-2YK9. The Department
explained that the Secretary’s “[t]argeted student debt
relief ” plan was designed to “address[] the financial
harms of the pandemic” and to “help[] borrowers at
highest risk of delinquencies or default once payments
resume.” Ibid. But “[e]fforts to block student debt relief in the courts have caused tremendous financial uncertainty for millions of borrowers who cannot set their
family budgets or even plan for the holidays without a
clear picture of their student debt obligations.” Ibid.
The extension will “alleviate uncertainty for borrowers”
and “the continuing economic effects of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic” while this Court “review[s] the lower-court orders.” Ibid. Payment obligations will resume “60 days after the Department is permitted to implement the program or the litigation is resolved,” but no later than 60 days after June 30, 2023.
Ibid.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower courts’ orders have erroneously deprived
the Secretary of his statutory authority to provide targeted student-loan debt relief to borrowers affected by
national emergencies, leaving millions of economically
16
vulnerable borrowers in limbo. For nearly three years,
the Secretary and his predecessors have responded to
an unprecedented global pandemic by adopting and extending an unprecedented across-the-board pause in
payment obligations for all borrowers. The Secretary
determined, and respondents have not seriously disputed, that ending that pause without providing some
additional relief for lower-income borrowers would
cause delinquency and default rates to spike above prepandemic levels. This Court should not compel that
damaging and destabilizing result: Respondents do not
have Article III standing, and the Secretary’s plan is
lawful in any event.
I. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must
show that she has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly
traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and
likely to be redressed by judicial relief. Neither the
States nor Brown and Taylor can satisfy those fundamental requirements.
A. The States have raised four theories of standing,
all of which the district court in Nebraska correctly rejected.
First, four States argue that the plan will diminish
their tax revenues because some student loans that
would have been discharged in the future will instead be
discharged under the plan and because federal law
(which the States have chosen to incorporate) does not
treat discharges that occur between 2021 and 2025 as
taxable income. That argument is flawed for several independent reasons: The States’ alleged harm is selfinflicted; a federal policy’s incidental effects on a State’s
tax revenues are not judicially cognizable injuries in any
event; and the incidental injury the States posit rests on
a chain of speculation.
17
Second, three States argue that, because the plan
provides relief for Direct Loans but not for Family Education Loans, it has encouraged borrowers to consolidate their Family Education Loans (which state entities
hold or in which they have invested) into Direct Loans.
But the plan does not encourage consolidation because
the Department has announced that “borrowers with
federal student loans not held by [the Department] cannot obtain one-time debt relief by consolidating those
loans into Direct Loans.” J.A. 215 (emphasis omitted).
And even if the plan did encourage consolidation, the
States would still lack standing. An injury suffices for
Article III standing only if it is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, rather than to the
independent action of a third party. Any harms resulting from consolidation are fairly traceable, not to the
plan, but to borrowers’ independent decisions to consolidate.
Third, the Eighth Circuit adopted a theory of standing focused on MOHELA, a state-created entity in Missouri. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that MOHELA has
contracted with the Department to service student
loans; that MOHELA will stop receiving servicing fees
for loans that are discharged under the plan; and that
this loss of revenue could in turn impair MOHELA’s
ability to fulfill its state-law obligation to contribute a
specified amount of money to the state treasury. But
the States have never alleged that the plan will cause
MOHELA to default on its obligations to the State. And
it is pure speculation that, if the plan causes a reduction
in MOHELA’s revenues, MOHELA will respond by defaulting on its obligations rather than, say, cutting its
other expenditures. In any event, the Eighth Circuit
cited no authority for the proposition that, if A causes
18
financial harm to B, and B owes money to C, C has
standing to sue A.
Finally, the States have asserted that the alleged financial harms to MOHELA are harms to the State of
Missouri, and that Missouri may accordingly sue based
on MOHELA’s loss of servicing fees. But Missouri cannot establish standing based on harms to MOHELA,
which it has established as a separate corporation.
B. Brown and Taylor, too, lack standing to challenge
the plan as substantively unlawful. The district court in
Brown held that they have standing because the plan
provides no debt relief to borrowers such as Brown and
only $10,000 rather than $20,000 in debt relief to borrowers such as Taylor. But a judgment that the plan is
substantively unlawful would in no sense redress those
asserted injuries. It would not grant Brown and Taylor
the additional debt relief they say they desire; rather, it
would mean that nobody gets any debt relief at all.
Nor do Brown and Taylor have standing to challenge
the plan on procedural grounds. They argue that, although the HEROES Act exempts certain actions from
notice-and-comment and negotiated-rulemaking procedures, that exemption does not apply here because the
plan exceeds the Secretary’s substantive authority under the HEROES Act. But a judgment based on that
theory would not redress Brown and Taylor’s injuries.
Instead, because the ostensibly procedural judgment
would be premised on the plan’s substantive unlawfulness, it would mean that no one—including Brown and
Taylor—could receive any debt-cancellation relief under the HEROES Act at all.
II. On the merits, the Secretary’s plan is authorized
by the HEROES Act, reasonably explained, and procedurally proper.
19
A. The plain language of the HEROES Act authorizes the plan. The operative text empowers the Secretary to respond to a “national emergency” by “waiv[ing]
or modify[ing] any statutory or regulatory provision”
governing the federal student loan programs in order to
“ensure” that affected student-loan borrowers are not
“placed in a worse position financially” in relation to
their loans because of the emergency. 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(1) and (2). Here, the Secretary responded to
the devastating economic consequences of the COVID19 pandemic by granting targeted relief to borrowers at
higher risk of delinquency and default due to the
pandemic—specifically, by waiving and modifying certain provisions governing student-loan cancellation and
discharge. That relief falls squarely within the Secretary’s express statutory authority.
Respondents’ various attempts to reconcile their
contrary position with the Act’s unambiguous text fall
short. Their arguments rest on manufactured limits nowhere to be found in the Act; revisionist accounts of the
Act’s purpose and history flatly contradicted by the Act
itself; strained readings of other provisions in other
statutes; and mischaracterizations of the plan and the
analysis on which it is based. Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of the Act undermines the most natural
reading of its operative provisions, and the Secretary’s
plan readily satisfies the Act’s requirements.
Respondents’ resort to the major questions doctrine
fares no better. That doctrine does not justify overriding ordinary principles of statutory construction whenever an agency action can be described as consequential; rather, this Court has applied the doctrine only in
“extraordinary cases” characterized by what the Court
has concluded is a gross mismatch between an agency’s
20
assertion of regulatory authority and the history and
context of the supposed congressional authorization.
West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2608-2609 (2022)
(citation omitted). This case does not share the key features of those extraordinary cases. The Secretary’s
plan concerns the administration of a federal benefit
program and involves no assertion of regulatory authority at all; the statutory authorization to provide debt relief is central to the HEROES Act, direct, and concrete;
and the asserted authority to discharge debt is neither
a surprising form of borrower relief nor beyond the Department’s ordinary domain. Even if the major questions doctrine applied, moreover, it would not justify invalidating the plan: The Act’s plain text supplies the
clear authorization that the doctrine requires.
B. The Secretary’s plan is both reasonable and reasonably explained. In defining the key aspects of the
plan, the Secretary examined the available economic
and historical data and tailored the relief to the relevant
statutory objective: ensuring that borrowers affected
by the pandemic would not be in a worse position financially with regard to their student-loan obligations. Respondents offer no sound basis to second-guess the Secretary’s considered evaluation of the evidence or his
predictive judgment about the type and degree of relief
required to ensure that borrowers are not placed in a
worse financial position because of the pandemic.
C. The Secretary’s plan is also procedurally proper.
The HEROES Act expressly exempts the Secretary
from complying with the notice-and-comment requirements in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
701 et seq., when issuing waivers and modifications
under the Act. The Education Act’s negotiatedrulemaking procedures are likewise inapplicable to such
21
waivers and modifications. Contrary to respondents’
contentions, neither procedural exemption depends on
the substantive validity of the Secretary’s plan. In any
event, because the HEROES Act does authorize the
plan, the Secretary’s undisputed compliance with the
Act’s procedural requirements answers respondents’
challenge in full.
ARGUMENT
I. RESPONDENTS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING
Article III empowers the federal courts to decide
only “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III,
§ 2, Cl. 1. An Article III case or controversy exists only
if the plaintiff has standing, a requirement that “ensures that [the] federal courts decide only ‘the rights of
individuals’ ” and “exercise ‘their proper function in a
limited and separated government.’ ” TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021) (citations omitted). In our system, “[f ]ederal courts do not possess a
roving commission to publicly opine on every legal question” and “do not exercise general legal oversight of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.” Ibid.
The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” has “three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “First, the plaintiff must
have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Ibid. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Second, the injury must be “fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.” Id.
at 560-561 (brackets, citation, and ellipsis omitted).
“Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
decision.’ ” Id. at 561 (citation omitted). “The party in-
22
voking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Ibid. Respondents have failed
to do so here.
A. The States Lack Standing
The States have raised four theories of standing.
The district court in Nebraska correctly rejected each
of them. J.A. 142-151.
1. Four States—Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and South
Carolina—assert that the plan will diminish their tax
revenues. J.A. 150. They contend that some student
loans that would have been discharged in the future will
instead be discharged under the plan. Ibid. That hypothesized shift in timing matters, they say, because the
Internal Revenue Code normally treats “discharge of
indebtedness” as a form of “gross income,” 26 U.S.C.
61(a)(11)-(12), but a temporary provision excludes discharges of student loans from 2021 to 2025, see 26
U.S.C. 108(f )(5). J.A. 150. The States argue that, because they have chosen to incorporate the Code’s definition of “gross income” into their own laws, a change in
the timing of discharges will diminish their revenues.
Ibid. That roundabout theory is incorrect for multiple
independent reasons.
First, the States’ alleged harm results from their
own choice to tie their tax laws to the Internal Revenue
Code. This Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. New
Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam), forecloses a
State’s effort to claim standing on such a self-generated
basis. There, Pennsylvania sought to establish standing
to challenge a New Jersey tax by arguing that, because
Pennsylvania provided a credit for taxes paid to other
States, a tax increase in New Jersey could lead to a loss
of tax revenue in Pennsylvania. Id. at 664-665. The
Court rejected that theory, explaining that nothing re-
23
quired Pennsylvania to extend the credit, that any harm
to Pennsylvania was thus “self-inflicted,” and that “[n]o
State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted
by its own hand.” Id. at 664.
Any harm to the States’ treasuries here is likewise
self-inflicted. The States have no obligation to track the
federal definition of gross income; indeed, two of the six
States that have brought this suit (Arkansas and Missouri) evidently do not do so. The other States remain
free to depart from that definition and to treat studentloan discharges from 2021 to 2025 as taxable income for
purposes of state income taxes. If they choose not to do
so, any resulting reduction in their tax revenues is fairly
traceable not to the Secretary’s plan, but instead to
their own choices about how to structure their tax laws.
And the States “cannot manufacture standing merely
by inflicting harm on themselves.” Clapper v. Amnesty
Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013).
Second, even apart from the self-inflicted nature of
the States’ asserted harm, this Court’s decision in Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927), establishes that a federal policy’s incidental effects on state tax revenues are
not judicially cognizable injuries. There, Florida sought
to establish standing to challenge a federal inheritance
tax by arguing that the tax would prompt the “withdrawal of property” from the State, diminishing its tax
base. Id. at 18. The Court rejected that argument, explaining that Florida was required to show a “direct injury” and that any harm caused by the federal tax was,
“at most, only remote and indirect.” Ibid. (emphasis
omitted). That analysis equally applies here: Just as
Florida could not establish standing by claiming that
state tax revenues would decline because of a federal
policy, the States here cannot do so either.
24
Respondents’ contrary view has startling implications. Virtually all federal actions—from prosecuting
crime to imposing taxes to managing property—have
some incidental effects on state finances. If such incidental effects suffice for standing, every State would
have standing to challenge almost any federal policy.
That would flout Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement and convert the federal courts into “an open
forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes.” United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring); see Pennsylvania v.
Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 672 (D.C. Cir.) (“[T]he unavoidable economic repercussions of virtually all federal policies * * * suggest to us that impairment of state tax
revenues should not, in general, be recognized as sufficient injury in fact to support state standing.”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
Third, the States’ theory of reduced tax revenues is
unduly speculative. “Standing is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable’ ”; rather, a plaintiff
must show that its asserted injury is “ ‘certainly impending.’ ” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2,
566 (citations omitted). The asserted loss of tax revenues after 2025 is neither certain nor impending. Instead, it depends on the assumption that if borrowers
did not receive discharges under the plan, they would
receive discharges for other reasons; that those discharges would not occur until 2026 or later; and that neither state nor federal law would change in the meantime. The States’ theory thus depends on a “speculative
chain of possibilities,” which does not suffice to establish standing. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.
2. Three States—Arkansas, Missouri, and Nebraska
—assert a second theory of standing. J.A. 146 & n.4.
25
Those States argue that, because the plan provides relief for Direct Loans but not for Family Education
Loans, it has encouraged borrowers to consolidate (i.e.,
convert) their Family Education Loans into Direct
Loans. The States maintain that such consolidation
causes them financial harm because state entities hold
or have invested in Family Education Loans. J.A. 146.
The most obvious problem with the States’ incentiveto-consolidate theory is that the plan does not create an
incentive to consolidate. Under a decision the Department made before the States sued and announced and
made effective the day they sued, “borrowers with federal student loans not held by [the Department] cannot
obtain one-time debt relief by consolidating those loans
into Direct Loans.” J.A. 215 (emphasis omitted). Because consolidation does not make borrowers eligible
for relief under the plan, the plan does not encourage
borrowers to consolidate their loans.
Even if the plan still somehow encouraged consolidation, the States would lack standing. An injury suffices
for Article III standing only if it is “fairly traceable to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not
before the court.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560
(brackets, citation, and ellipses omitted). That principle
“does not exclude injury produced by [the] determinative or coercive effect [of the defendant’s conduct] upon
the action of someone else.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 169 (1997). But it does mean that, in general, a
plaintiff cannot establish standing simply by showing
that the defendant’s conduct creates an incentive for
third parties to act in a particular way. For example, in
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), this Court held that a group of
26
indigent plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a revenue ruling concerning the availability of a federal tax
benefit that allegedly “ ‘encouraged’ hospitals to deny
services to indigents.” Id. at 42. The Court found it
“purely speculative” that any denial of service would result from the government’s “ ‘encouragement’ ” rather
than from “decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.” Id. at 43.
The States’ incentive-to-consolidate theory defies
those principles. The States do not allege that the plan
“coerc[ed]” borrowers to consolidate their loans. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169. They instead allege only that the
plan created an “incentive” for borrowers to do so. J.A.
146. But a borrower deciding whether to consolidate
loans must weigh the benefits of consolidation (such as
lower monthly payments, the switch from a variable interest rate to a fixed interest rate, and potential eligibility for COVID-19 forbearance) and the costs (such as
a longer repayment period and the loss of discounts associated with the existing loans). See, e.g., Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., What are the benefits and
downsides of loan consolidation?; Federal Student Aid,
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., COVID-19 Loan Payment Pause
and 0% Interest. It is purely speculative whether any
loan consolidations that may occur will result from the
plan’s “ ‘encouragement’ ” or instead from “decisions
made by the [borrowers] without regard to the [plan].”
Simon, 426 U.S. at 43. Any financial harms that flow
from consolidation would thus be fairly traceable to the
borrowers’ independent decisions to consolidate, not to
the plan.
3. The Eighth Circuit adopted a theory of standing
focused on MOHELA, a state-created entity in Missouri that has contracted with the Department of Edu-
27
cation to service student loans. J.A. 162. The States
have alleged that MOHELA receives an administrative
fee for each loan it services and that MOHELA will stop
receiving such fees for loans that are discharged under
the plan. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Missouri
has standing because Missouri law requires MOHELA
to contribute a specified amount to a fund in the state
treasury, and “the financial impact on MOHELA due to
the Secretary’s debt discharge” may impair MOHELA’s ability to fulfill that obligation. J.A. 164. But
the States have not alleged that the plan’s effect on MOHELA will cause it to default on its obligation to Missouri. And even if they had made such an allegation, the
Eighth Circuit still would have erred in accepting it as
a basis for Article III standing.
The Eighth Circuit cited no authority for the proposition that, if A causes financial harm to B, and B owes
money to C, C has standing to sue A. That theory of
standing is irreconcilable with the principle that a plaintiff must “assert [its] own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest [its] claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975). Taken to its logical conclusion, the Eighth
Circuit’s theory would mean that banks could sue anyone who causes financial harm to their borrowers,
credit-card companies could sue anyone who causes financial harm to their customers, and governments
could sue anyone who causes financial harm to their taxpayers.
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis also conflicts with this
Court’s “usual reluctance to endorse standing theories
that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. It is pure speculation that, if the plan causes financial harm to MO-
28
HELA, MOHELA will default on its obligation to pay a
fixed sum to the state treasury. The plan may not cause
a significant drop in MOHELA’s revenue at all. Alternatively, MOHELA may make enough money that it
can fulfill its financial obligations to the State despite
any loss of revenue. Guesswork about how the plan will
affect MOHELA and how MOHELA will react to those
effects does not suffice to establish Article III standing.
4. Fourth, the States have also advanced a different
theory of standing based on MOHELA: They assert
that the relationship between MOHELA and Missouri
means that financial injuries to MOHELA are injuries
to the State—and thus that MOHELA’s alleged loss of
servicing fees as a result of the plan constitutes an Article III injury to the State itself. J.A. 145-146.
The States’ theory is foreclosed by two familiar legal
principles, taken together. First, a plaintiff has standing only if it has a “personal stake” in the outcome of
the litigation. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203 (citation
omitted). That is, a plaintiff may sue only to vindicate
its “own legal rights and interests”; it may not rest its
claim to judicial relief on “the legal rights and interests
of third parties.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. Second, “separately incorporated organizations are separate legal
units with distinct legal rights and obligations.” Agency
for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 140
S. Ct. 2082, 2087 (2020). Indeed, “[s]eparate legal personality has been described as ‘an almost indispensable
aspect of the public corporation.’ ” First Nat’l City
Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 625 (1983) (Bancec) (citation omitted).
Missouri has established MOHELA as a corporation
with a separate legal personality. Missouri law declares
MOHELA to be a “body corporate.” Mo. Rev. Stat.
29
§ 173.360 (2022). MOHELA, like any other corporation,
has “perpetual succession” and the right to “sue and be
sued” in its own name. Id. § 173.385(1) and (3). Its assets shall not “be considered to be part of the revenue
of the state,” id. § 173.425, and the State “shall not be
liable” for its debts, id. § 173.410. In short, Missouri
and MOHELA are legally separate entities. Missouri
thus cannot establish its own standing by asserting that
the plan injures MOHELA.
The States’ contrary arguments (Nebraska Resp. 1316) conflict with the bedrock principle of corporate separateness. The States emphasize that Missouri law describes MOHELA as a “public instrumentality” that
performs “essential public functions.” Id. at 14 (brackets and citation omitted). But a corporation’s status as
a public instrumentality does not detract from its legal
separateness. “[G]overnment instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent
from their sovereign should normally be treated as
such.” Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626-627; see Dole Food Co.
v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003). “Freely ignoring the separate status of government instrumentalities
would result in substantial uncertainty” over the instrumentality’s and the sovereign’s legal rights and obligations. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626.
The States also argue (Nebraska Resp. 15) that Missouri and MOHELA have a “close” relationship, but the
States overstate the closeness of those ties. As the district court observed, Missouri has established MOHELA as a “self-sustaining,” “financially independent”
corporation with “express financial separation” from
the State. J.A. 145. And MOHELA has stated that it
was “not involved with the decision of the Missouri Attorney General’s Office” to bring this suit. 22-3179 C.A.
30
Docket Entry (8th Cir. Nov. 1, 2022). Indeed, MOHELA has stated that its only communications with the
Office regarding student debt relief have involved the
Office’s “sunshine law requests” to MOHELA seeking
documents for use in this litigation. Ibid.
More fundamentally, it makes no difference whether
MOHELA has close ties to the State. A corporation’s
status as a separate legal person does not depend on the
closeness of its relationship to its creator. “After all,
incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal
entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who
created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” Cedric
Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163
(2001). For example, the law generally treats a corporation and its sole owner as distinct persons, regardless
of the closeness of the link between the two. See ibid.
There is no reason to treat a corporation created by
Missouri any differently. Missouri chose to structure
MOHELA as a separate corporation that can sue and
be sued in its own name. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 173.385(3)
(2022). The States identify no prior case in which Missouri purported to sue on MOHELA’s behalf. Having
chosen to establish MOHELA as a separate legal entity
and reaped the benefits of that choice, Missouri may not
now maintain that the State and MOHELA are one and
the same merely because it believes that MOHELA has
standing to challenge a policy the State opposes. 2
In addition to their other theories, the States have asserted (Nebraska Resp. 21-22) that the plan’s alleged effect on MOHELA will
harm Missouri’s “quasi-sovereign state interest” by diminishing its
residents’ educational opportunities. But it is well-established that
“[a] State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an ac2
31
B. Brown And Taylor Lack Standing
Brown and Taylor, too, lack standing to challenge
the plan. The district court in Brown held that they
have standing because the plan provides them less debt
relief than they claim to desire and they allege that they
were improperly deprived of the opportunity to urge
the Secretary to provide greater relief. J.A. 277-282.
The court emphasized that Brown is ineligible for any
relief under the plan because her debt is held by a commercial lender, while Taylor is eligible for $10,000 rather than $20,000 because he did not receive a Pell
Grant. J.A. 279-280. But that theory is insufficient to
establish standing to press either the substantive claim
on which the court granted relief or the distinct procedural claim that Brown and Taylor have actually asserted.
Brown and Taylor plainly lack standing to raise the
substantive claim on which the district court granted relief. Indeed, they have never seriously argued otherwise. To establish Article III standing, plaintiffs must
do more than show injury; they must also show that “the
injury would likely be redressed” by their requested relief. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203. And because
“standing is not dispensed in gross,” plaintiffs must
make that showing “for each claim that they press and
for each form of relief they seek.” Id. at 2208. The relief
the district court granted—a declaration that the plan
is substantively unlawful and an order vacating it—
would not redress the injuries asserted here. That
judgment leaves Brown’s financial position unchanged;
she would still receive no loan forgiveness. And it would
leave Taylor worse off than before; he would receive
tion against the Federal Government.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc.
v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) (emphasis omitted).
32
neither the $10,000 the plan provides nor the $20,000 he
purports to seek, but instead nothing at all.
Brown and Taylor also lack standing to raise the procedural claim they presented below. In concluding otherwise, the district court reasoned that the ordinary redressability requirement is “relaxed when a plaintiff asserts a deprivation of a procedural right”—here, an asserted right to have the Secretary follow notice-andcomment and negotiated-rulemaking procedures, which
would enable Brown and Taylor to “advocate for the expansion of the [plan’s] eligibility criteria.” J.A. 276, 279280. The court concluded that, in that circumstance, the
plaintiff need only show that “ ‘there is some possibility
that the requested relief will cause the injury-causing
party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed
the litigant.’ ” J.A. 281 (citation and emphasis omitted).
But private respondents’ claim fails that test.
Brown and Taylor contend that, even though the
HEROES Act exempts waivers and modifications from
notice-and-comment and negotiated-rulemaking procedures, those exemptions do not apply here because the
plan exceeds the Secretary’s substantive authority under the HEROES Act. Under that theory, the Secretary would lack authority to provide loan forgiveness to
any borrower—Brown and Taylor included. A judgment based on that theory thus could not prompt the
Secretary to reconsider the decisions that allegedly
harmed private respondents—i.e., the decision not to
extend HEROES Act relief to borrowers such as Brown
and to extend only $10,000 rather than $20,000 to borrowers such as Taylor. Instead, because the ostensibly
procedural judgment would be premised on the plan’s
substantive unlawfulness, it would mean that no one
could receive debt-cancellation relief under the HE-
33
ROES Act at all, now or in the future following a noticeand-comment period. That result would in no way redress Brown’s injury and would cost Taylor $10,000. Cf.
Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 501-502 (2020) (holding that a plaintiff lacked standing because “the context
of th[e] particular record” suggested simply “a desire to
vindicate his view of the law” and “not an actual desire”
to have his asserted individual injury remedied).
* * * * *
“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Simon, 426 U.S. at 37; see
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203. Yet respondents’ theories make that fundamental principle seem like a lawyer’s game. The States assert standing based on injuries that are highly speculative, that they have inflicted
upon themselves, or that fall upon a third party that is
a stranger to this litigation. And private respondents
purport to assert that the plan injures them because it
provides too little debt relief, but seek a remedy that
would result in no debt relief at all. This Court should
reject those convoluted theories and hold that none of
the respondents has established Article III standing to
challenge the plan.
II. THE SECRETARY’S PLAN IS LAWFUL
On the merits, respondents challenge the Secretary’s plan as exceeding his statutory authority, arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally improper. Each
contention is wrong. The plan falls squarely within the
plain text of the HEROES Act; indeed, a central purpose of the statute is to authorize the Secretary to grant
student-loan-related relief to at-risk borrowers because
34
of a national emergency—precisely what the Secretary
did here. The plan rests on the Secretary’s examination
of the relevant economic data and his predictive judgment based on the Department’s long experience with
borrowers transitioning back into repayment after periods of forbearance, which illustrates that forbearance
alone is not necessarily sufficient to alleviate the continuing economic effects of an emergency. And it is undisputed that the Secretary complied with the procedural
requirements of the HEROES Act.
A. The HEROES Act Authorizes The Plan
The Secretary’s plan is authorized by the plain text
of the HEROES Act. Respondents’ contrary arguments are unpersuasive, and their invocation of the major questions doctrine provides no sound reason to depart from the most natural reading of the statutory text.
1. The plain text of the HEROES Act authorizes the
plan
a. The HEROES Act provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” the Secretary may
(i) respond to a “national emergency” by (ii) providing
relief to student-loan recipients who are “affected individuals” (iii) to the extent “the Secretary deems necessary” to “ensure” that those individuals are not “placed
in a worse position financially” in relation to their loans
because of the emergency. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1) and
(2). The Act further specifies (iv) that the relief may
consist of “waiv[ing] or modify[ing] any statutory or
regulatory provision” governing the federal student
loan programs. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1). The Secretary’s plan satisfies each of those elements.
First, the COVID-19 pandemic is a “national emergency declared by the President of the United States.”
35
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(4); see 87 Fed. Reg. 10,289, 10,289
(Feb. 23, 2022). Both the Trump and Biden Administrations previously invoked the HEROES Act to categorically suspend payment obligations and interest accrual
on all Department-held loans in light of the pandemic.
See p. 8, supra. No respondent has argued that those
actions were unlawful.
Second, borrowers eligible for relief under the plan
are “affected individuals.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2)(A).
The vast majority qualify based on where they “reside[]” or are “employed,” 20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(C): The
50 States, the District of Columbia, and all five permanently populated United States territories have been
designated as COVID-19 disaster areas. See p. 7, supra. And because the pandemic has inflicted profound
global economic harms, with particularly severe effects
on lower-income borrowers, the Secretary reasonably
“determined” that the small fraction of eligible borrowers living and working abroad qualify because they have
suffered “direct economic hardship” due to the pandemic. 20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(D). Again, the payment
pauses adopted by both the Trump and Biden Administrations rested on the same understanding of “affected individual.”
Third, the plan serves an express statutory objective. The Secretary “deem[ed]” relief “necessary to ensure” that a subset of affected individuals—namely,
those with lower incomes—“are not placed in a worse
position” in relation to their student-loan obligations
“because of their status as affected individuals,” i.e., because of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. 20
U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1) and (2). That determination was
supported by analysis and evidence showing that, because of the pandemic, such borrowers are at particu-
36
larly high risk of delinquency and default once payment
obligations restart. See pp. 9-10, supra.
Fourth, the Act authorizes the type of relief that the
Secretary granted. The Act allows the Secretary to
“waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision
applicable to the student financial assistance programs
under title IV.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1) (emphasis
added). The provisions governing student-loan repayment obligations, cancellation, and discharge are unquestionably “statutory or regulatory provision[s] applicable to the student financial assistance programs
under title IV.” Ibid.; see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. 1087 (2018 &
Supp. I 2019), 1087dd(g); 34 C.F.R. 682.402, 685.212.
The HEROES Act thus authorized the Secretary to
“waive or modify” those provisions to reduce the scope
of vulnerable borrowers’ payment obligations in order
to ensure that they are not worse off in relation to their
student-loan obligations because of the pandemic. 20
U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1); J.A. 257-259.
b. Other provisions of the HEROES Act underscore
the breadth of the authority Congress conferred on the
Secretary to determine eligibility criteria and define
the scope of relief to be afforded. The Act specifically
authorizes the Secretary to issue relief to classes of borrowers rather than on a “case-by-case basis.” 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(b)(3). Congress likewise expressly contemplated the Secretary’s exercise of substantial discretion
in fashioning appropriate relief, authorizing the Secretary not once but twice to issue those waivers and modifications he “deems necessary” to “achieve the purposes of this section.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1) and (b)(1).
By authorizing relief that the Secretary “deems” necessary rather than relief that actually “is necessary,”
Congress adopted a standard that “fairly exudes defer-
37
ence.” Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (citation
omitted). Congress underscored the point in Section
1098bb(a)(2), authorizing the Secretary to waive or
modify any such provision “as may be necessary” to
“ensure” that the Act’s objectives are met. 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(2) (emphasis added). And Congress made
clear that the Secretary’s authority to grant debt relief
applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,
unless enacted with specific reference to [the HEROES
Act],” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1)—thus setting a default of
expansive remedial authority that can be displaced only
through express reference.
2. Respondents’ attempt to exclude discharge as a form
of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act’s text
In challenging the Secretary’s statutory authority to
adopt the plan, respondents principally contend that the
HEROES Act categorically precludes discharge of loan
principal as a form of relief. See Nebraska Resp. 24-26;
Brown Resp. 21-22. That purported limit contradicts
the Act’s unambiguous text, and respondents’ various
attempts to justify it are unpersuasive.
a. The Act specifically authorizes the Secretary to
“waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision
applicable to the student financial assistance programs”
under Title IV of the Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(1) (emphasis added). Nothing in the Act limits the Title IV provisions that the Secretary can waive
or modify; to the contrary, “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S.
1, 5 (1997) (citation omitted). Respondents do not dispute that the referenced provisions include those governing student-loan cancellation and discharge, which
are the provisions the Secretary waived and modified
here. See J.A. 261-262 (citing 20 U.S.C. 1087, 1087a,
38
1087e, 1087dd(g); 34 C.F.R. 682.402, 685.212); 87 Fed.
Reg. at 61,512. And respondents cannot show that those
provisions are implicitly excluded; to the contrary, Congress underscored that the HEROES Act authorizes
the Secretary to displace the ordinary operation of
those provisions by specifying that the Act applies
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, unless
enacted with specific reference to [the Act].” 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(1).
Respondents make little effort to square their contrary position with the Act’s text. Brown and Taylor
briefly assert that “waive” and “modify” are “ ‘modest
words’ ” that cannot authorize debt relief. Brown Resp.
21 (citation omitted). But to waive is “[t]o abandon, renounce, or surrender (a claim, privilege, right, etc.)” or
“to give up (a right or claim) voluntarily,” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1894 (11th ed. 2019); to modify is “[t]o make
somewhat different” or “to reduce in degree or extent,”
id. at 1203. The Act thus unambiguously authorizes the
Secretary to eliminate or reduce the requirements imposed by any Title IV student-aid provision—including
those that establish loan repayment obligations and discharge eligibility. To be sure, the Secretary can only
exercise that authority when all predicates for relief under the HEROES Act are satisfied, and those limitations ensure that any relief is tailored to the economic
consequences of a particular emergency. See pp. 34-37,
supra; pp. 50-51, infra. But there is no reason to think
that Congress, by empowering the Secretary to “waive
or modify” any Title IV student-aid provision, intended
to limit the Secretary to modest changes when such
changes would not suffice to ameliorate borrower hardship due to the emergency. “By introducing a limitation
not found in the statute, respondents ask [this Court] to
39
alter, rather than to interpret, the [Act].” Little Sisters
of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
140 S. Ct. 2367, 2381 (2020). But courts have no authority to “impos[e] limits on an agency’s discretion that are
not supported by the text.” Ibid.
b. Lacking textual support, respondents invoke
other statutory provisions and the Act’s purpose and
legislative history. Those arguments are unpersuasive
on their own terms, and none justifies a departure from
the Act’s unambiguous text.
First, Brown and Taylor emphasize that the Education Act explicitly authorizes the Department to discharge student-loan debt in certain circumstances and
assert that “[t]he Court should not ‘read [debt cancellation] into’ the HEROES Act ‘when it is clear that Congress knew how to [authorize it] when it wanted to.’ ”
Brown Resp. 22 (citation omitted; brackets in original).
But such specific statutory references to loan cancellation authorize only cancellation; by contrast, when Congress says “any,” it authorizes any appropriate form of
relief, which naturally includes debt cancellation in the
context of a provision designed to provide student-loanrelated relief as warranted by circumstances like a national emergency.
Moreover, the HEROES Act does not list any of the
specific forms of relief the Secretary has long issued under the Act to ensure that borrowers affected by a national emergency are not left worse off—including extending forbearance, suspending interest accrual, and
altering the requirements for loan deferrals. See pp. 78, supra. The Act instead ensures that the Secretary
can respond quickly and effectively to the particular
emergency at hand by authorizing the Secretary to
waive or modify “any” Title IV provision applicable to
40
the federal student-aid programs, where the circumstances so warrant. Indeed, as with cancellation, various provisions of the Education Act specifically authorize many of the forms of relief the Secretary has long
granted under the HEROES Act. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.
1077(a)(2)(C) (deferment); 20 U.S.C. 1078(b)(1)(M)
(same); 20 U.S.C. 1087e(f) (same); 20 U.S.C. 1087e(o)
(suspension of interest accrual); 20 U.S.C. 1087dd(e)
(forbearance). If respondents were correct that Congress’s express authorization of a form of relief in other
circumstances implicitly precludes the Secretary from
granting that relief under the HEROES Act, the Act
would be a virtual dead letter.
Respondents’ effort to read Congress’s express authorization of discharge in other circumstances as an
implied limit on the HEROES Act also contradicts Congress’s direction that the Secretary’s authority under
the Act applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law, unless enacted with specific reference to [the
Act].” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1). “[T]he use of such a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section
override conflicting provisions of any other section.”
Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993).
The provisions authorizing debt relief in other circumstances—which were not enacted with specific reference to the HEROES Act—thus cannot be construed to
limit the Secretary’s authority under the Act.
Second, the States assert (Nebraska Resp. 25) that
the Act’s “focus on addressing temporary challenges
like a ‘military operation or a national emergency’ ” is
inconsistent with “the permanent cancellation of principal.” But nothing about the nature of events that can
trigger the Act suggests a limitation on the type of relief
41
that might be necessary to respond to those conditions.
Rather, the Act contemplates that the Secretary will authorize relief in proportion to the scale and scope of the
emergency; the more devastating and lingering the
emergency, the more significant the relief “necessary to
ensure” that borrowers are not worse off as a result. 20
U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2)(A). And even in response to lesssevere disruptions, the Secretary has long invoked the
HEROES Act to provide permanent relief such as waiving the requirement that borrowers return certain overpayments or modifying the criteria for loan cancellation. OLC Op., 2022 WL 3975075, at *4; 87 Fed. Reg. at
52,944.
Finally, relying on statements made by individual
legislators, respondents assert that in enacting the HEROES Act Congress “thought it was doing little more
than relieving active-duty military from ‘making student loan payments for a period of time while they are
away.’ ” Brown Resp. 18-19 (citation omitted); see Nebraska Resp. 30-31. But again, that argument flatly
contradicts the statutory text. In two predecessor statutes, Congress had focused narrowly on providing relief
to soldiers serving in the Gulf War and people affected
by terrorist attacks. See pp. 4-5, supra. In the HEROES Act, in contrast, Congress deliberately granted
the Secretary broader authority: Rather than limit relief to those “serving on active duty in connection with
Operation Desert Storm,” § 372(a)(1), 105 Stat. 93, or
those affected by September 11th or subsequent terrorist attacks, 115 Stat. 2386, Congress authorized the Secretary to grant relief in response to any “national emergency.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1). And the Act defines
“affected individuals” to include not only individuals
“serving on active duty” or “performing qualifying
42
National Guard duty,” but also anyone who “resides or
is employed in an area that is declared a disaster area
by any Federal, State, or local official in connection
with a national emergency” or who “suffered direct economic hardship” due to that emergency. 20 U.S.C.
1098ee(2)(A)-(D); see pp. 5-6, supra. The Secretary has
thus long issued relief under the Act to large groups of
civilians, including in response to COVID-19. See pp. 78, supra.
3. Respondents’ remaining statutory arguments lack
merit
Respondents also argue that even if the HEROES
Act generally authorizes discharge of principal as a
form of relief, the particulars of the Secretary’s plan do
not comply with the Act’s requirements. All those arguments are unpersuasive, and many of them rest on
misunderstandings of the plan and its supporting analysis.
For instance, respondents assert (Nebraska Resp.
26; Brown Resp. 22-23) that the Secretary failed to limit
the plan to those who “reside[d] or [were] employed in
an area that is declared a disaster area.” 20 U.S.C.
1098ee(2)(C). But the entire country has been declared
a disaster area, so the vast majority of borrowers
do qualify based on where they work and reside. See p.
35, supra.
And the Secretary could reasonably
“determine[]”—as both the Trump and Biden Administrations previously did—that the small fraction of eligible borrowers who live and work abroad qualify because they have suffered “direct economic hardship”
due to a global pandemic. 20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2)(D); see
p. 35, supra.
Respondents also assert that because interest accrual and payment obligations have been paused during
43
the pandemic, the plan would place borrowers in a “better position” rather than ensuring that they are not
placed in a “ ‘worse position financially in relation to
[their] financial assistance.’ ” Nebraska Resp. 22, 24
(capitalization, citation, and emphasis omitted; brackets
in original); see Brown Resp. 21. But the evidence before the Secretary showed that without relief, lowerincome borrowers were likely to experience increased
default and delinquency rates beyond pre-pandemic levels once repayments resume. See J.A. 234-239, 245, 249251; pp. 9-10, supra. And the evidence further showed
that reducing the principal owed by such borrowers by
the proposed amounts, and reducing their monthly payments accordingly, would ameliorate the “risk that delinquency and default rates will rise above prepandemic levels.” J.A. 242 (emphasis added); see J.A.
242-244. Respondents do not seriously dispute those
determinations.
Respondents further contend (Nebraska Resp. 26;
Brown Resp. 22) that the Department failed to show
that the plan was “necessary” to prevent delinquency
and default for each borrower eligible for relief. Congress, however, authorized the Secretary to issue relief
“as may be necessary to ensure” that affected individuals are not worse off with respect to their student loans.
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2) (emphasis added); see Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language 756 (2002) (“ensure” means “to make sure,
certain, or safe”). And again, the Act makes clear that
“[t]he Secretary is not required to exercise the waiver
or modification authority * * * on a case-by-case basis.”
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(3). By authorizing the Secretary to
act on a class-wide basis as may be necessary to make
“sure” or “certain” that borrowers are not placed in a
44
worse position financially, Congress authorized and encouraged the Secretary to err on the side of overinclusion—a sensible approach in a statute addressing
relief from national emergencies. See Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975) (Congress may conclude
“that the expense and other difficulties of individual[ized] determinations justif [y] the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.”).
Previous invocations of the HEROES Act have likewise afforded relief on a class-wide basis. See OLC Op.,
2022 WL 3975075, at *4-*5. Most obviously, each invocation of the Act to pause payment obligations and interest accrual during the pandemic—which respondents do not challenge—provided relief for all borrowers
with federally held student loans. See, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg.
at 79,857; 87 Fed. Reg. at 61,512-65,514. Here, by contrast, the Secretary limited eligibility for relief to the
subset of affected borrowers most likely to be in a
“worse position financially in relation to” their student
loans because of the pandemic.
20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(2)(A). No more is required.
Relatedly, respondents argue (Nebraska Resp. 26;
Brown Resp. 22) that the plan’s income thresholds are
insufficiently tailored to identify those borrowers who
will be at heightened risk of delinquency and default
due to the pandemic. But again, Congress specifically
authorized the Secretary to respond quickly and fully to
an emergency by acting on a class-wide basis, and it encouraged him to err on the side of over- rather than
under-inclusion. Here, moreover, the plan directly corresponds to the Department’s supporting analysis,
which examined the relevant data and determined that
$125,000 is the individual income threshold at which repayment capability is likely to substantially change, and
45
that a $10,000 discharge ($20,000 for qualifying Pell
Grant recipients) will mitigate the risk that vulnerable
borrowers will be worse off in relation to their student
loans as a result of the pandemic. See pp. 10-11, supra.
Finally, the States assert (Nebraska Resp. 23) that
the Act requires “more than” a “but-for” connection
between the proposed relief and the national emergency. But the Act authorizes the Secretary to ensure
that borrowers are not worse off in relation to their
student loans “because of ” an emergency. 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(2)(A). The term “because of ” is most “often
associated with but-for causation.” Comcast Corp. v.
National Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140
S. Ct. 1009, 1016 (2020); see University of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013) (collecting
cases). And the States’ assertion that the Act instead
demands “direct causation” (Nebraska Resp. 23) cannot
be reconciled with the Act’s definition of the “affected
individuals” eligible for relief. Congress defined an “affected individual” to include not just those who have
“suffered direct economic hardship as a direct result” of
the triggering emergency, but also three other categories, including anyone who “resides or is employed in an
area that is declared a disaster area.” 20 U.S.C.
1098ee(2)(C) and (D). If “direct causation” were required, those other provisions would be superfluous because the affected individuals in those categories who
would be eligible for relief would necessarily fall within
the separate “direct economic hardship” provision.
In any event, the plan satisfies any potentially applicable standard of causation. The evidence before the
Secretary included substantial data showing that the
pandemic has caused severe economic harms, including
layoffs, inflationary spikes, rising delinquency rates,
46
and projected reductions in lifetime earnings for students who left school in 2020 and 2021—and that those
material hardships have disproportionately affected
lower-income households. J.A. 234-239, 245-253. The
evidence further showed that, without the proposed relief, those borrowers would likely experience default
and delinquency rates beyond pre-pandemic levels. See
J.A. 234-239, 242-245, 249-251. The plan thus directly
targets those borrowers facing “a worse position financially” “because of ” the pandemic, 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(1) and (2).
4. The major questions doctrine provides no reason to
depart from the statutory text
The district court in Brown—the only court that addressed the merits of the Secretary’s plan—did not
deny that the plan is authorized by the natural reading
of the HEROES Act. But the court nonetheless believed that the major questions doctrine compelled a
contrary result. J.A. 287-294. Respondents have likewise relied heavily on the major questions doctrine. But
that doctrine does not apply here and, even if it did, it
would not support respondents’ claims.
a. The Brown district court believed that the major
questions doctrine applies because the plan is an agency
action of great “economic and political significance.”
J.A. 291. But this Court has never treated the major
questions doctrine as a license for courts to override
statutory text simply because they regard an agency’s
action as economically or politically consequential.
Many agency actions can be characterized as costly or
politically salient, but the Court has not applied the major questions doctrine as a matter of course. To the contrary, this Court regularly decides challenges to executive actions of major economic and political significance
47
under the usual rules of statutory interpretation without imposing heightened-specificity requirements. See,
e.g., Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647, 652 (2022) (per
curiam); Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1776 (2021);
Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2380-2381; Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551,
2571-2572 (2019); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,
2408 (2018).
In particular, the cost of a government program
alone provides no basis to depart from plain statutory
meaning. For example, although the scope of the Medicare program inevitably means that policies adopted by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services may involve many billions of dollars, this Court has never
treated that as a reason to demand specific authorization in a Medicare case. See, e.g., Becerra v. Empire
Health Found., 142 S. Ct. 2354 (2022); American Hosp.
Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896 (2022); see generally
Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1808
(2019). The same is true for various agency actions implicating billions of dollars in costs to the energy, utility,
and telecommunications industries. See, e.g., EPA v.
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489
(2014); National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); New York v. FERC,
535 U.S. 1 (2002). The district court thus erred in presuming that the mere fact that an action could be called
“economically and politically significant” suffices to demand clearer-than-ordinary congressional authorization.
Rather, the major questions doctrine applies when
an agency claims an “[e]xtraordinary grant[] of regulatory authority” based on “ ‘modest words,’ ‘vague
terms,’ or ‘subtle devices,’ ” and the “ ‘history and the
48
breadth’ ” of that asserted power provide “ ‘reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress’ ” meant to
confer such authority. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct.
2587, 2608-2609 (2022) (brackets and citations omitted).
The Court has thus applied the doctrine only in a handful of “extraordinary cases” that presented a marked incongruity between an agency’s claimed authority and
the history and context of the statutory provision that
purportedly conferred it. Id. at 2609. This case lacks
the hallmarks of those extraordinary cases.
Most fundamentally, this case does not involve any
assertion of “regulatory authority,” but rather the exercise of authority over a government benefit program
to provide additional relief to beneficiaries. Every case
in which this Court has invoked the major questions
doctrine to invalidate an agency action involved an
agency asserting the power to regulate, and not simply
the provision of government benefits. See, e.g., West
Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608 (EPA’s authority to regulate power plants with emissions standards based on restructuring the Nation’s mix of electricity generation);
NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 666 (2022) (per curiam)
(OSHA’s authority to adopt “a broad public health regulation” requiring vaccination or other COVID-19 precautions in the workplace); Alabama Ass’n of Realtors
v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam)
(CDC’s authority to regulate “the landlord-tenant relationship” by issuing a nationwide eviction moratorium);
Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014) (EPA’s power to assert permitting authority over
millions of small sources); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 266-268 (2006) (Attorney General’s authority to ban
drugs used in physician-assisted suicide); Whitman v.
American Trucking Assn’s, 531 U.S. 457, 465-468
49
(2001) (EPA’s authority to consider implementation
costs in setting national ambient air quality standards);
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 159-161 (2000) (FDA’s authority to regulate tobacco products).
The Court’s focus on whether a case involves an
“[e]xtraordinary grant[] of regulatory authority” makes
good sense: the major questions doctrine rests on “separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent,” both of which inform the way
one would expect Congress to legislate if it intended to
grant an agency “ ‘extravagant statutory power over the
national economy.’ ” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2609
(citation omitted). It is, in other words, tailored to assertions of “expansive regulatory authority over some
major social or economic activity.” United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(per curiam) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc); see also West Virginia, 142 S. Ct.
at 2618 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“The framers believed that the power to make new laws regulating private conduct was a grave one that could, if not properly
checked, pose a serious threat to individual liberty.”).
The provision of government benefits, in contrast, poses
no similar risk of “significant encroachment into the
lives” of individuals and the affairs of entities. NFIB,
142 S. Ct. at 665. Broad grants of authority to provide
such benefits accordingly do not provide the same “reason to hesitate” when interpreting a statute. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608. Neither the district court nor
respondents have offered any sound basis for extending
the major questions doctrine to this distinct context,
where the agency is not claiming power to impose regulation on private parties in the first place.
50
b. Even setting aside that fundamental distinction,
this case lacks the other key features this Court has emphasized in invoking the major questions doctrine.
Most obviously, this is not a case where the agency relied on statutory language that is “vague,” “cryptic,”
“ancillary,” or “modest.” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at
2608-2610 (citation omitted). To the contrary, the relevant grant of authority at issue here is direct, concrete,
and central to the HEROES Act, which authorizes the
Secretary to provide student-loan-related relief to affected borrowers in enumerated circumstances, including national emergencies. See pp. 34-37, supra.
Relatedly, the asserted power is neither “ ‘transformative’ ” nor “sweeping.” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct.
at 2608, 2610 (citation omitted). Although the HEROES
Act gives the Secretary powerful tools to address the
situations encompassed by the Act, it applies only in a
limited set of circumstances (including a “national
emergency,” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1)); authorizes relief
only for a defined class of individuals and entities, e.g.,
20 U.S.C. 1098ee(2) (defining “affected individual”); to
accomplish limited objectives (such as “ensur[ing]” that
affected individuals are not “placed in a worse position
financially” in relation to their loans, 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(2)(A)); through specific measures related
only to student loans (waiving or modifying applicable
student-loan requirements, 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1)). In
keeping with those limits, the Secretary waived and
modified certain terms of a federal benefit program to
ensure that vulnerable student-loan borrowers would
not be worse off in relation to their student loans due to
the pandemic. This case is thus far afield from cases
like West Virginia, where the Court found that the
agency action at issue would have required a complete
51
reorganization of American energy infrastructure, 142
S. Ct. at 2604, or Alabama Association of Realtors,
where the Court could perceive “no limit” on the types
of “measures [the agency’s] interpretation would place
outside the CDC’s reach,” from “mandat[ing] free grocery delivery to the homes of the sick or vulnerable” to
“[o]rder[ing] telecommunications companies to provide
free high-speed Internet service to facilitate remote
work,” 141 S. Ct. at 2489.
This is also not a case in which the agency lacks
“ ‘comparative expertise’ in making [the relevant] policy
judgments,” West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2613 (citation
omitted), or has asserted authority that falls outside its
“particular domain,” Alabama Ass’n of Realtors, 141
S. Ct. at 2489. Rather, the Department of Education,
the agency responsible for administering federal student loans, has taken actions that apply only within the
scope of the federal student-loan program—and, indeed, only to loans held by the Department itself.
Nor has the Secretary relied on a “long-extant statute” to claim “unheralded power.” Utility Air, 573 U.S.
at 324. Since the HEROES Act’s enactment in 2003, the
Department has repeatedly invoked it to provide classwide relief to affected borrowers, see p. 7, supra, and
since March 2020, both the Trump and Biden Administrations have invoked the Act to afford relief to all borrowers, see p. 8, supra. Those previous invocations of
the Act had permanent and substantial economic effects. Most significantly, the previous COVID-19 relief
measures, including the suspension of loan payments
and interest accrual, are estimated to have cost the federal government $102 billion. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Student Loans: Education Has Increased
52
Federal Cost Estimates of Direct Loans by Billions due
to Programmatic and Other Changes 14 (July 2022).
That across-the-board pause and the Secretary’s
more targeted debt-relief plan affect many more
borrowers—and thus involve significantly higher
costs—than the Secretary’s pre-pandemic actions. But
that reflects the pandemic’s unparalleled scope, not any
established understanding about the limits of the Secretary’s authority. It is only natural that the Secretary’s response to an unprecedented pandemic went
“further than what the Secretary has done in the past”
in response to less severe and less widespread exigencies. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. at 653.
The Brown district court suggested that “Congress’s
extensive consideration of various bills seeking to forgive student loans and failure to pass such bills” justified applying the major questions doctrine. J.A. 290. But
each bill the court cited meaningfully differed from the
relief the Secretary authorized. 3 The far more relevant
congressional action is a measure included in pandemicrelief legislation enacted in 2021. At that time, when the
possibility of forgiveness under the HEROES Act was
already being publicly debated, Congress anticipated
and facilitated the possibility of such relief by adopting
a “Special Rule for Discharges in 2021 Through 2025”
that makes student-loan discharges during that period
tax-free. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub.
L. No. 117-2, § 9675(a), 135 Stat. 185-186 (capitalization
altered); see also Sen. Menendez, Press Release, MenenSee, e.g., H.R. 2034, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021) (proposing discharge of entire loan balances); H.R. 6800, 116th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 150117(h) (2020) (omnibus $3 trillion relief package that included
many other controversial provisions); S. 2235, 116th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2019) (proposing discharge of up to $50,000 before the pandemic).
3
53
dez, Warren Bill to Make Student Loan Relief Tax-Free
Passes as Part of COVID Relief Package, Clearing Hurdle for Broad Loan Forgiveness (Mar. 6, 2021). That enacted legislation—far from indicating any disapproval
of loan forgiveness under the HEROES Act—instead
shows that Congress foresaw and provided for precisely
the sort of relief the Secretary granted. See Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 155 (emphasizing, in finding
that a case presented a major question, that the Court
was “not rely[ing] on Congress’ failure to act—its consideration and rejection of bills that would have given
the FDA this authority,” but rather on the fact that
“Congress has enacted several statutes” that created a
“regulatory scheme * * * incompatible with FDA’s jurisdiction”).
c. Even if the major questions doctrine applied, it
would not justify invalidating the plan. The central interpretive question in the case is whether the HEROES
Act authorizes the Secretary to grant loan forgiveness.
On that score, the Act’s unambiguous text provides the
“clear congressional authorization” that the major
questions doctrine demands. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct.
at 2609 (citation omitted). And the doctrine provides no
support for respondents’ various secondary arguments
quibbling with the Secretary’s application of the Act’s
other requirements in defining the details of the plan.
First, as explained above, see pp. 34-37, supra, the
Act’s key provision, on its face, authorizes the Secretary
to “waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs under title IV of the [Education] Act” the Secretary deems necessary to respond to a “national emergency,” “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,”
20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(1). The terms governing loan re-
54
payment and discharge are among the most basic statutory and regulatory provisions governing the federal
student-loan programs; Congress’s express grant of authority to the Secretary to waive and modify “any” such
Title IV provision cannot plausibly be read to exclude
such obvious candidates for debt relief without saying
anything of the sort. The plan thus “fits neatly within
the language of the statute,” Missouri, 142 S. Ct. at 652;
indeed, a central purpose of the HEROES Act is to authorize the Secretary to grant student-loan debt relief
to mitigate economic harms borrowers face from national emergencies.
Nor is discharge of principal a type of debt relief that
“ ‘Congress could not have intended to delegate.’ ” West
Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608 (citation omitted). In various circumstances, Congress has specifically recognized that loan forgiveness can be an appropriate response to hardships experienced by borrowers. See,
e.g., 20 U.S.C. 1087(a) (authorizing discharge of Family
Education Loans due to total disability or death); 20
U.S.C. 1087dd(c)(1)(F)(ii) (same for Perkins Loans); 20
U.S.C. 1087(c) (authorizing discharge of Family Education Loans due to school closure); 20 U.S.C. 1087dd(g)
(same for Perkins loans); 20 U.S.C. 1087(c) (authorizing
discharge of Family Education Loans due to school’s
false eligibility certification); 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h) (authorizing the Secretary to establish borrower defenses
to repayment); see also 20 U.S.C. 1087a(b)(2) (applying
same terms to Direct Loans). And Congress has elsewhere granted the Secretary the substantial “power[]”
to “compromise, waive, or release any right, title, claim,
lien, or demand” acquired in administering the Department’s portfolio of loans, 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(6)—authority the Secretary has many times exercised to discharge
55
debts owed by student borrowers, including on a classwide basis and for substantial amounts. See p. 4, supra;
see West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2613 (emphasizing that
Congress “ha[d] not conferred a like authority upon
EPA anywhere else in the Clean Air Act”). In short,
“there is nothing surprising” about the Secretary
providing for discharge—a quintessential form of debt
relief Congress clearly could have contemplated—upon
finding that relief necessary to ensure that borrowers
are not left worse off as a result of the unprecedented
global pandemic. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2613.
Statutory context fortifies that conclusion. The determination whether the HEROES Act clearly confers
authority for the plan “must be ‘shaped, at least in some
measure, by the nature of the question presented,’ ”
West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2608 (citation omitted)—
here, whether Congress would likely authorize the Secretary to provide the benefit of discharge to studentloan borrowers when warranted by a national emergency. A central purpose of the HEROES Act is to empower the Secretary to respond quickly and fully to
such emergencies to ensure borrowers are not left
worse off in relation to their student-loan debt. And because the Act involves only the provision of government
benefits—and not any authority to impose regulation—
the claimed power to discharge debt risks no countervailing intrusion on individual liberty. Under these circumstances, declining to give full effect to the statutory
language authorizing the Secretary to “waive or modify
any statutory or regulatory provision” governing the
federal student loan programs by excluding discharge
as a permissible form of debt relief would not implement
Congress’s intent, but instead override it. 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(1) (emphasis added).
56
Second, the major questions doctrine provides no
support for respondents’ challenges to particular features of the plan, including the Secretary’s determinations about which borrowers should be eligible for relief
and the amount of relief necessary to achieve the HEROES Act’s purpose. Those subsidiary issues—such as
whether $10,000 is an appropriate amount of relief,
whether the plan’s income-eligibility thresholds are justified, or whether Pell Grant recipients warrant additional consideration—are not the sort of fundamental
questions of agency authority to which the doctrine applies. Instead, they are questions about the application
of the Act to the particular factual circumstances presented by a specific emergency. The major questions
doctrine provides no basis for imposing a clearstatement requirement for such subsidiary applications
of an agency’s statutory authority. And imposing such
a requirement here would directly contradict Congress’s decision to vest the Secretary with broad authority to provide class-wide relief as he “deems necessary” to achieve the Act’s objectives. 20 U.S.C.
1098bb(a)(1).
In any event, the Secretary’s plan directly targets
those borrowers facing “a worse position financially” in
relation to their student loans “because of ” a national
emergency, 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(a)(2)(A)—here, the
COVID-19 pandemic. The evidence before the Secretary showed that borrowers with individual incomes below $125,000 were most likely to have experienced job
loss, non-student-loan debt delinquency, and other material hardships as a result of the pandemic, and thus
faced the highest risk of delinquency and default when
student-loan repayment obligations resume. See J.A.
235-236, 245-251; p. 10, supra. And the evidence further
57
showed that reducing the principal owed by such borrowers by the proposed amounts, and reducing their
monthly payments accordingly, would ameliorate the
“risk that delinquency and default rates will rise above
pre-pandemic levels.” J.A. 242; see J.A. 239-243; pp. 1011, supra.
Contrary to the Brown district court’s suggestion,
therefore, the Secretary has not asserted the power to
“use the HEROES Act to forgive student-loan debt” “in
ten years * * * because of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
J.A. 293. Rather, the plan reflects the Secretary’s determination that a one-time discharge of a limited measure of debt for a subset of affected borrowers is necessary when loan-repayment obligations resume to ensure that those borrowers are not placed in a worse position as they and the country work to recover from the
immediate and devastating effects of COVID-19. Other
emergencies may be different in kind, scope, or scale,
and may call for different relief—but always subject to
the terms of the HEROES Act, which limit (1) the circumstances in which the Secretary can act; (2) the class
of individuals eligible for relief; (3) the objectives any
relief must aim to accomplish; and (4) the measures the
Secretary may implement. See pp. 50-51, supra.
B. The Plan Is Reasonable And Reasonably Explained
The States—but not Brown and Taylor—maintain
that the Secretary’s plan is arbitrary and capricious.
No court has accepted that argument, and it is without
merit.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
701 et seq., authorizes a court to set aside agency action
that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary
58
and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Although “the
available data” often “do not settle a regulatory issue,”
id. at 52, “[t]he APA imposes no general obligation on
agencies to conduct or commission their own empirical
or statistical studies,” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. 1150, 1160 (2021). In assessing agency
action, “[a] court is not to ask whether a regulatory decision is the best one possible or even whether it is better than the alternatives.” FERC v. Electric Power
Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 292 (2016). Instead, to satisfy judicial scrutiny, an agency need only “examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’ ” State Farm, 463
U.S. at 43 (citation omitted). The Secretary’s action
readily satisfies that deferential standard because it is
both “reasonable and reasonably explained.” Prometheus, 141 S. Ct. at 1158.
The Secretary reviewed the Department’s “[p]ast
experience with student loan borrowers transitioning
back into repayment” after emergency-related forbearance; borrower surveys, economic studies, and credit
analyses examining “current economic conditions facing
borrowers” as a result of the pandemic; and evidence
about the “substantial negative penalties” imposed on
borrowers “who go delinquent or default on their student loans.” J.A. 233-239 (capitalization altered; emphasis omitted); pp. 9-10, supra. The Secretary also
considered whether “pandemic-connected loan discharge will reduce * * * delinquency and default rates”;
the availability of “other options to reduce monthly pay-
59
ments”; the “amount of debt to discharge” to “mitigate
the risk that delinquency and default rates will rise
above pre-pandemic levels”; and “borrower income
threshold[s]” to confine relief to those borrowers
“mo[st] likely to experience delinquency and default.”
J.A. 240, 242, 245 (capitalization altered; emphasis omitted); see J.A. 240-255; pp. 10-11, supra.
The Secretary found that, when loan-repayment obligations resume, many lower-income borrowers “will
be at heightened risk of loan delinquency and default”
due to the pandemic’s continuing economic effects. J.A.
257. The Secretary further determined that “[a]dditional steps are needed to * * * ensure that borrowers
are not in a worse position financially due to the pandemic with regard to their ability to repay their loans.”
J.A. 257-258. Accordingly, the Secretary reasonably determined—as part and parcel of the decision to end forbearance and restart repayments—that eligible borrowers with federal adjusted gross incomes below
$125,000 ($250,000 for joint filers) should be afforded up
to $10,000 in student-loan debt relief, and that Pell
Grant recipients can receive up to $20,000. J.A. 258-259.
2. The States have argued (Nebraska Resp. 32-35)
that the Secretary failed to consider alternatives, overlooked reliance interests, failed to justify key aspects of
the plan, and offered pretextual justifications. Those
criticisms lack merit.
An agency need not consider “every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man.” DHS
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915
(2020) (citation omitted). And here, the Secretary did
consider the availability of reasonable alternatives. The
supporting analysis considered whether discharge was
necessary “even though borrowers have other options
60
to reduce monthly payments, like income-driven repayment (IDR) plans.” J.A. 241. The analysis determined
that “[l]oan discharges” would reduce “delinquency and
default risks” beyond what could be accomplished
through “efforts to increase enrollment in IDR.” Ibid.
The Secretary likewise considered continuing the
across-the-board pause on interest accrual and payment obligations for all borrowers. His decision to continue that pause until December 31, 2022, but resume
payments after that date, J.A. 257-259, reflected his determination that the Department’s objectives would be
best served by resuming payments rather than indefinitely continuing forbearance—so long as lower-income
borrowers could receive relief to address the difficulties
they would face, ibid.
Nor did the Secretary ignore cognizable reliance interests in issuing relief to certain federal borrowers.
The States have no cognizable interest in this action, see
pp. 22-30, supra, let alone “ ‘serious’ ” or “significant reliance interests.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
579 U.S. 211, 222 (2016) (citation omitted). This case
bears no resemblance to Regents, where the Court
found that the agency had ignored the interests of
DACA recipients themselves in rescinding a program
they had relied upon to “embark[] on careers,” “purchase[] homes, and even marr[y] and ha[ve] children.”
140 S. Ct. at 1914.
The States’ contention (Nebraska Resp. 34) that the
Department did not justify “key aspects” of the plan
likewise fails. The supporting analysis explains at
length how the Department arrived at the $125,000 income threshold, including by examining data showing
that “[t]here is a break in repayment capacity at around
$125,000” and that “borrowers with incomes between
61
$100,000 and $124,000 have rates of payment inconsistency * * * nearly double what they are for those
with incomes between $125,000 and $149,000.” J.A. 245246; see J.A. 235-237, 246-248. Given that the COVID19 disaster spanned both 2020 and 2021, it was reasonable to consider borrowers’ incomes from both years.
J.A. 262. And the Secretary reasonably set the deadline
to apply for relief to reflect the fact, emphasized in the
Department’s analysis, that lower-income borrowers often do not immediately apply for available relief. J.A.
241-242. The Secretary has “ ‘wide discretion’ in making
[such] line-drawing decisions,” National Shooting
Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones, 716 F.3d 200, 214 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (citation omitted), particularly where the authorizing statute expressly contemplates such discretion, see pp. 36-37, supra.
Finally, the States’ assertion (Nebraska Resp. 33-34)
that the Secretary’s decision was pretextual is based on
legally irrelevant political statements that cast no doubt
on the Secretary’s stated explanation. A “court may not
set aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because it might have been influenced by political considerations or prompted by an Administration’s priorities.” Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct.
2551, 2573 (2019). The statements on which respondents rely reflect, at most, the sort of policy and political
considerations that “routinely” inform policymaking.
Ibid. They do not come close to the “strong showing of
bad faith or improper behavior” necessary before this
Court looks behind an agency’s stated rationale. Id. at
2574 (citation omitted); see Biden v. Texas, 142 S. Ct.
2528, 2546-2547 (2022).
62
C. The Secretary’s Action Was Procedurally Proper
Finally, Brown and Taylor—but not the States—
argue that the Secretary’s plan was procedurally defective. Indeed, that is the only claim Brown and Taylor
asserted in their complaint: a single count that the Secretary “fail[ed] to follow proper rulemaking procedures” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. Compl. 13
(capitalization and emphasis omitted); see D. Ct. Doc. 4,
at 20 (Oct. 10, 2022) (brief in support of preliminary injunction raising only one merits argument: “The Department violated the APA by adopting the [plan] without following the proper rulemaking procedures.”) (emphasis omitted); pp. 13-14, supra.
The district court correctly rejected that claim. The
Secretary adopted the plan under the HEROES Act,
which expressly exempts the Secretary from complying
with “section 553 of title 5”—i.e., the APA’s notice-andcomment requirement—when issuing waivers and modifications under the Act. See 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1).
All the HEROES Act requires “is that the Secretary
publish the modifications” in the Federal Register. J.A.
287. Brown and Taylor do not dispute that the Secretary has done that here. See ibid. The Secretary therefore satisfied the applicable procedural requirements.
Brown and Taylor have nonetheless asserted (Brown
Resp. 14-16) that the plan falls outside the HEROES
Act’s express exemption from notice-and-comment procedures because it exceeds the Secretary’s substantive
authority. But as the district court recognized, the
notice-and-comment exemption does not depend on
whether, as a substantive matter, the HEROES Act actually authorizes the Secretary’s action. J.A. 287. The
statute provides: “Notwithstanding [the APA’s noticeand-comment provisions], the Secretary shall, by notice
63
in the Federal Register, publish the waivers or modifications of statutory and regulatory provisions the Secretary deems necessary to achieve the purposes of this
section.” 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(b)(1). That text makes clear
that the procedural exemption depends only on the Secretary’s determination that the HEROES Act applies
and that waivers or modifications are necessary—not on
the substantive merits of the Secretary’s plan.
In addition to their arguments based on the APA’s
notice-and-comment requirement, Brown and Taylor
have invoked Section 1098bb(d) of the HEROES Act.
Section 1098bb(d) specifies that a provision requiring
the Secretary to proceed by negotiated rulemaking in
certain circumstances “shall not apply to the waivers
and modifications authorized or required” by the HEROES Act. 20 U.S.C. 1098bb(d). But that direction
cannot plausibly be read to condition the procedural exception on the substantive validity of the Secretary’s action. To the contrary, the referenced provision for negotiated rulemaking imposes requirements only on
“proposed regulations” issued for public comment. 20
U.S.C. 1098a(b)(1) and (2). By its terms, that provision
has no application where, as here, the Act provides an
express exemption from notice-and-comment procedures and the Secretary need not issue “proposed regulations” at all. Ibid.
More broadly, Brown and Taylor’s theory would subvert the distinction between procedural and substantive
challenges. Many statutes authorizing agency actions
include specific procedural provisions that govern actions taken pursuant to that statute. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
360eee-2(e); 42 U.S.C. 7410; Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-90, Tit. V,
§ 540, 119 Stat. 2088 (49 U.S.C. 114 note). If litigants
64
could characterize a claim that the action was not “actually” authorized by the statute, Brown Resp. 15 (emphasis omitted), as a procedural challenge—based on the
agency’s use of the procedures associated with the asserted statutory basis for its action—many substantive
challenges could be reconceptualized as procedural
claims, providing a ready end-run around the “normal
standards for redressability and immediacy.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. Respondents cite no
decision by any court endorsing—or even entertaining—such an end-run.
In any event, the HEROES Act does authorize the
student-loan-relief plan: As explained above, the Secretary’s actions fall comfortably within the plain text of
the Act. See pp. 34-57, supra. Accordingly, the Secretary’s undisputed compliance with the procedural requirements of the HEROES Act refutes Brown and
Taylor’s challenge, even on its own terms.
65
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court in Nebraska should
be affirmed. The judgment of the district court in Brown
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
LISA BROWN
General Counsel
TOBY MERRILL
Deputy General Counsel
BRIAN SIEGEL
Assistant General Counsel
SOREN LAGAARD
NATASHA VARNOVITSKY
SUE LIN
Attorneys
JANUARY 2023
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
BRIAN H. FLETCHER
Deputy Solicitor General
VIVEK SURI
YAIRA DUBIN
Assistants to the Solicitor
General
MICHAEL S. RAAB
THOMAS PULHAM
COURTNEY L. DIXON
SIMON C. BREWER
Attorneys
APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix — Statutory provisions:
20 U.S.C. 1082(a) .................................................................. 1a
20 U.S.C. 1098bb ................................................................... 3a
20 U.S.C. 1098ee ................................................................... 6a
(Ia)
1.
20 U.S.C. 1082(a) provides:
Legal powers and responsibilities
(a) General powers
In the performance of, and with respect to, the functions, powers, and duties, vested in him by this part, the
Secretary may–
(1) prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this part, including
regulations applicable to third party servicers (including regulations concerning financial responsibility standards for, and the assessment of liabilities for
program violations against, such servicers) to establish minimum standards with respect to sound management and accountability of programs under this
part, except that in no case shall damages be assessed
against the United States for the actions or inactions
of such servicers;
(2) sue and be sued in any court of record
of a State having general jurisdiction or in any district court of the United States, and such district
courts shall have jurisdiction of civil actions arising
under this part without regard to the amount in controversy, and action instituted under this subsection
by or against the Secretary shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Secretary or any vacancy in that office; but no
attachment, injunction, garnishment, or other similar
process, mesne or final, shall be issued against the
Secretary or property under the Secretary’s control
and nothing herein shall be construed to except litigation arising out of activities under this part from
(1a)
2a
the application of sections 509, 517, 547, and 2679 of
title 28;
(3) include in any contract for Federal loan insurance such terms, conditions, and covenants relating to repayment of principal and payment of interest, relating to the Secretary’s obligations and rights
to those of eligible lenders, and borrowers in case of
default, and relating to such other matters as the Secretary determines to be necessary to assure that the
purposes of this part will be achieved; and any term,
condition, and covenant made pursuant to this paragraph or pursuant to any other provision of this part
may be modified by the Secretary, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, if the Secretary finds
that the modification is necessary to protect the
United States from the risk of unreasonable loss;
(4) subject to the specific limitations in this part,
consent to modification, with respect to rate of interest, time of payment of any installment of principal
and interest or any portion thereof, or any other provision of any note or other instrument evidencing a loan which has been insured by the Secretary
under this part;
(5) enforce, pay, or compromise, any claim on, or
arising because of, any such insurance or any guaranty agreement under section 1078(c) of this title;
and
(6) enforce, pay, compromise, waive, or release
any right, title, claim, lien, or demand, however acquired, including any equity or any right of redemption.
3a
2.
20 U.S.C. 1098bb provides:
Waiver authority for response to military contingencies
and national emergencies
(a) Waivers and modifications
(1) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, unless
enacted with specific reference to this section, the Secretary of Education (referred to in this part as the “Secretary”) may waive or modify any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the student financial assistance programs under title IV of the Act [20 U.S.C. 1070
et seq.] as the Secretary deems necessary in connection
with a war or other military operation or national emergency to provide the waivers or modifications authorized by paragraph (2).
(2) Actions authorized
The Secretary is authorized to waive or modify any
provision described in paragraph (1) as may be necessary to ensure that—
(A) recipients of student financial assistance under title IV of the Act who are affected individuals
are not placed in a worse position financially in relation to that financial assistance because of their status as affected individuals;
(B) administrative requirements placed on affected individuals who are recipients of student financial assistance are minimized, to the extent possible without impairing the integrity of the student financial assistance programs, to ease the burden on
such students and avoid inadvertent, technical violations or defaults;
4a
(C) the calculation of “annual adjusted family income” and “available income”, as used in the determination of need for student financial assistance under title IV of the Act for any such affected individual
(and the determination of such need for his or her
spouse and dependents, if applicable), may be modified to mean the sums received in the first calendar
year of the award year for which such determination
is made, in order to reflect more accurately the financial condition of such affected individual and his or
her family;
(D) the calculation under section 484B(b)(2) of
the Act (20 U.S.C. 1091b(b)(2)) of the amount a student is required to return in the case of an affected
individual may be modified so that no overpayment
will be required to be returned or repaid if the institution has documented (i) the student’s status as an
affected individual in the student’s file, and (ii) the
amount of any overpayment discharged; and
(E) institutions of higher education, eligible lenders, guaranty agencies, and other entities participating in the student assistance programs under title IV
of the Act that are located in areas that are declared
disaster areas by any Federal, State or local official
in connection with a national emergency, or whose operations are significantly affected by such a disaster,
may be granted temporary relief from requirements
that are rendered infeasible or unreasonable by a national emergency, including due diligence requirements and reporting deadlines.
5a
(b) Notice of waivers or modifications
(1) In general
Notwithstanding section 1232 of this title and section 553 of title 5, the Secretary shall, by notice in the
Federal Register, publish the waivers or modifications
of statutory and regulatory provisions the Secretary
deems necessary to achieve the purposes of this section.
(2)
Terms and conditions
The notice under paragraph (1) shall include the
terms and conditions to be applied in lieu of such statutory and regulatory provisions.
(3) Case-by-case basis
The Secretary is not required to exercise the waiver
or modification authority under this section on a caseby-case basis.
(c) Impact report
The Secretary shall, not later than 15 months after
first exercising any authority to issue a waiver or modification under subsection (a), report to the Committee
on Education and the Workforce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the Senate on the impact of any
waivers or modifications issued pursuant to subsection
(a) on affected individuals and the programs under title
IV of the Act [20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.], and the basis for
such determination, and include in such report the Secretary’s recommendations for changes to the statutory
or regulatory provisions that were the subject of such
waiver or modification.
6a
(d) No delay in waivers and modifications
Sections 482(c) and 492 of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1089(c), 1098a) shall not apply to the
waivers and modifications authorized or required by this
part.
3.
20 U.S.C. 1098ee provides:
Definitions
In this part:
(1) Active duty
The term “active duty” has the meaning given such
term in section 101(d)(1) of title 10, except that such
term does not include active duty for training or attendance at a service school.
(2) Affected individual
The term “affected individual” means an individual
who—
(A) is serving on active duty during a war or
other military operation or national emergency;
(B) is performing qualifying National Guard
duty during a war or other military operation or national emergency;
(C) resides or is employed in an area that is declared a disaster area by any Federal, State, or local
official in connection with a national emergency; or
(D) suffered direct economic hardship as a direct
result of a war or other military operation or national
emergency, as determined by the Secretary.
7a
(3) Military operation
The term “military operation” means a contingency
operation as such term is defined in section 101(a)(13)
of title 10.
(4) National emergency
The term “national emergency” means a national
emergency declared by the President of the United
States.
(5) Serving on active duty
The term “serving on active duty during a war or
other military operation or national emergency” shall
include service by an individual who is—
(A) a Reserve of an Armed Force ordered to active duty under section 12301(a), 12301(g), 12302,
12304, or 12306 of title 10 or any retired member of
an Armed Force ordered to active duty under section
688 of such title, for service in connection with a war
or other military operation or national emergency,
regardless of the location at which such active duty
service is performed; and
(B) any other member of an Armed Force on active duty in connection with such war, operation, or
emergency or subsequent actions or conditions who
has been assigned to a duty station at a location other
than the location at which such member is normally
assigned.
(6) Qualifying National Guard duty
The term “qualifying National Guard duty during a
war or other military operation or national emergency”
means service as a member of the National Guard on
8a
full-time National Guard duty (as defined in section
101(d)(5) of title 10) under a call to active service authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense for a
period of more than 30 consecutive days under section
502(f) of title 32, in connection with a war, another military operation, or a national emergency declared by the
President and supported by Federal funds.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.