Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Daniel Beckwitt, Petitioner v. Maryland
Supreme Court briefAug 22, 2022
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APPENDIX TO PETITION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Appendix A:
Court of Appeals Opinion
.la
Appendix B:
Court of Special Appeals Opinion,
86b
Appendix C:
Transcript of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Hearing
in Circuit Court............................................................ ,153c
Appendix D:
Court of Appeals' Order Denying Rehearing
Entered March 25, 2022...........................
Appendix E:
Court of Appeals’ Mandate Issued March 25, 2022
195d
196e
Appendix F:
U.S. Const. Amend. V................
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV............
U.S. Const Art. VI, Cl. 2...........
MD. Const. Decl. Of Rts. Art. V.
6Ann., Ch. 31 §6.......................
10 Ann., Ch. 14, §1.... :...............
12 Geo. Ill, Ch. 73, §37.............
• . v.
197f
I97t
;L98f
J.99f
200f
200f
201f
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Appendix F—Continued:
14 Geo. Ill, Ch. 78, §86...............................................
MD. Code Annotated, Public Safety
§6-206.......................................................
§6-601.......................................................
§9-106.......................................................
Code of Maryland Regulations
COMAR 29.06.01.01...........................................
COMAR 29.06.01.03...........................................
COMAR 29.06.01.06...........................................
NFPA 1 Fire Code................................................
Montgomery County Fire Safety Code
§22-40.................................................................
201f
202f
204f
205f
,206f
,207f
,208f
209f
211f
Appendix G:
Indictment...........
212g
Bill of Particulars,
213g
Petitioner's Briefing in the Court of Special Appeals...... 215g
Respondent's Briefing in the Court of Special Appeals....221g
Petitioner's Briefing in the Court of Appeals...
223g
Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing
in the Court of Appeals................................
258g
Respondent's Briefing in the Court of Appeals,
260g
April 10, 2019 Trial Transcript Excerpts.........
262g
April 11, 2019 Trial Transcript Excerpts.........
April 12, 2019 Trial Transcript Excerpts.........
April 23, 2019 Trial Transcript Excerpts.........
265g
269g
297g
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 133838C
Argued: December 7, 2021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 16
September Term, 2021'
DANIEL BECKWITT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Getty, C.J.
McDonald
Watts
Hotten
Booth
Biran
Adkins, Sally. (Senior Judge,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Watts, J.
Filed: January 28, 2022
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§
10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is
authentic. 2022-01-28 12:01-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
App.la
This case involves the tragic death of twenty-oneyear-old Askia Khafra, who died in a fire while trying
in vain to escape from the reprehensible conditions of
his workplace in the basement of his employer Daniel
Beckwitt’s, Petitioner’s/Cross-Respondent’s, home.
Following a trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, a jury found Beckwitt guilty of second-degree
depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter.
The circuit court sentenced Beckwitt to twenty-one
years’ imprisonment, suspending all but nine years,
with credit for sixty days of time served, for seconddegree depraved heart murder, and merged the
conviction for involuntary manslaughter for
sentencing. Beckwitt appealed, and the Court of
Special Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient
to support the conviction for gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter but insufficient to support
the conviction for depraved heart murder. See
Beckwitt v. State. 249 Md. App. 333, 346, 245 A.3d
201, 209 (2021).
Beckwitt filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
raising four issues—whether the circuit court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to enter a conviction on
involuntary manslaughter due to old English statutes
concerning a lack of liability for accidental fires,
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
conviction for involuntary manslaughter, whether legal
duty involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included
offense of depraved heart murder, and whether the
circuit court erred by failing to correctly instruct the
jury on the elements of legal duty involuntary
manslaughter.
The
State,
Respondent/CrossPetitioner, filed a conditional cross-petition, raising one
issue—whether the evidence was sufficient to support
App.2a
the conviction for second-degree depraved heart
murder. We granted both the petition and conditional
cross-petition.
We answer the questions raised as follows. To begin
with, we reject Beckwitt’s argument that, because the
case involved an accidental house fire, certain old
English statutes deprived the circuit court of subject
matter jurisdiction. In actuality, the argument does
not involve a question of subject matter jurisdiction
and because Beckwitt failed to raise the issue in the
circuit court, the matter is not preserved for appellate
review. Were we to consider the issue, though, we
would determine that the statutes on which Beckwitt
relies do not preclude his prosecution or otherwise
serve as a defense.
Next, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to
support Beckwitt’s conviction for involuntary
manslaughter under both a gross negligence and
failure to perform a legal duty theory of the offense. We
hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish gross
negligence
involuntary
manslaughter because
Beckwitt’s conduct, in causing Khafra to live and work
in dangerous conditions, constituted a gross departure
from that of an ordinarily careful and prudent person
under the same circumstances and a disregard for the
consequences which might ensue and so demonstrated
a wanton and reckless disregard for Khafra’s life.
Beckwitt’s conduct was likely to result in harm to
Khafra at any moment and an ordinarily prudent
person under similar circumstances would have been
conscious of the risk to Khafra. The evidence was
sufficient to establish legal duty involuntary
manslaughter because the evidence demonstrated that
Khafra was Beckwitt’s employee and, as such,
App.3a
Beckwitt had a duty to provide Khafra with a
reasonably safe workplace, which he failed to do with
reckless indifference as to the endangerment of Khafra
and that failure constituted gross negligence.
In addition, we hold that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that Beckwitt’s
conduct was both the actual and legal cause of Khafra’s
death. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential
elements of involuntary manslaughter under both a
gross negligence and legal duty theory.
Because we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support Beckwitt’s involuntary
manslaughter conviction under both theories, we need
not reach the issue of whether legal duty involuntary
manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of depraved
heart murder. Nonetheless, we determine that legal
duty involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included
offense of depraved heart murder, although gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter is.
We conclude that Beckwitt’s contention that the
circuit court erred or abused its discretion by failing to
instruct the jury as to all of the essential elements of
legal duty involuntary manslaughter is not preserved
for appellate review. If the issue were preserved,
however, we would conclude that the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction
because it constituted a correct statement of law and
covered the essential elements of the offense.
Finally, in agreement with the Court of Special
Appeals, we hold that the evidence was not sufficient
to support Beckwitt’s conviction for second-degree
depraved heart murder because his conduct, although
App.4a
demonstrating a wanton and reckless disregard for
human life, was not the kind of conduct that was
likely, if not certain, to have caused death, and thus
did not constitute conduct that demonstrated an
extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Beckwitt’s conduct—including having Khafra dig
tunnels beneath his home while living and working in
a basement with electrical power provided by multiple
extension cords and power strips and that was filled
with trash and debris which severely hampered
Khafra’s escape in the event of an emergency—
whether considered individually or cumulatively,
although demonstrating a reckless disregard for
human life, did not constitute conduct that was
reasonably likely, if not certain, to cause death.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals.
BACKGROUND
This case involves uncommon and, indeed, bizarre
facts which, in its reported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals set forth in a well-written, thorough,
and detailed manner. See Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at
347-51, 245 A.3d at 209-11. As there is no material
dispute between the parties about the accuracy of the
facts—although the parties certainly dispute whether
the facts were sufficient to support Beckwitt’s
convictions—we adopt the facts as set forth by the
Court of Special Appeals:
This case involves the tragic death of Askia
Khafra, a twenty-one-year-old who died while
trying to escape a fire in [Beckwitt]’s basement. At
the time of the fire, [Beckwitt] was twenty-six years
old. The unfortunate series of events that brought
App.5a
Khafra and [Beckwitt] together arose from Khafra’s
idea to create a smartphone application or “app”
called Equity Shark. Khafra envisioned Equity
Shark as streamlining the process for average
people to invest in “starter companies” or small
businesses that had not yet gone public and needed
funding. Khafra expended considerable effort in
developing the app. In furtherance of that goal,
Khafra browsed internet chatrooms looking for
investors. Khafra found his first investor—
[Beckwitt]—in such a chatroom.
Khafra pitched his business idea to [Beckwitt],
and explained that he was looking for
approximately $5,000 to go to San Francisco to
apply for a Thiel Fellowship.1 According to the
parties’ briefs, [Beckwitt] invested approximately
$10,000 for a 5% stake in Equity Shark.2 Khafra
and [Beckwitt] went on to develop a close
friendship. Khafra apparently became fascinated
with [Beckwitt] due to [Beckwitt]’s wealth and
financial success. Khafra looked to [Beckwitt] as.
someone who could help him grow Equity Shark,
not just financially, but by assisting with computer
coding and other efforts needed to develop the app
into a viable business. Unfortunately, Equity Shark
never took off as planned, and Khafra was not
accepted for the Thiel Fellowship.
In order to repay [Beckwitt]’s $10,000
investment, Khafra agreed to dig tunnels
underneath [BeckwittJ’s house. [Beckwitt] had been
building tunnels and an underground bunker
beneath his home because he apparently feared a
nuclear war with North Korea.
App.6a
r
Khafra was not the first person to dig tunnels
for
[Beckwitt].
Douglas Hart,
who was
approximately twenty years old at the time,3 dug
tunnels on several occasions from approximately
October 2016 to April 2017. Logistically, Hart
would drive his car to Maryland,4 meet [Beckwitt]
at a McDonald’s, and then [Beckwitt] would require
Hart to wear sunglasses with duct tape on them to
obscure Hart’s vision while [Beckwitt] drove the
two to [Beckwitt]’s home. Despite the fact that
[Beckwitt] actually lived in Maryland, he gave Hart
the impression that they were going to Virginia.
When Hart visited [Beckwitt] to dig tunnels, he
typically stayed in the tunnels and basement area
for approximately a month at a time and
understood that he was not allowed into the rest of
the house. Hart indicated that he was physically
. incapable of leaving the basement/tunnel area, and
that although there was a door from the basement
leading directly to the outside, that door was kept
locked and [Beckwitt] always had the key. When
Hart communicated to [Beckwitt] that he wanted to
go outside for fresh air or to get food, however,
[Beckwitt] would oblige him. Nevertheless,
[Beckwitt] required Hart to wear the duct-taped
sunglasses upon going outside to prevent Hart from
learning the location of [Beckwitt]’s house.
'The transcript incorrectly refers to this as the “Peter Field
Fellowship.” The specifics of the Fellowship itself, however, such
as the age limit, the requirement to drop out of school in order to
attend, and the Fellowship’s general purpose, persuade us that
Khafra was pursuing a “Thiel Fellowship” rather than a “Field
Fellowship,
FAQ,
Thiel
Fellowship.”
See
https://thielfellowship.org/faq/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
App.7a
In early 2017, Khafra began digging tunnels at
[Beckwitt]’s home for $150 a day. [Beckwitt]
typically picked Khafra up at Khafra’s parents’
house in the early morning hours, around 3:00 a.m.,
and like Hart, required Khafra to be blindfolded
during the trip to [Beckwitt]’s house.5 Khafra would
dig underneath [Beckwitt]’s home approximately
once a month to every two months, and would stay
anywhere from a few days to a few weeks at a
time.6 During his stays, Khafra mostly remained in
the bunker area in the tunnels. According to
[Beckwitt]’s brief, “Khafra roamed freely in the
basement and the tunnels, but he was not
permitted to come up to the first or second floors of
the residence.” Rather than take showers, Khafra
cleaned himself using disposable wipes. To relieve
himself, Khafra would urinate and defecate in a
bucket he kept in the tunnels. Every few days,
Khafra and [Beckwitt] used a winch system to haul
the bucket from the basement to the first floor,
where [Beckwitt] himself would dispose of its
contents in the first-floor bathroom. Because
[Beckwitt] did not own a phone, Khafra could only
communicate with [Beckwitt] from the basement
and tunnels using Google apps such as Google
Voice and V Chat.7 [Beckwitt] used numerous
extension cords and power strips to provide electri
city to the tunnels. In his interviews with police,
2There appears to be some discrepancy regarding the total
amount of [Beckwittfs investment, but that discrepancy is
immaterial to the outcome of this appeal.
3Hart testified at the April 2019 trial that he was twenty-three
years old. From this fact we extrapolate that he was
approximately twenty years old when he began working in
[Beckwitt]’s tunnels in October 2016.
4At trial, Hart indicated that he was living in New York.
App.8a
[Beckwitt] intimated his familiarity with the failing
power cords and having to reset the circuit breaker.
On September 3, 2017, Khafra went to [Beckw
ith’s home to resume work in the tunnels. A week
later, while digging in the tunnels on September 10
at 2:32 a.m., Khafra messaged [Beckwitt] using
Google Hangouts, stating “holy [s**t] bro there’s no
power down here.” Approximately five minutes
later, at 2:37 a.m., Khafra indicated that there was
smoke in the basement. At 2:51 a.m., Khafra wrote
again, stating that he no longer believed there was
smoke in the basement, but that the lights had
gone out and it was “pitch black down [there]” with
no airflow. Khafra’s message asked [Beckwitt] to
“please try to fix when you see this.”
[Beckwitt] did not see Khafra’s messages until
he woke up at approximately 9 a.m. At 9:27 a.m.,
[Beckwitt] wrote to Khafra that there had been a
“pretty major electrical failure” and that [Beckwitt]
was switching the power over to a different circuit.
[Beckwitt] then went back to sleep, and awoke at
approximately 3 p.m. [Beckwitt] went downstairs
5During a trip to [Beckwitt]’s home, Khafra learned that
[Beckwitt] actually lived in Bethesda, Maryland.
6Khafra’s father testified at trial that he recalled Khafra going
to [Beckwittfs house in January, February, March, April, and
September of 2017.
7“Google Voice” is a program that “gives you a phone number
for
calling,
text
messaging,
and
voicemail.”
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.
android.apps.googlevoice&=en_US & gl=US (last visited Jan. 8,
2021). “V Chat” is a private messenger service that allows users to
“communicate instantly while avoiding [text messaging] fees[.]” •
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?
id=com.wVChat_9255903 (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
App.9a
from his second-floor bedroom to get something to
eat, and at around 4 p.m., he heard a beeping sound
coming from the carbon monoxide detector in the
dining room. [Beckwitt] understood the beep to
signify a loss of power, which he confirmed when he
could no longer hear the refrigerator running,
[Beckwitt] waited approximately twenty to thirty
minutes, believing that the circuit breaker would
reset itself. When the power failed to return,
[Beckwitt] went to the basement to manually reset
the breaker. [Beckwitt] did not see Khafra while in
the basement resetting the breaker.
On his way up the stairs from the basement to
the first floor, [Beckwitt] heard an explosion, which
he believed to be either the refrigerator’s
compressor or the air conditioner. [Beckwitt] went
to the kitchen to see if the refrigerator’s compressor
was working, and immediately saw smoke rising
out of the kitchen floor. [Beckwitt] promptly headed
back to the basement to tell Khafra that there was
a fire, and that Khafra needed to get out. [Beckwitt]
heard Khafra yell “yo dude,” but he could not see
him through all of the smoke. Fearing that he
would not be able to take the basement stairs to the
first floor, [Beckwitt] exited the basement by
unlocking the basement door that led directly to the
outside.8 Because he did not have a cellular phone,
and because it would have been dangerous to
return to his second-floor bedroom to call 9-1-1 from
his computer, [Beckwitt] began to yell for help.
[Beckwitt]’s neighbors called 9-1-1.
Firefighters from Montgomery County Fire and
Rescue Service responded to [Beckwitt]’s home at
approximately 4:23 p.m. The firefighters struggled
App.lOa
to navigate through [Beckwitt]’s home to extinguish
the fire, however, because, as [Beckwitt] concedes,
“[t]he home by all accounts was a hoarder's home.”
Put simply, [Beckwitt]’s home was filled with an
extreme amount of debris, trash, and other objects
that made navigation difficult. In fact, it took
firefighters approximately a minute and a half to
two minutes to traverse the short distance from the
basement’s side entrance to the fire. Firefighters
extinguished the fire with two or three sprays of
water lasting approximately fifteen to thirty
seconds each. When the steam finally cleared,
firefighters found Khafra’s lifeless body in the
middle of the basement.
Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at 347-51, 245 A.3d at 209-11
(footnotes and some alterations in original).
We include additional facts below as necessary.
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals
On January 28, 2021, the Court of Special
Appeals
affirmed
Beckwitt’s
conviction
for
involuntary manslaughter, reversed the conviction
for depraved heart murder, and remanded the case
to the circuit court for sentencing on involuntary
manslaughter. See Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at 346,
245 A.3d at 209. The Court of Special Appeals
concluded that Beckwitt’s conduct, under the totality
of the circumstances, was sufficient to establish gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter. Id* at 362, 245
8Although he could not remember for certain, [Beckwitt]
indicated that he “[thought he] had to” unlock the basement door
to exit. [Beckwitt] could not recall whether the key was already in
the door or whether he had it at the time, but told police it was
“common” to keep the key in the door, original). We include
additional facts below as necessary.
App.lla
A.3d at 218. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of
Special Appeals considered “the inherent danger
ousness of [Beckwitt’s] act[s], as judged by a reason
able person[,] combined with environmental risk
factors, which, together, [made] the particular activ
ity more or less likely at any moment to bring harm
to another[.]” Id* at 362, 245 A.3d at 218 (cleaned
up). The Court of Special Appeals determined that
Beckwitt placed Khafra, who was not an experienced
construction worker, in a dangerous situation by
paying him to dig tunnels beneath his home with
electricity provided by “extension cords and power
strips with an apparent history of failing” and that
Khafra could contact Beckwitt in case of an emerg
ency only by messages sent through “Google apps” in
the hope that Beckwitt would receive them. Id. at
363, 245 A.3d at 218.
The Court of Special Appeals noted that on the
day of his death when Khafra believed he smelled
smoke, his early morning messages went undetected
for more than six hours until Beckwitt eventually
woke up. See id. at 363, 245 A.3d at 218. The Court
of Special Appeals indicated that Beckwitt deprived
Khafra of exact knowledge of his whereabouts by
blindfolding him in transit to the home, which left
Khafra, who apparently had internet and phone
service, without knowledge of his location to call for
help. See id. at 363, 245 A.3d at 218-19. The Court of
Special Appeals determined that “the amount of
debris and detritus in” the basement contributed to
the environmental risk factors and “elevated the da
nger by hampering Khafra’s ability to escape in the
event of an emergency.” Id* at 363, 245 A.3d at 219.
The Court of Special Appeals pointed out that
App.l2a
Beckwitt’s conduct on the day of the fire included
that, upon seeing Khafra’s messages at approxim
ately 9 a.m. regarding a power outage and the possible
odor of smoke, Beckwitt’s sole response was to tell
Khafra that there had been a “pretty major electrical
failure,” and to switch the power to another breaker.
Id. at 364, 245 A.3d at 219. Later, after the carbon
monoxide alarm started to beep, Beckwitt “waited app
roximately twenty to thirty minutes before finally rese
tting the circuit breaker despite the fact that the prev
ious electrical failure had left Khafra in ‘pitch black’
darkness with no airflow .” Mi at 364, 245 A.3d at 219.
The Court of Special Appeals noted that “at no point in
time did [Beckwitt] ask Khafra to leave the basement
for precautionary reasons.” Mi at 364, 245 A.3d at 219.
The Court of Special Appeals determined that the
environmental risk factors and Beckwitt’s conduct in
relation to the risk factors, considered together, “suffic
iently demonstrate^] the requisite wanton and reck
less disregard for Khafra’s life necessary to support a
conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaug
hter.” Mi at 364, 245 A.3d at 219. The Court of Special
Appeals concluded that the State produced sufficient
evidence of actual causation, because but for Beckwitt
having “Khafra work in a dangerous environment, Kh
afra would not have died.” Mi at 372, 245 A.3d at 224.
The Court of Special Appeals determined that there
was sufficient evidence of legal causation because, bas
ed on the facts, “it was foreseeable that a fire might oc
cur in the basement, and if it did, Khafra’s ability to
safely escape would be severely restricted.” Mi at 373,
245 A.3d at 224.
On the other hand, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that Beckwitt’s “conduct, viewed in conjunApp.l3a
ction with the surrounding circumstances, d[id] not
satisfy the evidentiary standard required for depraved
heart murder” Id. at 377, 245 A.3d at 227. From the
Court of Special Appeals’s perspective, Beckwitt’s
“conduct itself did not demonstrate an extreme disre
gard for human life reasonably likely to cause death.”
Id. at 377, 245 A.3d at 227 (emphasis omitted). The
Court of Special Appeals explained:
In our view, hiring someone to dig tunnels under
neath a hoarder’s home may demonstrate a reck
less disregard for human life, but it is not the type
of conduct that is likely, if not certain, to cause
death, and thus does not rise to the level of oppro
brious conduct that depraved heart murder pro
scribes conduct that is so extreme in its disregard of
human life that it may be deemed willful.
LL at 378, 245 A.3d at 227.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that it need
not consider whether the evidence was sufficient to su
pport a conviction for involuntary manslaughter under
the failure to perform a legal duty theory because there
was only one conviction for involuntary manslaughter,
which the Court affirmed on the basis of gross
negligence. See id. at 382 n.21, 245 A.3d at 230 n.21.9
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
and Conditional Cross-Petition
9In addition, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the
circuit court did not err with respect to other matters raised on
appeal by Beckwitt, including, among other things, not giving jury
instructions concerning assumption of the risk, knowledge of the
conditions by the victim, and the element of causation, and not
sustaining objections to alleged improper remarks by the
prosecutor during closing argument. See Beckwitt, 249 Md. App.
at 382-401, 245 A.3d at 230-41. These issues are not before us.
App,14a
Beckwitt petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising
the following four issues:
1. As a matter of first impression, was the evidence
legally sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to
find that Petitioner was guilty of involuntary mans
laughter beyond a reasonable doubt for permitting
his friend to work in a home with hoarding
conditions accompanied by power outages?
2. As a matter of first impression, is legal duty
manslaughter a type of gross negligence
manslaughter that serves as a lesser included
offense of depraved-heart murder, thereby
requiring review of Petitioner’s challenges to the
legal duty manslaughter conviction?
3. Did the circuit court commit reversible error by
failing to instruct the essential elements of legal
duty manslaughter, for which there is no pattern
jury instruction?
4. As a matter of first impression, did the circuit
court lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter a
conviction against an occupant of a home on a
common law involuntary manslaughter charge
resulting from an accidental housefire?
The State filed a conditional cross-petition, raising
the following issue: “In an issue of first impression,
does the line separating second-degree depraved heart
murder and gross negligence manslaughter depend
upon the likelihood of death and, if so, was the
evidence sufficient in this case to support the jury’s
verdict of second-degree murder?5 On June 22, 2021,
we granted the petition and conditional cross-petition.
See Beckwitt v. State. 474 Md. 720, 255 A.3d 1090
(2021).
App.l5a
DISCUSSION
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Parties’ Contentions
Beckwitt’s first contention is as unusual as the
facts of the case. Beckwitt contends that a series of
English statutes from the 1700s leading up to the
enactment of the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act of
1774 prohibit today in Maryland a criminal prosecut
ion “against someone in whose home a fire accidentally
began ” According to Beckwitt, the statutes were in
existence as of July 4, 1776, and courts across the
United States have incorporated them into their
common law. Beckwitt contends that the statutes serve
as a complete bar to any action arising from an accide
ntal house fire, and, as such, divest the circuit court of
subject matter jurisdiction over the prosecution of this
case. Beckwitt urges this Court to determine that the
old English statutes are a part of the common law of
Maryland today, and that he is “entitled to any defense
that was available by English statute that was
incorporated into Maryland common law.”
The State responds that the 300-year-old statutes
to which Beckwitt refers do not prohibit his prosecution in this case and even if somehow the statues could be
construed as having that effect, the issue is not one of
subject matter jurisdiction. The State points out that a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction occurs where jurisdi
ction is lacking in a fundamental sense, not where a
trial court makes a ruling in violation of a statutory re
striction on the courts authority or discretion. The Sta
te asserts that, because Beckwitt’s contention about
the English statutes does not involve an issue of subje
ct matter jurisdiction, he was required to raise the iss
ue in the circuit court and, because he failed to do so,
App.l6a
the contention is not preserved for appellate review.
The State maintains that, even if the issue were prese
rved, Beckwitt has conceded that the preeminent auth
ority on the topic has concluded that the Fires Prevent
ion (Metropolis) Act of 1774 is not applicable in Mary
land and contends that no other authority supports
Beckwitt’s contention. The State points out that, even
if the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act of 1774 were
somehow applicable today in Maryland, it would not
prohibit the prosecution of this case because the actus
reus10 supporting the charges against Beckwitt involv
ed the creation of dangerous circumstances preventing
Khafra’s escape from the fire-not causing the fire itself.
Standard of Review
It is well settled that a ‘lack of subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, including
initially on appeal” and “need not be raised by a party,
but may be raised by a court sua sponte.” Derrv v.
State. 358 Md. 325, 334, 748 A.2d 478, 482 (2000)
(cleaned up). See also Md. R. 8-131(a) (“The issueQ of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter ...
may be raised in and decided by the appellate court
whether or not raised in and decided by the trial
court.”). We review without deference questions of law
involving statutory interpretation. See Gorge v. State.
386 Md. 600, 610, 873 A.2d 1171, 1177 (2005).
I0Black’s Law Dictionary defines “actus reus” as “(t]he
wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime
and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish
criminal liability; a forbidden act” and as “[t]he voluntary act or
omission, the attendant circumstances, and the social harm
caused by a criminal act, all of which make up the physical
components of a crime.” Actus Reus, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019).
App.l7a
Analysis
In agreement with the State, we conclude that
Beckwitt’s contention concerning the English Fires
Prevention (Metropolis) Act of 1774 and earlier
statutes does not raise a question of subject matter
jurisdiction. We are not persuaded by Beckwitt’s
argument that 300-year-old statutes deprived the
circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
Subject matter jurisdiction, also called fundamental
jurisdiction, sge Tshiwala v. State. 424 Md. 612, 621,
37 A.3d 308, 313 (2012), “is the court’s ability to adjudi
cate a controversy of a particular kind[,]” John A. v.
Bd. of Educ. for Howard Ctv.. 400 Md. 363, 388, 929
A.2d 136, 151 (2007) (citation omitted). “If by that law
which defines the authority of the court, a judicial body
is given the power to render a judgment over that class
of cases within which a particular one falls, then its
action cannot be assailed for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Tshiwala. 424 Md. at 621, 37 A.3d at 313
(cleaned up). We have expressly recognized the differ
ence between a court lacking fundamental jurisdiction
and improperly exercising jurisdiction, explaining that
just “[bjecause a court or judge is unauthorized to take
particular action or is erroneously exercising jurisdi
ction, does not mean that the court or judge does not
have basic subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 621, 37
A.3d at 313. We have explained:
Simply because a statutory provision directs a court
to decide a case in a particular way, if certain circu
mstances are shown, does not create an issue going
to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. There
have been numerous cases in this Court involving
the situation where a trial court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter, but where a statute directs
App.l8a
the court, under certain circumstances, to exercise
its jurisdiction in a particular way, and the tribunal
erroneously refuses to do so because [of] an error of
statutory interpretation or an error of fact. In these
situations, this Court has regularly held that the
matter did not concern the subject matter juris*
diction of the trial court.
Id. at 622, 37 A.3d at 313-14 (cleaned up).
Maryland circuit courts are courts of general juris
diction and have “full common-law and equity powers
and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within
[their] county[.]” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
(1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.) (“CJ”) § 1-501. In criminal
cases, with certain exceptions, the circuit courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction over felony offenses. See
CJ §§ 4-302(a), 4-301(b). The Circuit Court for Montgo
mery County—the circuit court in this case—plainly
had subject matter jurisdiction over Beckwitt’s crimin
al case because it had the power to render a judgment
with respect to the felony offenses with which Beckwitt
was charged. See Powell v. State. 324 Md. 441, 446,
597 A.2d 479, 482 (1991) (The circuit courts “are courts
of original jurisdiction, authorized to hear all actions
and causes, other than those particularly prescribed by
statute or constitutional provision for other fora.”
(Citations omitted)). Beckwitt’s contention that old En
glish statutes preclude his prosecution and provide a
complete defense because, according to him, the charg
es are based on an accidental housefire is, in actuality,
an argument that the 300-year-old statutes compel the
circuit court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular
way, i.e., that given the circumstances, permitting Bec
kwitt’s prosecution was erroneous. Under Maryland
law, it is clear that Beckwitt’s prosecution for depraved
App.l9a
heart murder and involuntary manslaughter was not
beyond the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the issue raised by Beckwitt does not
constitute an issue of subject matter jurisdiction,
Beckwitt was required to raise the issue in the circuit
court to preserve the matter for appellate review. See
Md. R. 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, the appellate court will
not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by
the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial
court[.]”). On brief, in a footnote, Beckwitt indicates
that the issue is preserved because, while moving for
judgment of acquittal, his attorney challenged the
circuit court’s “ability to enter a conviction on a
common law. offense that was not cognizable[.]” In
moving for judgment of acquittal, among many other
things, Beckwitt’s counsel stated:
(T]f there was a common law duty to provide a safe,
unobstructed egress from a single-family home, . . .
that common law duty was abrogated by enactment
of the Maryland State Fire Prevention Code, becau
se the State Fire Prevention Code exempts single
family homes from its scope. That code is codified in
COMAR 29.06.01. . . . Single-family homes are
specifically exempted from the code, just as smoke
detector statutes .... So it is legally not possible to
provide a basis for these charges by not providing
adequate egress from a single-family home because
there is no statutory or common law duty.
With these remarks, Beckwitt’s counsel did not
mention any old English statutes upon which he now
relies, or otherwise argue, as he does now, that the
statutes precluded Beckwitt’s prosecution.11 A review
of the record leads to the conclusion that Beckwitt’s
contention concerning the Fires Prevention (MetropoApp.20a
lis) Act of 1774 and any other English statute preclud
ing his conviction in this case is not preserved for
appellate review.
Even if we were to reach the merits, we would conc
lude that old English statutes did not preclude Beckwitt’s prosecution or serve as a defense. In 1707, an Eng
lish law was enacted which provided in pertinent part:
That no Action, Suit, or Process whatsoever, shall
be had, maintained, or prosecuted against any
Person in whose House or Chamber any Fire shall,
from and after the said first Day of May, accidenta-.
lly begin, or any Recompence be made by such
Person for any Damage suffered or occasioned
thereby; any Law, Usage, or Custom to the contrary
notwithstandingf.]
6 Ann., Ch. 31, § VI (1707) (italics omitted).12
Eventually, the provision was codified as part of the
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act of 1774, which stated
that “no Action, Suit, or Process whatever, shall be
had, maintained, or prosecuted, against any Person in
uWe also note that Beckwitt did not raise the issue he now
raises concerning the alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and applicability of old English statutes on brief in the Court of
Special Appeals.
12Section III of the statute provided in pertinent part, however:
That if any menial or other Servant or Servants, through
Negligence or Carelessness, shall fire or cause to be fired
any Dwelling-house, or Out-house or House, such Servant
or Servants being thereof lawfully convicted by the Oath of
one or more credible Witnesses made before two or more of
her Majesty’s Justices of the Peace, shall forfeit and pay
the Sum of one hundred Pounds unto the Churchwardens
of such Parish where such Fire shall happen, to [be]
distributed amongst the Sufferers by such Fire[.]
6 Ann., Ch. 31, § III (1707).
App.21a
whose House, Chamber, Stable, Bam, or other Build
ing, or on whose Estate any Fire shall, after the said
twenty-fourth Day of June, accidentally begin[.j”. Fires
Prevention (Metropolis) Act of 1774, 14 Geo. Ill, Ch.
78, § LXXXVI (italics omitted).
As the State points out, historically, there has been
disagreement about the scope of liability for accidental
fires and the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act of 1774.
In Koos v. Roth. 652 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Or. 1982), the
Supreme Court of Oregon discussed the status of the
common law of England in 1843 with respect to fires,
explaining that “[a]n early common law action for let
ting one’s fire escape and injure his neighbor is traced
to [a] 1401 report” and “applied equally to a fire set
outdoors, for burning stubble in a field, as to fire in
one’s house.” (Footnote omitted). The Court observed
that in an 1894 law review article, “Wigmore treated
this action as a form of absolute liability.” XcL at 1264 &
n.ll (footnote omitted). According to the Court, in a
1926 academic journal article, Winfield differed becau
se a person would not have been ‘liable if he showed
that the fire was the act of a stranger, or an act of
God.” Id* at 1264 & n.12 (cleaned up). In addition, alth
ough the Supreme Court of Oregon did not note this in
Koos. in the 1894. law review article, Wigmore stated
that, in 1712, “the responsibility for accidental fires in
houses was abolished by the legislature.” John H. Wig
more, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History —
HI, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 449 (1894) (footnotes omitted).
In a 1996 article in The Journal of Legal Studies,
A.W. Brian Simpson discussed the “obscure” history of
liability for fires, stating:
During the eighteenth century a series of fire
prevention statutes was passed; they include proviApp.22a
sions dealing with fires which began “accidentally.”
In 1774 a comprehensive Fires Prevention (Metro
polis) Act was passed; section 86 appears to assume
that at common law there might be liability, possi
bly strict, for fires which escaped from premises but
had not been deliberately kindled, but the provision
is obscure. The underlying assumption seems to
have been that fires which caused damage to
neighbors would normally either have been delibe
rately kindled, and allowed by negligence to spread,
or have begun through negligence, but that there
might be situations where a fire was accidental in
the sense that it had not spread through negligen
ce. The Act of 1774 does not clearly indicate what
the standard of liability was then supposed to be,
perhaps for the reason I have explained. However,
Blackstone in his Commentaries (1765-69) thought
that the effect of the Act was to exonerate a house
holder from liability either for his own negligence or
that of his servant. However, a servant responsible
was made liable to a penalty, with imprisonment in
default of payment. Since serious fires would
commonly leave a potential defendant without
means, tort actions may have had little value.
A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J.
Legal Stud. 53, 76-77 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
In spite of this history, Beckwitt argues that a
person cannot be prosecuted in Maryland for any crime
related to an accidental housefire, seemingly without
regard to any circumstances surrounding the fire.
Beckwitt’s contention is flawed for any number of
reasons. First, Beckwitt concedes that Kilty’s Report of
the Statutes, the preeminent authority on the topic,
concluded that the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act of
App.23a
1774 is not applicable in Maryland.13 Specifically, on
brief, Beckwitt acknowledges: “Candidly, the statutes
relied upon by [him] have not been found applicable by
Kilty ” Although Beckwitt argues that this Court is not
precluded from having a different view from Kilty's,14
13In 1811, pursuant to a resolution of the General Assembly,
William Kilty, the Chancellor of Maryland, made a report to the
body concerning the English statutes applicable to the people of Maryland. Kilty’s English Statutes, 1811, Vol. 143, at 1, available at
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000
001/ 000143/html/aml43--l.html [https://perma.cc/R8VG-2F77].
According to the Archives of Maryland Online, the full title of the
report is:
A Report of All Such English Statutes as Existed at the Time
of the First Emigration of the People of Maryland, and Which
by Experience Have Been Found Applicable to Their Local and
Other Circumstances; and of Such Others as Have Since Been
Made in England or Great-Britain, and Have Been
Introduced, Used and Practised, by the Courts of Law or
Equity; and Also All Such Parts of the Same as May Be Proper
to Be Introduced and Incorporated into the Body of the Statute
Law of the State. Made According to the Directions of the
Legislature, by William Kilty, Chancellor of Maryland. To
Which Are Prefixed, an Introduction and Lists of the Statutes
Which Had Not Been Found Applicable to the Circumstances
of the People: with Full and Complete Indexes. Published
under the Directions of the Governor and Council, Pursuant to
a Resolution of the General Assembly.
Id. (some capitalization omitted). In State v. Magliano. 7 Md. App.
286, 293, 255 A.2d 470, 474 (1969), the Court of Special Appeals
referred to Kilty’s as “[t]he only evidence on th[e] subject” of which
English statutes have been found to be applicable in Maryland.
14Beckwitt points to a footnote in Magliano. 7 Md. App. at 293
n.5, 255 A.2d at 474 n.5, in which the Court of Special Appeals
stated: “That Kilty did not regard a statute as ‘applicable’ did not
preclude a court from having a different view.” Significantly, the
Court of Special Appeals noted that one scholar had “found only
two cases, however, in which Kilty’s opinion was overruled[.]” RL
at 293 n.5, 255 A.2d at 474 n.5 (citations omitted).
App.24a
we see no basis on which to diverge from the longprevailing view that the Fires Prevention (Metropolis)
Act of 1774 is not applicable in Maryland.
Even if the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act of
1774 were applicable in Maryland, it would not govern
the outcome of this case. Beckwitt fails to appreciate
that he was not convicted of second-degree depraved
heart murder and involuntary manslaughter because
an accidental fire occurred in the basement of his
house. Rather, he was convicted because the evidence
demonstrated that Beckwitt had created conditions in
the basement that severely impeded Khafra’s ability to
report and escape from any potentially life-threatening
situation, which manifested a reckless or wanton
disregard for Khafra’s life.
There is nothing novel about an individual being
prosecuted and convicted for a death resulting from an
accidental fire where the individual created conditions
that caused the death. For instance, in Commonwealth
v. Skufca. 321 A.2d 889, 891, 893-94 (Pa. 1974), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed a defendant’s
conviction for involuntary manslaughter where the
defendant locked her two young children in a room,
without supervision, for several hours, and a fire
started in the building. A visitor was prevented from
rescuing the children due to the locked door, and the
children died of smoke inhalation. See id. at 891, 893.
In Johnson v. State. 801 S.E.2d 294, 295-96 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2017), the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed a
defendant’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter
where the defendant left three of her children alone in
a room with a space heater and blocked the
apartment’s hallway with a sofa and access to the
kitchen with a table, and the space heater caught fire
App.25a
and two of the children died of smoke inhalation. In
Commonwealth v. Levesque. 766 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Mass.
2002), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
concluded that evidence before the grand jury was
sufficient to support the defendants’ prosecution for
manslaughter where the defendants accidentally
started and failed to report a fire in a warehouse,
which took the lives of six firefighters.
In the cases discussed above, the actus reus suppor
ting the criminal charges was not the setting of a fire
or that an accidental fire occurred. Rather, the actus
reus was the creation of dangerous circumstances
surrounding the fire, such as preventing young childr
en from being rescued or starting and failing to report
a fire thereby placing firefighters in danger. Such
conduct supported criminal culpability. The same can
be said of the conduct in this case, where Beckwitt
arranged for Khafra to live, and work in a basement
with a faulty source of electrical power for the
provision of light and ventilation and with no way for
Khafra to immediately communicate with him in the
event of an emergency and with the basement filled
with trash and debris which severely impeded Khafra’s
ability to escape the basement in the event of an
emergency. Beckwitt was not charged, tried, and convi
cted based on the circumstance that an accidental fire
occurred in the basement of his house. Beckwitt was
charged, tried, and convicted based on his conduct in
creating dangerous conditions from which Khafra
could not escape in the event of an emergency such as
a fire. So, even if the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act
of 1774 applied in Maryland, it would not preclude
Beckwitt’s prosecution or otherwise serve as a defense
because the charges in this case were not based on
App.26a
Khafra having lost his life in an accidental fire but
rather on Beckwitt’s conduct in subjecting Khafra, in
wanton and reckless disregard for his life, to the
dangerous conditions that caused his death.
II. Involuntary Manslaughter
The Parties’ Contentions
Beckwitt contends that the evidence was insufficie
nt to support a conviction for involuntary manslaugh
ter under either a theory of gross negligence or a theo
ry of legal duty. Beckwitt argues that the State failed
to demonstrate that his conduct demonstrated a want
on and reckless disregard for human life, i.e., that his
conduct rose to the level of gross negligence. Beckwitt
maintains that having a person work in a home with
hoarding conditions and power outages is not likely to
cause harm to the person, and that hoarding is not
inherently dangerous conduct. Beckwitt asserts that
there was no legal duty applicable to the circumstances
of the case and that the jury instruction regarding the
duty to provide a safe workplace failed to take into
account that such a duty does not “encompass
providing emergency egress in the event of an
accidental fire” or “providing a smoke alarm.” Beckwitt
also argues that the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence establishing both actual and legal causation.
The State responds that the involuntary manslaug
hter conviction can be reversed only if there was insuff
icient evidence under both the legal duty and gross
negligence theories. The State maintains that Beck
witt’s conduct demonstrated a reckless and wanton
disregard for Khafra’s life and was grossly negligent,
and that Beckwitt failed to perform his legal duty to
provide Khafra with a reasonably safe work environ
ment, a duty which any employer owes to an employee.
App.27a
The State contends that both legal and actual causat
ion are satisfied as Khafra’s death would not have
occurred but for Beckwitt’s conduct and his death was
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such conduct.
Standard of Review
In State v. Wilson. 471 Md. 136, 159, 240 A.3d
1140, 1153 (2020), we described the standard of review
of the sufficiency of evidence as follows:
In determining whether the evidence is legally
sufficient, we examine the record solely to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. In examining the
record, we view the State’s evidence, including all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the State.
(Cleaned up). In reviewing the evidence, we consider
“whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evide
nce, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a
rational trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt of the offe
nses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” White v.
State. 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855, 862 (2001)
(citation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence may supp
ort a conviction if the circumstances, taken together, do
not require the trier of fact to resort to speculation or
conjecture, but circumstantial evidence which merely
arouses suspicion or leaves room for conjecture is obvi
ously insufficient.” Smith v. State. 415 Md. 174, 185,
999 A.2d 986, 992 (2010) (cleaned up). “It must afford
the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id* at 185, 999 A.2d at 992 (cleaned up).
Involuntary Manslaughter Generally
App.28a
In Maryland, involuntary manslaughter is a
common law felony generally defined as “the
unintentional killing of a human being, irrespective of
malice.” State v. Thomas. 464 Md. 133, 152, 211 A.3d
274, 285 (2019) (citation omitted). There are three
varieties or theories of involuntary manslaughter: “(1)
unlawful act manslaughter—doing some unlawful act
endangering life but which does not amount to a
felony; (2) gross negligence manslaughter—negligently
doing some act lawful in itself; and (3) the negligent
omission to perform a legal duty.” Mi at 152, 211 A.3d
at 285 (cleaned up). For the latter two variations of
involuntary manslaughter—gross negligence and
negligent omission to perform legal duty—“the
negligence must be criminally culpable[,] i.e., grossly
negligent.” Mi at 152, 211 A.3d at 285 (cleaned up).
In addition, the State must “demonstrate a causal
connection between such gross negligence and death to
support a conviction, although it is not essential that
the ultimate harm which resulted was foreseen or
intended.” Id* at 152, 211 A.3d at 285 (cleaned up). The
causal connection “includes actual, but-for causation
and legal causation.” M» at 152, 211 A.3d at 285; see
also id. at 173, 211 A.3d at 297-98 (“[T]he defendant’s
gross negligence must be the proximate cause of the
victim’s death—meaning the (1) actual, but-for cause
and (2) legal cause.” (Cleaned up)). “[A]ctual cause, or
cause-in-fact, concerns the threshold inquiry of
whether [the] defendant’s conduct actually produced
an injury.” McCauley v. State. 245 Md. App. 562, 575,
227 A.3d 656, 663 (2020) (cleaned up). “For conduct to
be the actual cause of some result, it is almost always
sufficient that the result would not have happened in
the absence of the conduct—or *but for’ the defendant’s
App.29a
actions.” Thomas. 464 Md. at 174, 211 A.3d at 298
(cleaned up).
As to actual causation in gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter cases, in Thomas, we
observed that on only a few occasions have Maryland
cases “evaluated the actual, or but-for, cause of a given
result[.]” Id. at 174-75, 211 A.3d at 298. We discussed
one instance, stating:
In one such case, the Court of Special Appeals
determined that a mutual agreement to engage in
grossly negligent conduct can be sufficient to find
causation, even where the victim was, himself,
engaged in the grossly negligent act. In Goldring v.
State, 103 Md. App. 728, 730-31, 654 A.2d 939[,
940] (1995), two racers, Hall and Goldring,
participated in a drag race on a two-lane country
highway with a posted 45-mile-per-hour speed
limit. During the race, Hall accidently struck the
side of Goldring’s vehicle and lost control of his car.
See id. at 731, 654 A.2d [at 940]. Hall and two
pedestrians were killed. See id. The court concluded
that Goldring’s conduct in competing in the drag
race bore a sufficiently direct causal connection to
Hall’s death to support Goldring’s conviction for
involuntary manslaughter, and Goldring was
convicted in the death of Hall and the two
pedestrians. See id. at 738, 654 A.2d [at 944].
Thomas. 464 Md. at 175, 211 A.3d at 298-99. In Thom
as, id. at 175, 211 A.3d at 299, we also discussed Palm
er v. State. 223 Md. 341, 353, 164 A.2d 467, 474 (1960)
—a case in which we stated “that a defendant does not
‘cease to be responsible for his otherwise criminal
conduct because there were other conditions which
contributed to the same result.’” Specifically, we stated:
App.30a
In Palmer, we held a mother liable for gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter when she
failed to prevent her husband’s savage beatings of
her daughter. Significantly, the Court concluded
that it was not necessary that the mother’s grossly
negligent conduct be the sole reason for her
daughter’s death. See Palmer, 223 Md. at 353, 164
A.2d [at 474]. Ultimately, her unwillingness to aid
her child, which was her duty, resulted in the
child’s death and she, too, could be convicted of
involuntary manslaughter. Thus, we took a broader
view of actual cause, implicitly recognizing that the
grossly negligent conduct need only be the but-for
cause of the death, and not an independently
sufficient cause of it.
Thomas. 464 Md. at 175, 211 A.3d at 299.
In Thomas, id. at 178, 211 A.3d at 301, we explain
ed that “[t]he concept of legal causation is applicable in
both criminal and tort law, and the analysis is parallel
in many instances” and “turns largely upon the forese
eability of the consequences of the defendant’s conduct.” (Cleaned up). The State is not required to prove
“that the ultimate harm which resulted was actually
foreseen or intended.” Id* at 178, 211 A.3d at 301
(cleaned up). Rather, “[i]t is sufficient that the ultimate
harm is one which a reasonable man would foresee as
being reasonably related to the acts of the defendant.”
Id. at 178, 211 A.3d at 301 (cleaned up).
Gross Negligence Involuntary Manslaughter
With respect to gross negligence involuntary mansl
aughter, the State must prove that the defendant’s
conduct that resulted in the victim’s death, “under the
circumstances, amounted to a disregard of the conseqApp.31a
uences which might ensue and indifference to the
rights of others, and so was a wanton and reckless
disregard for human life.” Sfate v. Albrecht. 336 Md.
475, 500, 649 A.2d 336, 348 (1994) (cleaned up). The
defendant “must have committed acts so heedless and
incautious as necessarily to be deemed unlawful and
wantonfj” LL at 500, 649 A.2d at 348 (cleaned up).
“The act must manifest such a gross departure from
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily careful and
prudent person under the same circumstances so as to
furnish evidence of indifference to the consequences.”
Thomas. 464 Md. at 153, 211 A.3d at 286 (cleaned up).
“Moreover, the defendant, or an ordinarily prudent
person under similar circumstances, should be
conscious of this risk.” Id* at 154, 211 A.3d at 286
(citations omitted). In Thomas, id. at 160-61, 211 A.3d
at 290, we explained that, in addition to the above
considerations, determining whether an individual’s
conduct constitutes gross negligence
also involves an assessment of whether an activity
is more or less likely at any moment to bring harm
to another, as determined by weighing the inherent
dangerousness of the act and environmental risk
factors. This weighing must amount to a high
degree of risk to human life—falling somewhere
between the unreasonable risk of ordinary
negligence and the very high degree of risk
necessary for depraved-heart murder.
(Cleaned up).
Whether a defendant’s conduct rises to.the level of
gross negligence is a fact-specific inquiry and “[t]here
is no scientific test or quantifiable probability of death
that converts ordinary negligence to criminal gross
negligence.” Id* at 159, 211 A.3d at 289. Instead, “the
App.32a
inherent dangerousness of the act engaged in, as
judged by a reasonable person[,] ... is combined with
environmental risk factors, which, together, make the
particular activity more or less likely at any moment to
bring about harm to another.” I<L at 159, 211 A.3d at
289 (cleaned up). The inquiry into gross negligence is
not limited to an assessment of inherent danger
ousness and environmental factors; “the defendant, or
an ordinarily prudent person under similar
circumstances, should be conscious of the risk to
others.” M* at 167, 211 A.3d at 294 (citation omitted).
We have indicated that gross negligence involunt
ary manslaughter generally occurs “in four main
contexts: automobiles, police officers, failure to perform
a duty, and weapons.” Idi at 154, 211 A.3d at 286. In
Thomas, in considering “under what circumstances the
dangers of heroin would justify holding a dealer liable
for involuntary manslaughter for supplying the means
by which his customer fatally overdoses[,]” we discuss
ed cases involving automobiles, police officers, and
weapons to “create a helpful tableau depicting how we
assess a defendant’s level of negligence.” ML at 139,
154, 211 A.3d at 277, 286.16
In the context of automobiles and gross negligen
ce,16 we observed that, in Duren v. State. 203 Md. 584,
16Although we recognized that involuntary manslaughter could
involve a failure to perform a duty, in Thomas we did not discuss
this line of cases.
I6In Thomas. 464 Md. at 154, 211 A.3d at 286, although we
recognized that a criminal statute for “manslaughter by vehicle”—
defined “as causing the death of another by driving, operating, or
controlling a vehicle in a grossly negligent manner”—“preempts
any prosecution for such conduct as common law gross negligence
manslaughter,” the cases involving manslaughter by vehicle were
relevant because they involve “the same common law concept and
meaning of gross negligence[.]” (Cleaned up).
App.33a
588-90, 102 A.2d 277, 279-80 (1954), a defendant’s
conduct constituted gross negligence where the defend
ant operated a vehicle in a reckless manner by speed
ing in a heavily congested residential • and business
area and struck and killed a pedestrian. See Thomas.
464 Md. at 154-55, 211 A.3d at 286-87. In State v.
Kramer. 318 Md. 576, 586-89, 592-93, 569 A.2d 674,
679-82 (1990), we held that the evidence was sufficient
to support a jury’s finding that the defendant’s conduct
constituted gross negligence where the defendant
while driving in a rural area passed vehicles in a no
pass zone going at least 75 miles per hour,.while talk
ing and joking with passengers, and hit an oncoming
vehicle, killing an occupant. See Thomas. 464 Md. at
155-56, 211 Ar3d at 287. By contrast, in Johnson v.
State. 213 Md. 527, 529-30, 132 A.2d 853, 854, 856
(1957), we concluded that the evidence was not suffici
ent to support a conviction for manslaughter by vehicle
where the defendant, who was driving.-in a non-residential area early in the morning, hit a curb, ,side-swiped
a pole, and ended up in a plot of grass, causing a
passenger to be ejected from the car and . killed. See
Thomas. 464 Md. at 156-57, 211 A.3d at 287-88. At
trial, there was contradictory testimony about the
speed at which the car had been going. See id. at 156,
211 A.3d at 287. Looking at environmental factors
such as “the type of road traveled, the time of day, the
traffic, the density and character of the neighborhood,
and any safety precautions or warnings disregarded,”
we “determined that there was insufficient evidence, to
conclude that the defendant was grossly negligent.” Mi
at 156-57, 211 A.3d at 287-88 (citations omitted).
In Thomas, we also discussed gross negligence invo
luntary manslaughter cases involving negligent police
App.34a
officer conduct that resulted in death. See id. at 157,
211 A.3d at 288. Although “such cases are evaluated
under a heightened ‘reasonable police officer under the
circumstances’ standard, rather than a reasonably pru
dent person standard^]” we noted that the. cases prov
ided “guidance concerning the line between ordinary
and gross negligence.” Id* at 157, 211 A.3d at 288 (cita
tion omitted). In Albrecht. 336 Md. at 478, 480-82, 649
A.2d 337-39, we held that the evidence was sufficient
to support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter where an officer removed a shotgun
from his vehicle, racked the gun, leveled it at the
victim, and, with his finger on the trigger, intended to
swing the shotgun to aim it at another person, but
instead the gun discharged, and the victim was killed.
See Thomas. 464 Md. at 157-58, 211 A.3d at 288.
Lastly, in Thomas, we discussed Mills v. State. 13
Md. App. 196, 197, 282 A.2d 147, 147 (1971), a case in
which a sixteen-year-old defendant took his father’s
gun with him to a school dance, then went into a
bathroom with friends to look at the gun and drink
liquor. See Thomas. 464 Md. at 159, 211 A.3d at 289.
The defendant, who knew there was one bullet in the
chamber, pointed the gun at his friend, who slapped
the gun from the defendant’s hand, causing it to hit the
floor, discharge, and kill another boy. £gg id* at 159,
211 A.3d at 289. The Court of Special Appeals concl
uded “that the circumstances plainly demonstrated a
grossly negligent act dangerous to life” and that “the
friend’s reaction when the gun was pointed in his dir
ection was wholly predictable, and therefore not an
independent supervening cause.” Id* at 159, 211 A.3d
at 289 (cleaned up).
After reviewing the cases discussed above, in
App.35a
Thomas, we concluded that the defendant’s conduct
demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for
human life and that the evidence was sufficient to
support a conviction for gross negligence manslaugh
ter. See id. at 171-72, 211 A.3d at 296-97. The agreed
findings of fact in the case showed that the victim, a
twenty-three-year-old man, died of a heroin overdose.
See id. at 141, 147, 211 A.3d at 278-79, 282. The defen
dant, a heroin dealer and user, would consume twelve
bags of heroin a day, using four bags for a single shot,
and would travel to Delaware every two to three days
to get his supply of heroin. See id. at 148, 211 A.3d at
283. The defendant had sold heroin to the victim a few
times. See id. at 149, 211 A.3d at 283. In the hours
before he was found dead in the early morning, the
victim called the defendant approximately twentyseven times over the course of twenty-two minutes
and, during the same time span, the victim text mess
aged the defendant five times. See id. at 145, 169, 211
A.3d at 280-81, 295. This was unusual behavior becau
se the defendant usually met the victim earlier in the
day to sell him heroin. See id. at 149, 211 A.3d at 283.
The defendant met with the victim and sold him four
bags of heroin—the only time he sold heroin to the vic
tim around midnight. See id. at 149, 211 A.3d at 283.
In Thomas, we considered “the inherent dangerous
ness of distributing heroin with the attendant environ
mental risk factors presented[,]” and observed that,
according to the agreed statement of facts, anyone in
the defendant’s position—who was knowingly engaged
in the unregulated selling of a controlled dangerous
substance to customers in a region suffering from an epidemic of heroin and opioid abuse and deaths
—“would understand the dangers of heroin, and its
App.36a
propensity to harm physically, if not kill, individuals
who are ingesting it” Id* at 167, 211 A.3d at 294
(cleaned up). We determined that it was “fair to infer
that [the defendant] subjectively knew an overdose
was possible based on his statement that [the victim]
‘couldn’t have overdosed off [the amount] I sold him.”’
Id. at 168, 211 A.3d at 295 (last alteration in original).
We concluded that “the consumption of heroin in
unknown strength is dangerous to human life, and the
administering of such a drug is inherently
dangerous[,]” although “distribution, alone, does not
always amount to gross negligence.” Id* at 169, 211
A.3d at 295 (cleaned up).
We noted that the defendant was a “systematic and
sustained heroin distributor!,]” who also abused
heroin himself, not an “infrequent or inexperienced
provider.” Id* at 170, 211 A.3d at 295. From this, we
stated that it could be inferred that the defendant “was
aware of the risk to life posed by consistent heroin
abuse, cognizant of its ill-effects, and, yet, continued to
sell the drug notwithstanding its danger.” Id* at 170,
211 A.3d at 296 (citations omitted). We concluded that
the defendant’s conduct constituted a wanton and
reckless disregard for human life and that the evidence
was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for
gross negligence manslaughter beyond a reasonable
doubt. See id* at 171-72, 211 A.3d at ,296-97.
As to causation, we concluded that the defendant’s
conduct—selling four bags of heroin to the victim, who
consumed them—was sufficient to establish actual,
but-for causation, stating: “There is no evidence in the
record that [the victim] could have died without the
heroin, and this is enough to find but-for causation.”
Id. at 178, 211 A.3d at 300 (citation omitted). We also
App.37a
concluded that there was sufficient evidence of legal
causation. See id. at 180, 211 A.3d at 301. We explain
ed that the State was not required to prove “that the
four bags of heroin were the only reason [the victim]
overdosed and died.” I<L at 180, 211 A.3d at 301. We
stated that “[rjather,.there must be sufficient evidence
in the record to determine that [the victim] would not
have died but for. the heroin and that his death was a
foreseeable consequence of [the defendant] selling him
the four bags of heroin[,]” which the State had
established. LL at 180, 211 A.3d at 301.
In State v. Morrison. 470 Md. 86, 94-95, 233 A.3d
136, 141 (2020), this Court held that the evidence was
not sufficient to support a mother's convictions for .
gross negligence involuntary manslaughter and reck
less endangerment where a mother co-slept with her
four-month-old infant and her four-year-old daughter,
after an evening of drinking beer with friends virtual
ly, and the infant died as a result of. asphyxia from
probable overlay. 470 Md. at 94-95, 233 A.3d at 141.
We concluded that the mother did not engage in inher
ently dangerous conduct and we observed .that the
State did not introduce evidence that the mother was
aware of the risks associated with co-sleeping “or that
a reasonable person under the circumstances would
have appreciated those risks.” Id* at 115, 233 A.3d at
153. Although the evidence showed that the mother
had consumed alcohol, there was insufficient evidence
to support a finding that she was intoxicated or impair
ed on the night her infant died. See id. at 121, 233 A.3d
at 157. In sum, we concluded that “there was insuffici
ent evidence of gross negligence—wanton and reckless
disregard for human life— ”and that “the conviction for
involuntary manslaughter was properly reversed.” Id.
App.38a
at 124, 233 A.3d at 158.
Legal Duty Involuntary Manslaughter
In Maryland, it is a longstanding principle that an
employer owes an employee the duty to provide a
reasonably safe place to work. See, e.g.. Athas v. Hill.
300 Md. 133, 139, 476 A.2d 710, 713 (1984) (“Among
the nondelegable duties which the employer owed his
employees was the duty to provide a safe place to
work[.]” (Citations omitted)).
In State v. DiGennaro. 415 Md. 551, 564-65, 3 A.3d
1201, 1208-09 (2010), this Court discussed whether a
defendant could have been convicted of involuntary
manslaughter under a legal duty theory where the
victim's death was not caused by the defendant's negli
gent operation of a vehicle, but rather by the failure to
clear a roadway of debris that fell from his dump truck.
The Court of Special Appeals had reversed the defend
ant’s conviction for manslaughter by vehicle and we
affirmed, holding that the definition of the term “oper
ating” in the manslaughter by vehicle statute is synon
ymous with the definitions of “drive” and “operate” in
the Transportation Article, such “that a defendant
cannot be convicted of manslaughter by vehicle unless
the victim died as a result of grossly negligent conduct
that occurred while the defendant was actually operat
ing a vehicle.” frL at 553-54, 563-64, 3 A.3d at 1202,
1208. Although the defendant had not been charged
with legal duty involuntary manslaughter, we discuss
ed whether he could have been convicted of the offense.
See id, at 564-67, 3 A.3d at 1208-10. We stated:
To convict a defendant of involuntary manslaughter
by grossly negligent failure to perform a legal duty,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
App.39a
that (1) the victim’s death was caused by the defen
dant’s failure to perform a duty that the defendant
had a legal obligation to. perform, and (2) the defen
dant acted in a grossly negligent manner because
the defendant (a) was aware of his or her obligation
to perform that duty, and (b) was aware that his or
her failure to perform that duty would create a high
degree of risk to human life.
DiGennaro. 415 Md. at 566, 3 A.3d at 1210 (citations
omitted).
We explained that the defendant could have been
convicted of legal duty involuntary manslaughter if the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that: •
(1) even though his operation of the vehicle was
neither reckless nor negligent, as a result of what
occurred while he had been operating that vehicle,
[the statute] imposed .upon him a duty to take
appropriate remedial measures on behalf of other
users of the highway; (2) he failed to perform that
duty with reckless indifference to the issue of
whether his inaction was endangering other users
of [the road]; and (3) under the circumstances, that
failure constituted gross negligence.
Id. at 564-65, 3 A.3d at 1208-09 (footnotes omitted).
Analysis
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support
Beckwitt’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter
under either a gross negligence or legal duty theory.17
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction for gross negligence involuntary manslaug
hter, we must determine whether Beckwitt acted with
the mens rea necessary to establish gross negligence,
App.40a
i.e., whether he acted with wanton and reckless disre
gard for Khafra’s life. This involves a determination as
to whether Beckwitt’s conduct departed from that of an
ordinarily careful and prudent person and demonstr
ated a disregard of the consequences to Khafra. It also
requires an assessment of whether Beckwitt’s conduct
was likely to bring harm at any moment, i.e., whether
the inherent dangerousness of the conduct combined
with environmental risk factors together made the
conduct more or less likely at any moment to result in
harm to Khafra. See Thomas. 464 Md. at 160-61, 211
A.3d at 290.
Applying this framework, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to establish gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter because Beckwitt’s conduct
constituted a departure from the conduct that any
reasonable person would have taken under the
circumstances and demonstrated a disregard of the
consequences to Khafra. On multiple levels, Beckwitt's
conduct constituted a departure from the conduct that
a reasonable person would have engaged in under
similar circumstances. No reasonable person would
have required Khafra to live and work in a basement
with a faulty supply of electricity for light and airflow
and without a reliable way for Khafra to contact him.
No reasonable person would have maintained the
abhorrent conditions that existed in the basement with
debris and trash blocking Khafra’s route out in the
17In this case, the jury was instructed on both the gross
negligence and failure to perform a legal duty type of involuntary
manslaughter. The verdict sheet did not contain a separate
question requiring the jury to choose between the two theories or
otherwise differentiate between the two theories. When the jury
returned its verdict, it returned a general verdict of guilty as to
involuntary manslaughter.
App.41a
event of an emergency. And no reasonable person
would have reacted as casually as Beckwitt did on the
day of the fire upon learning of the two power outages
in the basement.
Beckwitt’s conduct was likely to bring harm to
Khafra at any moment and an ordinarily prudent
person under similar circumstances would have been
conscious of the risk to Khafra. See Thomas. 464 Md.
at 160-61, 211 A.3d at 290. Beckwitt’s conduct, acco
mpanied by other circumstances, presented a risk of
danger to Khafra. Specifically, the combination of
Beckwitt’s conduct and environmental risk factors that
he created in the basement produced a substantial risk
of harm to Khafra—namely, that he would not be able
to escape from the basement in the event of a fire or
any other emergency. Beckwitt hired Khafra, a young
man with no construction experience, to live
underground for weeks at a time and dig tunnels bene
ath his home in conditions that could only be described
as extraordinarily unsafe, i.e., dangerous. Electricity to
the tunnels was provided by multiple extension cords
and power strips that had a history of failing and
making the circuit breaker trip. In response to power
outages, Beckwitt would switch the power to a differe
nt circuit or wait, believing that the circuit breaker
might reset itself, and replace extension cords rather
than make any meaningful improvement to the electri
city source. A loss of electricity would result in a loss of
both light and ventilation in the tunnels. The failure to
provide reliable electricity alone constituted conduct on
Beckwitt’s part that created a dangerous condition and
an environmental risk factor that made it likely that
working in the basement could result in harm to Khaf
ra at any moment and created a risk that any reasonaApp.42a
ble person would have been aware of. An ordinarily
prudent person would know that causing someone to
live and work in a basement in which there could be
power outages that result in a lack of light and airflow
would create circumstances, i.e., risk factors, that could
prevent the person from escaping the basement in the
event of an emergency.
The evidence showed that Beckwitt engaged in
conduct that increased the risk of harm by causing
Khafra to work in the basement with no reliable way
to contact him in the event that he was injured or
needed to leave the basement in an emergency. Beck
witt did not have a cell phone or landline telephone
and Khafra could reach him only through an internet
messaging app. The unreliability of this method of
communication was demonstrated when in the early
morning hours on September 10, 2017, the power first
went out, and Khafra messaged Beckwitt stating that
there was no power and that there was smoke in the
basement; Beckwitt did not see the messages until
over six hours later when he woke up.
Compounding the risk was the circumstance that
Khafra did not know his exact location if he needed to
call for assistance in an emergency. Beckwitt took
deliberate steps to conceal the location of his house.
The evidence at trial showed that Beckwitt actively
sought to hide his address from Khafra and Hart,
another person whom Beckwitt hired to dig in his
basement. In transit to the home, Beckwitt required
Hart to wear sunglasses with duct tape on them and
he required Khafra to be blindfolded, all to obstruct
Hart’s and Khafra’s vision when Beckwitt drove them
to the house. Although Khafra eventually learned that
Beckwitt lived in Bethesda, Beckwitt had nevertheless
App.43a
attempted to conceal the fact. And although Khafra
learned that the house was in Bethesda, he did not
know— and could not know—his exact location
because Beckwitt used a virtual private network such
that, had Khafra tried to use his cell phone’s location
services while connected to Beckwitt’s network, it
would have appeared as if Khafra were in Virginia.
These circumstances obviously would have impeded
Khafra’s ability to call for help in the event of an emer
gency and are circumstances that an ordinarily prude
nt person would have known presented a risk of harm.
Adding to the dangerous conditions and environmental
risk factors created by Beckwitt, the basement was
filled with a large amount of trash, construction debris,
and other items. Indeed, the basement was so full of
trash and debris that it took over twenty firefighters,
working eight- to ten-hour days, several weeks to clear
it out. The detritus in the basement was piled six to
seven feet tall, creating a wall of materials on either
side of narrow pathways, which themselves were obst
ructed with items. To move around in the basement, a
person was required to squeeze through the pathways,
sometimes crawling, pushing, and moving debris to
proceed, and walking on trash that was piled approxi
mately one-and-a-half to two feet high. The situation in
the tunnels (the area in the basement in which Khafra
would dig) was so dangerous that a fire investigator,
Lieutenant Erin Wirth of Montgomery County Fire
Rescue, a witness for the State, testified that she resp
onded to the scene the day after Khafra’s death and
was equipped with a mask that covered her entire face,
an air line to oxygen tanks outside the house, a small
oxygen tank on her person, and a safety harness, but
she refused to crawl to the end of the tunnels because
App.44a
she did not feel it was safe to do so.18 According to Dan
iel Maxwell, a fire origin and cause investigator for
NEFCO Fire Investigations, who testified as an expert
witness for the State, escape from the fire in the base
ment would have been very difficult given the trash
and debris in the basement. Maxwell testified that
people escaping a fire “instinctively]” get close to the
floor to get below the “layer of hot air and gases.”
Maxwell testified that getting down and crawling
through Beckwitt’s basement would have been
difficult, though, because Khafra would have had “to
crawl over all the debris, all the buckets and the bags
of cement and all the other” items in the basement.
Based on Lieutenant Wirth’s and Maxwell’s testimony,
any rational trier of fact could have concluded that,
given the amount of debris in the basement, Khafra’s
ability to move through the basement was impeded to
the point that he ran out of time to escape the fire. In
other words, a rational trier of fact could have
determined that Beckwitt created conditions in the
basement that prevented Khafra’s ability to get out.
We are wholly unpersuaded by Beckwitt’s content
ion that “Khafra’s mode of egress was reasonable
under the circumstances” and that “Khafra was not
prevented from escaping the basement[,]” but rather
was simply “slowed down by the hoarding conditions.”
(Cleaned up). Based on the evidence, the jury reason
ably could have concluded that the conditions that
Beckwitt maintained in the basement impeded
Khafra’s escape to the extent that Khafra was unable
l0Lieutenant Wirth testified that the conditions were unsafe
for her to go to the end of the tunnels “[n]ot just because of shoring
and dirt and all of that, but also the water that had come down
from the firefighting.”
App.45a
to get out of the basement during the fire. In evaluat
ing the sufficiency of the evidence, our duty is to “exa
mine the record solely to determine whether any ratio
nal trier of fact could have found the essential elemen
ts of the crime.beyond a reasonable doubt ” Wilson. 471
Md. at 159, 240 A.3d at 1153 (cleaned up). “We defer to
any possible reasonable inferences the jury could have
drawn from the admitted evidence and need not decide
whether the jury could have drawn other inferences
from the evidence, refused to draw inferences, or
whether we would have drawn different inferences
from the evidence.” Fuentes v. State. 454 Md. 296, 308,
164 A.3d 265, 272 (2017) (citations omitted).
In this case, on top of all of the other circumstances,
the evidence demonstrated that living conditions in the
basement were atrocious and that, while in the basem
ent, Khafra was entirely reliant on Beckwitt for food,
basic hygiene, and escape. There were no toilet faciliti
es. Khafra urinated and defecated in a bucket that Be
ckwitt emptied every few days. Khafra cleaned himself
using disposable wipes. On the day of the fire, Khafra
was found dead in the tunnels, wearing no clothes.
In addition to the hazardous conditions he establis
hed in the basement, Beckwitt’s conduct on the day of
the fire demonstrated an indifference to or disregard of
the consequences that might befall Khafra as a result
of the power outages. Khafra messaged Beckwitt early
in the morning on September 10, 2017, beginning at
2:32 a.m., alerting him to a power outage, at 2:37 a.m.,
advising of smoke in the tunnels, and at 2:51 a.m. abo1
ut the darkness and lack of airflow. Beckwitt did not
see the messages until he woke up over six hours later,
at approximately 9:00 a.m. After Beckwitt awoke and
finally saw Khafra’s three messages, despite the conteApp.46a
nt of the messages, he did not respond until 9:27 a.m.,
almost a half hour later. At that time, instead of chec
king on Khafra or getting Khafra out of the basement
right away, Beckwitt responded by simply telling Khaf
ra that there had been a “pretty major electrical failure” and that his solution was to “switch [] it all over to a
different circuit.” Beckwitt then went back to sleep for
over five hours. Later that day, at around 4:00 p.m.,
Beckwitt heard the carbon monoxide alarm beep. Beck
witt understood the beeping sound to be an indication
of another loss of power, which was confirmed when he
did not hear the refrigerator running anymore. Despite
there being another loss of power and knowing from
Khafra’s earlier messages that the previous power out
age had resulted in Khafra being in the dark with no
airflow, Beckwitt waited twenty to thirty minutes befo
re going to investigate the outage and reset the circuit
breaker in the basement. As Beckwitt was leaving the
basement, he heard an explosion, saw smoke, and
became aware that the fire had started.
From the evidence produced at trial, the jury reaso
nably could have concluded that on the day of the fire
when Beckwitt finally went to the basement to reset
the circuit breaker as a result of the second power out
age, he knew the following: Khafra was alone in the
basement with trash and debris obstructing his ability
to get out; electrical power to the basement was suppli
ed by a series of extension cords and power strips and
was unreliable; there had been two power outages in
the span of just over twelve hours, one of which he
himself described as a “pretty major electrical failure”;
Khafra had thought he smelled smoke in the basement
during the night; and, Khafra had been without electri
cal power in the morning and had told him that there
App.47a
was no airflow or light in the basement. Yet, despite
knowing all of this, Beckwitt did not take any steps to
have Khafra leave the basement earlier in the day
before the fire and did not respond promptly to the
second power outage that immediately preceded the
fire. Beckwitt’s conduct on the day of the fire and over
all conduct in creating unsafe conditions in the base
ment placed Khafra in a position in which he would
have been at a high risk of harm during a fire or other
emergency. The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate
that Beckwitt possessed enough information to be awa
re of the risk of harm to Khafra and that on the day of
the fire, he disregarded the risk or, at the very least,
was indifferent to it. An ordinarily prudent person
would have been aware of the risk of harm to Khafra
under the circumstances.
In this case, with certainty, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, any rational juror
could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt, based
on evidence of the dangerous conditions that Beckwitt
created in the basement and his disregard for Khafra’s
safety on the day of the fire, that his “conduct amount
ed to a wanton and reckless disregard for human life—
a gross departure from the conduct of an ordinarily
prudent person, without regard to the consequences or
the rights of others, and [was] likely to bring harm at
any moment.” Thomas. 464 Md. at 171, 211 A.3d at
296 (cleaned up). Beckwitt not only departed from
conduct that a reasonable person would have taken
under similar circumstances but also demonstrated
both a disregard of the consequences which might
ensue and an indifference to Khafra’s well-being, and
so evinced a wanton and reckless disregard for Khaf
ra’s life. In sum, the evidence was sufficient for a
App.48a
rational trier of fact to find that Beckwitt’s conduct was
grossly negligent.
Because we conclude that the evidence was suffici
ent to support Beckwitt’s conviction for involuntary
manslaughter under a gross negligence theory, we
need not necessarily consider whether the evidence
was also sufficient to support a conviction under the
legal duty theory of involuntary manslaughter.19 To
dispel any remaining question concerning the sufficien
cy of the evidence for Beckwitt’s conviction for involun
tary manslaughter, however, we address the issue and
determine that the evidence was sufficient for the jury
to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Beckwitt
failed to fulfill the legal duty to provide Khafra with a
reasonably safe work environment and that the failure
to do so was grossly negligent. To be sure, no Maryland
case has directly addressed whether an employer may
be convicted of involuntary manslaughter under a legal
duty theory. Maryland law is clear, though, that empl
oyers have a common law duty to provide employees
with a reasonably safe work environment. See Athas.
19In Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 47, 49 (1991), in
considering “whether, in a federal prosecution, a general guilty
verdict on a multiple-object conspiracy charge must be set aside if
the evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the
objectsU” the Supreme Court stated that it was a well-settled rule
of criminal procedure “that a general jury verdict was valid so long
as it was legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds^]”
The Supreme Court further stated:
It is one thing to negate a verdict that, while supported by
evidence, may have been based on an erroneous view of the
law; it is another to do so merely on the chance—remote, it
seems to us—that the jury convicted on a ground that was not
supported by adequate evidence when there existed alternat
ive grounds for which evidence was insufficient.
Id. at 59-60 (cleaned up).
App.49a
300 Md. at 139, 476 A.2d at 713. The evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction for legal duty involun
tary manslaughter as long as the State proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that Beckwitt was Khafra’s emplo
yer, that Beckwitt failed to fulfill the duty to provide a
reasonably safe workplace with reckless indifference as
to whether his inaction endangered Khafra, and that,
under the circumstances involved, the failure constit
uted gross negligence. Cf. DiGennaro. 415 Md. at 56465, 3 A.3d at 1208-09.
In this case, the evidence was sufficient for the jury
to conclude that Beckwitt was Khafra’s employer. Bec
kwitt paid Khafra $150 per day to live in the basement
and dig tunnels. As such, in accord with Maryland law,
as his employer, Beckwitt owed Khafra the duty of pro
viding a reasonably safe work environment. Based on
the evidence concerning the conditions that Beckwitt
created and allowed to persist in the basement, there
was more than sufficient evidence, for a reasonable jury
to conclude that Beckwitt failed miserably in fulfilling
the duty to provide Khafra a reasonably safe work
environment.
,
Beckwitt’s contention that he had no common law
duty to install a smoke detector or to provide emerge
ncy exit in case of an accidental fire is nothing more
than a distraction.20 The installation of a smoke detect
or or having a designated emergency exit are but two
measures that Beckwitt could have taken to establish
a reasonably safe workplace. The evidence was suffici
ent to prove that Beckwitt failed in numerous ways to
fulfill the duty to provide Khafra with a reasonably
safe workplace, including by failing to provide reliable
electricity for light and airflow in the workplace, by
failing to provide a reliable method of communication,
App.50a
and by maintaining an excessive amount of debris and
trash in the workplace. In other words, it is of no signi
ficance that Beckwitt claims he was not required to in
stall a smoke detector or have an emergency exit as th
ose are but two measures that could have been taken
to establish a reasonably safe workplace, but were not,
and Beckwitt’s own conduct and other factors contri
buted to the risk of danger in the work setting.
Similarly, Beckwitt’s reliance on the 19th century
case of Jones v. Granite Mills. 126 Mass. 84 (1878) for
the proposition that the duty to provide a safe workpla
ce does not include a duty to provide emergency egress
from an accidental fire is not persuasive. In Jones, idat 88-89, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that the owner of a mill could not be held liable
for failing to ensure that employees escaped a fire whe
re there was no evidence that the “failure to construct
proper and additional means of exit from a mill in case
of fire in any way contributed to the occurrence of the
fire itself’ or that the owner failed to take proper prec
autions. In other words, there was no evidence that the
mill owner had been negligent.
id* at 89. The Court
explained: ‘The master is not liable to the servant
unless he has been negligent in something which he
has contracted or undertaken with his servants to do,
“Beckwitt contends that he did not have a duty to utilize
specific fire safety measures, such as installing a smoke detector or
providing emergency egress from an accidental fire. Beckwitt
argues that there is no such duty under the common law. The
State points out:
Beckwitt was not charged with involuntary manslaughter
because he failed to fulfill his legal duty to install a smoke
detector. As the jury was instructed, the State’s legal duty
theory of involuntary manslaughter was based upon
Beckwitt’s failure to fulfill his common law duty to provide
Khafra, his employee, with a reasonably safe place to work.
App.51a
and he has not undertaken to protect him from the
results of casualties not caused by him or beyond his
control.” Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
What Beckwitt fails to take into account is that,
although language in Jones may say that there is no
common law duty for an owner of a building to provide
a particular manner of escape from a fire, the case sta
nds for the larger principle that an employer who acts
negligently in failing to take proper precautions or who
negligently contributes to the occurrence of the fire
may be liable. Under the theory discussed in Jones.
Beckwitt’s conduct in maintaining an unsafe work
environment that prevented Khafra’s escape from the
fire could fairly be determined to be negligence. Jones
does not conflict with the principle well established in
Maryland law that an employer owes a general duty to
an employee to provide a reasonably safe workplace.
We are more persuaded by the State’s' reliance on
Commonwealth v. Godin. 371 N.E.2d 438, 441-42, 444
(Mass. 1977), a case involving a discussion of an empl
oyer’s duty of reasonable care and the circumstances
sufficient to demonstrate wanton or reckless conduct.
In Godin, id. at 440, the president of a fireworks manu
facturing company was convicted of manslaughter for
the deaths of three employees that occurred as a result
of an explosion at the company’s manufacturing plant.
The defendant appealed and the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions. See
id. The defendant argued that the indictments were
insufficient because, as of the time of the explosion, no
court decision held that an employer owed his employ
ees a duty of reasonable care in the operation and
maintenance of the workplace. See id. At 442.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
App.52a
concluded that involuntary manslaughter, a common
law crime, “is an unlawful homicide unintentionally
caused by an act which constitutes such a disregard of
probable harmful consequences to another as to amou
nt to wanton or reckless conduct.” Id* (cleaned up). The
Court determined that the indictments were legally
sufficient, holding that “[a]n employer whose acts or
omissions constitute a disregard for the probable har
mful consequences and loss of life as to amount to wan
ton or reckless conduct is properly charged with man
slaughter where a foreseeable death is caused there
by” I& At 443.
The Court explained that there was evidence prese
nted from which the jury could conclude that, prior to
the explosion, the amount of fireworks stored in one of
the buildings “had reached unprecedented levels; Q the
defendant had been warned of the dangers posed by
such accumulations; Q nothing was done to remedy the
situation; and Q increments in such storage increased
the risk of explosion and resulting harm[.]” IcL at 444.
The Court concluded that the “evidence, if believed,
would warrant the jury in concluding that the defenda
nt should have been aware and indeed was aware of
the increased risk of harm and thus his failure to rem
edy the situation was the kind of conduct which const
itutes wanton and reckless conduct.” H* The Court
explained that “[rjecklessness involves conscious crea
tion of a substantial and unjustifiable risk” and, so
long as “the defendant’s conduct was reckless as far as
the risk of explosion was concerned, he must then be
held accountable for the probable consequences of such
conduct.” Id* (citations omitted). See also State v. Far
W. Water & Sewer Inc.. 228 P.3d 909, 927-29 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2010) (The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that
App.53a
the evidence was sufficient to support a corporation’s
convictions for negligent homicide where a jury could
reasonably conclude that management was “aware of
the substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or physi
cal injury involved in working in” the sewage treatme
nt plant and consciously disregarded that risk, and
that management’s conduct “constituted a gross devia
tion from the standard of care or conduct under a reas
onable person standard[.]”).
As in Godin, the evidence in this case was sufficient
for a rational juror to conclude that Beckwitt should
have been aware, and was in fact aware, of the risk of
harm to Khafra posed by the deplorable conditions in
the workplace, i.e., the basement, and that his failure
to remedy the conditions was conduct that demonstrat
ed a wanton and reckless disregard for Khafra’s safety.
Beckwitt hired Khafra to live and work in a basement
filled with trash and debris, with spotty electricity pro
vided by a series of extension cords and power strips,
and without a reliable manner for Khafra to contact
him. The conditions in the basement made it difficult
to move around. Testimony at trial established that
Khafra would have had to crawl through and climb
over debris, including buckets and bags of cement, to
get out of the basement. Beckwitt created unsafe condi
tions in the basement that made escape from a fire, or
any other emergency for that matter, difficult if not
impossible and allowed those conditions to exist while
Khafra worked in the basement for weeks at a time.
Moreover, Beckwitt’s conduct on the day of the fire
demonstrated a reckless and wanton disregard for Kh
afra’s life. Based on all of the above, the.‘jury, could
have concluded that Beckwitt violated his common law
duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace with reckApp.54a
less indifference as to whether his actions or inactions
endangered Khafra and that Beckwitt’s failure to fulfill
his duty constituted gross negligence. ££ DiGennaro.
415 Md. at 564-65, 3 A.3d at 1208-09.
We are not convinced by Beckwitt’s attempt to diff
erentiate his conduct from that of other defendants
convicted of manslaughter where death resulted from a
fire. Beckwitt’s conduct was as wanton and reckless as
the conduct of defendants convicted of involuntary
manslaughter in other cases. In Commonwealth v.
Welanskv. 55 N.E.2d 902, 904, 906-07 (Mass. 1944),
the defendant owned and operated a nightclub where
several of the emergency exits were locked or blocked
and “[s]ome employees, and a great number of patrons,
died in [a] fire” and others with bums and injuries
from smoke died within a few days. Notably, the Supr
eme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that, to
convict the defendant of manslaughter, the prosecution
did not need to prove that the defendant caused the
fire through wanton or reckless conduct, but instead
that “[i]t was enough to prove that death resulted from
his wanton or reckless disregard of the safety of patro
ns in the event of fire from any cause.” LL at 912. In
Commonwealth v. Zhan Tang Huang. 25 N.E.3d 315,
318-19, 325, 327 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015), after tenants (a
father and his two young sons) died as a result of a fire
and another tenant (the mother) was severely injured
in the fire, one of the landlords of an apartment build
ing was convicted of three counts of manslaughter and
four counts of wanton or reckless violation of the State
building or fire code causing serious bodily injury or
death, where the landlord violated numerous code pro
visions related to fire safety, routinely failed to respond
to requests to repair or replace missing smoke detectApp.55a
ors, and had been warned of the safety risk posed by
not installing smoke detectors.
In People v. Ogg. 182 N.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1970), a mother was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter where she left her two young children
unattended and locked in a windowless room and the
children died from inhalation of carbon monoxide
fumes from a fire. The Court of Appeals of Michigan
held that the defendant’s actions of putting her child
ren, or at least “allowing them with her knowledge to
be locked, in a small windowless upstairs room, with
out proper heat, light, food, clothing or bedding, and
without means of escape, and, in reckless disregard of
the consequences of such action, absenting herself from
the home in pursuit of her own business,” rose to the
level of “culpable negligence.” IcL at 575. Although
Beckwitt’s conduct was obviously different than that of
the defendants in these cases, the evidence demonstra
ted that his failure to provide a reasonably safe workp
lace was done with reckless indifference as to whether
his conduct endangered Khafra and that a reasonable
person would have been aware of the substantial risk
of danger that Khafra faced.
Turning to causation, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence of both actual and legal causation.
As to actual, but-for causation, the evidence was suffic
ient for the jury to have concluded that, but for Beckw
itt’s conduct, i.e., having subjected Khafra to the dang
erous conditions that existed in Beckwitt’s basement,
Khafra would not have died in the fire. The jury could
have reasonably inferred that Khafra would have been
able to escape the relatively minor fire but for the circ
umstance that the basement was full of trash and
debris that impeded Khafra’s ability to move freely
App.56a
about. The jury could also have reasonably inferred
that but for Beckwitt’s failure to promptly respond to
the two electrical failures, Khafra would not have been
trapped in the fire. As the Court of Special Appeals
recognized, although Beckwitt “did not intentionally
set the fire, his disregard for safety, including his refu
sal to recognize the implications of two electrical failu
res on the day of the fire, satisfy actual causation.”
Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at 372, 245 A.3d at 224.
As to legal causation, we are persuaded that the
State produced sufficient evidence demonstrating that
Khafra’s death was a reasonably foreseeable consequ
ence of Beckwitt’s conduct. A reasonable person would
have been able to discern the risk of danger or harm to
Khafra from the working conditions in the basement.
Although the evidence demonstrated that the fire lik
ely started as the result of a latent defect in an electri
cal outlet and that Beckwitt would not have been awa
re of the defect, it was entirely foreseeable that in a
fire, or any other emergency that might occur in the
basement, due to the numerous unsafe conditions that
Beckwitt allowed to exist, Khafra’s ability to escape
would have been seriously impeded.
In sum, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to
support Beckwitt’s conviction for involuntary manslau
ghter under both a gross negligence theory and a legal
duty theory As such, we, like the Court of Special
Appeals, affirm the conviction. See id. at 373, 245 A.3d
at 224.
III. Lesser-Included Offense
The Parties’ Contentions
Beckwitt contends that legal duty involuntary man
slaughter is a type of gross negligence involuntary
App.57a
manslaughter and a lesser-included offense of deprav
ed heart murder. Beckwitt argues that although there
was not a particularized verdict sheet, the substance of
the State's closing argument leaves little .doubt that
the jury convicted him of “failure to perform a legal
duty gross negligence manslaughter" (not “affirmative
act gross negligence manslaughter^’) and depraved
heart murder based on the allegation that he showed
“extreme disregard” in breaching a legal duty in the
workplace. Beckwitt also asserts that the jury was not
properly instructed as to the elements of the legal duty
theory of involuntary manslaughter, which led to his
conviction of the offense. Although Beckwitt’s content
ion contains different subparts, at bottom, it appears
that he argues that legal duty involuntary manslaug
hter is a lesser-included offense of depraved heart
murder, the jury instruction concerning the legal duty
theory was flawed, and his conviction for involuntary
manslaughter must be reversed.
The State responds that the jury instructions given
by the circuit court and the State’s closing argument
conveyed to the jury that the gross negligence and
legal duty theories are distinct theories of involuntary
manslaughter, and only gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of depraved
heart murder.. The State contends that Beckwitt’s
conviction for depraved heart murder was necessarily
based on his conviction for gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter.
Analysis
As an initial matter, for two reasons, it is not
necessary that we reach this issue. First, we have
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support
Beckwitt’s involuntary manslaughter conviction under
App.58a
both a gross negligence and a legal duty theory and
next, as discussed below, we affirm the Court of Speci
al Appeals’s conclusion that the evidence was insuffici
ent to sustain a conviction for depraved heart murder.
Given these determinations, we need not address Beckwitt’s contention that legal duty involuntary mansla
ughter is a type of gross negligence involuntary mansl
aughter and a lesser-included offense of depraved
heart murder, or, for that matter, review the circuit
court’s instruction as to legal duty involuntary
manslaughter.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we
have done just as Beckwitt urged and reviewed his
challenge to the legal duty involuntary manslaughter
conviction, set forth the elements of both the legal duty
and gross negligence manslaughter theories (which are
not the same), and determined that the evidence was
sufficient to support a conviction under either theory.
As discussed below, we affirm the Court of Special
Appeals’s reversal of Beckwitt’s conviction for seconddegree depraved heart murder, so it no longer matters
whether or not legal duty involuntary manslaughter is
a lesser-included offense of depraved heart murder.
Nonetheless, to put to rest any lingering question
about the integrity of Beckwitt’s conviction for involun
tary manslaughter, we will briefly address the issues of
whether legal duty manslaughter is a lesser-included
offense of depraved heart murder and whether the jury
was led to believe that was the case, and review the
challenge to the circuit court’s jury instruction on legal
duty involuntary manslaughter.
Legal duty involuntary manslaughter is not a
lesser-included offense of depraved heart murder. A
key element of legal duty involuntary manslaughter is
App.59a
that the defendant had a legal duty to perform and
failed to do so. The offense of depraved heart murder
contains no such element. The pattern jury instruction
for depraved heart murder sets forth the elements of
the offense as follows:
Second degree murder is the killing of another
person while acting with an extreme disregard for
human life. In order to convict the defendant of
second degree murder, the State must prove: (1)
that the defendant caused the death of (name); (2)
that the defendant’s conduct created a very high
degree of risk to the life of (name); and (3) that the
defendant, conscious of such risk, acted with extre
me disregard of the life endangering consequences.
MPJI-Cr 4:17.8A. In short, legal duty involuntary
manslaughter has an extra element— the existence of
a legal duty imposed upon the defendant—that
depraved heart murder does not and as such under the
required elements test is not a lesser-included offense.
See State v. Wilson. 471 Md. 136, 178-79, 240 A.3d
1140, 1164 (2020).21
Gross negligence involuntary manslaughter is,
however, a lesser-included offense of depraved heart
murder. It is well-established that gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter is a less culpable form of
depraved heart murder. See Thomas. 464 Md. at 173
n.20, 211 A.3d at 298 n.20 (“[G]ross negligence involu21In Wilson, 471 Md. at 178-79, 240 A.3d at 1164, we explained
the required evidence test, stating: Under the required evidence
test—also known as the same evidence test, Blockburger test, or
elements test—Crime A is a lesser-included offense of Crime B
where all of the elements of Crime A are included in Crime B, so
that only Crime B contains a distinct element. In other words, nei
ther Crime A nor Crime B is a lesser-included offense of the other
where each crime contains an element that the other does not.
App.60a
ntary manslaughter is a less culpable form of
depraved-heart murder.” (Citation omitted)); Dishman
v. State. 352 Md. 279, 299, 721 A.2d 699, 708 (1998)
(“While our cases have not drawn a precise line
between depraved heart murder and involuntary
manslaughter and we are not called upon to do so in
this case, we observe that the difference is one of the
degree of culpability.ir).22
In this case, the circuit court’s jury instructions
made clear that the gross negligence and legal duty
theories of involuntary manslaughter are separate and
distinct and that only gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of depraved
heart murder. The circuit court gave the Maryland
Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction for second-degree
depraved heart murder,23 stating:
The defendant is charged with a crime of depraved
heart murder, this charge includes second degree
(Citation omitted).
“We are aware that the Court of Special Appeals stated:
Although depraved heart murder is often described in
terms of being a more culpable manifestation of gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter, we are aware of no
authority that depraved heart murder may only arise from
the grossly negligent modality of involuntary
manslaughter. In other words, it seems possible that the
negligent omission of a lawful duty variety of
manslaughter could, in a proper case, be elevated to the
more culpable crime of depraved heart murder.
Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at 352 n.10, 245 A3d at 212 n.10. The
remarks by the Court of Special Appeals do not serve to convert
the legal duty theory of involuntary manslaughter into a lesserincluded offense of depraved heart murder. They are merely an
acknowledgement in dicta that in some instances the same
conduct may satisfy the elements of both offenses. While the
offenses may have different elements, they are not mutually
exclusive with respect to conviction.
App.61a
depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaug
hter. Second degree depraved heart murder is the
killing of another person while acting with an extre
me disregard for human life. In order to convict the
defendant of second degree depraved heart
murder[,] the State must prove that the defendant
cause [d] the death of Askia Khafra, that defendant’s
conduct created a very high degree of risk to the life
of Askia Khafra and that the defendant conscious of
such risk acted with extreme disregard of the life
endangering consequences.
Immediately after that, the circuit court instructed the
jury on the two theories of involuntary manslaughter
at issue, stating:
Involuntary manslaughter, there are two theories.
The [defendant is charged with the crime of
involuntary manslaughter.
In order to convict the defendant of involuntary
manslaughter!,] the State must prove that the
defendant acted in a grossly negligent manner and
that this grossly negligent conduct caused the
death of Askia Khafra. Grossly negligent means
that defendant, while aware of the risk, acted in a
manner that created a high risk to and showed a
reckless disregard for human life.[24] Or alternative
23See MPJI-Cr 4:17.8A.
24The pattern jury instruction on gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter, MPJICr 4:17.8B, provides:
The defendant is charged with the crime of involuntary
manslaughter. In order to convict the defendant of involuntary
manslaughter, the State must prove:
(1) that the defendant acted in a grossly negligent manner;
and (2) that this grossly negligent conduct caused the death of
(name). “Grossly negligent” means that the defendant, while
aware of the risk, acted in a manner that created a high risk
to, and showed a reckless disregard for, human life.
App.62a
theory, either B or C, if you find that Askia Khafra
and the defendant had an employer/employee
relationship the defendant has a legal duty to
provide his employee with a reasonably safe place
in which to work.
In order to convict the defendant of involuntary
manslaughter!,] the State must prove that the
victim, Askia Khafra, was employed by the
defendant, that defendant failed to perform his
legal duty, that the defendant’s failure to perform
the legal duty caused the death of the victim and
that by failing to perform this legal duty defendant
acted in a grossly negligent manner. Grossly
negligent means that defendant, while aware of the
risk, acted in a manner that created a high risk to
and showed a reckless disregard for human life.
The depraved heart murder jury instruction given
by the circuit court was the pattern jury instruction on
the offense and as such contained language advising
that in order to convict Beckwitt of second-degree
depraved heart murder, among other things, the jury
must find that the “defendant’s conduct created a very
high degree of risk to the life of Askia Khafra and that
the defendant conscious of such risk acted with extre
me disregard of the life endangering consequences.”
This language mirrored the jury instruction that the
circuit court gave pertaining to the gross negligence
theory of involuntary manslaughter, which referred to
the defendant, while aware of the risk, acting in a
manner that created a high risk to and showing a
reckless disregard for human life. In contrast, the
depraved heart murder jury instruction given by the
circuit court included no mention of the legal duty
theory of manslaughter. In other words, the circuit
App.63a
court did not instruct the jury that in order to convict
Beckwitt of depraved heart murder, the jury must find
that Beckwitt was Khafra’s employer or that Beckwitt
failed to fulfill a legal duty to provide Khafra with a
reasonably safe workplace.
During closing argument, the prosecutor told the
jury that depraved heart murder was a greater offense
of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. At the
outset of the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor
stated:
So, there are two crimes that you’re going to be
considering, depraved heart murder and involunt
ary manslaughter and there’s two ways to get to
involuntary manslaughter and either one of them is
up to you. Depraved heart murder, as you heard, it
involves and I’m not going to restate it out but the
main difference is that it involves what’s called a
very high degree of risk to human life and extreme
disregard for the risk taking behavior or for the life
of others and the risk taking behavior.
The main difference between that and one of the
forms of involuntary manslaughter is the word
very, very high degree of risk and involuntary man
slaughter is high degree of risk, and the word extre
me. Extreme disregard and involuntary manslaug
hter reckless disregard. So it’s a matter of degrees
between the depraved heart murder and one of tho
se ways you can get to involuntary manslaughter.
The other way to get to involuntary manslaugh
ter is by finding that there was an employer/emplo
yee relationship between the defendant and the vic
tim and that therefore he owed him a duty to keep
the workplace safe and he acted with a high degree
of risk and reckless disregard in breaching that
App.64a
duty.
The prosecutor’s explanation of the offenses during
closing argument was consistent with what the circuit
court had essentially instructed—that gross negligence
involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense
of a depraved heart murder.26
IV. Legal Duty Involuntary
Manslaughter Jury Instruction
The Parties* Contentions
Beckwitt contends that a jury instruction on legal
duty involuntary manslaughter must include that the
State is required to prove that: (1) the defendant was
aware of his obligation to perform a legal duty; (2) the
defendant was aware that his failure to perform his
legal duty would create a high degree of risk to human
life; (3) the defendant consciously disregarded his legal
duty; and (4) a reasonable employer in the defendant’s
position would not have disregarded his legal duty; and
that the circuit court’s failure to instruct the jury on
these points constituted reversible error.
“Beckwitt draws our attention to jury notes in the case, in
which the jury asked for an example of second-degree depraved
heart murder and the definition of “extreme disregard” and posits
that, based on the jury notes, “the jury considered the lesserincluded offenses first” meaning that the jury moved upward, first
finding him guilty of legal duty involuntary manslaughter and
then finding him guilty of depraved heart murder. The State
points out that even if Beckwitt is correct that the jury considered
the involuntary manslaughter first, he fails to explain why the
jury would have considered the legal duty theory only and not both
that and the gross negligence theory, especially where the circuit
court instructed the jury on both theories. We agree with the
State. Beckwitt’s contention concerning the jury notes does not
support a conclusion that the jury convicted him only of legal duty
involuntary manslaughter and not gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter.
App.65a
The State points out that Beckwitt did not request
that the circuit court give the instruction on legal duty
involuntary manslaughter that he now claims .was
reversible error for the court not to have given and
argues that the . issue is not preserved for appellate
review. The State contends that, if this Court considers
the merits of the issue, the Court should conclude that
the circuit court’s instruction on legal duty involuntary
manslaughter was a correct statement of law.
Standard of Review
Generally, where a party fails to object to a trial
court’s refusal to give a requested instruction, the issue
is not preserved for appellate review. See, e.g.. Yates v.
State. 429 Md. 112, 130, 55 A.3d 25, 36 (2012) (“In
general, a party must object to the failure to give a
particular instruction promptly after the instructions
are delivered, stating the grounds for the objection.”
(Citation omitted)); Watts v. State. 457 Md. 419, 426,
179 A.3d 929, 933 (2018) (‘This Court has consistently
repeated that the failure to object to an instructional
error prevents a party on appeal from raising the issue
under Rule 4-325([f]).” (Citations omitted)).
“We review a trial court’s decision to propound or
not propound a proposed jury instruction under an
abuse of discretion standard.” Lawrence v. State. 475
Md. 384, 397, 257 A.3d 588, 596 (2021) (citation omitt
ed). ‘We review de novo whether a jury instruction was
a correct statement of the law.” State v. Elzev. 472 Md.
84, 107, 244 A.3d 1068, 1082 (2021) (citation omitted).
This is so “because even in areas where a triad court
has discretion, no discretion is afforded to trial courts
to act upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” IcL at 107,
244 A.3d at 1082 (cleaned up). Generally, jury insthictApp.66a
ions are reviewed as a whole to determine whether
they fairly or accurately cover the issues and are gene
rated by the evidence. See Derr v. State. 434 Md. 88,
133, 73 A.3d 254, 281 (2013) (“On review, jury instruct
ions must be read together, and if, taken as a whole,
they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and
cover adequately the issues raised by the evidence, the
defendant has not been prejudiced and reversal is
inappropriate. Reversal is not required where the jury
instructions, taken as a whole, sufficiently protected
the defendant’s rights and adequately covered the
theory of the defense.” (Citation omitted)).
Analysis
The contention that Beckwitt raises in this Court
concerning the four points of law that he claims a jury
must be instructed on with respect to legal duty involu
ntary manslaughter is not preserved for appellate revi
ew as he never asked the circuit court to instruct the
jury on any of the four points. See Md. R. 4-325(f) (“No
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to
give an instruction unless the party objects on the
record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stat
ing distinctly the matter to which the party objects and
the grounds of the objection.”).26 Even if the issue were
preserved, we would conclude that the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury as to
legal duty involuntary manslaughter because the
instruction was a correct statement of law and covered
the essential elements of the offense.
The record reflects that prior to trial Beckwitt filed
written objections to the court’s proposed jury instruc
tions. Beckwitt argued that an instruction on legal
duty involuntary manslaughter should not be given at
App.67a
all because he alleged that he was not charged with
that theory of involuntary manslaughter. Beckwitt
requested that, if the circuit court were to instruct the
jury as to legal duty involuntary manslaughter, the
circuit court instruct the jury on eleven points that he
maintained were related to legal duty. In particular,
Beckwitt requested the following instructions:
1. The mere happening of an injury does not impute
a failure to comply with a legal duty.
2. One cannot be said to have failed to meet one’s
legal duty merely because he failed to provision
against a happening that he could not reasonably
be expected to foresee.
3. An employer is not an insurer of the employee’s
safety nor does he warrant the safety of the
employee.
4. Where there is no evidence that an alleged defect
could have been discovery [sic] by proper
inspection, a sudden and unexpected event affords
no inference of a breach of a legal duty on the part
of the employer[J
5. You may consider whether the employee was
familiar with working conditions prior to the date of
the event.
6. There is no breach of a legal duty where the
alleged perilous working conditions were known
both to the employer and the employee.
7. The legal duty of an employer arises from the
employer’s superior knowledge of the working
conditions from that of the employee.
26Effective July 1, 2021, Maryland Rule 4-325(e) was relettered
as Maryland Rule 4-325(f) without change. See Court of Appeals of
Maryland, Rules Order at 33 (Mar. 30, 2021), available at
https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules/order/ro206.pdf
[https://perma.ee/7LUV-3ZW].
App.68a
8. An employer’s duty exi[s]ts only when the
dangerous circumstance is known to the employer
and not known [to] the person injured.
9. An employer does not breach [a] legal duty for
failure to warn of a defect not known to the
employer.
10. An employer [] does not breach a legal duty
when injury occurs that is entirely collater[]al to
and not a probable consequence of the work for
which the employee was hired.
11. There must be a causal connection between the
alleged breach of a legal duty and the resulting
injury.
None of the eleven points concern the matters that
Beckwitt now claims the circuit court was required to
instruct the jury on.
In addition, in his written objections, Beckwitt
alleged that the circuit court’s proposed jury instruct
ion on legal duty involuntary manslaughter was “not a
complete and fair statement of the law” and was mis
leading in that it advised the jury that “the State must
prove that *by failing to perform a legal obligation, the
defendant acted in a grossly negligent manner.”’ On
brief, Beckwitt contends that, by making these allega
tions, he preserved for appellate review the issue that
he raises. Regardless of Beckwitt’s contention, the
record reflects that he did not request, either before or
during trial, that the circuit court instruct the jury on
the points that he now claims were necessary.
Beckwitt argues nonetheless that his contention is
preserved because he advised the circuit court that the
proposed involuntary manslaughter instruction “omitt
ed essential elements” and, as such, permitted the jury
to convict him based solely on finding that he failed to
App.69a
perform a legal duty and the death of the victim. The
problem with Beckwitt’s. contention, however, is that
the purpose of the language in Maryland Rule 4-325(f)
— prohibiting a party from raising on appeal an error
on the trial court’s part in giving or failing to give an
instruction “unless the party objects on the.record
promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating
distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the
grounds of the objection”—“is to give the trial court an
opportunity to correct its charge if it deems correction
necessary.” Sequeira v. State. 250 Md. App. 161, 19697, 248 A.3d 1151, 1172 (2021) (cleaned up). Because
Beckwitt’s written objections to the legal duty
involuntary manslaughter jury instruction did not
include any of the four points he urges as error before
us, the circuit court was deprived of the opportunity to
consider the request and to correct the proposed
instruction if required.
Beckwitt himself apparently recognizes that the
issue is not preserved, requesting that, “[ajssuming,
arguendo, the issue was not preserved,” we exercise
our discretion to consider the matter by engaging in
plain error review. As we stated in Newton v. State.
455 Md. 341, 364, 168 A.3d 1, 14 (2017), “[pjlain error
review is reserved for those errors that are compelling,
extraordinary, exceptional or fundamental to assure
the defendant of a fair trial.” (Cleaned up). Before an
appellate court can exercise its discretion to find plain
error, the following four conditions must be satisfied:
(1) there must be an error or defect—some sort of
deviation from a legal rule—that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affir
matively waived, by the appellant; (2) the legal err
or must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
App.70a
reasonable dispute; (3) the error must have affected
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the
ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it
affected the outcome of the Q proceedings; and (4)
the error must seriously affect the fairness, integ
rity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Id. at 364, 168 A.3d at 14 (cleaned up). The circumsta
nces of this case do not satisfy the conditions for plain
error review, as for instance, any error regarding the
instruction was not clear and obvious but rather is
subject to reasonable disagreement as can be seen from
the arguments raised by the State on brief in this
Court, urging that the legal duty involuntary man
slaughter instruction was a correct statement of law.
Even though the issue is not preserved for appell
ate review nor a matter that qualifies for plain error
review, we nonetheless address the matter and deter
mine that the legal duty involuntary manslaughter ju
ry instruction given by the circuit court was a correct
statement of law. The circuit court instructed the jury
that, to convict Beckwitt of legal duty involuntary ma
nslaughter, the State was required to prove that Khafra was employed by Beckwitt, that Beckwitt failed to
perform his legal duty to provide Khafra with a reason
ably safe workplace, that Beckwitt’s failure to perform
the legal duty caused Khafra’s death, and that Beckwi
tt acted in a grossly negligent manner by failing to per
form his legal duty, meaning that Beckwitt, while awa
re of the risk, acted in a manner that created a high
risk to and showed a reckless disregard for human life.
Beckwitt contends that the circuit court erred in
not instructing the jury that the State was required to
prove that he had knowledge of the duty owed to Khaf
ra. However, our case law demonstrates that the State
App.71a
was required to prove that Beckwitt had knowledge of
the facts that gave rise to the obligation to perform the
duty, not that the State was required to prove that
Beckwitt had knowledge of the statutory, common law,
or constitutional basis for the creation of the duty. Cf.
DiGennaro. 415 Md. at 564, 3 A.3d at 1208 (In stating
that the defendant could have been convicted of legal
duty involuntary manslaughter, we stated that a
statute imposed on the defendant a duty to take appro
priate remedial measures, not that the defendant had
to be aware of the statute.).
In State v. Kanaw. 416 Md. 1, 4-5, 4 A.3d 991, 99293 (2010), five defendants, who were employees of a
juvenile detention facility, were each charged with
reckless endangerment after a juvenile died at the
facility while they were on duty and they failed to
contact emergency services in a timely manner. The
defendants filed motions to dismiss the indictments,
arguing that the reckless, endangerment statute does
not proscribe the failure to act. See id. at 4, 4 A.3d at
993. The circuit court granted the motions and the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed. See id. at 4, 4 A.3d
at 993. We reversed and remanded the case for trial,
concluding “that the conduct proscribed by the reckless
endangerment statute includes the wilful failure to
perform a legal duty.” Id. at 5, 10-11, 4 A.3d at 993,
996. We explained that, to convict a defendant of
reckless endangerment as charged in the indictment,
the State would be required to prove beyond a reason
able doubt, among other things, that the defendant
owed a duty to obtain emergency medical care for the
juvenile and that the defendant “was aware of his
obligation to perform that duty[.]” Id. at 12-13, 4 A.3d
at 997. We stated that none of the defendants could be
App.72a
convicted of reckless endangerment based on force
used against the juvenile, but evidence of injuries
sustained by the juvenile would be admissible “for the
limited purpose of establishing the [defendants’
awareness of the duty to obtain emergency services for
the deceased.” Id* at 12 n.2, 4 A.3d at 997 n.2.
Applying the same analysis to this case, it is clear
that the State was not required to prove that Beckwitt
knew that as an employer he had a legal duty to provi
de an employee with a reasonably safe working enviro
nment. Rather, the State needed to prove that Beckwi
tt had knowledge of the employer-employee relation
ship and knowledge of the dangerous conditions of Khafra’s work environment that gave rise to the duty to
correct or eliminate the unsafe conditions. If we were
to conclude otherwise and require that a defend-ant
have actual knowledge of the existence of a statutory
or common law duty, we would, as the State points out,
in essence hold that ignorance of the law is a defense.
Two of the other points raised by Beckwitt—that
the circuit court needed to instruct the jury that the
State was required to prove that he was aware that his
failure to perform his legal duty would create a high
degree of risk to human life, and that he consciously
disregarded his legal duty—were covered by the circuit
court’s instruction. The circuit court instructed the jury
that the State was required to prove that, in failing to
perform his legal duty, the defendant acted in a grossly
negligent manner, which the circuit court described as
meaning that the “defendant, while aware of the risk,
acted in a manner that created a high risk to and
showed a reckless disregard for human life.” The jury
instruction given by the circuit court covered all of the
essential elements of legal duty involuntary manslauApp.73a
ghter and was a correct statement of the law.27 In sum,
the circuit court did not err in giving the legal duty
involuntary manslaughter jury instruction.
V. Depraved Heart Murder
The Parties’ Contentions
The State contends that the evidence was sufficient
to support the conviction for second-degree depraved
heart murder because the evidence established that
Beckwitt’s conduct was reasonably likely or certain to
result in death. The State asserts that in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, “the Court of Special
Appeals overlooked or devalued a number of salient
facts and failed to consider all of the facts
cumulatively!,]” including the danger of the tunnels,
and the conditions in the basement, which, according
to the State, were inherently dangerous.
For his part, Beckwitt responds that the Court of
Special Appeals was correct in concluding that
depraved heart murder requires conduct that must be
reasonably likely, if not certain, to cause death, and in
determining that the evidence in this case was
insufficient to satisfy that element of the offense.
Beckwitt argues that none of his “conduct was
inherently dangerous, let alone likely fatal, even in the
totality.” Beckwitt asserts that neither the tunnels, the
hoarding conditions in the basement, nor the use of
multiple extension cords, whether considered
individually or cumulatively, were likely, or certain, at
any moment to cause death.
27As to the fourth point, although Beckwitt contends that the
circuit court was required to instruct that a reasonable employer
in his position would not have disregarded his legal duty, this is
not one of the elements of legal duty involuntary manslaughter.
415 Md. at 566, 3 A.3d at 1210.
App.74a
Law
We have described depraved heart murder as “one
of the unintentional murders that is punishable as
murder because another element of blameworthiness
fills the place of intent to kill.” Robinson v. State. 307
Md. 738, 744, 517 A.2d 94, 97 (1986) (cleaned up).
Depraved heart murder constitutes “the form of murd
er that establishes that the willful doing of a dangero
us and reckless act with wanton indifference to the
consequences and perils involved, is just as blamewort
hy, and just as worthy of punishment, when the harmf
ul result ensues, as is the express intent to kill itself.”
Id. at 744, 517 A.2d at 97 (cleaned up). “The critical
feature of depraved heart murder is that the act in qu
estion be committed under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Id* at
745, 517 A.2d at 98 (cleaned up). We elaborated:
A depraved heart murder is often described as a
wanton and wilful killing. The term ‘depraved hea
rt’ means something more than conduct amounting
to a high or unreasonable risk to human life. The
perpetrator must or reasonably should realize the
risk his behavior has created to the extent that his
conduct may be termed wilful. Moreover, the condu
ct must contain an element of viciousness or conte
mptuous disregard for the value of human life whi
ch conduct characterizes that behavior as wanton.
Id. at 745, 517 A.2d at 98 (cleaned up). Similarly, in
DeBettencourt v. State. 48 Md. App. 522, 530, 428 A.2d
479, 484, cert, denied. 290 Md. 713 (1981), the Court of
Special Appeals explained that depraved heart murder
involves “the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly
dangerous act with reckless and wanton unconcern
and indifference as to whether anyone is harmed or
App.75a
not.”
In In re Eric F.. 116 Md. App. 509, 519, 698 A.2d
1121, 1126 (1997), the Court of Special Appeals reiter
ated that “[t]he essential element of depraved heart
murder is that the act in question be committed under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life.” (Cleaned up). Thus, the key ques
tion to consider “is whether the defendant engaged in
conduct that created a very high risk of death or seri
ous bodily injury to others.” Id* at 519, 698 A.2d at
1126 (cleaned up). Depraved heart “murder may be
perpetrated without the slightest trace of personal illwill” and, instead, “the willful doing of a dangerous
and reckless act with wanton indifference to the conse
quences and perils involved, is just as blameworthy,
and just as worthy of punishment, when the harmful
result ensues, as is the express intent to kill itself.” Id.
at 520, 698 A.2d at 1126 (cleaned up).
In Pagotto v. State. 127 Md. App. 271, 276, 732
A.2d 920, 923 (1999), affd, 361 Md. 528, 762 A.2d 97
(2000), the Honorable Charles E. Moylan Jr. stated
that “[o]n the matrix of blameworthy states of mind
that will support a verdict of either civil liability or
criminal guilt on the part of an unquestioned homicidal
agent, one of those mental states is” where the “agent
causes an unintended death by carelessly or negligent
ly doing some act lawful in itself.” (Cleaned up). “At the
bottom end of the culpability scale is mere civil liability
for a wrongful death,” i.e., civil negligence, “where
there may be uncontestable fault and perhaps heavy
civil liability but still something less than criminality.”
Id. at 276, 732 A.2d at 923. Higher up on the “scale of
blameworthy negligence are those more gross devia
tions from the standard of care used by an ordinary
App.76a
person where the negligent conduct can reasonably be
said to manifest a wanton or reckless disregard of
human life.” Id* at 277, 732 A.2d at 923 (cleaned up).
Such conduct constitutes gross negligence involuntary
manslaughter. £ge id* at 277, 732 A.2d at 923. Finally,
highest up on the scale of blameworthy negligence “are
those acts of a life-endangering nature so reckless that
they manifest a wanton indifference to human life.
That level of blameworthiness constitutes seconddegree murder of the depraved-heart variety.” IsL at
277, 732 A.2d at 923.
As to the line distinguishing gross negligence invol
untary manslaughter from second-degree depraved
heart murder, Judge Moylan stated that “Maryland
case law has yet provided no meaningful distinction ...
. As an abstract matter, however, we know that there
is—somewhere—such a line. There must be or else
there is no legally cognizable distinction between mur
der and manslaughter.” ItL at 277, 732 A.2d at 923-24.
Although the line between depraved heart murder and
gross negligence involuntary manslaughter may not be
well defined, as the Court of Special Appeals in this
case recognized, Maryland case law demonstrates that
the line between the two offenses “appears to be as
follows: depraved heart murder requires an extreme
indifference to the value of human life, whereas gross
negligence involuntary manslaughter requires only a
wanton and reckless disregard for human life[J”
Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at 355, 245 A.3d at 214
(cleaned up).
In Simpkins v. State. 88 Md. App. 607, 608-09, 619,
596 A.2d 655, 655-56, 661 (1991), cert, denied. 328 Md.
94, 612 A.2d 1316 (1992), the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the second-degree depraved heart murder
App.77a
convictions of a mother and father whose two-year-old
child died of malnutrition and dehydration. The evide
nce showed that the child lived with her parents and
her four-year-old sister, and that a houseguest who
had been living with the family realized that he had
not seen the child in more than a day, went into her
bedroom, and discovered that she was not moving. See
id. at 609, 596 A.2d at 656. According to the medical
examiner, the child died of malnutrition and dehydra
tion as she “had not been given food or drink for three
to five days.” Mi at 609, 596 A.2d at 656. Moreover, the
child was discovered in a dirty diaper containing about
three-quarters of a pound “of layered fecal material!,]”
and the medical examiner believed that the diaper had
not been changed in four to six days. Id* at 609, 596
A.2d at 656. Although the child was permitted to star
ve to death, the evidence demonstrated it was not due
to the parents’ inability to provide food, as the “refrige
rator was crammed full of food, and they and [the older
child] apparently ate quite well.” Id* at 610, 596 A.2d
at 656.
On appeal, the parents contended that the State
had failed to prove that they acted, or failed to act,
with malice. See id. at 611, 596 A.2d at 657. The Court
of Special Appeals recognized that “malice is the indis
pensable ingredient of murder; by its presence, homici
de is murder; in its absence, homicide is manslaught
er.” Id* at 611, 596 A.2d at 657 (cleaned up). The Court
of Special Appeals observed, though, that malice for
depraved heart murder may be inferred from “the
intent to do an act under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” Id*
at 611, 596 A.2d at 657. The Court of Special Appeals
noted that “[m]ost cases prosecuted under a ‘depraved
App.78a
heart’ theory involve affirmative conduct—firing a gun
or driving a car or boat into a crowd, for example.” Id*
at 612, 596 A.2d at 657 (citations omitted). Neverthe
less, ‘“depraved heart’ murder has also been found in
cases of malicious omission, including situations where
a parent has maliciously allowed a small child to die of
exposure or of malnutrition and dehydration.” Id* at
612, 596 A.2d at 657. The Court of Special Appeals
traced the history of depraved heart murder cases
involving child exposure or starvation from the English
common law to the present, including cases from
courts in other jurisdictions. See id* at 612-19, 596
A.2d at 657-61. Applying the principles distilled from
its historical review, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that the evidence in the case supported the
finding of malice:
Most of these cases—English and American—
tend to be fact-specific. It is evident from all of them
that mere neglect, despite its awful consequence, is
not enough to establish malice and thus to support
a conviction of murder. We believe, however, that..
. the court’s finding of malice in this case is support
ed by the evidence. Where a young child, incapable
of self-help, is knowingly, deliberately, and unnece
ssarily placed in confinement and left alone for up
to five days without food, drink, or attention and
death ensues from that lack, malice may be inferr
ed. A rational trier of fact could reasonably find
that death is at least a likely, if not a certain, conse
quence of such conduct, that any normal adult wou
ld understand and appreciate the likelihood of that
consequence, and that the conduct is therefore will
ful and wanton, manifesting viciousness or contem
ptuous disregard for the value of human life[J
App.79a
Id. at 619-20, 596 A.2d at 661-62 (cleaned up).
In Maryland, convictions for depraved heart murd
er also have been affirmed in cases involving the use of
weapons, intentional infliction of physical injury resul
ting in death, and leaving an incapacitated person un
attended knowing that death would result. In Alston v.
State. 101 Md. App. 47, 58-59, 643 A.2d 468, 473-74
(1994), &f£d, 339 Md. 306, 662 A.2d 247 (1995), the
Court of Special Appeals held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for
second-degree depraved heart murder where a’ fifteenyear-old was fatally shot on a street during a gunfight.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded “that for appr
oximately ten men to engage in an extended firefight
on an urban street in a residential neighborhood was
conduct that created a very high degree of risk of death
or serious bodily injury to others.” Alston. 101 Md.
App. at 58, 643 A.2d at 473. In Owens v. State. 170
Md. App. 35, 43, 103, 906 A.2d 989, 993, 1027 (2006),
affd. 399 Md. 388, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007), the Court of
Special Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient
to support the defendant’s conviction for second-degree
depraved heart murder where the evidence established
that the two-year-old victim, who was the defendant’s
stepson, had sustained “a tremendous amount of blunt
force[,]” “causing rib fractures, bruising of both the
lungs and. thymus, and tearing of the liver[,]” that the
“injuries could not have been inflicted by the victim’s
four-year-old brother[,]” and that the defendant “had
sole custody of the victim during the time that the
injuries were sustained.”
In Eric F.. 116 Md. App. at 511, 522, 698 A.2d at
1122, 1127, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
evidence was sufficient to support a finding of a juveApp.80a
rule’s involvement in a delinquent act which would
have constituted second-degree depraved heart murder
had the juvenile been an adult. In Eric F.. id. at 511,
522, 698 A.2d at 1122, 1127, the juvenile, a teenager
who had been drinking with a fifteen-year-old victim,
dragged the victim, who was unconscious and only
partially clothed, to the woods behind his house on a
cold and rainy night, and left the victim to die of hypo
thermia. The Court of Special Appeals determined that
the juvenile’s indifference toward the victim was demo
nstrated by his placing the victim “outside in the cold,
dragging her to the woods, and leaving her there in an
unconscious state[,]” placing “her in a dangerous situ
ation and, therefore, clearly indicat [ing] his total lack
of regard for her well being, considering the dangerous
state in which she was placed in the sub-freezing cold.”
Id. at 521, 698 A.2d at 1127. The Court of Special
Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that the juvenile knew that his
actions would lead to the victim’s death, “and that he
manifested an extreme indifference to the value of her
life by leaving her in the cold, and failing to seek
appropriate help.” M* at 522, 698 A.2d at 1127.
Analysis
We hold that the evidence was not sufficient to sup
port Beckwitt’s conviction for second-degree depraved
heart murder because, as the Court of Special Appeals
determined, Beckwitt’s conduct, although demonstrat
ing a reckless disregard for human life, was “not the
type of conduct that [was] likely, if not certain, to cause
death, and thus does not rise to the level of opprobrious
conduct that depraved heart murder proscribes—
conduct that is so extreme in its disregard to human
App.81a
life that it may be deemed willful”,Beckwitt, 249 Md.
App. at 378, 245 A.3d at 227. Beckwitt’s conduct—
having Khafra dig tunnels underneath his home, in a
basement with electrical power supplied.by multiple
extension cords and power strips and filled with trash
and debris that would have severely impeded Khafra’s
escape in the event of any emergency—whether consi
dered individually or cumulatively, did not constitute
conduct that could be said to be reasonably likely, if
not certain, to cause death and thus did not satisfy the
malice element necessary for depraved heart murder.
As the Court of Special Appeals observed, the State
conceded that, at trial, it did not present evidence that
the tunnels were structurally unsafe. Ii at 377, 245
A.3d at 227. In other words, the tunnels were not stru
cturally unsound, ready to collapse or cave in at a mo
ment’s notice. To be sure, the evidence demonstrated
that during a power outage, it was dark, and the airf
low was restricted. But, that circumstance by itself was
not reasonably likely, if not certain, to cause death.
In addition, it is readily apparent that, although
Beckwitt’s basement was full of trash and debris, to
the point that the hoarding conditions hampered esca
pe from the basement in the event of an emergency,
the conditions in the basement in and of themselves
did not pose an imminent risk of death to Khafra. Sim
ilarly, that Beckwitt used multiple extension cords and
power strips to provide electricity, and that he was
aware of two power failures in the hours before the
fire, does not constitute conduct reasonably likely, if
not certain, to cause death. Even when all of the envir
onmental factors and Beckwitt’s actions are considered
in the aggregate, we are not able to conclude that a
rational trier of fact could have found that Beckwitt’s
App.82a
conduct demonstrated an extreme indifference to the
value of human life or rose to the level such that it was
reasonably likely, if not certain, to cause death.
The State takes issue with the Court of Special
Appeals having pointed out that “other individuals,
including Khafra, worked in the tunnels without
incident[,]” Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at 377, 245 A.3d at
227, and contends that the circumstance that others
worked in the tunnels and did not die is irrelevant and
does not mean that Beckwitt’s conduct was not reason
ably likely to cause death. The State relies on two outof-state cases involving fatal traffic accidents in which
depraved heart murder convictions were affirmed—
State v. Fuller. 531 S.E.2d 861 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
and State v. Doub. 95 P.3d 116 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004)—
for the argument that, “[i]n both of those cases, the
defendant could have managed to make it home with
out killing anyone!,]” but “[t]hat does not mean that
their conduct was not reasonably likely to result in
death!,]” especially “where the same high-risk behavior
is repeated day after day[J” We are unpersuaded by
the State’s reliance on those cases, as, unlike in this
case, the defendants in Fuller and Doub engaged in
numerous actions that, either individually, or cumu
latively, were indeed likely to cause death.
In Fuller. 531 S.E.2d at 864, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina concluded that a charge of seconddegree murder was properly submitted to the jury and
that the defendant’s conduct “manifested] a mind
utterly without regard for human life and social duty,
supporting a finding of malice sufficient for a convict
ion of second-degree murder.” (Citations omitted). The
defendant, while driving drunk, led police on a 16.7mile high- speed chase that ended when he hit a truck,
App.83a
forcing it into oncoming traffic, killing both of the
occupants. See id. at 863-64. The defendant engaged in
several actions that were likely, if not certain, to cause
death, including driving a vehicle with a blood-alcohol
concentration of 0.15, running a stop sign, running a
red light, speeding and passing stopped traffic at speed
of 90-95 miles per hour, and leading police on a long
high-speed chase. See id.
Similarly, in Doub, 95 P.3d at 117, the Court of
Appeals of Kansas concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for
second-degree murder, where the defendant, while dri
ving drunk, struck another car, ultimately resulting in
a child’s death, and left the scene. The defendant enga
ged in several actions that were likely, if not certain, to
cause death, including driving after drinking, consum
ing more alcohol and using crack cocaine and then re
suming driving, speeding and running into a vehicle,
and failing to stop and render aid to the victims after
the collision. See id. The Court determined that those
facts, along with others, clearly demonstrated an
extreme indifference to human life. See id. at 121.
By contrast, in this case, although Beckwitt’s
conduct demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard
for human life, it was not conduct that could be said to
be likely, if not certain, to cause death, and is not
conduct that satisfied the malice element of depraved
heart murder. Beckwitt’s conduct was reprehensible
and demonstrated an indifference to the risk of danger
to which Khafra was exposed and satisfied all the
elements for both gross negligence and legal duty
involuntary manslaughter but we cannot say that
Beckwitt engaged in conduct from which a jury could
reasonably conclude that death was a likely, if not
App.84a
certain, result. In accord with the Court of Special
Appeals, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to
support Beckwitt’s conviction for second-degree
depraved heart murder.28
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
80% OF COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER/CROSS
RESPONDENT AND 20% OF COSTS
TO BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY
COUNTY.
28As a result of our affirmance, in accord with the mandate
issued by the Court of Special Appeals, Beckwitt’s conviction for
depraved heart murder remains reversed and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for sentencing on the conviction for
involuntary manslaughter. See Beckwitt. 249 Md. App. at 346,
401-02, 245 A.3d at 209, 242.
App.85a
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. 133838C REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 794
September Term, 2019
DANIEL BECKWITT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
*Meredith,
Kehoe,
Beachley,
JJ.
Opinion by Beachley, J.
Filed: January 28, 2021
*Meredith, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of the Court. He participated in the adoption
of this opinion after being recalled pursuant to
Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A.
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
(§§ 10*1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic: 2021-04-07 11:25-04:00 Suzanne C.
Johnson, Clerk
App.86b
Following a trial that spanned over two weeks, a
jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County found
appellant, Daniel Beckwitt, guilty of second-degree
depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter.
The court sentenced appellant to twenty-one years’
imprisonment, suspending all but nine, for depraved
heart murder, and merged the conviction for
involuntary manslaughter. Appellant timely appealed
and presents the following four issues for our review:
1. Was the evidence legally sufficient to sustain
[appellant’s] convictions for depraved heart murder
and involuntary manslaughter?
2. Did the trial court err by giving flawed jury
instructions on murder and manslaughter?
3. Did the prosecutor’s repeated improper remarks
during closing and rebuttal closing arguments
result in reversible error?
4. Did the suppression court err in denying
[appellant’s] request for a hearing pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware111?
We hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to
sustain appellant’s conviction for gross negligence invo
luntary manslaughter, but was insufficient to sustain
the depraved heart murder conviction. We reject appe
llant’s remaining allegations of error. We shall theref
ore reverse appellant’s conviction for depraved heart
murder and remand for sentencing on the previously
merged involuntary manslaughter conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case involves the tragic death of Askia Khafra,
a twenty-one-year-old who died while trying to escape
a fire in appellant’s basement. At the time of the fire,
‘Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
App.87b
appellant was twenty-six- years old. The unfortunate
series of events that brought Khafra and appellant
together arose from Khafra’s idea to create a
smartphone application or “app” called Equity Shark.
Khafra envisioned Equity Shark as streamlining the
process for average people to invest in ■ “starter
companies” or small businesses that had not yet gone
public and needed funding. Khafra expended
considerable effort in developing the app. In
furtherance of that goal, Khafra browsed internet
chatrooms looking for investors. Khafra found his first
investor—appellant—in such a chatroom.
Khafra pitched his business idea to appellant, and
explained that he was looking for approximately
$5,000 to go to San Francisco to apply for a Thiel Fello
wship.2 According to the parties’ briefs, appellant inve
sted approximately $10,000 for a 5% stake in Equity
Shark.3 Khafra and appellant went on to develop a
close friendship. Khafra apparently became fascinated
with appellant due to appellant’s wealth and financial
success. Khafra looked to appellant as someone who
could help him grow Equity Shark, not just financially,
but by assisting with computer coding and other efforts
needed to develop the app into a viable business.
Unfortunately, Equity Shark never took off as planned,
and Khafra was not accepted for the Thiel Fellowship.
2The transcript incorrectly refers to this as the ‘Peter Field
Fellowship.” The specifics of the Fellowship itself, however, such
as the age limit, the requirement to drop out of school in order to
attend, and the Fellowship’s general purpose, persuade us that
Khafra was pursuing a “Thiel Fellowship” rather than a ‘Field
Fellowship.”
See •
Thiel
Fellowship, •
FAQ,
https://thielfellowship.org/faq/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
3There appears to be some discrepancy regarding‘the total
amount of appellant’s investment, but that discrepancy is
immaterial to the outcome of this appeal.
App.88b
In order to repay appellant’s $10,000 investment,
Khafra agreed to dig tunnels underneath appellant’s
house. Appellant had been building tunnels and an
underground bunker beneath his home because he
apparently feared a nuclear war with North Korea.
Khafra was not the first person to dig tunnels for
appellant. Douglas Hart, who was approximately
twenty years old at the time,4 dug tunnels on several
occasions from approximately October 2016 to April
2017. Logistically, Hart would drive his car to
Maryland,5 meet appellant at a McDonald’s, and then
appellant would require Hart to wear sunglasses with
duct tape on them to obscure Hart’s vision while
appellant drove the two to appellant’s home. Despite
the fact that appellant actually lived in Maryland, he
gave Hart the impression that they were going to
Virginia. When Hart visited appellant to dig tunnels,
he typically stayed in the tunnels and basement area
for approximately a month at a time and understood
that he was not allowed into the rest of the house. Hart
indicated that he was physically incapable of leaving
the basement/tunnel area, and that although there
was a door from the basement leading directly to the
outside, that door was kept locked and appellant
always had the key. When Hart communicated to
appellant that he wanted to go outside for fresh air or
to get food, however, appellant would oblige him.
Nevertheless, appellant required Hart to wear the
duct-taped sunglasses upon going outside to prevent
Hart from learning the location of appellant’s house.
4Hart testified at the April 2019 trial that he was twenty-three
years old. From this fact we extrapolate that he was
approximately twenty years old when he began working in
appellant’s tunnels in October 2016.
5At trial, Hart indicated that he was living in New York.
App.89b
In early 2017, Khafra began digging tunnels at
appellant’s home for $150 a day. Appellant typically
picked Khafra up at Khafra’s parents’ house in the
early morning hours, around 3:00 a.m., and like Hart,
required Khafra to be blindfolded during the trip to
appellant’s house.6 Khafra would dig underneath
appellant’s home approximately once a month to every
two months, and would stay anywhere from a few days
to a few weeks at a time.7 During his stays, Khafra
mostly remained in the bunker area in the tunnels.
According to appellant’s brief, “Khafra roamed freely in
the basement and the tunnels, but he was not
permitted to come up to the first or second floors of the
residence.” Rather than take showers, Khafra cleaned
himself using disposable wipes. To relieve himself,
Khafra would urinate and defecate in a bucket he kept
in the tunnels. Every few days, Khafra and appellant
used a winch system to haul the bucket from the
basement to the first floor, where appellant ■ himself
would dispose of its contents in the first-floor
bathroom. Because appellant did not own a phone,
Khafra could only communicate with appellant from
the basement and tunnels using Google apps such as
Google Voice and V Chat.8 Appellant used numerous
6During a trip to appellant’s home, Khafra learned that
appellant actually lived in Bethesda, Maryland.
’Khafra’s father testified at trial that he recalled Khafra going
to appellant’s house in January, February, March, April, and
September of 2017.
8“Google Voice” is a program that “gives you a phone number
for
calling,
text
messaging,
and
voicemail.”
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?
id=com.google.android.apps.googlevoice&hl= en_US&gl=US (last
visited Jan. 8, 2021). {CV Chat” is a private messenger service that
allows users to “communicate instantly while avoiding [text
messaging] fees [.]” https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?
id=com.wVChat_9255903 (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
App.90b
extension cords and power strips to provide electricity
to the tunnels. In his interviews with police, appellant
intimated his familiarity with the failing power cords
and having to reset the circuit breaker.
On September 3, 2017, Khafra went to appellant’s
home to resume work in the tunnels. A week later,
while digging in the tunnels on September 10 at 2:32
a.m., Khafra messaged appellant using Google Hang
outs, stating £Choly [s**t] bro there’s no power down
here.” Approximately five minutes later, at 2:37 a.m.,
Khafra indicated that there was smoke in the base
ment. At 2:51 a.m., Khafra wrote again, stating that he
no longer believed there was smoke in the basement,
but that the lights had gone out and it was “pitch black
down [there]” with no airflow. Khafra’s message asked
appellant to “please try to fix when you see this.”
Appellant did not see Khafra’s messages until he
woke up at approximately 9 a.m. At 9:27 a.m., appella
nt wrote to Khafra that there had been a “pretty major
electrical failure” and that appellant was switching the
power over to a different circuit. Appellant then went
back to sleep, and awoke at approximately 3 p.m. App
ellant went downstairs from his second-floor bedroom
to get something to eat, and at around 4 p.m., he heard
a beeping sound coming from the carbon monoxide
detector in the dining room. Appellant understood the
bee
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