Amicus Curiae Brief — Geraldine Tyler, Petitioner v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al.

No. 22-166

_________________________________________________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________________________________________________________________________________

GERALDINE TYLER, on behalf of herself and all others

similarly situated,

Petitioner,

v.

HENNEPIN COUNTY and MARK V. CHAPIN, AuditorTreasurer, in his official capacity,

Respondents.

__________________________________________________________________________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

__________________________________________________________________________________

Brief of Amici Curiae States of Utah, Arkansas,

Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Texas,

and West Virginia in Support of Petitioner

____________________________________________________________________________________

SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

MELISSA HOLYOAK

Utah Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JORDAN E. SMITH

STEPHEN TENSMEYER

Special Assistant

Attorneys General

350 N. State Street

Suite 230

P.O. Box 142320

Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Telephone: (801) 538-9600

Email:

melissaholyoak@agutah.gov

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I. The Majority of States Safeguard

Homeowners’ Surplus Equity After a TaxRelated Foreclosure. ........................................ 3

A. Utah............................................................. 4

B. Wisconsin .................................................... 5

C. Florida ......................................................... 7

II. Confiscation of Surplus Equity Results in

Serious Injustice in the Minority of States

that Allow the Practice. ................................... 7

A. Tax-Lien Systems of Massachusetts

and New Jersey ........................................... 8

B. Confiscatory Tax-Collection Schemes

Lead to Shockingly Unfair Results. ........... 9

C. The Injustice of Confiscatory TaxCollection Schemes is Exacerbated by

the Involvement of Private Investors. ..... 11

D. Property Owners in States with

Confiscatory Tax-Collection Schemes

Lose Tens of Millions in Equity Each

Year. .......................................................... 12

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 14

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL ........................................ 16

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty.,

482 U.S. 304 (1987) ................................................. 2

Foss v. New Bedford,

No. 1:22-cv-10761, Dkt. 1-1 (D. Mass. May 17,

2022) ...................................................................... 10

Ithaca Fin., LLC v. Leger,

167 N.E.3d 874 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021) ............. 9, 10

Knick v. Township of Scott,

139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) ........................................... 11

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,

544 U.S. 528 (2005) ................................................. 2

Tallage Lincoln, LLC v. Williams,

151 N.E.3d 344 (2020) ............................................. 9

Tallage LLC v. Meaney,

2015 WL 4207424 (Mass. Land Ct. June 26,

2015) ................................................................ 10, 12

Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cnty.,

847 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2017) ................................. 10

Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 197.432(6)................................................. 7

Fla. Stat. § 197.502(1)................................................. 7

Fla. Stat. § 197.502(5)(c)............................................. 7

Fla. Stat. § 197.522(1)(a) ............................................ 7

Fla. Stat. § 197.542(1)................................................. 7

Fla. Stat. § 197.582(2)(a) ............................................ 7

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, § 37 ..................................... 8

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, § 52 ................................... 12

iii

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, § 53 ..................................... 8

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, § 62 ..................................... 8

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, § 64 ..................................... 8

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, § 65 ..................................... 8

N.J. Stat. § 54:4-67 ..................................................... 8

N.J. Stat. § 54:4-67.1 .................................................. 8

N.J. Stat. § 54:5-104.64 .............................................. 9

N.J. Stat. § 54:5-31 ..................................................... 8

N.J. Stat. § 54:5-32 ................................................... 12

N.J. Stat. § 54:5-6 ....................................................... 8

N.J. Stat. § 54:5-86(a) ................................................. 9

Utah Code § 59-2-1346 ............................................... 4

Utah Code § 59-2-1347(1)(a) ....................................... 5

Utah Code § 59-2-1351.1(7) ........................................ 5

Utah Code § 67-4a-201(14) ......................................... 5

Utah Code § 67-4a-903(1) ........................................... 5

Wis. Stat. § 74.11(2) .................................................... 5

Wis. Stat. § 74.57 ........................................................ 5

Wis. Stat. § 74.57(2)(b) ............................................... 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.07 ........................................................ 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.12 ........................................................ 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.19 ........................................................ 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.35 ........................................................ 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.36(2m)............................................. 5, 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.36(3)(c) ................................................ 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.521(14a) .............................................. 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.521(14a) .............................................. 6

Wis. Stat. § 75.521(2) .................................................. 6

iv

Wis. Stat. § 846.162 .................................................... 6

Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

U.S. CONST. amend. V ........................................ 1, 2, 3

Other Authorities

Angela C. Erickson et al., End Home Equity Theft

(Arlington, VA: Pacific Legal Foundation, 2022),

last modified Feb. 24, 2023,

https://homeequitytheft.org .................................. 13

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Frequently

asked questions about tax lien foreclosure cases

in the Land Court, Question 19,

https://www.mass.gov/info-details/frequentlyasked-questions-about-tax-lien-foreclosurecases-in-the-land-court (last visited Mar. 3,

2023) ........................................................................ 9

Jenna Foos, State Theft in Real Property Tax

Foreclosure Procedures,

54 Real. Prop. Tr. & Est. L. J. 93 (2019) ............ 3, 7

New Jersey Tax Lien Investing, Amazon.com,

https://www.amazon.com/New-Jersey-Tax-LienInvesting-ebook /dp/B0B2NHJDY9 (last visited

Mar. 3, 2023) ......................................................... 11

Ralph D. Clifford, Massachusetts Has a Problem:

The Unconstitutionality of the Tax Deed,

13 U. Mass. L. Rev. 274 (2018) ....................... 12, 13

The Federalist No. 54, p. 336 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961

(J., Madison)) ........................................................... 1

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici curiae, the States of Utah, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Dakota, Texas, and

West Virginia respectfully submit this brief in support

of Petitioner.

In Federalist 54, James Madison stated: “Government is instituted no less for the protection of the

property, than of the persons, of individuals.” The

Federalist No. 54, p. 336 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961 (J.,

Madison)). Private property rights are essential to a

free society, and when governments violate those

rights, they destabilize the public’s trust in and respect for the system under which they live. The practice in a minority of states of confiscating surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale, after the relevant delinquent taxes and fees are recouped, is just such a violation of these rights.

While Amici states do not employ the minority approach, the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the Takings Clause has implications beyond the individual

state law regimes. The federal government too is controlled by that clause, and the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation risks harm to Amici states’ citizens. Amici

states file this brief to ensure protection for their citizens’ property rights. Specifically, confiscation of excess proceeds from a tax-delinquency foreclosure is a

violation of its citizens’ Fifth Amendment right to

“just compensation” when a taking for “public use” is

necessary. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution protects private property

rights by requiring the government to provide just

compensation when it takes property for public use.

U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause “is designed not to

limit the governmental interference with property

rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the

event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a

taking.” First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., 482 U.S. 304, 315

(1987) (emphasis in original). The clause applies to

state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536

(2005).

Property taxes imposed by state and local governments are commonly secured by a lien on the property

against which they are assessed. If the taxes are not

paid, governments can secure payment by foreclosing

on the lien. The property tax regimes of most states,

including Utah, comply with the Fifth Amendment by

taking in foreclosure only the amount owed and returning any surplus to the property owners.

A minority of states, including Minnesota, have

adopted property tax regimes that do not provide such

protections. Instead, when those states foreclose on

property tax liens, they often keep all of the remaining

equity, even when the proceeds are orders of magnitude greater than the amount owed. This practice violates the Constitution and often causes starkly unjust results for the most vulnerable property owners,

including the elderly, disabled, and low-income individuals.

3

The decision of the Eight Circuit should be reversed to ensure that property owners in Minnesota

and other states are protected by the Takings Clause

of the Fifth Amendment.

ARGUMENT

I.

The Majority of States Safeguard Homeowners’ Surplus Equity After a Tax-Related Foreclosure.

State governments have a constitutional duty to

honor the property rights of their residents. This includes following the Fifth Amendment’s edict not to

take private property without “just compensation.”

U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sale proceeds from the

foreclosure of Petitioner Geraldine Tyler’s home far

exceeded her tax debt and associated interest and

fees. JA. 12-13, 48. As Ms. Tyler outlines in her merits

brief, history and tradition recognize that the equity

in Ms. Tyler’s home is a constitutionally protected

property interest, for which this Court’s precedents offer further support. See Pet. Br. 11-18. And thus,

Hennepin County’s refusal to return the excess proceeds of the sale to Ms. Tyler was a taking without

“just compensation.” See id. 23-24.

Rather than repeat Ms. Tyler’s arguments why

Hennepin County’s confiscation of her equity violated

the Takings Clause, Amici states instead provide examples of various state regimes that safeguard homeowners’ constitutionally protected property interests

when collecting delinquent taxes.

Unlike Minnesota, most states protect a homeowner’s right to the surplus equity in a house after

that house is sold to satisfy a past-due tax. See, e.g.,

Jenna Foos, Comment, State Theft in Real Property

Tax Foreclosure Procedures, 54 Real. Prop. Tr. & Est.

4

L. J. 93, 99–103 & n.38 (2019) (noting that most states

“require the foreclosing government unit to return

surplus funds from a property tax foreclosure sale to

the previous property owner”). Those states demonstrate a willingness to provide several opportunities

for homeowners to pay their debts and recover any excess profits if a house must be sold as collateral. The

following are descriptions of these alternative approaches to enforcing tax obligations while also respecting property rights.

A.

Utah

Utah takes several measures to protect its citizens’

real property rights before and after a tax-delinquent

foreclosure sale.

For example, Utah allows for a lengthy redemption

period before initiating foreclosure and allows installment payments of any amount. In Utah, a county cannot sell a homeowner’s house until the resident is at

least four years behind on his or her property taxes.

Utah Code § 59-2-1346. In addition to this generous

redemption period, the state simplifies the redemption process to allow small installment payments over

time, which is particularly beneficial to lower-income

homeowners. “At any time before the expiration of the

period of redemption, the county treasurer shall accept and credit on account for the redemption of property, payments in amounts of not less than $10, except

for the final payment, which may be in any amount.”

Id. § 59-2-1346(4)(a).

Furthermore, Utah law allows a county to adjust

the amount of delinquent taxes owed by a homeowner

based on individual circumstances. Such a provision

allows for leniency in cases like Ms. Tyler’s that involve elderly, low-income, or otherwise vulnerable

5

persons. The relevant statute provides that “[the] legislative body may accept a sum less than the full

amount due, or defer the full amount due, where, in

the judgment of the county legislative body, the best

human interests and the interests of the state and the

county are served.” Id. § 59-2-1347(1)(a).

Finally, and most importantly for constitutional

purposes, when an adjustment in tax debt is not appropriate or the homeowner otherwise fails to timely

redeem the property, the homeowner is given three

years to claim the surplus proceeds after a sale. Utah

Code §§ 59-2-1351.1(7), 67-4a-201(14), 67-4a-903(1).

B.

Wisconsin

Like Utah, Wisconsin also explicitly protects

homeowners’ rights to surplus proceeds from a sale of

their property, after their tax and interest obligations

are discharged. Wis. Stat. § 75.36(2m). In fact, several

aspects of Wisconsin’s system for collecting past-due

property taxes demonstrate the state’s dedication to

respecting homeowners’ property rights.

Wisconsin provides for a significant amount of

time between the accruing of the tax debt and a sale

of the real property at issue, thus giving vulnerable

populations more opportunity to raise the necessary

money. Property taxes are due near the first of the

year, but the Wisconsin county treasurers must not

issue a “tax certificate” (i.e., lien) listing the affected

property until the beginning of September of that

same year. Id. §§ 74.11(2), 74.57. Then, the issuance

of this lien generally commences a two-year redemption period. Id. § 74.57(2)(a).

Wisconsin also requires that several notices be

sent to a homeowner when property tax is owed. A

county treasurer must mail a notice to all property

6

owners within 90 days of the issuance of the tax certificate. Wis. Stat. § 74.57(2)(b). The redemption period does not begin until the certificate is mailed. Id.

The county treasurer must also publish additional notice between six and ten months before the expiration

of the redemption period. Id. § 75.07.

After the two-year redemption period expires, Wisconsin law provides for three possibilities for handling

the sale of the property, all of which either involve automatic distribution of surplus proceeds to the homeowner or give the homeowner multiple years to reclaim the surplus.

First, the county may conduct the foreclosure as a

private mortgage foreclosure, Wis. Stat. § 75.19, and

the laws of private mortgage foreclosures in virtually

all states protect the equity of all interested parties,

see, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 846.162.

Second, the county may proceed with a tax lien

foreclosure in rem. Wis. Stat. § 75.521(2). In this approach, the refund of surplus proceeds to the former

owner doesn’t happen automatically, but the owner

can recover the surplus by making a claim in court

within two years of the foreclosure. Id. § 75.521(14a).

Third, the county may apply for a tax deed to take

ownership of the property, which requires additional

notice to the owner. Wis. Stat. § 75.12. After a tax deed

is issued, the county must also notify the homeowner

of her right to the surplus proceeds of the forthcoming

sale of the property. Id. § 75.36(2m). The county typically sells the property and then automatically reimburses the homeowner any surplus proceeds. Wis.

Stat. §§ 75.35, 75.36(3)(c).

7

C.

Florida

Florida takes a different approach to property tax

collection, but its tax-lien system is also deliberately

crafted to protect property rights. Florida is a tax-lien

state, which means that the government sells the tax

liens (and the power to enforce them) to private

investors.

Florida’s tax-lien approach is designed to

maximize value for the tax-delinquent homeowner in

two ways. First, local governments auction tax liens to

the person who will pay the amount of delinquency

“and demand the lowest” interest rate. Fla. Stat.

§ 197.432(6). This means whichever auction

participant offers the lowest interest rate to the

homeowner will become the new lienholder. Second,

after a two-year redemption period, the lienholder

may apply for a tax deed, which triggers a sale of the

real property to the highest bidder. Fla. Stat.

§§ 197.502(1), 197.502(5)(c), 197.542(1). Surplus

proceeds are then returned to the former owner. Id.

§ 197.582(2)(a); see Fla. Stat. § 197.522(1)(a). Thus, in

Florida, the process of selling the lien and then selling

the property both operate to preserve as much value

for the homeowner as possible.

All three of these states offer different examples of

systems that effectively recover delinquent property

taxes while remaining faithful to the Constitution.

II.

Confiscation of Surplus Equity Results in

Serious Injustice in the Minority of States

that Allow the Practice.

Approximately 20% of states have tax-lien

systems that allow for confiscation of surplus equity.

See Foos, supra at 102 (citing states). The results of

8

such systems are always unconstitutional and often

tragic.

A.

Tax-Lien Systems of Massachusetts

and New Jersey

The property tax lien systems of Massachusetts

and New Jersey are illustrative of unjust confiscatory

regimes. In both states, property taxes are

automatically secured by a lien on the property at the

time of assessment. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 60, § 37; N.J.

Stat. § 54:5-6. From there, the two states take slightly

different paths to similar ends.

In Massachusetts, when a property tax bill

becomes more than two weeks overdue following a

demand, “the collector may take such land for the

town” on fourteen days’ notice. Mass. Gen. Laws ch.

60, § 53. After taking this limited tax title, the

collector may immediately take possession and collect

any rents or income due to pay down the tax

delinquency (with any excess amounts “being paid to

the person entitled thereto”). Id. Or the municipality

may sell tax title to the highest bidder at auction after

14 days’ notice. Id. § 52. If the owner does not redeem

the property within a specified time by paying the full

delinquency, plus 16% interest, the municipality or

private party may foreclose on the rights of

redemption and obtain “absolute” title to the property,

id. §§ 62, 64, 65, including any surplus equity.

In New Jersey, when property taxes become

delinquent, the government may auction the property,

subject to redemption. Id. §§ 54:4-67, 54:4-67.1, 54:531 to 5-32. After the tax sale, interest accrues in an

amount determined by the winning bid. Id. § 54:5-32.

If the taxpayer still does not redeem the property

within a certain timeframe, the lienholder can start

9

foreclosure proceedings. Id. § 54:5-86(a) . Once the

foreclosure proceedings are complete, they result in a

judgment that grants the lienholder “an absolute and

indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple in the

lands therein described,” id. § 54:5-104.64, including

any surplus equity.

B.

Confiscatory Tax-Collection Schemes

Lead to Shockingly Unfair Results.

Tax-lien systems like those of Massachusetts and

New Jersey often lead to gross injustice. The

Massachusetts state government’s website puts the

matter bluntly: “if a [tax lien] judgment of foreclosure

enters, you can lose all of your property’s value, even

if the amount you owe is much less than the property’s

value.” See Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

Frequently asked questions about tax lien foreclosure

cases

in

the

Land

Court,

Question

19,

https://www.mass.gov/info-details/frequently-askedquestions-about-tax-lien-foreclosure-cases-in-theland-court (last visited Mar. 3, 2023); see also Tallage

Lincoln, LLC v. Williams, 151 N.E.3d 344, 352 (2020)

(“[A]fter a strict foreclosure, the taxpayer loses any

equity he or she has accrued in the property, no

matter how small the amount of taxes due or how

large the amount of equity.”).

Examples of clear injustice are legion. In one case,

a buyer unknowingly purchased a property for which

the previous owner had failed to pay certain property

taxes. The lien was sold to a private company that

“sent a single letter” to the owner announcing its

intention to foreclose. Ithaca Fin., LLC v. Leger, 167

N.E.3d 874, 878 (Mass. App. Ct. 2021). The company’s

subsequent foreclosure action failed to list the owner

as a defendant, so the court issued a special citation

informing the owner about the foreclosure action. Id.

10

The owner did not respond and default foreclosure

was entered. Id. The company then waited until all

possibility of redemption had expired to inform the

owner that the complany was now “the owner of the

property which you currently occupy.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because of the first owner’s

failure to pay $3,229.66 in taxes, the next owner

ultimately lost all of the equity in her home—while

then having to make payments to the new corporate

owner. Id. at 877-78.

The buyer challenged this procedure in court. The

court said that it “cannot overstate the severity of the

impact that a tax foreclosure judgment may have on

the taxpayer,” id. at 877 n.3, but the court ultimately

concluded that “[w]hile we empathize with [the

foreclosed owner’s] plight under the unfortunate

circumstances of this case, binding precedent requires

us” to deny any relief. Id. at 880.

In another case, the plaintiff alleged that, despite

being a “disabled retiree” living on a fixed income of

“less than $1,000 per month,” she was rendered

homeless and had $210,000 in surplus equity

confiscated by a private investment company who

purchased a tax lien on her property. See Foss v. New

Bedford, No. 1:22-cv-10761, Dkt. 1-1, ¶¶ 9-40 (D.

Mass. May 17, 2022). And in another, a

Massachusetts court foreclosed on a property valued

at $270,000 due to an unpaid water and sewer bill of

$492.51. Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 2015 WL 4207424,

at *1 (Mass. Land Ct. June 26, 2015).

Such stories are tragically common in states that

allow the seizure of surplus equity. See, e.g., Wayside

Church v. Van Buren Cnty., 847 F.3d 812, 823 (6th

Cir. 2017) (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (“In this case the

defendant Van Buren County took property worth

11

$206,000 to satisfy a $16,750 debt, and then refused

to refund any of the difference. In some legal precincts

that sort of behavior is called theft. But under the

Michigan General Property Tax Act, apparently, that

behavior is called tax collection.”), abrogated on other

grounds by Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct.

2162, 2167-68 (2019).

C.

The Injustice of Confiscatory Tax-Collection Schemes is Exacerbated by the

Involvement of Private Investors.

In states like Massachusetts and New Jersey,

where rights to tax liens are often sold at auction,

profiting from the confiscation of surplus equity has

become big business. For example, the book New Jersey Tax Lien Investing, whose author is identified as

the Chief Financial Officer for a New Jersey municipality that “sell[s] lucrative tax lien certificates,” is advertised with the following pitch:

New Jersey has the highest property taxes in the

country. This is fantastic news for investors. . . .

Tax liens offer a low risk, high reward investment opportunity. Municipal tax liens accrue interest at up to 18% in the State of New Jersey.

Lien investors often earn triple digit returns on

an annualized basis. . . . There is an opportunity

to gain ownership of a property at a modest cost,

often less than a down payment on a home or

even a new car.

New Jersey Tax Lien Investing, Amazon.com,

https://www.amazon.com/New-Jersey-Tax-LienInvesting-ebook /dp/B0B2NHJDY9 (last visited Mar.

3, 2023).

Private parties often pay more than the entire

amount of the delinquency when purchasing tax liens

12

at auction, knowing that the chance of obtaining

surplus equity makes such “premium” bidding

worthwhile. N.J. Stat. § 54:5-32 (“[T]he property shall

be struck off and sold to the bidder who offers to pay

the amount of such taxes, assessments or charges,

plus the highest amount of premium.”); Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 60, § 52 (providing that “tax titles” may not

be sold for “less than the amount necessary for

redemption”).

These private companies have no incentive to

make it easy for homeowners to redeem their

properties. As one court explained, such companies

“are responsible to their investors, not the citizens of

a city or town, and their goals and incentives are not

the same. Maximizing return on investment may not

include accommodation to individual circumstance to

the same extent a municipality, acting for itself, might

otherwise deem warranted.” Meaney, 2015 WL

4207424, at *5; see also id. n.10. These systems create

perverse incentives for private industry to prey on

homeowners, often from the most vulnerable

populations.

D.

Property Owners in States with Confiscatory Tax-Collection Schemes Lose

Tens of Millions in Equity Each Year.

Property owners who are caught up in these

confiscatory tax-collection processes suffer massive

losses wholly out of proportion to the taxes they owe.

For example, one analysis of tax foreclosures from

August 2013 to August 2014 estimated that

“Massachusetts

municipalities

collected

approximately $56,600,000 more from their taxpayers

than was owed.” Ralph D. Clifford, Massachusetts Has

a Problem: The Unconstitutionality of the Tax Deed,

13 U. Mass. L. Rev. 274, 282–83 (2018). These

13

municipalities took properties with an average value

of $258,462 even though the tax liens being collected

averaged only $4,177—and in one case was only $26.

Id. at 283. In the end, these “towns and cities collected

$42.87 for every dollar they were owed.” Id.

Similarly, an analysis by Pacific Legal

Foundation1 of 31 cities in New Jersey from 2014 to

2021 found that on average, homeowners subjected to

the process lost $178,000 in equity. Angela C.

Erickson et al., “New Jersey,” End Home Equity Theft

(Arlington, VA: Pacific Legal Foundation, 2022), last

modified

Feb.

24,

2023,

https://homeequitytheft.org/new-jersey. These losses

represented an average of 90% of thehomes’ value. Id.

The same analysis found that the amounts recovered

represented, on average, approximately 30 times more

than the original tax debts that led to the foreclosure.

Id.

Although Massachusetts and New Jersey provide

illustrative examples, this issue is by no means

isolated to these states. Pacific Legal Foundation’s

analysis found that nationwide, “[l]ocalities and

private investors foreclosed on and sold at least 8.950

homes from 2014 to 2021.” Erickson, supra,

“Thousands Lose Their Wealth to Home Equity

Theft,”

https://homeequitytheft.org/size-and-scope.

For the 6,200 homes for which complete data was

available, this analysis found that “[h]omeowners lost

more than $860 million in wealth . . . above what they

owed in tax debt.” Id.

Pacific Legal Foundation is the non-profit law firm that

represents Petitioner in this action.

1

14

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the Eighth Circuit

and judgment below.

15

DATED this 6th day of March, 2023.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Melissa A. Holyoak

SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

MELISSA HOLYOAK

Utah Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JORDAN E. SMITH

STEPHEN TENSMEYER

Special Assistant

Attorneys General

350 N. State Street

Suite 230

P.O. Box 142320

Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Telephone: (801) 538-9600

Email:

melissaholyoak@agutah.gov

Counsel for Amici Curiae

16

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

Counsel for Amici States

TIM GRIFFIN

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ARKANSAS

KRIS KOBACH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF KANSAS

DANIEL CAMERON

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF KENTUCKY

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

DREW WRIGLEY

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General

State of Texas

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General

State of West Virginia