Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jonathan Corbett, Petitioner v. Transportation Security Administration, et al.

NO. __________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_______________

JONATHAN CORBETT,

Petitioner

V.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

DAVID P. PEKOSKE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.

Respondents

_______________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

_______________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_______________

JONATHAN CORBETT, ESQ.

CORBETT RIGHTS, P.C.

PETITIONER (ATTORNEY PROCEEDING PRO SE)

958 N. WESTERN AVE. #765

HOLLYWOOD, CA 90029

PHONE: (310) 684-3870

E-MAIL: JON@CORBETTRIGHTS.COM

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is a pandemic-related public health mandate

within the statutory authority granted by Congress to

the U.S. Transportation Security Administration?

2. Has this controversy become moot as a result of

TSA’s announcement that it will not presently enforce

its mandate and, if so, should the opinion of the court

below be vacated?

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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Jonathan Corbett, a member of the

Bar of this Court appearing Court pro se.

Respondent is the U.S. Transportation Security

Administration, a sub-agency of the U.S. Department

of Homeland Security.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ........................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iv

......... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ...............................................

......... 1

JURISDICTION......................................................

......... 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .............

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................... 3

A. Factual Background .......................................... 3

B. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals ................ 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......... 9

I. The Rules Set By NFIB v. OSHA Conflict With

That Used By the Court Below ............................... 9

II. The Opinion Below Stands To Grant TSA And

Countless Other Agencies Powers Beyond Those

Authorized By Congress ........................................ 14

III. This Case Is An Excellent Candidate For A

Grant, Vacate, Remand Order .............................. 16

IV. Alternatively, If The Issue is Moot, the Court

Should Vacate The Decision Below....................... 17

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 20

APPENDIX A – D.C. Circuit Opinion ...................... 2a

......... 30a

APPENDIX B – Order Denying Rehearing .........

APPENDIX C – Order Denying Rehearing En Banc

..........................................................32a

......... 34a

APPENDIX D – Statutes & Regulations .........

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alabama Association of Realtors v. Dept. of Health

and Human Svcs., ___ U.S. ___ (Aug. 26th, 2021). 11

Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S. ____ (2018) ......................... 19

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............... 7, 14, 15

City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301 (2013). 14

Health Freedom Defense Fund v. Biden, 8:20-CV1693 (M.D. Fla, April 18th, 2022) ............................ 4

NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U. S. ___, No. 21A244 (Jan. 13th,

2022) ....................................... 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) .................... 18

United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950). 19

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. ____ (2022) ........... 13

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ..................................................... 2

28 U.S.C..§ 2101(c) ...................................................... 2

29 U.S.C. § 655 .......................................................... 10

49 U.S.C. § 41706 ........................................................ 4

49 U.S.C. § 44901(h)(1) ............................................. 13

49 U.S.C. § 44903(b)(3)(A) ........................................ 13

49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) ............................................... 1, 5

Regulations

49 C.F.R. § 1542.201(b)............................................. 12

49 C.F.R. § 1542.221 ................................................. 12

49 C.F.R. § 1542.101(a)(1) ........................................ 12

86 FR 8025 .................................................................. 4

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OPINIONS BELOW

This case began as a petition to the Court of

Appeals for review of an order of the Transportation

Security Administration, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §

46110(a). There were therefore no District Court

proceedings and Petitioner was neither entitled to nor

received any proceedings in front of the agency.

The opinion of the D.C. Circuit dismissing

Petitioner’s original petition is attached as Appendix

A. The opinion of the same denying a petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc is attached as

Appendices B & C. The case number below was 211074.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals denied a timely petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc on February 2nd,

2022. Jurisdiction was proper in the Court of Appeals

pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).

On April 23rd, 2022, Petitioner filed a timely

application to extend the time to file a petition for a

writ of certiorari. The application was assigned

number 21A652 and was granted on April 28th, 2022,

extending the time to file until July 2nd, 2022. By

operation of S. Ct. R. 30.1 and a holiday weekend, this

petition is timely if filed by July 5th, 2022.

-1-

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1) .

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

All statutes found in the Table of Authorities are

reproduced in Appendix D.

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Factual Background

In the days after the attacks of September 11th,

2001,

Congress

created

Respondent

U.S.

Transportation Security Administration and granted

the agency broad authority in the realm of

transportation security. Since 2002, TSA has been the

familiar face of airport security, conducting passenger

screening on approximately two million people daily,

as well as baggage and cargo screening, maintenance

of trusted and restricted traveler databases, the

Federal Air Marshal Service, and certain security

functions on other interstate modes of transportation.

Both by law and in practice, TSA’s role has always

been limited to security issues, i.e., preventing

intentional attack on our transportation system, and

until mid-2018 described its vision as to “[p]rovide the

most effective transportation security in the most

efficient way as a high performing counterterrorism

organization1.” The preeminent goal of the agency is

to prevent another 9/11. TSA has never been granted

authority or funding to conduct a general safety

mission – i.e., preventing accidents from happening –

much less a public health mission. There are other

agencies who do have this power; most notably, the

1 See Archive of TSA’s Mission Statement, Saved

April 5th, 2018:

https://web.archive.org/web/20180405122757/https://

www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission

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Federal Aviation Administration has general safety

authority with regards to air transportation (or for

non-aviation modes of transit, other components of

the Department of Transportation), while the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention has general public

health authority (including within the transportation

system). These agencies regularly use this authority

to protect health and safety. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §

41706 (airplane smoking ban passed in FAA’s

authorization); 86 FR 8025 (CDC enacts its own

airplane mask mandate).

Notwithstanding, in the advent of the coronavirus

pandemic, TSA has claimed the authority to issue

public health mandates binding on the general public

whenever they are within the aviation system. In

particular, TSA has required air passengers (and the

employees serving them) to wear masks throughout

all airports and on all airplanes at all times with

limited exceptions (hereafter, the “mask mandate”)2.

TSA has extended and/or re-issued this mandate

multiple times. However, on April 18th, 2022, the

CDC’s airplane mask mandate was enjoined in Health

Freedom Defense Fund v. Biden, 8:20-CV-1693 (M.D.

Fla, April 18th, 2022).

The initial government

response appeared to be to abandon all of its travelrelated mask mandates: TSA announced that same

2 This case presented no challenge to the prudence of

the mask mandate; the sole challenge was to whether

TSA has the statutory authority to promulgate it.

-4-

day that it would “no longer enforce” its mask

mandate as a result of that court decision and that it

“will also rescind” the next extension of its mask

mandate3. However, the government apparently

reconsidered its position: an appeal was filed in the

CDC’s case4, and while TSA has not appeared to have

enforced its mandate since April, it has never formally

rescinded its mandate in any public forum5.

B.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed his original proceeding in U.S.

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

on February 26th, 2021. The case was filed directly in

the Court of Appeals because the policy was created

by the issuance of TSA “security directives,” which

constitutes an “order” subject to 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a),

a statute that channels review directly to that court.

3 TSA. “Statement regarding face mask use on public

transportation.” April 18th, 2022.

https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/statements/2022/04/1

8/statement-regarding-face-mask-use-publictransportation

4 11th Cir. Case No. 22-11287.

5 The undersigned counsel represents that he

attempted to conference with the government’s

counsel shortly after the CDC injunction to determine

if TSA had non-publicly rescinded, or would soon

publicly rescind; government counsel was unable or

unwilling to confirm.

-5-

Respondent’s brief was filed on June 9th, 2021,

which in sum made the following arguments: 1) that

Petitioner lacked standing, 2) that TSA was merely

supporting CDC6, or that its rule overlaps a similar

rule of CDC such that overturning TSA’s rule without

also overturning CDC’s would provide Petitioner no

relief, 3) that TSA’s mission includes both safety and

security components, 4) that coronavirus does

threaten the “security” of transportation, and 5) that

TSA’s emergency powers allow for the mandate even

if under non-emergency circumstances, TSA would

lack such authority.

The case was fully briefed on July 1st, 2021, and

decided, without oral arguments, by a panel on

December 10th, 2021. The decision was 2-1 in favor of

denying the petition, although the “dissenting” judge

also would have denied the petition on other grounds.

The opinion was published as Corbett v. Transp. Sec.

Admin., 19 F.4th 478 (D.C. Cir. 2021) and is attached

in Appendix A.

The majority rejected TSA’s argument that

Petitioner did not have standing. App’x 11a (“As a

directly regulated party, Corbett plainly has standing

to pursue his claims in this case.”). It also rejected

TSA’s argument that the court could afford no relief

6

TSA is allowed to “coordinate” and “oversee”

transportation-related duties of other agencies during

emergencies, see 49 U.S.C. § 114(g)(1)(B), but not to

issue its own regulations.

-6-

on account of CDC’s similar rule because TSA’s “Mask

Directives are not a one-for-one fit with the CDC

Order as far as scope … and they indisputably carry

new and distinct penalties.” Id., pp. 12a-13a.

However, the majority was skeptical of Petitioner’s

argument that Congress intended for TSA’s security

powers to exclude safety matters, and ultimately

found that it was unimportant to distinguish because

“TSA has established that COVID-19 qualifies as a

threat to both safety and security.” Id., p. 33. It also

found that TSA’s emergency powers “cannot seriously

be doubted” to include the mask directives. Id. The

Court called out the familiar standard called for by

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but did not appear

to actually apply the test called for by that case and

its progeny in its reasoning, instead essentially

finding TSA’s authority to be sufficiently obvious as to

not require going through the process.

The dissenting judge agreed that TSA has

authority but would have disposed of the case by

denying standing. App’x 27a-29a.

A timely motion for rehearing and rehearing en

banc was filed January 24th, 2022, bringing the court

below’s attention to NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U. S. ___, No.

21A244 (Jan. 13th, 2022), a decision of this Court

issued after the merits panel ruled in this case, that

clarified how courts should address agencies that

issue emergency coronavirus mandates that are

-7-

outside of their traditional sphere of operation. The

court below denied both rehearing and rehearing en

banc on February 2nd, 2022. App’x 30a-33a.

-8-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The Rules Set By NFIB v. OSHA Conflict

With That Used By the Court Below

The general thrust of the Court’s decision in NFIB

was that the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration was charged by Congress with

occupational safety- and health-related matters, and

that general public health measures are outside of

that scope. NFIB at *6. In other words, a public

health matter that affects the general public at all

times, whether or not they are at work, is not an

“occupational” matter just because it also affects them

at work.

The general thrust of Petitioner’s argument in the

court below was that the Transportation Security

Administration was charged by Congress with

transportation security, and general public health

measures are outside of that scope. In other words, a

public health matter that affects the general public at

all times, whether or not they are in the

transportation system, is not a “transportation

security” matter just because it also happens while

engaged in transportation – and further, it is not a

“security” matter whatsoever: security and public

health are simply two different things.

NFIB looked at the high-level intent of Congress,

starting with the name of the agency and continuing

to the basic powers assigned to the agency and its

head in the enabling act. “The Act empowers the

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Secretary to set workplace safety standards, not broad

public health measures. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)

(directing the Secretary to set ‘occupational safety and

health standards’ (emphasis added)); § 655(c)(1)

(authorizing the Secretary to impose emergency

temporary standards necessary to protect ‘employees’

from grave danger in the workplace).” NFIB at *6.

In the court below, Petitioner urged the panel to do

the same. TSA’s enabling act provides that “The

Administrator shall be responsible for security in all

modes of transportation, including — (1) carrying out

chapter 449, relating to civil aviation security, and

related research and development activities; and (2)

security responsibilities over other modes of

transportation that are exercised by the Department

of Transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 114(d) (emphasis

added). A review of 49 U.S.C., Chapter 449, makes

clear Congress’s mandate was with regards to

passenger screening, cargo screening, managing

intelligence relating to threats to civil aviation,

technology to detect weapons and explosives, federal

air marshals, and similar matters.

The court below declined to take this approach. It

instead found that anything that “poses a threat to the

operational viability of the transportation system” is

transportation-security related. App’x 20a. This

simply misses the mark. Even pre-NFIB7, no one

7 And even pre-NFIB, the Court’s approach in NFIB

was not subtly foreshadowed in Alabama Association

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would say that rising jet fuel prices, weather

incidents, or airport/aircraft maintenance issues are

transportation security issues, even though they

clearly tend to affect the “operational viability of the

transportation system.” But NFIB makes clear that a

general public health matter’s tangential effect on

something within an agency’s purview simply does not

give the agency the authority to regulate the public

health. There is no doubt that coronavirus has

affected the “operational viability” of many

workplaces – certainly, there are millions of

businesses that closed, temporarily or permanently,

due to the pandemic – but that did not give OSHA the

authority to regulate on the matter, and obviously,

TSA’s mandate here does not fall under the same

umbrella as does its customary passenger screening,

cargo inspection, air marshals, and the like. This

standard directly conflicts with the standard used by

of Realtors v. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., ___

U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 2485, No. 21A23 (Aug. 26th, 2021).

The court below distinguished this case by finding

that the mandate fit within both “transportation

‘security’ and ‘safety.’” App’x a20. NFIB makes clear,

to the extent that Alabama Ass’n was not, that public

health mandates cannot be squeezed into these

buckets.

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this court in NFIB.8

The court below also failed to apply the skepticism

traditionally applied when an agency “discovers”

newly-found powers. For nearly 20 years, TSA has

stayed in its lane and regulated only security issues.

A review of the agency’s regulations makes this clear.

See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.101(a)(1) (must prevent “an act

of criminal violence, aircraft piracy, and the

introduction of an unauthorized weapon, explosive, or

incendiary into an aircraft.”); § 1542.201(b) (prevent

unauthorized persons) § 1542.221 (piracy attempt

recordkeeping); etc. Congress has likewise been

exceptionally clear, and the few times that TSArelated statutes use the word “safety” all either make

clear that the word was inartfully used and meant to

8

One may reasonably argue that the mandate in

NFIB was more onerous and consequential than the

one here, as NFIB addressed a job-threatening

vaccination requirement. Petitioner is not arguing

that the mandates are “equal,” but one should

consider that: 1) the NFIB mandate allowed a testand-mask opt-out that was perhaps less intrusive

than vaccination, 2) there are many pilots, flight

attendants, and others who have indeed lost their jobs

over unwillingness or inability to comply with TSA’s

mandate, and hundreds of travelers (or more) have

been fined, lost their PreCheck status, and/or been

ejected from flights, and 3) regardless of how onerous

mandate compliance may be, we are still left with an

agency that has forayed into public health, affecting

billions in commerce, when its statutory mission

simply does not contemplate the same.

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speak of security, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 44901(h)(1)

(allowing armed law enforcement for “passenger

safety and national security”), or meant to impose a

special limited duty on TSA, e.g. 49 U.S.C. §

44903(b)(3)(A) (TSA must keep passengers safe while

searching them).

Although the court below did not have the benefit

of it either during initial hearing or when considering

rehearing and rehearing en banc, the Court reiterated

this point last week: when claimed authority is novel

to the “history and the breadth of the authority that

[the agency] has asserted,” and the significance of

allowing the new authority is considerable, there is a

“‘reason to hesitate before concluding’ that Congress’

meant to confer such authority.” West Virginia v.

EPA, 597 U. S. ____ (2022), at *17. The Court went

through two pages of examples where despite “a

colorable textual basis” for claimed authority, it was

simply obvious that the claimed authority was not

what Congress meant and thus the Court rejected the

agency’s overreach. Id. at *17, 18.

The same skepticism that applied in NFIB when

OSHA claimed newly-found authority to wade into

public health regulation, and in West Virginia v. EPA

and the collection of cases found therein, should have

been applied with equal force to TSA’s newly-found

authority. It is clear that the court below applied no

such skepticism and instead eagerly granted new

authority too heavy to be supported by the “wafer-thin

reed” allegedly provided by Congress.

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II.

The Opinion Below Stands To Grant TSA

And Countless Other Agencies Powers

Beyond Those Authorized By Congress

The Court should grant this petition and review

the ruling of the court below because it stands not just

to allow TSA to create a mask policy, but to grant

deference to any agency’s action in a manner far

beyond even the highly deferential standard of

Chevron that would apply even if the major questions

doctrine did not dominate the analysis.

The D.C. Circuit mentioned Chevron in the

“standard of review” section of its opinion, and then in

its analysis mentions Chevron again but one time to

share that “’the question in every case is, simply,

whether the statutory text forecloses the agency's

assertion of authority, or not.’” App’x 22a, citing City

of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301 (2013). It may

be true that the Chevron test is aimed at answering

that question, but foregoing an actual application of a

tried-and-true test in favor of simply looking at the

goal of the test and summarily concluding that the

goal is met does not get the job done.

To be clear, Chevron may not even be the correct

test, in light of NFIB and in an instance where the

major questions doctrine may resolve the question

without reaching Chevron.

But, assuming that

Chevron and the major questions doctrine harmonize

together to produce a result here, or even in the

instance that Chevron alone does the job, the court

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below did not just “misapply” the Chevron test; it

failed to apply it at all.

The result is that loose standards like “threatens

operational viability” will now be the only hurdle an

agency has to overcome in order to satisfy “Step 1”

and/or “Step 2” of the Chevron test9. Given that

coronavirus threatens the “operational viability” of

the post office, the IRS, the General Services

Administration, and virtually every other agency, we

are left with a standard by which any and all agencies

are allowed to promulgate any and all coronavirus

regulations. Clearly this would not even stop with

pandemics: does global warming not affect the

“operational viability” of the post office? And if people

cannot send mail, have we not threatened the

operational viability of the IRS as well? And with less

taxpayer money, how can GSA operate? And so on

and so forth.

The actual application of a principled test is

required here. The court below did not even touch the

considerations presented by NFIB – refusing

rehearing after the case was brought to its attention –

and it did nothing to actually apply Chevron either.

The result was a mistaken judgment here and a door

open to further mistakes in the future, and the Court

9

Since the court below did not actually apply the

Chevron test, it is unclear where exactly the D.C.

Circuit would terminate the test; notwithstanding,

both steps require far more precision.

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will eventually need to correct the court below,

whether it does so now or in a future case where the

stakes may be even higher. This is doubly-so given

the D.C. Circuit’s prominence in agency review

actions (thus reducing the likelihood of other circuits

considering the matter and assisting in developing the

law) and that circuit’s refusal of en banc review. The

Court should take the time to correct this matter

before more cases are wrongly decided.

III.

This Case Is An Excellent Candidate For A

Grant, Vacate, Remand Order

Regardless of whether NFIB – decided after the

panel opinion in this case but before the motion for

rehearing – represents a change in the law or simply

a clarification of how the law is applied in a scenario

that was substantially similar to the one presented

here, it is clear from NFIB that the court below took a

different approach to analyzing the merits than this

Court did.

In light of the fact that the approach used by the

Court of Appeals in this case cannot be harmonized

with that used in NFIB, the court below should have

granted the petition for rehearing that Petitioner filed

immediately after NFIB was announced. A grant,

vacate, and remand order from this Court would

essentially direct the Court of Appeals to do what it

should have done in the first place: recognize that the

Court has set forth a new applicable framework and

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apply it. Given the advent of new law, it may be

appropriate for the Court to guide the Court of

Appeals toward taking a new look.

IV.

Alternatively, If The Issue is Moot, the

Court Should Vacate The Decision Below

The issue of mootness is raised by the

government’s pronouncement that it will no longer

enforce the mask mandate. There are several reasons

for the Court to find that the issue is still live.

First, the government has declined to formally

rescind the security directives. An agency statement

that it will not (presently) enforce a mandate is

operative only at the pleasure of the agency’s leader.

It takes no rulemaking or additional authorization to

resume enforcement; only the whim of Respondent

Pekoske.

Second, the government’s suspension of the

mandate was not entirely voluntary, but based on a

court decision that it has decided to appeal. Should

the appeal be successful, there is substantial

likelihood that the mandate could be resumed either

immediately or upon the next “strain” of coronavirus

becoming popular.

Third, the executive has signaled strong support

for mask mandates and for TSA, in particular, to

implement them. TSA was initially brought into this

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issue at the written direction of the President himself

immediately following inauguration10.

The

government continues to recommend that all noninfant travelers wear masks while traveling11. The

government has never conceded any scientific or legal

impropriety with its mandate, and especially given

the frequency that “new strains” of the virus appear,

Petitioner has reasonable fear that the mandate’s

return is forthcoming.

Finally, coronavirus has shown itself capable of

coming and going on a repeated basis.

The

regulations have followed, and will continue to follow,

suit. Just as the ephermal nature of pregnancy made

regulations on the same “capable of repetition, yet

evading review,” the same doctrine applies to

coronavirus restrictions. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

125 (1973) (overruled on other grounds).

In the event that the Court concludes that this is

no longer a live controversy, however, the Court

10

TSA.

“TSA to implement Executive Order

regarding face masks at airport security checkpoints

and throughout the transportation network.” Jan.

31st,

2021.

https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2021/01/31/t

sa-implement-executive-order-regarding-face-masksairport-security

11 CDC. “Wearing Masks in Travel and Public

Transportation Settings.” Updated May 13th, 2022.

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/travelers/masks-public-transportation.html

- 18 -

should vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals

pursuant to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340

U.S. 36 (1950). “The established practice of the Court

in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal

system which has become moot while on its way here

or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or

vacate the judgment below and remand with a

direction to dismiss.” Id.

“Because this practice is rooted in equity, the

decision whether to vacate turns on the conditions and

circumstances of the particular case. One clear

example where vacatur is in order is when mootness

occurs through the unilateral action of the party who

prevailed in the lower court.” Azar v. Garza, 584 U.S.

____, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1792 (2018) (overruled on other

grounds) (cleaned up).

Here, any mootness was entirely out of control of

the party requesting vacatur: TSA voluntarily

discontinued its mask mandate, even if out of fear that

a court may give it the same treatment as CDC’s mask

mandate, and regardless of whether TSA or a court is

“responsible,” it is certainly not Petitioner.

Given the importance of ensuring that the court

below’s near blank check is cancelled, vacatur is a

worthy exercise of the Court’s time. As described

supra in subsection II, allowing that holding to stand

will assuredly result in the improper endorsement of

agency action that will quickly become a burden on

this Court and the parties affected.

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CONCLUSION

There are many who would consider the imposition

of mask-wearing to be a mere “trifle.” But this case is

not about whether TSA has created an intolerable

burden. It is about whether a federal agency may

substantially deviate from the authority granted to it

by Congress, regardless of whether its reasons for

doing so are pure.

Just as OSHA strayed too far with its vaccination

requirement, and CDC too far with its eviction

moratorium, TSA has meandered past the boundaries

of its enabling act with its mask mandate and the

Court of Appeals has green-lit this detour when this

Court has clearly signaled yellow, if not red. For the

reasons above, this petition for certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully,

_______________________________

Jonathan Corbett

CORBETT RIGHTS, P.C.

Petitioner

Attorney Proceeding Pro Se

958 N. Western Ave. #765

Hollywood, CA 90029

Phone: (310) 684-3870

FAX: (310) 675-7080

E-mail: jon@corbettrights.com

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