Amicus Curiae Brief — Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al., Petitioners v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 7, 2023

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Text

No. 22-448

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

V.

COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA, LIMITED, ET AL.,

Respondents.

——————

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATE OF

WEST VIRGINIA AND 26 OTHER STATES

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

LINDSAY S. SEE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Principal Deputy Solicitor

General

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

[additional counsel listed after signature page]

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the

statute that describes how the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau is funded, 12 U.S.C. § 5497, violates the

Appropriations Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, and in

vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the

CFPB was receiving such funding.

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented .............................................................. I

Introduction and Interests of Amici Curiae ..................... 1

Summary of Argument ........................................................ 4

Argument .............................................................................. 5

I.

The Appropriations Clause Matters,

Especially To The States ............................................ 5

II.

Lacking An Appropriation, The CFPB Has

Avoided Real Accountability .................................... 18

III. The Court Should Ignore Doomsaying About

The Consequences Of Providing Relief .................. 32

Conclusion ........................................................................... 33

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO,

Loc. 1647 v. FLRA,

388 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2004) ............................................ 6

Atherton v. FDIC,

519 U.S. 213 (1997) ....................................................... 22

Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC,

143 S. Ct. 890 (2023) ..................................................... 28

Biden v. Nebraska,

No. 22-506, slip op. (U.S. June 30, 2023),

2023 WL 4277210 .......................................................... 22

Bond v. United States,

564 U.S. 211 (2011) ....................................................... 13

CFPB v. Access Funding, LLC,

No. CV ELH-16-3759,

2021 WL 2915118 (D. Md. July 12, 2021) ................... 31

CFPB v. Accrediting Council for Indep.

Colleges & Sch.,

183 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2016) ................................ 31

CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc.,

33 F.4th 218 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................... 10, 16

CFPB v. Borders & Borders, PLC,

No. 3:13-CV-1047-CRS, 2016 WL

9460472 (W.D. Ky. June 29, 2016)............................... 31

CFPB v. Brown,

No. 21-14468, 2023 WL 3939432

(11th Cir. June 12, 2023) .............................................. 31

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, LLC,

846 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) ....................................... 29

City of Arlington v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ......................................................... 3

Clinton v. City of New York,

524 U.S. 417 (1998) ....................................................... 13

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.

Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477 (2010) ......................................................... 9

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit

Auth.,

469 U.S. 528 (1985) ....................................................... 13

Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,

529 U.S. 861 (2000) ....................................................... 15

INS v. Chadha,

462 U.S. 919 (1983) ......................................................... 3

Laird v. Tatum,

408 U.S. 1 (1972) ............................................................. 7

Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,

447 U.S. 27 (1980) ......................................................... 33

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519 (2012) ....................................................... 13

OPM v. Richmond,

496 U.S. 414 (1990) ..................................................... 5, 6

Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp.,

967 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2020) .......................................... 22

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

PHH Corp. v. CFPB,

881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ........................................ 24

Ring v. Maxwell,

58 U.S. 147 (1854) ........................................................... 6

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB,

140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) ............................................. 21, 22

U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. FLRA,

665 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012) .................................. 6, 9

United States v. McIntosh,

833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016) ......................................... 9

United States v. Texas,

No. 22-58, slip op. (U.S. June 23, 2023),

2023 WL 4139000 .......................................................... 21

Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,

550 U.S. 1 (2007) ........................................................... 33

Wayman v. Southard,

10 Wheat. 1 (1825) .......................................................... 9

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ................................................... 1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.................................................. 8

Statutes

12 U.S.C. § 5492 .................................................................. 20

VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

12 U.S.C. § 5497 ........................................................ 2, 19, 26

12 U.S.C. § 5531 .................................................................. 27

12 U.S.C. § 5552 .................................................................. 33

31 U.S.C. § 1301 .................................................................... 2

Regulations

88 Fed. Reg. 6,088 (Jan. 30, 2023) ..................................... 29

88 Fed. Reg. 18,382 (Mar. 29, 2023).................................. 28

Other Authorities

156 Cong. Rec. S4140 (2010) .............................................. 20

Abner J. Mikva,

Congress: The Purse,

the Purpose, and the Power,

21 GA. L. REV. 1 (1986) ................................................... 6

Adam C. Smith & Todd Zywicki,

Behavior, Paternalism, and Policy:

Evaluating Consumer Financial

Protection,

9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201 (2015) ........................... 21

Amanda Frost,

Judicial Review of FDA Preemption

Determinations,

54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367 (1999) ................................ 15

VII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Aubry D. Smith,

Executive-Branch Rulemaking and

Dispute Settlement in the World Trade

Organization: A Proposal to Increase

Public Participation,

94 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1996) ........................................ 7

Bradford R. Clark,

Separation of Powers As A Safeguard

of Federalism,

79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001)......................................... 13

C. Boyden Gray,

Extra Icing on an Unconstitutional

Cake Already Frosted? A

Constitutional Recipe for the CFPB,

24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1213 (2017) ................. 8, 21, 22

Calvin R. Massey,

The Tao of Federalism,

20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 887 (1997) ...................... 13

CFPB, CFPB FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL

YEAR 2022 (2022) ............................................................ 1

CFPB, CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN:

FY2013-FY2017 (2013) .................................................. 1

Chad Squitieri,

The Appropriate Appropriations

Inquiry,

74 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2023) ................................................. 8

VIII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Charles Davant IV,

Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?:

Federal Agencies and the Creation of

Individual Rights,

2003 WIS. L. REV. 613 (2003) ....................................... 15

Charles Kruly,

Self-Funding and Agency

Independence,

81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1733 (2013) ...................... 20, 25

Christopher C. DeMuth & Michael S.

Greve,

Agency Finance in the Age of

Executive Government,

24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555 (2017) ............................. 23

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Semiannual Report, C-SPAN

(Oct. 28, 2021) .................................................................. 1

D. Bruce La Pierre,

Political Accountability in the

National Political Process—the

Alternative to Judicial Review of

Federalism Issues,

80 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1985) ....................................... 14

Daniel Martin,

The Duty to Appropriate: Why

Congress Has A Constitutional

Obligation to Fund Criminal Law

Enforcement,

106 CAL. L. REV. 511 (2018) ........................................... 8

IX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Daniel Press,

The Myth of Independence at the

Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INSTIT.

(Feb. 5, 2018) ................................................................. 25

David A. Herrman,

To Delegate or Not to Delegate—That

Is the Preemption: The Lack of

Political Accountability in

Administrative Preemption Defies

Federalism Constraints on

Government Power,

28 PAC. L.J. 1157 (1997) ............................................... 15

David B. Spence & Frank Cross,

A Public Choice Case for the

Administrative State,

89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000) ................................................... 11

Debra L. Lowman,

A Call for Judicial Restraint: Federal

Taxpayer Grievances Challenging

Executive Action,

30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 (2007) .............................. 10

Edward Wyatt,

Decorum Breaks Down at House

Hearing, N.Y. TIMES

(May 24, 2011) ............................................................... 29

X

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Elizabeth Warren,

Republicans Remain Silent As

Mulvaney’s CFPB Ducks Oversight,

WALL ST. J.

(Mar. 28, 2018, 5:48 p.m.) ............................................. 30

Eloise Pasachoff,

The President’s Budget As A Source of

Agency Policy Control,

125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016) ............................................ 10

Eric Pearson,

A Brief Essay on the Constitutionality

of the Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau,

47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99 (2013) ................................ 23

Federalism: Hearings Before the S. Comm.

on Governmental Affs.,

106th Cong. 15 (1999) ............................................. 14, 15

Gillian E. Metzger,

Agencies, Polarization, and the States,

115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2015) ................................. 12

How Will The CFPB Function Under

Richard Cordray, Hearing before the

H. Oversight Comm., Subcomm. on

TARP, Fin. Servs., and Bailouts of

Pub. and Priv. Programs,

112th Cong. 69 (2012) ................................................... 27

XI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Committee

Pushes for Accountability and

Transparency at the CFPB, YOUTUBE

(Mar. 6, 2015) ................................................................ 30

J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman,

The Congressional Competition to

Control Delegated Power,

81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003) ......................................... 12

Jack M. Beermann,

Congressional Administration,

43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006) ........................... 12, 15

James V. DeLong,

New Wine for A New Bottle: Judicial

Review in the Regulatory State,

72 VA. L. REV. 399 (1986) ............................................. 26

JAMES V. SATURNO, ET AL.,

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42388, THE

CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS

PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION (2016) .......................... 16

James B. Stewart,

As A Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is

Tossed a Bone,

N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011) .......................................... 11

Jed S. Rakoff,

The Financial Crisis: Why Have No

High-Level Executives Been

Prosecuted?,

N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014) ................................... 24

XII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz,

Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure,

89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2016) ...................................... 18

Jeremy Rabkin,

Micromanaging the Administrative

Agencies,

100 PUB. INT. 116 (1990) .............................................. 11

Jim Puzzanghera,

CFPB Chief Mick Mulvaney Says He

Could Just ‘Twiddle My Thumbs’

Before Congress To Highlight Agency’s

Flaws, L.A. TIMES

(Apr. 11, 2018, 11:55 a.m.) ............................................ 30

Jolina C. Cuaresma,

Commissioning the Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau,

31 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 426 (2019) ...................... 26

Jonathan H. Adler,

The Ducks Stop Here? The

Environmental Challenge to

Federalism,

9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205 (2001) ............................... 14

Jonathan Masur,

Judicial Deference and the Credibility

of Agency Commitments,

60 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (2007) ...................................... 26

XIII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

JOSEPH STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES (1833) ..................................... 7

Julia Patterson Forrester,

Still Mortgaging the American Dream:

Predatory Lending, Preemption, and

Federally Supported Lenders,

74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303 (2006) .................................... 22

Kate Stith,

Congress’ Power of the Purse,

97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) ........................................... 8, 9

Keeping Up With the Codes—Using AI

For Effective RegTech, Hearing before

H. Fin. Servs. Comm. A.I. Task Force

of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,

117th Cong. 2 (2022) ..................................................... 32

Laura E. Dolbow,

Agency Adherence to Legislative

History,

70 ADMIN. L. REV. 569 (2018) ...................................... 16

Laurence H. Tribe,

Intergovernmental Immunities in

Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:

Separation of Powers Issues in

Controversies About Federalism,

89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976) ........................................ 14

XIV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Lauren Sanders,

THE ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER THE

DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM

AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF

2010 (2010) ..................................................................... 22

Letter from Rep. Patrick McHenry,

H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Republican

Leader, et al. to Rohit Chopra, Dir.,

CFPB (Sept. 20, 2022) .................................................. 28

Letter from Rep. Randy Neugebauer,

Chairman, H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,

Subcomm. on Oversight and

Investigations, et al. to Richard

Cordray, Dir., CFPB (May 2, 2012) ........................... 30

Letter from Rohit Chopra, Dir., CFPB, to

Jerome Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors

of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Apr. 6, 2023) .......................... 19

Letter from Sen. Mike Enzi, Chairman, S.

Budget Comm. & Richard Shelby,

Chairman, S. Comm. On Banking,

Hous. & Urban Affairs, to Richard

Cordray, Dir., CFPB (Mar. 9, 2015) ........................... 30

Letter from Sen. Rob Portman, et al. to

Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB (Oct. 30,

2013) ............................................................................... 30

XV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Marie Plicka,

Mr. Peanut Goes to Court:

Accommodating an Individual’s

Peanut Allergy in Schools and Day

Care Centers Under the Americans

with Disabilities Act,

14 J.L. & HEALTH 87 (2000) ........................................ 11

Markham S. Chenoweth & Michael P.

DeGrandis,

How the Court’s Decision in Seila Law

Makes CFPB’s Unlawful Structure

Even Worse,

8/27/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 55

(2020) ................................................................................ 9

Martin Baily,

Dodd Bill Offers Progress At Last,

POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2010 5:17 a.m.) ............................. 18

MARTIN H. REDISH,

THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL

STRUCTURE (1995) ........................................................ 14

Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B.

Rodriguez,

Canonical Construction and Statutory

Revisionism: The Strange Case of the

Appropriations Canon,

14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669

(2005) ........................................................................ 16, 17

XVI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Matthew B. Lawrence,

Congress’s Domain: Appropriations,

Time, and Chevron,

70 DUKE L.J. 1057 (2021) ....................................... 10, 12

Michael Doran,

Legislative Entrenchment and Federal

Fiscal Policy,

81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (2018) ....................... 12

Michael Patrick Wilt,

Evaluating “Consumer Relief”

Payments in Recent Bank Settlement

Agreements,

17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 253 (2017)...................................... 8

Michael R. Faz,

Scouring Muddied Waters: Towards

Clarifying the CFPB’s “Abusive”

Practices,

32 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 45 (2019) ........................ 27

Michele E. Gilman,

Presidents, Preemption, and the States,

26 CONST. COMMENT. 339 (2010) ................................ 16

Note, Independence, Congressional

Weakness, and the Importance of

Appointment: The Impact of

Combining Budgetary Autonomy with

Removal Protection,

125 HARV. L. REV. 1822 (2012) .................................... 10

XVII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh,

The Appropriations Power and

Sovereign Immunity,

107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009) ...................................... 5

Paul Larkin, Jr. & Zack Smith,

“Brother, Can You Spare A Million

Dollars?”: Resurrecting the Justice

Department’s “Slush Fund,”

19 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2021) ........................... 6

Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Invokes

Dormant Authority to Examine

Nonbank Companies Posing Risks to

Consumers (Apr. 25, 2022) .......................................... 28

Rachel E. Barkow,

Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture

Through Institutional Design,

89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) ............................................. 24

Robert C. Byrd,

The Control of the Purse and the Line

Item Veto Act,

35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297 (1998) .................................. 6

Roberta Romano,

Does Agency Structure Affect Agency

Decisionmaking? Implications of the

CFPB’s Design for Administrative

Governance,

36 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (2019) .................................... 20

XVIII

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN,

THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY

COMMISSIONS (1972) .................................................... 10

S. REP. NO. 111-176 (2010)........................................... 22, 33

Steven G. Calabresi,

A Critical Introduction to the

Originalism Debate,

31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 875 (2008) ........................ 7

Taking Account of Bureaucrats’ Spending

Act of 2023, H.R. 1382, 118th Cong.

(2023) .............................................................................. 32

Tara Leigh Grove,

Government Standing and the Fallacy

of Institutional Injury,

167 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (2019) ...................................... 21

THE FEDERALIST, NO. 58 .................................................... 6

Thomas Arning,

The Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau: A Novel Agency Design with

Familiar Issues,

24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 153

(2018) .............................................................................. 20

Thomas W. Merrill,

Preemption and Institutional Choice,

102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008) ..................................... 24

XIX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?,

81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013) ........................ 18, 24

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A

FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS

AND CREDIT UNIONS (2017) ........................................ 28

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,

GOVERNMENT-WIDE INVENTORY OF

ACCOUNTS WITH SPENDING AUTHORITY

AND PERMANENT APPROPRIATIONS,

FISCAL YEARS 1995 TO 2015 (2018) ............................... 1

Wentong Zheng,

The Revolving Door,

90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015) ......................... 24

William Simpson,

Above Reproach: How the Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau Escapes

Constitutional Checks & Balances,

36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 343 (2016) ...................... 26

INTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS

OF AMICI CURIAE

In many ways, the question here—whether the

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has received a

proper appropriation—is an easy one. Article 1, Section

9, Clause 7 of the Constitution says that “[n]o Money shall

be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of

Appropriations made by Law.” Before this Court, the

CFPB concedes that it needs to identify an appropriation

but insists that its “funding statute indisputably

establishes” one. Pet.18. It thinks Congress did so by

“authorizing [the] agenc[y] to spend money indefinitely.”

CFPB.Br.27.

Until now, the CFPB has said just the opposite: It does

not receive appropriations. An early strategic plan hyped

the Bureau’s “full independence” in operating “outside of

the congressional appropriations process.” CFPB, CFPB

STRATEGIC

PLAN:

FY2013-FY2017

36

(2013),

https://bit.ly/3hiawEm. Its financial reports have called

the agency “an independent, non-appropriated bureau.”

CFPB, CFPB FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2022, at

38 (2022), https://bit.ly/3HwmCVq. And the current

director told Congress that the CFPB’s “base level of

funding” is “guaranteed.”

Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau Semiannual Report, C-SPAN (Oct.

28, 2021), https://bit.ly/3iGFC93. The agency would be

“subject to the normal appropriations process,” he

declared, only if it needed more than the hundreds of

millions it already gets on demand. Id.; see also, e.g., U.S.

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GOVERNMENT-WIDE

INVENTORY OF ACCOUNTS WITH SPENDING AUTHORITY

AND PERMANENT APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1995

TO 2015 (2018), https://bit.ly/3phKYLT (omitting CFPB

from list of agencies with permanent appropriations).

2

More importantly, Congress commanded that the

Bureau’s ordinary funding flows “shall not be construed to

be … appropriated monies.” 12 U.S.C. § 5497(c)(2).

Congress distinguished the Bureau’s automatic funding—

which this year can tally up to about $734 million—from

the “appropriated funds” that the CFPB could separately

seek. Id. § 5497(e). The protections that ordinarily cover

congressional spending apply to only the supplemental

funds, which the Bureau has never needed. Id. Leaving

no doubt, Congress stressed that the Bureau’s regular

funding scheme is not “subject to review” by the

congressional appropriations committees or subject to

approval from the Director of the Office of Management

and Budget. Id. § 5497(a)(2)(C), (4)(E).

So both the Bureau and Congress have recognized that

the Bureau does not receive appropriations. And were

that not clear enough, another key principle drives the

point home: “A law may be construed to make an

appropriation out of the Treasury … only if the law

specifically states that an appropriation is made.” 31

U.S.C. § 1301(d). The CFPB’s funding statute contains no

statement of that kind. And lacking anything that can

rightfully be called an appropriation, the Bureau’s funding

structure is unconstitutional.

Faced with unyielding law and difficult facts like these,

the Bureau and its allies look elsewhere for help. They

maintain that other agencies have similar funding

structures, for instance. But the list of self-funded

agencies is short, and a potential constitutional violation

elsewhere doesn’t immunize one here, anyway.

Supporters also catalog the good things that they feel the

agency has done. See, e.g., AARP.Amici.Br.3 (“[T]he

CFPB has improved the financial services marketplace.”).

Even if the CFPB has done some good—and some would

3

even dispute that premise—it wouldn’t matter. “[P]olicy

arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’

are subject to the demands of the Constitution which

defines powers and … sets out just how those powers are

to be exercised.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983).

And maybe worst of all, the Bureau and its friends

downplay the appropriations power’s importance while

minimizing the harm that comes from diluting it.

The Amici States focus on this last flawed argument—

that is, the idea that the benefits of enforcing the

Appropriations Clause are too small and the potential

costs too great to justify upholding the Fifth Circuit’s

decision. The Constitution isn’t subject to a cost-benefit

analysis. Yet even taking the argument on its own terms,

the Appropriations Clause is one of the Constitution’s

most powerful tools to curb the administrative state’s

abuses and preserve federalism’s values. Experience with

the CFPB has shown that sidelining Congress can

greenlight an agency to wreak havoc. Even more so when,

as here, the agency wields broad regulatory and

enforcement powers over the entire U.S. financial system,

acts under the control of a single powerful figure, and

lacks other protections from meaningful oversight. In

other words, the Post Office this is not.

Contra

CFPB.Br.29.

“[W]ith hundreds of federal agencies poking into every

nook and cranny of daily life,” it’s no longer enough to

point to presidential oversight and hope for the best—if it

ever were. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315

(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Courts must ensure

that Congress keeps a firm grasp on the purse strings.

Nor will fulfilling that responsibility here cause any

catastrophe. Congress can appropriate funds properly if

it chooses. And in the meantime, States and federal

4

regulators can stand guard in the Bureau’s stead just as

they did for decades before.

In the end, we return to where we began: to an easy

answer that the agency and Congress have already

provided. Congress has not appropriated the CFPB the

hundreds of millions of dollars it spends each year. But

the Constitution says the Bureau needs an appropriation

if it wants to spend. So the Court should affirm the

decision below.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The Appropriations Clause offers Congress one of

its best tools to supervise and control federal agencies.

The appropriations power is essential to the separation of

powers, and the separation of powers in turn protects the

States’ interests. Beyond that, Congress offers a forum in

which States can participate more directly in the oversight

and operation of administrative processes. In contrast,

when an agency like the CFPB operates outside the

ordinary appropriations process, it often leaves States out

in the cold.

II. Licensing the Bureau to operate free from the

appropriations process’s ordinary constraints has had real

consequences for our financial system. The CFPB has

ignored Congress and the States—and proponents

overstate the perceived benefits from its complete

financial autonomy. At the same time, the CFPB’s actions

show that evading effective oversight does damage.

Honoring the Appropriations Clause’s limits will bring

needed accountability and transparency to this critical

area.

III. The Bureau and its amici cannot justify skirting

around the problems in the CFPB’s funding scheme with

5

their imagined harms. Although they worry the financial

system is destined for failure if the Court affirms, none

explains why the Bureau’s unusual self-governance is

essential to the agency’s operation. And if the CFPB is as

critical to the financial system as its supporters suggest,

then Congress can restore its funding quickly. In the

meantime, States and other federal financial regulators

have experience protecting consumers in financial

markets. They can stand in the breach.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Appropriations Clause Matters, Especially

To The States.

Often, those supporting a sovereign CFPB downplay

the Appropriations Clause’s importance. One group of

States, for instance, dismisses the harm from this type of

constitutional violation as “indeterminate” or “meager.”

NY.Amici.Br.9-10. A group of legislators, meanwhile,

takes a no-harm-no-foul approach, arguing that Congress

does a good enough job overseeing the CFPB through

other means. See Legislators.Br.21-28.

But the Appropriations Clause is no small thing.

“Seemingly innocuous and self-evident, it is instead “one

of the most profound political statements in the

Constitution.” Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The

Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107

MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1267 (2009). So violations strike a

blow to the centerpiece of our constitutional scheme—and

impose serious harm on the States.

A. The Appropriations Clause comprises a

“straightforward and explicit command” that “no money

can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been

appropriated by an act of Congress.” OPM v. Richmond,

6

496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990). Its restraint is “absolute.” U.S.

Dep’t of Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339, 1348 (D.C. Cir.

2012) (Kavanaugh, J.). It covers “any sum of money

collected for the government.” Ring v. Maxwell, 58 U.S.

147, 148 (1854).

The Appropriations Clause is an important way the

Constitution ensures that Congress reaches the “difficult

judgments.” Richmond, 496 U.S. at 428. Early thinkers

like Justice Joseph Story concluded that the “common

good” motivates Congress, rather than the “individual

favor” that other “Government agents” might use to

decide a spending issue. Id. And as “our most

representative of institutions,” Paul Larkin, Jr. & Zack

Smith, “Brother, Can You Spare A Million Dollars?”:

Resurrecting the Justice Department’s “Slush Fund,” 19

GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 457 (2021), Congress is

“uniquely qualified to make spending decisions,” Robert

C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto

Act, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 315-16 (1998).

Congressionally led spending should thus produce “the

most desirable, balanced, and responsive” results. Abner

J. Mikva, Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the

Power, 21 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986). And the Founders

recognized all this from the beginning. James Madison,

for example, explained that “[t]his power over the purse

may [be] the most complete and effectual weapon with

which any constitution can arm the immediate

representatives of the people.” THE FEDERALIST, NO. 58.

Getting to specifics, the Appropriations Clause “hands

the Legislative Branch a powerful tool to curb behavior by

the Executive.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO,

Loc. 1647 v. FLRA, 388 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2004). If

Congress is not in control of the purse, then “the executive

would possess an unbounded power.” Richmond, 496 U.S.

7

at 427 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1348 (3d ed.

1858)). But by exercising its appropriations power,

Congress maintains “a controlling influence” over that

power.

2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 530, at 14 (1833);

see also, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)

(describing Congress’s power of the purse as particularly

suited to monitor the “wisdom and soundness of Executive

action”). The Clause ensures that each branch plays an

important and mutually limiting role.

And in practice, Congress has exercised its

appropriations power to police the executive in all manner

of ways. For instance, it used appropriations bills to cut

funding for the Vietnam War and effectively squeeze the

military into ending the fight. Mikva, supra, at 4. In

another foreign-policy-related act, Congress used an

appropriations rider to smother a secret clean-air

agreement that the executive had signed with Venezuela.

Aubry D. Smith, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and

Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: A

Proposal to Increase Public Participation, 94 MICH. L.

REV. 1267, 1268 (1996). These examples show that even

where executive power is at its apex beyond the country’s

waterline, the Appropriations Clause gives Congress

some real bite.

The Appropriations Clause is also more than a tool that

Congress can take up at will; it imposes obligations

directly on Congress, too. Recall that the Clause appears

in Article I—governing Congress—and Section 9—

describing limits on Congress’s powers. See Steven G.

Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism

Debate, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 875, 896 (2008)

(reading the Appropriations Clause as a limit on the

8

spending power found in the preceding section’s

Necessary and Proper Clause); see also Chad Squitieri,

The Appropriate Appropriations Inquiry, 74 FLA. L.

REV. FORUM 1, 7 (2023) (suggesting that the CFPB’s

funding statute “is not a ‘necessary and proper’ exercise

of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce”).

“This placement … suggests that the Appropriations

Clause is properly viewed as a limitation on Congress to

not spend in broad, undifferentiated terms or delegate

spending authority to the President.” Daniel Martin, The

Duty to Appropriate: Why Congress Has A

Constitutional Obligation to Fund Criminal Law

Enforcement, 106 CAL. L. REV. 511, 518 (2018). And

unlike some of the other limits found in Article I, Section

9, the Appropriations Clause does not contain an escape

hatch. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (providing that the

Emoluments Clause does not apply when Congress has

given its “consent”). Congress therefore offends the

Clause if it fails to provide sufficient limits on the

Executive’s spending authority, “particularly in areas”—

as here—“where the executive branch has significant

discretion in defining the objects of expenditure.” Kate

Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343,

1386 (1988).

The Clause thus “force[s] Congress to take ownership

of the government’s spending choices, in order to promote

accountability and fiscal restraint.” C. Boyden Gray,

Extra Icing on an Unconstitutional Cake Already

Frosted? A Constitutional Recipe for the CFPB, 24 GEO.

MASON L. REV. 1213, 1226 (2017). Understood this way,

the Clause ensures that members of Congress make

spending decisions in full view of their constituents, which

lets the voters appropriately reward or punish the

decisionmakers. See Michael Patrick Wilt, Evaluating

“Consumer Relief” Payments in Recent Bank Settlement

9

Agreements, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 253, 291 (2017)

(explaining how the separation of powers “provides voters

with a greater ability to hold political leaders accountable

and to elicit information from them”).

So if Congress tries to “divest[]” itself of “its core

Article I appropriations power,” it crosses a “forbidden

line.” Markham S. Chenoweth & Michael P. DeGrandis,

Out of the Separation-of-Powers Frying Pan and into the

Nondelegation Fire: How the Court’s Decision in Seila

Law Makes CFPB’s Unlawful Structure Even Worse,

8/27/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 55 (2020). Congress

may not “delegate ... powers,” like the appropriations

power, that “are strictly and exclusively legislative.”

Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42-43 (1825). So

whenever the executive escapes the ordinary

appropriations processes, even with congressional

acquiescence or assistance, it “vitiate[s] the foundational

constitutional decision to empower Congress to determine

what actions shall be undertaken in the name of the

United States.” Stith, supra, at 1356; cf. Free Enter.

Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497

(2010) (“[T]he separation of powers does not depend on …

whether the encroached-upon branch approves the

encroachment.” (cleaned up)).

In short, by operating on both Congress and the

executive, “[t]he Appropriations Clause plays a critical

role in the Constitution’s separation of powers among the

three branches of government and the checks and

balances between them.” United States v. McIntosh, 833

F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Navy, 665 F.3d at

1347 (“The Appropriations Clause is thus a bulwark of the

Constitution’s separation of powers among the three

branches of the National Government.”).

10

B. The Appropriations Clause has continued to play

its vital role even with the rise of the modern

administrative state. “The budget … is a key tool for

controlling agencies.” Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s

Budget As A Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE

L.J. 2182, 2186 (2016); see also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 674-75 (1972)

(explaining that congressional oversight of an

independent agency’s finances is “[t]he most constant and

effective control”). It’s not hard to understand why:

“agencies dependent upon annual appropriations obey

both houses of Congress because each must consent to

enact such appropriations.” Matthew B. Lawrence,

Congress’s Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron,

70 DUKE L.J. 1057, 1059 (2021); see also CFPB v. All Am.

Check Cashing, Inc., 33 F.4th 218, 241 (5th Cir. 2022)

(Jones, J., concurring) (“[F]unding is the very lifeblood

that empowers [an agency] to act.”).

The Appropriations Clause gives Congress more

options than just turning off the financial faucet. Besides

“altering total funding,” Congress can also “target[]

specific programs through earmarks and riders” or “us[e]

signals and threats” to affect agency choices both before

and after the fact. Note, Independence, Congressional

Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The

Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with

Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1825 (2012);

accord Debra L. Lowman, A Call for Judicial Restraint:

Federal Taxpayer Grievances Challenging Executive

Action, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 698-99 (2007)

(describing specific actions that Congress can take against

an agency under the Appropriations Clause). Sometimes,

Congress needn’t do anything at all; the unstated

understanding that “the agency would have to please

Congress with its use of the appropriated money” to get

11

more can drive it in the right direction. David B. Spence

& Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the

Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 118 (2000).

Here again, real-world examples are plenty. Congress

once used funding cuts to curtail the Consumer Product

Safety Commission’s powers. Independence, supra, at

1825-26. Another time, Congress cut the Securities and

Exchange Commission’s budget by hundreds of millions

of dollars—after expanding its responsibilities in the

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer

Protection Act—because it was frustrated by the agency’s

“troubled past” and failure to go after wrongdoers

aggressively enough. James B. Stewart, As A Watchdog

Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES (July

15, 2011), https://bit.ly/3r6FgNa.

Of course, not

everything that draws Congress’s appropriations

attention is of such grand scale. Congress also barred the

Department of Transportation from spending money to

implement peanut-free zones on airplanes in a 1999

appropriations rider. Marie Plicka, Mr. Peanut Goes to

Court: Accommodating an Individual’s Peanut Allergy

in Schools and Day Care Centers Under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 87, 88 (2000).

And ten years before, Congress used another rider to

prevent the Department of the Interior from keeping a

record of communications with congressmembers or their

staff.

Jeremy Rabkin, Micromanaging the

Administrative Agencies, 100 PUB. INT. 116, 127 (1990).

So whether it comes to hundreds of millions of dollars

for securities enforcement or just peanuts for keeping the

skies goober-free, the point is the same: “[I]n a

disagreement between Congress and the President over

the priorities or the value of a particular program,

Congress will win if it uses its power over the allocation of

12

funds.”

Jack

M.

Beermann,

Congressional

Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84-85 (2006).

Some might mistakenly think that Congress could just

as easily win these fights by targeting the agencies’

authorizing statutes themselves. But that view ignores

the realities of modern legislation. “The complex,

interlocking, and overlapping structures of legislative

organization … make it difficult to change existing policy.”

Michael Doran, Legislative Entrenchment and Federal

Fiscal Policy, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 45 (2018).

More so in a highly polarized and divided Congress or

when the President is of a different party than the

congressional majority.

Unlike the difficulties of amending authorizing

statutes, appropriations legislation carries a “must-pass

status, dramatically raising the stakes of a presidential

veto.” Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the

States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1749 (2015); see also, e.g.,

Lawrence, supra, at 1072-73 (explaining soft legislative

entrenchment of agency statutes and how appropriations

bills can overcome that hurdle). If the President or a

legislative minority blocks appropriations, then the

government shuts down—a painful pill to swallow for the

sake of standing up for an agency’s policy choice. And

procedural mechanisms like reconciliation can help

Congress effect change through appropriations without

having to fight through obstacles that persist even in this

context, like the filibuster.

What’s more, the

appropriations-committee process itself has value.

Because appropriations involves both oversight

committees and appropriations committees, agencies may

have “less flexibility to ally themselves with executive

branch officials or interest groups.” J.R. DeShazo & Jody

13

Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control

Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1509-10 (2003).

C. As an aspect of the separation of powers, the

Appropriations Clause also advances federalism. “The

allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the

integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States.”

Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). Balancing

powers among the branches helps “ensure that States

function as political entities in their own right.” Id.; see

also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers As A

Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324

(2001) (“Permitting the federal government to avoid these

constraints would allow it to exercise more power than the

Constitution contemplates, at the expense of state

authority.”). The Framers chose the “structure of the

Federal Government” as the “principal means” “to ensure

the role of the States.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.

Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985). And at the same

time, federalism and separation of powers are the two

“principal mechanism[s]” by which to control

“improvident spending.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524

U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). So while

“federalism and separation of powers” may be “less

romantic” aspects of our Constitution, “the Framers

considered [these] structural protections of freedom the

most important ones.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.

Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 707 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,

Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).

Romance aside, assigning the spending power directly

to Congress—including authority over agencies’

budgets—makes the federal government far more

accountable to the States.

Congress can be better “relied upon to respect the

States.” Calvin R. Massey, The Tao of Federalism, 20

14

HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 887, 891 (1997). At least in part

because they come to Washington from specific

communities, “[m]embers of Congress are more

responsive to the concerns of local regional

con[stituencies] than centralized regulatory agencies.”

Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The

Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT.

ECON. REV. 205, 221 (2001); see also MARTIN H. REDISH,

THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 138 (1995)

(concluding that the legislative branch is based on

“localized accountability”). But Congress doesn’t respect

States just because its members travel from everywhere.

Rather, “political checks and Congress’ political

accountability”—like State-centered involvement in

congressional elections, State-focused lobbying efforts,

state political party pressure, and more—are the political

safeguards of federalism. D. Bruce La Pierre, Political

Accountability in the National Political Process—the

Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80

NW. U. L. REV. 577, 633 (1985).

And over time, Congress has also come to show its

“peculiar institutional competence … in adjusting federal

power relationships,” including relationships between the

States and the federal government. Laurence H. Tribe,

Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation,

and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in

Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682,

696 (1976). As Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson

once told Congress: “I like dealing with you and I can

usually convince you to go part way with the position of

the States, but once it leaves your hands and goes over to

a department, to some bureaucrat there that is going to

promulgate the rules, … we are left out.” Federalism:

Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs.,

106th Cong. 15 (1999). Congress’s spending power

15

prevents situations in which the States have “no recourse

whatsoever.” Id.

Indeed, the federal government becomes far less

accountable to States as agencies seize independent

spending power. “[U]nlike Congress, administrative

agencies are clearly not designed to represent the

interests of States.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529

U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rather, the

“‘political safeguards’ that give [S]tates a voice in

Congress’s lawmaking” do not extend to a “voice in the

executive branch’s activities.”

Charles Davant IV,

Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and

the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613,

640 (2003). And “independent agencies” in particular are

“virtually insulated from political forces.” David A.

Herrman, To Delegate or Not to Delegate—That Is the

Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability in

Administrative

Preemption

Defies

Federalism

Constraints on Government Power, 28 PAC. L.J. 1157,

1181-82 (1997).

Tracing accountability back to States through

Congress benefits everyone. For example, agencies may

be “too quick” to “displace state law” precisely “because,

unlike Congress, agencies are not accountable directly to

the States.” Amanda Frost, Judicial Review of FDA

Preemption Determinations, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367,

368 (1999). The Appropriations Clause supplies a fiscal

prophylactic—if agencies overreach, States can speak up,

and Congress can hit their pocketbook. Or States might

be more aggressive, convincing Congress to attach

appropriations riders that “single out a specific regulatory

activity and prohibit the expenditure of funds for carrying

[it] out.” Beermann, supra, at 85. Either approach might

lead an agency to abandon course, but also might prompt

16

Congress to incorporate cooperative federalism programs

or other State-centric measures to win over reluctant

state interests and achieve its regulatory objectives.

Congressional inaction in the appropriations process can

likewise check an agency—an especially important

constraint during times of political polarization and

deadlock. States can make the pitch for any of these

measures.

These are not abstractions. The appropriations

process gives States concrete opportunities to influence

agency operations that wouldn’t otherwise exist. See, e.g.,

Laura E. Dolbow, Agency Adherence to Legislative

History, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 569, 579-80 (2018) (explaining

how the appropriations process provides an “effective

oversight technique” for agencies). “[F]rom a state’s

perspective,” the legislative process provides several

concrete on-ramps for state involvement—“more

opportunities and more access points to provide input to

Congress than [there would be] to the President.”

Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the

States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 365 (2010). Passing a

budget is complex: every year the President proposes a

detailed budget; relevant committees in the House and

Senate hold hearings, make sub-allocations, adopt

amendments, and report budget bills out to the chambers;

the bills are considered on the House and Senate floors

(where members can offer further amendments); the bills

are conferenced; and both chambers eventually agree to

the complete budgetary package, which the President

signs. See JAMES V. SATURNO, ET AL., CONG. RSCH.

SERV., R42388, THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS

PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 2-9 (2016). Each of these

steps is a genuine invitation for the States to get involved.

And Congress’s “institutional design” allows legislators

from all States to participate. Mathew D. McCubbins &

17

Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and

Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the

Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES

669, 697 (2005). In short, the deliberative way in which the

budget wends through Congress gives States plenty of

people to speak to, helping to ensure that their interests

are heard. The States have used this process to shape

agency behavior many times. See WV.Cert.Amicus.Br.1213 (listing examples when State-centric interests have

compelled agency action through appropriations-related

maneuvers).

The appropriations process also provides key

information that helps States influence agency actions in

less direct ways. For instance, when an agency launches

a new enforcement initiative or substantial rulemaking

effort, it needs to detail its anticipated work publicly to

secure the funding to support it. See McCubbins &

Rodriguez, supra, at 702 (describing how the

appropriations process is “probably more” transparent

than “any other legislation”). Disclosure on the front end

of the appropriations process can empower affected

parties—including the States—to take quick, responsive

actions beyond lobbying their representatives (up to suing

to stop illegal action, if need be). Early informationsharing through Congress also allows States to bring their

expertise to bear in all manner of fora on issues of

traditional state expertise, from law enforcement and land

use, to insurance and immunizations. But an agency free

from the appropriations process can keep critical

information out of public view for as long as possible. As

a result, new enforcement initiatives may become hard to

spot until the pattern emerges. And even rulemakings

may lack the transparency that the appropriations

process offers, as “many substantive policy decisions

happen before the agency publishes the notice of proposed

18

rulemaking.” Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz,

Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733,

743 (2016).

* * * *

All these considerations should make one thing plain:

there’s nothing “meager” or “indeterminate” about the

harms that flow from skipping the appropriations process.

Just as the Constitution intended, that process serves as a

vital avenue of influence by giving States insight into

agency action and a meaningful way to respond to it.

II.

Lacking An Appropriation, The CFPB Has

Avoided Real Accountability.

In arguing to overturn the decision below, many of the

Bureau’s supporters have compiled lists of what the

Bureau has done over the last decade. See, e.g.,

NY.Amici.Br.10-22; Cmty.Dev.Amici.16-26; Treasury.

Emps.Br.8-13. But none of them explains why the Bureau

needed funding autonomy to accomplish any of these

actions. And a deeper look at the agency’s record reveals

that the Bureau has shown itself unconcerned with even

less direct oversight from Congress. Or with giving the

States genuine opportunities to participate in an area

where they have unique and longstanding expertise.

A. The CFPB’s funding structure offers none of the

ordinary appropriations process’s benefits. See Todd

Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:

Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 888

(2013). One former Democratic chair of the Council of

Economic Advisors calls the structure a “clever ruse to

use the Fed’s deep pockets.” Martin Baily, Dodd Bill

Offers Progress At Last, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2010 5:17

a.m.), https://bit.ly/3XwgBxY.

The trick effectively

19

silences anyone who would otherwise offer input on the

Bureau’s work.

States and others are left out. They cannot participate

through committee work because the CFPB’s hundreds of

millions of dollars in funding is “not … subject to review

by the Committees on Appropriations of the House of

Representatives and the Senate.”

12 U.S.C.

§ 5497(a)(2)(C). If the Bureau stays under the statute’s

automatic funding cap (it always has), and if Congress

does not overcome legislative entrenchment to revise the

Bureau’s enabling statute wholesale (it hasn’t yet), then

the CFPB’s funding will never reach the floor of Congress

again. True, the Bureau files a few minimal reports to the

Office of Management and Budget, but it need not

“consult with or obtain [OMB’s] consent or approval”

before it does anything. Id. § 5497(a)(4)(E).

Instead, the CFPB Director need only determine that

funds are “reasonably necessary to carry out the

authorities of the Bureau,” and the Federal Reserve must

transfer those funds. Id. § 5497(a)(1). A half-page

letter—with no reasoning, analysis, or justification—is all

that the Bureau needs to set that process in motion. See,

e.g., Letter from Rohit Chopra, Dir., CFPB, to Jerome

Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.

(Apr. 6, 2023), https://bit.ly/3NrRZBQ. Once the Director

sends that letter, millions of dollars become “immediately

available” to the Bureau and remain ready under its

control until the agency spends them. See 12 U.S.C.

§ 5497(c)(1). Aside from that ordinary operating fund, the

CFPB also maintains a separate, unsupervised slush fund

where it funnels hundreds of millions of dollars in civil

penalties. See id. § 5497(d)(2). And even though the

Federal Reserve cuts the Bureau’s checks, Congress

20

expressly barred it from exercising any oversight along

the way. See id. § 5492(c).

Thus, the CFPB is its own appropriator. The approach

is an anomaly. See, e.g., Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and

Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1733, 1735

(2013) (“Congress has utilized self-funding in only a

limited number of ‘narrowly-focused’ independent

agencies.”).

It was also intentional: The Bureau’s

champions thought this structure would prevent it from

being “compromised by political maneuvering.” 156 Cong.

Rec. S4140 (2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd). Others, of

course, might call this “maneuvering” “oversight” and

“input.” Either way, this choice was not one that Congress

was free to make: Because of the CFPB’s structure,

accountability and transparency have fallen by the

wayside. “[S]elf-funding … effectively makes the agency

accountable to nobody.” Thomas Arning, The Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau: A Novel Agency Design

with Familiar Issues, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.

153, 169 (2018).

So those outside the cloistered community of the

Bureau are kept effectively powerless. “[T]here is

minimal leverage that Congress,” and by extension the

States, “can bring to bear to influence the agency.”

Roberta Romano, Does Agency Structure Affect Agency

Decisionmaking? Implications of the CFPB’s Design for

Administrative Governance, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 273, 299

(2019) (explaining that the CFPB is the most insulated

agency among those with similar regulatory objectives).

The States and the public must depend on voluntary

disclosures and a couple semi-annual reports to learn what

the agency is up to. They can hope that audits or reports

from the General Accountability Office might lead the

Bureau to change its ways. But depending on a self-

21

interested CFPB to do the right thing is a “curious

assumption,” especially when the Bureau has “lack[ed]

transparency in much of its decision-making.” (More on

that below.) Adam C. Smith & Todd Zywicki, Behavior,

Paternalism, and Policy: Evaluating Consumer

Financial Protection, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201, 23637 (2015). It’s hardly a surprise, then, that the Court has

already observed how the Bureau’s “financial freedom”

“makes it even more likely that the agency will slip …

from [the control] of the people.” Seila Law LLC v.

CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2204 (2020) (cleaned up). It already

has.

The most States have left is the Hail Mary of

convincing Congress to pass a Congressional Review Act

resolution or, failing that, filing suit. But litigation should

be a backstop—not the only practical option to constrain

an agency running amuck—because the Constitution

“does not establish ‘government by lawsuit.’” United

States v. Texas, No. 22-58, slip op. at 19 (U.S. June 23,

2023), 2023 WL 4139000, at *17 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in

the judgment) (cleaned up). “[G]overnment institutions

should rely on … structural tools, not lawsuits, to protect

the public interest.” Tara Leigh Grove, Government

Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U.

PA. L. REV. 611, 635 (2019).

This setup is even more worrisome given the immense

power that the CFPB holds. The Bureau “wields vast

rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority over

a significant portion of the U.S. economy.” Seila Law, 140

S. Ct. at 2191. It oversees nineteen different consumerfinancial statutes, many of which themselves employ

broadly defined terms granting expansive power. Gray,

supra, at 1216-17. Working from these statutes, the

agency can issue regulations and interpretations that

22

trump those of other financial regulators. Id. Before

Congress created the Bureau, seven different federal

regulators—not to mention their state counterparts—

exercised these powers. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 10

(2010). And the Bureau can also bring enforcement

actions that the Director himself can then hear. Gray,

supra, at 1216-17. The “sweeping” and “unprecedented”

nature of the Bureau places it firmly “in the ‘wheelhouse’

of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.”

Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506, slip op. at 23 (U.S. June

30, 2023), 2023 WL 4277210, at *14.

The CFPB’s specific lack of accountability to the States

is all the worse because the Bureau is operating in a realm

that the State historically owned. Consumer protection is

the States’ “traditional[]” field. Pennsylvania v. Navient

Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 2020). The same goes for

banking and finance, where our dual-banking system

contemplates that States are active regulatory partners.

Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 221-23 (1997); see also,

e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the

American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and

Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303,

1359-68 (2006) (describing the States’ “longstanding”

control over real-estate financing and consumer

protection). States are not any old constituents for the

CFPB; Congress fully intended the CFPB to work

directly with the States in their area of expertise. See

generally Lauren Sanders, THE ROLE OF THE STATES

UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 (2010); see also

infra Part III (describing traditional state involvement in

this area). But without backup from Congress, the Bureau

can ignore them.

23

Even just considering preemption shows the threat an

unaccountable CFPB poses to the States. As a federal

agency with a wide-reaching regulatory domain, the

Bureau can displace large swaths of state regulatory

action through preemption or otherwise.

“[B]road

delegations of lawmaking … authority” like Congress

gave the CFPB “should go hand-in-hand with increased

congressional vigilance with respect to the means of

backstopping agencies—foremost, budgetary means.”

Christopher C. DeMuth & Michael S. Greve, Agency

Finance in the Age of Executive Government, 24 GEO.

MASON L. REV. 555, 587 (2017). That backstop is missing

here.

So the Court faces an agency endowed with substantial

power, led by a single Director who can exercise great

additional power, indefinitely self-funded through the Fed

that is itself self-funded, in permanent control of any funds

it obtains, expressly exempt from the usual forms of

oversight that come with federal appropriations, and

operating in a field of traditional state control. That

combination of features renders the agency different from

all others—no other law-enforcement agency is funded

outside the normal process in this way. See Pet.App.37a.

Plain and simple, “the CFPB is truly exemplary: it is a

self-funded agency … with broad policymaking powers”

great enough “to fundamentally restructure the private

economy.”

Eric Pearson, A Brief Essay on the

Constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99, 110 (2013).

B. And it is not clear what benefits this structure

provides. (That’s not even to mention the harms; we’ll get

to those in a moment.)

Perhaps most often, proponents of agency funding

independence fret about regulatory capture by the

24

regulated industry. These worries are overstated, as the

“career-making benefits” that flow to successful

regulatory and enforcement attorneys often prompt them

to act. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No

High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.

BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), https://bit.ly/435ETQi; see also

Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L.

REV. 1265 (2015). But if these concerns were real, selffunding might only worsen them.

That’s because

agencies’ “greater degree of political insulation may make

them more attuned to the interests of the industries they

regulate and less responsive to the states and other

interests.”

Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and

Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 757 (2008).

In contrast, when Congress stays involved, it can “help

guard against agency capture by opening the

claustrophobic and technical process of agency

decisionmaking to a broader array of information and

constituencies.” Zywicki, supra, at 889; see also PHH

Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(Henderson, J., dissenting) (explaining how a “mutant

CFPB” is “responsive to the President” and thus subject

to powerful “lobbying” efforts, “but nowise accountable to

the Congress”).

If capture were really the concern, it’s also hard to

understand why the CFPB has only a single director.

“[H]aving only one person at the apex can ... mean that the

agency is more easily captured.” Rachel E. Barkow,

Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through

Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 38 (2010). The

Court should not overlook a constitutional funding defect

to save Congress from the consequences of its separate

decision how to structure the agency. And indeed, the fear

of capture may have already become a reality, as some

conclude that certain interest groups are effectively

25

calling the shots. See Daniel Press, The Myth of

Independence at the Consumer Financial Protection

Bureau, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INSTIT. (Feb. 5, 2018),

https://bit.ly/3JyEEXh.

Apart from capture, some States seem to think that

funding independence fosters more cooperation between

the States and the Bureau, but they never close the circle

on why that’s true. NY.Amici.11-22. Even in their favored

examples, those States celebrate how they had a few “calls

and meetings” with agency personnel and submitted

comments that the CFPB assured them it “considered.”

Id. at 15-16. Those minimal avenues of input hardly

replace the strong medicine that appropriations leverage

would provide for a policy gone wrong. Likewise, that the

CFPB has hopped on board with certain multistate

enforcement efforts means little; nobody explains why

agency financial independence was essential for that

involvement—or even why the CFPB needed to be

involved at all. Id. at 17-22. And in truth, these arguments

only prove that appropriations oversight is important. If

state input on CFPB operations is good, and if

appropriations oversight provides more opportunities for

that input, see supra Section I.B, then all States should be

pushing for more appropriations oversight.

Sometimes advocates for self-funding also insist that it

provides stability and policy coherence, but that rationale

doesn’t work here, either. Remember how the Bureau is

led by a single Director who the President may remove

and replace at any time. So unlike a multi-member

commission, the Bureau’s “priorities may fluctuate with

the party of the appointing President,” and Congress has

no means to pull it back. Kruly, supra, at 1742. At the

same time, the only ostensible check on the Bureau’s

budget—other than the soaring cap—is the Director’s

26

finding that the money is “reasonably necessary to carry

out the authorities of the Bureau.” 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1).

That provision provides the Bureau a financial incentive to

expand faster and farther, no matter whether those

efforts aid market improvement or stability. James V.

DeLong, New Wine for A New Bottle: Judicial Review in

the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 421 (1986) (“[A]n

agency is subject to strong internal incentives to attempt

to expand its budget.”). Aggressive, inconsistent, and

unaccountable are not words we usually associate with the

quiet prudence of a financial regulator.

And fundamentally, by using an “unprecedented

combination of structural characteristics” to build out the

agency, William Simpson, Above Reproach: How the

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Escapes

Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV. BANKING &

FIN. L. 343, 345 (2016), Congress has left the Bureau in a

constant state of upheaval and legal uncertainty. This

case is the second major structural challenge to the

Bureau to reach the Court in just three years. That

constant flux hardly bespeaks the sort of stability that

policymakers should seek when it comes to financial

regulation. See Jolina C. Cuaresma, Commissioning the

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 LOY.

CONSUMER L. REV. 426, 430 (2019) (describing how the

Bureau’s uniquely problematic mix of structural features

has led to “regulatory uncertainty” that “discourages

investment”); see also Jonathan Masur, Judicial

Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments,

60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1041 (2007) (describing how

“change[s] in the background regulatory rules” can upset

investment strategies).

C. Along with few benefits, the costs of the Bureau’s

fiscal autonomy are high. A few examples show how.

27

First, in exercising one of its broadest authorities, the

Bureau has shown a continuing preference for hiding its

actions from the public view. The statute in question

empowers the Bureau to go after persons for engaging in

“unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]” in the

consumer-finance space. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a). The agency

has repeatedly declined to acknowledge how it

understands this “UDAAP” provision to work.

Start with “abusive.” In one hearing, the Director

labelled the statutory language a “puzzle” and declared

that it was “[p]robably not useful to try to define a term

like that in the abstract.” How Will The CFPB Function

Under Richard Cordray, Hearing before the H. Oversight

Comm., Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., and Bailouts of

Pub. and Priv. Programs, 112th Cong. 69 (2012). It was

unclear at the time what that odd response meant, but it

became clear soon enough: the Bureau wanted to leave

wiggle room so it could use the provision as it pleased.

Dozens of enforcement actions followed as the Bureau

pursued a campaign of “regulation by enforcement.”

Michael R. Faz, Scouring Muddied Waters: Towards

Clarifying the CFPB’s “Abusive” Practices, 32 LOY.

CONSUMER L. REV. 45, 46 (2019).

Later, the Bureau turned its attention to the “unfair”

portion of the statute. That effort proved no better, as the

agency quietly abandoned any ordinary understanding of

the term in a change to its enforcement manual without

notice or comment. The effort spurred a lawsuit. See

Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. CFPB, No. 6:22-cv-00381JCB (E.D. Tex. filed Sept. 28, 2022).

In short, as even the Treasury Department has

recognized, the Bureau is fond of adopting new policies

retroactively through an “unusual degree” of

“enforcement actions and guidance documents, which the

28

CFPB has consistently issued without opportunity for

public comment.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A

FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC

OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 82 (2017),

https://bit.ly/3PyuuJP; see, e.g., Press Release, CFPB,

CFPB Invokes Dormant Authority to Examine Nonbank

Companies Posing Risks to Consumers (Apr. 25, 2022),

https://bit.ly/3Fzl5fQ (announcing, after a decade of

silence and no new comment opportunity, that the agency

planned to begin examining “nonbank financial

companies”); Letter from Rep. Patrick McHenry, H.R.

Comm. on Fin. Servs., Republican Leader, et al. to Rohit

Chopra, Dir., CFPB, at 2 (Sept. 20, 2022),

https://bit.ly/3PaEYwK

(listing

various

CFPB

“initiatives” that “circumvented” Congress and

undermined “transparency and accountability”); Letter

from Sen. Pat Toomey, et al. to Rohit Chopra, Dir., CFPB,

at 1-3 (Sept. 12, 2022) (same), https://bit.ly/46x7WPM.

Second, the Bureau has preferred to stack the deck in

its own favor. Just recently, for example, the Bureau

changed its adjudicatory procedures to allow the Director

to bypass an administrative-law judge and rule directly on

substantive legal issues. See Rules of Practice for

Adjudication Proceedings, 88 Fed. Reg. 18,382, 18,386

(Mar. 29, 2023). And that rule would compel those facing

enforcement actions to exhaust every question before the

agency, including questions like the one presented here

about the constitutionality of the Bureau’s very structure.

Id. at 18,388; but see Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct.

890, 897 (2023) (finding constitutional challenges to the

FTC’s and SEC’s structures need not be challenged

through administrative proceedings). So when entities

face ambiguous UDAAP enforcement actions, the

Director intends to be the one to decide whether his own

29

claims are viable. Once more, the Bureau has positioned

itself to skirt any oversight.

Third, free from worries about Congress, the Bureau

has also struck repeatedly at the States’ sovereign

interests. For instance, a few months ago the Bureau

proposed to establish a “repeat offender” registry for

certain non-bank financial institutions. See Registry of

Nonbank Covered Persons Subject to Certain Agency and

Court Orders, 88 Fed. Reg. 6,088 (Jan. 30, 2023). But in

forcing these entities to disclose settlements and the like,

the Bureau shows little regard for state regulators and

authorities who might’ve preferred to keep them

confidential; a state regulator might reasonably fear that

disclosure of a particular issue at a particular bank might

cause investor departures or depositor withdrawals that

in turn threaten the bank’s safety and soundness. Yet the

CFPB has left no room for state judgments like these.

Meanwhile, the CFPB has also aggressively issued at

least one civil investigative demand to a sovereign—a

tribal entity that Dodd-Frank defines as a “State.” See

CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, LLC, 846 F.3d 1049 (9th

Cir. 2017). With no approval from Congress and no

opportunity for States to object, the CFPB has construed

its investigatory powers to reach directly into state

operations. In effect, state regulators have become

regulated parties themselves.

Fourth, substantive policies aside, consider how the

agency has comported itself before Congress. Officials

from the agency were trading blows with Congress even

before the agency formally launched. See Edward Wyatt,

Decorum Breaks Down at House Hearing, N.Y. TIMES

(May 24, 2011), https://bit.ly/3CMRIo0. Later, in one bit

of testimony, the CFPB’s first director responded, “Why

does that matter to you?” when a congressperson asked

30

who had authorized hundreds of millions in renovation

costs for the Bureau’s headquarters. See H.R. Comm. on

Fin. Servs., Committee Pushes for Accountability and

Transparency at the CFPB, YOUTUBE, at 3:33:19 (Mar. 6,

2015), http://bit.ly/3Y6p9eJ. And another time, a different

CFPB director told the House Financial Services

Committee that he could “twiddle [his] thumbs while you

all ask questions” because the CFPB is “not accountable

to anybody but itself.” Jim Puzzanghera, CFPB Chief

Mick Mulvaney Says He Could Just ‘Twiddle My

Thumbs’ Before Congress To Highlight Agency’s Flaws,

L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018, 11:55 a.m.), http://bit.ly/

3PaQJ6o.

Things haven’t gone better outside the hearing room.

The Bureau’s actions have forced senators and

representatives to send the Bureau repeated letters

complaining about its inadequate responses to

congressional requests, budget-related and otherwise.

See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Randy Neugebauer, Chairman,

H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on Oversight and

Investigations, et al. to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, at 1

(May 2, 2012), https://bit.ly/3uHWEX9; Letter from Sen.

Rob Portman, et al. to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, at 1

(Oct. 30, 2013), https://bit.ly/3uFK0rT; Letter from Sen.

Mike Enzi, Chairman, S. Budget Comm. & Richard

Shelby, Chairman, S. Comm. On Banking, Hous. & Urban

Affairs, to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, at 1 (Mar. 9,

2015), https://bit.ly/3Fx3gwP. Even Senator Elizabeth

Warren lamented that her pet project had come to

“ignore[] congressional mandates” and function as a

“politicized rogue agency” when it fell under the control of

a political opponent. Elizabeth Warren, Republicans

Remain Silent As Mulvaney’s CFPB Ducks Oversight,

WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:48 p.m.), https://bit.ly/

3Bh6lQg.

31

Fifth, the CFPB has behaved badly in the courtroom,

too. Just recently, it “tried to bring a wide-ranging civil

lawsuit against 18 defendants without ever being

deposed.” CFPB v. Brown, No. 21-14468, 2023 WL

3939432, at *1 (11th Cir. June 12, 2023). When that

(unsurprisingly) didn’t go well, the Bureau “doubled down

by engaging in dramatic abuse of the discovery process.”

Id. Because the agency had “tried to game the system so

that nothing was accomplished,” the Bureau’s antics

forced the district court to dismiss the suit. Id. at *4-5.

And that case was hardly an aberration; over and over, the

Bureau has shown that it thinks it is above the rules that

apply to others. See, e.g., CFPB v. Access Funding, LLC,

No. CV ELH-16-3759, 2021 WL 2915118, at *22 (D. Md.

July 12, 2021) (striking a witness’s deposition testimony

after the CFPB tried to use it on summary judgment,

where “the Bureau created … time constraints” that

prevented the defendants from cross-examining the

witness); CFPB v. Borders & Borders, PLC, No. 3:13-CV1047-CRS, 2016 WL 9460472, at *7 (W.D. Ky. June 29,

2016) (sanctioning the CFPB for trying to change legal

theories “at essentially the 11th hour,” creating

“manifest” “unfairness” to the defendants); CFPB v.

Accrediting Council for Indep. Colleges & Sch., 183 F.

Supp. 3d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2016) (describing how the Bureau

had “plow[ed] head long into fields not clearly ceded to

them by Congress” by pursuing enforcement action and

then offered a “post-hoc justification” for its authority that

was “a bridge too far!”).

The Amici States don’t offer these examples to sully

the agency’s reputation. Rather, they show how the

Bureau acts unaccountable before Congress and

throughout all its regulatory and enforcement efforts.

And really, it’s no surprise that institutional

imperiousness is the result when Congress hands an

32

agency a blank check. The Appropriations Clause’s limits

matter.

III.

The Court Should Ignore Doomsaying About

The Consequences Of Providing Relief.

The Court can fix all this right now, but many are

forecasting catastrophic results to try to scare the Court

into staying its hand. See, e.g., Treasury.Emps.Br.2

(“[T]he Bureau’s important work will grind to a halt.”).

The Court shouldn’t listen.

Plenty of solutions to the Bureau’s funding problem

exist at the federal level. Most obviously, faced with a

court decision effectively compelling it to act, Congress

could pass a proper appropriations bill. This case is about

one specific regulation, and the measured pace of litigation

should give Congress time to act before the Court’s

decision affects much else. And a rebuke from this Court

would no doubt grease the sticky wheels of the legislative

process and move them a bit faster. Indeed, Congress

already has many potential funding bills from which to

choose. See, e.g., Taking Account of Bureaucrats’

Spending Act of 2023, H.R. 1382, 118th Cong. § 3 (2023)

(bill to bring the Bureau into the ordinary appropriations

process). And if any stopgap were needed, the many

federal regulators that existed long before the CFPB

came to be in 2011 could step up again.

The States are ready to move, too. That’d be nothing

new. Today, “[s]tate regulators charter and supervise

approximately 3,981 banks with more than $7.15 trillion in

combined assets, representing 79% of all U.S. banks.”

Keeping Up With the Codes—Using AI For Effective

RegTech, Hearing before H. Fin. Servs. Comm. A.I. Task

Force of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. 2 (2022)

(testimony of Melanie Hall, Comm’r, Mont. Div. of

33

Banking & Fin. Institutions), available at https://bit.ly/

44zOsbz. As Congress recognized when passing DoddFrank, “[o]versight of [nonbank] companies” has also

“largely been left to the States.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at

167 (2010). And across the board, “[c]onsumer protection”

has been “quintessentially a field which the States have

traditionally occupied.” Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,

550 U.S. 1, 35-36 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cleaned

up). Congress continued that tradition by giving state

Attorneys General the power to enforce Dodd-Frank and

by taking care to preserve other aspects of state authority.

12 U.S.C. § 5552(a), (d). Likewise, States have long taken

the lead in ensuring “sound financial institutions and

honest financial practices” in “banking and [all] related

financial activities.” Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447

U.S. 27, 38 (1980).

So if a little accountability from Congress somehow

pared back the CFPB’s remit, then the States could fill

any gap. In fact, “[w]here federal [financial] regulators

[have] refused to act [before], the states stepped into the

breach.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16; see also id. at 174

(“States are much closer to abuses and are able to move

more quickly when necessary to address them.”). They

can do the same while Congress fixes the Bureau’s

constitutional flaw.

The financial system will not fold if the Court holds

Congress to the Appropriations Clause’s line. The Court

should do exactly that.

CONCLUSION

The Court should affirm the decision below.

34

Respectfully submitted.

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

LINDSAY S. SEE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Principal Deputy Solicitor

General

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

35

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

KRIS KOBACH

Attorney General

State of Kansas

TREG TAYLOR

Attorney General

State of Alaska

DANIEL CAMERON

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Kentucky

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General

State of Florida

CHRIS CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

RAÚL LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

TODD ROKITA

Attorney General

State of Indiana

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

ANDREW BAILEY

Attorney General

State of Missouri

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

State of Montana

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

JOHN M. FORMELLA

Attorney General

State of New Hampshire

36

DREW WRIGLEY

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

JASON MIYARES

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Virginia

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

State of Ohio

BRIDGET HILL

Attorney General

State of Wyoming

GENTNER DRUMMOND

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

MARTY JACKLEY

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General and

Reporter

State of Tennessee

JOHN SCOTT

Provisional Attorney

General

State of Texas

SEAN D. REYES

Attorney General

State of Utah

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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