Amicus Curiae Brief — Loper Bright Enterprises, et al., Petitioners v. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 20, 2023

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No. 22-451

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

__________

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

__________

BRIEF OF THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE AND

PROFESSORS RICHARD EPSTEIN,

TODD ZYWICKI, GUS HURWITZ, AND

GEOFFREY MANNE AS AMICI CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

__________

Ilya Shapiro

MANHATTAN INSTITUTE

52 Vanderbilt Ave.

New York, NY 10017

(212) 599-7000

ishapiro@manhattan.institute

July 20, 2023

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that

statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute

does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference

to the agency.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4

I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE

ENCOURAGES AGENCY TAKEOVER

OF GOVERNMENT AND A

DIMINUTION OF CONGRESS ....................... 4

II. CHEVRON PRESUPPOSES THAT

CONGRESS WON’T OVER-DELEGATE

AND THAT AGENCIES WILL BE

LOYAL AGENTS; IN PRACTICE,

NEITHER IS TRUE .......................................... 6

III.STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT STOP

THE COURT FROM OVERRULING OR

CABINING CHEVRON .................................... 9

A. The strength of stare decisis is

proportionate to how easily Congress

could remedy the underlying error. ............ 9

B. Chevron is an interpretive instruction,

not statutory interpretation itself, and

thus hard for Congress to remedy............. 11

C. Chevron should receive a weak form of

stare decisis, largely because it

involves no reliance interests. ................... 12

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 13

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. HHS,

594 U. S. __ (2021) ................................................... 7

Am. Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra,

596 U.S. __ (2022) .................................................... 9

Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. __ (2023) .................... 5, 8

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,

285 U.S. 393 (1932) ............................................ 9, 10

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) .............................................. 3, 4

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) .............................................. 9

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120 (2000) .................................................. 5

Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) ............... 12

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 576 U. S. 446 (2015) ........ 10

King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) .......................... 5

Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ...................... 3, 10, 11, 12, 13

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............... 5

MCI Telecomm. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) .......... 4

Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015) ..................... 5-6

Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X

Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)..................... 4

NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. __ (2022) ............................. 7

iv

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)..................... 9

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. __ (2022) ................... 7

Other Authorities

Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable

Deference to Agency Interpretations,

89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 727 (2014) .......................... 5

Amy C. Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the

Courts of Appeals,

73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317 (2005) .......................... 10

Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis:

Distinguishing Common-Law,

Constitutional, and Statutory Cases,

8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 279 (2004) ...................... 10, 11

Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after

Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 ............................ 5

Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes,

Separation of Parties, not Powers,

119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 (2006) ................................. 7

Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial

Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:

Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of

Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998) ......................... 8

Gary Lawson, The Ghosts of Chevron Present and

Future, 103 B.U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2023) .. 8-9

Gregory Curfman, Jason Gardiner & Justin

Cole, The 340B Drug Discount Program

Preserved After US Supreme Court

Review—But Chevron Remains Vulnerable,

3 JAMA Health F. (2022) ......................................... 9

Herman Melville, Moby Dick (1851) ......................... 12

v

Ilya Shapiro and Nicholas M. Mosvick, Stare

Decisis after Citizens United: When Should

Courts Overturn Precedent,

16 Nexus J. of L. & Pub. Policy 121 (2011) ........... 10

Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron’s Political Domain:

W(h)ither Step Three,

68 DePaul L. Rev. 615 (2019) .................................. 7

Maxwell L. Stearns, Todd J. Zywicki &

Thomas Miceli, Law and Economics:

Private and Public (2018) .................................... 4, 8

Michael Coenen and Seth Davis, Minor Courts,

Major Questions, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 777 (2017) ........ 8

Mila Sohoni, The Major Questions Quartet,

136 Harv. L. Rev. 262 (2022) ................................... 8

Nathan Richardson, Antideference: COVID,

Climate, and the Rise of the Major Questions

Canon, 108 Va. L. Rev. Online 174 (2022)............... 5

Nathan Richardson, Deference Is Dead (Long Live

Chevron), 73 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 441 (2021) ........... 5

Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How

Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,

90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1463 (2015) ............................. 6, 7

Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine,

67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411 (2010) .................. 12-13

Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation,

Administrative Deference, and the Law of

Stare Decisis, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1125 (2019). ........... 11

Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,

Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,

83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997) ....................................... 8

vi

Thomas Griffith and Haley Proctor,

Deference, Delegation, and Divination:

Justice Breyer and the Future of the Major

Questions Doctrine,

Yale L. J. Forum (Nov. 21, 2022)......................... 4, 6

Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of

Arlington, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 753 (2014).............. 4

William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and

Representative Government (1971) .......................... 8

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research

(“MI”) is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation whose mission is to develop and disseminate new

ideas that foster greater economic choice and individual responsibility. To that end, MI has historically

worked sponsored scholarship and filed briefs supporting economic freedom against government overreach.

Richard Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University. He also serves as

the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the

Hoover Institution and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law emeritus and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago.

Todd Zywicki is George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law at George Mason University

Antonin Scalia School of Law and a research fellow of

the GMU Law and Economics Center.

Justin “Gus” Hurwitz is a senior fellow and academic director of the Center for Technology, Innovation, and Competition at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School.

Geoffrey Manne is the president and founder of

the International Center for Law and Economics and

a distinguished fellow at Northwestern University’s

Center on Law, Business, and Economics.

This case interests amici because it involves an

agency regulation that was not explicitly authorized

by statute. Indeed, it gives the Court a chance to

1 Rule 37 statement: No part of this brief was authored by any

party’s counsel, and no person or entity other than amici funded

its preparation or submission.

2

revisit Chevron—either overruling it or clarifying that

statutory silence does not require judicial deference.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Family-run fishing businesses face a fraught and

competitive environment even before the intrusion of

burdensome regulations. Here, the National Marine

Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) promulgated a rule for certain classes of herring boats that sweeps in most such

businesses, as portrayed in the Oscar-winning movie

CODA. If a vessel needs a monitor and has not already

been assigned one under a federally funded program,

it must pay for one itself. The cost for most herring

boats exceeds $710 per sea day.

Petitioners, four family-owned and -operated fishing companies, contend that the industry-funding requirement—which is not explicitly authorized by statute—will have a devastating economic impact on the

herring fleet and will disproportionately impact small

businesses, destroying historic communities.

The district court ruled for the government, finding

that various provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“MSA”) together conferred broad authority on the NMFS to implement regulations to carry out fishery management

plan’s measures. Without any analysis, the court also

found that, even if the statute were ambiguous, the

government’s reading would be reasonable under Chevron Step Two and thus worthy of judicial deference. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed,

reasoning that the MSA’s authorization for the placement of monitors, through silence on funding, left

room for agency discretion. This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court should overrule

3

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or

at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity

requiring deference to the agency.

The Court should now take this opportunity to

overhaul the Chevron-deference regime, because this

experiment in rebalancing the relationship between

administration and judicial review has failed. It has

led to agency overreach, haphazard practical results,

and the diminution of Congress. Although intended to

empower Congress by limiting the role of courts, Chevron has instead empowered agencies to aggrandize

their own powers to the greatest extent plausible under their operative statutes, and often beyond. Congress has proved unequal to the task of responding to

this pervasive agency overreach and now has less of a

role in policymaking than in the pre-Chevron era.

Courts, in turn, have become sloppy and lazy in interpreting statutes. It’s a vicious cycle of legislative buckpassing and judicial deference to executive overreach.

Chevron deference rests on the presumption that

Congress won’t over-delegate and that agencies will be

loyal agents. But the past 40 years have shown that

Congress loves passing the buck and agencies are actually principals who pursue their own interests. The

time has more than come for the Court to revisit Chevron, whether it chooses to overrule it explicitly or keep

it nominally under a newly restricted standard. Cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (preserving Auer

deference but reworking it so completely that both

Chief Justice Roberts, who joined Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, and Justice Kavanaugh, who joined

4

Justice Gorsuch’s effective dissent, noted that there

wasn’t much difference between the two).

ARGUMENT

I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE ENCOURAGES

AGENCY TAKEOVER OF GOVERNMENT

AND A DIMINUTION OF CONGRESS

In Chevron, courts were told “to treat statutory silence or ambiguity as an implicit delegation of authority from Congress to the agency.” Thomas Griffith and

Haley Proctor, Deference, Delegation, and Divination:

Justice Breyer and the Future of the Major Questions

Doctrine, Yale L. J. Forum 693, 695 (Nov. 21, 2022)

(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,

843-44 (1984)). Such presumption of agency power was

based on good intentions: a desire to provide ease and

flexibility, with agency action seen as less permanent

than judicial rulings. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill,

Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 Fordham L. Rev.

753, 753 (2014) (“Chevron’s appeal for the courts rests

in significant part on its ease of application as a decisional device”). In practice, however, there has been

little ease or flexibility.

Indeed, the degree of deference that courts owe to

agency interpretations is one of the “the most crucial

and contested legal issue[s] respecting agency decision

making.” Maxwell L. Stearns, Todd J. Zywicki &

Thomas Miceli, Law and Economics: Private and Public 767 (2018). Courts’ interpretation of Chevron deference has produced “haphazard results.” Id. at 774

(quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)). See, e.g.,

MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994)

(holding that statutory authority to modify did not

5

extend to setting aside tariffs entirely); FDA v. Brown

& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)

(finding FDA regulations invalid because Congress

had not intended to give the agency the power to regulate tobacco); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497

(2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act gave the EPA

the power to regulate tailpipe emissions); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (applying the major questions doctrine instead of Chevron deference). See also

Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 Notre Dame L.

Rev. 727 (2014) (postulating that the Court’s unique

position and competencies necessitate that it give

agencies less deference than do lower courts).

Chevron deference also encouraged agency overreach. Chevron and its progeny shifted “interpretive

authority from courts to agencies—it was a ‘counterMarbury for the administrative state.’” Nathan Richardson, Antideference: COVID, Climate, and the Rise

of the Major Questions Canon, 108 Va. L. Rev.

Online 174, 176 (2022) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Law

and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev.

2071, 2075 (1990)). See also, Nathan Richardson, Deference Is Dead (Long Live Chevron), 73 Rutgers U. L.

Rev. 441 (2021). In her concurrence in Biden v. Nebraska, Justice Barrett likens an agency overstepping

its power to a person, who when told to “pick up dessert,” orders a four-tiered wedding cake. 600 U.S. __,

__ (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring). In his concurrence

in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015), Justice

Thomas lamented that Chevron deference had devolved into an agency power grab. “These cases bring

into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the

name of Chevron deference. What EPA claims for itself

6

here is not the power to make political judgments in

implementing Congress’ policies . . . . It is the power to

decide—without any particular fidelity to the text—

which policy goals EPA wishes to pursue.” Id. at 763

(Thomas, J., concurring).

Along with enabling agencies to go overboard and

to take over the government, Chevron deference has

also resulted in a diminution of Congress’s role. See,

e.g., Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U.

L. Rev. 1463 (2015). Judge Rao explored examples

from economics and political science to show how individual Congress members derive “myriad benefits”

from delegation. Id. at 1468. In effect, delegation “unravel[s] the institutional interests of Congress.” Id. at

1466. As her colleague Judge Griffith pointed out, “the

Court is of many minds about what Congress does

when it gives discretion to agencies.” Griffith and Proctor, Deference, Delegation, and Divination, Yale L. J.

Forum at 693.

Being cognizant of the diminution of Congress’s

role and the tendency toward agency self-aggrandizement coming from Chevron, the Court should curb

agency overreach by curbing Chevron.

II. CHEVRON PRESUPPOSES THAT CONGRESS WON’T OVER-DELEGATE AND

THAT AGENCIES WILL BE LOYAL AGENTS;

IN PRACTICE, NEITHER IS TRUE

Chevron rests on a separation-of-powers presumption

that Congress won’t over-delegate and that an agency

will be a loyal agent of Congress. As the past 40 years

have shown, however, Congress does over-delegate

and agencies pursue their own agendas.

7

In retrospect, congressional over-delegation appears inevitable. Congress will over-delegate because

individual members can more easily achieve their

goals by shaping administration than by marshalling

the collective to pass legislation. As Judge Rao has described, delegation “undermines separation of powers

. . . [and] unravel[s] the institutional interests of Congress.” Rao, Administrative Collusion, 90 N.Y.U. L.

Rev. at 1466. Among other effects, “Chevron effectively

allows, and indeed encourages, Congress to abdicate

its role as the most politically-accountable branch by

deferring politically-difficult questions to agencies in

ambiguous terms.” Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron’s

Political Domain: W(h)ither Step Three, 68 DePaul L.

Rev. 615, 618 (2019). This dynamic is an affront to the

separation of powers: the most politically difficult

questions are precisely the ones that most need to be

answered by the most politically accountable branch.

Id. at 630. See also Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H.

Pildes, Separation of Parties, not Powers, 119 Harv. L.

Rev. 2311 (2006) (contending that Congress allows executive overreach during times of unified government).

In addition to the problem of congressional overdelegation, there is the problem of agencies who behave not as loyal agents but as principals. Too often,

agencies attempt to piggyback their sweeping policy

agendas onto narrow statutes unrelated to their powers. To take three recent examples where the Court

had to step in to stop blatant overreach: in Alabama

Assn. of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U. S. __ (2021), the CDC

tried to issue a nationwide eviction moratorium; in

NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U. S. __ (2022), OSHA tried to

mandate employee vaccinations; and in West Virginia

v. EPA, 597 U.S. __ (2022), the EPA tried to use the

Clean Air Act to restructure electricity generation.

8

More than half a century ago, the economist William Niskanen identified that bureaucratic management is subject to “survivor” bias; “only those bureaucrats willing to compete for larger budgets and power

will survive.” Stearns et al., Law and Economics, at

786 (citing Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative

Government 38 (1971)). One should be “‘[s]keptical of

mismatches’ between broad ‘invocations of power by

agencies’ and relatively narrow ‘statutes that purport

to delegate that power.’” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S.

at __ (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring).

Beyond the disloyal-agent problem, there is a lack

judicial neutrality, in that judges don’t apply Chevron

deference in a neutral manner. See, e.g., Richard L.

Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the

D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997) (exploring how

ideology influences judicial review of administrative

decision making); Frank B. Cross and Emerson H.

Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal

Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998) (enumerating further

evidence that D.C. Circuit judges vote ideologically

when reviewing agency decision making).

But courts do not always swallow Chevron hook,

line, and sinker. Indeed, they have recently tried to

sidestep Chevron by refraining from applying a deference analysis or citing Chevron even when the facts of

a case might implicate it. See, e.g., Michael Coenen and

Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 Vand.

L. Rev. 777, 796 n.92 (2017) (enumerating several

lower court cases where the influence of King v. Burwell “disallow[s] Chevron deference in cases that

would otherwise fall firmly within Chevron’s domain.”); Gary Lawson, The Ghosts of Chevron Present

9

and Future, 103 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (exploring six 2021 cases where courts failed to cite Chevron); Mila Sohoni, The Major Questions Quartet, 136

Harv. L. Rev. 262 (2022) (claiming that four of the

Court’s 2021 cases adopt a “different and more potent”

version of the major question exception); Am. Hospital

Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896 (2022) (discussing

HHS discretion in interpretating statutory language

without mentioning Chevron); Gregory Curfman, Jason Gardiner & Justin Cole, The 340B Drug Discount

Program Preserved After US Supreme Court Review—

But Chevron Remains Vulnerable, 3 JAMA Health F.

(2022) (discussing AMA v. Becerra).

III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT STOP THE

COURT FROM OVERRULING OR CABINING CHEVRON

A. The

strength

of

stare

decisis

is

proportionate to how easily Congress

could remedy the underlying error.

Stare decisis helps promote “consistency and uniformity,” but it is not “an inexorable command.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407

(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Stare decisis should

not “compel unending adherence to . . . abuse of judicial authority.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

142 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2022).

Applied in the most generous light, the doctrine of

stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable,

and consistent development of legal principles, fosters

reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the

actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). It may

even serve judicial economy by reducing “incentives for

10

challenging settled precedents, saving parties and

courts the expense of endless relitigation.” Kimble v.

Marvel Entm’t, 576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015). But at its

worst, stare decisis may allow “judges to abdicate their

job of interpreting the Law.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct.

2400, 2426 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

The weight of stare decisis depends on the type of

interpretive task before the court. See Brian C. Kalt,

Three Levels of Stare Decisis: Distinguishing CommonLaw, Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 Tex. Rev.

L. & Pol. 279 (2004). This weight is determined by the

ease with which the legislature can override incorrect

interpretations of the law. Stare decisis holds the least

weight when courts review cases that implicate constitutional rights. See Ilya Shapiro and Nicholas M.

Mosvick, Stare Decisis after Citizens United: When

Should Courts Overturn Precedent, 16 Nexus J. L. &

Pub. Policy 121, 124 (2011). In contrast, it typically

holds the greatest weight when courts revisit statutory

interpretations. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis, at

279. One member of this Court has described this

weight as a “special force” and “super-strong,” one that

seeks to honor legislative supremacy. Amy C. Barrett,

Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317 (2005). That’s because the constitutional amendment process is a high hurdle to pass

compared to legislative action. See e.g., Burnet, 285

U.S. at 407. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing

amending the Constitution as “practically impossible.”). Moreover, when Congress fails to respond to a

judicial ruling, its silence can be taken as approval of

that interpretation. See e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2406

(“For approaching a century, Congress has let this deference regime work side-by-side with both

11

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the

many statutes delegating rulemaking power to agencies.”)

But there are compelling explanations as to why

congressional silence may not represent approval of a

court’s interpretation. One is that Congress’s composition may have changed such that the new Congress is

unable or unwilling to defend the original intended

meaning of the statute. Other reasons may include

simple apathy, a misunderstanding of the judicial interpretation, or practical political realities. Kalt, Three

Levels of Stare Decisis, at 280.

B. Chevron is an interpretive instruction, not

statutory interpretation itself, and thus

hard for Congress to remedy.

Chevron’s rule is not an interpretation of any particular statute, but an interpretive instruction on how

to approach a wide range of statutes. See e.g., Kisor,

139 S. Ct. at 2445 (Gorsuch, describing the similar

Auer doctrine as “an abstract default rule of interpretive methodology that settles nothing of its own

force.”). In this way, Chevron deference may be analogous to a development of common law, which generally

receives a lower form of stare decisis. See Randy J.

Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1125

(2019). In a typical case involving statutory interpretation, Congress can amend the underlying statute to

override the judicial interpretation of a particular

word or phrase. But it is less clear how Congress can

go about addressing interpretive canons such as the

Chevron doctrine.

12

Congress may, on one hand, attempt to write statutes with such specificity and clarity that it forces

every Step One Chevron analysis to find that there is

no ambiguity, preventing any Chevron deference from

applying. But overeager agencies, like Ishmael in

Moby Dick, will always purport to find statutory ambiguities in an effort to expand their authority. (“I try all

things, I achieve what I can.”) On the other hand, Congress may attempt to legislate away Chevron deference more generally, but this type of legislation is

likely to instigate a larger constitutional issue about

Congress’s ability to dictate judicial interpretation of

future laws. See, e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2445 (“We

should not be in the business of tossing “‘balls . . . into

Congress’s court . . . that would explode with constitutional questions if Congress tried to pick them up.”)

Finally, although Chevron does not strictly implicate constitutional interpretation, it raises similar

considerations because courts have used it to shift

power from the legislature to the executive.

C. Chevron should receive a weak form of

stare decisis, largely because it involves no

reliance interests.

The Court considers several stare decisis factors,

including the reasoning of the original opinion, the

workability of the ruling, the factual and legal developments that have taken place since the ruling, and

any applicable reliance interests. Janus v. AFSCME,

138 S. Ct. 2448, 2479 (2018). We addressed post-Chevron factual and legal developments in Parts I and II

above, but the reliance point is really the central concern of stare decisis, with the other factors often serving as further proxies for reliance interests. Randy J.

13

Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. &

Lee L. Rev. 411, 449 (2010).

Chevron should not receive reliance-interest consideration because it doesn’t create any rights or obligations. The only parties that could rely on Chevron

doctrine are administrative agencies, and the Court

has “never suggested that the convenience of government officials should count in the balance of stare decisis, especially when weighed against the interests of

citizens in a fair hearing before an independent judge

and a stable and knowable set of laws.” Kisor, 139 S.

Ct. at 2445 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Overturning Chevron wouldn’t upset any previous

statutory interpretations; it would only change the

methodology that courts use to review agency action

going forward. It would also re-empower Congress to

curtail the excesses of unaccountable agencies.

CONCLUSION

The 40-year-old Chevron experiment has not

worked. Agencies have gone overboard and Congress

hasn’t responded, leading to haphazard results and

agency overreach. Chevron deference results in agencies’ taking over government and a diminution of Congress, while courts have become lazy in interpreting

statutes. The time has come to overhaul Chevron.

Respectfully submitted,

Ilya Shapiro

MANHATTAN INSTITUTE

52 Vanderbilt Ave.

New York, NY 10017

(212) 599-7000

ishapiro@manhattan.institute

July 20, 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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