Respondents Brief — Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc., Petitioner v. Operating Engineers’ Local 324 Fringe Benefit Funds, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 6, 2023

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No. 22-432

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc.,

Petitioner,

v.

Operating Engineers’ Local 324

Fringe Benefit Funds, et. al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Nancy H. Pearce

Counsel of Record

Daniel G. Levan

Finkel Whitefield Feldman

32300 Northwestern Highway, Ste. 200

Farmington Hills, MI 48334

(248) 855-6500

npearce@fwf-law.com

dlevan@fwf-law.com

Counsel for Respondents

Mosaic - (301) 927-3800 - Cheverly, MD

49261_Ltrhd.indd

1

6/11/08

12:44:0

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Applying Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for

N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484

U.S. 539 (1988), the Sixth Circuit held that federal

courts have jurisdiction under ERISA § 515 over Respondents’ claims premised on good faith assertions

that independent, live agreements bind Petitioner,

and that the question whether an enforceable contract

exists is a “merits” issue to be decided on remand.

Petitioner seeks review based primarily on San Diego

Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)

and the Garmon preemption doctrine. The questions

presented are:

1. Whether the question presented and arguments

in the petition were not raised, preserved, or developed

in the lower court, where Garmon and Garmon

preemption were not even argued by Petitioner in the

Court of Appeals?

2. Whether the Court of Appeals engaged in a

correct and straightforward analysis and application

of Advanced Lightweight consistent with other circuit

courts of appeals faced with the same issue?

3. Whether this case is an inappropriate vehicle to

review Petitioner’s question presented, where (a) postremand discovery has conclusively established that a

factual conclusion underpinning the district court’s

prior decision (i.e. that the Funds allegedly already

were pursuing contribution claims against Petitioner

before the NLRB) is incorrect, (b) the case has not yet

been decided on the merits, but will be on remand,

where discovery already has been completed and Rule

56 summary judgment motions are pending; and (c)

the conclusion of the district court proceedings will

moot the Petition and be appealable at that time on

the complete record?

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

None of the Respondents is a subsidiary or affiliate

of a publicly owned corporation, and no publicly held

company owns 10% or more of the stock of any of the

Respondents. No other publicly owned corporation or

its affiliate has a substantial financial interest in the

outcome of the litigation.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED................................

i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.....

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................

1

A. Relevant facts and procedural history......

1

B. Mischaracterizations in the petition.........

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.............................

10

ARGUMENT........................................................

12

I. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO

REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS’

DECISION..................................................

12

A. The question presented and

arguments in the petition were not

raised or developed in the Court of

Appeals..................................................

12

B. The Court of Appeals’ decision was

correct, consistent with the Court’s

precedent, and did not create a

circuit split.............................................

13

C. The errors argued by Petitioner

primarily involve factual disputes

and are not sufficiently important to

warrant review......................................

17

D. The Court of Appeals’ decision does

not present a complete, final, or clean

slate on which to decide the question

presented...............................................

17

II. SUMMARY REVERSAL IS NOT

WARRANTED............................................

18

CONCLUSION.....................................................

19

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Automobile Mechanics Local 701 Welfare and

Pension Funds v Vanguard Car Rental

USA, Inc.,

502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007)...................... 4, 11, 16

Brown v. C. Volante Corp.,

194 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1999)....................... 4, 11, 16

Cent. States Pension Fund v.

Cent. Transp., Inc.,

472 U.S. 559 (1985).................................... 1, 15, 18

Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund

v. Behnke, Inc.,

883 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1989)............................ 4, 11

E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth.,

476 U.S. 19 (1986)............................................ 10, 12

Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund

v. Superior General Contractors, Inc.,

104 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1997).................... 4, 11, 16

Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal.

v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co.,

484 U.S. 539 (1988)............ i, 3-5, 10-11, 13-16, 18

RiverStone Group, Inc. v. Midwest Operating

Eng’rs Fringe Benefit Funds,

33 F.4th 424 (7th Cir. 2022)............................ 15, 16

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236 (1959)............................. i, 5, 9-11, 13

Schweiker v. Hansen,

450 U.S. 785 (1981)..........................................

18

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page



Statutes

29 U.S.C. § 1132...................................................

1

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).....................................

13

29 U.S.C. § 1145...........................................

i, 1, 4, 5

29 U.S.C. § 185.....................................................

1

45 U.S.C. § 151-165..............................................

13

Rules

Fed. Rules. Civ. Proc. Rule 56.....................

i, 6, 7, 17

Supreme Court Rule 10.......................................

17

Supreme Court Rule 15(2)...................................

8

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Relevant facts and procedural history

The Respondents, Operating Engineers’ Local 324

Fringe Benefit Funds (the “Funds”), brought this action

against Petitioner, a contributing employer to the

Funds, after Petitioner refused to comply with a fund

audit. Pet. App. 6-7. The Funds’ claims were brought

under § 502 and § 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132

and § 1145, and § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and seek to compel Petitioner to comply with the audit and to pay any

delinquent contributions determined to be owing by the

audit. Pet. App. 7, 25. Multiemployer fund audit rights

are important and enforceable. Cent. States Pension

Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559 (1985).

Although the collective bargaining agreement

(“CBA”) at issue in this case expired effective May 31,

2018, Petitioner continued to contribute to the Funds

from and after that date. Along with each of its contribution payments after expiration of the CBA, Petitioner submitted separate Fringe Benefit Reports

(“Reports”) to the Funds which stated the names of

employees, the hours they worked, and the wages they

earned. Pet. App. 22. Each of the Reports also included a certification by Petitioner certifying the accuracy of the information in the Report and an express

agreement to be bound by the payment terms of the

expired CBA1 and to all terms of the Funds’ Trust

Each Report was completed by Petitioner to identify the labor agreement and corresponding contribution rates under

which contributions were being submitted. After expiration of

the CBA, Petitioner continued to identify in the Reports the

then expired CBA at issue, by name (“MITA Road”), and its corresponding contribution rates. See, e.g., Exhibits to Funds’ 6-221

2

Agreements (which contain detailed fund audit obligations and procedures). The certifications in the Reports stated:

By filing this report, the above-named Employer

certifies the accuracy of information on the report

and agrees to be bound by all terms of payment to

the foregoing named Funds, as set forth in the current applicable Collective Bargaining Agree­ments

between Operating Engineers Local 324 and Employer Associations, and to all the terms of the Trust

Agreements of these funds.

Pet. App. 22-23.2 It is undisputed that the Funds have

accepted all Petitioner’s contributions and Fringe

Benefit Reports from and after the date of the CBA

expiration. Pet. App. 7, 23-24.

There was a period of approximately four months

after the CBA expired during which all the parties

were operating under a mutually mistaken belief that

the bargaining relationship between the parties had

altogether terminated, and during which the Funds

had refused to accept the contributions. Pet. App.

6-7, 23-24. It is undisputed that the Funds retroactively accepted all Petitioner’s contributions and Re21 Response to Motion to Dismiss, District Court Doc. 27-3–279, Page ID# 758–1493 & Funds’ 12-19-22 SJ Motion, District

Court Doc. 77-13 through 77-15, PageID# 3674-3928 (E.D. Mich.

Case No. 20-10323).

At the time of the district court decision at issue in the petition, Petitioner had submitted Reports and certifications with all

its contribution payments to the Funds. From and after the time

frame of the district court’s opinion, Petitioner continued to submit contributions and Reports to the Funds, as set forth in the

Funds’ Rule 56 motion for summary judgment filed with the district court on remand on December 19, 2022. Fund SJ Motion,

District Court Doc. 77, PageID# 3406-3434.

2

3

ports for that period without complaint (and has continued to do so going forward) after an old agreement

was discovered stating that a 9(a) relationship existed between the Local 324 Union and Petitioner. Pet.

App. 7, 23-24.

The Funds have never alleged in this case that Petitioner engaged in an unfair labor practice or violated

the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), but have

always maintained that, post-CBA-expiration, Petitioner violated its contractual obligations (not simply

those set forth in the expired collective bargaining

agreement but also those in Fringe Benefit Reports

executed by Petitioner and Trust Agreements to which

Petitioner was bound). E.g., Pet. App. 12, 22-23, 31,

33. The Funds have not alleged a violation of the

NLRA’s status quo obligation, Pet. App. 12, as Defendant did continue paying contributions after expiration of the CBA. The Funds simply seek an audit to

determine if the contributions were made on behalf of

the proper employees. E.g., Pet. App. 7.

Before discovery had been completed, Pet. App. 3738, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner argued that there

was no contractual basis for a contribution obligation

for periods from June 1, 2018 forward, that the only

contribution duty arose from statutory NLRA status

quo obligations, and that under Laborers Health &

Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight

Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539 (1988), the National Labor

Relations Board (“NLRB”) had exclusive jurisdiction

over the Funds’ claims. Pet. App. 7.

The Funds opposed Petitioner’s jurisdictional challenge. The Funds did not dispute that under Advanced

Lightweight, federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether an employer’s refusal to make contribu-

4

tions after expiration of a CBA violates the NLRA.

Advanced Lightweight held that ERISA § 515 provides

a remedy for a fund to collect “promised contributions,” but not to enforce NLRA obligations. Id. at

549. The Funds argued that their claims were premised solely on promises and contractual obligations

independent of Petitioners’ NLRA obligations, Pet.

App. 8, and that the Sixth Circuit, and other circuits,

have consistently applied Advanced Lightweight to

permit post-CBA-expiration ERISA claims in district

courts where independent, contractual obligations or

manifestations of assent continued to bind the employer after expiration. E.g., Pet. App. 8, 10-11, 28-33;

Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Behnke,

Inc., 883 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1989); Brown v C. Volante

Corp, 194 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1999); Auto. Mech. Loc.

701 Welfare & Pension Funds v Vanguard Car Rental

USA. Inc., 502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007); Greater Kan.

City Laborers Pension Fund v Superior Gen. Contractors, Inc., 104 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1997).

The district court granted the motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction, rejected the Funds’ argument that

the motion was premature because discovery had not

yet been provided or completed, and dismissed the

Funds’ pending motions on discovery issues as moot.

Pet. App. 37-39. The district court held that the existence of a live contract was an “essential jurisdictional

fact” that it had to “determine before proceeding forward.” Pet. App. 8. The district court weighed the

evidence and made judicial findings of fact. In doing

so, the district court concluded and emphasized (by

stating at three separate points in its opinion), that

the Funds already were pursuing post-contract contribution claims against Petitioner before the NLRB. Pet.

App. 18, 25, 32 (Petitioners have since admitted in

discovery responses on remand that this conclusion

5

was incorrect). The district court also found that the

certifications in Petitioner’s post-expiration Fringe

Benefit Reports were “boilerplate” and did not create

post-CBA-expiration contract obligations. Pet. App.

22, 31-32. The district court concluded there was no

independent agreement binding the parties, and that

the only post-expiration contribution duty arose from

Petitioner’s statutory duty under the NLRA which

Advanced Lightweight holds can be enforced only before the NLRB. Pet. App. 8, 26, 30-36.

The Funds appealed, arguing, inter alia, that it

was inappropriate to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and that their claims are expressly rooted

in enforceable promises and agreements, not statute.

Pet. App. 8.

In the Court of Appeals, Petitioner again relied on

Advanced Lightweight as the foundation for its arguments. Petitioner did not cite or argue San Diego

Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959),

and did not argue Garmon preemption or “artful

pleading” in its brief to the Court of Appeals. See Petitioner’s Brief on Appeal, Sixth Cir. Doc. No. 25.

On August 8, 2022, the Court of Appeals reversed

the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction

and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Pet. App. 15. The Court of Appeals stated that the appeal “turns on a straightforward question: Is ‘the presence of a live contract’ an

‘essential jurisdictional fact’ in a § 515 ERISA action?”

Or, “does the presence of a live contract go to the merits of the[ Funds’] ERISA claim, not the district court’s

jurisdiction to hear it?” Pet. App. 8-9. The Court analyzed and applied Advanced Lighweight to answer

that question as follows:

6

We read Advanced Lightweight to stand for a simple proposition: ERISA grants federal district

courts jurisdiction to hear breach-of-contract

claims, not unfair-labor-practice claims. The scope

of this proposition is limited. It signifies only that a

plaintiff cannot use ERISA to get around the wellaccepted rule that an NLRA claim belongs in the

NLRB. And in practice, it plays out as follows. If a

plaintiff brings an ERISA claim for “promised [contractual] contributions,” a federal district court has

jurisdiction to hear the suit. Id. Put another way,

as long as a plaintiff’s claim rests on good-faith assertions that independent, live agreements bind

the employer, Advanced Lightweight does not enter the picture.

Pet. App. 10.

The Court of Appeals addressed the district court’s

factual finding that there are no contracts covering

the post-expiration time period, concluding that “those

findings go to the merits of the Funds’ ERISA claim,

not our jurisdiction to hear it. To the extent that the

district court concluded otherwise, it erred.” Pet. 1112. In other words, the Court of Appeals ruled that

the disputed factual issue of the existence of a postCBA-expiration contractual obligation should be decided as a “merits” issue (e.g., by a Rule 56 summary

judgment motion after completion of discovery) not as

a jurisdictional finding that had to be made before asserting jurisdiction over the case. In this regard, the

Court of Appeals stated:

[A]ssume Rieth-Riley is right about the contracts:

they don’t exist. Even so, a deficient contract claim

by itself doesn’t “convert[] the Funds’ complaint

into an unfair labor practice claim” and “divest[]”

this court of jurisdiction. Rather, it would mean

7

what a deficient claim always does in this context:

The Funds lose on the merits.

Pet. App. 14.

On August 25, 2022, Petitioner filed a motion asking the Court of Appeals to put its decision on hold

pending Petitioner’s forthcoming petition for certiorari. Motion to Stay Mandate, Sixth Cir. Doc. No. 40.

The Court of Appeals summarily denied that motion

on September 1, 2022. Sixth Cir. Doc. No. 41-2.

Since the Court of Appeals’ remand order, the case

has continued in the district court. After a September 8, 2022, status conference, discovery was conducted and completed as of November 30, 2022. Discovery conclusively established that a primary

factual conclusion underpinning the district court’s

opinion that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction

over this matter, i.e. its finding that the Funds already were pursuing claims for contributions against

Petitioner in the NLRB, was incorrect. Petitioner’s

Request for Admission Responses, District Court

Doc. No. 77-17, PageID# 3934-3936 (E.D. Mich. Case

No. 20-10323). On December 19, 2022, the Funds

and Petitioner each filed a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The Funds’ motion seeks to compel

a fund audit as requested in the Complaint, going

back to periods as early as January 1, 2016 or 2017

for certain Petitioner locations, and to subsequently

collect any shortfalls discovered by the audit. Funds’

SJ Motion, District Court Doc. No. 77, PageID# 3412,

3422-3423, 3427-3428. Petitioner’s summary judgment motion requests dismissal of the complaint, arguing, like its prior motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, that there is no enforceable contract

supporting the Funds’ claims. Pet. SJ Motion, District Court Doc. No. 75, PageID# 2464. Both motions

8

remain pending in the district court as of the date of

the Funds’ present brief in opposition.

B. Mischaracterizations in the petition

In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 15(2), the

Funds point out the following mischaracterizations or

inaccuracies in the Petition bearing on the questions

presented.

Petitioner repeatedly represents that it is “undisputed” or a matter of “undisputed fact” that there is no

contractual basis for the post-CBA-expiration obligations the Funds seek to enforce and that the obligations

allegedly arise solely under statutory duties. E.g., Pet.

i, 19, 23-24. This is incorrect. The Funds’ do not allege

or rely on a violation of the NLRA or statutory duties

and expressly premise their claims solely on independent contractual obligations. The Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that “the Funds argue[] that independent agreements continue to bind the parties”

after the expiration of the CBA. Pet. App. 8.

Petitioner represents and premises the petition on

the claim that the Funds’ ERISA claims are based on

“mere labels”. E.g., Pet. ii, 18. This is incorrect. The

Funds’ ERISA claims are expressly premised on enforceable agreements independent of NLRA obligations, including hundreds of written Fringe Benefit

Reports and certifications (quoted above) submitted

by Petitioner post-expiration, in which Petitioner expressly agreed that each Fringe Benefit Report was

accurate, and expressly agreed to comply with the payment terms of the expired CBA and the Funds’ Trust

Agreements containing clear and express Fund audit

rights and obligations. Pet. App. 22-23.

Petitioner asserts or suggests it is undisputed that

none of Petitioner’s contract offers to continue contrib-

9

uting to the Funds in accordance with the expired

CBA were “accepted.” Pet. 24. In fact, the Funds specifically argued to the Court of Appeals that the Funds

accepted the post-expiration contributions and Fringe

Benefit Reports submitted by Petitioner. E.g., Funds’

Brief on Appeal, Sixth Cir. Docket No. 22, p. 52 (Petitioner “continued to submit contributions with written certifications of assent to the benefit provisions of

the expired CBA and Trust Agreements—which the

Funds accepted—and to which neither the Union nor

the Funds objected”).3

Petitioner repeatedly suggests in the Petition that

it specifically argued Garmon in the Court of Appeals

and/or that the Court of Appeals inappropriately disregarded Garmon. Pet. i-ii (Questions Presented), 3,

22-23, 24. In fact, Petitioner did not cite Garmon or

argue Garmon preemption in the Court of Appeals.

Garmon is not even listed in the index of authorities

in Petitioner’s brief to the Court of Appeals. Sixth Cir.

Docket No. 25, p. v-ix.

Petitioner disingenuously suggests that the Court

of Appeals agreed with the district court’s factual findings that no enforceable contract exists, when Petitioner states: “the Sixth Circuit did not disagree with

any of the district court’s factual findings and, in fact

‘assume[d] Rieth-Riley is right about the contracts;

they do not exist.’ ” Pet. 18. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not opine on the correctness of the district

court’s factual findings as to the contract issue. The

The Funds similarly argue in the present district court proceedings that each of the post-expiration certifications by Petitioner, and accepted by the Funds, establish independent agreements to permit the Fund to audit Petitioner and to collect any

shortfalls discovered by audit. Fund SJ Motion, District Court

Doc. 77, PageID# 3413-3414.

3

10

Court of Appeals held that the contract issue should

not have been decided as a “jurisdictional fact” before

exercising jurisdiction over the Funds’ ERISA claims,

and remanded the case for it to be decided as a merits

issue. Pet. App. 11-12. The point in the opinion where

the Court of Appeals “assume[d]” the district court

was “right” about the contracts quite obviously was

made for the sake of argument—not as a statement of

agreement. Pet. App. 14.4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Funds respectfully request that the Court deny

the petition for a writ of certiorari and permit this

matter to continue in the normal course before the

district court.

The question Petitioner requests that this Court review was not raised in or addressed by the Court of

Appeals. See E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 476

U.S. 19, 24 (1986) (“Our normal practice . . . is to refrain from addressing issues not raised in

the Court of Appeals”). The question as Petitioner

now presents it involves Garmon, the Garmon preemption doctrine, and alleged “artful pleading” to

avoid Garmon preemption. Pet. i-ii. But Garmon

preemption and “artful pleading” were not argued by

Petitioner in the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the bulk of

The Court of Appeals summarized its decision on the disputed contract issue by stating: “as long as a plaintiff’s claim rests on

‘good faith’ assertions that independent, live agreements bind the

employer, Advanced Lightweight does not enter the picture.” Pet.

App. 10. Thus, although the Court of Appeals did not expressly

evaluate the strength of the evidence or arguments on the disputed post-expiration contract issue, by remanding the case over

Petitioner’s Advanced Lightweight arguments, the Court clearly

believed at the very least that a good faith basis exists for the

Funds’ contention that independent contracts bind Petitioner.

4

11

Petitioner’s legal arguments as to why a writ of certiorari should be granted, including those based on Garmon and Garmon preemption, Pet. 18-28, and its arguments based on the complete preemption doctrine

and the Railway Labor Act, Pet. 30-33, were not made

to the Court of Appeals and, thus, not addressed in

the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The questions actually raised in and addressed by

the Court of Appeals do not involve an important issue warranting review by the Court. This case involves a routine multiemployer fund collection case

which includes periods after expiration of a CBA and

the Court of Appeals engaged in a straightforward

and correct analysis and application of Advanced

Lightweight—consistent with other circuit courts of

appeals faced with the same issue. Decisions in multiple Circuits consistently hold that post-CBA-expiration contribution claims may be pursued under ERISA

in federal courts without interfering with Advanced

Lightweight’s ruling where, as here, a fund’s claims do

not claim a violation of the NLRA and are based on

promises or obligations of an employer independent of

the expired collective bargaining agreement. E.g.,

Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Behnke,

Inc., 883 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1989); Brown v C. Volante

Corp, 194 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1999); Auto. Mech. Loc.

701 Welfare & Pension Funds v Vanguard Car Rental

USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007); Greater Kan.

City Laborers Pension Fund v Superior Gen. Contractors, Inc., 104 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1997).

The Court of Appeals’ decision does not create a circuit split with the Seventh Circuit as argued by Petitioner. Pet. 28-30. The Court of Appeals’ decision,

like decisions from other circuits, merely holds that

post-CBA-expiration claims that expressly seek to en-

12

force statutory NLRA duties belong before the NLRB;

while post-expiration claims that seek to enforce contractual obligations may be brought in federal courts

under ERISA.

Petitioner’s request for summary reversal should be

denied. In addition to all the other reasons discussed

herein, it is now clear that the district court’s opinion

which Petitioner requests the Court to summarily reinstate through summary reversal was premised on

an erroneous factual conclusion that the Funds already were pursing contribution claims against Petitioner in the NLRB.5

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO

REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS’

DECISION

For all the reasons below, the Funds respectfully request that the Court deny the petition for a writ of

certiorari and allow the case to play out in the district

court in the normal course.

A. The question presented and arguments in

the petition were not raised or developed

in the Court of Appeals

The Court should decline to review the question

presented in the petition because it was not properly

raised or preserved for review in the lower court, and

thus not developed in the judicial decisions below. See

E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 476 U.S. 19, 24

Petitioner now admits that this finding was incorrect and

that the Funds were not pursuing claims for audit or contributions against Petitioner before the NLRB. 10-26-22 Request for

Admission Responses, District Court Doc. 77-17.

5

13

(1986). Petitioner argued in the Court of Appeals that

Advanced Lightweight was controlling. Pet. App. 10.

After the Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s Advanced Lightweight argument, Defendant filed this

Petition based primarily on San Diego Building

Trades Council v Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), a case

that Petitioner did not even cite in its brief to the

Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Index of Authorities to Petitioner’s Brief, Sixth Cir. Docket No. 25, p. 5-8. The

question presented in the Petition centers around

Garmon, the Garmon preemption doctrine, and arguments of alleged “artful pleading” in avoidance of Garmon preemption. Pet. i-ii (Question Presented), 3, 2223, 24.

But Petitioner did not argue Garmon

preemption or “artful pleading” in its brief to the Court

of Appeals. Even if Petitioner had specifically relied

on Garmon below, it would not have affected the outcome of the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Similarly missing from Petitioner’s brief to the

Court of Appeals were Petitioner’s present arguments

that the jurisdictional question in this case should be

decided through application of the complete preemption approach applicable to state law claims for violation of a labor agreement under the LMRA, or for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)

(1)(B), or the approach to jurisdictional disputes under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-165

(“RLA”). Pet. 30-33.

B. The Court of Appeals’ decision was

correct, consistent with the Court’s

precedent, and did not create a

circuit split

The Court of Appeals in this case simply applied the

Court’s own analysis as set forth in Advanced Lightweight in determining that there is federal court juris-

14

diction in this matter. The Court of Appeals rejected

Petitioner’s jurisdictional argument because the

plaintiffs in Advanced Lightweight alleged that the

employer’s unilateral decision to stop contributing to

employee benefit funds constituted an unfair labor

practice and was therefore a violation of the NLRA.

Because the argument of the fund in Advanced Lightweight was based on an employer’s statutory duty under the NLRA to maintain the status quo upon expiration of a collective bargaining agreement rather than

a contractual duty under ERISA, the Court ruled in

Advanced Lightweight that there was no federal court

jurisdiction but that the matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.

Here, the Funds have never alleged that Petitioner

engaged in an unfair labor practice or violated the

NLRA, but have always maintained that Petitioner

violated post-CBA-expiration contractual obligations.

Under Advanced Lightweight, if the underlying claim

at issue constitutes an unfair labor practice, the NLRA

preempts other laws and the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. The NLRA does not automatically preempt

ERISA, however, when the underlying claim arises

under ERISA and is contractual.

Petitioner also has changed its argument before

the Court of Appeals by asserting repeatedly in the

Petition that the issue now is whether a plaintiff can

“artfully plead” in order to convert an unfair labor

practice claim into a breach of contract claim to get

around the analysis in Advanced Lightweight. In doing so, Petitioner ignores the undisputed fact that the

Funds have never asserted an unfair labor practice or

violation of the NLRA but have always maintained

that, post-CBA-expiration, Petitioner violated its contractual obligations (not simply those set forth in the

15

expired collective bargaining agreement but also

those in Fringe Benefit Reports executed by Petitioner and the Funds’ trust agreements to which Petitioner was bound). Petitioner cannot get around the undisputed facts in the record that the Funds simply

haven’t alleged any such violation, as Defendant did

continue paying contributions after expiration of the

collective bargaining agreement. The Funds simply

seek an audit to determine if the contributions were

made on behalf of the proper employees. Pet. App. 7.

See Cent. States Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc.,

472 U.S. 559, 569, 581 (1985) (upholding fund’s right

to conduct random audits as provided for in trust

agreements—“Given Congress’ vision of the proper

administration of employee benefit plans under

ERISA . . . the audit requested by [the fund] is well

within the authority of the trustees as outlined in the

trust documents” and “highly relevant to legitimate

trustee concerns”).

Petitioner alleges a circuit split with the Seventh

Circuit, citing RiverStone Group, Inc. v Midwest Operating Eng’rs Fringe Benefit Funds, 33 F.4th 424 (7th

Cir. 2022). Pet. 28-30. Riverstone, however, involved

a situation—as in Advanced Lightweight—where

plaintiffs alleged violations of “labor law” in connection with an employer’s refusal to maintain the status

quo after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. The courts in Riverstone did nothing different

from the Court of Appeals here and simply applied the

same analysis. The Court of Appeals in the present

case specifically addressed and distinguished RiverStone in its decision, observing:

[The Funds in Riverstone] didn’t argue a breach of

the CBA or other written instrument, but asserted

that ‘labor law’ required RiverStone to ‘honor the

16

terms of an expired agreement.’ Here, the Funds

bring a contract claim, not a ‘labor law’ claim. So

their suit differs from those brought in Advanced

Lightweight or RiverStone. In those cases, the

plaintiffs tried to use an ERISA cause of action to

air their unfair-labor-practice claims in federal

courts. Here, the Funds do not such thing; they alleged contract claims only.

Pet. App. 14-15.

The Court of Appeals also cited decisions from both

the Second and Seventh Circuits (as well as other circuits) upholding federal court jurisdiction when—as

here—the plaintiff alleged post-CBA-expiration contractual ERISA violations, rather than statutory

NLRA violations. Pet. App. 11-12. See Automobile

Mec. Loc. 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v Vanguard

Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007)

(jurisdiction proper where Funds did not rely on any

alleged statutory NLRA duty employer had to continue contributing during post-expiration status quo period but claimed violation of contractual duty); Brown

v. C. Volante Corp., 194 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1999)

(affirming ERISA jurisdiction over action for unpaid

contributions after CBA expiration where fund did

not argue an unfair labor practice, observing that Advanced Lightweight “stands only for the unremarkable proposition that the [NLRB] generally has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims”);

Greater Kan. City Laborers Pension Fund v Superior

Gen. Contractors, Inc., 104 F.3d 1050, 1058 (8th Cir.

1997) (“Defendants’ reliance on Advanced Lightweight

is misplaced, because the Funds, unlike the plaintiff

trustees in Advanced Lightweight, did not claim that

defendants’ failure to make fringe benefit contributions constituted an unfair labor practice”).

17

C. The errors argued by Petitioner primarily

involve factual disputes and are not

sufficiently important to warrant review

Petitioner’s arguments boil down to a routine factual dispute as to whether there is sufficient evidence

of independent post-CBA-expiration contract obligations. This dispute is in the process of being addressed by the district court on remand under Rule

56 summary judgment standards and thereafter will

be subject to appeal of right on the complete record.

It is not an issue of sufficient importance to warrant

review of the present Court of Appeals decision. E.g.,

Supreme Court Rule 10 (“A petition . . . is rarely

granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous

factual findings . . . .”).

D. The Court of Appeals’ decision does not

present a complete, final, or clean slate on

which to decide the question presented

The district court opinion which Petitioner ultimately seeks to reinstate through the Petition is premised in part on factual conclusions that have been

shown by Petitioner’s discovery responses on remand

to be incorrect. Contrary to the findings in the district

court opinion at issue before the Court of Appeals, the

Funds have not pursued contribution claims against

Petitioner in the NLRB.

Moreover, this case involves not only claims of contributions owing after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, which was the focus of the Court

of Appeals’ decision. It also involves multiemployer

fund audit rights. The Funds’ claims expressly request to compel an audit, Pet. App. 6-7, 25, which is a

well-established right, extremely important to proper

administration of multiemployer benefit funds, en-

18

forceable under ERISA and the Court’s precedent.

Cent. States Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472

U.S. 559 (1985). The audit must be completed in order to determine the nature and extent to which there

are delinquent contributions, if any, and to identify

the nature and dates of any delinquent contributions.

Pet. App. 7; Funds’ Appeal Brief, Sixth Cir. Doc. No.

22, p. 44-46.

Post-remand discovery and motions in the district

court more clearly define the evidence and issues involved in this case. Further, the Funds’ summary

judgment motion currently pending in the district

court expressly seeks to enforce the Funds’ audit right

regarding time periods prior to the May 31, 2018 expiration of the CBA.6 These pre-expiration time periods

are subject to unexpired contract obligations under

the CBA and are not subject to the Advanced Lightweight arguments focused on in the Court of Appeals

decision at issue in the petition.

II. SUMMARY REVERSAL IS NOT

WARRANTED

As acknowledged by Petitioner, Pet. 23, “[a] summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved

by this Court for situations in which the law is settled

and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error.” Schweiker v. Hansen,

450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

The Funds’ complaint and claims seek to enforce the Fund

auditor’s October 1, 2019, audit request letter, which covers periods going back as far as January 2016 and January 2017 for certain of Petitioner’s business locations. Complaint, District Court

Doc. 12, PageID# 68, 70-71; Funds SJ Motion, District Court

Doc. 77, PageID# 3406 & audit letter, District Court Doc. 77-10,

PageID# 3663.

6

19

Petitioner’s request for summary reversal clearly is

without merit for all the reasons herein. As discussed

above, the Court of Appeals decision was correctly decided and there are factual issues yet to be decided on

remand. And of particular significance, the district

court decision which Petitioner seeks to reinstate

through summary reversal is premised on factual

findings which are now undisputed to be incorrect.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

nanCy h. peaRCe

Counsel of Record

danIel g. Levan

FInkel WhITefIeld Feldman

32300 Northwestern Highway, Ste. 200

Farmington Hills, MI 48334

(248) 855-6500

npearce@fwf-law.com

dlevan@fwf-law.com

Counsel for Respondents

Dated: January 6, 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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