Amicus Curiae Brief — Billy Raymond Counterman, Petitioner v. Colorado

No. 22-138

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BILLY RAYMOND COUNTERMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO,

Respondent.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The

Colorado Court Of Appeals, Division II

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF JACK JORDAN

IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JACK JORDAN

Counsel of Record

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City, Missouri 64116

jack.jordan@emobilawyer.com

(816) 853-1142

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

2

ARGUMENT ........................................................

4

I.

Courts Should Emphasize Uniform Analysis of Repression of Expression with Emphasis on the Purpose of Freedom of

Expression .................................................

4

Education, Not Repression, Fosters Confidence ..........................................................

6

III.

Labels and Names Are Dangerous Things....

9

IV.

To the Freedom of Speech, the Judiciary

May Be the Most Dangerous Branch ........ 15

V.

Government Must Prove Each Fact Material to Showing Clear and Present Danger

Before Punishing Speech ........................... 24

VI.

The Constitution Requires Proof of a Clear

and Present Danger ................................... 27

VII.

The 1776 Declaration Constituted the U.S.

and Declared the Nation’s Constitution ...... 28

II.

VIII. The Constitution Protects People from

Each Other................................................. 31

CONCLUSION..................................................... 33

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418 (1979) ........................................... 12, 13

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242 (1986) .................................................12

Bowsher v. Synar,

478 U.S. 714 (1986) .................................................23

Bridges v. California,

314 U.S. 252 (1941) ..................................... 11, 24, 25

Cammer v. United States,

350 U.S. 399 (1956) .................................................23

Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost,

909 N.E.2d 1271 (Ohio 2009) ..................................13

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) ............................................... 4, 6

Garrison v. Louisiana,

379 U.S. 64 (1964) ............................. 9, 11, 14, 25, 26

Herbert v. Lando,

441 U.S. 153 (1979) ............................................... 4-6

Immerso v. U.S. DOL,

2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 33011

(2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2022) ....................................... 14, 15

In re Johnson,

729 P.2d 1175 (Kan. 1986) ......................................14

In re Jordan,

518 P.3d 1203 (Kan. 2022) ................................ 13, 14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

In re Primus,

436 U.S. 412 (1978) .................................................14

Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,

366 U.S. 36 (1961) ...................................................10

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,

497 U.S. 1 (1990) .....................................................14

Mills v. Alabama,

384 U.S. 214 (1966) ...................................................5

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis,

310 U.S. 586 (1940) ...................................................7

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966) .................................................11

Mo., K. & T. R. Co. v. May,

194 U.S. 267 (1904) .................................................28

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,

371 U.S. 415 (1963) .................................................14

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) ............................................ 4, 6

New York Times v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964) ................................ 12-14, 18, 19

Olmstead v. United States,

277 U.S. 438 (1928) .................................................11

Patterson v. Colorado,

205 U.S. 454 (1907) .................................................18

Pennekamp v. State of Fla.,

328 U.S. 331 (1946) ........................................... 11, 15

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Pickering v. Board of Ed.,

391 U.S. 563 (1968) .................................................14

Richmond Newspapers v. Va.,

448 U.S. 555 (1980) ...................................................6

Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982) .................................................13

Thornhill v. Alabama,

310 U.S. 88 (1940) .....................................................7

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community

School District,

393 U.S. 503 (1969) .................................................26

United States v. Alvarez-Machain,

504 U.S. 655 (1992) ...................................................1

Wood v. Georgia,

370 U.S. 375 (1962) ............................................. 7, 11

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

U.S. Constitution

Amend. I ...................................................... 3, 28, 30, 34

Amend. V .....................................................................30

Amend. IX ...................................................................30

Amend. X ............................................................... 28, 31

Amend. XIII ................................................................31

Amend. XIV ........................................................... 27, 31

Amend. XV ..................................................................31

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Amend. XIX .................................................................31

Amend. XXIV ..............................................................31

Amend. XXVI ..............................................................31

Art. I ............................................................................27

Art. IV .........................................................................27

Art. VI .........................................................................27

Preamble ......................................................... 28, 29, 31

18 U.S.C. §§241, 242....................................................11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789) (James Madison) .........19

Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood No. 8, The

New-England Courant, July 9, 1722 ................ 20, 21

Declaration of Independence of 1776 ................... 28-31

De Libellis Famosis............................................... 16, 17

James Madison’s Address (Jan. 23, 1799)....................9

Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596 ..................................9

Stephen D. Solomon, Revolutionary Dissent:

How the Founding Generation Created the

Freedom of Speech (2016)................. 17, 21-23, 33, 34

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address

(Mar. 4, 1801) .............................................................7

Thomas Jefferson Letter to Edward Carrington

(Jan. 16, 1787) ....................................................... 7, 8

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Jan. 1776) (reprinted London, H.D. Symonds (1792) ............... 8-10

The Federalist No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) ..............28

The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) ......................8

The Federalist No. 63 (James Madison or

Alexander Hamilton) ........................................ 31, 32

The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ...... 15, 16

The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) ...... 29, 30

The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) ......................8

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws

of England (1765) ....................................................17

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Curiae is a lawyer who was a soldier. For

many years in conflicts around the world, Amicus and

people he represents supported and defended our Nation and Constitution by risking or giving life or limb.

Many gave their health and happiness. To honor the

millions who have given much to honor their oaths to

support and defend the Constitution (America’s constitution), Amicus now supports judges fulfilling their

duty to honor their own oaths, and he exposes and opposes judges and government attorneys violating their

oaths by attacking and undermining the Constitution

and the people and principles that it protects.1

Of considerable concern to Amicus is defending

the freedom of speech in America for its core purpose

(helping ensure government truly is good and for the

People). See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain,

504 U.S. 655, 688 (1992) (Stevens, Blackmun, O’Connor,

JJ., dissenting):

As Thomas Paine warned, an “avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty” because it

leads a nation “to stretch, to misinterpret, and

to misapply even the best of laws.” To counter

that tendency, he reminds us:

“He that would make his own liberty secure

must guard even his enemy from oppression;

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No counsel for any party authored any part, or contributed

any money intended to (or that did) fund preparing or submitting,

this brief.

2

for if he violates this duty he establishes a

precedent that will reach to himself.”

Amicus is profoundly concerned by the precedent

and examples being set by some of today’s judges and

government attorneys who are dangerously lacking in

respect for the Constitution and its restraints on their

powers. Amicus, himself, was viciously “punished” by

(and to protect) malicious judges and government attorneys who lied about facts and evidence and knowingly violated much law and much of the Constitution.

So Amicus seeks to prevent persecution for speech exposing and opposing judges and government attorneys

who knowingly violate their oaths to support the Constitution.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Colorado’s incarceration of Counterman is clear

and convincing evidence of a system that, in multiple

respects, is egregiously unconstitutional and frighteningly dysfunctional. It should be universally feared.

Counterman in prison is analogous to the canary in the

coal mine.

The words used by Counterman, as well as those

used by the legislators, prosecutor and judge who incarcerated Counterman, are clear and convincing evidence that far too many Americans—including far too

many involved in creating or enforcing law—are

frighteningly far from understanding or respecting

the scope and purpose of “the freedom of speech” and

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“press.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. The “true threat” in

Counterman’s case comes from those who put him in

prison for nearly (or, ultimately, maybe considerably

more than) five years for a couple ill-considered emails.

Counterman’s case and the words used to discuss

it and similar matters are clear and convincing evidence that education, not incarceration, is a remedy

that is required, not only for people like Counterman,

but also the people responsible for incarcerating Counterman.

Instead of intelligent discussion of constitutional

principles and this Court’s precedent, those in favor of

incarceration urge this Court (and the People) to accept mere labels and succumb to a dangerous siren

song. References to a “reasonable” person and “objective” analysis are dangerous extensions of the dangerous pretense that the People can and should trust,

presume the good faith of and have “confidence” in the

“legitimacy” of public officials and their actions. This

case and others prove that such confidence is something the People certainly should not have.

One of the most important and most fundamental

aspects of the repression of speech by government is

that it reverses the natural relationship between sovereign and servant. In America, the People are the ultimate sovereign, and our governors are our servants.

The relationship of sovereign citizen to governor is

perhaps best viewed as analogous to the concept of a

governor for a willful child. Guidance, not punishment,

should the goal. Education of strong sovereigns should

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be the objective. To the extent practicable, America’s

public servants should be in the business of educating

and empowering kings and queens, not filling prisons.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT

I.

Courts Should Emphasize Uniform Analysis

of Repression of Expression with Emphasis

on the Purpose of Freedom of Expression.

All speech is subject to the First Amendment and

all repression of speech should be subjected to disciplined, rigorous due process of law. Courts “always”

have “widely understood that” the First Amendment

“codified” multiple “pre-existing right[s],” which were

not “granted by the Constitution” or “in any manner

dependent upon” the Constitution for their “existence.”

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).

“Constitutional rights” (e.g., the freedom of speech

and the right to petition) “are enshrined with the scope

they were understood to have when the people [enshrined] them.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

142 S.Ct. 2111, 2136 (2022) (emphasis by the Court).

“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope

they were understood to have when the people [enshrined] them, whether or not future legislatures” or

“judges think that scope too broad.” Heller, 554 U.S. at

634-635 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Herbert v.

Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183-185 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cleaned up):

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the First Amendment serves to foster the values of democratic self-government [ ] in several senses. The First Amendment bars

[public servants] from imposing upon [sovereign] citizens [mere public servants’ purported] vision of truth. It prohibits [public

officials] from interfering with the communicative processes through which [sovereign]

citizens exercise and prepare to exercise their

rights [and powers] of self-government. And

the Amendment shields those [sovereign citizens] who would [exercise their power to]

censure [public servants] or expose [such

servants’] abuses.

See also id. quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219

(1966) (emphasis added):

[The People with the power of speech and

press serve and were] designed to serve as a

powerful antidote to any abuses of power by

governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping [public] officials [ ] responsible to all the people whom

they [purport] to serve. Suppression of [the

power of the People, to use speech and] press

to praise or criticize governmental agents and

to clamor and contend for or against change

. . . muzzles one of the very agencies the

Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and

deliberately selected to improve our society

and keep it free.

The First Amendment “is the very product of an

interest balancing by the people” and it clearly “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,

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responsible citizens” to freely use means of communication. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2131 quoting Heller, 554

U.S. at 635. “It is this balance—struck by the traditions

of the American people—that demands” the “unqualified deference” of all public servants, even judges. Id.

The First “Amendment’s plain text covers” Counterman’s “conduct” so “the Constitution presumptively

protects” such “conduct. To justify” punishing Counterman, the government “must demonstrate” that its putative “regulation” is “consistent with this Nation’s

historical tradition” of protecting such conduct. Bruen,

142 S.Ct. at 2126. The government “must affirmatively

prove that” its putative “regulation” is within this Nation’s long and strong “historical tradition” of protecting speech, assembly and petitioning within “the outer

bounds” of such “right[s].” Id. at 2127.

II.

Education, Not Repression, Fosters Confidence.

“A result considered untoward may undermine

public confidence” in courts and the justice system.

Richmond Newspapers v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)

(opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Stevens, JJ.). “The educative effect of public” access to information about how

and whether justice is being served “is a material advantage” of our system of justice. Id. at 572. “Not only

is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of government,

but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured

which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy”

or repression. Id.

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People like Counterman need education, not incarceration. People need to be better taught to better exercise the fearsome power of the freedom of expression.

Clearly, “education in the abandonment of foolish” conduct “is itself a training in liberty.” Minersville Sch.

Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940). Education

promotes “the self-confidence of a free people.” Id.

“Those who won our independence had confidence

in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread” the “truth.”

Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962) quoting

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). Judges

and lawyers should be among the leading educators in

America, leading in making America think. Analysis

and discipline should not be eliminated in favor of

mere labels. Otherwise, America will cease to be what

it was meant to be. America will cease to be exceptional

and serve only as another cautionary tale.

Thomas Jefferson admonished that we all must

“with courage and confidence pursue” and secure our

“Federal and Republican principles,” i.e., creating and

securing the “union and representative government”

because we should not be confident we have “found

angels” to “govern.” First Inaugural Address (1801)

(https://www.loc.gov/item/rbpe.1900040a/).

He also emphasized that the freedom of speech

and press is “the only safeguard of the public liberty.”

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington

(Jan. 16, 1787) (available at https://press-pubs.uchicago.

edu/founders/tocs/amendI_speech.html). Jefferson

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emphasized that critical thinking and critical speech,

not mere confidence, were crucial to good government.

“The people are the only censors of their governors: and even” their “errors [in criticism] will tend to

keep” public servants “to the true principles of their

institution.” Id. To minimize or mitigate errors, “full

information of ” public “affairs” must be given to the

“people,” and such communication “should penetrate

the whole mass of the people. The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right.” Id. Otherwise, “under

pretence of governing,” purported public servants will

act like “wolves” and attack people like “sheep.” Id. “If ”

the people “become inattentive” to “public affairs,” then

legislators, “judges and governors shall all become

wolves.” Id.

James Madison also emphasized the “great importance” to our “republic” of “guard[ing our] society

against the oppression of its rulers.” The Federalist

No. 51 (https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text).

A “thirst for absolute power is the natural disease” of

government that is “trusted without being looked after.” Thomas Paine, Common Sense at 5 (Jan. 1776)

reprinted London, H.D. Symonds (1792) (available via

Google Books).

Many a world power has been undone by excessive

confidence in the purported or perceived propriety or

wisdom of putative leaders in politics or opinion. “[T]he

nation which reposes on the pillow of political confidence, will sooner or later end its political existence in

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a deadly lethargy.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,

86 (1964) (appendix to Douglas, J., concurring, quoting

James Madison’s Address, January 23, 1799).

III. Labels and Names Are Dangerous Things.

“So insatiable is a love of power that” from this

Nation’s very founding, those who love power have “resorted to a distinction between the freedom” of expression and purported “licentiousness” for “the purpose of

converting the” First Amendment, itself, “into an instrument for abridging” the “freedom” that amendment was designed to “preserve.” Id. at 85-86 (referring

to the Sedition Act of 1798).

Labels like “reasonable” and “objective” are deceptive and dangerous and amenable to egregious abuse

by judges and government attorneys. Labels like “exempt” or “excepted” from or “not immunized by” the

mere “First Amendment” are dangerous to, and often

abused to deny, Americans’ freedom to speak and publish. Such expressions should be eliminated entirely.

Expression is expression and all potential repression

should be subjected disciplined scrutiny.

The central dichotomies here (purportedly reasonable, objective perception versus subjective intent or

knowledge) also are central to prosecuting or persecuting lawyers and litigants for their speech in many jurisdictions. Throughout history and in many areas,

“Men” have used “names without understanding

them.” Common Sense at 11. That includes “the

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unmeaning name of king.” Id. at 4. Would-be kings by

any other name would be as bad.

History provides copious evidence of the danger of

names and labels—including those made and applied

by judges. Three judge-made labels that proved among

the most dangerous to First Amendment freedoms are

“seditious libel,” “common law” (see pages 15-17, below)

and even “clear and present danger.”

“Justices Holmes and Brandeis” wisely emphasized the importance of requiring identification of a

particular “clear and present danger” before government proposed or permitted restriction or punishment

of expression. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 63 (1961) (Black, Douglas, JJ.,

Warren, C.J., dissenting). Requiring public officials

to identify “a clear and present danger” greatly

“broaden[ed] the then prevailing” judicial “interpretation of First Amendment freedoms;” it “protected

speech in all cases except” when a harm or a “danger

was” proved to exist or be “so imminent that there was

no time for rational discussion.” Id. (emphasis added).

Many judges, however, egregiously abused what

they (merely) called the “clear and present danger test”

to “justify” their unconstitutional “refusal to apply the

plain mandate of the First Amendment.” Id. Many

judges merely labeled certain speech a “clear and present danger.” Such labels allowed and allow judges to

be lazy and undisciplined and even misrepresent facts.

It is well-settled that judges sometimes say things

merely because they sound legitimate when, in fact,

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they are not. So this Court has reminded judges that

due process of law requires much more than the mere

“enunciation of a constitutionally acceptable standard”

by judges merely purportedly “describing the effect” of

“conduct” being punished. Wood, 370 U.S. at 386. In

Wood, the Court wisely accentuated the absence of evidence to protect a court officer who criticized and opposed multiple judges.

Shortly thereafter, the Court was more emphatic

but more cryptic. A decision famous for one warning

should be famous for another warning: “Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it

breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-480 (1966) quoting

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)

(Brandeis, J., dissenting).

In such manner, judges invite anarchy by knowingly undermining First Amendment freedoms and

other express language of the Constitution. Cf., e.g., 18

U.S.C. §§241, 242. One reason they have done (and still

do) so is to repress expression that judges consider

merely offensive. See, e.g., Garrison, above); Bridges v.

California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. State of

Fla., 328 U.S. 331 (1946). Judicial repression of purportedly-offensive expression has deep roots and a

very long, very dark history. See pages 16-17, below.

Even today, it is not uncommon that lawyer or litigant speech is punished by judges and government

attorneys based on distinctions such as are central to

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this case. The same or similar labels and concepts regarding speech are central (e.g., “reasonable” or “objective” perceptions versus the speaker’s “subjective”

intent or knowledge, or speech that is “exempt” or “excepted” from or “not immunized by” the First Amendment).

Judges and the government attorneys in judges’

disciplinary apparatus commonly state or imply that

the foregoing dichotomies are dispositive. They pretend that such distinctions justify flouting this Court’s

considerable precedent repeatedly emphasizing that

the government must prove each material fact.

In attorney discipline cases, any purported “proof

presented to show” each material fact must have “the

convincing clarity which the constitutional standard

demands.” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,

285-286 (1964). The “First Amendment mandates a

‘clear and convincing’ standard” of proof of each material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

252 (1986).

Such “standard of proof ” is “embodied in the Due

Process Clause” to establish “the degree of confidence”

each court must “have in the correctness” of its “factual

conclusions.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423

(1979). It “serves to allocate the risk of error” to the

court punishing attorney speech, and “to indicate the”

great “importance attached to the ultimate decision.”

Id. It “reflects the” great “value society places” on the

“liberty” at stake. Id. at 425.

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The “clear” and “convincing” standard “reduce[s]

the risk to” a person “of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing” the government’s

“burden of proof.” Id. at 424. Such “level of certainty” is

“necessary to preserve fundamental fairness” in “government-initiated proceedings that threaten” an “individual” with a “significant deprivation of liberty” or

“stigma.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).

Instead of ensuring the government bears its burden of proof with evidence, judges sometimes camouflage the true nature of government conduct with nicesounding names and labels. Regarding Counterman,

government implied its conduct was “reasonable” and

its analysis was “objective.” Judges, themselves, repeatedly provide good reason to distrust their labels.

To justify flouting this Court’s precedent, some

judges contend they “adopted” a “standard” that “evaluates” what “what the reasonable attorney” supposedly “would do” and “whether” an “attorney had a

reasonable factual basis for making the statements.”

Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 909 N.E.2d 1271, 1277

(Ohio 2009) (imposing indefinite suspension). They do

so specifically to flout the New York Times “subjective

‘actual malice’ standard” and tout their own “objective

standard.” Id. at 1277.

When judges and government attorneys employed

in judges’ so-called disciplinary authorities repress

attorney criticism of judges, they sometimes claim to

apply “reasonable subject-matter limitations.” In re

Jordan, 518 P.3d 1203, 1235 (Kan. 2022). They imply

14

that they act reasonably when they disbar attorneys

for exposing the lies and crimes of judges merely because “attorneys” have a “duty to maintain the respect”

purportedly “due” to “judicial officers.” Id. at 1236

quoting In re Johnson, 729 P.2d 1175, 1179 (Kan.

1986). In truth, judges sometimes protect each other

with obvious (and even knowing) falsehoods, including

by merely contending that criticism has “no reasonable

basis in fact.” Id. at 1237.

Judges and government attorneys engage in such

conduct expressly to flout this Court’s precedent. See

id. at 1224, 1234, flouting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal

Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391

U.S. 563 (1968) and Garrison and New York Times,

above (each requiring the government to prove that

criticism was false); id. at 1224 flouting N.A.A.C.P. v.

Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412

(1978) (each requiring disciplinary authorities to prove

that punishment served a compelling court interest

and avoided abridging First Amendment freedoms).

In another context (to purport to justify concealing

information and records in violation of the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA)), government attorneys urge,

and judges commonly “accord,” an unconstitutional

“presumption of good faith” to assertions of agency

employees. Immerso v. U.S. DOL, 2022 U.S. App.

LEXIS 33011, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2022). Judges do

so even when they know agency employees’ declarations are obviously (and even knowingly) false. See id.

Government attorneys and judges have knowingly

misrepresented that efforts to expose and oppose such

15

government misconduct were mere “bad faith” purportedly “slanderous accusations.” Id. at *4.

IV. To the Freedom of Speech, the Judiciary

May Be the Most Dangerous Branch.

It is dangerous to liberty and the freedom of expression “to play make-believe” and “assume that men

in gowns are angels.” Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 359

(Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Founders knew better than to make that mistake.

They designed the Constitution to compel all

“judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the

Constitution.” The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text).

The Constitution pointedly deprived judges of powers

that the common law gave them. Under the Constitution, judges have “neither FORCE nor WILL, but

merely judgment.” Id. The Constitution requires “government in which” the judiciary is separate from the

other branches, so that “the judiciary” will “be the least

dangerous” branch. Id.

The Founders also revealed what would make

judges, themselves, a clear and present danger. When

judges exercise “judgment,” alone, “liberty can have

nothing to fear from the judiciary alone.” Id. But the

People “have every thing to fear from” a “union” of “judiciary” powers with the powers of “either of the other

departments.” Id. When “the power of judging” is “not

separated from the legislative and executive powers,”

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the People will have “no liberty.” Id. quoting Montesquieu.

Such statements and copious plain language of the

Constitution confirmed that the common law was the

epitome of evil and the enemy of freedom of expression.

The People had “every thing to fear from” judges because the common law was a “union” of “judiciary”

powers with the powers of both “other departments.”

Id. “[T]he power of judging” was “not separated from”

either “the legislative” or the “executive powers,” so the

People had “no liberty” to expose misconduct by public

officials. Id.

Particular aspects of the common law are crucial

to understanding its devastating failings and judges’

ferocious attacks on the freedom of expression and the

people who attempted to exercise it. First, judges and

courts were creatures of the King (extensions of executive power). Second, because judges protected and projected the King’s power, they were not accountable to

(or particularly concerned with) Parliament or the

People. Third, judges were not governed by the common law. Fourth, the common law was created by individual judges who then, individually and collectively,

enforced or applied what they wanted when they

wanted.

“Blackstone” and his “Commentaries” and “Coke”

and “his report of the case De Libellis Famosis in 1606”

should serve as compelling reminders (and warnings)

that some of the blackest blots on the history of freedom of expression were put there by judges punishing

17

those who dared to speak. Stephen D. Solomon, Revolutionary Dissent: How the Founding Generation Created the Freedom of Speech (2016) at 100.

The infamous “Star Chamber,” for example, fabricated and enforced the cruel fiction that exposing

“corrupt or wicked Magistrates” was a “criminal act”

(“seditious libel”) because such expression (merely) revealed the greatest “scandal of government,” i.e., that

“corrupt or wicked Magistrates” had been “appointed.”

Id. at 39. In 1606 “with De Libellis Famosis, the Star

Chamber” judges fabricated the especially cruel fiction

that “a true statement” about “corrupt or wicked Magistrates” especially required punishment. Id. The monstrous “precedent set in De Libellis Famosis lived on as

part of English common law” and became a horrific

“common maxim” that judges used to justify truly brutal repression of critics of government: “the greater the

truth, the greater the libel.” Id.

That was the “common law” that was “exported to

the colonies.” Id. at 39. The “common law” and “legal

commentators in America followed the lead of Coke

and Blackstone,” which shaped how “lawyers and

judges viewed freedom of expression” for far more than

“fifty years following the Revolution.” Id. at 100.

“Blackstone” in his “Commentaries” in 1765 “endorsed the idea that freedom of the press meant

nothing more than the right” to print “without prior

censorship,” i.e., not freedom from punishment for seditious libel. Id. at 4. Before he reconsidered this issue,

even Justice Holmes emphasized that the common law

18

“of criminal libel” called for “punishment” of even

“true” criticism “in most cases, if not in all,” and “the

rule applied to criminal libels” (somehow) applies”

even “more clearly to” purported “contempts” of court.

Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).

One very useful purpose that “the Sedition Act of

1798” served was to sharply focus American “national”

attention (near the Founding) on “the central meaning

of ” not merely “the First Amendment,” but also America’s political constitution. New York Times, 376 U.S. at

273. The Act punished federal officials’ critics “inten[ding]” to “defame” or “bring them” into “contempt

or disrepute” or “to excite against them” the “hatred of ”

the “people.” Id. at 274.

Everyone understood the Constitution and America’s constitution precluded punishing truthful criticism of public officials’ official conduct. So the Sedition

Act required the government to bear the burden of

proving that criticism was both “false” and “malicious.”

Id. at 273. It also “allowed” the “defense of truth,” and

(of profound historical importance regarding so-called

seditious libel) “the jury were” the “judges both of the

law and the facts.” Id. at 274.

Even so, Jefferson and Madison very vigorously

opposed the Act. See, e.g., id. at 273-276. Madison insisted Americans enjoy full “freedom in canvassing the

merits and measures of public men, of every description,” and he emphasized that such freedom “has not

been confined” by “the common law.” Id. (emphasis

19

added). “On this” sturdy “foundation” the “freedom of

the press” has “stood” and still “stands.” Id.

In 1794, Madison had emphasized that in “Republican Government” the “censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government

over the people.” Id. at 275. Earlier, in Madison’s proposed First Amendment, he emphasized why: the

People’s “right to speak,” “write,” and “publish” and

“the freedom of the press” were “the great bulwarks of

liberty.” 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789).

Significantly, Madison’s and Jefferson’s statements about the freedom of expression were not entirely their own thoughts. They were echoes of

thoughts made popular throughout pre-revolutionary

America, including by America’s most famous revolutionary-newsman. In 1722, Benjamin Franklin reprinted a letter from a collection known as Cato’s

Letters that, like The Federalist Papers, explained the

foundations of republican government.

Franklin published under a pseudonym that was

supposed to be a woman’s name, Silence Dogood.

Silence spoke about (and helped establish) the freedom

of speech in America. Much of the nascent American

press helped establish that Americans are free to expose the lies and crimes of purported public servants

abusing their powers. Franklin and Cato’s Letters led

the way decades before Adams, Jefferson and Madison.

Franklin showed the freedom of speech and press

by publishing a crucial excerpt from Cato’s Letters,

thereby endorsing and promoting the thunderous

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principles therein that roared throughout America,

first as speech, and then as gunfire, and then as

cannon fire that defeated the military and economic

might of an empire. See Benjamin Franklin, Silence

Dogood No. 8, The New-England Courant, July 9, 1722

(https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/0101-02-0015).

“Without Freedom of Thought, there can be no

such Thing as Wisdom; and no such Thing as publick

Liberty, without Freedom of Speech.” Id. Americans’

“Freedom of Speech” is a “sacred Privilege” that “is so

essential to free Governments” that “the Security of

Property, and the Freedom of Speech always go together; and in those wretched Countries” (or courts)

“where a Man cannot call his Tongue his own, he can

scarce call any Thing else his own. Whoever would

overthrow the Liberty of a Nation, must begin by subduing the Freeness of Speech.” Id.

“A free People will” show “that they are” free “by

their Freedom of Speech.” Id. “Freedom of Speech is

ever the Symptom, as well as the Effect of a good Government.” Id. “The best Princes have ever encouraged

and promoted Freedom of Speech; they know that upright Measures would defend themselves, and that all

upright Men would defend them.” Id. “Misrepresentation of publick Measures is easily overthrown, by representing publick Measures truly; when they are

honest, they ought to be publickly known, that they

may be publickly commended; but” when “they are

knavish or pernicious” (as they are here), “they ought

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to be publickly exposed, in order to be publickly detested.” Id.

“Men ought to speak well of their Governours” only

“while their Governours deserve to be well spoken of ”

because for public officials “to do publick Mischief,

without” the public “hearing of it, is only the” corrosive

“Prerogative” of “Tyranny” and evil-meaning tyrants.

Id. “Government” is “nothing” but “Trustees of the People” acting “upon the Interest and Affairs of the People:

And” it “is the Part and Business of the People” to actually “see whether” such “publick Matters” have been

“well or ill transacted.” Id.

“[S]o it is the Interest, and ought to be the Ambition, of all honest Magistrates, to have their Deeds

openly examined, and publickly scann’d.” Id. “Only the

wicked Governours of Men dread what is said of

them.” Id. “Guilt only dreads Liberty of Speech, which

drags it out of its lurking Holes, and exposes its Deformity and Horrour to Daylight.” Id. For that reason,

“Freedom of Speech” is a “Thing terrible to Publick

Traytors.” Id.

Excerpts of Cato’s Letter were “printed in virtually

all the newspapers in the colonies and widely quoted

in political essays, making them among the most influential political essays for the American founding generation.” Solomon, Revolutionary Dissent at 44. They

also were very famous because they were instrumental

in establishing political freedom of speech in America

by virtually entirely thwarting (starting in 1735) the

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despicable judicial practices used to punish so-called

seditious libel.

Among those who know anything about the origin

of “the freedom of speech” in the First Amendment, the

1735 trial of Peter Zenger for seditious libel in New

York is famous. Zenger’s attorney caused to be reprinted the portions of Cato’s Letters that Franklin

printed. See id. at 44. So Zenger’s “case enlarged public

participation in politics. An entire city reverberated

with debate over the conduct of government” (including judges’ abuse of despicable fictions to repress

speech) “to an extent never before seen in the colonies.”

Id. at 55.

Based on Cato’s Letters, above, Zenger’s attorney

pointed out that public officials first “injure[d] and oppress[ed] the people under their administration,”

thereby “provok[ing] them to cry out and complain”

and then those same officials made “that very complaint the foundation for new oppressions and prosecutions.” Id. at 53.

Zenger’s attorney further argued that the People

have the “right publicly to remonstrate the abuses of

power, in the strongest terms,” and they have the right

“of exposing and opposing arbitrary power by speaking

and writing the truth.” Id. The judge (the Chief Justice

of New York) disagreed, but he (and the common law of

seditious libel) were overruled by the jury.

“To a people aggrieved by royal officials and their

overbearing policies, the idea that a man could be”

punished “for speaking the truth” about public officials

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or “expressing a critical opinion” about them “was an

affront to liberty.” Id. at 55. So “in less than thirty

minutes,” the jury found Zenger “not guilty of seditious

libel.” Id. at 54. “News of the verdict spread” like wildfire “up and down the coast,” and Zenger also “published a book” about the “trial, which was probably the

most popular book in America up to that time.” Id.

As a result of Cato’s Letters, the arguments of

Zenger’s attorney, the jury’s verdict, newspaper coverage, and Zenger’s book, “until independence, common

law cases against dissidents [for seditious libel] all but

disappeared,” and Zenger’s “acquittal is often noted as

a landmark in the history of freedom of the press” and

speech. Id. at 55.

“[P]amphleteers of the founding generation put

talismanic weight” on “Cato’s Letters” for the way they

presented “political liberty and freedom of the press”

and speech. Id. at 187.

Despite the foregoing history and the plain language of the Sedition Act (protecting truthful criticism

of public officials), judges continued to persecute people for merely criticizing public officials, especially

judges. Some judges even have been impeached for

egregiously abusing their powers to repress government critics. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,

738 n.1 (1986) (Stevens, Marshall, JJ., concurring) (Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase’s “impeachment”

for not “respect[ing] the law” (the Sedition Act) when

persecuting government critics); Cammer v. United

States, 350 U.S. 399, 406 (1956) (federal Judge Peck’s

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“impeachment” for jailing lawyer and suspending

“right to practice” law for mere “published criticism of ”

judge’s “opinion”).

Many lessons of history teach that labels often

lead to overconfidence, laziness and obvious falsehoods

by those who would undermine the freedom of expression.

V.

Government Must Prove Each Fact Material

to Showing Clear and Present Danger Before Punishing Speech.

Even today, in the minds of far too many lawyers,

judges and legal commentators, Blackstone and English common law continue to strangle the freedom of

expression. But “one of the objects of the Revolution

was to get rid of the English common law” abridging

Americans’ “liberty of speech” and “press.” Bridges, 314

U.S. at 264. See id. at 263:

What finally emerge[d with] the ‘clear and

present danger’ cases is [the] principle that

the [government must prove a] substantive

evil [that is] extremely serious and [a] degree

of imminence [that is] extremely high before

utterances can be punished.

Such a rule does “no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First

Amendment” speaks “explicit[ly]” and “[un]equivocally” and “prohibits any law” that “abridg[es] the freedom of speech” or “press,” which “must be taken as a

command of the broadest scope that” such “language,

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read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.” Id. (emphasis added).

There is no reason “that criminal” offensivespeech laws (such as are at issue here) “serve interests

distinct from those secured by civil” offensive-speech

“laws, and therefore should not be subject to the same

limitations.” Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67. Regardless of

“whether the use” of “laws” is “civil or criminal,” the

Constitution controls, and “constitutional limitations

protecting freedom of expression” govern. Id. n.3.

“Whether” the “law be civil or criminal, it must satisfy

relevant constitutional standards.” Id. “What [this

Court] said” of “civil” offensive-speech “law” necessarily “applies equally to” any “criminal” offensivespeech “rule.” Id. at 74.

In Counterman’s case (and in so-called attorney

discipline cases) the government’s explicit or implicit

“rejection of ” or disregard for “the clear-and-presentdanger standard as irrelevant,” especially when “coupled with the absence of any limitation in the statute

itself to speech calculated to cause” a public harm necessarily “leads” to the conclusion that a restriction on

speech “is not” constitutionally “narrowly drawn.” Id.

at 70 (emphasis added).

It should go “without saying that penal sanctions

cannot be justified merely by the fact that” speech is

merely “damaging to a person in ways that entitle” a

“person” to “civil” relief; “criminal law” must be “reserve[d]” for “behavior” that is “harmful” to or

26

“exceptionally disturbs the community’s sense of security.” Id. at 69-70 (quoting ALI Reports).

The community’s “preference for” a “civil remedy”

for personal harm means “it can hardly be urged that”

the community’s security “requires a criminal prosecution” for Counterman’s speech merely because a public

figure purportedly was somewhat fearful. Id. at 69.

That is especially true when the public figure proved

any such fear was fairly insignificant (and Colorado

failed to prove punishment was necessary). She chose

to refrain from protecting herself by even serving the

protective order that she already obtained or even instructing or asking Counterman to cease communicating with her.

“Any variation from” the “opinion” people hold

“may inspire fear. Any word spoken” that “deviates

from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.” Tinker v. Des Moines

Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503,

508 (1969). “But our Constitution says we must take

this risk,” and “our history says that it is this sort of

hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the

basis of our national strength and of the independence

and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this

relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.” Id.

at 508-509. “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or

apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome

the right to freedom of expression.” Id. at 508.

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VI. The Constitution Requires Proof of a Clear

and Present Danger.

The Constitution stands in striking contrast with

the abominable common-law history of repressing expression. This Nation and the federal government were

constituted to establish and ensure that all public officials are public servants. None have the power to deprive the People of any “Privileges” or “Immunities of

Citizens,” and all must “guarantee” all Americans a

“Republican Form of Government.” U.S. Const. Art. IV.

“No Title of Nobility” may “be granted by the United

States.” Art. I, §9. “No State” may “grant any Title of

Nobility.” Id., §10.

Relevant to this case, the “Constitution, and” federal “Laws” that are “made in Pursuance” of the “Constitution” are “the supreme Law of the Land,” and all

“Judges in every State” are “bound thereby” despite

“any Thing” to “the Contrary” in any other purported

source of authority. Art. VI. Moreover, “all [state and

federal] executive and judicial Officers” are “bound,”

not merely to comply with, but to “support this Constitution.” Art. VI.

No state” employee whatsoever may “make or enforce any law” that “abridge[s]” any “privileges or immunities” of American “citizens” or “deprive any

person” of any “liberty” or “property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person” essentially “equal

protection of the laws.” Amend. XIV, §1.

“[I]t must be remembered that” all “courts” and all

“legislatures” must be “guardians of the liberties and

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welfare of the people.” Mo., K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194

U.S. 267, 270 (1904). No state or federal court or legislature may make any law “abridging” the “freedom of

speech” and “press.” U.S. Const. Amend. I.

VII.

The 1776 Declaration Constituted the U.S.

and Declared the Nation’s Constitution.

The primary issue here is not merely one individual’s right to speak and publish. It is the most fundamental aspect of America’s constitution and the

Constitution: the right and power of the People to selfgovern, i.e., the People’s power to create—and the fact

that they did create—government for the people. That

fact is explicit in parts of the Constitution. See U.S.

Const. Preamble, Amend. X. It is implicit in much more

of the Constitution. And it was stated even more emphatically in the Declaration of Independence.

The power “to decide” America’s “political constitutions” was “reserved to the people” in 1776, so in

1787 the Founders “called upon” the People “to deliberate on” another “new Constitution.” The Federalist

No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (https://guides.loc.gov/

federalist-papers/full-text). People, “by their conduct

and example,” decide “the important question” of how

to establish “good government.” Id. Then as now, “the

most formidable” opposition to “the new Constitution”

came from men who “resist all change” that would diminish “the power” or “consequence” of their “offices”

or motivated by “perverted ambition.” Id. at 4.

29

“Justice is the [objective] of government” and “civil

society,” and it “ever has been and ever will be pursued

until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.” Id. By declaring the sovereignty of the People,

the Constitution’s Preamble provided “better recognition of popular rights” than any mere “bills of rights.”

The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)

(https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text).

The first statement constituting the United States

and stating America’s constitution (truly America’s

first written constitution) was a document known by a

different name. But labels and names (especially in

government) often are misleading.

In 1776, “Congress” hurriedly constituted the

“united States” and declared America’s constitution.

Declaration of Independence of 1776 ¶32. “[T]he Representatives of the united States of America,” i.e.,

“Congress,” under the “Authority of ” the “People” (of

the “united States of America”) did “declare, That these

United Colonies” have the “Power to levy War, conclude

Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce.” Id.

“[F]or the support of ” that “Declaration” 56 members of Congress personally “pledge[d]” their and their

families’ “Lives,” “Fortunes” and “sacred Honor.” Id.

Fifty-six men speaking as the “Congress” of and for the

“People” of the “united States of America” declared

“War” on “Great Britain.” Id. Nearly all were prominent lawyers, legislators or merchants. Nearly all were

serious students of serious law and true government.

All knew their “Lives,” “Fortunes” and “Honor” were

30

forfeit if they failed; yet, all courageously signed. They

signed as “Congress” for the “united States.” Id. In doing so, they signed a contract with the “People” who

had the “Power” to wage “War” to secure the “united

States” (as well as the signers’ own “Lives,” “Fortunes”

and “Honor”). Id.

Some of America’s most prominent, prosperous

people and profound thinkers pledged and did what

they did in 1776 to constitute America and declare

America’s bold new political constitution. They stated

and demonstrated America’s constitution and the

judgment of Congress: “We hold” that “all men are created equal” and equally “endowed” with “unalienable

Rights,” including “the Right of the People to alter” or

“abolish” any aspect or even “any Form of Government”

to secure their “Life, Liberty” and “pursuit of Happiness.” Id. ¶2. Moreover, when government “abuses and

usurpations” evidence “Despotism,” the People have

the “right” and “duty, to throw off such Government,

and to provide new Guards for their future security.”

Id.

The 1776 Declaration declared rights, grievances,

independence, war and America’s constitution. It declared and constituted a nation founded on equality of

people who possessed and exercised the power to create and secure the nation. To the People (for their

service, sacrifices and suffering), the Declaration

promised a life of liberty from the tyranny of government and the opportunity to pursue individual happiness. The Constitution delivered on Congress’s 1776

promises and contract. See U.S. Const. Amends. I, V, IX,

31

X, XIII-XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. “We the People” constituted this Nation and “establish[ed]” (and repeatedly

amended) the “Constitution” specifically to “establish

Justice” and “secure the Blessings of Liberty.” U.S.

Const. Preamble.

The Declaration and the Constitution constitute

strong historical evidence of the purpose of, and the

meaning of the text of, the other document. The Federalist Papers serve the same purpose for the relevant

aspects of the Declaration as for the Constitution.

VIII. The Constitution Protects People from

Each Other.

When the Founders wrote the Constitution, they

constituted this Nation and described America’s constitution, i.e., “the genius” of “America.” The Federalist

No. 63 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton)

(https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text).

They protected against “misguided people” using

“iniquitous measures” to bring about “calamities.” Id.

They protected people and this Nation from “people”

being “subject to the infection of violent passions” and

“the danger of ” their “combining in pursuit of unjust

measures.” Id. They guarded against “the people” being

“stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit

advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations

of interested men” to “call for measures which they

themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.” Id. They did so to prevent the “bitter anguish” of “the people of Athens” because “their

32

government” and constitution “contained” no comparable “safeguard against the tyranny of ” the People’s

“own passions.” Id.

They did so to ensure that in “these critical moments,” more than one “temperate and respectable

body of citizens” ensures “salutary” and essential “interference” to “check the misguided career, and to

suspend the blow meditated by the people against

themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain

their authority over the public mind.” Id. “[S]uch an

institution” is “sometimes necessary as a defense to the

people against their own temporary errors and delusions.” Id.

“Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be

limited to objects within the power” given, “and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that

power.” Id. “The people can never wilfully betray their

own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by

the representatives of the people.” Id.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

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CONCLUSION

The history of this case should be a source of great

concern, not only for the people of Colorado, but for the

legal profession, the judiciary and the people of America. The future of this case should be a source of pride

and enlightenment.

Criminal prosecutions propped up by purported

fear of mere offensive speech promote a dangerous tyranny of the timid. The fear used to convict Counterman

is frighteningly reminiscent of the fear that fed some

of the most evil adjudications in U.S. and world history.

The power of public officials and public figures (including people who see themselves as “influencers”) to procure criminal prosecutions and convictions for mere

offensive or unpopular speech (or people) is frighteningly similar to those who fueled seditious libel and

witch trials, inquisitions, red scares and Reigns of Terror.

History highlights that sometimes courts’ view of

history regarding fundamental rights is dangerously

myopic. Far too often for far too long, some of the most

precious rights of the People were not defined or defended by judges or legislators. See generally, Solomon,

Revolutionary Dissent. Far too often, courts’ conduct—

writing produced by judges—has obscured, rather

than illuminated, fundamental rights (and egregious

wrongs). The history of First Amendment rights and

freedoms and the repression thereof provide important

illustrations. See id. Others include Dred Scott and the

Slaughter House Cases.

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Americans’ freedom to speak and publish was created, defined and fought for primarily directly by the

People, not judges or legislators. See id. For generations, the People, including lawyers, juries, defendants,

popular assemblies and the entire Continental Army

fought for the freedom of speech and press against

judges, governors, the King and even Parliament. See

id. For that reason no public servant may abridge “the

freedom of speech” and “press” or “the right of the people peaceably to assemble” or “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” against public

servants violating their public duties. U.S. Const.

Amend. I.

Far too often in cases pertaining to First Amendment rights and freedoms, judges egregiously fail the

People and the Constitution. They fail to state or discuss the plain text and plain purpose of the Constitution and some of the most relevant law. They avoid

disciplined thought and analysis of the Constitution,

the law, and this Court’s precedent. They resort to

mere labels or conclusory contentions. They claim entitlement to great and powerful trust, confidence or

presumptions, all favoring and facilitating abuses of

their power and diminution or elimination of the People’s power to self-govern.

This Court must speak strongly to counter the cacophony of judges and attorneys who, over many generations, have intimidated or conned Americans into

forsaking or abandoning “the freedom of speech” and

“press.” U.S. Const. Amend. I. Such freedoms (and

judges, lawyers, juries and publicists who exercise

35

and defend them) are foremost among Americans’ vital weapons and warriors securing Americans’ selfgovernment and self-defense. They are of vastly

greater importance to this Nation’s greatness (past,

present and potential) than the right of self-defense

acknowledged in the Second Amendment.

Mock trials and terrorizing punishments insidiously steal from the arsenal of democracy the People’s

sharpest swords and strongest shields, their best defense against deceitful, dangerous purported servants

scheming to overthrow and brutally oppress the sovereign. The confidence games being played on the People

by political figures demanding confidence in themselves and punishing speech that merely threatens

such confidence are among the most dangerous games

in America today. The sad and sickening truth is that

too many judges and government attorneys play such

an evil confidence game precisely to perpetuate the

Star Chamber’s reign of terror. Everyone should be required to play by the same rules, all conforming to the

Constitution. Every aspect of government should be

consistent with the pillars of America’s Constitution:

a strong union and a strong people, each fortified by

equality of civil and political rights.

Respectfully submitted,

JACK JORDAN

Counsel of Record

3102 Howell Street

North Kansas City, Missouri 64116

jack.jordan@emobilawyer.com

(816) 853-1142