Amicus Curiae Brief — Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al., Petitioners v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 7, 2023
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No. 22-448
In the Supreme Court of the United States
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
V.
COMMUNITY FINANCIAL SERVICES ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, LIMITED, ET AL.,
Respondents.
——————
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATE OF
WEST VIRGINIA AND 26 OTHER STATES
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
LINDSAY S. SEE
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Principal Deputy Solicitor
General
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia
[additional counsel listed after signature page]
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the
statute that describes how the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau is funded, 12 U.S.C. § 5497, violates the
Appropriations Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, and in
vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the
CFPB was receiving such funding.
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Question Presented .............................................................. I
Introduction and Interests of Amici Curiae ..................... 1
Summary of Argument ........................................................ 4
Argument .............................................................................. 5
I.
The Appropriations Clause Matters,
Especially To The States ............................................ 5
II.
Lacking An Appropriation, The CFPB Has
Avoided Real Accountability .................................... 18
III. The Court Should Ignore Doomsaying About
The Consequences Of Providing Relief .................. 32
Conclusion ........................................................................... 33
III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO,
Loc. 1647 v. FLRA,
388 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2004) ............................................ 6
Atherton v. FDIC,
519 U.S. 213 (1997) ....................................................... 22
Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC,
143 S. Ct. 890 (2023) ..................................................... 28
Biden v. Nebraska,
No. 22-506, slip op. (U.S. June 30, 2023),
2023 WL 4277210 .......................................................... 22
Bond v. United States,
564 U.S. 211 (2011) ....................................................... 13
CFPB v. Access Funding, LLC,
No. CV ELH-16-3759,
2021 WL 2915118 (D. Md. July 12, 2021) ................... 31
CFPB v. Accrediting Council for Indep.
Colleges & Sch.,
183 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2016) ................................ 31
CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc.,
33 F.4th 218 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................... 10, 16
CFPB v. Borders & Borders, PLC,
No. 3:13-CV-1047-CRS, 2016 WL
9460472 (W.D. Ky. June 29, 2016)............................... 31
CFPB v. Brown,
No. 21-14468, 2023 WL 3939432
(11th Cir. June 12, 2023) .............................................. 31
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, LLC,
846 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) ....................................... 29
City of Arlington v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290 (2013) ......................................................... 3
Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998) ....................................................... 13
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477 (2010) ......................................................... 9
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) ....................................................... 13
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000) ....................................................... 15
INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) ......................................................... 3
Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1 (1972) ............................................................. 7
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27 (1980) ......................................................... 33
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) ....................................................... 13
OPM v. Richmond,
496 U.S. 414 (1990) ..................................................... 5, 6
Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp.,
967 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2020) .......................................... 22
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
PHH Corp. v. CFPB,
881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ........................................ 24
Ring v. Maxwell,
58 U.S. 147 (1854) ........................................................... 6
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB,
140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) ............................................. 21, 22
U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. FLRA,
665 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012) .................................. 6, 9
United States v. McIntosh,
833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016) ......................................... 9
United States v. Texas,
No. 22-58, slip op. (U.S. June 23, 2023),
2023 WL 4139000 .......................................................... 21
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
550 U.S. 1 (2007) ........................................................... 33
Wayman v. Southard,
10 Wheat. 1 (1825) .......................................................... 9
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ................................................... 1
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.................................................. 8
Statutes
12 U.S.C. § 5492 .................................................................. 20
VI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
12 U.S.C. § 5497 ........................................................ 2, 19, 26
12 U.S.C. § 5531 .................................................................. 27
12 U.S.C. § 5552 .................................................................. 33
31 U.S.C. § 1301 .................................................................... 2
Regulations
88 Fed. Reg. 6,088 (Jan. 30, 2023) ..................................... 29
88 Fed. Reg. 18,382 (Mar. 29, 2023).................................. 28
Other Authorities
156 Cong. Rec. S4140 (2010) .............................................. 20
Abner J. Mikva,
Congress: The Purse,
the Purpose, and the Power,
21 GA. L. REV. 1 (1986) ................................................... 6
Adam C. Smith & Todd Zywicki,
Behavior, Paternalism, and Policy:
Evaluating Consumer Financial
Protection,
9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201 (2015) ........................... 21
Amanda Frost,
Judicial Review of FDA Preemption
Determinations,
54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367 (1999) ................................ 15
VII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Aubry D. Smith,
Executive-Branch Rulemaking and
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade
Organization: A Proposal to Increase
Public Participation,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1996) ........................................ 7
Bradford R. Clark,
Separation of Powers As A Safeguard
of Federalism,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001)......................................... 13
C. Boyden Gray,
Extra Icing on an Unconstitutional
Cake Already Frosted? A
Constitutional Recipe for the CFPB,
24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1213 (2017) ................. 8, 21, 22
Calvin R. Massey,
The Tao of Federalism,
20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 887 (1997) ...................... 13
CFPB, CFPB FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2022 (2022) ............................................................ 1
CFPB, CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN:
FY2013-FY2017 (2013) .................................................. 1
Chad Squitieri,
The Appropriate Appropriations
Inquiry,
74 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2023) ................................................. 8
VIII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Charles Davant IV,
Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?:
Federal Agencies and the Creation of
Individual Rights,
2003 WIS. L. REV. 613 (2003) ....................................... 15
Charles Kruly,
Self-Funding and Agency
Independence,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1733 (2013) ...................... 20, 25
Christopher C. DeMuth & Michael S.
Greve,
Agency Finance in the Age of
Executive Government,
24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555 (2017) ............................. 23
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Semiannual Report, C-SPAN
(Oct. 28, 2021) .................................................................. 1
D. Bruce La Pierre,
Political Accountability in the
National Political Process—the
Alternative to Judicial Review of
Federalism Issues,
80 NW. U. L. REV. 577 (1985) ....................................... 14
Daniel Martin,
The Duty to Appropriate: Why
Congress Has A Constitutional
Obligation to Fund Criminal Law
Enforcement,
106 CAL. L. REV. 511 (2018) ........................................... 8
IX
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Daniel Press,
The Myth of Independence at the
Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INSTIT.
(Feb. 5, 2018) ................................................................. 25
David A. Herrman,
To Delegate or Not to Delegate—That
Is the Preemption: The Lack of
Political Accountability in
Administrative Preemption Defies
Federalism Constraints on
Government Power,
28 PAC. L.J. 1157 (1997) ............................................... 15
David B. Spence & Frank Cross,
A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000) ................................................... 11
Debra L. Lowman,
A Call for Judicial Restraint: Federal
Taxpayer Grievances Challenging
Executive Action,
30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 (2007) .............................. 10
Edward Wyatt,
Decorum Breaks Down at House
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2011) ............................................................... 29
X
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Elizabeth Warren,
Republicans Remain Silent As
Mulvaney’s CFPB Ducks Oversight,
WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 28, 2018, 5:48 p.m.) ............................................. 30
Eloise Pasachoff,
The President’s Budget As A Source of
Agency Policy Control,
125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016) ............................................ 10
Eric Pearson,
A Brief Essay on the Constitutionality
of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,
47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99 (2013) ................................ 23
Federalism: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Governmental Affs.,
106th Cong. 15 (1999) ............................................. 14, 15
Gillian E. Metzger,
Agencies, Polarization, and the States,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2015) ................................. 12
How Will The CFPB Function Under
Richard Cordray, Hearing before the
H. Oversight Comm., Subcomm. on
TARP, Fin. Servs., and Bailouts of
Pub. and Priv. Programs,
112th Cong. 69 (2012) ................................................... 27
XI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Committee
Pushes for Accountability and
Transparency at the CFPB, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 6, 2015) ................................................................ 30
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman,
The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003) ......................................... 12
Jack M. Beermann,
Congressional Administration,
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006) ........................... 12, 15
James V. DeLong,
New Wine for A New Bottle: Judicial
Review in the Regulatory State,
72 VA. L. REV. 399 (1986) ............................................. 26
JAMES V. SATURNO, ET AL.,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42388, THE
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS
PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION (2016) .......................... 16
James B. Stewart,
As A Watchdog Starves, Wall Street Is
Tossed a Bone,
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2011) .......................................... 11
Jed S. Rakoff,
The Financial Crisis: Why Have No
High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014) ................................... 24
XII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz,
Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure,
89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2016) ...................................... 18
Jeremy Rabkin,
Micromanaging the Administrative
Agencies,
100 PUB. INT. 116 (1990) .............................................. 11
Jim Puzzanghera,
CFPB Chief Mick Mulvaney Says He
Could Just ‘Twiddle My Thumbs’
Before Congress To Highlight Agency’s
Flaws, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 11, 2018, 11:55 a.m.) ............................................ 30
Jolina C. Cuaresma,
Commissioning the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau,
31 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 426 (2019) ...................... 26
Jonathan H. Adler,
The Ducks Stop Here? The
Environmental Challenge to
Federalism,
9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205 (2001) ............................... 14
Jonathan Masur,
Judicial Deference and the Credibility
of Agency Commitments,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (2007) ...................................... 26
XIII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1833) ..................................... 7
Julia Patterson Forrester,
Still Mortgaging the American Dream:
Predatory Lending, Preemption, and
Federally Supported Lenders,
74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303 (2006) .................................... 22
Kate Stith,
Congress’ Power of the Purse,
97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) ........................................... 8, 9
Keeping Up With the Codes—Using AI
For Effective RegTech, Hearing before
H. Fin. Servs. Comm. A.I. Task Force
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
117th Cong. 2 (2022) ..................................................... 32
Laura E. Dolbow,
Agency Adherence to Legislative
History,
70 ADMIN. L. REV. 569 (2018) ...................................... 16
Laurence H. Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in
Controversies About Federalism,
89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976) ........................................ 14
XIV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Lauren Sanders,
THE ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER THE
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
2010 (2010) ..................................................................... 22
Letter from Rep. Patrick McHenry,
H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Republican
Leader, et al. to Rohit Chopra, Dir.,
CFPB (Sept. 20, 2022) .................................................. 28
Letter from Rep. Randy Neugebauer,
Chairman, H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, et al. to Richard
Cordray, Dir., CFPB (May 2, 2012) ........................... 30
Letter from Rohit Chopra, Dir., CFPB, to
Jerome Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. (Apr. 6, 2023) .......................... 19
Letter from Sen. Mike Enzi, Chairman, S.
Budget Comm. & Richard Shelby,
Chairman, S. Comm. On Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, to Richard
Cordray, Dir., CFPB (Mar. 9, 2015) ........................... 30
Letter from Sen. Rob Portman, et al. to
Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB (Oct. 30,
2013) ............................................................................... 30
XV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Marie Plicka,
Mr. Peanut Goes to Court:
Accommodating an Individual’s
Peanut Allergy in Schools and Day
Care Centers Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act,
14 J.L. & HEALTH 87 (2000) ........................................ 11
Markham S. Chenoweth & Michael P.
DeGrandis,
How the Court’s Decision in Seila Law
Makes CFPB’s Unlawful Structure
Even Worse,
8/27/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 55
(2020) ................................................................................ 9
Martin Baily,
Dodd Bill Offers Progress At Last,
POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2010 5:17 a.m.) ............................. 18
MARTIN H. REDISH,
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE (1995) ........................................................ 14
Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B.
Rodriguez,
Canonical Construction and Statutory
Revisionism: The Strange Case of the
Appropriations Canon,
14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669
(2005) ........................................................................ 16, 17
XVI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Matthew B. Lawrence,
Congress’s Domain: Appropriations,
Time, and Chevron,
70 DUKE L.J. 1057 (2021) ....................................... 10, 12
Michael Doran,
Legislative Entrenchment and Federal
Fiscal Policy,
81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (2018) ....................... 12
Michael Patrick Wilt,
Evaluating “Consumer Relief”
Payments in Recent Bank Settlement
Agreements,
17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 253 (2017)...................................... 8
Michael R. Faz,
Scouring Muddied Waters: Towards
Clarifying the CFPB’s “Abusive”
Practices,
32 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 45 (2019) ........................ 27
Michele E. Gilman,
Presidents, Preemption, and the States,
26 CONST. COMMENT. 339 (2010) ................................ 16
Note, Independence, Congressional
Weakness, and the Importance of
Appointment: The Impact of
Combining Budgetary Autonomy with
Removal Protection,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1822 (2012) .................................... 10
XVII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh,
The Appropriations Power and
Sovereign Immunity,
107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009) ...................................... 5
Paul Larkin, Jr. & Zack Smith,
“Brother, Can You Spare A Million
Dollars?”: Resurrecting the Justice
Department’s “Slush Fund,”
19 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2021) ........................... 6
Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Invokes
Dormant Authority to Examine
Nonbank Companies Posing Risks to
Consumers (Apr. 25, 2022) .......................................... 28
Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) ............................................. 24
Robert C. Byrd,
The Control of the Purse and the Line
Item Veto Act,
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297 (1998) .................................. 6
Roberta Romano,
Does Agency Structure Affect Agency
Decisionmaking? Implications of the
CFPB’s Design for Administrative
Governance,
36 YALE J. ON REG. 273 (2019) .................................... 20
XVIII
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN,
THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS (1972) .................................................... 10
S. REP. NO. 111-176 (2010)........................................... 22, 33
Steven G. Calabresi,
A Critical Introduction to the
Originalism Debate,
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 875 (2008) ........................ 7
Taking Account of Bureaucrats’ Spending
Act of 2023, H.R. 1382, 118th Cong.
(2023) .............................................................................. 32
Tara Leigh Grove,
Government Standing and the Fallacy
of Institutional Injury,
167 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (2019) ...................................... 21
THE FEDERALIST, NO. 58 .................................................... 6
Thomas Arning,
The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau: A Novel Agency Design with
Familiar Issues,
24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 153
(2018) .............................................................................. 20
Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008) ..................................... 24
XIX
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)
Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013) ........................ 18, 24
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A
FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS
AND CREDIT UNIONS (2017) ........................................ 28
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GOVERNMENT-WIDE INVENTORY OF
ACCOUNTS WITH SPENDING AUTHORITY
AND PERMANENT APPROPRIATIONS,
FISCAL YEARS 1995 TO 2015 (2018) ............................... 1
Wentong Zheng,
The Revolving Door,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015) ......................... 24
William Simpson,
Above Reproach: How the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau Escapes
Constitutional Checks & Balances,
36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 343 (2016) ...................... 26
INTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS
OF AMICI CURIAE
In many ways, the question here—whether the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has received a
proper appropriation—is an easy one. Article 1, Section
9, Clause 7 of the Constitution says that “[n]o Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.” Before this Court, the
CFPB concedes that it needs to identify an appropriation
but insists that its “funding statute indisputably
establishes” one. Pet.18. It thinks Congress did so by
“authorizing [the] agenc[y] to spend money indefinitely.”
CFPB.Br.27.
Until now, the CFPB has said just the opposite: It does
not receive appropriations. An early strategic plan hyped
the Bureau’s “full independence” in operating “outside of
the congressional appropriations process.” CFPB, CFPB
STRATEGIC
PLAN:
FY2013-FY2017
36
(2013),
https://bit.ly/3hiawEm. Its financial reports have called
the agency “an independent, non-appropriated bureau.”
CFPB, CFPB FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2022, at
38 (2022), https://bit.ly/3HwmCVq. And the current
director told Congress that the CFPB’s “base level of
funding” is “guaranteed.”
Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Semiannual Report, C-SPAN (Oct.
28, 2021), https://bit.ly/3iGFC93. The agency would be
“subject to the normal appropriations process,” he
declared, only if it needed more than the hundreds of
millions it already gets on demand. Id.; see also, e.g., U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GOVERNMENT-WIDE
INVENTORY OF ACCOUNTS WITH SPENDING AUTHORITY
AND PERMANENT APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1995
TO 2015 (2018), https://bit.ly/3phKYLT (omitting CFPB
from list of agencies with permanent appropriations).
2
More importantly, Congress commanded that the
Bureau’s ordinary funding flows “shall not be construed to
be … appropriated monies.” 12 U.S.C. § 5497(c)(2).
Congress distinguished the Bureau’s automatic funding—
which this year can tally up to about $734 million—from
the “appropriated funds” that the CFPB could separately
seek. Id. § 5497(e). The protections that ordinarily cover
congressional spending apply to only the supplemental
funds, which the Bureau has never needed. Id. Leaving
no doubt, Congress stressed that the Bureau’s regular
funding scheme is not “subject to review” by the
congressional appropriations committees or subject to
approval from the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget. Id. § 5497(a)(2)(C), (4)(E).
So both the Bureau and Congress have recognized that
the Bureau does not receive appropriations. And were
that not clear enough, another key principle drives the
point home: “A law may be construed to make an
appropriation out of the Treasury … only if the law
specifically states that an appropriation is made.” 31
U.S.C. § 1301(d). The CFPB’s funding statute contains no
statement of that kind. And lacking anything that can
rightfully be called an appropriation, the Bureau’s funding
structure is unconstitutional.
Faced with unyielding law and difficult facts like these,
the Bureau and its allies look elsewhere for help. They
maintain that other agencies have similar funding
structures, for instance. But the list of self-funded
agencies is short, and a potential constitutional violation
elsewhere doesn’t immunize one here, anyway.
Supporters also catalog the good things that they feel the
agency has done. See, e.g., AARP.Amici.Br.3 (“[T]he
CFPB has improved the financial services marketplace.”).
Even if the CFPB has done some good—and some would
3
even dispute that premise—it wouldn’t matter. “[P]olicy
arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’
are subject to the demands of the Constitution which
defines powers and … sets out just how those powers are
to be exercised.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983).
And maybe worst of all, the Bureau and its friends
downplay the appropriations power’s importance while
minimizing the harm that comes from diluting it.
The Amici States focus on this last flawed argument—
that is, the idea that the benefits of enforcing the
Appropriations Clause are too small and the potential
costs too great to justify upholding the Fifth Circuit’s
decision. The Constitution isn’t subject to a cost-benefit
analysis. Yet even taking the argument on its own terms,
the Appropriations Clause is one of the Constitution’s
most powerful tools to curb the administrative state’s
abuses and preserve federalism’s values. Experience with
the CFPB has shown that sidelining Congress can
greenlight an agency to wreak havoc. Even more so when,
as here, the agency wields broad regulatory and
enforcement powers over the entire U.S. financial system,
acts under the control of a single powerful figure, and
lacks other protections from meaningful oversight. In
other words, the Post Office this is not.
Contra
CFPB.Br.29.
“[W]ith hundreds of federal agencies poking into every
nook and cranny of daily life,” it’s no longer enough to
point to presidential oversight and hope for the best—if it
ever were. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Courts must ensure
that Congress keeps a firm grasp on the purse strings.
Nor will fulfilling that responsibility here cause any
catastrophe. Congress can appropriate funds properly if
it chooses. And in the meantime, States and federal
4
regulators can stand guard in the Bureau’s stead just as
they did for decades before.
In the end, we return to where we began: to an easy
answer that the agency and Congress have already
provided. Congress has not appropriated the CFPB the
hundreds of millions of dollars it spends each year. But
the Constitution says the Bureau needs an appropriation
if it wants to spend. So the Court should affirm the
decision below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The Appropriations Clause offers Congress one of
its best tools to supervise and control federal agencies.
The appropriations power is essential to the separation of
powers, and the separation of powers in turn protects the
States’ interests. Beyond that, Congress offers a forum in
which States can participate more directly in the oversight
and operation of administrative processes. In contrast,
when an agency like the CFPB operates outside the
ordinary appropriations process, it often leaves States out
in the cold.
II. Licensing the Bureau to operate free from the
appropriations process’s ordinary constraints has had real
consequences for our financial system. The CFPB has
ignored Congress and the States—and proponents
overstate the perceived benefits from its complete
financial autonomy. At the same time, the CFPB’s actions
show that evading effective oversight does damage.
Honoring the Appropriations Clause’s limits will bring
needed accountability and transparency to this critical
area.
III. The Bureau and its amici cannot justify skirting
around the problems in the CFPB’s funding scheme with
5
their imagined harms. Although they worry the financial
system is destined for failure if the Court affirms, none
explains why the Bureau’s unusual self-governance is
essential to the agency’s operation. And if the CFPB is as
critical to the financial system as its supporters suggest,
then Congress can restore its funding quickly. In the
meantime, States and other federal financial regulators
have experience protecting consumers in financial
markets. They can stand in the breach.
ARGUMENT
I.
The Appropriations Clause Matters, Especially
To The States.
Often, those supporting a sovereign CFPB downplay
the Appropriations Clause’s importance. One group of
States, for instance, dismisses the harm from this type of
constitutional violation as “indeterminate” or “meager.”
NY.Amici.Br.9-10. A group of legislators, meanwhile,
takes a no-harm-no-foul approach, arguing that Congress
does a good enough job overseeing the CFPB through
other means. See Legislators.Br.21-28.
But the Appropriations Clause is no small thing.
“Seemingly innocuous and self-evident, it is instead “one
of the most profound political statements in the
Constitution.” Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The
Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1267 (2009). So violations strike a
blow to the centerpiece of our constitutional scheme—and
impose serious harm on the States.
A. The Appropriations Clause comprises a
“straightforward and explicit command” that “no money
can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been
appropriated by an act of Congress.” OPM v. Richmond,
6
496 U.S. 414, 424 (1990). Its restraint is “absolute.” U.S.
Dep’t of Navy v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (Kavanaugh, J.). It covers “any sum of money
collected for the government.” Ring v. Maxwell, 58 U.S.
147, 148 (1854).
The Appropriations Clause is an important way the
Constitution ensures that Congress reaches the “difficult
judgments.” Richmond, 496 U.S. at 428. Early thinkers
like Justice Joseph Story concluded that the “common
good” motivates Congress, rather than the “individual
favor” that other “Government agents” might use to
decide a spending issue. Id. And as “our most
representative of institutions,” Paul Larkin, Jr. & Zack
Smith, “Brother, Can You Spare A Million Dollars?”:
Resurrecting the Justice Department’s “Slush Fund,” 19
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 457 (2021), Congress is
“uniquely qualified to make spending decisions,” Robert
C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto
Act, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 315-16 (1998).
Congressionally led spending should thus produce “the
most desirable, balanced, and responsive” results. Abner
J. Mikva, Congress: The Purse, the Purpose, and the
Power, 21 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986). And the Founders
recognized all this from the beginning. James Madison,
for example, explained that “[t]his power over the purse
may [be] the most complete and effectual weapon with
which any constitution can arm the immediate
representatives of the people.” THE FEDERALIST, NO. 58.
Getting to specifics, the Appropriations Clause “hands
the Legislative Branch a powerful tool to curb behavior by
the Executive.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO,
Loc. 1647 v. FLRA, 388 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2004). If
Congress is not in control of the purse, then “the executive
would possess an unbounded power.” Richmond, 496 U.S.
7
at 427 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1348 (3d ed.
1858)). But by exercising its appropriations power,
Congress maintains “a controlling influence” over that
power.
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 530, at 14 (1833);
see also, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)
(describing Congress’s power of the purse as particularly
suited to monitor the “wisdom and soundness of Executive
action”). The Clause ensures that each branch plays an
important and mutually limiting role.
And in practice, Congress has exercised its
appropriations power to police the executive in all manner
of ways. For instance, it used appropriations bills to cut
funding for the Vietnam War and effectively squeeze the
military into ending the fight. Mikva, supra, at 4. In
another foreign-policy-related act, Congress used an
appropriations rider to smother a secret clean-air
agreement that the executive had signed with Venezuela.
Aubry D. Smith, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and
Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: A
Proposal to Increase Public Participation, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1267, 1268 (1996). These examples show that even
where executive power is at its apex beyond the country’s
waterline, the Appropriations Clause gives Congress
some real bite.
The Appropriations Clause is also more than a tool that
Congress can take up at will; it imposes obligations
directly on Congress, too. Recall that the Clause appears
in Article I—governing Congress—and Section 9—
describing limits on Congress’s powers. See Steven G.
Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism
Debate, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 875, 896 (2008)
(reading the Appropriations Clause as a limit on the
8
spending power found in the preceding section’s
Necessary and Proper Clause); see also Chad Squitieri,
The Appropriate Appropriations Inquiry, 74 FLA. L.
REV. FORUM 1, 7 (2023) (suggesting that the CFPB’s
funding statute “is not a ‘necessary and proper’ exercise
of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce”).
“This placement … suggests that the Appropriations
Clause is properly viewed as a limitation on Congress to
not spend in broad, undifferentiated terms or delegate
spending authority to the President.” Daniel Martin, The
Duty to Appropriate: Why Congress Has A
Constitutional Obligation to Fund Criminal Law
Enforcement, 106 CAL. L. REV. 511, 518 (2018). And
unlike some of the other limits found in Article I, Section
9, the Appropriations Clause does not contain an escape
hatch. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (providing that the
Emoluments Clause does not apply when Congress has
given its “consent”). Congress therefore offends the
Clause if it fails to provide sufficient limits on the
Executive’s spending authority, “particularly in areas”—
as here—“where the executive branch has significant
discretion in defining the objects of expenditure.” Kate
Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343,
1386 (1988).
The Clause thus “force[s] Congress to take ownership
of the government’s spending choices, in order to promote
accountability and fiscal restraint.” C. Boyden Gray,
Extra Icing on an Unconstitutional Cake Already
Frosted? A Constitutional Recipe for the CFPB, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1213, 1226 (2017). Understood this way,
the Clause ensures that members of Congress make
spending decisions in full view of their constituents, which
lets the voters appropriately reward or punish the
decisionmakers. See Michael Patrick Wilt, Evaluating
“Consumer Relief” Payments in Recent Bank Settlement
9
Agreements, 17 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 253, 291 (2017)
(explaining how the separation of powers “provides voters
with a greater ability to hold political leaders accountable
and to elicit information from them”).
So if Congress tries to “divest[]” itself of “its core
Article I appropriations power,” it crosses a “forbidden
line.” Markham S. Chenoweth & Michael P. DeGrandis,
Out of the Separation-of-Powers Frying Pan and into the
Nondelegation Fire: How the Court’s Decision in Seila
Law Makes CFPB’s Unlawful Structure Even Worse,
8/27/2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 55 (2020). Congress
may not “delegate ... powers,” like the appropriations
power, that “are strictly and exclusively legislative.”
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42-43 (1825). So
whenever the executive escapes the ordinary
appropriations processes, even with congressional
acquiescence or assistance, it “vitiate[s] the foundational
constitutional decision to empower Congress to determine
what actions shall be undertaken in the name of the
United States.” Stith, supra, at 1356; cf. Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497
(2010) (“[T]he separation of powers does not depend on …
whether the encroached-upon branch approves the
encroachment.” (cleaned up)).
In short, by operating on both Congress and the
executive, “[t]he Appropriations Clause plays a critical
role in the Constitution’s separation of powers among the
three branches of government and the checks and
balances between them.” United States v. McIntosh, 833
F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Navy, 665 F.3d at
1347 (“The Appropriations Clause is thus a bulwark of the
Constitution’s separation of powers among the three
branches of the National Government.”).
10
B. The Appropriations Clause has continued to play
its vital role even with the rise of the modern
administrative state. “The budget … is a key tool for
controlling agencies.” Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s
Budget As A Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE
L.J. 2182, 2186 (2016); see also ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 674-75 (1972)
(explaining that congressional oversight of an
independent agency’s finances is “[t]he most constant and
effective control”). It’s not hard to understand why:
“agencies dependent upon annual appropriations obey
both houses of Congress because each must consent to
enact such appropriations.” Matthew B. Lawrence,
Congress’s Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron,
70 DUKE L.J. 1057, 1059 (2021); see also CFPB v. All Am.
Check Cashing, Inc., 33 F.4th 218, 241 (5th Cir. 2022)
(Jones, J., concurring) (“[F]unding is the very lifeblood
that empowers [an agency] to act.”).
The Appropriations Clause gives Congress more
options than just turning off the financial faucet. Besides
“altering total funding,” Congress can also “target[]
specific programs through earmarks and riders” or “us[e]
signals and threats” to affect agency choices both before
and after the fact. Note, Independence, Congressional
Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The
Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with
Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1825 (2012);
accord Debra L. Lowman, A Call for Judicial Restraint:
Federal Taxpayer Grievances Challenging Executive
Action, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 698-99 (2007)
(describing specific actions that Congress can take against
an agency under the Appropriations Clause). Sometimes,
Congress needn’t do anything at all; the unstated
understanding that “the agency would have to please
Congress with its use of the appropriated money” to get
11
more can drive it in the right direction. David B. Spence
& Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 118 (2000).
Here again, real-world examples are plenty. Congress
once used funding cuts to curtail the Consumer Product
Safety Commission’s powers. Independence, supra, at
1825-26. Another time, Congress cut the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s budget by hundreds of millions
of dollars—after expanding its responsibilities in the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act—because it was frustrated by the agency’s
“troubled past” and failure to go after wrongdoers
aggressively enough. James B. Stewart, As A Watchdog
Starves, Wall Street Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES (July
15, 2011), https://bit.ly/3r6FgNa.
Of course, not
everything that draws Congress’s appropriations
attention is of such grand scale. Congress also barred the
Department of Transportation from spending money to
implement peanut-free zones on airplanes in a 1999
appropriations rider. Marie Plicka, Mr. Peanut Goes to
Court: Accommodating an Individual’s Peanut Allergy
in Schools and Day Care Centers Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 87, 88 (2000).
And ten years before, Congress used another rider to
prevent the Department of the Interior from keeping a
record of communications with congressmembers or their
staff.
Jeremy Rabkin, Micromanaging the
Administrative Agencies, 100 PUB. INT. 116, 127 (1990).
So whether it comes to hundreds of millions of dollars
for securities enforcement or just peanuts for keeping the
skies goober-free, the point is the same: “[I]n a
disagreement between Congress and the President over
the priorities or the value of a particular program,
Congress will win if it uses its power over the allocation of
12
funds.”
Jack
M.
Beermann,
Congressional
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84-85 (2006).
Some might mistakenly think that Congress could just
as easily win these fights by targeting the agencies’
authorizing statutes themselves. But that view ignores
the realities of modern legislation. “The complex,
interlocking, and overlapping structures of legislative
organization … make it difficult to change existing policy.”
Michael Doran, Legislative Entrenchment and Federal
Fiscal Policy, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 45 (2018).
More so in a highly polarized and divided Congress or
when the President is of a different party than the
congressional majority.
Unlike the difficulties of amending authorizing
statutes, appropriations legislation carries a “must-pass
status, dramatically raising the stakes of a presidential
veto.” Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the
States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1749 (2015); see also, e.g.,
Lawrence, supra, at 1072-73 (explaining soft legislative
entrenchment of agency statutes and how appropriations
bills can overcome that hurdle). If the President or a
legislative minority blocks appropriations, then the
government shuts down—a painful pill to swallow for the
sake of standing up for an agency’s policy choice. And
procedural mechanisms like reconciliation can help
Congress effect change through appropriations without
having to fight through obstacles that persist even in this
context, like the filibuster.
What’s more, the
appropriations-committee process itself has value.
Because appropriations involves both oversight
committees and appropriations committees, agencies may
have “less flexibility to ally themselves with executive
branch officials or interest groups.” J.R. DeShazo & Jody
13
Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control
Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1509-10 (2003).
C. As an aspect of the separation of powers, the
Appropriations Clause also advances federalism. “The
allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the
integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States.”
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). Balancing
powers among the branches helps “ensure that States
function as political entities in their own right.” Id.; see
also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers As A
Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324
(2001) (“Permitting the federal government to avoid these
constraints would allow it to exercise more power than the
Constitution contemplates, at the expense of state
authority.”). The Framers chose the “structure of the
Federal Government” as the “principal means” “to ensure
the role of the States.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985). And at the same
time, federalism and separation of powers are the two
“principal mechanism[s]” by which to control
“improvident spending.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). So while
“federalism and separation of powers” may be “less
romantic” aspects of our Constitution, “the Framers
considered [these] structural protections of freedom the
most important ones.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 707 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Romance aside, assigning the spending power directly
to Congress—including authority over agencies’
budgets—makes the federal government far more
accountable to the States.
Congress can be better “relied upon to respect the
States.” Calvin R. Massey, The Tao of Federalism, 20
14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 887, 891 (1997). At least in part
because they come to Washington from specific
communities, “[m]embers of Congress are more
responsive to the concerns of local regional
con[stituencies] than centralized regulatory agencies.”
Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The
Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 205, 221 (2001); see also MARTIN H. REDISH,
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 138 (1995)
(concluding that the legislative branch is based on
“localized accountability”). But Congress doesn’t respect
States just because its members travel from everywhere.
Rather, “political checks and Congress’ political
accountability”—like State-centered involvement in
congressional elections, State-focused lobbying efforts,
state political party pressure, and more—are the political
safeguards of federalism. D. Bruce La Pierre, Political
Accountability in the National Political Process—the
Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80
NW. U. L. REV. 577, 633 (1985).
And over time, Congress has also come to show its
“peculiar institutional competence … in adjusting federal
power relationships,” including relationships between the
States and the federal government. Laurence H. Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation,
and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in
Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682,
696 (1976). As Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson
once told Congress: “I like dealing with you and I can
usually convince you to go part way with the position of
the States, but once it leaves your hands and goes over to
a department, to some bureaucrat there that is going to
promulgate the rules, … we are left out.” Federalism:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affs.,
106th Cong. 15 (1999). Congress’s spending power
15
prevents situations in which the States have “no recourse
whatsoever.” Id.
Indeed, the federal government becomes far less
accountable to States as agencies seize independent
spending power. “[U]nlike Congress, administrative
agencies are clearly not designed to represent the
interests of States.” Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rather, the
“‘political safeguards’ that give [S]tates a voice in
Congress’s lawmaking” do not extend to a “voice in the
executive branch’s activities.”
Charles Davant IV,
Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and
the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613,
640 (2003). And “independent agencies” in particular are
“virtually insulated from political forces.” David A.
Herrman, To Delegate or Not to Delegate—That Is the
Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability in
Administrative
Preemption
Defies
Federalism
Constraints on Government Power, 28 PAC. L.J. 1157,
1181-82 (1997).
Tracing accountability back to States through
Congress benefits everyone. For example, agencies may
be “too quick” to “displace state law” precisely “because,
unlike Congress, agencies are not accountable directly to
the States.” Amanda Frost, Judicial Review of FDA
Preemption Determinations, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367,
368 (1999). The Appropriations Clause supplies a fiscal
prophylactic—if agencies overreach, States can speak up,
and Congress can hit their pocketbook. Or States might
be more aggressive, convincing Congress to attach
appropriations riders that “single out a specific regulatory
activity and prohibit the expenditure of funds for carrying
[it] out.” Beermann, supra, at 85. Either approach might
lead an agency to abandon course, but also might prompt
16
Congress to incorporate cooperative federalism programs
or other State-centric measures to win over reluctant
state interests and achieve its regulatory objectives.
Congressional inaction in the appropriations process can
likewise check an agency—an especially important
constraint during times of political polarization and
deadlock. States can make the pitch for any of these
measures.
These are not abstractions. The appropriations
process gives States concrete opportunities to influence
agency operations that wouldn’t otherwise exist. See, e.g.,
Laura E. Dolbow, Agency Adherence to Legislative
History, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 569, 579-80 (2018) (explaining
how the appropriations process provides an “effective
oversight technique” for agencies). “[F]rom a state’s
perspective,” the legislative process provides several
concrete on-ramps for state involvement—“more
opportunities and more access points to provide input to
Congress than [there would be] to the President.”
Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the
States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 365 (2010). Passing a
budget is complex: every year the President proposes a
detailed budget; relevant committees in the House and
Senate hold hearings, make sub-allocations, adopt
amendments, and report budget bills out to the chambers;
the bills are considered on the House and Senate floors
(where members can offer further amendments); the bills
are conferenced; and both chambers eventually agree to
the complete budgetary package, which the President
signs. See JAMES V. SATURNO, ET AL., CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R42388, THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS
PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 2-9 (2016). Each of these
steps is a genuine invitation for the States to get involved.
And Congress’s “institutional design” allows legislators
from all States to participate. Mathew D. McCubbins &
17
Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and
Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the
Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
669, 697 (2005). In short, the deliberative way in which the
budget wends through Congress gives States plenty of
people to speak to, helping to ensure that their interests
are heard. The States have used this process to shape
agency behavior many times. See WV.Cert.Amicus.Br.1213 (listing examples when State-centric interests have
compelled agency action through appropriations-related
maneuvers).
The appropriations process also provides key
information that helps States influence agency actions in
less direct ways. For instance, when an agency launches
a new enforcement initiative or substantial rulemaking
effort, it needs to detail its anticipated work publicly to
secure the funding to support it. See McCubbins &
Rodriguez, supra, at 702 (describing how the
appropriations process is “probably more” transparent
than “any other legislation”). Disclosure on the front end
of the appropriations process can empower affected
parties—including the States—to take quick, responsive
actions beyond lobbying their representatives (up to suing
to stop illegal action, if need be). Early informationsharing through Congress also allows States to bring their
expertise to bear in all manner of fora on issues of
traditional state expertise, from law enforcement and land
use, to insurance and immunizations. But an agency free
from the appropriations process can keep critical
information out of public view for as long as possible. As
a result, new enforcement initiatives may become hard to
spot until the pattern emerges. And even rulemakings
may lack the transparency that the appropriations
process offers, as “many substantive policy decisions
happen before the agency publishes the notice of proposed
18
rulemaking.” Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz,
Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 733,
743 (2016).
* * * *
All these considerations should make one thing plain:
there’s nothing “meager” or “indeterminate” about the
harms that flow from skipping the appropriations process.
Just as the Constitution intended, that process serves as a
vital avenue of influence by giving States insight into
agency action and a meaningful way to respond to it.
II.
Lacking An Appropriation, The CFPB Has
Avoided Real Accountability.
In arguing to overturn the decision below, many of the
Bureau’s supporters have compiled lists of what the
Bureau has done over the last decade. See, e.g.,
NY.Amici.Br.10-22; Cmty.Dev.Amici.16-26; Treasury.
Emps.Br.8-13. But none of them explains why the Bureau
needed funding autonomy to accomplish any of these
actions. And a deeper look at the agency’s record reveals
that the Bureau has shown itself unconcerned with even
less direct oversight from Congress. Or with giving the
States genuine opportunities to participate in an area
where they have unique and longstanding expertise.
A. The CFPB’s funding structure offers none of the
ordinary appropriations process’s benefits. See Todd
Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 888
(2013). One former Democratic chair of the Council of
Economic Advisors calls the structure a “clever ruse to
use the Fed’s deep pockets.” Martin Baily, Dodd Bill
Offers Progress At Last, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2010 5:17
a.m.), https://bit.ly/3XwgBxY.
The trick effectively
19
silences anyone who would otherwise offer input on the
Bureau’s work.
States and others are left out. They cannot participate
through committee work because the CFPB’s hundreds of
millions of dollars in funding is “not … subject to review
by the Committees on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.”
12 U.S.C.
§ 5497(a)(2)(C). If the Bureau stays under the statute’s
automatic funding cap (it always has), and if Congress
does not overcome legislative entrenchment to revise the
Bureau’s enabling statute wholesale (it hasn’t yet), then
the CFPB’s funding will never reach the floor of Congress
again. True, the Bureau files a few minimal reports to the
Office of Management and Budget, but it need not
“consult with or obtain [OMB’s] consent or approval”
before it does anything. Id. § 5497(a)(4)(E).
Instead, the CFPB Director need only determine that
funds are “reasonably necessary to carry out the
authorities of the Bureau,” and the Federal Reserve must
transfer those funds. Id. § 5497(a)(1). A half-page
letter—with no reasoning, analysis, or justification—is all
that the Bureau needs to set that process in motion. See,
e.g., Letter from Rohit Chopra, Dir., CFPB, to Jerome
Powell, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys.
(Apr. 6, 2023), https://bit.ly/3NrRZBQ. Once the Director
sends that letter, millions of dollars become “immediately
available” to the Bureau and remain ready under its
control until the agency spends them. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 5497(c)(1). Aside from that ordinary operating fund, the
CFPB also maintains a separate, unsupervised slush fund
where it funnels hundreds of millions of dollars in civil
penalties. See id. § 5497(d)(2). And even though the
Federal Reserve cuts the Bureau’s checks, Congress
20
expressly barred it from exercising any oversight along
the way. See id. § 5492(c).
Thus, the CFPB is its own appropriator. The approach
is an anomaly. See, e.g., Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and
Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1733, 1735
(2013) (“Congress has utilized self-funding in only a
limited number of ‘narrowly-focused’ independent
agencies.”).
It was also intentional: The Bureau’s
champions thought this structure would prevent it from
being “compromised by political maneuvering.” 156 Cong.
Rec. S4140 (2010) (statement of Sen. Dodd). Others, of
course, might call this “maneuvering” “oversight” and
“input.” Either way, this choice was not one that Congress
was free to make: Because of the CFPB’s structure,
accountability and transparency have fallen by the
wayside. “[S]elf-funding … effectively makes the agency
accountable to nobody.” Thomas Arning, The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: A Novel Agency Design
with Familiar Issues, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
153, 169 (2018).
So those outside the cloistered community of the
Bureau are kept effectively powerless. “[T]here is
minimal leverage that Congress,” and by extension the
States, “can bring to bear to influence the agency.”
Roberta Romano, Does Agency Structure Affect Agency
Decisionmaking? Implications of the CFPB’s Design for
Administrative Governance, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 273, 299
(2019) (explaining that the CFPB is the most insulated
agency among those with similar regulatory objectives).
The States and the public must depend on voluntary
disclosures and a couple semi-annual reports to learn what
the agency is up to. They can hope that audits or reports
from the General Accountability Office might lead the
Bureau to change its ways. But depending on a self-
21
interested CFPB to do the right thing is a “curious
assumption,” especially when the Bureau has “lack[ed]
transparency in much of its decision-making.” (More on
that below.) Adam C. Smith & Todd Zywicki, Behavior,
Paternalism, and Policy: Evaluating Consumer
Financial Protection, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201, 23637 (2015). It’s hardly a surprise, then, that the Court has
already observed how the Bureau’s “financial freedom”
“makes it even more likely that the agency will slip …
from [the control] of the people.” Seila Law LLC v.
CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2204 (2020) (cleaned up). It already
has.
The most States have left is the Hail Mary of
convincing Congress to pass a Congressional Review Act
resolution or, failing that, filing suit. But litigation should
be a backstop—not the only practical option to constrain
an agency running amuck—because the Constitution
“does not establish ‘government by lawsuit.’” United
States v. Texas, No. 22-58, slip op. at 19 (U.S. June 23,
2023), 2023 WL 4139000, at *17 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
the judgment) (cleaned up). “[G]overnment institutions
should rely on … structural tools, not lawsuits, to protect
the public interest.” Tara Leigh Grove, Government
Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U.
PA. L. REV. 611, 635 (2019).
This setup is even more worrisome given the immense
power that the CFPB holds. The Bureau “wields vast
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority over
a significant portion of the U.S. economy.” Seila Law, 140
S. Ct. at 2191. It oversees nineteen different consumerfinancial statutes, many of which themselves employ
broadly defined terms granting expansive power. Gray,
supra, at 1216-17. Working from these statutes, the
agency can issue regulations and interpretations that
22
trump those of other financial regulators. Id. Before
Congress created the Bureau, seven different federal
regulators—not to mention their state counterparts—
exercised these powers. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 10
(2010). And the Bureau can also bring enforcement
actions that the Director himself can then hear. Gray,
supra, at 1216-17. The “sweeping” and “unprecedented”
nature of the Bureau places it firmly “in the ‘wheelhouse’
of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.”
Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22-506, slip op. at 23 (U.S. June
30, 2023), 2023 WL 4277210, at *14.
The CFPB’s specific lack of accountability to the States
is all the worse because the Bureau is operating in a realm
that the State historically owned. Consumer protection is
the States’ “traditional[]” field. Pennsylvania v. Navient
Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 2020). The same goes for
banking and finance, where our dual-banking system
contemplates that States are active regulatory partners.
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 221-23 (1997); see also,
e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the
American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and
Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303,
1359-68 (2006) (describing the States’ “longstanding”
control over real-estate financing and consumer
protection). States are not any old constituents for the
CFPB; Congress fully intended the CFPB to work
directly with the States in their area of expertise. See
generally Lauren Sanders, THE ROLE OF THE STATES
UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2010 (2010); see also
infra Part III (describing traditional state involvement in
this area). But without backup from Congress, the Bureau
can ignore them.
23
Even just considering preemption shows the threat an
unaccountable CFPB poses to the States. As a federal
agency with a wide-reaching regulatory domain, the
Bureau can displace large swaths of state regulatory
action through preemption or otherwise.
“[B]road
delegations of lawmaking … authority” like Congress
gave the CFPB “should go hand-in-hand with increased
congressional vigilance with respect to the means of
backstopping agencies—foremost, budgetary means.”
Christopher C. DeMuth & Michael S. Greve, Agency
Finance in the Age of Executive Government, 24 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 555, 587 (2017). That backstop is missing
here.
So the Court faces an agency endowed with substantial
power, led by a single Director who can exercise great
additional power, indefinitely self-funded through the Fed
that is itself self-funded, in permanent control of any funds
it obtains, expressly exempt from the usual forms of
oversight that come with federal appropriations, and
operating in a field of traditional state control. That
combination of features renders the agency different from
all others—no other law-enforcement agency is funded
outside the normal process in this way. See Pet.App.37a.
Plain and simple, “the CFPB is truly exemplary: it is a
self-funded agency … with broad policymaking powers”
great enough “to fundamentally restructure the private
economy.”
Eric Pearson, A Brief Essay on the
Constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99, 110 (2013).
B. And it is not clear what benefits this structure
provides. (That’s not even to mention the harms; we’ll get
to those in a moment.)
Perhaps most often, proponents of agency funding
independence fret about regulatory capture by the
24
regulated industry. These worries are overstated, as the
“career-making benefits” that flow to successful
regulatory and enforcement attorneys often prompt them
to act. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No
High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), https://bit.ly/435ETQi; see also
Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1265 (2015). But if these concerns were real, selffunding might only worsen them.
That’s because
agencies’ “greater degree of political insulation may make
them more attuned to the interests of the industries they
regulate and less responsive to the states and other
interests.”
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and
Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 757 (2008).
In contrast, when Congress stays involved, it can “help
guard against agency capture by opening the
claustrophobic and technical process of agency
decisionmaking to a broader array of information and
constituencies.” Zywicki, supra, at 889; see also PHH
Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Henderson, J., dissenting) (explaining how a “mutant
CFPB” is “responsive to the President” and thus subject
to powerful “lobbying” efforts, “but nowise accountable to
the Congress”).
If capture were really the concern, it’s also hard to
understand why the CFPB has only a single director.
“[H]aving only one person at the apex can ... mean that the
agency is more easily captured.” Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 38 (2010). The
Court should not overlook a constitutional funding defect
to save Congress from the consequences of its separate
decision how to structure the agency. And indeed, the fear
of capture may have already become a reality, as some
conclude that certain interest groups are effectively
25
calling the shots. See Daniel Press, The Myth of
Independence at the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INSTIT. (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://bit.ly/3JyEEXh.
Apart from capture, some States seem to think that
funding independence fosters more cooperation between
the States and the Bureau, but they never close the circle
on why that’s true. NY.Amici.11-22. Even in their favored
examples, those States celebrate how they had a few “calls
and meetings” with agency personnel and submitted
comments that the CFPB assured them it “considered.”
Id. at 15-16. Those minimal avenues of input hardly
replace the strong medicine that appropriations leverage
would provide for a policy gone wrong. Likewise, that the
CFPB has hopped on board with certain multistate
enforcement efforts means little; nobody explains why
agency financial independence was essential for that
involvement—or even why the CFPB needed to be
involved at all. Id. at 17-22. And in truth, these arguments
only prove that appropriations oversight is important. If
state input on CFPB operations is good, and if
appropriations oversight provides more opportunities for
that input, see supra Section I.B, then all States should be
pushing for more appropriations oversight.
Sometimes advocates for self-funding also insist that it
provides stability and policy coherence, but that rationale
doesn’t work here, either. Remember how the Bureau is
led by a single Director who the President may remove
and replace at any time. So unlike a multi-member
commission, the Bureau’s “priorities may fluctuate with
the party of the appointing President,” and Congress has
no means to pull it back. Kruly, supra, at 1742. At the
same time, the only ostensible check on the Bureau’s
budget—other than the soaring cap—is the Director’s
26
finding that the money is “reasonably necessary to carry
out the authorities of the Bureau.” 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(1).
That provision provides the Bureau a financial incentive to
expand faster and farther, no matter whether those
efforts aid market improvement or stability. James V.
DeLong, New Wine for A New Bottle: Judicial Review in
the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 421 (1986) (“[A]n
agency is subject to strong internal incentives to attempt
to expand its budget.”). Aggressive, inconsistent, and
unaccountable are not words we usually associate with the
quiet prudence of a financial regulator.
And fundamentally, by using an “unprecedented
combination of structural characteristics” to build out the
agency, William Simpson, Above Reproach: How the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Escapes
Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 343, 345 (2016), Congress has left the Bureau in a
constant state of upheaval and legal uncertainty. This
case is the second major structural challenge to the
Bureau to reach the Court in just three years. That
constant flux hardly bespeaks the sort of stability that
policymakers should seek when it comes to financial
regulation. See Jolina C. Cuaresma, Commissioning the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 426, 430 (2019) (describing how the
Bureau’s uniquely problematic mix of structural features
has led to “regulatory uncertainty” that “discourages
investment”); see also Jonathan Masur, Judicial
Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1041 (2007) (describing how
“change[s] in the background regulatory rules” can upset
investment strategies).
C. Along with few benefits, the costs of the Bureau’s
fiscal autonomy are high. A few examples show how.
27
First, in exercising one of its broadest authorities, the
Bureau has shown a continuing preference for hiding its
actions from the public view. The statute in question
empowers the Bureau to go after persons for engaging in
“unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s]” in the
consumer-finance space. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a). The agency
has repeatedly declined to acknowledge how it
understands this “UDAAP” provision to work.
Start with “abusive.” In one hearing, the Director
labelled the statutory language a “puzzle” and declared
that it was “[p]robably not useful to try to define a term
like that in the abstract.” How Will The CFPB Function
Under Richard Cordray, Hearing before the H. Oversight
Comm., Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs., and Bailouts of
Pub. and Priv. Programs, 112th Cong. 69 (2012). It was
unclear at the time what that odd response meant, but it
became clear soon enough: the Bureau wanted to leave
wiggle room so it could use the provision as it pleased.
Dozens of enforcement actions followed as the Bureau
pursued a campaign of “regulation by enforcement.”
Michael R. Faz, Scouring Muddied Waters: Towards
Clarifying the CFPB’s “Abusive” Practices, 32 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 45, 46 (2019).
Later, the Bureau turned its attention to the “unfair”
portion of the statute. That effort proved no better, as the
agency quietly abandoned any ordinary understanding of
the term in a change to its enforcement manual without
notice or comment. The effort spurred a lawsuit. See
Chamber of Com. of the U.S. v. CFPB, No. 6:22-cv-00381JCB (E.D. Tex. filed Sept. 28, 2022).
In short, as even the Treasury Department has
recognized, the Bureau is fond of adopting new policies
retroactively through an “unusual degree” of
“enforcement actions and guidance documents, which the
28
CFPB has consistently issued without opportunity for
public comment.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A
FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 82 (2017),
https://bit.ly/3PyuuJP; see, e.g., Press Release, CFPB,
CFPB Invokes Dormant Authority to Examine Nonbank
Companies Posing Risks to Consumers (Apr. 25, 2022),
https://bit.ly/3Fzl5fQ (announcing, after a decade of
silence and no new comment opportunity, that the agency
planned to begin examining “nonbank financial
companies”); Letter from Rep. Patrick McHenry, H.R.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., Republican Leader, et al. to Rohit
Chopra, Dir., CFPB, at 2 (Sept. 20, 2022),
https://bit.ly/3PaEYwK
(listing
various
CFPB
“initiatives” that “circumvented” Congress and
undermined “transparency and accountability”); Letter
from Sen. Pat Toomey, et al. to Rohit Chopra, Dir., CFPB,
at 1-3 (Sept. 12, 2022) (same), https://bit.ly/46x7WPM.
Second, the Bureau has preferred to stack the deck in
its own favor. Just recently, for example, the Bureau
changed its adjudicatory procedures to allow the Director
to bypass an administrative-law judge and rule directly on
substantive legal issues. See Rules of Practice for
Adjudication Proceedings, 88 Fed. Reg. 18,382, 18,386
(Mar. 29, 2023). And that rule would compel those facing
enforcement actions to exhaust every question before the
agency, including questions like the one presented here
about the constitutionality of the Bureau’s very structure.
Id. at 18,388; but see Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 143 S. Ct.
890, 897 (2023) (finding constitutional challenges to the
FTC’s and SEC’s structures need not be challenged
through administrative proceedings). So when entities
face ambiguous UDAAP enforcement actions, the
Director intends to be the one to decide whether his own
29
claims are viable. Once more, the Bureau has positioned
itself to skirt any oversight.
Third, free from worries about Congress, the Bureau
has also struck repeatedly at the States’ sovereign
interests. For instance, a few months ago the Bureau
proposed to establish a “repeat offender” registry for
certain non-bank financial institutions. See Registry of
Nonbank Covered Persons Subject to Certain Agency and
Court Orders, 88 Fed. Reg. 6,088 (Jan. 30, 2023). But in
forcing these entities to disclose settlements and the like,
the Bureau shows little regard for state regulators and
authorities who might’ve preferred to keep them
confidential; a state regulator might reasonably fear that
disclosure of a particular issue at a particular bank might
cause investor departures or depositor withdrawals that
in turn threaten the bank’s safety and soundness. Yet the
CFPB has left no room for state judgments like these.
Meanwhile, the CFPB has also aggressively issued at
least one civil investigative demand to a sovereign—a
tribal entity that Dodd-Frank defines as a “State.” See
CFPB v. Great Plains Lending, LLC, 846 F.3d 1049 (9th
Cir. 2017). With no approval from Congress and no
opportunity for States to object, the CFPB has construed
its investigatory powers to reach directly into state
operations. In effect, state regulators have become
regulated parties themselves.
Fourth, substantive policies aside, consider how the
agency has comported itself before Congress. Officials
from the agency were trading blows with Congress even
before the agency formally launched. See Edward Wyatt,
Decorum Breaks Down at House Hearing, N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2011), https://bit.ly/3CMRIo0. Later, in one bit
of testimony, the CFPB’s first director responded, “Why
does that matter to you?” when a congressperson asked
30
who had authorized hundreds of millions in renovation
costs for the Bureau’s headquarters. See H.R. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., Committee Pushes for Accountability and
Transparency at the CFPB, YOUTUBE, at 3:33:19 (Mar. 6,
2015), http://bit.ly/3Y6p9eJ. And another time, a different
CFPB director told the House Financial Services
Committee that he could “twiddle [his] thumbs while you
all ask questions” because the CFPB is “not accountable
to anybody but itself.” Jim Puzzanghera, CFPB Chief
Mick Mulvaney Says He Could Just ‘Twiddle My
Thumbs’ Before Congress To Highlight Agency’s Flaws,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018, 11:55 a.m.), http://bit.ly/
3PaQJ6o.
Things haven’t gone better outside the hearing room.
The Bureau’s actions have forced senators and
representatives to send the Bureau repeated letters
complaining about its inadequate responses to
congressional requests, budget-related and otherwise.
See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Randy Neugebauer, Chairman,
H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, et al. to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, at 1
(May 2, 2012), https://bit.ly/3uHWEX9; Letter from Sen.
Rob Portman, et al. to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, at 1
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://bit.ly/3uFK0rT; Letter from Sen.
Mike Enzi, Chairman, S. Budget Comm. & Richard
Shelby, Chairman, S. Comm. On Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs, to Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB, at 1 (Mar. 9,
2015), https://bit.ly/3Fx3gwP. Even Senator Elizabeth
Warren lamented that her pet project had come to
“ignore[] congressional mandates” and function as a
“politicized rogue agency” when it fell under the control of
a political opponent. Elizabeth Warren, Republicans
Remain Silent As Mulvaney’s CFPB Ducks Oversight,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:48 p.m.), https://bit.ly/
3Bh6lQg.
31
Fifth, the CFPB has behaved badly in the courtroom,
too. Just recently, it “tried to bring a wide-ranging civil
lawsuit against 18 defendants without ever being
deposed.” CFPB v. Brown, No. 21-14468, 2023 WL
3939432, at *1 (11th Cir. June 12, 2023). When that
(unsurprisingly) didn’t go well, the Bureau “doubled down
by engaging in dramatic abuse of the discovery process.”
Id. Because the agency had “tried to game the system so
that nothing was accomplished,” the Bureau’s antics
forced the district court to dismiss the suit. Id. at *4-5.
And that case was hardly an aberration; over and over, the
Bureau has shown that it thinks it is above the rules that
apply to others. See, e.g., CFPB v. Access Funding, LLC,
No. CV ELH-16-3759, 2021 WL 2915118, at *22 (D. Md.
July 12, 2021) (striking a witness’s deposition testimony
after the CFPB tried to use it on summary judgment,
where “the Bureau created … time constraints” that
prevented the defendants from cross-examining the
witness); CFPB v. Borders & Borders, PLC, No. 3:13-CV1047-CRS, 2016 WL 9460472, at *7 (W.D. Ky. June 29,
2016) (sanctioning the CFPB for trying to change legal
theories “at essentially the 11th hour,” creating
“manifest” “unfairness” to the defendants); CFPB v.
Accrediting Council for Indep. Colleges & Sch., 183 F.
Supp. 3d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2016) (describing how the Bureau
had “plow[ed] head long into fields not clearly ceded to
them by Congress” by pursuing enforcement action and
then offered a “post-hoc justification” for its authority that
was “a bridge too far!”).
The Amici States don’t offer these examples to sully
the agency’s reputation. Rather, they show how the
Bureau acts unaccountable before Congress and
throughout all its regulatory and enforcement efforts.
And really, it’s no surprise that institutional
imperiousness is the result when Congress hands an
32
agency a blank check. The Appropriations Clause’s limits
matter.
III.
The Court Should Ignore Doomsaying About
The Consequences Of Providing Relief.
The Court can fix all this right now, but many are
forecasting catastrophic results to try to scare the Court
into staying its hand. See, e.g., Treasury.Emps.Br.2
(“[T]he Bureau’s important work will grind to a halt.”).
The Court shouldn’t listen.
Plenty of solutions to the Bureau’s funding problem
exist at the federal level. Most obviously, faced with a
court decision effectively compelling it to act, Congress
could pass a proper appropriations bill. This case is about
one specific regulation, and the measured pace of litigation
should give Congress time to act before the Court’s
decision affects much else. And a rebuke from this Court
would no doubt grease the sticky wheels of the legislative
process and move them a bit faster. Indeed, Congress
already has many potential funding bills from which to
choose. See, e.g., Taking Account of Bureaucrats’
Spending Act of 2023, H.R. 1382, 118th Cong. § 3 (2023)
(bill to bring the Bureau into the ordinary appropriations
process). And if any stopgap were needed, the many
federal regulators that existed long before the CFPB
came to be in 2011 could step up again.
The States are ready to move, too. That’d be nothing
new. Today, “[s]tate regulators charter and supervise
approximately 3,981 banks with more than $7.15 trillion in
combined assets, representing 79% of all U.S. banks.”
Keeping Up With the Codes—Using AI For Effective
RegTech, Hearing before H. Fin. Servs. Comm. A.I. Task
Force of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. 2 (2022)
(testimony of Melanie Hall, Comm’r, Mont. Div. of
33
Banking & Fin. Institutions), available at https://bit.ly/
44zOsbz. As Congress recognized when passing DoddFrank, “[o]versight of [nonbank] companies” has also
“largely been left to the States.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at
167 (2010). And across the board, “[c]onsumer protection”
has been “quintessentially a field which the States have
traditionally occupied.” Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
550 U.S. 1, 35-36 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cleaned
up). Congress continued that tradition by giving state
Attorneys General the power to enforce Dodd-Frank and
by taking care to preserve other aspects of state authority.
12 U.S.C. § 5552(a), (d). Likewise, States have long taken
the lead in ensuring “sound financial institutions and
honest financial practices” in “banking and [all] related
financial activities.” Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447
U.S. 27, 38 (1980).
So if a little accountability from Congress somehow
pared back the CFPB’s remit, then the States could fill
any gap. In fact, “[w]here federal [financial] regulators
[have] refused to act [before], the states stepped into the
breach.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16; see also id. at 174
(“States are much closer to abuses and are able to move
more quickly when necessary to address them.”). They
can do the same while Congress fixes the Bureau’s
constitutional flaw.
The financial system will not fold if the Court holds
Congress to the Appropriations Clause’s line. The Court
should do exactly that.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the decision below.
34
Respectfully submitted.
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General
OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL
State Capitol Complex
Building 1, Room E-26
Charleston, WV 25305
lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov
(304) 558-2021
LINDSAY S. SEE
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS
Principal Deputy Solicitor
General
Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia
35
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL
STEVE MARSHALL
Attorney General
State of Alabama
KRIS KOBACH
Attorney General
State of Kansas
TREG TAYLOR
Attorney General
State of Alaska
DANIEL CAMERON
Attorney General
Commonwealth of
Kentucky
TIM GRIFFIN
Attorney General
State of Arkansas
ASHLEY MOODY
Attorney General
State of Florida
CHRIS CARR
Attorney General
State of Georgia
RAÚL LABRADOR
Attorney General
State of Idaho
TODD ROKITA
Attorney General
State of Indiana
BRENNA BIRD
Attorney General
State of Iowa
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General
State of Louisiana
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General
State of Mississippi
ANDREW BAILEY
Attorney General
State of Missouri
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General
State of Montana
MICHAEL T. HILGERS
Attorney General
State of Nebraska
JOHN M. FORMELLA
Attorney General
State of New Hampshire
36
DREW WRIGLEY
Attorney General
State of North Dakota
JASON MIYARES
Attorney General
Commonwealth of Virginia
DAVE YOST
Attorney General
State of Ohio
BRIDGET HILL
Attorney General
State of Wyoming
GENTNER DRUMMOND
Attorney General
State of Oklahoma
ALAN WILSON
Attorney General
State of South Carolina
MARTY JACKLEY
Attorney General
State of South Dakota
JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General and
Reporter
State of Tennessee
JOHN SCOTT
Provisional Attorney
General
State of Texas
SEAN D. REYES
Attorney General
State of Utah
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.