Amicus Curiae Brief — Relentless, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Department of Commerce, et al.

No. 22-1219

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL.,

v.

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION AND

THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM INSTITUTE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Braden H. Boucek

Kimberly S. Hermann

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL

FOUNDATION

560 W. Crossville Rd.

Suite 104

Roswell, GA 30075

(770) 977-2131

Donald A. Daugherty, Jr.

DEFENSE OF FREEDOM

INSTITUTE

1455 Pennsylvania. Ave.,

NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20004

(414) 559-6902

November 27, 2023

Thomas R. McCarthy

Counsel of Record

Tiffany H. Bates

ANTONIN SCALIA LAW

SCHOOL

SUPREME COURT CLINIC

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

1600 Wilson Boulevard

Suite 700

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 243-9423

tom@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................. 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 5

I.

Allowing agencies to evade congressional

appropriations and pass off enforcement costs

to regulated parties violates the separation of

powers.................................................................. 5

II. The Court should adopt a discretion-limiting

reading of the phrase “necessary and

appropriate” in the MSA..................................... 9

A. The courts below misinterpreted the

MSA’s “necessary and appropriate”

language. ....................................................... 9

B. A discretion-limiting interpretation of

“necessary and appropriate” is more

textually sound. .......................................... 11

C. To the extent ambiguity exists, the

constitutional-avoidance canon demands

a discretion-limiting construction. ............. 13

III. The Court should overrule Chevron. ................ 15

A. Chevron violates the separation of powers. . 16

B.

Chevron violates basic due process

principles. ................................................... 19

CONCLUSION ........................................................ 23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

295 U.S. 495 (1935) .......................................... 14

Buffington v. McDonough,

143 S. Ct. 14 (2022) .................. 17, 20, 21, 22, 23

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .................................. 15

Clinton v. City of N.Y.,

524 U.S. 417 (1998) .................................... 16, 19

Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. Railroads,

575 U.S. 43 (2015) ...................................... 18, 19

Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth.,

851 F.3d 263 (3d. Cir. 2017)......................... 4, 23

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477 (2010) .......................................... 19

Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67 (1972) ............................................ 22

Goethel v. Pritzker,

2016 WL 4076831 (D.N.H. July 29, 2016) ....... 10

Goldberg v. Kelly,

397 U.S. 254 (1970) .......................................... 20

Gundy v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ...................................... 13

Guthrie v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n,

111 Wis. 2d 447 (1983) ..................................... 20

iii

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,

834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016) ........................ 19

Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder,

707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) .......................... 17

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.

American Petroleum Institute,

448 U.S. 607 (1980) .......................................... 14

Kennedy v. Butler Fin. Sols., LLC,

2009 WL 290471 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2009) ......... 18

Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ........................................ 1

Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v.

Raimondo, 45 F.4th 359

(D.C. Cir. 2022)....................... 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803) .............................................. 17

Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens

for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,

501 U.S. 252 (1991) .......................................... 16

Mexican Gulf Fishing Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Com., 60 F.4th 956 (5th Cir. 2023) ...... 11, 12, 15

Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743 (2015) .......................................... 11

Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361 (1989) .......................................... 13

Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X

Internet Servs.,

545 U.S. 967 (2005) ...................................... 4, 18

iv

N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC v. SEC,

962 F.3d 541 (D.C. Cir. 2020) .......................... 12

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def.,

138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) .......................................... 1

Olivas-Motta,

746 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2013) ............................ 12

Padilla-Caldera v. Holder,

637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) ........................ 18

PHH Corp. v. CFPB,

881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ............................ 19

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB,

140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) ................................ 16, 19

Serono Lab’ys, Inc. v. Shalala,

158 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ........................ 21

Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue,

382 Wis. 2d 496 (2018) ..................................... 22

U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth.,

665 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ...................... 6, 8

United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson

Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909) ................................... 13

United States v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc.,

310 U.S. 534 (1940) .......................................... 17

United States v. Havis,

907 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2018) ............................ 21

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ............................................ 1

Wayman v. Southard,

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) ............................ 13

v

Whitman v. Am. Truckers Ass’n, Inc.,

531 U.S. 457 (2001) .......................................... 14

Williams v. Pennsylvania,

579 U.S. 1 (2016) .............................................. 22

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

U.S. Const., Article I § 9............................................. 6

U.S. Const., Article III § 1........................................ 16

16 U.S.C. § 1801 ....................................................... 10

16 U.S.C. § 1853 ....................................................... 10

31 U.S.C. § 1341 ......................................................... 5

31 U.S.C. § 3302 ......................................................... 5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the

Constitution of the United States (1833) .......... 8

A. Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference

to Executive Interpretation,

126 Yale L. J. 908 (2017).................................. 20

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law

(2012) ................................................................ 13

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory

Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118

(2016) ................................................................ 23

Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After

Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990) ......... 17

Kate Stith, Appropriations Clause,

Nat’l Const. Ctr .................................................. 6

vi

Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse,

97 Yale L.J. 1343 (1988)............................. 3, 8, 9

Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law

(2d ed. 1988)…………………..………………….7

New Oxford American Dictionary (Angus

Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds.,

3rd ed. 2010) ..................................................... 12

Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias,

84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (2016) ...... 19, 20, 21

Sean M. Stiff, Congress’s Power Over

Appropriations: Constitutional and

Statutory Provisions, Cong. Research

Serv., R46417 (June 16, 2020) ........................... 7

The Federalist No. 10 ............................................... 22

The Federalist No. 47 ............................................... 16

The Federalist No. 51 ............................................... 18

The Federalist No. 58 ................................................. 6

The Federalist No. 78 ......................................... 16, 19

Todd Garvey & Daniel J. Sheffner, Congress’s

Authority to Influence and Control

Executive Branch Agencies, Cong. Research

Serv., R45442 (May 12, 2021) ............................ 7

U.S. Jud. Conduct Code, Canons 1, 3 ...................... 21

Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions

and Separation of Powers,

71 Vand. L. Rev. 357 (2018) ............................... 8

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Southeastern Legal Foundation (SLF), founded in

1976, is a national nonprofit, public interest law firm

and policy center that advocates for constitutional

individual liberties, limited government, and free

enterprise in the courts of law and public opinion. In

particular, SLF advocates to protect individual rights

and the framework set forth to protect such rights in

the Constitution. This aspect of its advocacy is

reflected in the regular representation of parties

challenging government overreach and other actions

in violation of the constitutional framework. See, e.g.,

Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014),

and Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617

(2018). SLF also regularly files amicus curiae briefs

with this Court about issues of agency overreach and

deference. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400

(2019).

The Defense of Freedom Institute for Policy

Studies, Inc. (DFI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan

501(c)(3) institute dedicated to defending and

advancing freedom and opportunity for every

American family, student, entrepreneur, and worker,

and to protecting the civil and constitutional rights of

Americans at school and in the workplace. Founded in

1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for amici curiae

certifies that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by

counsel for any party and that no person or entity other than

amici curiae or its counsel has made a monetary contribution to

the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

2021 by former senior leaders of the U.S. Department

of Education who are experts in education law and

policy, DFI has a significant interest in challenging

administrative overreach by the Department. DFI’s

efforts in support of its mission include litigating

federal authority under the Constitution to take

actions through rulemaking or otherwise.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

OF THE ARGUMENT

For more than three decades, the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act

of 1976 (MSA) has authorized the National Marine

Fisheries Service to require commercial herring

fisherman to carry third-party monitors on board to

monitor their compliance with federal fishing

regulations. But when the agency ran out of money for

the monitors, it shifted the responsibility of paying for

them (an estimated $710 per day) to the fishermen

themselves. In doing so, the agency evaded Congress’s

power over the purse and its concomitant ability to

limit agency programming through appropriations.

That scheme violates the separation of powers. The

power of the purse is an important check on federal

agencies. And “absent express statutory authority …

agencies can only spend as much money as Congress

appropriates.” Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v.

Raimondo, 45 F.4th 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2022), cert.

granted in part sub nom. Loper Bright Enterprises v.

Raimondo, No. 22-451, 2023 WL 3158352 (U.S. May

1, 2023) (Walker, J., dissenting). They may not “resort

to nonappropriation financing” without express

3

authority to do so. Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the

Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1356 (1988). If an agency

“could avoid limitations imposed by Congress in

appropriations

legislation[]

by

independently

financing its activities,” it “would vitiate the

foundational Constitutional decision to empower

Congress to determine what actions shall be

undertaken in the name of the United States.” Id. Yet

the Fisheries Service “attempted a workaround” of

those constraints here. Loper Bright, 45 F.4th at 373

(Walker, J., dissenting). The Court should not allow it.

Further, the Court should resolve the meaning of

the phrase “necessary and appropriate,” which has

divided the lower courts. In determining that

industry-funded monitors are “necessary and

appropriate” under the MSA, the courts below gave

that provision a meaning that is far too broad and

allowed the agency to expand its power and ignore the

costs that the program imposed on fishermen. In the

MSA and other statutes, “necessary and appropriate”

is most naturally read as a discretion-limiting

provision. But even if the phrase was not clear, any

ambiguity should be read narrowly to avoid serious

constitutional questions about the breadth of the

MSA’s delegation.

Finally, Amici agree with Petitioners that the

Court should overrule Chevron. Chevron requires

courts to uphold an agency’s interpretation of a

statute—even if not the best interpretation—so long

as that interpretation is reasonable. This approach

forces courts to defer to agencies on questions of law,

thus requiring the judiciary to shirk its duty to say

4

what the law is. Time and again, Chevron forces

judges to uphold interpretations that they believe are

wrong. Indeed, “Chevron teaches that a court’s opinion

as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an

agency is charged with administering is not

authoritative.” Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.

Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005). In

short, Chevron takes judicial power from the courts

and vests it in the administrative agencies in direct

violation of the separation of powers.

Chevron also violates bedrock principles of due

process.

Among

other

concerns,

Chevron

systematically tips the scales in the government’s

favor, allows an agency to act as its own judge, and

deprives non-agency parties of fair notice. That

scheme is incompatible with the Constitution’s most

fundamental safeguards. Indeed, it is “contrary to the

roles assigned to the separate branches of

government” and “require[s] [judges] at times to lay

aside fairness and [their] own best judgment and

instead bow to the nation’s most powerful litigant, the

government, for no reason other than that it is the

government.” Egan v. Delaware River Port Auth., 851

F.3d 263, 278 (3d. Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in

the judgment).

The Court should reverse the decision below.

5

ARGUMENT

I.

Allowing agencies to evade congressional

appropriations and pass off enforcement

costs to regulated parties violates the

separation of powers.

For at least the last decade, “the Fisheries Service

has had trouble affording its preferred monitoring

programs with just its congressionally appropriated

funds.” The level of funding Congress set presented a

practical problem for the agency. “[A]bsent express

statutory authority … agencies can only spend as

much money as Congress appropriates.” Id.; see e.g.,

31 U.S.C. §1341(a)(1) (“An officer or employee of the

United States Government or of the District of

Columbia government may not— (A) make or

authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an

amount available in an appropriation or fund for the

expenditure or obligation”). And “Congress generally

prohibits an agency from collecting fees and keeping

the money from those fees for the agency’s own

purposes.” Loper Bright, 45 F.4th at 373 (Walker, J.,

dissenting); see 31 U.S.C. §3302(b) (barring agencies

from collecting fees and keeping that money to fund

the agency itself; and requiring government officials

“receiving money … from any source” to “deposit the

money in the Treasury as soon as practicable” unless

Congress establishes an exception).

Rather than seek additional funding from

Congress, the Fisheries Service “attempted a

workaround.” Loper Bright, 45 F.4th at 373 (Walker,

J., dissenting). “It decided to make fishing

6

companies,” like Petitioner Relentless, Inc., “hire and

pay for their own at-sea monitors.” Id. Fisheries

asserted this power despite acknowledging that it was

controversial and “highly sensitive.” Loper Bright,

CADC App. 293. It simply classified the burden of

contracting $700 a day third-party monitors as a

reasonable “compliance cost,” thereby evading

Congress’s power of the purse. App. 13a. By

interpreting the Magnuson-Stevens Act to allow the

agency to circumvent Congressional authority, this

scheme raises violates the separation of powers.

“Congress’s ‘power of the purse’ is at the

foundation of our Constitution’s separation of powers,

a constitutionally mandated check on Executive

power.” Kate Stith, Appropriations Clause, Nat’l

Const. Ctr., perma.cc/T7EW-S5BM; see U.S. Const.

art. I, §9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the

Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made

by Law”). Indeed, the Founders intended

Congressional power of the purse to be a key

structural curb on executive authority. See The

Federalist No. 58 (J. Madison) (“This power over the

purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete

and effectual weapon with which any constitution can

arm the immediate representatives of the people, for

obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for

carrying into effect every just and salutary

measure.”). And it remains a “bulwark of the

Constitution’s separation of powers among the three

branches of the National Government.” U.S. Dep’t of

Navy v. Fed. Lab. Rel. Auth., 665 F.3d 1339, 1347

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (Kavanaugh, J.).

7

For decades, however, executive agencies abused

the appropriations process. See Sean M. Stiff,

Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional

and Statutory Provisions, Cong. Research Serv.,

R46417, 2 (June 16, 2020) (“Agencies augmented their

own budgets by retaining and using public money;

obligated an appropriation beyond its purpose;

wrested greater funding from Congress by spending

all that Congress had appropriated previously or

obligated for purposes not permitted by the

appropriation; and refused to obligate funds to

advance policies with which a President disagreed.”).

In response, “Congress adopted a series of generally

applicable ‘fiscal control’ statutes designed to” reclaim

its power over appropriations and to “tighten its hold

on the purse strings.” Id.

Today, the power of the purse remains an

important check on federal agencies. Indeed, it

remains one of the few practical checks on

overregulation. “Congress exercises virtually plenary

control over agency funding.” Todd Garvey & Daniel

J. Sheffner, Congress’s Authority to Influence and

Control Executive Branch Agencies, Cong. Research

Serv., R45442, 14 (May 12, 2021). And this power “can

be used to control agency priorities, prohibit agency

action by denying funds for a specific action, or force

agency action by either explicitly appropriating funds

for a program or activity or withholding agency

funding until Congress’s wishes are complied with.”

Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, American

Constitutional Law 221-22 (2d ed. 1988) (“Congress

may simply refuse to appropriate funds for policies it

8

deems unsound.”). This power is a particularly potent

tool for Congress because, unlike legislation, a

President cannot veto the absence of an appropriation.

See Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and

Separation of Powers, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 357, 367-68

(2018) (“Congress has ensured that presidents must

always come back every year seeking money just to

keep the government’s lights on.”); U.S. Dep’t of Navy,

665 F.3d at 1347 (Kavanaugh, J.) (Congress’s

appropriations power “is particularly important as a

restraint on Executive Branch officers.”).

Yet the “attempted [] workaround” here, Loper

Bright, 45 F.4th at 373 (Walker, J., dissenting), allows

the agency to independently fund its operations

without congressional authorization. That scheme

undercuts the constitutional safeguards provided by

the congressional appropriations process. See Stith,

Congress’ Power of the Purse, supra, 1356.

Under the government’s theory, any agency could

evade congressional oversight by designing a

regulatory program that simply transferred the

agency’s costs directly on regulated parties. See Dep’t

of Navy, 665 F.3d at 1347 (Kavanaugh, J.) (quoting 3

Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of

the United States, §1342, at 213-14 (1833)) (“If not for

the Appropriations Clause, ‘the executive would

possess an unbounded power over the public purse of

the nation.’”). Indeed, as Judge Walker recognized in

a related case, the agency’s theory could allow it—or

other agencies—to evade congressional oversight

altogether. Loper Bright, 45 F.4th at 373 (Walker, J.,

9

dissenting) (“[W]hat if Congress were to entirely

defund the compliance mechanisms of the Fisheries

Service—could the agency continue to operate by

requiring the industry to fund [the agency]? That …

could undermine Congress’s power of the purse.”).

That theory would fundamentally undermine the

separation of powers.

At bottom, “[f]ederal agencies may not resort to

nonappropriation financing.” Stith, Congress’ Power of

the Purse, supra, 1356. “[T]heir activities are

authorized only to the extent of their appropriations.”

Id. Fisheries’ imposition of costs on regulated entities

to fund its regulatory priorities thus violates the

separation of powers.

II. The Court should adopt a discretionlimiting reading of the phrase “necessary

and appropriate” in the MSA.

A. The courts below misinterpreted the

MSA’s “necessary and appropriate”

language.

In determining that industry-funded monitors are

“necessary and appropriate” under the MSA, the

courts below gave that provision meaning that

impermissibly intrudes upon Congress’s power of the

purse and imposes intolerably high costs on regulated

fishermen. The agency itself estimated that it would

cost fisherman $710 dollars a day—“an amount that

can exceed the profits from a day’s fishing.” Pet. 2.

The Fisheries Service sought to justify its program

under its authority to implement comprehensive

10

fishery management programs. See 16 U.S.C.

§1801(a)(6). The law directs regional fisheries

councils—like the New England Fishery Management

Council—to create and implement these plans within

certain defined limits. Id. §1853. And section 1853(b)

specifies the areas in which the fishery management

programs may permissibly regulate. That subsection

ends with a catchall provision that authorizes

measures that are “necessary and appropriate” to

conserve the fishery. Id. §1853(b)(14). Because the

MSA does not explicitly authorize the New England

Council’s industry-funded monitoring scheme, the

Council simply asserted authority under the

“necessary and appropriate” language in §1853 to pass

off the agency’s monitoring costs to the fishermen

themselves.

The courts below ignored the grave separation

powers concerns of the Fisheries Service’s

nonappropriation financing. In the district court’s

view, the agency “reasonably concluded that industry

monitored funding was necessary and appropriate to

effectuate the goals of the Atlantic herring fishery

management plan and the MSA.” App. 64a-65a. And

the First Circuit tacitly accepted this reading without

conducting its own inquiry into the meaning of the

phrase. See App. 13a. Instead, it relied on Goethel v.

Pritzker, No. 15-CV497-JL, 2016 WL 4076831 *4

(D.N.H. July 29, 2016), which interpreted the

language

“necessary

and

appropriate”

as

“augment[ing] whatever existing powers have been

conferred on [the agency] by Congress.”

11

That decision flies in the face of this Court’s

interpretation of similar language. In Michigan v.

EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015), this Court held that a

“necessary and appropriate” clause in the Clean Air

Act requires an agency to weigh the various, contextsensitive factors that inform sound policy. This almost

always requires “some attention to cost,” because

Congress tasks agencies with promulgating policy

under conditions of scarcity. See id. at 752. Put simply,

“necessary and appropriate” clauses are one way that

Congress expresses its view that promulgating highcost, low-return policies is “[not] rational, never mind

‘appropriate.’” Id.

The First Circuit did not so much as cite

Michigan, let alone acknowledge that it might cabin

the Council’s discretion. Further, it failed to analyze

the reasonableness or “necessary and appropriate”

nature of this regulation, and in doing so allowed the

agency to ignore the cost of the regulation. It did this

even though the agency initially estimated that the

program would cost each regulated fisherman $710

dollars a day. Pet. 2. Asked to account for actual costs

during the course of litigation, the agency could not do

so. Instead, the court below speculated the costs would

not be as high as the regulation initially estimated.

App. 15a n.5.

B. A discretion-limiting interpretation of

“necessary and appropriate” is more

textually sound.

Though the circuits are split on the issue, see

Mexican Gulf Fishing Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 60

12

F.4th 956, 965 (5th Cir. 2023); Loper Bright, 45 F.4th

at 366, the better reading of “necessary and

appropriate” is discretion-limiting. In the MSA and

other statutes, “necessary and appropriate” is most

naturally read as a discretion-limiting provision.

“Necessary” does not encompass all possible actions.

Rather, it extends only to those that are “needed” or

“essential.” New Oxford American Dictionary 1170

(Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3rd

ed. 2010). The word “appropriate” characterizes

actions that are “suitable or proper in the

circumstances.” Id. at 77. Taken together, these words

cabin discretion by requiring the agency to “spell out

the need for any proposed rule and its potential

drawbacks.” N.Y. Stock Exch. LLC v. SEC, 962 F.3d

541, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Pillard, J., concurring).

Thus, the most textually sound reading of “necessary

and appropriate” is the reading that requires agencies

to weigh the costs and benefits of a particular policy

before promulgating it. See, e.g., Mexican Gulf, 60

F.4th at 965 (“[T]he adjectives necessary and

appropriate limit the authorization contained in this

provision.”) (emphasis in original). Moreover, because

“necessary and appropriate” clauses are discretion

limiting

and

“require[]

necessity

and

appropriateness,” they do not grant independent

authority to promulgate rules not otherwise permitted

by the statute. Olivas-Motta, 746 F.3d 908, 918 (9th

Cir. 2013) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).

13

C. To the extent ambiguity exists, the

constitutional-avoidance canon demands

a discretion-limiting construction.

Even if there was some ambiguity about how to

interpret the MSA’s “necessary and appropriate”

clause, it should be resolved in favor of the narrower

interpretation to avoid raising serious constitutional

questions present here. United States ex rel. Att’y Gen.

v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)

(“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions,

by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional

questions arise and by the other of which such

questions are avoided, [this Court’s] duty is to adopt

the latter.”). Applying the constitutional-avoidance

canon is necessary because Fisheries’ reading of

“necessary and appropriate” “raise[s] serious

questions of constitutionality.” Antonin Scalia &

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 248 (2012).

A broad interpretation of “necessary and

appropriate” raises serious questions here concerning

congressional delegation of power. “Congress may not

transfer to another branch ‘powers which are strictly

and exclusively legislative.’” Gundy v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (quoting Wayman v.

Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825)).

Though the Court has seldom invoked the

nondelegation doctrine to invalidate statutes, the

doctrine often informs statutory construction. See,

e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7

(1989) (“[O]ur application of the nondelegation

doctrine principally has” consisted of “giving narrow

14

constructions to statutory delegations that might

otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”).

In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.

American Petroleum Institute, this Court held that the

phrase “necessary and appropriate” may raise

delegation problems. 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). In that

case, this Court interpreted §3(8) of the Occupation

Health and Safety Act, which granted OSHA the

authority to promulgate regulations “reasonably

necessary and appropriate” to ensure workplace

safety. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The Court adopted a

construction that cabined the Secretary’s discretion

because the alternative would constitute a “‘sweeping

delegation of legislative power’ that might be

unconstitutional.” Id. at 646 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter

Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539

(1935)). Concurring, Justice Powell explained that a

broad reading of “reasonably necessary and

appropriate” would require Congress to have

delegated an “irrational” amount of discretion to the

agency. Id. at 670 (Powell, J., concurring).

This Court’s logic in American Petroleum applies

with equal force here. The First Circuit’s reading of

“necessary and appropriate” lacks any clear

“intelligible principle” to guide agency action. See

Whitman v. Am. Truckers Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,

458 (2001) (holding that a congressional act of

delegation must “lay down an intelligible principle to

which the person or body authorized to act is directed

to conform”). It is not clear whether the court below

would deem anything outside the scope of the statute’s

“necessary and appropriate” language. A capacious

15

reading plausibly permits all sorts of peculiar

hypothetical regulations that have a tenuous link to

Congress’ intended scheme. E.g., Loper Bright, 45

F.4th at 377 (Walker, J., dissenting) (“Could the

agency require the fishermen to drive regulators to

their government offices if gas gets too expensive?”).

At a minimum, this raises the possibility of a

delegation issue.

Recently, the Fifth Circuit invoked the

constitutional-avoidance canon while construing this

very language in the MSA. In Mexican Gulf,

fishermen challenged a rule requiring covered fishing

vessels to install GPS trackers. Though the court

found the meaning of “necessary and appropriate” to

be sufficiently clear to adopt the narrow

interpretation, they “[a]dd[ed] belt to suspenders.”

App. 15a. Assuming in the alternative that the phrase

was vague, the court adopted the narrow

interpretation in any event because doing so avoided

a potential Fourth Amendment problem with the

challenged rule. Mexican Gulf, 60 F.4th at 966-67.

This Court should do the same if it finds that

“necessary and appropriate” is vague and adopt the

interpretation least likely to raise a constitutional

issue.

III.

The Court should overrule Chevron.

Finally, the Court should overrule Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837 (1984). Chevron violates the separation of powers

and basic principles of due process.

16

A. Chevron violates the separation of powers.

The separation of powers is an “essential

precaution in favor of liberty.” The Federalist No. 47

(J. Madison). Indeed, the “ultimate purpose” of the

separation of powers “is to protect the liberty and

security of the governed.” Metro. Washington Airports

Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,

501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991). But “[l]iberty is always at

stake when one or more of the branches seek to

transgress the separation of powers.” Clinton v. City

of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring). Because the “accumulation of all powers,

legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same

hands, … may justly be pronounced the very

definition of tyranny,” the Framers formed a

government that would keep those powers “separate

and distinct.” The Federalist No. 47, supra. They thus

adopted a Constitution that “set[] out three branches

and vest[ed] a different form of power in each—

legislative, executive, and judicial.” Seila Law LLC v.

CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2212 (2020) (Thomas, J.,

concurring in part).

Article III vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United

States” in the federal courts alone. That division of

power was intentional. The Framers believed that

“the general liberty of the people can never be

endangered … so long as the judiciary remains truly

distinct from both the legislative and executive.” The

Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton). But Chevron—which

often requires judges to defer to an agency’s judgment

on questions of law—reallocates considerable judicial

power to federal agencies.

17

When agencies interpret the law, they exercise

“[t]he judicial Power of the United States.” U.S.

Const., art. III, §1. “The interpretation of the meaning

of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is

exclusively a judicial function.” United States v. Am.

Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940). In the

familiar words of Chief Justice John Marshall, “[i]t is

emphatically the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is.” Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Yet Chevron forces

judges to shirk this duty. It is unsurprising, then, that

scholars have described Chevron deference as

“counter-Marbury.” Cass R. Sunstein, Law and

Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev.

2071, 2074-75 (1990). Under Chevron, judges do not

“say what the law is.” Instead, they pass off that task

to an agency, violating the separation of powers.

Chevron invites executive agencies to take on the

role of independent judges. It conflicts with the

“traditional rule that judges must exercise

independent judgment about the law’s meaning.”

Buffington v. McDonough, 143 S. Ct. 14, 17 (2022)

(Gorsuch, J.). And it instructs judges to “bypass[] any

independent review of the relevant statutes.” Id. at 14;

see, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081,

1087 (9th Cir. 2013) (“If the [agency’s] construction is

reasonable, we must accept that construction under

Chevron, even if we believe the agency’s reading is not

the best statutory interpretation.”). Yet neither

Congress nor the courts have constitutional authority

to transfer the judicial power to agencies. Indeed, the

“Vesting Clauses are exclusive” and “the branch in

18

which a power is vested may not give it up or

otherwise reallocate it.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of

Am. Railroads, 575 U.S. 43, 74 (2015) (Thomas, J.,

concurring in the judgment). The Framers “were

concerned not just with the starting allocation, but

with the ‘gradual concentration of the several powers

in the same department.’” Id. (quoting The Federalist

No. 51 (J. Madison)). On top of that, agency

bureaucrats—who are responsive to political

pressures, budgetary concerns, and potential

removal—make poor substitutes for independent

judges who enjoy tenure and salary protections.

Over and over, Chevron forces judges to uphold

interpretations that they believe are wrong. See, e.g.,

Kennedy v. Butler Fin. Sols., LLC, 2009 WL 290471,

at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 2009) (“The FTC’s regulation

strikes the Court as reasonable, though perhaps not

the best interpretation of the law.”). And sometimes

courts are required to uphold an interpretation that

they have previously rejected. See, e.g., PadillaCaldera v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1140, 1147-1152 (10th

Cir. 2011) (holding that under Chevron the court is

obligated

to

discard

its

earlier

statutory

interpretation

and

defer

to

the

agency’s

interpretation). In fact, “Chevron teaches that a

court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous

statute an agency is charged with administering is not

authoritative.” Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at

983.

Chevron thus shifts substantial power from the

judiciary to administrative agencies, disrupting the

19

Constitution’s careful allocation of power amongst the

three branches. From the start, the Framers

identified the judiciary as “the weakest of the three

departments of power.” The Federalist No. 78, supra.

But under Chevron, courts are made even weaker.

Indeed, Chevron effectively renders the judiciary a

rubber stamp for agencies that “wield[] vast power

and touch[] almost every aspect of daily life.” Free

Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.

477, 499 (2010). Such a scheme “‘pose[s] a significant

threat to individual liberty and to the constitutional

system of separation of powers and checks and

balances.’” Seila Law LLC, 140 S. Ct. at 2212

(Thomas, J., concurring in part) (quoting PHH Corp.

v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018)

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). “Abdication of

responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.”

Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

The Constitution simply does not contemplate such

“undifferentiated governmental power.” Ass’n of Am.

Railroads, 575 U.S. at 67 (Thomas, J., concurring in

judgment) (cleaned up).

B. Chevron violates basic due process principles.

Chevron also violates basic principles of due

process.

As

then-Judge

Gorsuch

observed,

“[t]ransferring the job of saying what the law is from

the judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites

the very sort of due process … concerns the framers

knew would arise if the political branches intruded on

judicial functions.” Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834

F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring); see also Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias,

20

84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187, 1239 (2016) (“Precedents

such as Chevron … require judges to give up their role

as judges and … violate the due process of law.”).

Among other problems, Chevron systematically tips

the scales in the government’s favor, allows agencies

to act as their own judge, and deprives non-agency

parties of fair notice.

To start, Chevron “introduce[s] into judicial

proceedings a ‘systematic bias toward one of the

parties.’” Buffington, 143 S. Ct. at 19 (Gorsuch, J.)

(quoting Hamburger, supra, 1212). But Americans

expect courts to “resolve disputes about their rights

and duties under law without fear or favor to any

party—the Executive Branch included.” Id. at 16

(citing A. Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to

Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L. J. 908, 987

(2017)). Indeed, the “minimal rudiment of due

process”

includes

a

fair

and

impartial

decisionmaker.” Guthrie v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n,

111 Wis. 2d 447, 453 (1983) (citing Goldberg v.

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).

But Chevron undermines the promise of a neutral

decisionmaker. Under Chevron, judges must abandon

their independent judgment and defer to an agency’s

interpretation of law. That means when judges defer

to these administrative interpretations, they often

simply “adopt[] the interpretation or legal position of

one of the parties.” Hamburger, supra, 1189. And they

must do so as long as the agency’s interpretation is

reasonable, “regardless [of] whether there may be

other reasonable, or even more reasonable, views.”

21

Serono Lab’ys, Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1321

(D.C. Cir. 1998). That necessarily produces

“systematically biased judgment[s]” in favor of one

party. Hamburger, supra, 1211.

In no other context does a court simply defer to

one of the parties. At least one federal judge has

suggested that such extreme deference may violate

judicial canons requiring independence. See United

States v. Havis, 907 F.3d 439, 451 n.1 (6th Cir. 2018)

(Thapar, J., concurring), rev’d en banc, 927 F.3d 382,

n.1 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f judges are predisposed to

defer when the government is involved, then that precommitment is ‘systemic bias.’ And that bias violates

both the first and third canon of judicial conduct. See

U.S. Jud. Conduct Code, Canon 1 (requiring an

independent judiciary for a just society); Canon 3

(requiring judges to recuse if a judge has a bias in

favor or against a party).”). Instead of recognizing the

judge as an impartial decisionmaker, Chevron

requires the judge to systematically favor one party.

And not just any party. This scheme favors the

federal government—“the most powerful of litigants.”

Buffington, 143 S. Ct. at 19 (Gorsuch, J.). Indeed,

Chevron gives the federal government an unfair

advantage by tipping the scales in its favor. See

Hamburger, supra, 1250. Such deference conflicts

with American courts’ historic commitment to “favor

individual liberty” and to construe certain ambiguities

in law “against the government and with lenity

toward affected persons.” Buffington, 143 S. Ct. at 19

(Gorsuch, J.).

22

Chevron also undermines due process because it

allows the agency to act as its own judge. “When an

administrative agency interprets and applies the law

in a case to which it is a party, it is to that extent

acting as judge of its own cause.” Tetra Tech EC, Inc.

v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 555, (2018).

But it is a “basic requirement of due process,”

Buffington, 143 S. Ct. at 19 (Gorsuch, J.), that “[n]o

man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,” The

Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison). As James Madison

explained, “a body of men are unfit to be both judges

and parties, at the same time,” because a man’s

“interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not

improbably, corrupt his integrity.” Id.; see also

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2016). And

“[i]t is entirely unrealistic to expect [an] agency to

function as a ‘fair and impartial decisionmaker’ as it

authoritatively tells the court how to interpret and

apply the law that will decide its case.” Tetra Tech EC,

Inc., 382 Wis. 2d at 556.

Finally, Chevron violates notions of fair notice.

The “central meaning of procedural due process” is the

“right to notice and an opportunity to be heard … at a

meaningful

time

and

in

a

meaningful

manner.” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).

Under a broad reading of Chevron, “[f]air notice gives

way to vast uncertainty.” Buffington, 143 S. Ct. at 20.

(Gorsuch, J.). Because agencies may shift from one

“reasonable” interpretation to another, “individuals

can never be sure of their legal rights and duties.” Id.

This uncertainty makes it difficult for individuals,

especially ordinary Americans, to structure their

23

personal affairs. They are simply “left to guess what

some executive official might ‘reasonably’ decree the

law to be today, tomorrow, next year, or after the next

election.” Id. And while “‘[e]very relevant actor may

agree’ that the agency’s latest interpretation is not the

best interpretation of the law, each new iteration still

‘carries the force of law.’” Id. (citing Brett M.

Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129

Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2151 (2016)). Allowing federal

agencies to shift the meaning of binding laws denies

Americans fair notice.

At bottom, Chevron is incompatible with the

Constitution’s most fundamental safeguards. It is

“contrary to the roles assigned to the separate

branches of government” and “require[s] [judges] at

times to lay aside fairness and [their] own best

judgment and instead bow to the nation’s most

powerful litigant, the government, for no reason other

than that it is the government.” Egan, 851 F.3d at 278

(Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court

should revisit Chevron and put an end to this

“atextual invention by courts.” Kavanaugh, 129 Harv.

L. Rev. at 2150.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should reverse the

decision below.

24

Respectfully submitted,

Braden H. Boucek

Kimberly S. Hermann

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL

FOUNDATION

560 W. Crossville Rd.

Suite 104

Roswell, GA 30075

(770) 977-2131

Donald A. Daugherty, Jr.

DEFENSE OF FREEDOM

INSTITUTE

1455 Pennsylvania. Ave.,

NW

Suite 400

Washington, DC 20004

(414) 559-6902

November 27, 2023

Thomas R. McCarthy

Counsel of Record

Tiffany H. Bates

ANTONIN SCALIA LAW SCHOOL

SUPREME COURT CLINIC

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

1600 Wilson Boulevard

Suite 700

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 243-9423

tom@consovoymccarthy.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae