Respondents Brief — Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc., Petitioner v. Operating Engineers’ Local 324 Fringe Benefit Funds, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 6, 2023
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No. 22-432
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
Rieth-Riley Construction Co., Inc.,
Petitioner,
v.
Operating Engineers’ Local 324
Fringe Benefit Funds, et. al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Nancy H. Pearce
Counsel of Record
Daniel G. Levan
Finkel Whitefield Feldman
32300 Northwestern Highway, Ste. 200
Farmington Hills, MI 48334
(248) 855-6500
npearce@fwf-law.com
dlevan@fwf-law.com
Counsel for Respondents
Mosaic - (301) 927-3800 - Cheverly, MD
49261_Ltrhd.indd
1
6/11/08
12:44:0
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Applying Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for
N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484
U.S. 539 (1988), the Sixth Circuit held that federal
courts have jurisdiction under ERISA § 515 over Respondents’ claims premised on good faith assertions
that independent, live agreements bind Petitioner,
and that the question whether an enforceable contract
exists is a “merits” issue to be decided on remand.
Petitioner seeks review based primarily on San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
and the Garmon preemption doctrine. The questions
presented are:
1. Whether the question presented and arguments
in the petition were not raised, preserved, or developed
in the lower court, where Garmon and Garmon
preemption were not even argued by Petitioner in the
Court of Appeals?
2. Whether the Court of Appeals engaged in a
correct and straightforward analysis and application
of Advanced Lightweight consistent with other circuit
courts of appeals faced with the same issue?
3. Whether this case is an inappropriate vehicle to
review Petitioner’s question presented, where (a) postremand discovery has conclusively established that a
factual conclusion underpinning the district court’s
prior decision (i.e. that the Funds allegedly already
were pursuing contribution claims against Petitioner
before the NLRB) is incorrect, (b) the case has not yet
been decided on the merits, but will be on remand,
where discovery already has been completed and Rule
56 summary judgment motions are pending; and (c)
the conclusion of the district court proceedings will
moot the Petition and be appealable at that time on
the complete record?
ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
None of the Respondents is a subsidiary or affiliate
of a publicly owned corporation, and no publicly held
company owns 10% or more of the stock of any of the
Respondents. No other publicly owned corporation or
its affiliate has a substantial financial interest in the
outcome of the litigation.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED................................
i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.....
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................
v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................
1
A. Relevant facts and procedural history......
1
B. Mischaracterizations in the petition.........
8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.............................
10
ARGUMENT........................................................
12
I. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO
REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS’
DECISION..................................................
12
A. The question presented and
arguments in the petition were not
raised or developed in the Court of
Appeals..................................................
12
B. The Court of Appeals’ decision was
correct, consistent with the Court’s
precedent, and did not create a
circuit split.............................................
13
C. The errors argued by Petitioner
primarily involve factual disputes
and are not sufficiently important to
warrant review......................................
17
D. The Court of Appeals’ decision does
not present a complete, final, or clean
slate on which to decide the question
presented...............................................
17
II. SUMMARY REVERSAL IS NOT
WARRANTED............................................
18
CONCLUSION.....................................................
19
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Automobile Mechanics Local 701 Welfare and
Pension Funds v Vanguard Car Rental
USA, Inc.,
502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007)...................... 4, 11, 16
Brown v. C. Volante Corp.,
194 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1999)....................... 4, 11, 16
Cent. States Pension Fund v.
Cent. Transp., Inc.,
472 U.S. 559 (1985).................................... 1, 15, 18
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund
v. Behnke, Inc.,
883 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1989)............................ 4, 11
E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth.,
476 U.S. 19 (1986)............................................ 10, 12
Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund
v. Superior General Contractors, Inc.,
104 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1997).................... 4, 11, 16
Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal.
v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co.,
484 U.S. 539 (1988)............ i, 3-5, 10-11, 13-16, 18
RiverStone Group, Inc. v. Midwest Operating
Eng’rs Fringe Benefit Funds,
33 F.4th 424 (7th Cir. 2022)............................ 15, 16
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959)............................. i, 5, 9-11, 13
Schweiker v. Hansen,
450 U.S. 785 (1981)..........................................
18
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Statutes
29 U.S.C. § 1132...................................................
1
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).....................................
13
29 U.S.C. § 1145...........................................
i, 1, 4, 5
29 U.S.C. § 185.....................................................
1
45 U.S.C. § 151-165..............................................
13
Rules
Fed. Rules. Civ. Proc. Rule 56.....................
i, 6, 7, 17
Supreme Court Rule 10.......................................
17
Supreme Court Rule 15(2)...................................
8
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Relevant facts and procedural history
The Respondents, Operating Engineers’ Local 324
Fringe Benefit Funds (the “Funds”), brought this action
against Petitioner, a contributing employer to the
Funds, after Petitioner refused to comply with a fund
audit. Pet. App. 6-7. The Funds’ claims were brought
under § 502 and § 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132
and § 1145, and § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and seek to compel Petitioner to comply with the audit and to pay any
delinquent contributions determined to be owing by the
audit. Pet. App. 7, 25. Multiemployer fund audit rights
are important and enforceable. Cent. States Pension
Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559 (1985).
Although the collective bargaining agreement
(“CBA”) at issue in this case expired effective May 31,
2018, Petitioner continued to contribute to the Funds
from and after that date. Along with each of its contribution payments after expiration of the CBA, Petitioner submitted separate Fringe Benefit Reports
(“Reports”) to the Funds which stated the names of
employees, the hours they worked, and the wages they
earned. Pet. App. 22. Each of the Reports also included a certification by Petitioner certifying the accuracy of the information in the Report and an express
agreement to be bound by the payment terms of the
expired CBA1 and to all terms of the Funds’ Trust
Each Report was completed by Petitioner to identify the labor agreement and corresponding contribution rates under
which contributions were being submitted. After expiration of
the CBA, Petitioner continued to identify in the Reports the
then expired CBA at issue, by name (“MITA Road”), and its corresponding contribution rates. See, e.g., Exhibits to Funds’ 6-221
2
Agreements (which contain detailed fund audit obligations and procedures). The certifications in the Reports stated:
By filing this report, the above-named Employer
certifies the accuracy of information on the report
and agrees to be bound by all terms of payment to
the foregoing named Funds, as set forth in the current applicable Collective Bargaining Agreements
between Operating Engineers Local 324 and Employer Associations, and to all the terms of the Trust
Agreements of these funds.
Pet. App. 22-23.2 It is undisputed that the Funds have
accepted all Petitioner’s contributions and Fringe
Benefit Reports from and after the date of the CBA
expiration. Pet. App. 7, 23-24.
There was a period of approximately four months
after the CBA expired during which all the parties
were operating under a mutually mistaken belief that
the bargaining relationship between the parties had
altogether terminated, and during which the Funds
had refused to accept the contributions. Pet. App.
6-7, 23-24. It is undisputed that the Funds retroactively accepted all Petitioner’s contributions and Re21 Response to Motion to Dismiss, District Court Doc. 27-3–279, Page ID# 758–1493 & Funds’ 12-19-22 SJ Motion, District
Court Doc. 77-13 through 77-15, PageID# 3674-3928 (E.D. Mich.
Case No. 20-10323).
At the time of the district court decision at issue in the petition, Petitioner had submitted Reports and certifications with all
its contribution payments to the Funds. From and after the time
frame of the district court’s opinion, Petitioner continued to submit contributions and Reports to the Funds, as set forth in the
Funds’ Rule 56 motion for summary judgment filed with the district court on remand on December 19, 2022. Fund SJ Motion,
District Court Doc. 77, PageID# 3406-3434.
2
3
ports for that period without complaint (and has continued to do so going forward) after an old agreement
was discovered stating that a 9(a) relationship existed between the Local 324 Union and Petitioner. Pet.
App. 7, 23-24.
The Funds have never alleged in this case that Petitioner engaged in an unfair labor practice or violated
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), but have
always maintained that, post-CBA-expiration, Petitioner violated its contractual obligations (not simply
those set forth in the expired collective bargaining
agreement but also those in Fringe Benefit Reports
executed by Petitioner and Trust Agreements to which
Petitioner was bound). E.g., Pet. App. 12, 22-23, 31,
33. The Funds have not alleged a violation of the
NLRA’s status quo obligation, Pet. App. 12, as Defendant did continue paying contributions after expiration of the CBA. The Funds simply seek an audit to
determine if the contributions were made on behalf of
the proper employees. E.g., Pet. App. 7.
Before discovery had been completed, Pet. App. 3738, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner argued that there
was no contractual basis for a contribution obligation
for periods from June 1, 2018 forward, that the only
contribution duty arose from statutory NLRA status
quo obligations, and that under Laborers Health &
Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539 (1988), the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) had exclusive jurisdiction
over the Funds’ claims. Pet. App. 7.
The Funds opposed Petitioner’s jurisdictional challenge. The Funds did not dispute that under Advanced
Lightweight, federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether an employer’s refusal to make contribu-
4
tions after expiration of a CBA violates the NLRA.
Advanced Lightweight held that ERISA § 515 provides
a remedy for a fund to collect “promised contributions,” but not to enforce NLRA obligations. Id. at
549. The Funds argued that their claims were premised solely on promises and contractual obligations
independent of Petitioners’ NLRA obligations, Pet.
App. 8, and that the Sixth Circuit, and other circuits,
have consistently applied Advanced Lightweight to
permit post-CBA-expiration ERISA claims in district
courts where independent, contractual obligations or
manifestations of assent continued to bind the employer after expiration. E.g., Pet. App. 8, 10-11, 28-33;
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Behnke,
Inc., 883 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1989); Brown v C. Volante
Corp, 194 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1999); Auto. Mech. Loc.
701 Welfare & Pension Funds v Vanguard Car Rental
USA. Inc., 502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007); Greater Kan.
City Laborers Pension Fund v Superior Gen. Contractors, Inc., 104 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1997).
The district court granted the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, rejected the Funds’ argument that
the motion was premature because discovery had not
yet been provided or completed, and dismissed the
Funds’ pending motions on discovery issues as moot.
Pet. App. 37-39. The district court held that the existence of a live contract was an “essential jurisdictional
fact” that it had to “determine before proceeding forward.” Pet. App. 8. The district court weighed the
evidence and made judicial findings of fact. In doing
so, the district court concluded and emphasized (by
stating at three separate points in its opinion), that
the Funds already were pursuing post-contract contribution claims against Petitioner before the NLRB. Pet.
App. 18, 25, 32 (Petitioners have since admitted in
discovery responses on remand that this conclusion
5
was incorrect). The district court also found that the
certifications in Petitioner’s post-expiration Fringe
Benefit Reports were “boilerplate” and did not create
post-CBA-expiration contract obligations. Pet. App.
22, 31-32. The district court concluded there was no
independent agreement binding the parties, and that
the only post-expiration contribution duty arose from
Petitioner’s statutory duty under the NLRA which
Advanced Lightweight holds can be enforced only before the NLRB. Pet. App. 8, 26, 30-36.
The Funds appealed, arguing, inter alia, that it
was inappropriate to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and that their claims are expressly rooted
in enforceable promises and agreements, not statute.
Pet. App. 8.
In the Court of Appeals, Petitioner again relied on
Advanced Lightweight as the foundation for its arguments. Petitioner did not cite or argue San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959),
and did not argue Garmon preemption or “artful
pleading” in its brief to the Court of Appeals. See Petitioner’s Brief on Appeal, Sixth Cir. Doc. No. 25.
On August 8, 2022, the Court of Appeals reversed
the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Pet. App. 15. The Court of Appeals stated that the appeal “turns on a straightforward question: Is ‘the presence of a live contract’ an
‘essential jurisdictional fact’ in a § 515 ERISA action?”
Or, “does the presence of a live contract go to the merits of the[ Funds’] ERISA claim, not the district court’s
jurisdiction to hear it?” Pet. App. 8-9. The Court analyzed and applied Advanced Lighweight to answer
that question as follows:
6
We read Advanced Lightweight to stand for a simple proposition: ERISA grants federal district
courts jurisdiction to hear breach-of-contract
claims, not unfair-labor-practice claims. The scope
of this proposition is limited. It signifies only that a
plaintiff cannot use ERISA to get around the wellaccepted rule that an NLRA claim belongs in the
NLRB. And in practice, it plays out as follows. If a
plaintiff brings an ERISA claim for “promised [contractual] contributions,” a federal district court has
jurisdiction to hear the suit. Id. Put another way,
as long as a plaintiff’s claim rests on good-faith assertions that independent, live agreements bind
the employer, Advanced Lightweight does not enter the picture.
Pet. App. 10.
The Court of Appeals addressed the district court’s
factual finding that there are no contracts covering
the post-expiration time period, concluding that “those
findings go to the merits of the Funds’ ERISA claim,
not our jurisdiction to hear it. To the extent that the
district court concluded otherwise, it erred.” Pet. 1112. In other words, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the disputed factual issue of the existence of a postCBA-expiration contractual obligation should be decided as a “merits” issue (e.g., by a Rule 56 summary
judgment motion after completion of discovery) not as
a jurisdictional finding that had to be made before asserting jurisdiction over the case. In this regard, the
Court of Appeals stated:
[A]ssume Rieth-Riley is right about the contracts:
they don’t exist. Even so, a deficient contract claim
by itself doesn’t “convert[] the Funds’ complaint
into an unfair labor practice claim” and “divest[]”
this court of jurisdiction. Rather, it would mean
7
what a deficient claim always does in this context:
The Funds lose on the merits.
Pet. App. 14.
On August 25, 2022, Petitioner filed a motion asking the Court of Appeals to put its decision on hold
pending Petitioner’s forthcoming petition for certiorari. Motion to Stay Mandate, Sixth Cir. Doc. No. 40.
The Court of Appeals summarily denied that motion
on September 1, 2022. Sixth Cir. Doc. No. 41-2.
Since the Court of Appeals’ remand order, the case
has continued in the district court. After a September 8, 2022, status conference, discovery was conducted and completed as of November 30, 2022. Discovery conclusively established that a primary
factual conclusion underpinning the district court’s
opinion that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction
over this matter, i.e. its finding that the Funds already were pursuing claims for contributions against
Petitioner in the NLRB, was incorrect. Petitioner’s
Request for Admission Responses, District Court
Doc. No. 77-17, PageID# 3934-3936 (E.D. Mich. Case
No. 20-10323). On December 19, 2022, the Funds
and Petitioner each filed a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The Funds’ motion seeks to compel
a fund audit as requested in the Complaint, going
back to periods as early as January 1, 2016 or 2017
for certain Petitioner locations, and to subsequently
collect any shortfalls discovered by the audit. Funds’
SJ Motion, District Court Doc. No. 77, PageID# 3412,
3422-3423, 3427-3428. Petitioner’s summary judgment motion requests dismissal of the complaint, arguing, like its prior motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, that there is no enforceable contract
supporting the Funds’ claims. Pet. SJ Motion, District Court Doc. No. 75, PageID# 2464. Both motions
8
remain pending in the district court as of the date of
the Funds’ present brief in opposition.
B. Mischaracterizations in the petition
In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 15(2), the
Funds point out the following mischaracterizations or
inaccuracies in the Petition bearing on the questions
presented.
Petitioner repeatedly represents that it is “undisputed” or a matter of “undisputed fact” that there is no
contractual basis for the post-CBA-expiration obligations the Funds seek to enforce and that the obligations
allegedly arise solely under statutory duties. E.g., Pet.
i, 19, 23-24. This is incorrect. The Funds’ do not allege
or rely on a violation of the NLRA or statutory duties
and expressly premise their claims solely on independent contractual obligations. The Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that “the Funds argue[] that independent agreements continue to bind the parties”
after the expiration of the CBA. Pet. App. 8.
Petitioner represents and premises the petition on
the claim that the Funds’ ERISA claims are based on
“mere labels”. E.g., Pet. ii, 18. This is incorrect. The
Funds’ ERISA claims are expressly premised on enforceable agreements independent of NLRA obligations, including hundreds of written Fringe Benefit
Reports and certifications (quoted above) submitted
by Petitioner post-expiration, in which Petitioner expressly agreed that each Fringe Benefit Report was
accurate, and expressly agreed to comply with the payment terms of the expired CBA and the Funds’ Trust
Agreements containing clear and express Fund audit
rights and obligations. Pet. App. 22-23.
Petitioner asserts or suggests it is undisputed that
none of Petitioner’s contract offers to continue contrib-
9
uting to the Funds in accordance with the expired
CBA were “accepted.” Pet. 24. In fact, the Funds specifically argued to the Court of Appeals that the Funds
accepted the post-expiration contributions and Fringe
Benefit Reports submitted by Petitioner. E.g., Funds’
Brief on Appeal, Sixth Cir. Docket No. 22, p. 52 (Petitioner “continued to submit contributions with written certifications of assent to the benefit provisions of
the expired CBA and Trust Agreements—which the
Funds accepted—and to which neither the Union nor
the Funds objected”).3
Petitioner repeatedly suggests in the Petition that
it specifically argued Garmon in the Court of Appeals
and/or that the Court of Appeals inappropriately disregarded Garmon. Pet. i-ii (Questions Presented), 3,
22-23, 24. In fact, Petitioner did not cite Garmon or
argue Garmon preemption in the Court of Appeals.
Garmon is not even listed in the index of authorities
in Petitioner’s brief to the Court of Appeals. Sixth Cir.
Docket No. 25, p. v-ix.
Petitioner disingenuously suggests that the Court
of Appeals agreed with the district court’s factual findings that no enforceable contract exists, when Petitioner states: “the Sixth Circuit did not disagree with
any of the district court’s factual findings and, in fact
‘assume[d] Rieth-Riley is right about the contracts;
they do not exist.’ ” Pet. 18. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not opine on the correctness of the district
court’s factual findings as to the contract issue. The
The Funds similarly argue in the present district court proceedings that each of the post-expiration certifications by Petitioner, and accepted by the Funds, establish independent agreements to permit the Fund to audit Petitioner and to collect any
shortfalls discovered by audit. Fund SJ Motion, District Court
Doc. 77, PageID# 3413-3414.
3
10
Court of Appeals held that the contract issue should
not have been decided as a “jurisdictional fact” before
exercising jurisdiction over the Funds’ ERISA claims,
and remanded the case for it to be decided as a merits
issue. Pet. App. 11-12. The point in the opinion where
the Court of Appeals “assume[d]” the district court
was “right” about the contracts quite obviously was
made for the sake of argument—not as a statement of
agreement. Pet. App. 14.4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Funds respectfully request that the Court deny
the petition for a writ of certiorari and permit this
matter to continue in the normal course before the
district court.
The question Petitioner requests that this Court review was not raised in or addressed by the Court of
Appeals. See E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 476
U.S. 19, 24 (1986) (“Our normal practice . . . is to refrain from addressing issues not raised in
the Court of Appeals”). The question as Petitioner
now presents it involves Garmon, the Garmon preemption doctrine, and alleged “artful pleading” to
avoid Garmon preemption. Pet. i-ii. But Garmon
preemption and “artful pleading” were not argued by
Petitioner in the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the bulk of
The Court of Appeals summarized its decision on the disputed contract issue by stating: “as long as a plaintiff’s claim rests on
‘good faith’ assertions that independent, live agreements bind the
employer, Advanced Lightweight does not enter the picture.” Pet.
App. 10. Thus, although the Court of Appeals did not expressly
evaluate the strength of the evidence or arguments on the disputed post-expiration contract issue, by remanding the case over
Petitioner’s Advanced Lightweight arguments, the Court clearly
believed at the very least that a good faith basis exists for the
Funds’ contention that independent contracts bind Petitioner.
4
11
Petitioner’s legal arguments as to why a writ of certiorari should be granted, including those based on Garmon and Garmon preemption, Pet. 18-28, and its arguments based on the complete preemption doctrine
and the Railway Labor Act, Pet. 30-33, were not made
to the Court of Appeals and, thus, not addressed in
the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The questions actually raised in and addressed by
the Court of Appeals do not involve an important issue warranting review by the Court. This case involves a routine multiemployer fund collection case
which includes periods after expiration of a CBA and
the Court of Appeals engaged in a straightforward
and correct analysis and application of Advanced
Lightweight—consistent with other circuit courts of
appeals faced with the same issue. Decisions in multiple Circuits consistently hold that post-CBA-expiration contribution claims may be pursued under ERISA
in federal courts without interfering with Advanced
Lightweight’s ruling where, as here, a fund’s claims do
not claim a violation of the NLRA and are based on
promises or obligations of an employer independent of
the expired collective bargaining agreement. E.g.,
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Behnke,
Inc., 883 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1989); Brown v C. Volante
Corp, 194 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1999); Auto. Mech. Loc.
701 Welfare & Pension Funds v Vanguard Car Rental
USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007); Greater Kan.
City Laborers Pension Fund v Superior Gen. Contractors, Inc., 104 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1997).
The Court of Appeals’ decision does not create a circuit split with the Seventh Circuit as argued by Petitioner. Pet. 28-30. The Court of Appeals’ decision,
like decisions from other circuits, merely holds that
post-CBA-expiration claims that expressly seek to en-
12
force statutory NLRA duties belong before the NLRB;
while post-expiration claims that seek to enforce contractual obligations may be brought in federal courts
under ERISA.
Petitioner’s request for summary reversal should be
denied. In addition to all the other reasons discussed
herein, it is now clear that the district court’s opinion
which Petitioner requests the Court to summarily reinstate through summary reversal was premised on
an erroneous factual conclusion that the Funds already were pursing contribution claims against Petitioner in the NLRB.5
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO
REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS’
DECISION
For all the reasons below, the Funds respectfully request that the Court deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari and allow the case to play out in the district
court in the normal course.
A. The question presented and arguments in
the petition were not raised or developed
in the Court of Appeals
The Court should decline to review the question
presented in the petition because it was not properly
raised or preserved for review in the lower court, and
thus not developed in the judicial decisions below. See
E.E.O.C. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 476 U.S. 19, 24
Petitioner now admits that this finding was incorrect and
that the Funds were not pursuing claims for audit or contributions against Petitioner before the NLRB. 10-26-22 Request for
Admission Responses, District Court Doc. 77-17.
5
13
(1986). Petitioner argued in the Court of Appeals that
Advanced Lightweight was controlling. Pet. App. 10.
After the Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s Advanced Lightweight argument, Defendant filed this
Petition based primarily on San Diego Building
Trades Council v Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), a case
that Petitioner did not even cite in its brief to the
Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Index of Authorities to Petitioner’s Brief, Sixth Cir. Docket No. 25, p. 5-8. The
question presented in the Petition centers around
Garmon, the Garmon preemption doctrine, and arguments of alleged “artful pleading” in avoidance of Garmon preemption. Pet. i-ii (Question Presented), 3, 2223, 24.
But Petitioner did not argue Garmon
preemption or “artful pleading” in its brief to the Court
of Appeals. Even if Petitioner had specifically relied
on Garmon below, it would not have affected the outcome of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
Similarly missing from Petitioner’s brief to the
Court of Appeals were Petitioner’s present arguments
that the jurisdictional question in this case should be
decided through application of the complete preemption approach applicable to state law claims for violation of a labor agreement under the LMRA, or for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
(1)(B), or the approach to jurisdictional disputes under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-165
(“RLA”). Pet. 30-33.
B. The Court of Appeals’ decision was
correct, consistent with the Court’s
precedent, and did not create a
circuit split
The Court of Appeals in this case simply applied the
Court’s own analysis as set forth in Advanced Lightweight in determining that there is federal court juris-
14
diction in this matter. The Court of Appeals rejected
Petitioner’s jurisdictional argument because the
plaintiffs in Advanced Lightweight alleged that the
employer’s unilateral decision to stop contributing to
employee benefit funds constituted an unfair labor
practice and was therefore a violation of the NLRA.
Because the argument of the fund in Advanced Lightweight was based on an employer’s statutory duty under the NLRA to maintain the status quo upon expiration of a collective bargaining agreement rather than
a contractual duty under ERISA, the Court ruled in
Advanced Lightweight that there was no federal court
jurisdiction but that the matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Here, the Funds have never alleged that Petitioner
engaged in an unfair labor practice or violated the
NLRA, but have always maintained that Petitioner
violated post-CBA-expiration contractual obligations.
Under Advanced Lightweight, if the underlying claim
at issue constitutes an unfair labor practice, the NLRA
preempts other laws and the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction. The NLRA does not automatically preempt
ERISA, however, when the underlying claim arises
under ERISA and is contractual.
Petitioner also has changed its argument before
the Court of Appeals by asserting repeatedly in the
Petition that the issue now is whether a plaintiff can
“artfully plead” in order to convert an unfair labor
practice claim into a breach of contract claim to get
around the analysis in Advanced Lightweight. In doing so, Petitioner ignores the undisputed fact that the
Funds have never asserted an unfair labor practice or
violation of the NLRA but have always maintained
that, post-CBA-expiration, Petitioner violated its contractual obligations (not simply those set forth in the
15
expired collective bargaining agreement but also
those in Fringe Benefit Reports executed by Petitioner and the Funds’ trust agreements to which Petitioner was bound). Petitioner cannot get around the undisputed facts in the record that the Funds simply
haven’t alleged any such violation, as Defendant did
continue paying contributions after expiration of the
collective bargaining agreement. The Funds simply
seek an audit to determine if the contributions were
made on behalf of the proper employees. Pet. App. 7.
See Cent. States Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc.,
472 U.S. 559, 569, 581 (1985) (upholding fund’s right
to conduct random audits as provided for in trust
agreements—“Given Congress’ vision of the proper
administration of employee benefit plans under
ERISA . . . the audit requested by [the fund] is well
within the authority of the trustees as outlined in the
trust documents” and “highly relevant to legitimate
trustee concerns”).
Petitioner alleges a circuit split with the Seventh
Circuit, citing RiverStone Group, Inc. v Midwest Operating Eng’rs Fringe Benefit Funds, 33 F.4th 424 (7th
Cir. 2022). Pet. 28-30. Riverstone, however, involved
a situation—as in Advanced Lightweight—where
plaintiffs alleged violations of “labor law” in connection with an employer’s refusal to maintain the status
quo after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. The courts in Riverstone did nothing different
from the Court of Appeals here and simply applied the
same analysis. The Court of Appeals in the present
case specifically addressed and distinguished RiverStone in its decision, observing:
[The Funds in Riverstone] didn’t argue a breach of
the CBA or other written instrument, but asserted
that ‘labor law’ required RiverStone to ‘honor the
16
terms of an expired agreement.’ Here, the Funds
bring a contract claim, not a ‘labor law’ claim. So
their suit differs from those brought in Advanced
Lightweight or RiverStone. In those cases, the
plaintiffs tried to use an ERISA cause of action to
air their unfair-labor-practice claims in federal
courts. Here, the Funds do not such thing; they alleged contract claims only.
Pet. App. 14-15.
The Court of Appeals also cited decisions from both
the Second and Seventh Circuits (as well as other circuits) upholding federal court jurisdiction when—as
here—the plaintiff alleged post-CBA-expiration contractual ERISA violations, rather than statutory
NLRA violations. Pet. App. 11-12. See Automobile
Mec. Loc. 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v Vanguard
Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2007)
(jurisdiction proper where Funds did not rely on any
alleged statutory NLRA duty employer had to continue contributing during post-expiration status quo period but claimed violation of contractual duty); Brown
v. C. Volante Corp., 194 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1999)
(affirming ERISA jurisdiction over action for unpaid
contributions after CBA expiration where fund did
not argue an unfair labor practice, observing that Advanced Lightweight “stands only for the unremarkable proposition that the [NLRB] generally has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice claims”);
Greater Kan. City Laborers Pension Fund v Superior
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 104 F.3d 1050, 1058 (8th Cir.
1997) (“Defendants’ reliance on Advanced Lightweight
is misplaced, because the Funds, unlike the plaintiff
trustees in Advanced Lightweight, did not claim that
defendants’ failure to make fringe benefit contributions constituted an unfair labor practice”).
17
C. The errors argued by Petitioner primarily
involve factual disputes and are not
sufficiently important to warrant review
Petitioner’s arguments boil down to a routine factual dispute as to whether there is sufficient evidence
of independent post-CBA-expiration contract obligations. This dispute is in the process of being addressed by the district court on remand under Rule
56 summary judgment standards and thereafter will
be subject to appeal of right on the complete record.
It is not an issue of sufficient importance to warrant
review of the present Court of Appeals decision. E.g.,
Supreme Court Rule 10 (“A petition . . . is rarely
granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous
factual findings . . . .”).
D. The Court of Appeals’ decision does not
present a complete, final, or clean slate on
which to decide the question presented
The district court opinion which Petitioner ultimately seeks to reinstate through the Petition is premised in part on factual conclusions that have been
shown by Petitioner’s discovery responses on remand
to be incorrect. Contrary to the findings in the district
court opinion at issue before the Court of Appeals, the
Funds have not pursued contribution claims against
Petitioner in the NLRB.
Moreover, this case involves not only claims of contributions owing after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, which was the focus of the Court
of Appeals’ decision. It also involves multiemployer
fund audit rights. The Funds’ claims expressly request to compel an audit, Pet. App. 6-7, 25, which is a
well-established right, extremely important to proper
administration of multiemployer benefit funds, en-
18
forceable under ERISA and the Court’s precedent.
Cent. States Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472
U.S. 559 (1985). The audit must be completed in order to determine the nature and extent to which there
are delinquent contributions, if any, and to identify
the nature and dates of any delinquent contributions.
Pet. App. 7; Funds’ Appeal Brief, Sixth Cir. Doc. No.
22, p. 44-46.
Post-remand discovery and motions in the district
court more clearly define the evidence and issues involved in this case. Further, the Funds’ summary
judgment motion currently pending in the district
court expressly seeks to enforce the Funds’ audit right
regarding time periods prior to the May 31, 2018 expiration of the CBA.6 These pre-expiration time periods
are subject to unexpired contract obligations under
the CBA and are not subject to the Advanced Lightweight arguments focused on in the Court of Appeals
decision at issue in the petition.
II. SUMMARY REVERSAL IS NOT
WARRANTED
As acknowledged by Petitioner, Pet. 23, “[a] summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved
by this Court for situations in which the law is settled
and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error.” Schweiker v. Hansen,
450 U.S. 785, 791 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The Funds’ complaint and claims seek to enforce the Fund
auditor’s October 1, 2019, audit request letter, which covers periods going back as far as January 2016 and January 2017 for certain of Petitioner’s business locations. Complaint, District Court
Doc. 12, PageID# 68, 70-71; Funds SJ Motion, District Court
Doc. 77, PageID# 3406 & audit letter, District Court Doc. 77-10,
PageID# 3663.
6
19
Petitioner’s request for summary reversal clearly is
without merit for all the reasons herein. As discussed
above, the Court of Appeals decision was correctly decided and there are factual issues yet to be decided on
remand. And of particular significance, the district
court decision which Petitioner seeks to reinstate
through summary reversal is premised on factual
findings which are now undisputed to be incorrect.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
nanCy h. peaRCe
Counsel of Record
danIel g. Levan
FInkel WhITefIeld Feldman
32300 Northwestern Highway, Ste. 200
Farmington Hills, MI 48334
(248) 855-6500
npearce@fwf-law.com
dlevan@fwf-law.com
Counsel for Respondents
Dated: January 6, 2023
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.