Amicus Curiae Brief — Geraldine Tyler, Petitioner v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 5, 2023
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No. 22-166
In the Supreme Court of the United States
________________
GERALDINE TYLER,
Petitioner,
v.
HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA, ET AL.,
Respondents.
________________
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
________________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LEGAL CENTER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
COUNTIES, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES,
INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS
________________
AMANDA KARRAS
ERICH EISELT
International Municipal
Lawyers Association
51 Monroe St., Suite 404
Rockville, MD 20850
(202) 466-5424
akarras@imla.org
JOHN M. BAKER
Counsel of Record
KATHERINE M. SWENSON
GREENE ESPEL PLLP
222 South Ninth Street
Suite 2200
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(612) 373-0830
jbaker@greeneespel.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
April 5, 2023
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii
STATEMENT OF INTERESTS OF
AMICI CURIAE ...........................................................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................3
ARGUMENT ................................................................5
I.
Principles of federalism and this Court’s
precedents dictate that “federal law
generally
will
not
interfere
with
administration of state taxes.”. ........................5
II.
The Takings Clause does not require a
public body that acquires absolute title to
real property through tax forfeiture and
later sells the property for more than the
amount of the tax debt, to compensate the
former owner. ....................................................8
A.
The loss of any “equity surplus,”
standing alone, does not constitute a
taking ....................................................10
B.
Petitioner’s
takings
theory
disregards delinquent owners’ loss of
all property interests in taxdelinquent property earlier in the
forfeiture process ..................................12
ii
C.
Petitioner’s rights under the Takings
Clause are limited or barred by her
failure to exercise the statutory
scheme’s safeguards to prevent the
alleged taking .......................................18
III.
Petitioner’s takings theory is impractical
and unmanageable..........................................20
IV.
The payment of property taxes and the use
of forfeiture as a tool in cases of delinquency
is tremendously important to local
governments ....................................................24
A.
Property taxes are a cornerstone of
local governments’ provision of
essential services..................................25
B.
Forfeiture is a crucial tool for
governments if property taxes are
not paid .................................................27
CONCLUSION ..........................................................30
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51 (1979) ............................................ 10, 11
Beckwith v. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.,
449 U.S. 155 (1980) ........................ 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City,
213 U.S. 276 (1909) .................................................. 7
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,
538 U.S. 216 (2002) ................................................ 18
Burton v. United States,
196 U.S. 283 (1905) ................................................ 17
Chapman v. Zobelein,
237 U.S. 135 (1915) .......................................... 14, 23
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v.
Collector of Internal Revenue,
275 U.S. 87 (1927) .................................................. 25
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602 (1993) ................................................ 11
Dows v. Chicago,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108 (1871) ................................... 7
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary,
454 U.S. 100 (1981) ...................................... 5, 6, 7, 8
iv
Hall v. State,
908 N.W.2d 345 (Minn. 2018)................................ 16
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) ............................... 19, 20
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987) .......................................... 10, 11
Murr v. Wisconsin,
137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) ...................................... 10, 11
Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582 (1995) .......................... 5, 6, 8
Nelson v. City of New York,
352 U.S. 103 (1956) ............................................ 9, 23
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves,
300 U.S. 308 (1937) ................................................ 25
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606 (2001) .......................................... 19, 20
Pearson v. Dodd,
429 U.S. 396 (1977) (per curiam) .............. 13, 14, 23
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
524 U.S. 156 (1998) .................................... 16, 17, 18
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706 (1995) .................................................. 6
Rogers v. Bucks Cty. Domestic Relations Section,
959 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1992) ........................... 15, 16
v
Simon v. Weissmann,
301 F. App’x 107 (3d Cir. 2008) ............................. 17
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
520 U.S. 725 (1997) .......................................... 19, 20
Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer,
550 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 2008) .............................. 18
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) ............................ 10, 11
Texaco, Inc. v. Short,
454 U.S. 516 (1982) .......................................... 18, 23
Texas State Bank v. United States,
423 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................. 17
United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84 (1985) ............................................ 18, 19
Washlefske v. Winston,
234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000) .................................. 16
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .......................................... 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
42 U.S.C. § 1988 .......................................................... 6
Fla Stat. § 28.33................................................... 14, 15
Minn. Stat. § 281.18 ............................................ 12, 17
Minn. Stat. § 282.01 .................................................. 21
vi
Other Authorities
Abt Assocs. & NUY Furman Ctr., Local Housing
Solutions Lab, Foreclosure and Disposition of
Tax-Delinquent
Properties,
https://tinyurl.com/4ncxhrx6 ................................. 30
Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and
Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747 (2000) ......... 24, 25, 29
Frank S. Alexander & Leslie A. Powell,
Neighborhood Stabilization: Legal Strategies for
Vacant and Abandoned Properties (2011),
https://tinyurl.com/5adyd5ea ................................. 28
James Alm et al., Property Tax Delinquency and
Its Spillover Effects on Nearby Properties, 58
REG’L SCI. & URBAN ECON. 71 (2016) .................... 28
D.A. Carroll & C.B. Goodman, Assessing the
Influence of Property Tax Delinquency and
Foreclosures on Residential Property Sales, 53
URBAN AFFAIRS REV. 898 (2017) ............................ 28
Michael DeStefano, Baltimore’s Targeted Blight
Elimination Program and How It Can Be
Improved, 52 U. BALT. L.F. 179 (2022) ................. 29
Goodwill-Easter
Seals,
Minn.,
Ramsey
County/Goodwill-Easter
Seals
Minnesota
Partnership Restores Historic Neighborhood
Home & Changes Lives (Mar. 1, 2022),
https://tinyurl.com/4apwkw2h............................... 21
vii
Kim Graziani, Ctr. for Cmty. Progress, Reimagine
Delinquent Property Tax Enforcement (2022),
https://tinyurl.com/42cf8s98 .................................. 24
Hennepin
Cty,
Minn.,
2023
Budget,
https://tinyurl.com/56uxyd4t ................................. 26
Hennepin
Cty.,
Minn.,
Property
Taxes,
https://tinyurl.com/5dbbzpy5 ................................. 26
Dan Immergluck, et al., Ctr. for Cmty. Progress,
The Cost of Vacant and Blighted Properties in
Pittsburgh: A Conservative Analysis of Service,
Tax Delinquency, and Spillover Costs (2017),
https://tinyurl.com/emmdutm9........................ 27, 29
Ramsey Cty., Minn., Productive Properties,
https://tinyurl.com/c9mf7brz ................................. 21
John Rao, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., The Other
Foreclosure Crisis: Property Tax Lien Sales
(2012), https://tinyurl.com/2s477u2t ..................... 29
U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 State & Local
Government Finance Historical Datasets and
Tables, Table 1 (State and Local Government
Finances by Level of Government and by State:
2020), https://tinyurl.com/3m6zsx3u ............... 26, 27
Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV,
Deconstructing Distressed-Property Spillovers:
The Effects of Vacant, Tax-Delinquent, and
Foreclosed Property in Housing Submarkets, 22
J. HOUS. ECON. 79 (2013) ....................................... 28
viii
Joan Youngman, Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, A
Good Tax: Legal and Policy Issues for the
Property Tax in the United States (2016),
https://tinyurl.com/4wp68psr ................................ 25
1
STATEMENT OF INTERESTS OF
AMICI CURIAE 1
The Local Government Legal Center (“LGLC”) is a
coalition of national local government organizations
formed in 2023 to provide education to local
governments regarding the Supreme Court and its
impact on local governments and local officials and to
advocate for local government positions at the
Supreme Court in appropriate cases. The National
Association of Counties, the National League of Cities,
and the International Municipal Lawyers Association
are the founding members of the LGLC, and the
Government Finance Officers Association is an
associate member of the LGLC.
The National Association of Counties (“NACo”) is
the only national association that represents county
governments in the United States. Founded in 1935,
NACo provides essential services to the Nation’s 3,069
counties through advocacy, education, and research.
The National League of Cities (“NLC”) is the oldest
and largest organization representing municipal
governments throughout the United States. Working
in partnership with forty-nine state municipal
leagues, NLC is the voice of more than 19,000
American cities, towns, and villages, representing
collectively more than 200 million people. NLC works
1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, these Amici affirm that
no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
that no such counsel or party, other than Amici or their counsel,
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief.
2
to strengthen local leadership, influence federal
policy, and drive innovative solutions.
The International Municipal Lawyers Association
(“IMLA”) is a non-profit, nonpartisan, professional
organization consisting of more than 2,500 members.
Membership is comprised of local government entities,
including cities, counties, and subdivisions thereof, as
represented by their chief legal officers, state
municipal leagues, and individual attorneys. IMLA’s
mission is to advance the responsible development of
municipal law through education and advocacy by
providing the collective viewpoint of local
governments around the country on legal issues before
state and federal appellate courts.
The Government Finance Officers Association
(“GFOA”) is the professional association of state,
provincial, and local finance officers in the United
States and Canada. GFOA has served the public
finance profession since 1906 and continues to provide
leadership to government-finance professionals
through research, education, and the identification
and promotion of best practices. Its more than 21,000
members are dedicated to the sound management of
government financial resources.
Amici are not-for-profit organizations whose
missions are to advance the interests of cities,
counties, and other local governments. They file this
brief to recommend that the Court affirm the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Although there are many property-tax systems across
the United States, local governments nationwide rely
3
on property-tax revenue to provide essential services
to their constituents. Tax forfeiture is sometimes
necessary to address the problems of tax-delinquent
properties, and Amici—in addition to agreeing with
Respondents that Petitioner is not entitled to
compensation under the Takings Clause—submit this
brief to provide the Court with information about the
importance to local governments of property taxes and
property-tax enforcement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Property owners who fail to pay their property
taxes and who disregard statutory safeguards for
preserving the equity in their property, do not have a
right under the Takings Clause to be paid if the public
body that acquires the property through forfeiture
sells it for more than the owner owed in taxes.
Principles of federalism dictate that Section 1983
cannot be used to interfere with the operations of a
State’s tax system unless the system leaves the
plaintiff without an adequate remedy. Petitioner tries,
and fails, to fashion a takings claim out of her wish
that the government share its earnings from a sale
after all of her interests in the property were
extinguished and vested in the State of Minnesota,
without regard to the numerous ways she could have
protected her investment before things reached that
stage. It was constitutional for absolute title to the
property to transfer to the State as a consequence of
Petitioner’s unpaid property taxes, and it was
constitutional for the State—as fee owner—to sell the
property to a third party and distribute the proceeds
beyond the tax debt, rather than to Petitioner.
4
Taxes are the lifeblood of local government in
America. At the apex of these are property taxes; while
some States do not impose income taxes, local
governments in every State in the nation use property
taxes to help fund the multitude of services on which
their constituents rely.
Petitioner seeks to undermine a longstanding and
central tenet of property taxation—that once a
property owner fails to pay property taxes, ignores
repeated notices over several years, and fails to take
advantage of multiple programs specifically designed
to preserve ownership, forfeiture will follow, vesting
title in one government body or another. The new
constitutional right Petitioner requests will reduce
taxpayer compliance, reduce the government’s
enforcement ability, and discourage solutions
currently in use that benefit delinquent (yet attentive)
owners, their neighbors, and the general public.
Petitioner’s proposed new constitutional right is also
far out of step with this Court’s Section 1983 and
Takings Clause jurisprudence.
The Court should reaffirm the well-established
limitations on takings claims that Petitioner
disregards and affirm the judgment below.
5
ARGUMENT
I.
Principles of federalism and this Court’s
precedents dictate that “federal law
generally
will
not
interfere
with
administration of state taxes.”
For decades, Section 1983 plaintiffs have been
litigating under important limitations established
through this Court’s modern decisions. For example,
in decisions such as Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981), the Court
barred the use of Section 1983 to seek declaratory,
injunctive, or compensatory relief based on a claim
that something in a State’s tax system is
unconstitutional. As Justice Thomas later wrote for a
unanimous Court, “the background presumption that
federal law generally will not interfere with
administration of state taxes leads us to conclude that
Congress did not authorize injunctive or declaratory
relief under § 1983 in state tax cases when there is an
adequate remedy at law.” Nat’l Private Truck Council,
Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 588
(1995). The Court’s reasoning in National Private
Truck Council, Inc. that “principles of federalism and
comity generally counsel that courts should adopt a
hands-off approach with respect to state tax
administration” applies with equal force here. Id. at
586. Compensatory relief in such cases has been
barred at least since the Fair Assessment decision in
1981. See 454 U.S. at 115–16.
Respondents properly invoke this Court’s decision
in National Private Truck Council, Inc. Resp. Br. 15,
6
40. Because Fair Assessment “was a case about the
scope of the § 1983 cause of action, not the abstention
doctrines[,]” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.
706, 719 (1995) (internal citation omitted), this
limitation applies to Section 1983 cases pending in
both federal and state courts. See Nat’l Private Truck
Council, Inc., 515 U.S. at 589 (“[T]he Oklahoma courts’
denial of relief under § 1983 was consistent with the
long line of precedent underscoring the federal
reluctance to interfere with state taxation.”). Because
Petitioner would have been subject to that limitation
even if Respondents had not removed her case to
federal court, this limitation was not created by the
removal, but was present from the case’s inception in
state court.
Petitioner’s effort to bring a class-action suit under
Section 1983 by challenging the Minnesota statutory
tax framework’s treatment of any “equity surplus” is
on a collision course with the principles underlying
Fair Assessment and its progeny. 2 As Justice
Rehnquist wrote in Fair Assessment, “[t]his Court,
even before the enactment of § 1983, recognized the
important and sensitive nature of state tax systems
and the need for federal-court restraint when deciding
cases that affect such systems.” 454 U.S. at 102. “‘It is
2
Petitioner expressly invoked Section 1983 in Paragraph 64 of
her Complaint, and implicitly did so in Paragraph 3 (by seeking
attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in a suit where there was
no other potential basis for liability giving rise to a claim for fees
under Section 1988 other than Section 1983). Joint App’x 4, 20.
Amici request that the Court limit its decision to the adequacy of
the Complaint, without addressing or calling into question the
availability of any defenses.
7
upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to
obtain the means to carry on their respective
governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all
of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes
levied should be interfered with as little as possible.’”
Id. (quoting Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108,
110 (1871)). To protect “the vital and vulnerable
nature of state tax systems,” this Court reaffirmed
that “‘a proper reluctance to interfere by prevention
with the fiscal operations of the state governments has
caused it to refrain from so doing in all cases where
the Federal rights of the persons could otherwise be
preserved unimpaired.’” Id. at 103, 108 (quoting Boise
Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 282
(1909)). To avoid the disruption to state and local
governments’ fiscal interests that would result if “a
district court first determines that respondents’
administration of the County tax system violated
petitioners’ constitutional rights,” Fair Assessment
barred compensatory relief and not simply injunctive
or declaratory relief. Id. at 113–14.
Petitioner’s suit does not challenge the adequacy of
state-law protections, for good reason: Minnesota’s
statutory tax framework includes multiple layers of
protections for tax-delinquent property owners.
Petitioner simply ignored those protections while she
had the opportunity to invoke them. 3
This Court should adjudicate this case under the
principles of federalism in Section 1983 challenges to
3
See infra Sections II, II.C.
8
States’ tax frameworks as described in Fair
Assessment and National Private Truck Council, Inc.
II.
The Takings Clause does not require a
public body that acquires absolute title to
real property through tax forfeiture and
later sells the property for more than the
amount of the tax debt, to compensate the
former owner.
Petitioner, seeking to represent a class of many
others, does not dispute that she and the putative
class members failed to pay their property taxes fully
when due, or upon notice of the delinquency. Nor does
Petitioner dispute that, in the face of forfeiture,
Minnesota law provided her with numerous
opportunities—none of which she took—to protect her
financial interests in her investment as owner,
including her interest in preserving any equity. Nor
does Petitioner dispute that her entirely passive
approach following her failure to pay the property
taxes due, which led to forfeiture of the property and
a statutory transfer of its ownership, relieved her of
any exposure to liens on the property—including those
protecting third parties—and spared her the cost of
hiring an agent to sell the property. Nor does she
dispute that if the government had sold her property
for less than her tax obligation, she would not be
responsible for the deficit.
Instead, Petitioner brought this federal suit
because she wanted, on top of everything else, to
receive a check from the government if the eventual
sale price of the property for which she refused to fully
9
pay her taxes exceeded the amount owed (which we
will call her “equity surplus”). Petitioner does not
claim a statutory right to receive both the benefits of
discharged liens and avoided sale costs, and a check
for any equity surplus. Instead, she contends that she
has an entitlement under the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution. 4 Petitioner asserts this
so-called right regardless of the statutory
opportunities to protect the amount of her investment
that she bypassed.
The district court properly dismissed Petitioner’s
takings claim, and the Eighth Circuit properly
affirmed that dismissal. Petitioner’s claim is about a
non-compensable “leaving” of value by Petitioner
rather than any compensable “taking” of property
from her by Hennepin County or its AuditorTreasurer. The government, by not sending Petitioner
a check in the amount of the alleged equity surplus
after final forfeiture to the State and a later sale to a
third party, did not “take” Petitioner’s “property” in
the proper legal meaning of those terms. Equally
important, Petitioner’s failure to have timely taken
advantage of avenues to protect her investment in
ownership provides a separate basis for affirmance.
See Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 109–10
(1956) (holding that complete forfeiture of real
property through tax foreclosure as a result of owner’s
neglect did not violate the Takings Clause).
4
This brief focuses solely on the Takings Clause claim, but these
Amici agree with Respondents that all of Petitioner’s claims lack
merit.
10
Notwithstanding
the
Takings
Clause,
governments have a “well-established power to
‘adjus[t] rights for the public good.’” Murr v.
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (quoting
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (brackets in
Murr)). “The Takings Clause has never been read to
require the States or the courts to calculate whether a
specific individual has suffered burdens under this
generic rule in excess of the benefits received.”
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 492 n.21 (1987).
A.
The loss of any “equity surplus,”
standing alone, does not constitute a
taking.
Petitioner’s attempt to base a takings claim on the
loss of a single twig (i.e., an alleged equity surplus)
from the proverbial “bundle of sticks” of property
ownership, disregards well-established decisions of
this Court.
A takings plaintiff may not divide a parcel into
discrete segments and then attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely denied. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327–30
(2002); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480
U.S. at 472, 498 (noting that many laws “place limits
on the property owner’s right to make profitable use of
some segments of his property,” and explaining that
the owner may not divide property and define "a
separate segment of property for takings law
purposes”). “[O]ur takings jurisprudence forecloses
11
reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle
of property rights.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n,
480 U.S. at 500. Instead, the takings plaintiff must
prove a taking of his or her entire parcel. “[E]ven
though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of
regulatory takings claims, in such cases [courts] must
focus on the parcel as a whole[.]” Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, 535 U.S. at 327 (quotation omitted); see also
id. at 331 (“[I]n regulatory takings cases [courts] must
focus on the parcel as a whole.” (quotation omitted)).
Indeed, this Court “has declined to limit the parcel
in an artificial manner to the portion of property
targeted by the challenged regulation.” Murr,
137 S. Ct. at 1944. “That approach would overstate
the effect of regulation on property[.]” Id. (citing
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 331). “‘To the
extent that any portion of property is taken, that
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant
question, however, is whether the property taken is
all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question.’” Id.
(quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644
(1993)). Even where an “owner possesses a full
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one
‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking[.]” Andrus, 444
U.S. at 65–66.
12
B.
Petitioner’s
takings
theory
disregards delinquent owners’ loss
of all property interests in taxdelinquent property earlier in the
forfeiture process.
Petitioner claims to have an “equity interest” in the
parcel that entitles her to some of the proceeds from
the government’s post-forfeiture sale of the parcel to a
third party. But even assuming for the sake of
argument that the “bundle of sticks” of property
ownership includes such an interest, the entire bundle
transferred from Petitioner to the State of Minnesota
when the statutory redemption period expired without
Petitioner’s redeeming her property. See Minn. Stat.
§ 281.18 (providing that upon the expiration of the
statutory redemption period for a parcel of land sold
to the state at any tax judgment sale, “absolute title to
such parcel, if not theretofore redeemed, shall vest in
the state”). That is, when the redemption period
expired, any and all interests Petitioner may have had
in the property were completely extinguished—and
became vested in the State. See Pet. Br. 2 (conceding
that transfer of “absolute title” extinguished “all
interests [Petitioner] had in her property, including
her equity”). 5
5
Petitioner’s arguments assume that the Court will focus
exclusively on the occasional opportunity for a former owner to
share in a higher sales price that is lost after transfer of absolute
title after redemption periods end. She ignores an accompanying
benefit of the same statutory tax system: the extinguishment of
all encumbrances held by the tax delinquent’s private creditors.
13
Petitioner faults Respondents for not paying her
“for the excess value” of the property either (1) “when
it took absolute title” or (2) “when it sold the property”
after taking absolute title. 6 But the Court should not
conflate the statutory vesting of absolute title to the
parcel with the later sale of the property to a third
party. As this Court has recognized, these are two
separate transfers—and the first transfer (vesting of
absolute title in the State after a redemption period)
leaves the prior owner with no property interests upon
which a constitutional challenge to the second transfer
(the government’s later sale of the property) can be
based. In Pearson v. Dodd, the Court held that because
appellant’s interest was transferred by statute to the
State of West Virginia after she failed to pay realestate taxes and did not redeem during the statutory
redemption period, and because she was not
This is more than a question of standing; it reflects how an
overall statutory property-tax system is made up of
counterbalancing potential burdens and potential opportunities
for delinquent taxpayers. If the Court transforms a former
owner’s opportunity to benefit (if a bidding war were to break out
at a tax-foreclosure sale) into a constitutional entitlement, it will
disrupt a legislative counterbalance. In the short run, it would
reduce compliance and tax collections—but in the longer run, it
could motivate state legislatures to restore balance by reducing
existing statutory benefits (like discharge of all other
encumbrances) that currently result in greater compliance and
tax-collection successes, more redemptions, and fewer
delinquencies that ultimately bring about loss of a home.
6
Pet. Br. 3. As Respondents point out, there are significant
practical problems with Petitioner’s argument that the transfer
of title is the triggering event for purposes of determining when
compensation is owed. See Resp. Br. 42–43.
14
challenging that transfer, her constitutional claims
based on the State’s later sale of the property failed:
[U]nder state law absolute title had
vested in the State at the expiration of
the 18-month period after the 1962 sale
during which appellant might have
exercised but did not exercise her right to
redeem . . . . Appellant thus has no
constitutionally protected property or
entitlement interest upon which she may
base a challenge of constitutional
deficiency in the notice provisions
attending the 1966 sale to appellee Dodd.
Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U.S. 396, 397–98 (1977) (per
curiam); see also Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135,
136, 138–39 (1915) (rejecting claim that State of
California, which received “absolute title” to taxforfeited land after expiration of redemption period,
had deprived former landowner of property without
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by
selling the land to the highest bidder and receiving
more than the tax debt for the parcel).
Notwithstanding these well-established principles,
Petitioner repeatedly cites rhetoric from Beckwith v.
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 449 U.S. 155
(1980), incorrectly implying that the present case fits
within the narrow exception recognized there. Webb’s
arose from a Florida statute providing that interest
generated on sums deposited in state courts “‘shall be
deemed income of the office of the clerk of the circuit
court.’” 449 U.S. at 160 (quoting Fla Stat. § 28.33
15
(1977)). The State construed the Florida statute as
applying not just to interest on funds owned by the
government, but also to “private funds deposited
under the direction of another statute.” Id. In Webb’s,
the particular deposited fund “was the amount
received as the purchase price for Webb’s assets,”
which was “property held only for the ultimate benefit
of Webb’s creditors, not for the benefit of the court and
not for the benefit of the county.” Id. at 160–61. But in
Webb’s this Court “was careful, however, to limit its
holding to the precise facts before it.” Rogers v. Bucks
Cty. Domestic Relations Section, 959 F.2d 1268, 1276
(3d Cir. 1992). This Court explained its narrow
holding this way:
We hold that under the narrow
circumstances of this case—where there
is a separate and distinct state statute
authorizing a clerk’s fee “for services
rendered” based upon the amount of
principal deposited; where the deposited
fund itself concededly is private; and
where the deposit in the court’s registry
is required by state statute in order for
the depositor to avail itself of statutory
protection from claims of creditors and
others—Seminole County’s taking unto
itself, under § 28.33 and 1973 Fla. Laws,
ch. 73-282, the interest earned on the
interpleader fund while it was in the
registry of the court was a taking
violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
16
Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164–65.
Because the equity surplus sought here is unlike
the “interpleaded and deposited fund” in Webb’s, “it
therefore falls outside the ‘narrow circumstances’ of
that holding.” Hall v. State, 908 N.W.2d 345, 355
(Minn. 2018); see also Rogers, 959 F.2d at 1276. First,
in this case (but not in Webb’s and its progeny) the
party claiming a property interest in the earnings on
the property lost title to that property earlier in the
process. In Webb’s, this Court emphasized that “[t]he
usual and general rule is that any interest on an
interpleaded and deposited fund follows the principal
and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be
the owners of that principal.” Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 162.
Second, in Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation, the Court emphasized that “‘earnings of
a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and
are property just as the fund itself is property.’” 524
U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (quoting Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164).
But “[t]he holding in Phillips, as well as that in Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies, assumes that the claimants had
a traditional private property right in the principal
and concludes only that, as an incident to that
ownership, the claimants also had a property right in
the interest.” Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 185
(4th Cir. 2000). Where that assumption is incorrect,
the opposite result follows. For example, the Federal
Circuit has refused to apply the “interest follows
principal” logic of Webb’s and Phillips to a claim for a
share of the Federal Reserve’s earnings on the
plaintiff’s reserves, because the defendant, not the
plaintiff, held title to those reserves:
17
As the Supreme Court put it almost a
century ago, when a bank receives
deposits, the funds “belong to the bank,
become part of its general funds, and can
be loaned by it as other moneys. . . . The
general doctrine that upon a deposit
made by a customer, . . . the title to the
money . . . is immediately vested in, and
becomes the property of, the bank, is not
open to question.”
Texas State Bank v. United States, 423 F.3d 1370,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Burton v. United States,
196 U.S. 283, 301–02 (1905)). “Under such
circumstances, even if the funds received by the
Federal Reserve were used to earn interest, Texas
State did not acquire a property interest in the
earnings.” Id. at 1380.
Here, as explained in the previous section (II.A),
the earnings on the eventual sale of Petitioner’s
condominium arose from property no longer owned by
the person bringing the takings claim. See Minn. Stat.
§ 281.18. Under the “interest follows principal” rule in
Webb’s and Phillips, it is a public body—as owner of
the property through final forfeiture—that holds the
right to receive the proceeds of a later sale. Cf. Simon
v. Weissmann, 301 F. App’x 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“None of the state cases cited in Phillips involves a
situation where a property owner claims he is owed
the fruit after abandoning the tree.”).
In any event, Webb’s and Phillips are “readily
distinguishable” because both “involved an invasion of
18
specific identifiable property.” Swisher Int’l, Inc. v.
Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1055 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008).
Webb’s, Phillips, and Brown v. Legal Foundation of
Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2002), do not apply where
“no deposit was made with a third party, such as a
private bank, that resulted in earned interest.” Texas
State Bank, 423 F.3d at 1380.
Petitioner’s lack of a property interest in the
condominium after title passed to the State but before
any equity surplus arose, dooms her takings claim.
C.
Petitioner’s
rights
under
the
Takings Clause are limited or barred
by her failure to exercise the
statutory scheme’s safeguards to
prevent the alleged taking.
This Court “‘has never required [Congress] to
compensate the owner for the consequences of his own
neglect.’” United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107
(1985) (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530
(1982) (brackets in Locke)). 7 “Regulation of property
rights does not ‘take’ private property when an
individual’s
reasonable,
investment-backed
expectations can continue to be realized as long as
7
In Short, this Court affirmed the dismissal of a Takings Clause
claim arising from a statute that reclassified mineral interests as
“lapsed” if they were not used for twenty years. It explained, “[i]n
ruling that private property may be deemed to be abandoned and
to lapse upon the failure of its owner to take reasonable actions
imposed by law, this Court has never required the State to
compensate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect.”
454 U.S. at 530.
19
[she] complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions
the legislature has imposed.” Id.
Here, there was a sequence of statutory
safeguards, spanning more than five years, available
to Petitioner that would have enabled her to protect
her investment before the alleged taking (whether the
taking occurred when absolute title transferred, or
when the property was later sold to a third party).
Understandably, Petitioner has made no effort to
show that those statutory procedures are
unreasonable. Instead, she focuses exclusively on the
relatively more extreme consequences of doing little or
nothing, trying to turn the added severity of those
consequences, when viewed in isolation, into a valid
constitutional claim.
The financial impact of a statutory scheme cannot
be viewed in isolation from the opportunities that
statutory scheme provided the property owner to
protect the property’s value, but which the property
owner ignored. A takings plaintiff cannot sit on his or
her hands and refuse to invoke formal procedures for
obtaining an exemption or variance from the potential
confiscatory effect of a statutory prohibition, and then
use that alleged confiscatory effect as the basis for a
takings claim. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 620–21 (2001); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736–37 (1997); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
297 (1981).
Where the regulatory regime offers the possibility
of a variance from its facial requirements, “a
20
landowner must go beyond submitting a plan for
development and actually seek such a variance to
ripen his [takings] claim.” Suitum, 520 U.S. at 736–37
(emphasis added) (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297). “[A]
takings claim based on a law or regulation which is
alleged to go too far in burdening property depends
upon the landowner’s first having followed reasonable
and necessary steps to allow regulatory agencies to
exercise their full discretion in considering
development plans for the property, including the
opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed
by law.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620–21 (emphasis
added).
III.
Petitioner’s takings theory is impractical
and unmanageable.
Petitioner contends, in essence, that she is the one
who is constitutionally entitled to reap the rewards if
the property that she forfeited by failing to pay her
property taxes ultimately sells for more than her
extinguished tax debt. But the transfer of ownership
from her to the government, and the government’s
need to spend money while it owns the property and
before its sale in an effort to get a better price for it,
make it speculative at best to believe that the
delinquent prior owner caused the actual higher sale
price. The county, not the delinquent prior owner,
would have hired the real estate agent in exchange for
a percentage of the sale. The county, not the
delinquent property owner, would have borne the
costs associated with home inspections and any
repairs, landscaping, staging, or other marketing
expenses leading up to the sale. The county, not the
21
delinquent property owner, would have paid the
utility bills needed to keep the empty condominium
from losing value while unoccupied.
Counties are not passive participants in the
process that occurs between the forfeiture of taxdelinquent property and its eventual sale. By statute,
Minnesota counties are encouraged to sell and utilize
tax-forfeited land “in order to eliminate nuisances and
dangerous conditions and to increase compliance with
land use ordinances.” Minn. Stat. § 282.01, subd. 4(c).
Consistent with that policy, the statute authorizing
counties to list and sell such properties “shall be
liberally construed to encourage the sale and
utilization of tax-forfeited land.” Id. Spending to
maintain and improve tax-forfeited properties so that
they are more likely to sell is an obvious way that
counties can achieve that mission. For example,
neighboring Ramsey County, Minnesota—which
includes St. Paul (the state capital) and several
smaller cities—has a Productive Properties division
that administers the process of making state-owned,
tax-forfeited property into productive and taxable
land. 8 But under Petitioner’s constitutional theory,
8
See
Ramsey
Cty.,
Minn.,
Productive
Properties,
https://tinyurl.com/c9mf7brz. For an example of an historicregistered, tax-forfeited home that construction students
restored through Ramsey County’s partnership with a non-profit
organization, see Goodwill-Easter Seals, Minn., Ramsey
County/Goodwill-Easter Seals Minnesota Partnership Restores
Historic Neighborhood Home & Changes Lives (Mar. 1, 2022),
https://tinyurl.com/4apwkw2h.
22
the financial benefits of that sale must then go to her
as the delinquent prior owner.
Amici scrutinized Petitioner’s merits brief for any
acknowledgment that tax delinquents’ claimed “equity
surpluses” may be constitutionally offset to avoid a
perverse incentive for tax delinquents to, in effect,
make a public body their unpaid realtor. That
common-sense concession is nowhere to be found in
Petitioner’s brief.
If the Court were to dignify Petitioner’s
constitutional theory, it would not merely be ignoring
the expenses of dollars, personnel, and other taxpayerfunded resources, incurred by a county leading up to
the post-forfeiture sale. It would also give cashstarved property owners a perverse incentive to let
their tax-delinquent properties go to forfeiture so that
the county (or other taxing district) will bear both the
burden of selling and the legal duty to “compensate”
the tax-delinquent prior owner for getting a decent
price. That would then give public bodies a perverse
incentive to market tax-forfeited properties without
improvements or meaningful marketing expenses.
Even if the properties were marketable in those
circumstances, this would simply reward potential
purchasers by keeping prices down, but do nothing to
further the interests of either the delinquent prior
owner or the taxing authority. It might also encourage
another bizarre species of claims by the delinquent
property owner—that the government “took” the
delinquent owner’s equity interest by not obtaining a
better price, and is somehow liable for that lapse.
23
Even if Petitioner were to propose an alternative
that would attempt to allocate the “equity surplus”
among the taxing authority, the former property
owner, and potentially multiple lienholders, 9 and to
somehow reduce the perverse incentives, appellate
courts would be burdened with creating and
developing the constitutional principles needed to
guide that allocation, and district courts would be
burdened with applying those principles to the myriad
of former owners of tax-forfeited parcels who would
become potentially eligible for the payoffs under
Petitioner’s theory.
Rather than disregarding or overturning the
precedent of this Court (including Texaco, Pearson,
Nelson,
and
Chapman)
and
making
new
constitutional law in the fashion Petitioner requests,
this Court should reject her arguments for the reasons
set forth above. That would leave it to legislative
bodies to craft the complex web of legal principles and
procedures that would be needed to fairly address all
the competing interests—just as the Constitution’s
framers envisioned.
9
For example, Petitioner’s property was encumbered by a
mortgage that exceeded the sale price, as well as a homeowner’s
association lien. Resp. Br. 2, 13.
24
IV.
The payment of property taxes and the use
of forfeiture as a tool in cases of
delinquency is tremendously important to
local governments.
Petitioner professes not to understand why a State
might treat surplus equity differently in the context of
tax forfeiture than in other contexts, such as private
mortgage transactions, where the mortgagee must
return surplus equity to the owner. See Pet. Br. 22
(“There is nothing about property taxes . . . that
justifies this unusual treatment.”). But unlike a
purely private contractual arrangement, the
obligation to pay property taxes is a commitment to
fund the common good. Delinquent taxpayers not only
increase the burden on people who do pay their taxes,
but they also harm the government’s ability to provide
essential services to all constituents (whether they
own real property or not). And property taxes are a
crucial source of revenue for local governments across
the nation. The importance of property taxes is
underscored by the “super priority” status of propertytax liens—most States give tax liens priority over
virtually all other liens, including mortgages 10—
undercutting Petitioner’s contention that the payment
of property taxes is no different than a private
obligation. It is vital that property taxes be paid, and
10
Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75
IND. L.J. 747, 770–71 (2000); see also Kim Graziani, Ctr. for
Cmty. Progress, Reimagine Delinquent Property Tax
Enforcement 6 (2022), https://tinyurl.com/42cf8s98 (“[I]n most
states, [a property-tax] lien is given first priority status, meaning
it needs to be paid back before almost any other debts, such as a
mortgage.”).
25
forfeiture is an important tool for governments if those
taxes are not paid.
A.
Property taxes are a cornerstone of
local governments’ provision of
essential services.
One of the most famous statements in American
jurisprudence is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s
statement that “[t]axes are what we pay for civilized
society[.]” Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas
v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (adopted by the Court
in New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313
(1937)). This is especially true for property taxes,
which are “the primary source of revenues controlled
by our local governments” 11 and fund many essential
services provided by local government.
By way of example, local taxing districts in
Hennepin County, Minnesota (where Petitioner’s
condominium is located) provide the following public
services, among others: building safety, community
education, corrections, environmental services, K–12
education, libraries, museums, parks and recreation,
police and fire, public health, public housing, public
11
Alexander, supra note 10, at 748; see also id. at 755; Joan
Youngman, Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, A Good Tax: Legal and
Policy Issues for the Property Tax in the United States ix (2016),
https://tinyurl.com/4wp68psr (“The property tax is a mainstay of
independent local government revenue in this country. It is the
largest single local tax and supplies nearly half of all general
revenue from local sources. It accounts for most school district
independent revenue and almost all school district tax revenue.”).
26
transportation, regional parks, regional railroads,
regional sewer, roads, sheriff, social services, and
watershed management. 12 For 2023, Hennepin
County has budgeted $2.7 billion for its major
programs, including Health, Human Services, Public
Works, and Law, Safety and Justice. 13 34% of the
revenue for those expenditures, or approximately
$927 million, will come from property taxes (the
largest source of Hennepin County’s revenue). 14
Nationwide in 2020, most (64%) of local
governments’ general revenues from their own sources
come from taxes, with $581 billion in property taxes
accounting for 72% of local governments’ tax revenue
and accounting for 46% of general revenues from local
governments’ own sources. 15 Local government
expenditures were $2.1 trillion, with the largest share
($781 billion, or 36%) devoted to education, the secondlargest share ($222 billion, or 10%) devoted to utilities
(water, gas, electric, and transit), and the third-largest
12
Hennepin
Cty.,
Minn.,
Property
Taxes,
https://tinyurl.com/5dbbzpy5 (under expandable heading “What
property taxes pay for”).
13
Hennepin Cty, Minn., 2023 Budget, at II-8 (Expenditures and
FTE Summary), available at https://tinyurl.com/56uxyd4t.
14
15
Id. at II-6 (Sources of Revenue); see also id. at II-7.
U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 State & Local Government Finance
Historical Datasets and Tables, Table 1 (State and Local
Government Finances by Level of Government and by State:
2020), available at https://tinyurl.com/3m6zsx3u.
27
share ($122 billion, or 6%) devoted to hospitals. 16
Property taxes are a necessary component of the
provision of these vital services.
B.
Forfeiture is a crucial tool for
governments if property taxes are
not paid.
Forfeiture can play an important role in addressing
problems associated with tax-delinquent properties. 17
Perhaps the most obvious problem is the loss of
revenue attributable to delinquent parcels—which
can be substantial. For example, according to a 2017
analysis, approximately 5,800 long-term taxdelinquent
vacant
parcels
in
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania cost taxpayers more than $2.3 million
per year in lost property-tax revenue. 18 Taxdelinquent parcels can also have negative “spillover”
16
Id.
17
Although forfeiture is constitutional, the taxing authority’s
goal is to see that its taxes are paid; divesting taxpayers of
ownership is a remedy of last resort. As such, States and local
governments take pains to avoid tax forfeitures. Indeed, many
programs exist to assist vulnerable taxpayers. See Amicus Br. of
Nat’l Tax Lien Ass’n et al. § I.B; see also Resp. Br. 6.
18
Dan Immergluck, et al., Ctr. for Cmty. Progress, The Cost of
Vacant and Blighted Properties in Pittsburgh: A Conservative
Analysis of Service, Tax Delinquency, and Spillover Costs 7–8
(2017), https://tinyurl.com/emmdutm9 [hereinafter PITTSBURGH
REPORT].
28
impacts, such as lower prices for nearby properties. 19
Because property taxes are based on value, this
results in further loss of revenue.
In addition, tax delinquency is correlated with
vacancy or abandonment. 20 Vacancy merely means
that a property is unoccupied; abandonment “is a far
stronger concept” that “suggests that the owner has
ceased to invest any resources in the property, is
for[going] all routine maintenance, and is making no
further payments on related financial obligations such
as mortgages or property taxes.” 21 The record here
indicates that Petitioner’s condominium, before title
passed to the State, was both vacant and abandoned.
If, as here, tax-delinquent parcels are also vacant or
abandoned, not only is revenue not being generated,
but local governments incur costs because of the
vacant properties (which also have negative spillover
19
See James Alm et al., Property Tax Delinquency and Its
Spillover Effects on Nearby Properties, 58 REG’L SCI. & URBAN
ECON. 71, 77 (2016); see also D.A. Carroll & C.B. Goodman,
Assessing the Influence of Property Tax Delinquency and
Foreclosures on Residential Property Sales, 53 URBAN AFFAIRS
REV. 898, 917–20 (2017); Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J.
Fitzpatrick IV, Deconstructing Distressed-Property Spillovers:
The Effects of Vacant, Tax-Delinquent, and Foreclosed Property
in Housing Submarkets, 22 J. Hous. Econ. 79, 91 (2013).
20
Frank S. Alexander & Leslie A. Powell, Neighborhood
Stabilization: Legal Strategies for Vacant and Abandoned
Properties 3 (2011) (paper for IMLA Mid-Year Conference),
https://tinyurl.com/5adyd5ea (“[P]roperty tax delinquency is the
most significant common denominator among vacant and
abandoned properties.”).
21
Id. at 2.
29
impacts on nearby properties). To return to the
example of Pittsburgh, in 2015 and 2016, the city
spent nearly $2 million annually to provide code
enforcement, police, and fire services to vacant
properties. 22 And the cumulative, city-wide loss of
property value for residential properties located
within 500 feet of a vacant residential property in
distressed physical condition was $266 million—
representing an annual loss of $4.8 million in
property-tax revenue. 23
The failure to pay property taxes is “destructive to
the social and financial health of our cities.” 24 And taxforfeiture laws “serve an important purpose in
ensuring that local governments recover tax revenue
needed to provide essential government services.” 25
Forfeiture also allows for delinquent parcels to be
transferred to new private owners who will fulfill their
societal and legal obligations, to be retained by the
government for public use, or to be transferred to a
22
PITTSBURGH REPORT, supra note 18, at 7–8.
23
Id. Sadly, Pittsburgh is but one of many American communities
suffering from tax-delinquent, vacant, and abandoned properties.
See, e.g., Michael DeStefano, Baltimore’s Targeted Blight
Elimination Program and How It Can Be Improved, 52 U. BALT.
L.F. 179, 184–87 (2022) (discussing the impact that taxdelinquent, vacant, and abandoned properties have on Baltimore
City, Maryland).
24
25
Alexander, supra note 10, at 755.
John Rao, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., The Other Foreclosure
Crisis:
Property
Tax
Lien
Sales
4
(2012),
https://tinyurl.com/2s477u2t.
30
land bank or community development corporation for
management and disposition. 26
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Amici Curiae Local
Government Legal Center, National Association of
Counties, National League of Cities, International
Municipal Lawyers Association, and Government
Finance Officers Association respectfully request that
the Court affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision.
26
See Abt Assocs. & NUY Furman Ctr., Local Housing Solutions
Lab, Foreclosure and Disposition of Tax-Delinquent Properties,
https://tinyurl.com/4ncxhrx6 (discussing examples of local
governments’ use of tax-foreclosure systems to achieve
community goals, including Multnomah County, Oregon, which
facilitates the sale of tax-foreclosed properties, including
properties in the City of Portland, and deposits into an
affordable-housing program 100% of any revenue from the
difference in sale price between the minimum bid for taxes owed
and the winning bid).
31
Respectfully submitted,
AMANDA KELLER KARRAS
ERICH EISELT
INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
51 Monroe St. Suite 404
Rockville, MD 20850
(202) 466-5424
akarras@imla.org
JOHN M. BAKER
Counsel of Record
KATHERINE M. SWENSON
GREENE ESPEL PLLP
222 South Ninth Street
Suite 2200
Minneapolis, MN 55402
(612) 373-0830
jbaker@greeneespel.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
April 5, 2023
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.