Amicus Curiae Brief — Loper Bright Enterprises, et al., Petitioners v. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 20, 2023
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 22-451
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________
LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
__________
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
__________
BRIEF OF THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE AND
PROFESSORS RICHARD EPSTEIN,
TODD ZYWICKI, GUS HURWITZ, AND
GEOFFREY MANNE AS AMICI CURIAE
SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
__________
Ilya Shapiro
MANHATTAN INSTITUTE
52 Vanderbilt Ave.
New York, NY 10017
(212) 599-7000
ishapiro@manhattan.institute
July 20, 2023
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that
statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute
does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference
to the agency.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4
I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE
ENCOURAGES AGENCY TAKEOVER
OF GOVERNMENT AND A
DIMINUTION OF CONGRESS ....................... 4
II. CHEVRON PRESUPPOSES THAT
CONGRESS WON’T OVER-DELEGATE
AND THAT AGENCIES WILL BE
LOYAL AGENTS; IN PRACTICE,
NEITHER IS TRUE .......................................... 6
III.STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT STOP
THE COURT FROM OVERRULING OR
CABINING CHEVRON .................................... 9
A. The strength of stare decisis is
proportionate to how easily Congress
could remedy the underlying error. ............ 9
B. Chevron is an interpretive instruction,
not statutory interpretation itself, and
thus hard for Congress to remedy............. 11
C. Chevron should receive a weak form of
stare decisis, largely because it
involves no reliance interests. ................... 12
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 13
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. HHS,
594 U. S. __ (2021) ................................................... 7
Am. Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra,
596 U.S. __ (2022) .................................................... 9
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. __ (2023) .................... 5, 8
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393 (1932) ............................................ 9, 10
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) .............................................. 3, 4
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) .............................................. 9
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000) .................................................. 5
Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) ............... 12
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 576 U. S. 446 (2015) ........ 10
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) .......................... 5
Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ...................... 3, 10, 11, 12, 13
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............... 5
MCI Telecomm. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) .......... 4
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015) ..................... 5-6
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005)..................... 4
NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. __ (2022) ............................. 7
iv
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)..................... 9
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. __ (2022) ................... 7
Other Authorities
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable
Deference to Agency Interpretations,
89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 727 (2014) .......................... 5
Amy C. Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the
Courts of Appeals,
73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317 (2005) .......................... 10
Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis:
Distinguishing Common-Law,
Constitutional, and Statutory Cases,
8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 279 (2004) ...................... 10, 11
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after
Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 ............................ 5
Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, not Powers,
119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311 (2006) ................................. 7
Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998) ......................... 8
Gary Lawson, The Ghosts of Chevron Present and
Future, 103 B.U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2023) .. 8-9
Gregory Curfman, Jason Gardiner & Justin
Cole, The 340B Drug Discount Program
Preserved After US Supreme Court
Review—But Chevron Remains Vulnerable,
3 JAMA Health F. (2022) ......................................... 9
Herman Melville, Moby Dick (1851) ......................... 12
v
Ilya Shapiro and Nicholas M. Mosvick, Stare
Decisis after Citizens United: When Should
Courts Overturn Precedent,
16 Nexus J. of L. & Pub. Policy 121 (2011) ........... 10
Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron’s Political Domain:
W(h)ither Step Three,
68 DePaul L. Rev. 615 (2019) .................................. 7
Maxwell L. Stearns, Todd J. Zywicki &
Thomas Miceli, Law and Economics:
Private and Public (2018) .................................... 4, 8
Michael Coenen and Seth Davis, Minor Courts,
Major Questions, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 777 (2017) ........ 8
Mila Sohoni, The Major Questions Quartet,
136 Harv. L. Rev. 262 (2022) ................................... 8
Nathan Richardson, Antideference: COVID,
Climate, and the Rise of the Major Questions
Canon, 108 Va. L. Rev. Online 174 (2022)............... 5
Nathan Richardson, Deference Is Dead (Long Live
Chevron), 73 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 441 (2021) ........... 5
Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How
Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress,
90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1463 (2015) ............................. 6, 7
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine,
67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411 (2010) .................. 12-13
Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation,
Administrative Deference, and the Law of
Stare Decisis, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1125 (2019). ........... 11
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,
83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997) ....................................... 8
vi
Thomas Griffith and Haley Proctor,
Deference, Delegation, and Divination:
Justice Breyer and the Future of the Major
Questions Doctrine,
Yale L. J. Forum (Nov. 21, 2022)......................... 4, 6
Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of
Arlington, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 753 (2014).............. 4
William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and
Representative Government (1971) .......................... 8
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The Manhattan Institute for Policy Research
(“MI”) is a nonpartisan public policy research foundation whose mission is to develop and disseminate new
ideas that foster greater economic choice and individual responsibility. To that end, MI has historically
worked sponsored scholarship and filed briefs supporting economic freedom against government overreach.
Richard Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University. He also serves as
the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law emeritus and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago.
Todd Zywicki is George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law at George Mason University
Antonin Scalia School of Law and a research fellow of
the GMU Law and Economics Center.
Justin “Gus” Hurwitz is a senior fellow and academic director of the Center for Technology, Innovation, and Competition at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School.
Geoffrey Manne is the president and founder of
the International Center for Law and Economics and
a distinguished fellow at Northwestern University’s
Center on Law, Business, and Economics.
This case interests amici because it involves an
agency regulation that was not explicitly authorized
by statute. Indeed, it gives the Court a chance to
1 Rule 37 statement: No part of this brief was authored by any
party’s counsel, and no person or entity other than amici funded
its preparation or submission.
2
revisit Chevron—either overruling it or clarifying that
statutory silence does not require judicial deference.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Family-run fishing businesses face a fraught and
competitive environment even before the intrusion of
burdensome regulations. Here, the National Marine
Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) promulgated a rule for certain classes of herring boats that sweeps in most such
businesses, as portrayed in the Oscar-winning movie
CODA. If a vessel needs a monitor and has not already
been assigned one under a federally funded program,
it must pay for one itself. The cost for most herring
boats exceeds $710 per sea day.
Petitioners, four family-owned and -operated fishing companies, contend that the industry-funding requirement—which is not explicitly authorized by statute—will have a devastating economic impact on the
herring fleet and will disproportionately impact small
businesses, destroying historic communities.
The district court ruled for the government, finding
that various provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“MSA”) together conferred broad authority on the NMFS to implement regulations to carry out fishery management
plan’s measures. Without any analysis, the court also
found that, even if the statute were ambiguous, the
government’s reading would be reasonable under Chevron Step Two and thus worthy of judicial deference. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that the MSA’s authorization for the placement of monitors, through silence on funding, left
room for agency discretion. This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court should overrule
3
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or
at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity
requiring deference to the agency.
The Court should now take this opportunity to
overhaul the Chevron-deference regime, because this
experiment in rebalancing the relationship between
administration and judicial review has failed. It has
led to agency overreach, haphazard practical results,
and the diminution of Congress. Although intended to
empower Congress by limiting the role of courts, Chevron has instead empowered agencies to aggrandize
their own powers to the greatest extent plausible under their operative statutes, and often beyond. Congress has proved unequal to the task of responding to
this pervasive agency overreach and now has less of a
role in policymaking than in the pre-Chevron era.
Courts, in turn, have become sloppy and lazy in interpreting statutes. It’s a vicious cycle of legislative buckpassing and judicial deference to executive overreach.
Chevron deference rests on the presumption that
Congress won’t over-delegate and that agencies will be
loyal agents. But the past 40 years have shown that
Congress loves passing the buck and agencies are actually principals who pursue their own interests. The
time has more than come for the Court to revisit Chevron, whether it chooses to overrule it explicitly or keep
it nominally under a newly restricted standard. Cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (preserving Auer
deference but reworking it so completely that both
Chief Justice Roberts, who joined Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, and Justice Kavanaugh, who joined
4
Justice Gorsuch’s effective dissent, noted that there
wasn’t much difference between the two).
ARGUMENT
I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE ENCOURAGES
AGENCY TAKEOVER OF GOVERNMENT
AND A DIMINUTION OF CONGRESS
In Chevron, courts were told “to treat statutory silence or ambiguity as an implicit delegation of authority from Congress to the agency.” Thomas Griffith and
Haley Proctor, Deference, Delegation, and Divination:
Justice Breyer and the Future of the Major Questions
Doctrine, Yale L. J. Forum 693, 695 (Nov. 21, 2022)
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984)). Such presumption of agency power was
based on good intentions: a desire to provide ease and
flexibility, with agency action seen as less permanent
than judicial rulings. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill,
Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 Fordham L. Rev.
753, 753 (2014) (“Chevron’s appeal for the courts rests
in significant part on its ease of application as a decisional device”). In practice, however, there has been
little ease or flexibility.
Indeed, the degree of deference that courts owe to
agency interpretations is one of the “the most crucial
and contested legal issue[s] respecting agency decision
making.” Maxwell L. Stearns, Todd J. Zywicki &
Thomas Miceli, Law and Economics: Private and Public 767 (2018). Courts’ interpretation of Chevron deference has produced “haphazard results.” Id. at 774
(quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)). See, e.g.,
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994)
(holding that statutory authority to modify did not
5
extend to setting aside tariffs entirely); FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)
(finding FDA regulations invalid because Congress
had not intended to give the agency the power to regulate tobacco); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act gave the EPA
the power to regulate tailpipe emissions); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (applying the major questions doctrine instead of Chevron deference). See also
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency Interpretations, 89 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 727 (2014) (postulating that the Court’s unique
position and competencies necessitate that it give
agencies less deference than do lower courts).
Chevron deference also encouraged agency overreach. Chevron and its progeny shifted “interpretive
authority from courts to agencies—it was a ‘counterMarbury for the administrative state.’” Nathan Richardson, Antideference: COVID, Climate, and the Rise
of the Major Questions Canon, 108 Va. L. Rev.
Online 174, 176 (2022) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
2071, 2075 (1990)). See also, Nathan Richardson, Deference Is Dead (Long Live Chevron), 73 Rutgers U. L.
Rev. 441 (2021). In her concurrence in Biden v. Nebraska, Justice Barrett likens an agency overstepping
its power to a person, who when told to “pick up dessert,” orders a four-tiered wedding cake. 600 U.S. __,
__ (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring). In his concurrence
in Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015), Justice
Thomas lamented that Chevron deference had devolved into an agency power grab. “These cases bring
into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the
name of Chevron deference. What EPA claims for itself
6
here is not the power to make political judgments in
implementing Congress’ policies . . . . It is the power to
decide—without any particular fidelity to the text—
which policy goals EPA wishes to pursue.” Id. at 763
(Thomas, J., concurring).
Along with enabling agencies to go overboard and
to take over the government, Chevron deference has
also resulted in a diminution of Congress’s role. See,
e.g., Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1463 (2015). Judge Rao explored examples
from economics and political science to show how individual Congress members derive “myriad benefits”
from delegation. Id. at 1468. In effect, delegation “unravel[s] the institutional interests of Congress.” Id. at
1466. As her colleague Judge Griffith pointed out, “the
Court is of many minds about what Congress does
when it gives discretion to agencies.” Griffith and Proctor, Deference, Delegation, and Divination, Yale L. J.
Forum at 693.
Being cognizant of the diminution of Congress’s
role and the tendency toward agency self-aggrandizement coming from Chevron, the Court should curb
agency overreach by curbing Chevron.
II. CHEVRON PRESUPPOSES THAT CONGRESS WON’T OVER-DELEGATE AND
THAT AGENCIES WILL BE LOYAL AGENTS;
IN PRACTICE, NEITHER IS TRUE
Chevron rests on a separation-of-powers presumption
that Congress won’t over-delegate and that an agency
will be a loyal agent of Congress. As the past 40 years
have shown, however, Congress does over-delegate
and agencies pursue their own agendas.
7
In retrospect, congressional over-delegation appears inevitable. Congress will over-delegate because
individual members can more easily achieve their
goals by shaping administration than by marshalling
the collective to pass legislation. As Judge Rao has described, delegation “undermines separation of powers
. . . [and] unravel[s] the institutional interests of Congress.” Rao, Administrative Collusion, 90 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 1466. Among other effects, “Chevron effectively
allows, and indeed encourages, Congress to abdicate
its role as the most politically-accountable branch by
deferring politically-difficult questions to agencies in
ambiguous terms.” Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron’s
Political Domain: W(h)ither Step Three, 68 DePaul L.
Rev. 615, 618 (2019). This dynamic is an affront to the
separation of powers: the most politically difficult
questions are precisely the ones that most need to be
answered by the most politically accountable branch.
Id. at 630. See also Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, not Powers, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 2311 (2006) (contending that Congress allows executive overreach during times of unified government).
In addition to the problem of congressional overdelegation, there is the problem of agencies who behave not as loyal agents but as principals. Too often,
agencies attempt to piggyback their sweeping policy
agendas onto narrow statutes unrelated to their powers. To take three recent examples where the Court
had to step in to stop blatant overreach: in Alabama
Assn. of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U. S. __ (2021), the CDC
tried to issue a nationwide eviction moratorium; in
NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U. S. __ (2022), OSHA tried to
mandate employee vaccinations; and in West Virginia
v. EPA, 597 U.S. __ (2022), the EPA tried to use the
Clean Air Act to restructure electricity generation.
8
More than half a century ago, the economist William Niskanen identified that bureaucratic management is subject to “survivor” bias; “only those bureaucrats willing to compete for larger budgets and power
will survive.” Stearns et al., Law and Economics, at
786 (citing Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative
Government 38 (1971)). One should be “‘[s]keptical of
mismatches’ between broad ‘invocations of power by
agencies’ and relatively narrow ‘statutes that purport
to delegate that power.’” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S.
at __ (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring).
Beyond the disloyal-agent problem, there is a lack
judicial neutrality, in that judges don’t apply Chevron
deference in a neutral manner. See, e.g., Richard L.
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997) (exploring how
ideology influences judicial review of administrative
decision making); Frank B. Cross and Emerson H.
Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998) (enumerating further
evidence that D.C. Circuit judges vote ideologically
when reviewing agency decision making).
But courts do not always swallow Chevron hook,
line, and sinker. Indeed, they have recently tried to
sidestep Chevron by refraining from applying a deference analysis or citing Chevron even when the facts of
a case might implicate it. See, e.g., Michael Coenen and
Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 Vand.
L. Rev. 777, 796 n.92 (2017) (enumerating several
lower court cases where the influence of King v. Burwell “disallow[s] Chevron deference in cases that
would otherwise fall firmly within Chevron’s domain.”); Gary Lawson, The Ghosts of Chevron Present
9
and Future, 103 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2023) (exploring six 2021 cases where courts failed to cite Chevron); Mila Sohoni, The Major Questions Quartet, 136
Harv. L. Rev. 262 (2022) (claiming that four of the
Court’s 2021 cases adopt a “different and more potent”
version of the major question exception); Am. Hospital
Ass’n v. Becerra, 142 S. Ct. 1896 (2022) (discussing
HHS discretion in interpretating statutory language
without mentioning Chevron); Gregory Curfman, Jason Gardiner & Justin Cole, The 340B Drug Discount
Program Preserved After US Supreme Court Review—
But Chevron Remains Vulnerable, 3 JAMA Health F.
(2022) (discussing AMA v. Becerra).
III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT STOP THE
COURT FROM OVERRULING OR CABINING CHEVRON
A. The
strength
of
stare
decisis
is
proportionate to how easily Congress
could remedy the underlying error.
Stare decisis helps promote “consistency and uniformity,” but it is not “an inexorable command.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Stare decisis should
not “compel unending adherence to . . . abuse of judicial authority.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,
142 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2022).
Applied in the most generous light, the doctrine of
stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). It may
even serve judicial economy by reducing “incentives for
10
challenging settled precedents, saving parties and
courts the expense of endless relitigation.” Kimble v.
Marvel Entm’t, 576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015). But at its
worst, stare decisis may allow “judges to abdicate their
job of interpreting the Law.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct.
2400, 2426 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
The weight of stare decisis depends on the type of
interpretive task before the court. See Brian C. Kalt,
Three Levels of Stare Decisis: Distinguishing CommonLaw, Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 Tex. Rev.
L. & Pol. 279 (2004). This weight is determined by the
ease with which the legislature can override incorrect
interpretations of the law. Stare decisis holds the least
weight when courts review cases that implicate constitutional rights. See Ilya Shapiro and Nicholas M.
Mosvick, Stare Decisis after Citizens United: When
Should Courts Overturn Precedent, 16 Nexus J. L. &
Pub. Policy 121, 124 (2011). In contrast, it typically
holds the greatest weight when courts revisit statutory
interpretations. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare Decisis, at
279. One member of this Court has described this
weight as a “special force” and “super-strong,” one that
seeks to honor legislative supremacy. Amy C. Barrett,
Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 317 (2005). That’s because the constitutional amendment process is a high hurdle to pass
compared to legislative action. See e.g., Burnet, 285
U.S. at 407. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing
amending the Constitution as “practically impossible.”). Moreover, when Congress fails to respond to a
judicial ruling, its silence can be taken as approval of
that interpretation. See e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2406
(“For approaching a century, Congress has let this deference regime work side-by-side with both
11
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the
many statutes delegating rulemaking power to agencies.”)
But there are compelling explanations as to why
congressional silence may not represent approval of a
court’s interpretation. One is that Congress’s composition may have changed such that the new Congress is
unable or unwilling to defend the original intended
meaning of the statute. Other reasons may include
simple apathy, a misunderstanding of the judicial interpretation, or practical political realities. Kalt, Three
Levels of Stare Decisis, at 280.
B. Chevron is an interpretive instruction, not
statutory interpretation itself, and thus
hard for Congress to remedy.
Chevron’s rule is not an interpretation of any particular statute, but an interpretive instruction on how
to approach a wide range of statutes. See e.g., Kisor,
139 S. Ct. at 2445 (Gorsuch, describing the similar
Auer doctrine as “an abstract default rule of interpretive methodology that settles nothing of its own
force.”). In this way, Chevron deference may be analogous to a development of common law, which generally
receives a lower form of stare decisis. See Randy J.
Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1125
(2019). In a typical case involving statutory interpretation, Congress can amend the underlying statute to
override the judicial interpretation of a particular
word or phrase. But it is less clear how Congress can
go about addressing interpretive canons such as the
Chevron doctrine.
12
Congress may, on one hand, attempt to write statutes with such specificity and clarity that it forces
every Step One Chevron analysis to find that there is
no ambiguity, preventing any Chevron deference from
applying. But overeager agencies, like Ishmael in
Moby Dick, will always purport to find statutory ambiguities in an effort to expand their authority. (“I try all
things, I achieve what I can.”) On the other hand, Congress may attempt to legislate away Chevron deference more generally, but this type of legislation is
likely to instigate a larger constitutional issue about
Congress’s ability to dictate judicial interpretation of
future laws. See, e.g., Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2445 (“We
should not be in the business of tossing “‘balls . . . into
Congress’s court . . . that would explode with constitutional questions if Congress tried to pick them up.”)
Finally, although Chevron does not strictly implicate constitutional interpretation, it raises similar
considerations because courts have used it to shift
power from the legislature to the executive.
C. Chevron should receive a weak form of
stare decisis, largely because it involves no
reliance interests.
The Court considers several stare decisis factors,
including the reasoning of the original opinion, the
workability of the ruling, the factual and legal developments that have taken place since the ruling, and
any applicable reliance interests. Janus v. AFSCME,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2479 (2018). We addressed post-Chevron factual and legal developments in Parts I and II
above, but the reliance point is really the central concern of stare decisis, with the other factors often serving as further proxies for reliance interests. Randy J.
13
Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 411, 449 (2010).
Chevron should not receive reliance-interest consideration because it doesn’t create any rights or obligations. The only parties that could rely on Chevron
doctrine are administrative agencies, and the Court
has “never suggested that the convenience of government officials should count in the balance of stare decisis, especially when weighed against the interests of
citizens in a fair hearing before an independent judge
and a stable and knowable set of laws.” Kisor, 139 S.
Ct. at 2445 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Overturning Chevron wouldn’t upset any previous
statutory interpretations; it would only change the
methodology that courts use to review agency action
going forward. It would also re-empower Congress to
curtail the excesses of unaccountable agencies.
CONCLUSION
The 40-year-old Chevron experiment has not
worked. Agencies have gone overboard and Congress
hasn’t responded, leading to haphazard results and
agency overreach. Chevron deference results in agencies’ taking over government and a diminution of Congress, while courts have become lazy in interpreting
statutes. The time has come to overhaul Chevron.
Respectfully submitted,
Ilya Shapiro
MANHATTAN INSTITUTE
52 Vanderbilt Ave.
New York, NY 10017
(212) 599-7000
ishapiro@manhattan.institute
July 20, 2023
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.