Amicus Curiae Brief — Gerald E. Groff, Petitioner v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General
Supreme Court briefFeb 28, 2023
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No. 22-174
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
GERALD E. GROFF,
v.
Petitioner,
LOUIS DEJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Respondent
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
BRIEF OF THE THOMAS MORE SOCIETY AND
THE JEWISH COALITION FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
Thomas Brejcha
Counsel of Record
Stephen M. Crampton
Thomas More Society
309 W. Washington St.
Suite 1250
Chicago, IL 60606
Telephone: (312) 782-1680
Facsimile: (312) 782-1887
tbrejcha@thomasmoresociety.org
Howard Slugh
Jewish Coalition
for Religious Liberty
2400 Virginia Ave, N.W., C619
Washington, D.C. 20037
Telephone: (954) 328-9461
hslugh@jcrl.org
B. Tyler Brooks
Thomas More Society
100 E. Lake Drive, Suite 6
Greensboro, NC 27403
Telephone: (336) 707-8855
Facsimile: (336) 900-6535
tbrooks@thomasmoresociety.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
LANTAGNE LEGAL PRINTING
801 East Main Street Suite 100 Richmond, Virginia 23219 (800) 847-0477
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................iii
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI
CURIAE .............................................................. 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3
I.
RELIGION SHOULD NOT BE
TREATED AS A “LESSER” CATEGORY
OF PROTECTION UNDER TITLE VII. ........... 3
II.
THE DE MINIMIS STANDARD HAS
UNDERMINED THE SCOPE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTIONS
UNDER TITLE VII BY PERMITTING
THE MOST MINOR OF
INCONVENIENCES TO QUALIFY AS
AN “UNDUE HARDSHIP” FOR AN
EMPLOYER. ....................................................... 6
III. THIS COURT SHOULD RETURN TO A
DEFINITION OF “UNDUE HARDSHIP”
THAT IS FAITHFUL TO THE TEXT OF
TITLE VII AND THUS SHOULD GIVE
EFFECT TO THE BALANCE
CONGRESS ATTEMPTED TO STRIKE
FOR AMERICA’S DIVERSE AND
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY. ............................... 8
A.
Hardison Improperly Tips the
Scales Against Employees of Faith. .......... 8
ii
B.
Societal Changes Make the Need
for Title VII’s Protections All the
More Necessary. ....................................... 16
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 17
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60
(1986) .................................................................. 9
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d
126 (1st Cir. 2004) ............................................ 11
Dalberiste v. GLE Assocs., Inc., 814 Fed. App'x
495 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 2463 (Apr. 5, 2021) (No. 19-1461) .............. 10
Dalberiste v. GLE Assocs., Inc., No. 19-1461
(July 31, 2020) .................................................. 10
Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480 (5th
Cir. 2014) ............................................................ 9
Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803
(1989) .................................................................. 4
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
575 U.S. 768 (2015) ............................................ 5
EEOC v. JBS USA, LLC, 339 F. Supp. 3d
1135 (D. Colo. 2018)............................................ 7
EEOC v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. IP 99-1962C H/G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15621
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 2001) .................................... 7
iv
E.E.O.C. v. Thompson Contracting, Grading,
Paving, & Utils., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d
738 (E.D.N.C. 2011) .................................... 11, 12
EEOC v. Walmart Stores East, L.P., No. 201419, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33263 (7th
Cir. June 4, 2021) ............................................. 10
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct.
2246 (2019)........................................................ 17
Farah v. A-1 Careers, No. 12-2692-SAC, 2013
WL. 6095118, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
164930 (D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2013) ..................... 7, 9
Finnie v. Lee Cty., Miss., 907 F. Supp. 2d 750
(N.D. Miss. 2012) .............................................. 10
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No.
12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d
Cir. 1999) .......................................................... 15
George v. Home Depot, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20627 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2001) ............................. 7
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (2015)............. 4
Hedican v. Walmart Stores East, L.P., 142 S.
Ct. 1357 (2022).................................................. 10
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136 (1987) .................................... 11, 12
Jiglov v. Hotel Peabody, G.P., 719 F. Supp. 2d
918 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) ...................................... 11
v
Leonce, No. 7:03-C 2008 WL. 58892 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 3, 2008)........................................................ 7
Mohamed v. 1st Class Staffing, LLC, 286 F.
Supp. 3d 884 (S.D. Ohio 2017) ......................... 10
O'Lone v. Est. of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) ....... 14
In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 1978) ................... 15
Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App'x 581
(11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
685 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 18-349) ...................... 10
Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 140 S. Ct. 685
(2020) .................................................................. 6
Prach v. Hollywood Supermarket, Inc., No. 0913756, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88738
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2010) ............................... 11
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ................... 12
Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S.
Ct. 1227 (2021).................................................... 5
Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952
F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 1227 (Apr. 5, 2021) (No. 191388) .................................................................. 10
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 (1977) ........................ 3, 5, 6, 8-12, 15, 17
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ..................... 9
vi
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) ....................................... 3, 4, 8
42 U.S.C. § 2000e ........................................................ 1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
3 Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch Orach
Chayim 242-365 (1977) .................................... 13
5 The Founders' Constitution 82, 82 ........................ 12
A. Scalia & B. Garner, READING LAW 167
(2012) .................................................................. 4
Aron Moss, Why Do Jewish Women Cover
Their Hair, Chabbad.org .................................. 14
Aryeh Kaplan, Sabbath: Day of Eternity, 2
The Aryeh Kaplan Anthology 107 (1998) ........ 13
Exodus 31:14
.......................................................... 14
Gertrude Himmelfarb, One Nation, Two
Cultures 96 (2001) ............................................ 16
Identity, Sikh Coal. ................................................... 15
“In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at
Rapid Pace,” Pew Research Center (Oct.
17, 2019) ............................................................ 16
vii
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments (June 20,
1785), in 5 The Founders’ Constitution
82 ....................................................................... 12
Jason Despain, A Peculiar Clause of Political
Compromise for California's Religious
Minorities, 21 ...................................................... 2
Jews in America: Shabbat as Social Reform
(1925) .................................................................. 2
Jonathan D. Sarna, American Judaism: A
History 162 (2004) .............................................. 2
Koran 62:9 ................................................................. 14
Leviticus 19:27 ........................................................... 14
Sampson Raphael Hirsch, Hirsch Siddur 14
(1969) ................................................................ 13
Scott Neuman, “Fewer Than Half of U.S.
Adults Belong to a Religious
Congregation, New Poll Shows,”
NPR.org (Mar. 30, 2021) .................................. 16
The 39 Categories of Sabbath Work Prohibited
by Law, Orthodox Union (July 17, 2006) ......... 13
What Adventists Believe About the Sabbath,
Seventh-day Adventist Church ........................ 14
Why the Sabbath?, Orthodox Union (July 17,
2006) .................................................................. 13
1
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI
CURIAE1
The Thomas More Society (TMS) is a not-forprofit, national public interest law firm dedicated to
restoring respect in law for life, family, and religious
liberty. Based in Chicago, Illinois, the Thomas More
Society defends and fosters support for these causes
by providing high quality pro bono legal services
from local trial courts to the United States Supreme
Court. Throughout its history, the Thomas More
Society has worked to eliminate discrimination
against persons of faith, and this has included
representation of clients in cases brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty
(JCRL) is a non-denominational organization of
Jewish communal and lay leaders, seeking to protect
the ability of Americans to freely practice their faith.
JCRL also aims to foster cooperation between Jewish
and other faith communities in an American public
square in which all supporters of freedom may
flourish.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, it is stated that no
counsel for a party wrote this brief in whole or in part, and no
counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person or
entity, other than the amici curiae or their counsel, has made a
monetary contribution to this brief’s preparation or submission.
1
2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As originally enacted and as subsequently
amended in 1972, Title VII was intended to provide
strong protections to workers against discrimination
in employment due to an employee’s religion. The
history of Jewish immigrants to America provides a
poignant example of why such protection is vital.
The combination of a Monday-through-Saturday
work week and “strictly enforced” Sunday closure
laws had a particularly devastating effect on the
lives of many newly arrived Jewish immigrants.
Jonathan D. Sarna, American Judaism: A History
162 (2004). “[U]nsympathetic employers” told their
Jewish employees, “if you don’t come in on Saturday,
don’t bother coming in on Monday.” Id. at 162-63;
see also Jason Despain, A Peculiar Clause of Political
Compromise for California’s Religious Minorities, 21
Rutgers J. L. & Religion 390, 393-94 (2021)
(describing how one rabbi’s pleas to secure
accommodations for Russian Jewish immigrants in
West Hollywood “often fell on deaf ears”); Jews in
America: Shabbat as Social Reform (1925), Jewish
Virtual Library, available at https://www.jewish
virtuallibrary.org/shabbat-as-social-reform-1925
(last visited Feb. 28, 2023) (“Almost no employers—
even Jewish employers—honored Saturday as a day
of rest.”).
Though some Jewish workers “preserve[d] their
Sabbath at all costs,” many more succumbed to the
need “to feed themselves and their families.” Sarna,
supra, at 163. “[T]he decline of Sabbath observance”
indicated “spiritual collapse within the Jewish
immigrant community.” Id. at 162. It was, at that
3
point, unclear whether Judaism could thrive in
America.
Title VII with its robust protections and
mandatory accommodations seemed like the answer
to the fervent prayers of those Jews and the prayers
of other people of faith. Unfortunately, this Court’s
decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977), caused religion to receive
substantially less protection than other statutory
bases protected by Title VII, such as race and sex.
Indeed, the “de minimis standard” adopted in
Hardison often provides little defense against
religious discrimination; and, it has led to results
that are inconsistent with the purpose of preventing
workplace discrimination on the basis of religious
belief and practice. Returning to an understanding
of “undue hardship” based in Title VII’s text would
restore the balance that Congress intended to strike
in this area upset by Hardison’s atextual and
otherwise unsound approach.
Amici therefore
respectfully urge that Hardison be overturned.
ARGUMENT
I.
RELIGION
SHOULD
NOT
BE
TREATED
AS
A
“LESSER”
CATEGORY
OF
PROTECTION
UNDER TITLE VII.
The language of Title VII equally protects
against discrimination on several bases: “race, color,
religion, sex, [and] national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). And yet, one of these
categories—religion—is
currently
given
less
4
protection than the others. The case currently
before the Court presents an ideal opportunity to
remedy this unjustifiable difference in treatment.
That religion was meant to be given the same
level of protection as, for example, race or sex should
have been obvious enough from the plain text of Title
VII when it was enacted, given that all of its
protected categories are listed in the very same
sentence. See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of
statutory construction that the words of a statute
must be read in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme.”); see
also A. Scalia & B. Garner, READING LAW 167 (2012)
(“The text must be construed as a whole”); cf.
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (2015)
(“[A] word is known by the company it keeps (the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis).”).
In 1972, Congress made its intended scope of
protections even clearer. It added definitional
language making it indisputable that religious
practices were protected as much as an employee’s
religious beliefs: “The term ‘religion’ includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s
or prospective employee’s religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). By
amending Title VII in this manner, Congress
ensured that “religious practice is one of the
protected characteristics that cannot be accorded
disparate treatment and must be accommodated.”
5
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S.
768, 775 (2015).
Despite this legislative action to protect against
religious discrimination, this Court in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),
reduced the level of protection for religion under
Title VII. In Hardison, the Court clawed back the
protections enacted by Congress and replaced them
with the de minimis standard. See Hardison, 432
U.S. at 84 (“To require TWA to bear more than a de
minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off
is an undue hardship.”).
The “de minimis standard” is not found in Title
VII, but it has nonetheless become the touchstone for
resolving religious discrimination cases. Petitioner
Groff has explained well the manner in which this
approach deviates from the text and uses a flawed
approach to statutory interpretation. These amici
agree with that analysis.
Courts after Hardison embraced its articulation
of the de minimis standard, even though the
language was dicta. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
Inc., 575 U.S. at 787 n.* (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Because
the employee’s termination had occurred before the
1972 amendment to Title VII’s definition of religion,
Hardison applied the then-existing EEOC guideline .
. . Hardison’s comment about the effect of the 1972
amendment was thus entirely beside the point.”); see
also Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 141 S.
Ct. 1227, 1228 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The
Court announced that standard in a single sentence
6
with little explanation or supporting analysis.
Neither party before the Court had even argued for
the rule.”). Thus, even though the legal prohibitions
under Title VII against other forms of discrimination
in employment remain vigorous, the prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of religion is
quite literally de minimis.
II.
THE DE MINIMIS STANDARD HAS
UNDERMINED THE SCOPE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTIONS
UNDER TITLE VII BY PERMITTING
THE
MOST
MINOR
OF
INCONVENIENCES TO QUALIFY AS
AN “UNDUE HARDSHIP” FOR AN
EMPLOYER.
Post-Hardison decisions are hard, if not
impossible, to square with the idea that Title VII
protects against religious discrimination in the
workplace. See, e.g., Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 140
S. Ct. 685, 686 (2020) (Alito, J., with Thomas and
Gorsuch, J.J., concurring in the denial of certiorari)
(“Hardison’s reading does not represent the most
likely interpretation of the statutory term ‘undue
hardship[.]’”); see also Hardison, 432 U.S. at 92 n.6
(calling it “seriously question[able] whether simple
English usage permits ‘undue hardship’ to be
interpreted to mean ‘more than de minimis cost’”)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Examples of such cases
are as follows:
It has been held that requiring an
employer to shift a meal break for Muslim
employees during Ramadan would be an
7
undue hardship. EEOC v. JBS USA, LLC,
339 F. Supp. 3d 1135 (D. Colo. 2018).
It has been held that requiring an
employer to provide an employee any space in
an office building in which to pray would be
an undue hardship. Farah v. A-1 Careers, No.
12-2692-SAC, 2013 WL 6095118, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 164930, at *23-25 (D. Kan. Nov.
20, 2013).
It has been held that a “mere possibility
of adverse impact” from adjusting work
schedules constitutes an undue hardship.
George v. Home Depot, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20627, at *28 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2001) (citations
omitted).
It has been held that an employer could
reject outright, and not be required to explore
at all, a female employee’s proposed
alternative of an ankle-fitting skirt rather
than pants in a factory setting. EEOC v. OakRite Mfg. Corp., No. IP 99-1962-C H/G, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15621, at *41-42 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 27, 2001).
It has been held that the possibility an
accommodation may create “hard feelings”
among coworkers was sufficient justification
to deny an accommodation.
Leonce v.
Callahan, No. 7:03-CV-110-KA, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 228, 2008 WL 58892, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 3, 2008).
8
Such cases illustrate the extreme application
given to the de minimis standard by many courts,
which ultimately results in exclusion of a certain
employees from the workplace because of their
religious beliefs and which cannot be reconciled with
Title VII’s text or purpose.
Recognition by this Court of the proper textuallybased “undue hardship” standard, rather than
Hardison’s aberrant reading of Title VII, would
restore prohibitions on religious discrimination to
their proper place of equal station in the scope of
Title VII’s protections.
III. THIS COURT SHOULD RETURN TO A
DEFINITION OF “UNDUE HARDSHIP”
THAT IS FAITHFUL TO THE TEXT OF
TITLE VII AND THUS SHOULD GIVE
EFFECT
TO
THE
BALANCE
CONGRESS ATTEMPTED TO STRIKE
FOR
AMERICA’S
DIVERSE
AND
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY.
A. Hardison Improperly Tips the
Scales Against Employees of Faith.
In Title VII, Congress struck a legislative
balance between the employer’s business interests
and the interests of an employee to be free of
discrimination based on religion. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j). “The ultimate tragedy . . . [of Hardison is
that] one of this Nation’s pillars of strength—our
hospitality to religious diversity—has been seriously
eroded.” Hardison, 432 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J.,
9
dissenting).
As such, that balance was, and
continues to be, upset.
A return to a textually faithful interpretation
would hardly open up the floodgates of litigation.
First, Title VII itself only applies to employers with
fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Moreover, to trigger protection, an employee’s
religious beliefs must be “sincere.” See, e.g., Ansonia
Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986).
Claims of discrimination under Title VII generally
must be administratively exhausted through the
EEOC, and the time for filing with the EEOC is as
brief as 180 days in some instances. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b), (e)(1). The total amount of compensatory
and punitive damages available under Title VII is
also capped based on the number of individuals
employed. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
The de minimis standard from Hardison,
however, places too much control in the hands of
employers. Compared to the employee, an employer
has superior knowledge of how its business runs,
and so employers are all too able to proffer ostensibly
reasonable sounding, but pretextual justifications,
for their rejection of proposed accommodations. Cf.
Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 488 (5th Cir.
2014) (reversing District Court grant of summary
judgment on issue of undue hardship). Courts have
come close to saying as much: “[Employer] was in a
better position than [Employee] to know whether [an
accommodation could be made and] . . . the Court
does not substitute the speculation of an employee
for the judgment of an employer.” Farah, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 164930, at *24.
10
The sting of Hardison is particularly painful to
working-class Americans who belong to minority
religious groups. Petitioners in recent cases asking
this Court to overrule Hardison have included a
Jehovah’s Witness service dispatcher; a Sabbatarian
industrial hygienist; a Sabbatarian trainer at
Walgreens; and a Sabbatarian who hoped to become
an assistant manager at Walmart.2 Calls to overrule
Hardison have come from Jews, Sikhs, Hindus,
Adventists, and Lutherans, among others.
See
generally, e.g., Br. for Jewish Coalition for Religious
Liberty; The Coalition for Jewish Values; The Sikh
Coalition; The International Society for Krishna
Consciousness;
Ethics
&
Religious
Liberty
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention;
The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod; and Church
Of God In Christ, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Dalberiste v. GLE Assocs., Inc., No. 191461 (July 31, 2020).
One can also look to the lower courts for
examples of Hardison’s pernicious effect on the lives
of working class Americans including: Muslim
factory production workers, Mohamed v. 1st Class
Staffing, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 3d 884 (S.D. Ohio 2017);
a Pentecostal juvenile detention officer, Finnie v. Lee
2 Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F.3d 821 (6th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1227 (Apr. 5, 2021) (No. 19-1388);
Dalberiste v. GLE Assocs., Inc., 814 Fed. App’x 495 (11th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2463 (Apr. 5, 2021) (No. 19-1461);
Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 685 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 18-349); EEOC
v. Walmart Stores East, L.P., No. 20-1419, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33263 (7th Cir. June 4, 2021), cert. granted, vacated,
and remanded for further consideration by Hedican v. Walmart
Stores East, L.P., 142 S. Ct. 1357 (2022)
11
Cty., Miss., 907 F. Supp. 2d 750 (N.D. Miss. 2012); a
Jewish dump truck driver, E.E.O.C. v. Thompson
Contracting, Grading, Paving, & Utils., Inc., 793 F.
Supp. 2d 738 (E.D.N.C. 2011); a Russian Orthodox
Christian hotel kitchen mechanic, Jiglov v. Hotel
Peabody, G.P., 719 F. Supp. 2d 918 (W.D. Tenn.
2010); and an Adventist part-time grocery store
clerk, Prach v. Hollywood Supermarket, Inc., No. 0913756, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88738 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 27, 2010). The list goes on.
And this list excludes the untold number of
Americans who—understanding, or informed by
counsel, that Hardison has stacked the deck against
them—capitulate
rather
than
challenge
a
discriminatory practice. See, e.g., Br. for Appellant at
13, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480
U.S. 136 (1987) (No. 85-993) (arguing that an
Adventist fired for keeping her Sabbath should not
be denied unemployment benefits because Hardison
already foreclosed an employment discrimination
claim).
Hardison permits employers to “compel” workers
from minority religions “to make the cruel choice of
surrendering their religion or their job.” 432 U.S. at
87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). And it permits them to
do so over relatively small matters.
That is,
Hardison allows the employer to turn its molehill
into the employee’s mountain. For example,
employers may discriminate against religious
employees for requesting minor departures from a
dress and appearance policy, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 134-37 (1st Cir.
2004), for requesting time off before completing the
12
new-hire probationary period, Thomson Contracting,
Grading, Paving, & Utils., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 2d at
741, or for requesting an accommodation that might
create “hard feelings” among coworkers if granted,
Leonce, No. 7:03-CV-110-KA, 2008 WL 58892, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2008). Hardison itself presents a
prime example of this: a global airliner fired the
respondent over an accommodation request that
would have cost $150 over three months. 432 U.S. at
92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Each of these situations creates a minor
inconvenience for the employer.
But for an
employee, her very conscience and relationship with
her creator is at stake. Small wonder that many
employees decide to honor their faith despite the
financial hardships that result. E.g., Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 138
(1987) (“[T]he general manager informed appellant
that she could either work her scheduled shifts or
submit her resignation to the company. When
Hobbie refused to do either, [the company]
discharged her.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
399 (1963) (explaining that Adell Sherbert was fired
for keeping her Sabbath and could not find work
because of her Sabbath observance); cf. James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in 5 The
Founders’ Constitution 82, 82 (arguing that the
demands of faith are “precedent, both in order of
time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
Civil Society”).
Consider Sabbath observance. The Torah and
Oral Law forbid Orthodox Jews working on the
13
Jewish Sabbath (sundown on Friday to nightfall on
Saturday) and designated Jewish holy days. See
generally 3 Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch
Orach
Chayim
242-365
(1977)
(Sabbath
prohibitions); id. at 495-529 (holy day prohibitions);
see also Aryeh Kaplan, Sabbath: Day of Eternity, in 2
The Aryeh Kaplan Anthology 107, 128 (1998). These
restrictions extend beyond paid employment to
encompass thirty-nine categories of prohibited
activity. See The 39 Categories of Sabbath Work
Prohibited by Law, Orthodox Union (July 17, 2006),
available at https://www.ou.org/holidays/shabbat/the
thirty_nine_categories_of_sabbath_work_prohibited_
by_law/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2023). “The Sabbath is
the most important institution of Judaism. It is the
primary ritual, the very touchstone of our faith.”
Why the Sabbath?, Orthodox Union (July 17, 2006),
available at https://www.ou.org/holidays/why_the
sabbath/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2023). The Torah
commands severe punishment for those who violate
the Sabbath. See Exodus 31:14 (“You shall keep the
Sabbath, for it is holy to you; anyone who profanes it
shall be put to death. For whoever does any work on
that day shall be cut off from his people.”). The
gravity of this obligation commands that half
measures cannot reasonably accommodate Sabbath
observance. It is no accommodation at all to relieve
the Jewish worker of only some types of prohibited
work or give her the day off on alternating
Saturdays. The choice between employment and the
Sabbath for that person is illusory—the Jewish
employee must be willing to lose her job rather than
violate the Sabbath. See 3 Karo, supra, at 308.
14
This is precisely the dilemma the amendment to
Title VII sought to avoid.
Though Sabbath
accommodation claims arise most frequently,
Orthodox Jewish employees may also require
accommodation from dress codes and grooming
policies. Jewish men and married women wear head
coverings, Aron Moss, Why Do Jewish Women Cover
Their
Hair,
Chabbad.org,
available
at
https://www.chabad.org/theJewishWoman/article_cd
o/aid/336035/jewish/Why-Do-Jewish-Women-CoverTheir-Hair.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2023), in the
case of a yarmulke or kippah, to express submission
to the Almighty, Sampson Raphael Hirsch, Hirsch
Siddur 14 (1969). Orthodox and Hasidic Jewish
males also let their sideburns grow to a certain
length, and some wear beards to honor the
commandment of Leviticus 19:27: “You shall not
round off the edge of your scalp and you shall not
destroy the edge of your beard.”
Of course, Sabbath observance is not unique to
the Jewish faith. Muslims and some Christian
denominations
require
similar
weekly
accommodations. Jumu’ah is “a weekly Muslim
congregational service . . . commanded by the Koran
and . . . held every Friday after the sun reaches its
zenith.” O’Lone v. Est. of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345
(1987) (citing Koran 62:9-10). Believers are
commanded to “leave trade” and attend these weekly
services. Koran 62:9. Seventh Day Adventists
observe the Sabbath from sundown Friday until
sundown Saturday and cannot work during that
time. What Adventists Believe About the Sabbath,
Seventh-day Adventist Church, available at
15
https://www.adventist.org/the-sabbath/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2023).
As with Sabbath observance, other religious
traditions also command certain forms of dress and
grooming. Many Muslims believe men must grow
beards if they are able, see Fraternal Order of Police
Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that refusal to
grow a beard “is a major sin” in that religious
tradition), and don a takia to symbolize that the
“wearer is in constant prayer,” see In re Palmer, 386
A.2d 1112, 1113 (R.I. 1978). Sikhs must maintain
five articles of faith that represent the fundamental
tenets of their religion. Identity, Sikh Coal.,
available at https://www.sikhcoalition.org/aboutsikhs/identity/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2023). One of
these articles of faith is unshorn hair, or kesh. Id.
Many Sikhs wear a turban as well to “assert[ ] a
public commitment to maintaining the values and
ethics of the tradition, including service, compassion,
and honesty.” Id. These practices can be
accommodated, often with little cost to the employer.
But under Hardison, employers need not take on
that minor inconvenience or risk offending
customers. Until Title VII is afforded its plain
meaning, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, Adventists,
Witnesses, and many others will continue to endure
religious discrimination that forces them to choose
between irreconcilable conflicts with their faith and
their ability to earn a living.
16
B. Societal Changes Make the Need
for Title VII’s Protections All the
More Necessary.
At one time, it was easy for this Court to remark
that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.” Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). Two decades ago, though,
one historian observed: “Although the United States
is far more religious than most European countries,
it is also less religious than it once was.” Gertrude
Himmelfarb, One Nation, Two Cultures 96 (2001).
That trend brought a host of other societal changes.
Id. at 96-98. Recent polls confirm that this move
away from religion continues. See, e.g., “In U.S.,
Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace,”
Pew
Research
Center
(Oct.
17,
2019),
https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-declineof-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/
(“[T]he
religiously unaffiliated share of the population,
consisting of people who describe their religious
identity as atheist, agnostic or ‘nothing in
particular,’ now stands at 26% [in 2019], up from
17% in 2009.”); see also Scott Neuman, “Fewer Than
Half of U.S. Adults Belong to a Religious
Congregation, New Poll Shows,” NPR.org (Mar. 30,
2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/03/30/982671783/
fewer-than-half-of-u-s-adults-belong-to-a-religiouscongregation-new-poll-shows (“Fewer than half of
U.S. adults say they belong to a church, synagogue
or mosque, according to a new Gallup survey that
highlights a dramatic trend away from religious
affiliation in recent years among all age groups.”).
With changes in the views of the population at
large, the risk that religious practices will be
excluded from the workplace increases, and in the
17
process marginalization of people of faith becomes
more likely. Cf. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue,
140 S. Ct. 2246, 2269-71 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring)
(discussing history of Blaine Amendments enacted in
waive of animus toward Catholic immigrants).
Ultimately, the de minimis standard effectively casts
aside a central purpose of Title VII—the goal of
protecting persons based on religion. As the nation’s
population becomes more pluralistic and generally
less religious, there arise more and more
opportunities for religious beliefs to conflict with an
employer’s requirements.
When that happens,
employees will be faced with a choice of adhering to
their religious beliefs, but losing their jobs, versus
keeping their jobs at the expense of violating their
religious beliefs. Overturning Hardison can help
alleviate that tension by adhering to the will of
Congress, as expressed in Title VII.
CONCLUSION
Hardison has become an excuse for employers to
evade their obligations under Title VII and for
reviewing Courts to adopt a position of judicial
inertia.
Overturning Hardison, however, would
facilitate the protection of religion as was intended
by Congress in enacting Title VII.
For the above-stated reasons, these amici
respectively submit that Hardison should be
overruled. Therefore, the Court should reverse the
grant of summary judgment for Respondent and
direct entry of summary judgment for Petitioner.
18
Respectfully submitted,
Thomas Brejcha
Counsel of Record
Stephen M. Crampton
Thomas More Society
309 W. Washington St., Suite 1250
Chicago, Illinois 60606
Telephone: (312) 782-1680
Facsimile: (312) 782-1887
tbrejcha@thomasmoresociety.org
Howard Slugh
Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty
2400 Virginia Ave, N.W., C619
Washington, D.C. 20037
Telephone: (954) 328-9461
hslugh@jcrl.org
B. Tyler Brooks
Thomas More Society
100 E. Lake Drive, Suite 6
Greensboro, North Carolina 27403
Telephone: (336) 707-8855
Facsimile: (336) 900-6535
tbrooks@thomasmoresociety.org
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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