Reply Brief — Relentless, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Department of Commerce, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 2, 2023

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No. 22-1219

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_________________________

RELENTLESS, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, et al.,

Respondents.

_________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

JOHN J. VECCHIONE

Counsel of Record

MARK S. CHENOWETH

KARA M. ROLLINS

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

1225 19th St. NW, Suite 450

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 869-5210

John.Vecchione@ncla.legal

October 2, 2023

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 1

I.THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI ON THE

SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED TOO .................. 1

A. What “Necessary and Appropriate” Means

in the MSA Is in Dispute in the Appellate

Courts ..........................................................1

1. Circuits Are Split on What “Necessary

and Appropriate” Means in the MSA .....2

2. The Court Has Not Addressed the MSA

in Two Generations .................................4

B. This Case Provides a Good Vehicle for

Addressing the Question Presented ...........7

II.THE CASE SHOULD AT LEAST BE HELD PENDING

THE DECISION IN LOPER BRIGHT ........................ 8

CONCLUSION ............................................................ 9

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Goethel v. Dept. of Commerce,

854 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2017) ....................................7

Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,

478 U.S. 221 (1986)..................................................4

Loper Bright Enters., Inc. v. Raimondo,

143 S.Ct. 2429 (2023)...............................................2

Mexican Gulf Fishing Co., v. Dep’t of Commerce,

60 F.4th 956 (5th Cir. 2023) .....................................6

Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743 (2015)..................................................3

Waithaka v. Amazon.com Inc.,

WL 7028945, slip op.

(W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2020) ....................................3

Statutes

16 U.S.C. § 1853 ..........................................................2

Other Authorities

Atlantic Highly Migratory Species,

NOAA Fisheries (last accessed Sept. 27, 2023) ......5

Fisheries Economics of the United States,

2020 Report,

NOAA Fisheries (Feb. 17, 2023) .............................5

1

ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI ON

THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED TOO

The Brief for Respondents devotes a paragraph to

the second question presented by Petitioners

requesting that certiorari not be granted to it. Resp.

Br. at 14. That question is: “Whether the phrase

‘necessary and appropriate’ in the Magnuson-Stevens

Act (“MSA”) augments agency power to force domestic

fishing vessels to contract with and pay the salaries of

federal observers they must carry.” Pet. Br. at ii. The

Respondents assert that the question does not meet

this Court’s traditional, though non-exhaustive,

criteria for granting certiorari. Id. As noted, both by

Petitioners and amici curiae, this is not so, and there

are other considerations not explicitly listed in Sup.

Ct. R. 10(a) that counsel such a grant. See Brief of

Amici Curiae the Southeastern Legal Foundation and

the Defense of Freedom Institute in Support of

Petitioners at 9-17.

A. What “Necessary and Appropriate” Means

in the MSA Is in Dispute in the Appellate

Courts

The Respondents’ blithe citation to Sup. Ct. R.

10(a) fails to recognize that there is a circuit split

regarding the meaning and application of the MSA’s

“necessary and appropriate” language. That circuit

split has arisen over the course of many years, and

many rules.

And a circuit split need not, as

2

Respondents’ narrow view of Sup. Ct. R. 10(a)

suggests, arise in an identical way to warrant this

Court’s discretionary grant of review. Indeed, the

split here is pressing precisely because the “necessary

and appropriate” language impacts all regulatory

actions approving or implementing MSA Fishery

Management Plans (“FMPs”). See 16 U.S.C.

§ 1853(a)(1)(A), 1853(b)(14). Respondents prolifically

regulate in this area. Since the beginning of this year,

Respondents have issued 125 final rules approving or

implementing various aspects of FMPs.1 While there

is no circuit split on the outcome of this exact rule

regarding at-sea monitors, there certainly is one on

what the words “necessary and appropriate” mean in

the statute at issue. Respondents also fail to note that

the Petitioners in Loper Bright Enters., Inc. v.

Raimondo, 143 S.Ct. 2429 (2023) did not claim that

there was a circuit split in their petition that this

Court has already accepted for review.2

1. Circuits Are Split on What “Necessary

and Appropriate” Means in the MSA

Respondents did not counter the cases cited by

Petitioners or by amici curiae demonstrating the

complete one-hundred-and-eighty-degree difference

This information is derived from a search of the Federal

Register’s database using its “Advanced Search” function for all

rules promulgated by the Department of Commerce in 2023 that

include the terms “Magnuson-Stevens Act” and “Fishery

Management Plan.”

2 As amici curiae in Loper Bright, Petitioners noted such a split.

1

3

between how “necessary and appropriate” is defined

in the MSA by the Fifth and First Circuits. Pet. Br.

at 32–34. This is an important federal question that

the Court should address, as how United States

fishermen are regulated is diverging due to the split.

The circuit split here is on an important question

of federal law on which the lower courts diverge, even

if the courts do not diverge on the outcome of the rule

or statute in question and in which the lower court

also diverged from the precedent of this court. See

Waithaka v. Amazon.com Inc., WL 7028945, slip op.

(W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2020) (noting that a circuit

diverging from Supreme Court precedent or other

circuits on a “broader question” than just the statute

at issue could allow grant of certiorari). In that case

the court was determining whether a stay was

appropriate given a petition for certiorari in this Court

and noted the many ways Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) functions.

In this case, not only is there a split between the

First and Fifth Circuits—at least, on what the words

“necessary and appropriate” mean in the making of

regulations—but the First Circuit has ignored this

Court’s explanation of those very words as taking into

account the cost of regulation. Cf. Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743 (2015) (not “appropriate” for a regulation

under the Clean Air Act to impose exorbitant costs for

marginal benefit) with App. 15a (“But the fact that

costs of complying with one regulatory requirement

are greater than the costs of complying with another

regulatory requirement does not mean that the former

is unlawful.”). The First Circuit went out of its way to

hold that costs don’t matter (failing to even mention

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the Fifth Circuit precedent cited to it on this point).

The First Circuit further rejected this Court’s ruling

on similar language in the Clean Air Act and, even

after requesting a 28(j) letter from Respondents on

what the costs were and receiving no answer, rejected

this Court’s guidance on what “appropriate” means.

Under Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), there is a clear split on

whether “necessary and appropriate” in the MSA

expands agency power so that all the other words in

the statute are meaningless, or whether it binds the

agency to some measure of rationality in regulation.

Worse, the First Circuit stating that costs do not

matter (as industry must always pay them) and

failing to address how this conclusion squares with

the “necessary and appropriate” language makes this

an ideal case to correct a straying circuit and realign

the MSA with the statute Congress wrote.

2. The Court Has Not Addressed the MSA in

Two Generations

Even were the conditions of Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) not

met, as they are here, other considerations would

weigh in favor of granting certiorari on question two.

These factors add impetus to the necessity for a grant

in this case. No current justice was a member of the

bench when the Court last substantively addressed

the MSA. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,

478 U.S. 221 (1986). Statutes can become encrusted

with bad rulings that, like barnacles, impede a law’s

proper function if not scraped off from time to time.

5

The MSA covers all domestic and foreign fishing in

American waters, which is an immense territory with

an enormous economic impact. Respondents report

that commercial and saltwater fishing in the United

States employed 1.7 million people, contributed 117

billion dollars in GDP, and 254 billion dollars in sales

impact in 2020. Fisheries Economics of the United

States, 2020 Report, NOAA Fisheries (Feb. 17, 2023).3

Yet for nearly 40 years the various appellate courts

have diverged in both their approach to Chevron

deference and their view of the meaning of the words

“necessary and appropriate.”

Respondents only dispute that there is a circuit

split on the narrow question of whether the agencies

can require industry to pay for at-sea monitors by

agency regulation in the face of the directives of the

MSA. They cannot claim that the First Circuit here,

with jurisdiction over the first and most storied of

American fisheries (and Puerto Rico), has not strayed

far afield in its interpretation of the MSA and the

power it allows regulators as compared to the Fifth

Circuit. For example, tuna are classified as a highly

migratory species (HMS) and travel between the

Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean

Sea.

Atlantic Highly Migratory Species, NOAA

Fisheries (last accessed Sept. 27, 2023).4 A tuna

fisherman in Puerto Rico challenging regulation of

3 https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/resource/document/fisheries-

economics-united-states-2020-report

4 https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/atlantic-highlymigratory-species

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tuna fishing that is subject to the MSA’s “necessary

and appropriate” standard is faced with a different

standard, particularly with regard to the costs the

fisherman must bear, as an identically situated

fisherman in the Gulf of Mexico who operates out of

the State of Louisiana. Same fish. Same occupation.

Same regulation. Different outcome because of the

circuit split. That lack of uniformity is detrimental to

fishery management and warrants this Court’s

review.

A fisherman in Puerto Rico bringing a challenge in

the First Circuit to a new MSA regulation is faced

with precedent in this case that: (1) Chevron, whether

step one or two, allows regulators to charge him for

employees who perform only service to the

government; (2) The “necessary and appropriate”

language of the MSA is expansive and that one

regulation costs more than another has no impact on

the lawfulness of that regulation; and (3) It is the

stated rule of the Circuit that all costs of regulation—

even the salaries of government functionaries

performing a federal duty—are assumed valid. App.

14a, 15a, 22a 50a–51a. Meanwhile, a fisherman off

the coast of Louisiana or Texas would find that the

words “necessary and appropriate” have meaning and

include an assessment of costs versus regulatory gain.

Mexican Gulf Fishing Co. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 60

F.4th 956, 965 (5th Cir. 2023).

Four decades of conflicting interpretations of the

same statute have obscured its meaning. This Court

should grant certiorari.

7

B. This Case Provides a Good Vehicle for

Addressing the Question Presented

The Respondent states, without citation, that the

First Circuit did not rely on the “necessary and

appropriate” language for its ruling. Resp. Br. at 14.

The First Circuit stated, “Because we agree with the

district court that the rule is a permissible exercise of

the agency’s authority and is otherwise lawful, we

affirm.” App. 3a. It is also clear that the First Circuit

did not do any analysis of the costs of the regulation

because it was unclear and, in any event, the costs of

the regulation did not matter to its lawfulness. App.

7a, 15a. The opinion below cited the language

“necessary and appropriate” at the very start of its

examination of the statute. App. 3a. Judge Kayatta

cited his own concurrence in Goethel v. Dept. of

Commerce, 854 F.3d 106, 117–118 (1st Cir. 2017), for

the proposition that all cost of regulation must be

borne by industry. App. at 13a. As noted in the Pet.

Br. at 31, that case and the district court it affirmed

stand for the First Circuit’s longstanding proposition

that the language “necessary and appropriate” in the

MSA provides broad powers that practically

supersede the necessity for exact statutory language

to provide regulatory power. Moreover, the district

court ruling that was affirmed in all respects by the

appellate court below relied not only on that language

for its ruling upholding the statute but cited the key

“necessary and appropriate” language twice and noted

the Respondents’ dependence on it. App. 37a, 43a.

Here, the First Circuit relied on its erroneous

holdings on the meaning of the MSA, buttressed by

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the key wrongful interpretation of the “necessary and

appropriate” language found in Goethel, that both

sides of the contest argued, and that forms the basis

of the second Question Presented. This case provides

a good vehicle for taking this important question

which affects an old, vibrant, and important portion of

the American economy and American life.

II.

THE CASE SHOULD AT LEAST BE HELD

PENDING THE DECISION IN LOPER BRIGHT

Respondents agree that the case should at least be

held awaiting the ruling in Loper Bright. Resp. Br. at

13. They claim delay should the cases be joined. It is

amusing that, in a brief supportive of Chevron

deference to agency interpretations of statutes, the

Respondents rely on facts stating that Congress has

determined not to fund any portion of the

promulgated rule! Resp. Br. at 6. On the Chevron

issue, the First Circuit made different errors

regarding Chevron than the D.C. Circuit did. The

Respondents make much of Petitioners’ successfully

opposing joinder at the district court level. But as the

opinions and findings in the cases reveal, the manner

of fishing done by the Petitioners here differs from

that of the Petitioners in Loper Bright. The Chevron

issues are the same, hence the identical first Question

Presented.

Whether the Court joins the cases or not, both the

Petitioners and Respondents have cited Relentless in

their Loper Bright briefing. If the Court remands this

case after ruling in Loper Bright, it should not allow

9

the First Circuit’s presumption of Chevron deference

when notice and comment rulemaking is followed, or

its presumption that regulated parties pay for all

government costs of regulation, or its blithe disregard

of the costs of regulation in its analysis to go

unremarked when doing so.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully

urge the Court to grant this petition for certiorari on

the second Question Presented too, and at minimum

hold the petition pending Loper Bright Enterprises,

Inc., et al., No. 22-451, if not joined with it on the first

Question Presented.

Respectfully,

/s/ John J. Vecchione

JOHN J. VECCHIONE

Counsel of Record

MARK S. CHENOWETH

KARA M. ROLLINS

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE

1225 19th St. NW, Suite 450

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 869-5210

John.Vecchione@NCLA.legal

Counsel for Petitioners

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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