Reply Brief — Relentless, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Department of Commerce, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 2, 2023
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No. 22-1219
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
_________________________
RELENTLESS, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, et al.,
Respondents.
_________________________
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
JOHN J. VECCHIONE
Counsel of Record
MARK S. CHENOWETH
KARA M. ROLLINS
NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE
1225 19th St. NW, Suite 450
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 869-5210
John.Vecchione@ncla.legal
October 2, 2023
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 1
I.THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI ON THE
SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED TOO .................. 1
A. What “Necessary and Appropriate” Means
in the MSA Is in Dispute in the Appellate
Courts ..........................................................1
1. Circuits Are Split on What “Necessary
and Appropriate” Means in the MSA .....2
2. The Court Has Not Addressed the MSA
in Two Generations .................................4
B. This Case Provides a Good Vehicle for
Addressing the Question Presented ...........7
II.THE CASE SHOULD AT LEAST BE HELD PENDING
THE DECISION IN LOPER BRIGHT ........................ 8
CONCLUSION ............................................................ 9
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Goethel v. Dept. of Commerce,
854 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2017) ....................................7
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,
478 U.S. 221 (1986)..................................................4
Loper Bright Enters., Inc. v. Raimondo,
143 S.Ct. 2429 (2023)...............................................2
Mexican Gulf Fishing Co., v. Dep’t of Commerce,
60 F.4th 956 (5th Cir. 2023) .....................................6
Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743 (2015)..................................................3
Waithaka v. Amazon.com Inc.,
WL 7028945, slip op.
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2020) ....................................3
Statutes
16 U.S.C. § 1853 ..........................................................2
Other Authorities
Atlantic Highly Migratory Species,
NOAA Fisheries (last accessed Sept. 27, 2023) ......5
Fisheries Economics of the United States,
2020 Report,
NOAA Fisheries (Feb. 17, 2023) .............................5
1
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI ON
THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED TOO
The Brief for Respondents devotes a paragraph to
the second question presented by Petitioners
requesting that certiorari not be granted to it. Resp.
Br. at 14. That question is: “Whether the phrase
‘necessary and appropriate’ in the Magnuson-Stevens
Act (“MSA”) augments agency power to force domestic
fishing vessels to contract with and pay the salaries of
federal observers they must carry.” Pet. Br. at ii. The
Respondents assert that the question does not meet
this Court’s traditional, though non-exhaustive,
criteria for granting certiorari. Id. As noted, both by
Petitioners and amici curiae, this is not so, and there
are other considerations not explicitly listed in Sup.
Ct. R. 10(a) that counsel such a grant. See Brief of
Amici Curiae the Southeastern Legal Foundation and
the Defense of Freedom Institute in Support of
Petitioners at 9-17.
A. What “Necessary and Appropriate” Means
in the MSA Is in Dispute in the Appellate
Courts
The Respondents’ blithe citation to Sup. Ct. R.
10(a) fails to recognize that there is a circuit split
regarding the meaning and application of the MSA’s
“necessary and appropriate” language. That circuit
split has arisen over the course of many years, and
many rules.
And a circuit split need not, as
2
Respondents’ narrow view of Sup. Ct. R. 10(a)
suggests, arise in an identical way to warrant this
Court’s discretionary grant of review. Indeed, the
split here is pressing precisely because the “necessary
and appropriate” language impacts all regulatory
actions approving or implementing MSA Fishery
Management Plans (“FMPs”). See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1853(a)(1)(A), 1853(b)(14). Respondents prolifically
regulate in this area. Since the beginning of this year,
Respondents have issued 125 final rules approving or
implementing various aspects of FMPs.1 While there
is no circuit split on the outcome of this exact rule
regarding at-sea monitors, there certainly is one on
what the words “necessary and appropriate” mean in
the statute at issue. Respondents also fail to note that
the Petitioners in Loper Bright Enters., Inc. v.
Raimondo, 143 S.Ct. 2429 (2023) did not claim that
there was a circuit split in their petition that this
Court has already accepted for review.2
1. Circuits Are Split on What “Necessary
and Appropriate” Means in the MSA
Respondents did not counter the cases cited by
Petitioners or by amici curiae demonstrating the
complete one-hundred-and-eighty-degree difference
This information is derived from a search of the Federal
Register’s database using its “Advanced Search” function for all
rules promulgated by the Department of Commerce in 2023 that
include the terms “Magnuson-Stevens Act” and “Fishery
Management Plan.”
2 As amici curiae in Loper Bright, Petitioners noted such a split.
1
3
between how “necessary and appropriate” is defined
in the MSA by the Fifth and First Circuits. Pet. Br.
at 32–34. This is an important federal question that
the Court should address, as how United States
fishermen are regulated is diverging due to the split.
The circuit split here is on an important question
of federal law on which the lower courts diverge, even
if the courts do not diverge on the outcome of the rule
or statute in question and in which the lower court
also diverged from the precedent of this court. See
Waithaka v. Amazon.com Inc., WL 7028945, slip op.
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2020) (noting that a circuit
diverging from Supreme Court precedent or other
circuits on a “broader question” than just the statute
at issue could allow grant of certiorari). In that case
the court was determining whether a stay was
appropriate given a petition for certiorari in this Court
and noted the many ways Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) functions.
In this case, not only is there a split between the
First and Fifth Circuits—at least, on what the words
“necessary and appropriate” mean in the making of
regulations—but the First Circuit has ignored this
Court’s explanation of those very words as taking into
account the cost of regulation. Cf. Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743 (2015) (not “appropriate” for a regulation
under the Clean Air Act to impose exorbitant costs for
marginal benefit) with App. 15a (“But the fact that
costs of complying with one regulatory requirement
are greater than the costs of complying with another
regulatory requirement does not mean that the former
is unlawful.”). The First Circuit went out of its way to
hold that costs don’t matter (failing to even mention
4
the Fifth Circuit precedent cited to it on this point).
The First Circuit further rejected this Court’s ruling
on similar language in the Clean Air Act and, even
after requesting a 28(j) letter from Respondents on
what the costs were and receiving no answer, rejected
this Court’s guidance on what “appropriate” means.
Under Sup. Ct. R. 10(a), there is a clear split on
whether “necessary and appropriate” in the MSA
expands agency power so that all the other words in
the statute are meaningless, or whether it binds the
agency to some measure of rationality in regulation.
Worse, the First Circuit stating that costs do not
matter (as industry must always pay them) and
failing to address how this conclusion squares with
the “necessary and appropriate” language makes this
an ideal case to correct a straying circuit and realign
the MSA with the statute Congress wrote.
2. The Court Has Not Addressed the MSA in
Two Generations
Even were the conditions of Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) not
met, as they are here, other considerations would
weigh in favor of granting certiorari on question two.
These factors add impetus to the necessity for a grant
in this case. No current justice was a member of the
bench when the Court last substantively addressed
the MSA. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y,
478 U.S. 221 (1986). Statutes can become encrusted
with bad rulings that, like barnacles, impede a law’s
proper function if not scraped off from time to time.
5
The MSA covers all domestic and foreign fishing in
American waters, which is an immense territory with
an enormous economic impact. Respondents report
that commercial and saltwater fishing in the United
States employed 1.7 million people, contributed 117
billion dollars in GDP, and 254 billion dollars in sales
impact in 2020. Fisheries Economics of the United
States, 2020 Report, NOAA Fisheries (Feb. 17, 2023).3
Yet for nearly 40 years the various appellate courts
have diverged in both their approach to Chevron
deference and their view of the meaning of the words
“necessary and appropriate.”
Respondents only dispute that there is a circuit
split on the narrow question of whether the agencies
can require industry to pay for at-sea monitors by
agency regulation in the face of the directives of the
MSA. They cannot claim that the First Circuit here,
with jurisdiction over the first and most storied of
American fisheries (and Puerto Rico), has not strayed
far afield in its interpretation of the MSA and the
power it allows regulators as compared to the Fifth
Circuit. For example, tuna are classified as a highly
migratory species (HMS) and travel between the
Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean
Sea.
Atlantic Highly Migratory Species, NOAA
Fisheries (last accessed Sept. 27, 2023).4 A tuna
fisherman in Puerto Rico challenging regulation of
3 https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/resource/document/fisheries-
economics-united-states-2020-report
4 https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/atlantic-highlymigratory-species
6
tuna fishing that is subject to the MSA’s “necessary
and appropriate” standard is faced with a different
standard, particularly with regard to the costs the
fisherman must bear, as an identically situated
fisherman in the Gulf of Mexico who operates out of
the State of Louisiana. Same fish. Same occupation.
Same regulation. Different outcome because of the
circuit split. That lack of uniformity is detrimental to
fishery management and warrants this Court’s
review.
A fisherman in Puerto Rico bringing a challenge in
the First Circuit to a new MSA regulation is faced
with precedent in this case that: (1) Chevron, whether
step one or two, allows regulators to charge him for
employees who perform only service to the
government; (2) The “necessary and appropriate”
language of the MSA is expansive and that one
regulation costs more than another has no impact on
the lawfulness of that regulation; and (3) It is the
stated rule of the Circuit that all costs of regulation—
even the salaries of government functionaries
performing a federal duty—are assumed valid. App.
14a, 15a, 22a 50a–51a. Meanwhile, a fisherman off
the coast of Louisiana or Texas would find that the
words “necessary and appropriate” have meaning and
include an assessment of costs versus regulatory gain.
Mexican Gulf Fishing Co. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 60
F.4th 956, 965 (5th Cir. 2023).
Four decades of conflicting interpretations of the
same statute have obscured its meaning. This Court
should grant certiorari.
7
B. This Case Provides a Good Vehicle for
Addressing the Question Presented
The Respondent states, without citation, that the
First Circuit did not rely on the “necessary and
appropriate” language for its ruling. Resp. Br. at 14.
The First Circuit stated, “Because we agree with the
district court that the rule is a permissible exercise of
the agency’s authority and is otherwise lawful, we
affirm.” App. 3a. It is also clear that the First Circuit
did not do any analysis of the costs of the regulation
because it was unclear and, in any event, the costs of
the regulation did not matter to its lawfulness. App.
7a, 15a. The opinion below cited the language
“necessary and appropriate” at the very start of its
examination of the statute. App. 3a. Judge Kayatta
cited his own concurrence in Goethel v. Dept. of
Commerce, 854 F.3d 106, 117–118 (1st Cir. 2017), for
the proposition that all cost of regulation must be
borne by industry. App. at 13a. As noted in the Pet.
Br. at 31, that case and the district court it affirmed
stand for the First Circuit’s longstanding proposition
that the language “necessary and appropriate” in the
MSA provides broad powers that practically
supersede the necessity for exact statutory language
to provide regulatory power. Moreover, the district
court ruling that was affirmed in all respects by the
appellate court below relied not only on that language
for its ruling upholding the statute but cited the key
“necessary and appropriate” language twice and noted
the Respondents’ dependence on it. App. 37a, 43a.
Here, the First Circuit relied on its erroneous
holdings on the meaning of the MSA, buttressed by
8
the key wrongful interpretation of the “necessary and
appropriate” language found in Goethel, that both
sides of the contest argued, and that forms the basis
of the second Question Presented. This case provides
a good vehicle for taking this important question
which affects an old, vibrant, and important portion of
the American economy and American life.
II.
THE CASE SHOULD AT LEAST BE HELD
PENDING THE DECISION IN LOPER BRIGHT
Respondents agree that the case should at least be
held awaiting the ruling in Loper Bright. Resp. Br. at
13. They claim delay should the cases be joined. It is
amusing that, in a brief supportive of Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of statutes, the
Respondents rely on facts stating that Congress has
determined not to fund any portion of the
promulgated rule! Resp. Br. at 6. On the Chevron
issue, the First Circuit made different errors
regarding Chevron than the D.C. Circuit did. The
Respondents make much of Petitioners’ successfully
opposing joinder at the district court level. But as the
opinions and findings in the cases reveal, the manner
of fishing done by the Petitioners here differs from
that of the Petitioners in Loper Bright. The Chevron
issues are the same, hence the identical first Question
Presented.
Whether the Court joins the cases or not, both the
Petitioners and Respondents have cited Relentless in
their Loper Bright briefing. If the Court remands this
case after ruling in Loper Bright, it should not allow
9
the First Circuit’s presumption of Chevron deference
when notice and comment rulemaking is followed, or
its presumption that regulated parties pay for all
government costs of regulation, or its blithe disregard
of the costs of regulation in its analysis to go
unremarked when doing so.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully
urge the Court to grant this petition for certiorari on
the second Question Presented too, and at minimum
hold the petition pending Loper Bright Enterprises,
Inc., et al., No. 22-451, if not joined with it on the first
Question Presented.
Respectfully,
/s/ John J. Vecchione
JOHN J. VECCHIONE
Counsel of Record
MARK S. CHENOWETH
KARA M. ROLLINS
NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE
1225 19th St. NW, Suite 450
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 869-5210
John.Vecchione@NCLA.legal
Counsel for Petitioners
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