Joint Appendix — Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Moab Partners, L.P., et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 13, 2023
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No. 22-1165
In the Supreme Court of the United States
____________________
MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE CORP., JAMES HOOKE,
JAY DAVIS, LIAM STEWART, RICHARD D. COURTNEY,
ROBERT CHOI, MARTIN STANLEY, NORMAN H. BROWN,
JR., GEORGE W. CARMANY, III, HENRY E. LENTZ, OUMA
SANANIKONE, WILLIAM H. WEBB, and MACQUARIE
INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT (USA) INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
MOAB PARTNERS, L.P., ET AL.,
on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated,
Respondents.
____________________
On Writ of Certiorari to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
____________________
JOINT APPENDIX
____________________
LINDA COBERLY
Winston & Strawn LLP
35 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60613
(312) 558-8768
lcoberly@winston.com
DAVID C. FREDERICK
Kellogg, Hansen, Todd,
Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C.
1615 M Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 326-7900
dfrederick@kellogghansen.com
Counsel of Record for Petitioners
Counsel of Record for Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari Filed May 30, 2023
Certiorari Granted September 29, 2023
(Additional counsel on inside cover)
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
& Garrison LLP
2001 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
Counsel of Record for Respondent Barclays Capital Inc.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Docket Excerpts, Moab Partners, L.P. v.
Macquarie Infrastructure Corp.,
No. 21-2524 (2d Cir.) ........................................ JA1
Docket Excerpts, City of Riviera Beach General
Employees Retirement System v. Macquarie
Infrastructure Corp., No. 18-cv-3608
(S.D.N.Y.) .......................................................... JA8
Consolidated Class Action Complaint for
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2019) ................................. JA16
The following documents have been omitted from this
joint appendix because they appear on the following
pages in the appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari:
Summary Order and Judgment (2d Cir. Dec.
20, 2022)............................................................... 1a
Opinion & Order Granting Defendants’ Motion
To Dismiss (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2021) ................. 14a
Order Denying Defendants’ Petition for
Rehearing En Banc (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2023) ...... 49a
15 U.S.C. § 78j......................................................... 51a
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 .............................................. 51a
ii
17 C.F.R. § 229.303 ................................................. 52a
Number and Percentage of Item 303 Cases in
Relevant Circuits ............................................... 62a
List of Item 303 Cases in Relevant Circuits .......... 64a
List of Law Firm Communications and
Commentary Addressing MD&A
Disclosures ......................................................... 76a
JA1
General Docket
Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit
Docketed: 10/07/2021
Termed: 12/20/2022
Court of Appeals Docket #: 21-2524
Nature of Suit: 3850 STATUTES-Secur Comm
Exchange
City of Riviera Beach General v. Macquarie Infrastructure Corpo
Appeal From: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)
Fee Status: Paid
Case Type Information:
1) Civil
2) Private
3) Originating Court Information:
District: 0208-1:182-cv-3608
Trial Judge: Vernon S. Broderick,
U.S. District Judge
Date Filed: 04/23/2018
Date Order/Judgment: 10/07/2021
Date Order/Judgment EOD: 10/07/2021
Date NOA Filed: 10/07/2021
Date Rec’d COA: 10/07/2021
Prior Cases:
None
Current Cases:
None
Panel Assignment:
Not available
JA2
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
10/07/2021
1
NOTICE OF CIVIL APPEAL,
with district court docket, on
behalf of Appellant Moab Partners, L.P., FILED.
10/07/2021
2
DISTRICT COURT OPINION
AND ORDER, dated
09/07/2021, RECEIVED.
10/07/2021
3
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT, dated 10/07/2021, RECEIVED.
12/17/2021
44
BRIEF & SPECIAL APPENDIX, on behalf of Appellant
Moab Partners, L.P., FILED.
Service date 12/17/2021 by
CM/ECF.
12/17/2021
45
JOINT APPENDIX, volume 1 of
4, (pp. 1-291), on behalf of Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,
FILED. Service date 12/17/2021
by CM/ECF.
12/17/2021
46
JOINT APPENDIX, volume 2 of
4, (pp. 292-552), on behalf of
Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,
FILED. Service date 12/17/2021
by CM/ECF.
12/17/2021
47
JOINT APPENDIX, volume 3 of
4, (pp. 553-825), on behalf of
Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,
FILED. Service date 12/17/2021
by CM/ECF.
JA3
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
12/17/2021
48
JOINT APPENDIX, volume 4 of
4, (pp. 826-1053), on behalf of
Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,
FILED. Service date 12/17/2021
by CM/ECF.
02/04/2022
66
BRIEF, on behalf of Appellee
Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam Stewart, Richard D.
Courtney, Robert Choi, Martin
Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr.,
George W. Carmany, III, Henry
E. Lentz, Ouma Sananikone
and William H. Webb, FILED.
Service date 02/04/2022 by
CM/ECF.
02/04/2022
67
LETTER, on behalf of Appellee
Barclays Capital Inc., joining in
the brief of Appellee Macquarie
Infrastructure Corporation,
James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam
Stewart, Richard D. Courtney,
Robert Choi, Martin Stanley,
Norman H. Brown, Jr., George
W. Carmany, III, Henry E.
Lentz, Ouma Sananikone and
William H. Webb, RECEIVED.
Service date 02/04/2022 by
CM/ECF.
JA4
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
02/04/2022
68
LETTER, on behalf of Appellee
Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc., joining in
the brief of Appellee Macquarie
Infrastructure Corporation,
James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam
Stewart, Richard D. Courtney,
Robert Choi, Martin Stanley,
Norman H. Brown, Jr., George
W. Carmany, III, Henry E.
Lentz, Ouma Sananikone and
William H. Webb, RECEIVED.
Service date 02/04/2022 by
CM/ECF.
02/25/2022
79
REPLY BRIEF, on behalf of Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,
FILED. Service date 02/25/2022
by CM/ECF.
11/09/2022
121 CASE, before PNL, RR, MP,
HEARD.
12/20/2022
123 SUMMARY ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, we vacate the
judgment of the district court
dismissing Plaintiff ’s Complaint, and we remand this case
for further proceedings consistent with this order, by PNL,
RR, MP, FILED.
12/20/2022
124 CERTIFIED ORDER, dated
12/20/2022, to SDNY (NEW
YORK CITY), ISSUED.
JA5
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
01/03/2023
128 PETITION FOR REHEARING/REHEARING EN BANC,
on behalf of Appellee Norman
H. Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany, III, Robert Choi, Richard
D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James
Hooke, Henry E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma Sananikone, Martin
Stanley, Liam Stewart and William H. Webb, FILED. Service
date 01/03/2023 by CM/ECF.
01/03/2023
129 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee
Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc., regarding
MIMUSA joins in the Petition
for Rehearing En Banc and
Panel Rehearing RECEIVED.
Service date 01/03/2023 by
CM/ECF.
01/03/2023
130 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee
Barclays Capital Inc., regarding
Barclays Capital Inc. joins in
the petition RECEIVED. Service date 01/03/2023 by
CM/ECF.
01/27/2023
133 ORDER, petition for rehearing/rehearing en banc denied,
FILED.
JA6
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
02/02/2023
134 MOTION, to stay mandate, on
behalf of Appellee Norman H.
Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany, III, Robert Choi, Richard
D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James
Hooke, Henry E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma Sananikone, Martin
Stanley, Liam Stewart and William H. Webb, FILED. Service
date 02/02/2023 by CM/ECF.
02/13/2023
138 OPPOSITION TO MOTION, to
stay mandate [134], on behalf of
Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,
FILED. Service date 02/13/2023
by CM/ECF.
02/21/2023
144 REPLY TO OPPOSITION
[138], on behalf of Appellee Norman H. Brown, Jr., George W.
Carmany, III, Robert Choi,
Richard D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James Hooke, Henry E.
Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma
Sananikone, Martin Stanley,
Liam Stewart and William H.
Webb, FILED. Service date
02/21/2023 by CM/ECF.
02/23/2023
148 MOTION ORDER, denying motion to stay mandate [134] filed
by Appellee Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, James
JA7
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam Stewart, Richard D. Courtney, Robert Choi, Martin Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr., George W.
Carmany, III, Henry E. Lentz,
Ouma Sananikone and William
H. Webb, by PNL, RR, MP,
FILED.
02/23/2023
149 JUDGMENT MANDATE, ISSUED.
JA8
U.S. District Court
Southern District of New York (Foley Square)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:18-cv-03608VSB
City of Riviera Beach General Employees Retirement System v. Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation et al
Assigned to:
Judge Vernon S. Broderick
Related Cases:
1:18-cv-03744-VSB
1:18-cv-07174-VSB
Cause:
15:78j(b)ss Stockholder Suit
Date Filed: 04/23/2018
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 850 Securities/Commodities
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
04/23/2018
1
COMPLAINT against Richard
D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James
Hooke, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Liam Stewart. (Filing Fee $ 400.00, Receipt Number 020814978368)
Document filed by City of Riviera Beach General Employees
Retirement System.
02/20/2019
56
AMENDED COMPLAINT
amending 1 Complaint, against
Richard D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James Hooke, Macquarie
Infrastructure Corporation,
Liam Stewart, Barclay Capital
Inc., Robert Choi, Martin Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr.,
JA9
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
George W. Carmany III, Henry
E. Lentz, Ouma Sananikone,
William H. Webb, Macquarie
Infrastructure Management
(USA) Inc. with JURY DEMAND. Document filed by
Moab Partners, L.P. Related
document: 1 Complaint.
04/04/2019
83
STIPULATION TO CLARIFY
COMPLAINT: NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and
between Plaintiff and Macquarie Management, that the
Consolidated Class Action Complaint does not name Macquarie
Management as a Defendant in
Count I, but only as to Count II,
Count III, and Count VI. SO
ORDERED. (Signed by Judge
Vernon S. Broderick on
4/4/2019)
04/22/2019
100 MOTION to Dismiss. Document
filed by Robert Choi, Norman
H. Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany III, Richard D. Courtney,
Jay Davis, James Hooke, Henry
E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma
Sananikone, Martin Stanley,
Liam Stewart, William H.
Webb.
JA10
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
04/22/2019
101 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in
Support re: 100 MOTION to
Dismiss. Document filed by
Robert Choi, Norman H.
Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany
III, Richard D. Courtney, Jay
Davis, James Hooke, Henry E.
Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma
Sananikone, Martin Stanley,
Liam Stewart, William H.
Webb.
04/22/2019
102 MOTION to Dismiss. Document
filed by Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc.
04/22/2019
103 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in
Support re: 102 MOTION to
Dismiss. Document filed by
Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc.
04/22/2019
104 DECLARATION of John E.
Schreiber in Support re: 100
MOTION to Dismiss. Document
filed by Robert Choi, Norman
H. Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany III, Richard D. Courtney,
Jay Davis, James Hooke, Henry
E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma
Sananikone, Martin Stanley,
Liam Stewart, William H.
Webb. (Attachments: #l Exhibit
A - Feb. 27, 2009 MIC 10-K
JA11
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
(Excerpt), #2 Exhibit B - May 3,
2012 MIC Earnings Call, #3 Exhibit C - Feb. 18, 2015 MIC
10-K (Excerpt), #4 Exhibit D Feb. 23, 2016 MIC 8-K (Excerpt), #5 Exhibit E - Feb. 23,
2016 MIC Earnings Call, #6 Exhibit F - Feb. 23, 2016 MIC
10-K (Excerpt), #7 Exhibit G May 2, 2016 MIC 10-Q (Excerpt), #8 Exhibit H - May 12,
2016 MIC Investor Day, #9 Exhibit I - Aug. 1, 2016 MIC 10-Q
(Excerpt), #10 Exhibit J - Aug.
2, 2016 MIC Earnings Call, #11
Exhibit K - Oct. 31, 2016 Blog
Post, #12 Exhibit L - Nov. 1,
2016 MIC 10-Q (Excerpt), #13
Exhibit M - Nov. 1, 2016 MIC
Earnings Call, #14 Exhibit N Nov. 3, 2016 MIC Prospectus
Suppl. (Excerpt), #15 Exhibit O
- 2017 Seatrade Maritime
Whitepaper, #16 Exhibit P Feb. 3, 2017 MIC Press Release,
#17 Exhibit Q - Feb. 21, 2017
MIC 10-K (Excerpt), #18 Exhibit R - May 3, 2017 MIC 10-Q
(Excerpt), #19 Exhibit S - May
10, 2017 Oppenheimer Conference, #20 Exhibit T - May 18,
2017 TPA Conference, #21 Exhibit U - June 27, 2017 JP Morgan Conference, #22 Exhibit V -
JA12
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
Aug. 2, 2017 MIC 10-Q (Excerpt), #23 Exhibit W - Aug. 3,
2017 MIC Earnings Call, #24
Exhibit X - Aug. 31, 2017 TPA
Conference, #25 Exhibit Y Sept. 11, 2017 MIC 8-K, #26
Exhibit Z -Nov. 1, 2017 MIC
10-Q (Excerpt), #27 Exhibit AA
- Nov. 2, 2017 MIC Earnings
Call, #28 Exhibit BB - Nov. 10,
2017 Email, #29 Exhibit CC Nov. 16, 2017 TPA Conference,
#30 Exhibit DD - Dec. 2017
MIC Presentation, #31 Exhibit
EE - Feb. 21, 2018 MIC 10-K
(Excerpt), #32 Exhibit FF - Feb.
22, 2018 MIC Earnings Call,
#33 Exhibit GG - May 3, 2018
MIC Earnings Call, #34 Exhibit
HH - May 3, 2018 MIC
FormDEFA14A, #35 Exhibit II Feb. 20, 2019 MIC 10-K (Excerpt), #36 Exhibit JJ - Chart)
04/22/2019
105 MOTION to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint. Document filed by Barclays Capital Inc.
04/22/2019
106 JOINDER to join re: 101 Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion. Document filed by Barclays Capital Inc.
09/07/2021
121 OPINION & ORDER: re: (102
in 1:18-cv-03608-VSB)
JA13
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
MOTION to Dismiss filed by
Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc., (100 in
1:18-cv-03608-VSB) MOTION
to Dismiss filed by Henry E.
Lentz, Richard D. Courtney,
Robert Choi, Norman H.
Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany
III, Macquarie Infrastructure
Corporation, Martin Stanley,
Liam Stewart, James Hooke,
Ouma Sananikone, William H.
Webb, Jay Davis, (105 in l:18cv-03608-VSB) MOTION to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint filed by Barclays Capital Inc. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
The Clerk’s office is directed to
terminate the open motions on
the docket and to post notice of
this Opinion & Order on the
docket for the related action
numbered 18-cv-3744. So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Vernon
S. Broderick on 9/7/2021) Filed
In Associated Cases: 1:18-cv03608-VSB, 1:18-cv-03744-VSB
10/06/2021
122 NOTICE OF APPEAL from 121
Memorandum & Opinion. Document filed by Moab Partners,
L.P. Filing fee $505.00, receipt
number ANYSDC-25160827.
JA14
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
Form C and Form D are due
within 14 days to the Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit.
10/07/2021
123 CLERK’S JUDGMENT re: (29
in 1:18-cv-03744-VSB, 121 in
1:18-cv-03608-VSB) Memorandum & Opinion, in favor of Barclay Capital Inc., Barclays Capital Inc., Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Macquarie Infrastructure Management
(USA) Inc., Daniel Fajardo,
George W. Carmany III, Henry
E. Lentz, James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam Stewart, Martin Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr.,
Ouma Sananikone, Richard D.
Courtney, Robert Choi, William
H. Webb against City of Riviera
Beach General Employees Retirement System, Moab Partners, L.P., Daniel Fajardo. It is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
That for the reasons stated in
the Court’s Opinion and Order
dated September 7, 2021, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED. The Clerk’s office is
directed to post notice of this
Opinion & Order on the docket
for the related action numbered
18-cv-3744. (Signed by Clerk of
Court Ruby Krajick on
JA15
Date Filed
#
Docket Text
10/7/2021) (Attachments: # 1
Notice of Right to Appeal) Filed
In Associated Cases: 1:18-cv-03
608-VSB, 1:18-cv-03744-VSB
10/07/2021
124 CORRECTED NOTICE OF APPEAL re: 122 Notice of Appeal,
121 Memorandum & Opinion,
123 Clerk’s Judgment. Document filed by Moab Partners,
L.P.
JA16
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH
GENERAL EMPLOYEES
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
on behalf of itself and all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
No. 1:18-cv-03608
CLASS ACTION
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
v.
MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION, JAMES HOOKE,
JAY DAVIS, LIAM STEWART, and RICHARD D.
COURTNEY,
Defendants.
CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
JA17
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
I.
II.
INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1
A.
Background of the Fraud ........................... 2
B.
The Truth Is Revealed ................................ 7
JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................... 8
III. PARTIES ............................................................. 9
A.
Lead Plaintiff .............................................. 9
B.
Corporate Defendants ................................ 9
C.
Officer Defendants .................................... 10
D.
Securities Act Defendants ........................ 11
IV. SUMMARY OF THE EXCHANGE ACT
CLAIMS ........................................................... 12
A.
The Exchange Act Defendants Sell
Macquarie’s “Unsexy Business
Model” To Investors By Promising
“Steady, Predictable” Dividends ............. 12
B.
Macquarie Depends On IMTT To
Fuel Its “Total Attractive Return” ........... 17
JA18
C.
D.
The Exchange Act Defendants Conceal That Macquarie’s “Total Return
Opportunity” Is Not Sustainable. ............ 23
1.
The No. 6 fuel oil industry
faces a “paradigm shift.”................... 24
2.
By the beginning of the Class
Period, investors are unaware
of IMTT’s exposure to the “brutal changes” in the No. 6 fuel
oil industry. ...................................... 28
3.
During the Class Period, the
Exchange Act Defendants conceal IMTT’s reliance on No. 6
fuel oil................................................ 30
4.
Just weeks after IMO 2020 is
confirmed, Macquarie Management profits from nearly $235
million in sales to investors.............. 34
5.
As IMTT’s utilization begins to
fall, Macquarie acquires Epic
Midstream in a largely-stock
transaction. ....................................... 41
The Exchange Act Defendants Continue To Falsely Tout IMTT’s Utilization And Promise Macquarie’s
Dividend Even As Customers Cancel Valuable No. 6 Fuel Oil Storage
Contracts ................................................... 42
JA19
E.
V.
Throughout The Class Period, The
Market Relied On The Exchange
Act Defendants’ Misrepresentations
About IMTT .............................................. 47
THE TRUTH EMERGES ................................. 48
VI. POST CLASS PERIOD EVENTS .................... 54
VII. THE EXCHANGE ACT DEFENDANTS’
FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS .............................. 60
A.
B.
The Exchange Act Defendants’ Materially False And Misleading Statements And Omissions In Earnings
Releases, Conference Calls And Investor Presentations Concerning
The Company’s Reliance On No. 6
Fuel Oil And Dividend Growth Plan ....... 61
1.
Fourth Quarter and Year End
2015 Misrepresentations ................. 61
2.
2016 Misrepresentations .................. 65
3.
2017 Misrepresentations .................. 69
The Exchange Act Defendants’ Materially False and Misleading Statements and Omissions in Macquarie’s Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and Offering Documents ...................................... 79
VIII.LOSS CAUSATION .......................................... 83
JA20
IX. SUMMARY OF SCIENTER ALLEGATIONS ............................................................... 84
X.
PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE ................... 92
XI. INAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY
SAFE HARBOR ............................................... 94
XII. CLAIMS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO
THE EXCHANGE ACT .................................... 95
XIII. CLAIMS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO
THE SECURITIES ACT .................................. 98
A.
Securities Act Parties ............................... 99
B.
False and Misleading Statements
and Omissions in the Offering Documents..................................................... 101
C.
The Securities Act Defendants’ Failure To Exercise Reasonable Care Or
To Conduct A Reasonable Investigation In Connection With The Offering ............................................................ 106
XIV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ................. 111
XV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF .................................. 113
XVI. JURY DEMAND ............................................. 114
APPENDIX A .......................................................... 116
JA21
Lead Plaintiff Moab Partners, L.P. (“Moab” or
“Lead Plaintiff ”), by and through its counsel, alleges
the following upon information and belief, except as to
those allegations concerning Lead Plaintiff, which are
alleged upon personal knowledge. Lead Plaintiff ’s information and belief is based upon, inter alia, counsel’s
investigation, which includes, among other things, review and analysis of: (a) Macquarie Infrastructure
Corporation’s (“Macquarie” or the “Company”) regulatory filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); (b) press releases, conference call transcripts, and media reports issued and
disseminated by the Company; (c) analyst and media
reports concerning Macquarie; (d) interviews with witnesses, including former Macquarie employees;
(e) consultation with industry experts and participants; and (f) other public information regarding the
Company.
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. This securities class action arises from a series
of material misrepresentations and omissions by Macquarie and its top executives regarding Macquarie’s
most important operating division, International-Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”), one of the largest independent bulk liquid storage terminals businesses in
the United States. Throughout the Class Period, Macquarie faced clear and present risks from IMTT’s concealed reliance on revenue from the storage of No. 6
fuel oil, a broadly defined group of high-sulfur heavy
and residual fuel oils facing fast-approaching “brutal
changes” that would effectively eliminate the only remaining demand for the commodity. Defendants omitted and actively misrepresented Macquarie’s exposure
to these risks. Indeed, as Macquarie’s stock began to
JA22
decline in 2017, investors directly asked Defendants
about these risks, and Defendants falsely stated that
they stored “very little” No. 6 fuel oil.
2. The omissions and misrepresentations set
forth below enabled Defendant Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc. (“Macquarie Management”), the controlling manager of Macquarie’s businesses, to cash out 40% of its ownership interest in
Macquarie in a November 2016 secondary public offering for a total of $235 million (the “Offering”), and to
thereafter accrue additional hundreds of millions of
dollars in management fees based on the Company’s
inflated share price and dividends. However, public investors suffered enormous losses when the truth about
the Company was revealed. As discussed in more detail below, after four years of assurances that IMTT
was stable and protected from commodity pressures,
on February 21, 2018, the Company abruptly slashed
the dividend that was its key selling point as a direct
result of the cancellation of a material number of previously-concealed No. 6 fuel oil storage contracts and
the consequential need to devote hundreds of millions
of dollars to a never-before publicly discussed “planned
repurposing” on a significant number of these now
empty tanks.
3. In response, Macquarie’s stock price declined
over 40% in a single trading day, dropping from $63.62
per share on February 21, 2018 to $37.41 per share on
February 22, 2018—a stunning decline from its Class
Period high of $84.13 per share in September 2016.
JA23
A.
Background of the Fraud
4. For years, Macquarie has been known as—and
actively cultivated a reputation as—a “total return opportunity” based on its stable and growing dividend.
For example, in early 2017, analysts named Macquarie
a “Top Dividend Stock,” noting the Company’s strong
quarterly dividend history, diversified business operations, and favorable long-term, multi-year growth
rates.
5. However, by the start of the Class Period, Macquarie faced a major industry ban that threatened its
ability to continue to deliver the historically high dividend that it promised investors. Specifically, the Exchange Act Defendants (defined below) knew that
IMTT, Macquarie’s top asset and largest profit-driver,
was materially exposed to upcoming regulations
strongly limiting the primary use of No. 6 fuel oil, a
heavily-regulated commodity that secretly comprised
well over 40% of IMTT’s tank storage capacity but for
which demand had been falling for years. Although—
as Macquarie would later admit—the impending limits on No. 6 fuel oil were known to the public, during
the Class Period Macquarie did not disclose but instead actively misled investors about the severe effects
of those limits on its business operations.
6. Not only did these regulations and the general
decline in demand leave IMTT secretly vulnerable to a
meaningful loss of revenue, but the noxious qualities
of No. 6 fuel oil contaminated even the pores of steel
and the tank, meaning that, at a minimum, IMTT’s
tanks could not be used to store other commodities
without a difficult, time-consuming, and expensive
cleaning process. Even after cleaning, some of the
JA24
tanks that IMTT had built to store No. 6 fuel oil were
so massive that there simply was no market to store
more in-demand commodities in them, as no other
commodities traded in sufficiently large volumes. For
that reason, one former employee described several of
these tanks—IMTT’s largest tanks, at its largest and
most important terminal in St. Rose, Louisiana—as
“obsolete” for storing anything lighter than No. 6 fuel
oil, the heaviest of the heavy fuel oils and which faced
imminent “brutal changes.”
7. Defendants had carefully guarded Macquarie’s
reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, leaving investors completely
in the dark as to this fast-approaching threat. Macquarie last acknowledged exposure to No. 6 fuel oil in
2012, at which time Defendants stated that—consistent with the industry at large—they had “concluded that it would be IMTT’s long-term best interests to begin to convert a portion of the residual oil
storage at Bayonne [IMTT’s second-largest terminal]
to clean product storage.” 1 For years afterward, Defendants made it impossible for investors to independently determine how industrywide changes might
impact IMTT by scrupulously avoiding stating that
they had any exposure to No. 6 fuel oil, instead describing the commodities stored only by very general
categories (such as “chemicals, vegetable and animal
oils, crude and asphalt, and refined petroleum products”) and telling investors—as IMTT’s CEO, Defendant Courtney, did at a May 12, 2016 Macquarie investor day—that IMTT had “flexibility” and “optionality”
in its tanks.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis herein is added.
JA25
8. Rather than provide additional information,
Defendants continuously assured investors that Macquarie’s businesses were “boringly predictable” even in
a “volatile and excited” world because of their “inherently more stable asset class” and “stable essential services nature.” Indeed, Defendants told the market that
IMTT in particular was not “sensitive to what is going
on in the exploration and production, or in interstate
product movement” and “is simply not [a] macroeconomically sensitive enterprise.”
9. Defendants continued to conceal IMTT’s reliance on No. 6 fuel oil storage revenue even after the
imminent end of demand for the commodity was confirmed. In October 2016, the International Maritime
Organization (“IMO”) confirmed that a long-scheduled, aggressive 0.5% sulfur cap on global shipping
fuels would begin by the start of 2020. Because in recent years the only sustained demand for No. 6 fuel oil
has come from shipping vessels, it was widely understood that IMO 2020 would cause “brutal changes” for
all those in the supply chain for No. 6 fuel oil. While
Macquarie ultimately acknowledged—after the Class
Period—that IMO 2020 dramatically shifted the industry away from No. 6 fuel oil, during the Class Period Defendants conspicuously avoided discussing
IMO 2020, despite their obligation under Item 303 of
Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.303) to disclose “any
known trends or uncertainties that have had or that
the registrant reasonably expects will have a material
favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”
10. Instead, just weeks after IMO 2020 was confirmed to proceed on schedule, Defendants told investors to “[r]emember” that “none of MIC’s business are
JA26
exposed directly to the price of crude oil or petroleum
products” as Macquarie Management sold investors
over $235 million of Macquarie common stock in a secondary public offering in the November 2016 Offering.
11. As the Class Period progressed, the demand for
No. 6 fuel oil continued to decline, but Defendants continued to tell investors—as Macquarie’s head of investor relations, Defendant Davis, did at a May 10, 2017
Oppenheimer Industrial Growth Conference—that
IMTT had “no commodity exposure other than the very
broad macroeconomic factors influencing supply and
demand more broadly.” Then, during the Company’s
August 3, 2017 earnings call, Defendant Hooke played
down declines in IMTT’s storage utilization as temporary and due only to routine maintenance, such as
tank cleaning and inspection, assured investors that
IMTT remained “a case of steady as she goes,” and
emphatically denied that there were “any commoditydriven factors that would cause a decline in utilization.”
12. All the while, Defendants told investors that
the Company would execute its growth goals and continue to deliver its dividend. For example, during Macquarie’s November 2, 2017 earnings call, Defendant
Hooke forcefully told investors not to expect Macquarie to “slash our dividend to deploy capital internally,” but rather to expect that “[g]rowing distributions to shareholders in a steady, predictable fashion
while investing for the future will continue to be part
of [Macquarie’s] strategy.”
13. As they did throughout the Class Period, at the
end of that November 2, 2017 call, Defendants actively
invited investors to contact them with further
JA27
questions. As a result, throughout the Class Period,
Defendants had regular discussions and exchanges
with analysts and investors during which Defendants
reiterated and provided additional color to their public
statements made in SEC filings, press releases, and
conference calls. Indeed, Macquarie would later
acknowledge that, as a result of its “Proactive Investor
Engagement,” it had “in excess of 1,200 individual
interactions with current and potential shareholders” in 2017 alone.
14. As the Class Period neared its end, with Macquarie’s stock price in decline, investors reached out to
Macquarie with specific questions about IMTT’s storage of fuel oils impacted by IMO 2020. In response, Defendants falsely misrepresented by half the amount of
heavy fuel oil (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil) stored by IMTT, and
also minimized the consequences of its storage of the
commodity. For example, on or around this time, Defendant Davis directly told an investor that No. 6 fuel
oil was only a small percent of IMTT’s utilization.
15. As another example, on September 22, 2017,
Defendant Davis spoke on the phone with another institutional investor, who told Defendant Davis that
the investor learned from one of Macquarie’s competitors that No. 6 fuel oil was 20% of IMTT’s capacity, and
that the market for No. 6 fuel oil was weak at the time
and specifically had “some real structural challenges
given” IMO 2020. In response, Davis told the institutional investor that IMO 2020 should not have much
of an impact—and in fact could end up a positive—and,
if needed, Macquarie could convert IMTT’s tanks for a
nominal amount.
JA28
16. Similarly, on November 7, 2017, Lead Plaintiff
emailed Defendant Davis and sought information on
the percentage of IMTT’s storage that was in “heavy
oil” and the impact, if any, of IMO 2020 on IMTT’s
heavy oil storage and tanks. In response, Defendant
Davis told Lead Plaintiff—consistent with information
made available to other investors—that only “20%” of
IMTT’s oil was heavy, and further minimized the impact of IMO 2020 by indicating that the banned heavy
oil could easily “be blended with distillate to meet the
new spec.” Davis even stated that the new regulations
“could well be a positive for storage demand at
IMTT-Bayonne given the deep water access at the facility.”
17. Defendant Davis repeated similar messages to
investors at a Three Part Advisors Investor Conference one week later, on November 16, 2017, telling the
audience that Defendants have “very good visibility
into the cash generating capacity of [IMTT] over a
longer period of time,” and that “very little” of IMTT’s
storage is in any “heavy product”—i.e., No. 6 fuel oil.
18. Then, on November 28, 2017, Macquarie and
Defendants Hooke, Stewart, and Davis hosted a dinner for approximately 12 institutional investors, during which they said that IMTT would be a “growth
driver for 2018” as a result of pricing and operational
improvements expected to push EBITDA margins
higher.
19. The following month, Defendants delivered an
investor presentation entitled “Overview of the IMTT
Segment.” The presentation stated that IMTT’s “[c]onsistently high utilization reflects essential services nature of IMTT’s services,” while any “[u]nused capacity
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is generally attributable to tank inspections, repairs,
and modifications.”
20. These statements were blatant lies. In fact, the
Company would later disclose that heavy and residual
fuel oil—No. 6 fuel oil—constituted well over 40% of
IMTT’s storage. This amount was far from the “very
little” that Defendant Davis had told an audience at an
investor conference, and over twice what Davis had
told Lead Plaintiff and other investors. Further, while
Davis misleadingly implied to investors, including
Lead Plaintiff, that compliance with IMO 2020 would
be straightforward and even possibly a “positive,” in
fact Macquarie would later acknowledge that IMO
2020 had triggered a “structural decline in the 6 oil
market” that caused IMTT to begin losing storage contracts at least a month earlier, in October 2017. Ultimately, as Macquarie admitted, decline in No. 6 fuel
oil caused utilization to fall to 89% by the end of the
fourth quarter 2017, and would cause utilization to fall
even farther, to an “average in the mid-80%
range”—a double-digit decline that was not “generally
attributable to tank inspections, repairs, and modifications.” In addition, Davis’s claim that No. 6 fuel oil
could simply “be blended with distillate to meet the
new spec” misled investors about the expensive cleaning required to scrub the highly noxious No. 6 fuel oil
from IMTT’s tanks before they could be used for other
commodities. Even then, because IMO 2020 effectively
killed the demand for high sulfur fuel oils (like No. 6
fuel oil), it could never be a “positive” for the Company:
many of IMTT’s No. 6 fuel oil tanks were so large that
they were (in the words of a former employee) largely
“obsolete” for storing less sulfuric commodities because no such commodities traded in sufficient volumes to make use of those tanks economical.
JA30
Ultimately, IMTT was so imperiled by its exposure to
No. 6 fuel oil that Macquarie had to slash its dividend
to afford the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary
to “repurpose” the tanks for other uses.
B.
The Truth Is Revealed
21. On February 21, 2018, after the close of trading, Macquarie surprised the market by announcing a
shocking decline in IMTT utilization, to the lowest
level that Macquarie had ever publicly reported;
fourth quarter earnings that fell well short of analysts’
estimates; and a 31% cut to the Company’s dividend—
just weeks after telling analysts that the dividend was
“sacrosanct.”
22. The next day, Macquarie blamed the bad news
directly on one culprit: No. 6 fuel oil. Revealing for the
first time the depth of IMTT’s exposure, Macquarie explained that it had to siphon money away from the dividend because the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil
would require Macquarie to spend hundreds of millions of dollars repurposing IMTT’s storage tanks to
accommodate other commodities. Analysts immediately noted their surprise, calling the Company’s
statements “troubling” and questioning management’s
credibility. In response to this news, Macquarie’s stock
price fell from $63.62 per share on February 21, 2018,
to $37.41 per share on February 22, 2018. The stock
price has not recovered since then. Instead, Macquarie
received a public reprimand from leading investment
advisory group Institutional Shareholder Services,
Inc., for creating a “credibility crisis” and “mistrust,”
and Macquarie Management was forced to cap its fee
to pacify investor rebellion. All the while, the damage
from Macquarie’s concealed reliance on No. 6 fuel oil
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has continued to prove disastrous: on February 20,
2019, Macquarie disclosed that IMTT ended 2018 with
utilization of just 82%, far below the constantly affirmed “historical mean” of 94% investors were told to
expect during the Class Period.
23. As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and
omissions, and the resulting decline in the market
value of Macquarie’s stock, Lead Plaintiff and other
Class members have suffered significant losses and
damages.
II.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
24. The claims asserted herein arise under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a), 78t-1; Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5;
and Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2), and 77o.
25. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1337; Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa;
and Section 22 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v.
26. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b); Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78aa(a); and Section 22 of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77v. Macquarie maintains its corporate
headquarters in New York, New York, which is situated in this District, conducts substantial business in
this District, and many of the acts and conduct that
constitute the violations of law complained of herein,
including the preparation and dissemination to the
public of materially false and misleading information,
occurred in this District. In connection with the acts
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alleged in this Complaint, Defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including the mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of the national securities markets.
III. PARTIES
A.
Lead Plaintiff
27. Lead Plaintiff Moab Partners, L.P. is a sophisticated institutional investor located in New York,
New York. As shown in Lead Plaintiff ’s certification
(see ECF No. 37-1), Moab purchased over 500,000
shares of Macquarie common stock during the Class
Period, including 18,800 shares of Macquarie common
stock traceable to the Offering at a price of $81.90 per
share directly from Securities Act Defendant Barclays.
Moab suffered damages as a result of the violations of
the federal securities laws alleged in this Complaint.
B.
Corporate Defendants
28. Defendant Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation (“Macquarie” or the “Company”) is a Delaware corporation headquartered at 125 West 55th Street, New
York, New York 10019. Macquarie is a holding company that owns and operates a portfolio of infrastructure and infrastructure-like businesses. Outside of
these operating segments, Macquarie does not have
any employees, but instead relies on personnel assigned by Macquarie Management. The Company’s
common stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”), which is an efficient market, under the
ticker symbol “MIC.” Macquarie currently has over 85
million shares of common stock outstanding, owned by
at least hundreds or thousands of investors.
JA33
29. Defendant Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc. (“Macquarie Management”) acts as
manager of Macquarie and is responsible for Macquarie’s day-to-day operations and affairs and oversight of the management teams of Macquarie’s operating segments. In accordance with its management services agreement, Macquarie Management assigned
certain of its employees, including Defendant James
Hooke—Macquarie’s CEO through most of the Class
Period—and Defendant Liam Stewart—Macquarie’s
CFO throughout the Class Period—to Macquarie. In a
secondary public offering conducted by Macquarie in
November 2016, Macquarie Management sold
2,870,000 shares of Macquarie common stock, comprising nearly 40% of Macquarie Management’s holdings,
for a profit of over $234 million. Macquarie Management is named as a defendant in Count II (for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act), Count III
(for violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act), and
Count VI (for violations of Section 15 of the Securities
Act).
C.
Officer Defendants
30. Defendant James Hooke (“Hooke”) was an employee of Defendant Macquarie Management assigned
to serve as Chief Executive Officer of Macquarie from
May 8, 2009 to December 31, 2017. Hooke also served
as a Director of Macquarie from September 8, 2017 to
September 5, 2018. Hooke also served as a member of
IMTT’s Board of Directors from May 2009 until July
2014, IMTT’s interim-CEO from July 2014 until February 2015, and Executive Chairman of IMTT’s Board
of Directors from July 2014 until December 31, 2017.
Hooke signed Macquarie’s materially misstated public
filings including the Registration Statement for the
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Offering filed with the SEC on April 5, 2016, and made
other materially false and misleading statements to
investors as set forth below. Hooke is named as a defendant in Count I (for violations of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder), Count II
(for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act),
Count III (for violations of Section 20A of the Exchange
Act), Count IV (for violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act), and Count VI (for violations of Section 15 of
the Securities Act).
31. Defendant Jay Davis (“Davis”) has served as
the Head of Investor Relations and Vice President of
Macquarie since March 2008. Davis made materially
false and misleading statements to investors as set
forth below. Davis is named as a defendant in Count I
(for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder) and Count II (for violations of
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act).
32. Defendant Liam Stewart (“Stewart”) is an employee of Defendant Macquarie Management who has
been assigned to serve as Chief Financial Officer of
Macquarie since June 2015. Stewart made materially
false and misleading statements to investors as set
forth below. Stewart is named as a defendant in
Count I (for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder), Count II (for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act), Count IV
(for violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act), and
Count VI (for violations of Section 15 of the Securities
Act).
33. Defendant Richard D. Courtney (“Courtney”)
has served as the Chief Executive Officer and President of IMTT, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
JA35
Macquarie, since February 2015. Courtney first joined
IMTT in 1982, and previously served as IMTT’s President and Chief Operating Officer. According to his profile on IMTT’s website, prior to becoming CEO, “Courtney’s previous responsibilities with IMTT have included budgeting and long-term forecasting, new venture and project analysis, treasury management, and
tax planning.” Courtney made materially false and
misleading statements to investors as set forth below.
Courtney is named as a defendant in Count I (for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 thereunder) and Count II (for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act).
34. Defendants Hooke, Davis, Stewart, and Courtney are collectively referred to hereinafter as the “Officer Defendants.” The Officer Defendants, because of
their positions with Macquarie, possessed the power
and authority to control the contents of Macquarie’s
reports to the SEC, press releases, and presentations
to securities analysts, money and portfolio managers,
and institutional investors. Each of the Officer Defendants was provided with copies of the Company’s reports and press releases alleged herein to be misleading prior to, or shortly after, their issuance and had the
ability and opportunity to prevent their issuance or
cause them to be corrected. Because of their positions
and access to material non-public information, each of
the Officer Defendants knew that the adverse facts
specified herein had not been disclosed to, and were
being concealed from, the public, and that the positive
representations which were being made were then materially false and/or misleading.
JA36
35. Macquarie, Macquarie Management, and the
Officer Defendants are collectively referred to as the
“Exchange Act Defendants.”
D.
Securities Act Defendants
36. Additional defendants—defined along with certain of the above-named Defendants as the “Securities
Act Defendants”—are named in Section XIII.A. below.
IV. SUMMARY
CLAIMS
A.
OF
THE
EXCHANGE
ACT
The Exchange Act Defendants Sell Macquarie’s “Unsexy Business Model” To
Investors By Promising “Steady, Predictable” Dividends
37. Macquarie owns, operates, and invests in a diversified group of infrastructure businesses that provide services to customers in the United States and
Canada. Throughout the Class Period, Macquarie had
four operating segments: (1) IMTT, a bulk liquid terminals business providing storage, handling, and related services at a dozen terminals in the United
States and Canada; (2) Atlantic Aviation, a provider of
fuel, terminal, hangaring, and other services to 70 airports throughout the United States; (3) Contracted
Power, comprised of controlling interests in wind and
solar power facilities in the United States, and—until
October 12, 2018—a gas-fired facility; and (4) MIC Hawaii, comprised of companies that provide energy services in Hawaii.
38. According to the Exchange Act Defendants,
Macquarie’s primary “objective” was to “consolidate all
of the cash being produced” by their businesses—
JA37
which the Exchange Act Defendants referred to as
“free cash flow”—“and distribute the majority of that
out to investors in the form of a quarterly cash dividend.” The Exchange Act Defendants repeatedly assured the market that the dividend was “stable” and
“predictable” because Macquarie’s businesses were
“characteristically providers of essential services” insulated from market fluctuations, which gave the Exchange Act Defendants “good visibility” into their
“cash-generating capacity over time.” As Defendant
Hooke colorfully told investors at the start of the Class
Period, “While the world around us is volatile and excited, MIC’s businesses have been boringly predictable. That is just the kind of unsexy business model
we want.”
39. Further, the Exchange Act Defendants told investors that Macquarie would deliver consistent dividend growth because they “actively managed” Macquarie’s operating segments. During an investor conference on August 30, 2016, Defendant Davis explained: “This is not a passive strategy. We are looking
to grow the topline performance managing the expenses down or manage the rate of growth and expenses and optimize the capital structure in each of
the businesses.” Davis continued that, when “managed
and capitalized well,” IMTT and the other businesses
would deliver “growing streams of distributable cash
flow that we then upstream to investors.”
40. Again more colorfully, on May 12, 2016, Defendant Hooke told investors that the Officer Defendants’ management was so heavy-handed that Macquarie’s operating segments compared it to “like walking around with a wedgie all the time . . . . [T]hat is the
way we try and fulfill which is perennially ensure that
JA38
there is a sense of accountability at the businesses we
operate.”
41. By the start of the Class Period, Macquarie had
reported nine consecutive quarters of dividend growth.
In a press release on February 22, 2016—the start of
the Class Period—Defendant Hooke bragged that this
“growth has been achieved despite the volatility in
markets broadly and reinforces a basic premise of infrastructure—namely, that it is an inherently more
stable asset class.”
42. The market had reacted exuberantly to Macquarie’s dividend policy. Investors flocked to the stock,
causing the stock to rise from $3.40 when Defendant
Hooke became CEO on May 8, 2009, to $62.83 by the
start of the Class Period.
43. Likewise, analysts had praised the Company’s
dividend payout. For example, on January 11, 2016—
just before the start of the Class Period—J.P. Morgan
wrote that “MIC’s portfolio of defensive businesses
drives a predictable dividend stream . . . that should
attract income-oriented investors seeking refuge from
commodity price volatility.” The report concluded,
“Among all stocks under coverage MIC remains a favorite.”
44. Throughout the Class Period, the Exchange
Act Defendants continued to stress the importance of
Macquarie’s dividend while they consecutively increased the payout, and analysts in turn continued to
focus on the Company’s dividend. For example, in its
report on May 2, 2016, Oppenheimer wrote that “we
continue to believe MIC’s dividend is well funded and
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may grow at least 14% in 2016 . . . Maintain Outperform[.]”
45. On February 3, 2017, the Company guided investors to expect Macquarie’s free cash flow—the underlying source of its dividend—to grow 10%-15% in
2017 and 2018, and that Macquarie’s quarterly dividends in 2017 would correspondingly grow 10%.
46. The market reacted positively. For example, in
its report dated February 21, 2017, Oppenheimer
wrote, “[A]dding confidence in our thesis, management
increased the dividend payment meaningfully and reiterated its target to grow . . . . MIC remains a compelling buy, in our view. Maintain Outperform[.]”
47. The Exchange Act Defendants affirmatively
denounced any skepticism that they would be unable
to grow the increasing amount of free cash flow required to meet their guidance. During an earnings call
on February 22, 2017, Defendant Hooke addressed
“the conspiracy theorists amongst you,” stating that
Macquarie’s guided dividends were actually “more
conservative” than in 2016 and that the Exchange Act
Defendants could deliver the promised dividend
growth while continuing to fund Company’s growth
given the Company’s “$1.4 billion of available credit.”
48. As the year continued—and the dividend payments increased as guided—the Exchange Act Defendants ever more firmly rejected investor skepticism.
During Macquarie’s earnings call for its second quarter 2017 results on August 3, 2017, an analyst asked
whether investors “shouldn’t necessarily expect, modify or think about your retained cash flow, either as a
percent of capital deployment opportunities, or said
JA40
another way, adjusting payout ratio to more internally
fund?” In response, Hooke stated: “No . . . . I don’t
think we will suddenly say there’s a great set of opportunities, we’re going to massively reduce the payout
ratio and stop growing the dividend . . . . I think you’ll
see steady as she goes, . . . reserving rights to do minor tweaks at the side.”
49. In November 2017, the Company announced
that it was revising its 2017 guidance for free cash flow
growth down to 9%, but otherwise left its guidance unchanged and remained, according to Defendant Hooke,
“excited about our prospects in 2018.” During Macquarie’s November 2, 2017 earnings call, Hooke forcefully assured investors that Macquarie would not
“pivot towards what the market values and not as
much maximizing dividend growth but more retaining
cash flow,” stating, “People slashing their dividend
saying we’re going to slash our dividend to deploy capital internally, I don’t think you’ll see us do that . . . .
Growing distributions to shareholders in a steady, predictable fashion while investing for the future will continue to be part of MIC’s strategy[.]”
50. Throughout the Class Period, the Officer Defendants actively solicited investors to contact them
directly. For example, at the end of earnings calls
throughout the Class Period, Defendant Hooke consistently noted that the Officer Defendants would be
“on the road participating in a number of road shows
and conferences” and told investors to let the Officer
Defendants know “[i]f there is someone you think we
should be introduced to the MIC story[.]” Similarly,
during a June 27, 2017 investor conference, Defendant
Stewart told investors to contact Davis and another executive, who would be “happy to help with any
JA41
additional insight into our operations or to assist with
any modeling matters.”
51. As a result, the Officer Defendants frequently
met directly with investors and analysts. In April
2018, the Company bragged about its “Proactive Investor Engagement” and “longstanding commitment to
engagement with all shareholders,” and disclosed that
it had “in excess of 1,200 individual interactions
with current and potential shareholders” in 2017
alone.
52. During those interactions, the Officer Defendants reiterated and provided additional color to their
public statements made in SEC filings, press releases,
and conference calls. Analysts often relayed to investors those statements made by the Exchange Act Defendants, which confirmed the public nature of those
statements. For example, on March 23, 2016, J.P. Morgan published an analyst report describing meetings
with Defendant Hooke and other Macquarie management that the firm hosted for investors. J.P. Morgan
wrote, “We walked away confident in MIC’s strong positioning during this difficult market environment.
The company retains numerous levers to achieve the
stated dividend growth . . . and payout targets[.]”
53. As another example, on August 12, 2016, RBC
Capital Markets wrote a report describing “Highlights
from investor meetings,” stating that they “had MIC
on the road this week in NYC and the mid-Atlantic.
We continue to view MIC as a solid total-return play,
with increasing visibility to hit . . . dividend/share
growth.”
JA42
54. Similarly, on November 3, 2016, Oppenheimer
wrote of its “Thoughts from Management Meeting”
that “Management remains bullish,” and concluded
that “[o]verall the MIC story is well intact. The underlying businesses all appear stable, if not improving; and, when coupled with attractive opportunities
for growth capital, we believe the company has multiple years of . . . dividend growth. Maintain Outperform[.]”
55. In its report on March 6, 2017, Barclays wrote
its “[t]akeaways” from investor meetings it hosted
with Defendants Hooke and Davis, including that
Macquarie’s growth in free cash flow that drove Macquarie’s dividend growth “may not be limited to
2017/2018. The team seems to have a path to not only
meet its growth objective, but potentially exceed the
growth target in 2018[.]”
56. As the Class Period neared its end, the Officer
Defendants continued to directly engage investors and
analysts, affirming the market’s reliance on Macquarie’s growth guidance and ever-increasing dividends. For example, on November 28, 2017, Macquarie
hosted a dinner for approximately a dozen institutional investors, including Lead Plaintiff. At this dinner, which was attended by Defendants Hooke, Stewart, and Davis, as well as Macquarie’s then-COO and
future-CEO, Mr. Frost, the Officer Defendants present
at the dinner told Lead Plaintiff and the other investors that Macquarie would have continued dividend
growth in 2018.
57. As another example, on or around December 7,
2017, Macquarie senior employees met with institutional investors during the Wells Fargo 2017 Pipeline,
JA43
MLP, and Utility Symposium in New York City. Likely
referencing that meeting, in its later report dated February 23, 2018, Wells Fargo stated that, “as recently
as December the dividend was described as ‘sacrosanct’ to us.”
58. Macquarie’s generous dividends did not just
benefit investors, but also Macquarie Management.
Pursuant to its management services agreement, Macquarie Management received fees based on the “New
Investment Value” of Macquarie, calculated as:
(a) Macquarie’s market capitalization; plus (b) the
amount of the Company’s borrowings; plus (c) the
value of the Company’s future investments; less
(d) cash and cash equivalents held. Accordingly, Macquarie Management’s fee benefitted directly from paying out as much cash to investors as possible.
59. The fee arrangement also meant that Macquarie Management directly benefitted from increasing the Company’s debt levels, further incentivizing
Defendants to spend the Company’s cash on the dividend above all else. In fact, during the Class Period—
as Macquarie continued to funnel its available cash
into dividend payments—Macquarie’s leverage multiples rose from 4.1x o [sic] 4.8x. FE-1—who had worked
as Chief Financial Officer at IMTT from the 1970s until 2011—stated that, when he was at IMTT, Macquarie had “virtually insisted” that IMTT not use operating cash flow, accumulated or current year, for its
fixed assets for any reason other than maintenance.
They wanted all new capital expenditures to be financed by borrowing. FE-1 described this as Macquarie’s “law of the land.”
JA44
60. Finally, because Macquarie Management’s fee
was—in Macquarie’s own words—“based primarily on
our market capitalization,” Macquarie Management
also benefitted directly from continually increasing
dividends and promising continued dividend growth
because doing so caused the market to assign higher
targets for the stock price, which drove the price of
Macquarie shares higher—generating higher fees for
Macquarie Management.
B.
Macquarie Depends On IMTT To Fuel
Its “Total Attractive Return”
61. Macquarie depended heavily on IMTT to provide the fuel for its dividend. During the Class Period,
IMTT’s contributions dwarfed those of the other operating segments, providing approximately 46% of Macquarie’s EBITDA. Even more impressive, in what Defendants told investors was “the true top line we use
at MIC for IMTT and our other businesses,” IMTT’s
net income amounted to 54% and 80% of the Company’s total in 2016 and 2017, respectively. This meant
that, of all the operating segments, IMTT provided the
vast majority of Macquarie’s free cash flow, and therefore contributed most to Macquarie’s dividend.
62. Investors understood that IMTT not only contributed the most to the dividend, but also that IMTT
was critical to delivering on Macquarie’s promised
growth based on Defendants’ representations that—as
Oppenheimer wrote in its May 12, 2016 report discussing a Macquarie investor day—“even in a somewhat
challenged energy environment . . . the business remains rock-solid.” For example, in its report dated
June 27, 2017, J.P. Morgan wrote that “IMTT[]
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continues to play the biggest role in MIC growth” and
“remain[s] the key driver of MIC’s ongoing growth.”
63. IMTT was originally founded in 1939 by James
J. Coleman, Sr. Over the following 75-years, Coleman
and his family expanded IMTT to become one of the
largest third-party providers of bulk liquid storage and
handling services in the United States, operating over
a dozen terminals handling petroleum, biofuels, chemicals, and vegetable/tropical oil products. Between
1975 to 1999, IMTT was operated in a partnership
with the Van Ommeren Company, which later became
Royal Vopak, N.V. (“Vopak”). Macquarie would later
disclose Vopak as one of IMTT’s “main terminal operation competitors.”
64. Macquarie first became involved with IMTT in
2006, when it acquired a 50% stake in IMTT. From the
start, FE-1 (IMTT’s former CFO) explained that Macquarie was “meticulous” in tracking IMTT’s performance and would “watch everything,” including
through an on-site Macquarie employee. FE-1 stated
that IMTT provided Macquarie with every “scintilla”
of information they asked for, and, as a result, Macquarie “[c]ertainly had enough to manage and micromanage the business.” FE-1 also explained that
Macquarie “knew in great detail” about IMTT’s contracts and what was stored in IMTT’s tanks, information that was continuously available through an inventory system that FE-1 personally helped to develop, known as “BLIS” (an abbreviation for Bulk Liquid Information System). In addition, FE-1 explained
that IMTT provided Macquarie with its annual
budget, which was prepared near the end of each calendar year and formally approved in the early part of
the year. FE-1 said that preparing the budget involved
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a conversation between marketing and accounting departments, and that Defendant Courtney—IMTT’s
Chief Operating Officer at the time—was very often
directly involved. 2 FE-1 said that built into the budget
was an assessment of the likelihood of renewal for contracts expiring in that year, which was information
typically provided directly by Courtney, who “absolutely” had “constant contact with customers, contracts, and trends.” FE-1 also stated that, in addition
to getting IMTT’s budget, Macquarie did its own projections, which went further out than a year.
65. In 2010, Defendant Hooke gave a presentation
in support of an IMTT application for a credit facility,
in which he corroborated the depth of Macquarie’s involvement with IMTT. Hooke said that Macquarie was
“completely joined at the hip with” IMTT, and that
he and Macquarie had become very familiar with
IMTT’s operations: “[F]rom MIC’s perspective . . . it’s
been a fortunate perspective for me to learn so much
about the business from [Thomas Coleman, then-CEO
of IMTT] and the rest of the management team.” 3
66. However, FE-1 explained, the relationship between IMTT and Macquarie gradually deteriorated.
FE-1 explained that IMTT and Macquarie disagreed
on a number of issues, including the extent to which
IMTT’s cash flow should be reinvested into the
2 This is consistent with Defendant Courtney’s profile on IMTT’s
website, which states that his “previous responsibilities with
IMTT have included budgeting and long-term forecasting,
new venture and project analysis, treasury management, and tax
planning.” See https://www.imtt.com/about-us/executive-team/.
3 See Macquarie Terminal Holdings LLC v. Voting Trust of IMTT
Holdings, Inc., Arbitration Award, ICDR File No. 50 125 T 00245
11.
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business as opposed to distributed to Macquarie shareholders in the dividend.
67. Years later, Defendant Hooke would
acknowledge that—consistent with FE-1’s information—Macquarie had “a disagreement over a number of issues” with the Coleman family, including “predominantly over the dividend policy.” Macquarie
pursued, and succeeded in, an arbitration against the
Colemans for unpaid dividend amounts from IMTT.
Then, according to Hooke, Macquarie’s “articulated
[dividend] strategy clearly [told] what we needed to
settle the differences with the co-investor”—by taking
complete control of IMTT.
68. On July 16, 2014, Macquarie acquired the remaining 50% interest in IMTT for $1 billion, making
IMTT the largest business in Macquarie’s portfolio. In
connection with the acquisition, the Company completed concurrent public offerings of approximately
$665.0 million in additional shares and $305.0 million
in convertible debt on July 9, 2014.
69. Immediately afterwards, the Exchange Act Defendants took total control of IMTT—so much so that,
when allegations arose just months later concerning
emissions of noxious fumes from St. Rose, a court in
the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that “[t]he level
of control exercised by Hooke, May, and the IMTT
Board [which was entirely controlled by Macquarie
employees] indicates that the ‘center of overall direction, control, and coordination’” for IMTT was actually
Macquarie’s offices in New York. See Rowell v. Shell
Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK, 2015 WL
7306435 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2015).
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70. In deposition testimony for Rowell, Defendant
Hooke described how he and Macquarie had taken
“proactive steps . . . to take control of IMTT” and put
in place a “MIC delegated authority framework. . . . It
was pretty important for us . . . to actually take full
control and see exactly what was going on in the business and implement the changes that we wanted to.” 4
As part of that effort, Macquarie appointed its CEO,
Hooke, to also serve as IMTT’s interim CEO—the first
and only time that Hooke has ever been the CEO of
one of Macquarie’s operating segments. Hooke explained his unusual involvement, stating that this
“was the biggest transaction MIC had ever done. And
the success of IMTT following that transaction was
probably the most important single event in [Macquarie’s] history, other than probably its IPO . . . I
wanted to make sure that went well.” During his time
as IMTT’s interim-CEO, Defendant Hooke personally
negotiated storage contracts.
71. Macquarie’s “full control” (in Defendant
Hooke’s words) continued throughout the Class Period. Even after Macquarie hand-selected Defendant
Courtney to serve as IMTT’s CEO in February 2015,
Hooke continued to serve as IMTT’s Executive Chairman until his exit from Macquarie in December 2017,
and Courtney reported directly to Hooke. Macquarie
also appointed Macquarie asset director James May as
IMTT’s CFO and to the IMTT Board of Directors. In a
deposition taken in Rowell, James May explained that,
prior to Macquarie’s complete control, he had served
as Macquarie’s “investor representative” to IMTT,
through which he “very much . . . was involved with
4 Rowell v. Shell Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK,
ECF No. 38-3 (E.D. La.).
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[IMTT] and . . . understood the company.” After being
appointed as IMTT’s CFO, May became “involved in
the decision-making processes for [IMTT].” 5 In addition, Macquarie took complete control of IMTT’s board,
which was responsible for approving major contracts
and appointing IMTT executives, among other things.
72. Further, the Exchange Act Defendants also appointed additional Macquarie personnel to head up an
expanded financial planning and analysis function at
IMTT and, as Defendant Hooke described during an
August 2, 2016 earnings call, spent an “enormous
amount of time” putting in place their exacting controls, including “rolling out proper maintenance
CapEx management processes and systems.”
73. As part of this process, Defendants Hooke and
Courtney, along with IMTT CFO James May and others, oversaw “Project One.” In a memorandum bearing
the logos of both IMTT and Macquarie, Hooke stated
that Project One sought to “shar[e] . . . knowledge and
best practice across terminals as fast as possible” and
directly solicited feedback from IMTT employees:
5 Rowell v. Shell Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK,
ECF No. 38-4 (E.D. La.).
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6
74. FE-2, who worked at IMTT from the 1970s until December 2015, most recently as terminal manager
of IMTT’s largest facility, St. Rose, described the
changes after Macquarie’s purchase of IMTT more
bluntly: IMTT became “100% a Macquarie show.”
75. Macquarie’s grip on IMTT tightened in 2016
with the introduction of Macquarie’s “shared services
model,” which consolidated HR, accounting, and other
services for all operating segments, and which the Exchange Act Defendants explicitly stated was designed
to “share knowledge” and “capture efficiencies” among
all of the businesses. On May 18, 2017, Defendant Davis explained that this shared services model was motivated by Defendants’ desire to “actively manage each
6 Rowell v. Shell Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK,
ECF No. 38-4 (E.D. La.).
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business, not a passive PE-type strategy where we just
parachute in every quarter, look at the books and say,
‘Nice job. See you next quarter.’ This is active day-today management driving top line improvement, typically increasing or optimizing pricing, trying to drive
volume increases and margin expansion.”
76. At the same time as Macquarie took even
greater control of IMTT, it also reduced the disclosures
it had historically provided about IMTT. For example,
an analyst noted during the February 23, 2016 earnings call that Macquarie had “stopped disclosing yearon-year storage rates for IMTT,” which Defendant
Hooke said was done to stop investors from reading too
much into a decline in utilization in 2014: “[P]eople
were spooked as to is it really offline for cleaning and
inspection? Will it ever come back or are you just saying that because your utilization is down?”
77. As another example, in the first Form 10-K
filed after obtaining complete ownership of IMTT in
2014, Macquarie also stopped providing granular capacity information about St. Rose—its largest terminal—but instead disclosed only the aggregate capacity
for the “Louisiana Terminals,” a category that included St. Rose and three other terminals.
78. Finally, after acquiring IMTT, Macquarie
ended its historical practice of disclosing its growth
capital expenditures for each operating segment,
providing only Company-wide growth capital expenditures. The Exchange Act Defendants understood that
this information was particularly critical to investors:
as Defendant Davis stated on August 31, 2017, Macquarie’s “attractive gains in cash flow generation, both
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cash flow generation and dividend growth” depended
on the “effective execution” of growth capital.
79. At the JPMorgan Energy Equity Investor Conference on June 26, 2017, Defendant Stewart acknowledged that Macquarie’s filed financial statements were
“not particularly helpful when it comes to determining
the cash generated by the enterprise.”
C.
The Exchange Act Defendants Conceal
That Macquarie’s “Total Return Opportunity” Is Not Sustainable
80. Contrary to their statements to investors, the
Exchange Act Defendants knew that Macquarie could
not sustain the dividend that it sold investors on.
81. Specifically, the Exchange Act Defendants
knew, but concealed from investors, that IMTT relied
heavily on the involvement of it [sic] largest terminal,
St. Rose, in a commodity that was widely known to be
in decline: “No. 6 fuel oil.” No. 6 fuel oil refers to a
broadly defined group of heavy and residual fuel oils,
sometimes simply known as “heavy” or “residual” fuel
oil, that are generally what is left in the bottom of the
barrel at the end of the petroleum refinement process.
82. As a result of its concealed reliance on No. 6
fuel oil, Macquarie would lose revenue as the No. 6 fuel
oil market dried up and contracts failed to renew, lose
more revenue as it had to take St. Rose tanks offline,
and then spend substantial capital to “repurpose”
those tanks—all of which cannibalized the cash flow
that Macquarie needed to fund the dividend promised
to investors.
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1.
The No. 6 fuel oil industry faces a
“paradigm shift.”
83. IMTT had become heavily involved in storing
No. 6 fuel oil in the 1970s. FE-2 and FE-1 explained
that, during that time, IMTT had built at its St. Rose
facility four massive tanks, each with a capacity of
500,000 barrels and a diameter larger than a football
field, specifically with the intention of storing No. 6
fuel oil. FE-2 and FE-1 both stated that also around
this time IMTT built eight additional 250,000 barrel
tanks at St. Rose, which FE-2 said were also dedicated
to No. 6 fuel oil. (FE-1 recalled that at least some were
dedicated to No. 6 fuel oil.) FE-1 stated that building
these tanks turned out to be a “major turning point”
and “huge overall change in direction and scope” for
IMTT—and ultimately transformed IMTT from a “relatively small and sleepy” company to a “force in the
industry” worldwide.
84. During the 1980s, FE-2 said, St. Rose became
“the big gorilla” in the Port of New Orleans / Port of
South Louisiana market for independent storage of
No. 6 fuel oil. Since that time, however, use of No. 6
fuel oil has declined significantly:
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85. As explained by a December 9, 2011 “Today in
Energy” article by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, “[c]hanges on both the residual fuel supply and demand side of the equation are contributing
to the downward trend” in consumption.
86. Supply was reduced because more competitive
alternatives were developed, causing refineries to focus operations to maximize production of those more
profitable products, including by installing ‘cokers,’ devices that convert No. 6 fuel oil, thereby reducing the
amount of No. 6 fuel oil at the source.
87. Meanwhile, demand was reduced because domestic and international governments, municipalities,
and institutions increasingly took steps to ban or heavily limit the use of No. 6 fuel oil as a result of its numerous noxious qualities, including that it contains
high amounts of pollutants such as sulfur; requires
specialized heating systems for storage and use; degrades slowly; and complicates cleanup efforts with its
viscous and sticky nature.
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88. These efforts had a significant impact on the
market for No. 6 fuel oil. In a June 11, 2013 presentation at the 10th Annual Bunker and Residual Fuel Oil
Conference, Tod D. McGreevy of industry consultants
Muse, Stancil & Co. noted that “The U.S. power sector
has all but eliminated residual oils as a fuel source,”
and stated that “Last year U.S. heavy product demand
continued the downward trend that has been firmly in
place since 2005, declining by more than 18% year on
year.” McGreevy also noted that, “[i]n response to declining domestic demand, U.S. refiners have reduced
production of heavy fuel oil – Aggregate production of
fuel oil is down by more than 35 percent since early in
the last decade.”
89. By the start of the Class Period, the primary
remaining users of No. 6 fuel oil were large shipping
vessels—so much so that it is at times referred to
simply as “bunker fuel.” In a June 2014 article titled
“Implications of Residual Fuel Oil Phase Out,” Dr. David Ramberg of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology noted that, while “[m]ost, if not all, developed
economics prohibit burning high-sulfur fuel oil” (i.e.,
No. 6 fuel oil), “the decline in residual fuel oil usage is
masked by increase in its use as a fuel for maritime
bunkering.” 7
7 http://www.usaee.org/usaee2014/submissions/onlineproceedin
gs/implications%20of%20rfo%20 phase%20out-ramberg&vanva
ctor.pdf
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90. However, Dr. Ramberg wrote, “the bunker
market is poised for big changes by 2020.” Dr. Ramberg was referring to actions taken by the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), the United Nations agency charged with regulating global shipping.
In response to heightening environmental concerns, in
2005 the IMO put into force Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships (“MARPOL”), which would phase in increasingly
stricter sulfur caps for shipping vessel fuel beginning
with an immediate limit of 4.5%. In October 2008, the
IMO revised MARPOL Annex VI with strengthened
requirements, including a 3.5% sulfur limit beginning
in 2012.
91. However, because the sulfur content of even
the heaviest fuel oil (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil) typically only
goes up to 3%, these limits were considered easy to
comply with and had very attenuated impacts on the
global markets. MARPOL Annex VI’s next and last
global sulfur limit, also adopted in October 2008, will
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be far more dramatic: a sulfur cap of 0.5% to begin by
the start of 2020, commonly referred to as “IMO 2020.”
92. It is widely understood that IMO 2020 will effectively eliminate the use of No. 6 fuel oil for global
shipping—the only sustained demand for the commodity—and therefore vastly reduce the overall demand
for No. 6 fuel oil. For example, in 2014, Dr. Ramberg
concluded that, given current trends, “total residual
fuel oil demand will drop by nearly half ” as a result
of IMO 2020.
93. Similarly, in its Medium-Term Market Report,
dated February 11, 2015, the International Energy
Agency wrote that, “The marine industry had long
been one of the last strongholds of high-sulphur residual fuel oil (RFO) [i.e. No. 6 fuel oil] demand, but international regulations are catching up with the sector,” and IMO 2020 “will greatly lighten the quality of
the global demand barrel as most shippers . . . are expected to switch from RFO to lower-sulphur marine
gasoil to meet the tighter standards.” The report also
predicted a “fuel oil collapse as bunkers switch to
lower sulphur fuels” as a result of IMO 2020.
94. The October / November 2014 issue of Bunkerspot, a periodical about the bunker fuel industry,
explained that a downward trend in No. 6 fuel oil was
already underway, writing that, as IMO 2020 “comes
closer into view . . . owners and operators [of marine
vessels] have been notably proactive in making the
shift to ‘greener’ shipping . . . a momentous—and
costly—transition[.]”
95. Consequentially, IMO 2020 will not just impact
global shipping, but rather all those involved in the
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supply chain for No. 6 fuel oil. On June 25-26, 2015,
S&P Global Platt’s hosted its annual Bunker and Residual Fuel Oil Conference. Among other speakers,
fuel industry consultant Turner, Mason & Company
gave a presentation entitled “The Outlook for Residual
Fuel Production in 2020” at an industry conference, in
which it discussed how the “[u]pcoming shift to low
sulfur bunker fuel in 2020 [will] present problems and
challenges for ship owners and refiners.”
96. According to a July 30, 2015 article by
MFame.com, a bunker fuel industry observer, as a result of the radical decrease in demand for heavy fuel
oil “[c]ome 2020,” “[m]any refineries are putting up
coking plants to use up surplus heavy fuels”—in other
words, getting rid of No. 6 fuel oil as it is created, and
thereby reducing the supply that might need storage
by bulk liquid terminal operators like IMTT.
97. Most dramatically, industry observer Seatrade
Maritime News described IMO 2020 in 2017 as ushering in “not step changes but brutal changes” that required “paradigm shifts on ship engines” and, in particular, a “need for huge logistics involving transport
between refineries, storage and delivery vessels.”
98. Indeed, since its 2013 Form 10-K filed on February 14, 2014, World Fuel Services Corp.—a fuel distributor that also operates storage facilities—has
listed IMO 2020 as an example of an “adverse condition[]” that could “reduce the demand for our products
and services” and “have a material adverse effect on
our business or on the businesses of our customers.”
Macquarie made no such disclosure.
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2.
By the beginning of the Class Period, investors are unaware of
IMTT’s exposure to the “brutal
changes” in the No. 6 fuel oil industry.
99. By the start of the Class Period, the market
was well aware of the declining use of No. 6 fuel oil and
even its coming ultimate demise from IMO 2020. For
example, in an article dated October 9, 2015, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration wrote that
“Health and environmental concerns related to the
high sulfur content of residual fuel oil (RFO) have led
to new policies and regulations that have significantly lowered expectations for future RFO use
globally. As the demand for RFO declines, the need
for the refining upgrades to convert residual material
to lighter, cleaner products will increase.”
100. Undisclosed to investors, declines in the No. 6
fuel oil industry had apparently already begun to impact IMTT. FE-3, an IT Operations Support / Network
Engineer at IMTT’s St. Rose facility from 2011-2016
relayed that, at IMTT’s Christmas luncheon at the end
of 2015, employees were told things were “a little bit
bleak,” and IMTT was not where it wanted to be as far
as customers buying storage as opposed to moving out
of storage. FE-3 recalled that IMTT attributed this to
general industry trends.
101. On the day that the Class Period begins, February 22, 2016, the International Energy Agency published a Medium-Term Oil Market Report, stating that
IMO 2020 was “due to come into force on 1 January
2020” and “will have global repercussions,” including
that “infrastructure will have to be constructed and
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adapted . . . involv[ing] the reconfiguration of
storage tanks to hold clean products rather than
fuel oil.”
102. However, only the Exchange Act Defendants
knew that—unlike the rest of the industry, which had
gradually shifted from No. 6 fuel oil in response to the
declining market—Macquarie remained incredibly reliant on the commodity. In reality, as was revealed after the end of the Class Period, No. 6 fuel oil was the
largest category of product stored by IMTT, amounting to at least 17.3 million barrels, or 40% of IMTT’s
total 45 million barrels of capacity.
103. Until that disclosure, Macquarie had last
acknowledged its exposure to No. 6 fuel oil in 2012—
nearly four years before the start of the Class Period—
as New York City was in the midst of implementing its
own high-profile ban on No. 6 fuel oil.
104. In 2011, New York City estimated the 1% of
city buildings burning No. 6 and other heavy fuel oils
caused 86% of the City’s building-related soot pollution. As a result, New York City issued regulations in
2011 requiring buildings to convert to cleaner alternatives. The use of No. 6 fuel oil was nearly completely
phased out by June 30, 2015, and as a result the use of
No. 6 fuel oil across the New York area fell dramatically.
105. Against this backdrop, Defendant Hooke
acknowledged during Macquarie’s May 3, 2012 earnings call that “[w]e’ve all read the articles” about ongoing “uncertainty” in oil production, and stated that
there may be an impact on the “demand for storage of
heavy oil residual product” (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil).
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However, Hooke said, IMTT could shift to storing the
clean products in increasing demand (as a result of the
shift to clean fuel oil), with “a one-off increase in capital expenditures to convert the heavy product tanks to
service the clean product.” Hooke said that “[t]hese
sorts of conversions have been completed before, including at Bayonne,” and would be beneficial because
“the storage rates for gasoline are higher than for residual product.” However, Hooke said, the Exchange
Act Defendants’ strategy was to continue to watch the
market—“to wait and see[.]”
106. In Macquarie’s next earnings call, on August 2,
2012, Defendant Hooke updated investors on the Exchange Act Defendants’ monitoring, stating, “While
the liquid hydrocarbon business is constantly evolving,
and we see this evolution continuing in the Gulf Coast,
the New York market is certainly more nuanced than
normal.” Based on their assessment, Hooke stated, the
Exchange Act Defendants “don’t see an immediate
need to convert large amounts of existing heavy oil
storage at Bayonne [IMTT’s second largest terminal,
after St. Rose] to clean products.”
107. However, before the end of the year, the Company told investors that they had changed their minds.
On November 1, 2012, Defendant Hooke told investors
that the Company had “continue[d] to access [sic] the
desirability of converting some residual product storage at Bayonne,” and “[o]ver the past couple of months
we’ve concluded that it would be IMTT’s long-term
best interests to begin to convert a portion of the
residual oil storage at Bayonne to clean product
storage” because “[w]e can achieve decidedly better
rates on clean product storage and we believe that reducing the amount of six oil in New York harbor will
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enhance pricing for that product.” As a result, Hooke
said, IMTT would be converting “some 1.2 million barrels of storage capacity at Bayonne from residual oil
or six oil to two oil,” a lighter grade fuel. Defendant
Hooke reminded investors that doing so would “involve[] cleaning the tanks and related pipes so we incur some up front OpEx to facilitate higher storage
rates on the new contracts.”
3.
During the Class Period, the Exchange Act Defendants conceal
IMTT’s reliance on No. 6 fuel oil.
108. Defendant Hooke’s discussion in 2012 of converting No. 6 fuel oil tanks would be the last time that
the Exchange Act Defendants would publicly discuss
the storage of No. 6 fuel oil was stored in IMTT’s tanks
until near the end of the Class Period, when Defendant
Davis explicitly and falsely told investors that “very
little” of IMTT’s storage is in “heavy product” (i.e.,
No. 6 fuel oil), among other similar comments to investors.
109. Otherwise, the Exchange Act Defendants only
generically disclosed that half of IMTT’s storage capacity was used for “refined petroleum products,” which
refers to a broad variety of products, ranging from
No. 6 fuel oil to gasoline and kerosene. Particularly
given that, in 2012, Hooke had discussed shifting from
No. 6 fuel oil at IMTT’s second-largest facility, Bayonne, and also acknowledged then that they saw the
“evolution continuing in the Gulf Coast,” investors reasonably interpreted the Exchange Act Defendants’ silence about No. 6 fuel oil to mean that IMTT’s Louisiana Terminals on the gulf coast—including IMTT’s
largest terminal, St. Rose—did not materially rely on
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the storage of No. 6 fuel oil but instead conformed with
the general shift and continuing evolution away from
the commodity.
110. The Exchange Act Defendants affirmatively reinforced investors’ wrong understanding by making
false and misleading statements that IMTT had limited exposure to macroeconomic pressure, implicitly
referencing trends such as the global decline in No. 6
fuel oil.
111. On the first day of the Class Period, February
22, 2016, Macquarie issued a press release in which
Defendant Hooke told investors that IMTT was “uncorrelated with the exploration and production
(E&P) portion of the oil industry.” Macquarie made a
similar claim in its 2015 Form 10-K filed the next day,
that the “essential services nature of the business and
continued strong demand for the products
stored” by IMTT offset any risk from “uncertainty
among industry participants” because of “sizeable and
largely unforeseen volatility in petroleum product
prices.”
112. Defendant Hooke continued to emphasize this
message during an earnings call the next day, stating
that [sic] IMTT’s utilization remains high [and] firm
commitments are up . . . . But none of this should come
as a huge surprise. This is not a business that is
sensitive to what is going on in the exploration
and production, or in interstate product movement.” Hooke further downplayed any impact to IMTT
from changing petroleum demand in particular. While
acknowledging that IMTT has “some sensitivity to
end-user demand,” Hooke said that sensitivity was
“least in the petroleum segment of its operations.”
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Finally, Hooke concluded that, “In short, we feel confident in the continued stable contribution from IMTT
to our overall results. The Business is simply not [a]
macroeconomically sensitive enterprise . . . . [W]e
run unsexy businesses with limited volatility.”
113. The Exchange Act Defendants continued to
make similar claims as the year went on. On May 2,
2016, in connection with the release of Macquarie’s
first quarter 2016 results, Defendant Hooke described
IMTT and Macquarie’s other operating segments as
“fundamentally sound businesses, operating in segments of the economy that are proven to be quite robust over the long-term” and delivering the “stable
performance for which the asset class is known.”
114. During a Macquarie investor day on May 12,
2016, Defendant Courtney—IMTT’s CEO—also misled investors about IMTT’s susceptibility to the global
changes in No. 6 fuel oil demand, stating, “Most of the
problems that are happening right now is affecting the
upstream, crude, exploration and the gathering. For
us, we are kind of downstream. Our assets are in a different part of the logistics and distribution chain.”
115. Defendant Courtney—who according to FE-1
“absolutely” had “constant contact with customers,
contracts, and trends”—also told investors that IMTT
“only deal[s] with major oil companies, major chemical
companies, utilities, major agricultural companies. We
have few other customers. We’ve got them very well.”
Courtney also stated, “there have to be catastrophic
[sic] for those ports not to be busy.”
116. Defendant Courtney further affirmatively misled investors about IMTT’s considerable storage of
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No. 6 fuel oil by stating that “our assets and our infrastructure” give IMTT the “flexibility” and “optionality” to change when “one day our customer . . . want
gasoline in his tanks, next day he may want distillate.”
To the contrary, FE-2 explained that cleaning the
“sticky, gooey” No. 6 fuel oil from tanks was “difficult,
time consuming, and expensive.” Only after the end of
the Class Period did Macquarie provide the following
timeline for repurposing these tanks, showing that it
could take up to nine months to repurpose tanks—
during which time the tanks require millions in capital
expenditures while generating no revenue themselves:
117. Moreover, both FE-2 and FE-1 explained that
the sheer size of some of IMTT’s No. 6 fuel oil tanks at
St. Rose limited their use. This is because storage imposes fixed costs proportionate to the size of the tank,
irrespective of the volume of material actually stored
inside. As a result, FE-2 explained that the 12 massive
tanks that IMTT had built at St. Rose specifically to
store No. 6 fuel oil—four 500,000 barrel tanks and
eight additional 250,000 barrel tanks—had become
largely “obsolete” for storing anything less sulfurous
than No. 6 fuel oil, because no such commodities trade
in sufficient volumes to make economical the high
fixed costs of using those tanks. FE-1 similarly said it
was “unequivocally a huge marketing challenge” to get
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any products lighter than No. 6 fuel oil (the heaviest
fuel oil) stored in IMTT’s “monster” 500,000 barrel
No. 6 fuel oil tanks at St. Rose. Because those “monster” tanks were not easily repurposed or re-contracted, FE-1 said any “disturbance in the force”—
even a “sneeze”—concerning those tanks immediately
got attention, and contract renewal efforts began at
least a year in advance of contract expiration.
118. On August 30, 2016, Defendant Davis told an
audience at the Three Part Advisors IDEAS Investor
Conference that IMTT is “dealing in refined products
and demand for refined products has likely been
quite strong.” By referencing the demand for refined
products as a general category, Davis misled investors
about IMTT’s reliance on storing No. 6 fuel oil, the demand for which had been declining for years—and was
about to plummet even further.
4.
Just weeks after IMO 2020 is confirmed, Macquarie Management
profits from nearly $235 million in
sales to investors.
119. As the fourth quarter 2016 began, the fuel oil
industry braced for confirmation that IMO 2020 would
come into effect as planned. In an article dated October 4, 2016, Reuters wrote:
The global shipping industry is bracing for a
key regulatory decision that could mark a
milestone in reducing maritime pollution, but
which could nearly double fuel costs in a sector already reeling from its worst downturn in
decades . . . .
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The issue has been brewing for more than a
decade and shippers said the industry was
now bracing for tighter regulation to be introduced sooner rather than later due to political
pressure . . . .
For traded oil markets, the shift to lowsulfur fuel will “substantially reduce demand for bunkers in the run up to 2020
and increase demand for gasoil and alternative fuels including LNG,” said
Christopher Haines, head of oil and gas at
BMI Research.
120. On October 27, 2016, the IMO announced that
it had concluded its review and, as expected, formally
fixed the global 0.5% cap on sulfur in bunker fuel to
begin in 2020.
121. The IMO’s decision was widely reported. For
example, in an article published on October 27, 2016,
Reuters quoted Alan Gelder of energy consultancy firm
Wood Mackenzie as discussing “how disruptive this is
going to be,” and that “refineries will need to run in a
way they have never run before . . . . Refineries that do
not have the ability to convert the fuel oil into higher
quality products will struggle to remain profitable as
this big outlet for lower-quality fuel disappears.”
122. According to S&P Global Platts’ October 2016
special report, the IMO’s October 2016 decision had an
immediate impact on demand: “Although we won’t
know the full price impact of the decision until we
reach 2020, the forward curves are already pricing in
the likelihood of a dramatically different fuel oil
market.”
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123. On October 31, 2016, Dr. Rudy Kassinger published an article for industry consultants Turner, Mason & Company entitled, “2020 or 2025: The Decision
Has Been Made.” In it, Dr. Kassinger wrote, “While
this move was widely expected . . . [t]his forthcoming
change is the equivalent of opening Pandora’s
Box.” Dr. Kassinger also said that the “recent IMO decision . . . will be one of the dominant issues facing the
global refinery industry in the next ten years.”
124. Yet, in its earnings call the next day, on November 1, 2016, Macquarie did not mention IMO 2020.
Instead, Defendant Hooke continued to suggest that
IMTT was immune to these sorts of dramatic shifts in
the market, stating:
[C]ontracts for storage and services at IMTT
continued to renew for longer durations than
they had been early in the year. This suggests
that producers, refiners, shippers and others
probably believe that commodity prices going
forward will not be either as low or as volatile
as has been the case over the last couple of
years. Remember, none of MIC’s businesses
are exposed directly to the price of crude
oil or petroleum products.
125. During that call, Defendant Hooke also spoke
personally about efforts to secure renewals in IMTT’s
storage contracts, stating that the Exchange Act Defendants’ “first emphasis [in contract renewals] is adding tenor to customer contracts, and then our emphasis would be adding pricing. And then our emphasis
after that would be on adding capacity . . . . [W]e continue to make nice progress on adding tenor to the contracts, so I’m sort of pleased with that.” Hooke also
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showed his awareness of contract renewals on a granular level, discussing how contract renewal “varies
terminal to terminal, product category to product category, chemicals are a little different than petroleum.”
126. Particularly in light of the momentous recent
developments for IMO 2020, the implication of Hooke’s
statements was clear even without explicit reference—
IMO 2020 did not pose any risk to IMTT or Macquarie.
127. This implication is even clearer by comparison
to statements made around this time by other operators of liquid storage terminals. For example, just days
earlier, the CEO of World Fuel Services Corp., a fuel
distributor that also operates storage facilities, discussed the company’s ability to “navigate through” the
“significant amount of changes coming into the marketplace” from IMO 2020, which is “certainly is going
to change the fuel diet. It’s going to become more complex. You’re going to have global imbalances in terms
of various products.”
128. Similarly, during a November 7, 2016 earnings
call for Vopak—the company that previously operated
IMTT in a partnership with the Coleman family, and
which Macquarie had identified as one of IMTT’s
“main terminal operation competitors”—its CFO discussed “the implications for global imbalances of diesel
and fuel oil” as a result of IMO 2020, which he said
raised the questions “what does it mean for the storage
of the products?” and “what we are doing . . . as a business?”
129. However, because the Exchange Act Defendants had concealed Macquarie’s heavy reliance on
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No. 6 fuel oil (and thereby its exposure to IMO 2020)—
and, further, misleadingly told investors that it was
macroeconomically protected—investors did not believe that Macquarie was facing the same questions
posed by Vopak, and prices of Macquarie common
stock actually climbed to Class Period highs during
this time. For example, on October 5, 2016—the day
after Reuters wrote about the industry bracing for IMO
2020—Macquarie reached its second-highest Class Period price of $85.
130. Then, on November 1, 2016—just days after
IMO 2020 was confirmed, and the same day as Hooke
assured investors that “none of MIC’s businesses are
exposed directly to the price of . . . petroleum products”—Macquarie stock climbed to its all-time Class
Period high of $85.45.
131. Within days, on November 3, 2016, the Exchange Act Defendants announced the Offering: a secondary public offering of 2,870,000 shares of Macquarie common stock by Macquarie Management,
comprising nearly 40% of Macquarie Management’s
holdings.
132. The Offering was conducted pursuant to the
Company’s existing shelf registration statement filed
with the SEC on April 5, 2016 (the “Registration Statement”), as updated by a prospectus supplement dated
November 3, 2016 (the “Prospectus Supplement”; with
the Registration Statement, the “Offering Documents”). The Offering Documents did not discuss
IMTT’s reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, IMO 2020, or even
the decline in No. 6 fuel oil generally. In fact, the Offering Documents remarkably suggested that “strict
environmental regulations” benefitted IMTT by
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providing one of “several barriers” to entry that protected IMTT from competition. In reliance on these
statements in the Offering Documents, investors purchased over $235,053,000 in Macquarie common stock
from Macquarie Management.
133. By comparison, beginning with its 2013 Form
10-K filed on February 14, 2014, World Fuel Services
Corp.—a fuel distributor that also operates storage facilities—has explicitly discussed IMO 2020 in its
Forms 10-K as an example of an “adverse condition[]”
that could “reduce the demand for our products and
services” and “have a material adverse effect on our
business or on the businesses of our customers.”
134. As 2016 ended and 2017 began, the bulk liquid
storage industry at large continued to discuss the impact of IMO 2020 and the declining No. 6 fuel oil market. For example, on December 19, 2016, the storage
industry periodical Tank Storage Magazine devoted a
full article to IMO 2020, describing it as “A Significant
Change For All Supply Chain Players.”
135. Then, on February 8, 2017, Tank Storage Magazine stated that a survey of 171 storage operator industry experts “highlight[ed] that operators are very
mindful of ever-stringent environmental standards,
such as the recent International Maritime Organisation decision regarding sulphur fuel content[.]”
136. On February 18, 2017, Vopak—the company
that previously operated IMTT in a partnership with
the Coleman family, and which Macquarie had identified as one of IMTT’s “main terminal operation competitors”—disclosed in its 2016 Annual Report listed
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IMO 2020 as a “key theme” that its “overall business
environment in 2016 has been influenced by.”
137. Later that month, on February 21, 2017, during its earnings call, Galp Energia—a corporation
whose business includes, among other things, the storage of liquid fuels—described IMO 2020 as a “disruption that [Galp] will face across all the industry,” and
explained that consequentially the company was “taking in consideration that we are addressing the challenges of new conversion capacity”—“This is a trend
and we have to fine tune our strategy . . . . [W]e
have to start to keep that in our mind and progressively allocate CapEx to this new economy . . . . So we
have to be working and competing on that space.”
138. The next day, on February 22, 2017, Tank Storage Magazine published in its first issue of the year an
editorial entitled “An Unpredictable Market,” stating
that “2017 could throw up its fair share of surprises for
the global market—particularly with . . . moves towards implementing the IMO’s 2020 marine fuel
cap[.]”
139. By that time, IMTT was already underway attempting to renew expiring No. 6 fuel oil contracts.
FE-4—who began working at IMTT in 1982, and later
reported directly to IMTT CFO (and Macquarie Management employee James May) as a Director of Insurance Risk—stated that, by the time he left IMTT in
February 2017, IMTT was already working on the renewals of the various No. 6 fuel oil contracts, and
would have been starting to get a feel of customers’
needs. FE-4 also said that—consistent with FE-1’s information—Defendant Courtney would have renegotiated the contracts.
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140. Nonetheless, Macquarie’s 2016 Form 10-K,
filed February 21, 2017, simply rehashed similar boilerplate risk factors as its prior year Form 10-K, claiming that the “essential services nature of the business
and continued strong demand for the products
stored” by IMTT offset any risk from “uncertainty
among industry participants” because of “historically
low and volatile petroleum product prices.”
141. Particularly in light of IMO 2020’s confirmation—and the concurrent impact on the market, described above—the Exchange Act Defendants’ decision
to repeat these generic risk disclosures told the market
that IMTT had no exposure to IMO 2020 or the decline
of the No. 6 fuel oil industry generally.
142. The Exchange Act Defendants continued to affirmatively mislead the market about IMTT’s protection from market trends. During Macquarie’s first
earnings call of the year on February 22, 2017, Defendant Hooke misleadingly told investors that “[s]torage
prices were stable” and affirmatively said that there
was “nothing we see coming down the pipe” that
would cause utilization to “revert to historically normal levels . . . we have every incentive to keep those
tanks as full as we can, and we will.”
143. In contrast, on March 31, 2017, Odfjell—which
Macquarie had previously identified as one of IMTT’s
“main terminal operation competitors”—published its
2016 annual report, in which the company stated that
it “must carefully consider consequences of the new requirements on sulphur emissions coming into effect
from 2020[.]”
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144. Nonetheless, on May 10, 2017, Defendant Davis discussed IMTT at an Oppenheimer Industrial
Growth Conference, and again did not discuss IMO
2020 specifically but instead assured investors that
IMTT’s storage and logistics services were secure, with
“no commodity exposure other than the very
broad macroeconomic factors influencing supply
and demand more broadly.”
145. Defendant Davis made similar misleading
statements one week later, during the May 18, 2017
Three Part Advisors East Coast Investor Conference.
Discussing IMTT, Davis stated, “There is no commodity exposure directly, other than that it results
from macroeconomic factors influencing supply and
demand more broadly.” Davis also conspicuously omitted No. 6 fuel oil from his description of refined petroleum products stored by IMTT: “A little over half of the
capacity . . . is in service for petroleum products, specifically refined petroleum products of gasoline,
diesel, heating oil, things of that nature.”
146. Defendant Davis also made other misleading
statements at the May 18, 2017 conference. For example, in response to a question about “environmental . . .
issues that arise out of the operation of this kind of
business,” Davis acknowledged that such issues are
“an important consideration,” but did not discuss IMO
2020 or other environmental concerns pushing the industry away from No. 6 fuel oil.
147. In addition, Defendant Davis misled investors
by stating that, “the easiest way to think of [IMTT] is
as a multimodal distribution hub for liquid products.
This is not the place where you would store it if
you’re playing contango or backwardation
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games. This is a distribution center for these
products.” 8 This statement further suggested that
IMTT was insulated from market fluctuations by conveying that IMTT’s customers were not speculative
commodity traders.
148. All the while, the tank storage industry at
large continued to focus on IMO 2020. On June 12,
2017, Tony Quinn of TankBank International (an international advisory and professional networking organization for bulk liquid storage) discussed the impact of IMO 2020 as part of a presentation called “A
Global Perspective on Liquid Storage” that he gave at
the International Liquid Terminals Association
(“ILTA”) 37th annual 2017 International Operating
Conference & Trade Show. Senior IMTT employees
certainly knew of, if not attended, Quinn’s presentation: IMTT’s COO throughout the Class Period, Michael Burgett, personally helped “shape the conference
program content” as a member of the 2017 Conference
Advisory Committee, and other IMTT personnel also
presented at the conference, including Rene Gurdian
(IMTT’s Regional Terminal Manager, based at IMTT’s
headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana) and Jordan
Blasi (IMTT Fire Chief).
149. Later that month, on June 27, 2017, Defendant
Stewart spoke at the JPMorgan Energy Equity Investor Conference. With the industry and investors focused on IMO 2020, Stewart boasted that IMTT
8 “Backwardation” and “contango” are industry terms referring to
the relationship between the current (spot) and futures prices of
commodities. Backwardation is when the current price is higher
than a future cost, and is seen as a sign of higher immediate demand. Conversely, contango is when the futures price is higher
than the spot price.
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“benefits from stable, generally growing demand” and
that “the opportunity set at IMTT is as good as it has
been in quite some time,” with frequent “requests for
additional capacity and capability.” Notably,
though Defendant Stewart did not address the decline
in No. 6 fuel oil explicitly, he was asked specifically
about the “renewal risk” in the “bulk liquid storage
market in general” given “the current environment,”
and responded that “the market is one that’s in relative equilibrium at the moment.”
5.
As IMTT’s utilization begins to fall,
Macquarie acquires Epic Midstream in a largely-stock transaction.
150. By the end of the second quarter 2017, the increasing decline in demand for No. 6 fuel oil began to
drag down IMTT’s utilization, falling to 94%, down
from 96% year-over-year. Nonetheless, during Macquarie’s earnings call for the quarter, on August 3,
2017, Defendant Hooke told investors that IMTT remained “a case of steady as she goes” and emphatically denied that there were “any commodity-driven
factors that would cause a decline in utilization,” stating:
No, no. The totality of the change in utilization was driven by tanks offline for tank
cleaning and inspection. But the other I would
– so there’s no – well, there’s nothing – there’s
no other commodity noise or other noise
or counter-party issues there. It’s purely
that.
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151. Defendant Hooke’s outright denial that any
“commodity-driven factors” threatened IMTT’s utilization contrasted dramatically with statements made
the very same day in the earnings call for PBF Energy,
a petroleum refiner and supplier. During that call,
PBF Energy’s CEO stated that IMO 2020’s impact on
the market is “going to be significant . . . for a period
of time . . . . I think it’s a very, very significant thing
going forward.”
152. This contrast between Hooke’s emphatic assurances during Macquarie’s earnings call and the larger
market assessment so misled investors that, in its report dated August 3, 2017, SunTrust remarkably
wrote that it actually “expect[s] a slight uptick in
[IMTT’s] utilization for the remainder of the year.”
153. In fact, at this time in particular, the Exchange
Act Defendants needed the market’s continued belief
in Macquarie’s strength (including Macquarie’s commitment to its dividend): on the same day as they disclosed IMTT’s slip in utilization, the Exchange Act Defendants also announced that Macquarie was acquiring Epic Midstream (“Epic”) for $171.5 million, to be
paid largely in shares of Macquarie stock. Similar to
IMTT, Epic operates a portfolio of storage terminals—
but, unlike IMTT, Epic was protected against the fallout in the heavy fuel oil industry because it principally
stored jet fuel, including for the Department of Defense as part of a longstanding relationship. Accordingly, Epic offered Macquarie a chance to buffer the
Company against IMO 2020—as Defendant Hooke
would later acknowledge, “jet fuel is the sort of reason
for Epic.”
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154. The use of stock to fund the majority of the
transaction reflected the Exchange Act Defendants’
growing awareness that Macquarie was facing a capital shortfall as IMTT would require enormous expenditures to repurpose the tanks that had been dedicated
to storing No. 6 fuel oil. In fact, FE-5, Epic’s Chief
Commercial Officer from Feb 2016 to August 2017,
participated in meetings with Macquarie and IMTT
employees in early 2017—including Defendant Courtney—and recalled that Macquarie sought to fund the
purchase entirely with stock.
155. Accordingly, it was critical that the Exchange
Act Defendants maintain the value of Macquarie’s
stock even in the face of the declining utilization rate.
When the Epic Acquisition finally closed on August 8,
2017, Macquarie ultimately issued 1,650,104 shares of
Macquarie stock for the Epic Acquisition—meaning
each share was valued at approximately $75.75. In
contrast, when the truth became known, the price of
Macquarie shares would plummet 50% of that value,
to just $37.41 per share. In other words, but for the
Exchange Act Defendants’ false and misleading statements and omissions, the Exchange Act Defendants
would have had to have issued up to twice as much
stock to complete the purchase.
156. On August 31, 2017, Defendant Davis participated in the Three Part Advisors Midwest IDEAS Investor Conference, where Davis stated that only Macquarie’s Atlantic Aviation segment had “exposure to
cyclicality or macroeconomic sensitivity . . . [Atlantic
Aviation is] definitely the one business in the portfolio
that has more or a greater potential to have macroeconomic sensitivity.” Davis also described as a “misperception” that Macquarie had “issues or potential
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exposures” from “volatility in the commodity price . . .
given the basic services nature of the visibility we have
into the cash-generating capacity of these businesses.”
D.
The Exchange Act Defendants Continue
To Falsely Tout IMTT’s Utilization And
Promise Macquarie’s Dividend Even As
Customers Cancel Valuable No. 6 Fuel
Oil Storage Contracts
157. Just one month after completing the Epic Acquisition, on September 11, 2017, Macquarie unexpectedly announced that Hooke would step down as
CEO in early 2018. The news surprised investors,
who—as one analyst stated during Macquarie’s earnings call two months later—“kind of always envisioned
[Hooke] being at MIC for life, it felt like.” However,
months later, as the truth about the Exchange Act Defendants’ fraud became known, some analysts began
to see the timing of Hooke’s departure as something
more suspicious: for example, in its February 22, 2018
analyst report, J.P. Morgan noted that, “in the first
quarter after the departure of former CEO James
Hooke,” there was a “sharp departure from prior messaging” around “underlying business issues.”
158. In connection with the release of its third quarter 2017 earnings in November 2017, Macquarie reported that it was lowering its 2017 free cash flow
guidance to 9%, rather than the 10-15% previously
provided, and disclosed that IMTT’s utilization had
continued to decline, now to 92.7% (down year-overyear from 96.7%). Nonetheless, Macquarie announced
that it raised its quarterly dividend yet again, consistent with its guidance that the dividend would grow
10%.
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159. During Macquarie’s November 2, 2017 earnings call—Hooke’s last—Hooke forcefully downplayed
the drop in IMTT utilization as related only to cleaning
tanks, and stated that, “[i]n general, IMTT’s operating
results for the third quarter and year-to-date periods
were stable.” During the November 2, 2017 earnings
call, Hooke also dismissed an analyst’s suggestion that
Macquarie might “pivot towards what the market values and not as much maximizing dividend growth but
more retaining cash flow,” stating:
Exuberant dividend growth at all costs where
people were urging us to guide to 7 years’ visibility of 20% plus dividend growth, we never
did that. People slashing their dividend
saying we’re going to slash our dividend
to deploy capital internally, I don’t think
you’ll see us do that. . . .
[Y]ou’ve never seen us make radical lurching
changes of, sort of, revisiting capital policy
and dividend policy, et cetera. I would be
pretty surprised if anything changes going
forward . . . .
[E]verything we’ve done to date, we can fund
without going to the market for more capital
. . . we fund–that standard 350 of growth
CapEx.
160. As throughout the Class Period, Defendant
Hooke’s statements contrasted significantly with those
of their competitors. For example, just days later during its November 6, 2017 earnings call, Vopak—the
company that previously operated IMTT in a partnership with the Coleman family, and which Macquarie
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had identified as one of IMTT’s “main terminal operation competitors”—stated that “the fuel oil market
structure remains challenging for our customers,
mainly due to uncertainty around long-term demand
for high sulfur fuel oil cost by the uncertain fuel oil demand implications of IMO 2020. In addition, the fuel
oil market is in backwardation, not stimulating any
additional trading activities. The uncertainties around
the exact IMO 2020 consequences is a global phenomenon affecting the whole industry from suppliers to traders, bunkering agencies, ship owners and also tank storage companies.”
161. At the end of the November 2017 earnings call,
as the Officer Defendants had throughout the Class
Period, Defendant Hooke invited investors to personally contact Defendant Davis. In fact, Macquarie
would later disclose that Defendants engaged in “in
excess of 1,200 individual interactions with current and potential shareholders” during 2017, including “investor interactions in November 2017” after
the earnings call.
162. Many of these direct communications were motivated by a decline in Macquarie’s stock price,
prompting several investors to specifically inquire
about IMTT’s storage of heavy fuel oil and exposure to
IMO 2020.
163. For example, as Defendants frequently referred to, they participated in numerous roadshows
during the Class Period. (See, e.g., ¶50.) During these
presentations, which were at times attended and/or
hosted by analyst firms covering Macquarie during the
Class Period, Macquarie representatives were directly
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asked about IMO 2020, and responded that the Company did not see IMO 2020 as a big impact on IMTT.
164. Similarly, in September 2017, an institutional
investor told Defendant Davis that this investor
learned from one of Macquarie’s competitors that No. 6
fuel oil was 20% of IMTT’s capacity, and that the market for No. 6 fuel oil was weak at the time and specifically had “some real structural challenges given” IMO
2020. During a phone call with this investor on September 22, 2017, Davis responded (as he did with other
investors) that IMO 2020 should not have much of an
impact on Macquarie and in fact could end up a positive for the Company. Davis also said that, if needed,
Macquarie could convert IMTT’s tanks for a nominal
amount.
165. In other instances, the Officer Defendants
falsely told investors that IMTT stored only half of the
amount of heavy oil (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil) that it actually
stored, and further minimized the consequences of
that exposure. For example, on or around this time,
Defendant Davis directly told an investor that No. 6
fuel oil was only a small percent of IMTT’s utilization.
166. Similarly, on November 10, 2017, Defendant
Davis—Macquarie’s head of investor relations—sent
the following in response to a question from Lead
Plaintiff:
[Lead Plaintiff:] What percent of IMTT’s
storage is in heavy oil? We heard new regulations are coming out in 2020 that prevent
fuel ships from using heavy oil unless improved scrubbers are also installed to clean
exhaust – how will this impact demand for
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heavy oil? Can heavy oil storage tanks be easily converted?
[Davis:] About 20%. Your information is consistent with our understanding of the proposed regulatory changes. The regs will require Sulphur content to move from a max of
3% today to .5% - what we are seeing in our
facility is already at about 1.5%. Some ships
will install scrubbers and continue to burn the
less expensive, high Sulphur product. Since
you cannot not produce black oil, going forward some of it will be blended with distillate
to meet the new spec, refiners will also look
for way to crack the #6, or the product will be
exported for power gen (or purposes other
than ship propulsion) in other parts of the
world. The latter could well be a positive for
storage demand at IMTT-Bayonne given the
deep water access at the facility.
Heavy tanks can be converted and we have
converted some in the past – in late 2012 we
converted about 1.2mm bbls of heavy storage
to distillate. There is a maintenance capex
cost associated with cleaning the tanks and
associated pipes, and potentially a growth
capex spend for new capability (floating roof,
for example) depending on the end use.
167. One week later, on November 16, 2017, Defendant Davis participated in another Three Part Advisors
IDEAS Investor Conference, during which he similarly
(and falsely) assured investors by misrepresenting
IMTT’s exposure to No. 6 fuel oil, stating that “[a] little
over 1/2 of [IMTT’s] capacity is in service in petroleum
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products, and as I say, very little of that is in crude or
asphalt, any -- or heavy product”—and stating that
the Exchange Act Defendants have “very good visibility into the cash generating capacity of this business
over a longer period of time.”
168. On November 28, 2017, Macquarie hosted a
dinner on November 28, 2017 for approximately a
dozen institutional investors, including Lead Plaintiff.
At this dinner, which was attended by Defendants
Hooke, Stewart, and Davis, as well as Macquarie’s
then-COO and future-CEO, Mr. Frost, the Officer Defendants told Lead Plaintiff and the other guests that
Macquarie would have continued dividend growth in
2018, citing among other things that IMTT would
serve as a “growth driver for 2018” as a result of pricing and operational improvements expected to drive
EBITDA margins higher.
169. In December 2017, the Exchange Act Defendants gave an investor presentation entitled “Overview
of the IMTT Segment,” in which they stated that
IMTT’s “[c]onsistently high utilization reflects essential services nature of IMTT’s services,” while any
“[u]nused capacity is generally attributable to tank inspections, repairs, and modifications.”
170. In fact, reconciling Macquarie’s later disclosures indicates that significant No. 6 fuel oil storage
contracts had not renewed by the beginning of November, at the latest, causing IMTT’s utilization to decline
to below the oft-stated historical average before Defendants’ reassuring statements discussed above. Specifically, Macquarie later disclosed that IMTT utilization at the end of the third quarter 2017 was 93.2%,
while the utilization at the end of the fourth quarter
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was 89.6%. To reconcile that decline with the reported
average utilization rate for the fourth quarter of 90.6%
means that there must have been at least 66 days of
89.6% utilization rate, or that the decline started as
early as October 25, 2017.
171. Nonetheless, the Exchange Act Defendants did
not disclose the contract non-renewals or give anything other than positive indications for IMTT, Macquarie, and the Company’s dividend.
E.
Throughout The Class Period, The Market Relied On The Exchange Act Defendants’ Misrepresentations About
IMTT
172. Throughout, the market took note of the Exchange Act Defendants’ claims about IMTT as positive
signs for the Company and its dividend.
173. For example, in its analyst report just before
the start of the Class Period, on January 11, 2016, J.P.
Morgan concluded that “Macquarie does not possess
the same commodity price exposure and volumetric
risk as others in our coverage universe . . . we believe
investors should flock to, not flea from, MIC’s niche
businesses that diversify away from riskier portions of
energy infrastructure. . . . Among all stocks under coverage MIC remains a favorite.”
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174. J.P. Morgan’s January 11, 2016 report also
noted “macroeconomic sensitivity” as a risk only for
Atlantic Aviation—not the Company’s other operating
segments, such as IMTT. J.P. Morgan would continue
to state similarly in reports throughout the Class Period, including on November 1, 2016.
175. For example, in an analyst report dated May
12, 2016, Oppenheimer discussed Macquarie’s “bullish
investor day,” and stated that Defendant Courtney
“presented a positive outlook [for IMTT] even in a
somewhat challenged energy environment. While
lower prices have affected sentiment, the business remains rock-solid.”
176. Similarly, in its analyst report dated October
31, 2016, Oppenheimer wrote that IMTT’s “core business outperformed . . . . Utilizations now stand at
~96.7%, reflecting strong demand across the petroleum storage markets. . . . We continue to believe the
company can grow its dividend double digits, as organic growth remains healthy[.]”
177. An analyst report by Wells Fargo issued just
weeks later, on November 18, 2016, also confirmed the
effectiveness of the Exchange Act Defendants’ deception: though the report discussed regulatory risks to
Macquarie’s Hawaii Gas segment, it did not discuss
any similar risk to IMTT—instead stating that, “[d]espite significant exposure to oil as a commodity, oil
prices do not have a significant impact on cash flow as
IMTT primarily works with downstream products. Refined oil product use tends to increase as oil prices (and
gas prices) drop.” Ultimately, the report concluded,
“We consider the dividend to be secure, with 8+% annual growth potential. Finally, we consider MIC’s
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management team to be knowledgeable and contemplative, with a conservative approach[.]”
178. Similarly, on March 20, 2017, SunTrust Robinson Humphrey initiated analyst coverage of Macquarie with a “Buy” rating. SunTrust noted that IMTT
provided 47% of Macquarie’s free cash flow with “longterm fee-based contracts provide the segment with
generally stable cash flows and MIC works to minimize any additional sources of risk to the business
model . . . minimizing its risk to commodity movements.”
179. Finally, in its June 26, 2017 analyst report, J.P.
Morgan wrote that IMTT “continues to play the biggest role in MIC growth . . . [and] remains the key
driver of MIC’s ongoing growth.”
V.
THE TRUTH EMERGES
180. On February 21, 2018, after the close of trading, Macquarie announced disappointing fourth-quarter earnings of $0.43 per share, well short of analysts’
prior estimate of $0.51 per share. In addition, IMTT’s
fourth quarter utilization rate was just 90.60% in the
fourth quarter, ending the year at 89.6%—far below
the consistently affirmed “historical mean” utilization
rate of 94%.
181. Macquarie also revealed a stunning collapse in
its free cash flow: rather than the 10-15% growth in
free cash flow that it had consistently guided investors
to expect—or even the downward revision to 9% free
cash flow growth that it gave in November 2017—Macquarie’s free cash flow increased only 8%. Remarkably,
Macquarie also now stated that it expected its free
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cash flow to decline by 8-10% during 2018—far from
the 10-15% growth guidance previously provided.
182. Most alarmingly, Macquarie revealed that it
would be cutting its quarterly 2018 dividend guidance
by 31%—ending over four years of consecutive quarterly dividend growth—primarily to fund the repurposing of IMTT fuel oil tanks to accommodate new
products. The earnings announcement quoted Macquarie’s new CEO Frost as stating, “[W]e have made
the decision to reduce our 2018 dividend in favor of
internally funding the repurposing of the assets
at International-Matex Tank Terminals and to
take advantage of the incentives to invest in growth
projects that are a part of recent tax reform.”
183. In Macquarie’s earnings call the following day,
Frost blamed all this bad news on one culprit: No. 6
fuel oil.
184. For the first time, Macquarie acknowledged
the “structural decline in the 6 Oil market,” a “broadly
defined group of residual and heavy oils” for which,
Frost said, “[p]rices are in backwardation, demand for
the product is declining and less of it is being produced
domestically as a consequence of the shale revolution
and the lighter feedstocks going to U.S. refineries.”
185. However, even as Frost acknowledged the
truth—that “it is well known to the market that 6 oil
is a declining market”—Frost suggested that IMTT’s
tumbling utilization somehow uniquely caught Macquarie off-guard, stating: “In December and early January, a number of customers terminated contracts for
a significant amount of 6 Oil capacity at IMTT’s facility in St. Rose. Not only did they terminate those
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contracts, in some cases, they shut down their operations and exited the industry.” Frost said this “was
quite sudden and it did happen to a number of contracts, whether the notice period came up. And it is
quite common that these do occur at the end of the
year. But it was something that was a surprise.”
186. In reality, investors were the ones who were
surprised. The Exchange Act Defendants had not once
during the Class Period disclosed or even hinted at the
importance of the No. 6 fuel oil segment to IMTT and
to the Company’s overall performance, nor had the Exchange Act Defendants ever revealed that “many” of
IMTT’s “long-term customers” were storing No. 6 fuel
oil—a product for which, as Frost accurately stated,
“the long-term trend . . . has been well understood” to
be in decline. To the contrary, the Exchange Act Defendants had, as recently as November 2017, actively
misrepresented that the Company had “very little” involvement in heavy fuel oils. Further, throughout the
Class Period, the Exchange Act Defendants had consistently reassured investors that these were exactly
the sorts of market forces that IMTT was shielded
against, such as when Defendant Hooke told investors
on February 22, 2017—shortly after IMO 2020 was
confirmed to proceed on schedule, immediately causing disruption in the No. 6 fuel oil market—that there
was “nothing we see coming down the pipe” that
would cause utilization to “revert to historically normal levels”—much less the lowest utilization that
Macquarie had ever publicly reported, as it had now
fallen to.
187. Former employees FE-2 and FE-1 also expressed outright skepticism at management’s purported “surprise” in February 2018. FE-1 stated that
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management’s explanation “doesn’t ring true,” because “it defies logic that the decline in No. 6 fuel oil
markets snuck up on them in one quarter”—the decline of an oil product like No. 6 fuel oil does not occur
overnight and such a trend does not “show up between
quarters.” FE-1 said bluntly that FE-1 “flat-ass
[doesn’t] believe there was a change in market that
caught them off guard and came on overnight.” Because demand for IMTT’s tanks had historically been
robust, FE-1 stated that Macquarie would have seen a
decline in demand coming, noting in particular that
Defendant Courtney was “absolutely” in “constant contact with customers, contracts, and trends.” Further,
FE-1 explained, because St. Rose’s “monster” 500,000
barrel tanks built to store No. 6 fuel oil could not be
“easily repurposed or re-contracted,” FE-1 said any
“disturbance in the force”—even a “sneeze”—concerning those tanks immediately got attention, and contract renewal efforts began at least a year in advance
of contract expiration.
188. Similarly, FE-2 stated his understanding that,
from a marketing standpoint, IMTT—a “100%” Macquarie show—would have been monitoring the length
of its contracts and making sure their customers were
satisfied, and would have had some feel for how long a
customer is “destined” to stay or go.
189. In fact, FE-4 confirmed that, by February 2017,
IMTT was already working on the renewals of the
No. 6 fuel oil contracts.
190. FE-1 and FE-2 also both confirmed that Defendant Courtney—IMTT’s CEO during the Class Period—would have been up to date on IMTT’s involvement in No. 6 fuel oil. FE-1, who personally knew
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Defendant Courtney, said that Courtney’s strength is
knowing the market, the customers and the facility’s
tanks, and can talk “for hours” about which tanks are
in service and what each customer is doing. FE-1 said
that Courtney is “assuredly” as up to date on the No. 6
fuel oil market as anyone, and “absolutely” had “constant contact with customers, contracts, and trends.”
191. FE-2 reported directly to Defendant Courtney
during 2015 and stated that Courtney would generally
know that IMTT was storing a lot of No. 6 fuel oil. FE-2
stated that he would oversee the preparation of
monthly reports on the utilization and in- and out-flow
of St. Rose’s storage tanks that would indicate whether
those tanks stored No. 6 fuel oil, and these reports
were provided to Courtney as well as IMTT’s CFO (and
Macquarie Management employee) James May. FE-2
also stated that Courtney and IMTT CFO / Macquarie
Management employee May occasionally participated
in monthly reporting meetings at IMTT, during which
any abnormalities in IMTT’s storage tanks’ throughput would be discussed.
192. What’s more, while Frost and Defendant Stewart attempted to downplay the loss of these IMTT customers as “an issue having to do with one product, in
one market, in one of our businesses,” the guidance for
projected utilization rates made clear the broader significance of No. 6 fuel oil to IMTT. After years of telling
investors to expect a historical mean of 94%, Macquarie now revealed that they expect utilization to
“average in the mid-80% range.”
193. The contrast was jarring: just months earlier,
investors had heard that IMTT would revert to its historical utilization average of around 94% and that
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IMTT would be a growth driver for 2018, but now
heard that a stunning decline in utilization would be
“the primary driver behind the year-on-year [projected] decrease in EBITDA.”
194. The explanation for the projected utilization
rate was almost as jarring. Frost claimed that the
lower guided utilization rate resulted from “spen[ding]
a considerable amount of time reviewing those contracts that are expected to come up for renewal.” This
revelation called into question what the Exchange Act
Defendants had been doing in the contract renewal efforts they had positively discussed throughout the
Class Period—all while consistently reaffirming
IMTT’s projected utilization—as Defendant Hooke had
done on November 1, 2016, when he personally asserted, “[W]e continue to make nice progress on adding
tenor to the contracts, so I’m sort of pleased with that.”
195. In addition, Frost’s explanation that “it is quite
common that these [contract renewals] occur at the
end of the year” made all the more misleading that, as
2017 drew to a close, the Exchange Act Defendants
had affirmed IMTT’s projected utilization and the
Company’s stability generally, knowing that a significant number of contracts for the storage of No. 6 fuel
oil—a commodity facing “brutal changes” and for
which demand had been declining—were up for renewal.
196. Discussing the decision to cut the dividend,
Frost stated:
We’ve spent the last month looking at various
options for dealing with this issue in 2018.
They all lead us back to one conclusion, we
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need to repurpose some of the IMTT tanks
into the storage and handling of bulk liquids
other than 6 Oil. This is nothing new. IMTT
has repurposed tanks opportunistically in response to changing market conditions. We believe, we are better off repurposing these 6 Oil
tanks now, given the long-term structural decline of this product . . . .
As a consequence of recent changes in demand, the handling of 6 Oil at St. Rose, we
now expect IMTT’s contribution to our 2018
results to be down . . . . We are reducing our
forecast 2018 dividend to $1 per share per
quarter. The capital retained as a result of reducing the dividend will be used to strengthen
our balance sheet and fund the portion of the
projects that we believe will generate incremental federal income tax shield and contribute to growth in cash generation in the future . . . .
Among these are expected to be the repurposing of some of IMTT’s tanks to take advantage
of favorable growth trends in certain bulk liquids.
197. Once repurposed, Frost said, Macquarie would
still “have exposure to the 6 Oil . . . [b]ut the type of
customer that we are likely to have exposure to, we believe will provide more stability in terms of 6 Oil revenues.”
198. Again, these revelations sharply contrasted
with the Exchange Act Defendants’ statements during
the Class Period, such as Defendant Hooke’s
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statement in May 2016 that IMTT was a “fundamentally sound business[], operating in segments of the
economy that are proven to be quite robust over the
long-term.”
199. In addition, the “favorable growth trends” that
Frost said that IMTT would look to take advantage of
were not recent trends, but in fact had been known and
identified since well before the Class Period—including by Defendant Hooke himself in 2012.
200. During the Class Period, the Exchange Act Defendants had repeatedly told investors that Macquarie
could fund its continued growth in part with its ample
credit facilities—for example, on February 21, 2017,
Defendant Hooke had told “the conspiracy theorists”
that the Exchange Act Defendants could deliver dividends while continuing to fund growth given Macquarie’s “$1.4 billion of available credit.” Now, however, Frost explained that Macquarie’s weakened economic state from IMTT’s concealed dependence on
No. 6 fuel oil left the Company “limit[ed] to using internally-generated resources” to “deploy[] capital into
attractive new projects, particularly those related to
the repurposing of IMTT,” which he said was “the
highest priority for us at the moment.”
201. The news shocked the market, and in response
Macquarie’s stock price fell over 41% in a single trading day, from $63.62 per share on February 21, 2018,
to $37.41 per share on February 22, 2018—a decline of
over 54% from the Offering price of $81.90 per share.
202. In its analyst report dated February 21, 2018,
RBC Capital Markets wrote: “The customer losses,
dividend cut and strategic re-purposing of IMTT come
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as a surprise to us as IMTT utilization was holding up
decently in 2017 (and peers had not indicated this level
of potential future distress).”
203. In its report dated February 22, 2018, J.P. Morgan was even more critical about the “significant shift
in the outlook for IMTT,” writing that “IMTT woes surprise . . . IMTT utilization declined to 90.6% in 4Q17,
below the 92-94% historical range previously . . . . The
rapid decline comes as a surprise given mgmt’s
prior steadfast commentary on the strength of the
business.” Overall, J.P. Morgan concluded, “MIC
likely moves into a ‘show me’ camp for investors.”
204. Similarly, in its report dated February 22,
2018, Alembic Global Advisors—who had hosted Defendant Davis for a roadshow just two months prior,
on December 11-12, 2017—wrote that the “surprisingly disappointing.” Noting the revelation that “[a]
global shift in the production and consumption of refined petroleum products” would impact “IMTT’s overall storage demand and price,” Alembic wrote that,
“[p]ost 3Q17, management was quite optimistic
about IMTT, so we were taken aback by its sudden
weakness—this, a business long-viewed as MIC’s most
stable asset” and its “bellwether.”
205. Finally, in its report dated February 23, 2018,
Wells Fargo downgraded its rating for Macquarie
stock, writing that “management’s credibility has
been called into question – as recently as December
the dividend was described as ‘sacrosanct’ to us.”
VI. POST CLASS PERIOD EVENTS
206. On May 3, 2018, Macquarie conducted an earnings call in which CEO Frost provided additional
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detail on the decline in IMTT’s utilization and the decision to reduce MIC’s dividend.
207. First, Frost made clear that the Company’s
February 2018 disclosures about No. 6 fuel oil referred
to heavy and residual oil generally, stating that in February “we used the word 6 Oil as a shorthand for a
range of heavy and residual oils rather than discussing
the specifics of a number of subcategories.”
208. Then, for the first time, Frost revealed that
“IMTT’s customers are a mix of commodity traders and
system players, customers who use IMTT storage and
handling facilities as part of production processes or
supply chains.” In fact, Frost continued, “[o]ver time,
both the Lower Mississippi and Bayonne facilities
have had a meaningful contingent of commodity
traders as customers, as much as 20% both by contract
number and lease capacity. Commodity traders typically move in and out of the market based on shortterm opportunities.” This revelation facially contradicted several claims made by the Exchange Act Defendants during the Class Period, including that IMTT
“only deal[s] with major oil companies, major chemical
companies, utilities, major agricultural companies. We
have few other customers” (¶115), and that “[t]his is
not the place where you would store it if you’re playing
contango or backwardation games. This is a distribution center for these products” (¶147).
209. The materiality of those false and misleading
statements was further emphasized by Frost’s revelation that, while purportedly “a substantial majority of
IMTT customers are system players,” “the counterparties who did not renew their [No. 6 fuel oil] contracts
were mainly commodity traders, not system players.”
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210. Frost also further elaborated on the timing,
amounts, and location of the No. 6 fuel oil contract nonrenewals, stating:
Over the course of the fourth quarter, approximately 1.6 million barrels of storage capacity
was not renewed. Additionally, in December
2017, IMTT was notified by 7 major commodity traders that contracts for approximately
1.8 million barrels of storage capacity coming
up for renewal in December and January
would not be renewed . . . . In addition, we
were notified that another 1.6 million barrels
currently under contract would only be under
contract through the middle of December
2018 as a result of a refinery closure[.]
[T]he capacity involved was located at IMTT’s
St. Rose facility.
211. Frost also explicitly linked Macquarie’s declining fortune to IMO 2020, stating that the commodity
traders “exited the market as a consequence of a backwardation in heavy and residual oils. We believe heavy
and residual oils are in backwardation in part as a result of the uncertainty surrounding the implementation of new regulations related to low sulfur fuel oil in
2020. Because they don’t need the storage per se, traders have low barriers to exit.”
212. In addition, in connection with that May 3,
2018 earnings call, Macquarie released an investor
presentation, filed with the SEC in a Form 8-K, which
revealed that, as of March 31, 2018, heavy and residual oils were the largest product type stored by IMTT,
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amounting to 17.3 million of IMTT’s total 45 million
barrels of capacity, or nearly 40%.
213. The presentation also stated, “Two third of existing [Heavy & Residual] capacity located in the
Lower Mississippi River,” where IMTT’s St. Rose terminal is located. Further, a footnote to the presentation revealed that this information was as of March 31,
2018—i.e., prior to the calamitous fall in utilization
and costly repurposing of, according to Frost, 1.3 million barrels of No. 6 fuel oil storage that Macquarie began in response to the non-renewals. In other words,
No. 6 fuel oil was likely half if not more of IMTT’s
storage capacity during the Class Period, and at a minimum well over 40% at the time that the Exchange Act
Defendants told investors the amount was “about
20%” (¶166) and “very little” (¶167). Indeed, even the
amount that Frost told investors that Macquarie
would “rightsize[]” heavy and residual capacity to—14
million barrels, or approximately 31% of the
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capacity—still exceeded what Defendants told investors during the Class Period.
214. The presentation also revealed something
else—though the Exchange Act Defendants had, on
February 22, 2018, claimed that repurposing IMTT’s
tanks “is nothing new,” information now provided by
Macquarie suggested otherwise:
215. Specifically, the chart above makes clear that
IMTT’s earlier drops in utilization that the Exchange
Act Defendants purportedly corrected through repurposing were both far milder (i.e., stayed closer to the
historical utilization average) and lasted only a brief
time. In contrast, Macquarie now predicted a fardeeper—and much longer lasting—impact to utilization as a result of the concealed No. 6 fuel oil exposure.
216. Analysts at Wells Fargo—who had previously
written that management’s credibility was called into
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question—were not swayed by the new disclosures,
writing on May 4, 2018 that, “[w]hile the Q1 report offered additional transparency into the underlying
businesses, most notably IMTT, we believe that MIC
remains a ‘show me’ as management looks to restore
credibility with the investment community.”
217. In May 2018, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (“ISS”), a proxy advisory firm retained by
investment funds to advise on shareholder votes, issued a report recommending that Macquarie shareholders vote against Defendant Hooke and the Company’s two other current directors—Norman Brown
and George Carmany—for re-election to the Board of
Directors. Citing a “credibility crisis,” ISS wrote in its
report that the “[t]he extent of the one-day stock price
drop [on February 22, 2018 (¶201)], which wiped out
more than $2 billion in shareholder value, suggests, at
a bare minimum, a failed communications strategy.”
218. ISS also took particular aim at the Company’s
explanation for IMTT’s declining utilization, calling it
“weak[]” and stating that Macquarie “has thus far
failed to provide a conclusive, fact-based argument
that definitively disproves the . . . assumptions or calculations” indicating that the Company must have
known of the contract non-renewals earlier than December 2017 (¶170). ISS criticized the Company’s refusal to provide utilization details as creating “mistrust,” and also stated its alarm at “the fact pattern
surrounding the Q4 earnings release” in February
2018 that disclosed the truth about the Officer Defendants’ fraud (¶¶180-205), stating that “[a]nnouncing
such an abrupt shift in the company’s dividend strategy – which the board claims to have thoroughly
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debated – less than two months after a management
changeover first announced in September 2017 further
undermines shareholder confidence in the board’s
long-term focus.”
219. On May 16, 2018, Macquarie held its annual
shareholder meeting, during which Frost further elaborated on IMTT’s involvement in storing No. 6 fuel oil,
stating:
At the Lower Mississippi, we have a class of
customers, which are either commodity traders or blenders that would trade or blend the
6 Oil product or a subcategory of this heavy
and residual oil. There is increasing uncertainty with respect to the global demand
for that product as a result of the impending introduction of this IMO 2020, which
is going to require the world fleet to burn
lower sulfur fuel. And given these are traders or blenders who would buy this product,
mix it with other products and then sell it,
given this uncertainty, it has been very difficult for these operators to make money. And
therefore, they are exiting the business or
exiting the industry and, therefore, are
no longer demanding storage or handling facilities with respect to this business. . . . [T]hat is why we are looking at repurposing some of the storage and handling
facilities, which deal with this heavy and residual oil, into these cleaner products because
we’re seeing a growth market in that.
220. Frost’s explanation again contradicted numerous of the Exchange Act Defendants’ statements
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during the Class Period as discussed above, including
as to the types of IMTT’s customers and the purported
stability of IMTT’s business in the face of now
acknowledged “increasing uncertainty with respect to
the global demand” for No. 6 fuel oil. Frost’s statement
also even more thoroughly linked IMTT’s decline to
IMO 2020 and the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil.
221. Also at that May 16, 2018 meeting, the Chairman of Macquarie’s Board of Directors (and Securities
Act Defendant) Martin Stanley explained further the
relation of Macquarie’s dividend cut to IMTT’s No. 6
fuel oil exposure, stating that there “were a whole series of things that we took into account at the point
that we made the decision to reduce the dividend, and
it wasn’t taken lightly. . . . We took into consideration
the things that were going on with respect to IMTT in
terms of the softening that we were seeing there and
the cancellation of contracts. Not only the cancellation
of certain contracts in the back end of last year but also
a deep view of what was going on into the future.”
222. On September 5, 2018, Defendant Hooke resigned from Macquarie’s Board of Directors.
223. On October 31, 2018, in response to shareholder concerns, Macquarie announced revisions to its
management services agreement with Macquarie
Management. Pursuant to these revisions, Macquarie
Management capped the amount of fees it received at
no greater than 1% of Macquarie’s market capitalization, and also waived fees to the Company’s debt and
future investments. Macquarie also announced that
its CEO and CFO—employees of Macquarie Management—will be required to purchase and maintain a position in Macquarie not less than six times and two
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times their base compensation, respectively. In its
press release announcing the change, Macquarie
stated that its Board’s Compensation Committee “will
participate to a greater extent in an annual process
with the Manager of setting performance objectives,
evaluating actual performance, and providing input to
the Manager on annual compensation decisions.”
224. In its October 31, 2018 “Flash Comment,”
Wells Fargo—who had earlier written that management’s credibility was in question—wrote that it
viewed the “shareholder friendly changes” “favorably,”
but “question[ed] whether they will be enough to flip
investor sentiment towards the stock and the structure in general.”
225. On November 15, 2018, Defendant Davis spoke
at the Three Part Advisors Southwest IDEAS Conference, during which he again linked IMTT’s decline in
utilization to IMO 2020. Discussing IMTT’s shift from
No. 6 fuel oil, Davis stated that, “Historically, most
of that has been used in power generation and
ship propulsion, but the rules around ship propulsion are changing. We had some traitors in that
marketplace leave us. And we said, rather than sit
with empty capacity, we’re going to put it back into
service, but it’s going to be in clean petroleum, chemicals project -- products or agricultural products, get
out of the heavy and resid.”
226. On February 20, 2019, Macquarie released its
fourth quarter and full-year 2018 financial results.
The disclosure revealed that IMTT utilization in the
fourth quarter 2018 was 82%—dramatically lower
than the historical mean of 94% that the Exchange Act
Defendants had guided during the Class Period, and
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even lower than the “mid-80% range” that Macquarie
guided after the truth emerged in February 2018. Macquarie also revealed that at least 1.3 million barrels of
IMTT storage capacity were out of service for nearly
the entire year, with less than half coming back into
service only in December 2018, to carry out the repurposing required by its concealed reliance on No. 6 fuel
oil storage. Due to IMTT’s utilization decline and lower
storage rates, IMTT’s 2018 EBITDA was down 12.1%
versus 2017—and Macquarie forecasted that IMTT
EBITDA would decline another 12% in 2019.
VII. THE EXCHANGE ACT DEFENDANTS’
FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS
AND OMISSIONS
227. During the Class Period, Defendant Macquarie
and the Officer Defendants each made materially false
and misleading statements and omissions, which were
disseminated to investors in the Company’s SEC filings, press releases, conference calls and investor
presentations. These misrepresentations and omissions concealed, among other things, (a) IMTT’s anticipated loss of revenue from the storage and heating of
No. 6 fuel oil, a commodity comprising well over 40%
of IMTT’s refined petroleum storage capacity, which
was scheduled to be largely phased out of its primary
use by 2020; (b) the need to undertake significant capital expenditures to repurpose IMTT’s unused No. 6
fuel oil storage tanks, which would cost hundreds of
millions of dollars of capital expenditures and lost revenue; and (c) the falsity of statements concerning Macquarie’s growth plan that hinged on the sustainability
and stability of Macquarie’s “sacrosanct” quarterly
dividends, which were made possible throughout the
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Class Period by Macquarie’s and the Officer Defendants’ misrepresentations.
A.
The Exchange Act Defendants’ Materially False And Misleading Statements
And Omissions In Earnings Releases,
Conference Calls And Investor Presentations Concerning The Company’s Reliance On No. 6 Fuel Oil And Dividend
Growth Plan
1.
Fourth Quarter and Year End 2015
Misrepresentations
228. On February 22, 2016, the first day of the Class
Period, Macquarie issued a press release announcing
its financial results for the fourth quarter and full-year
2015. This press release was filed the next day, February 23, 2016, as an exhibit to a Form 8-K signed by
Defendant Hooke. In the press release, Macquarie
stated:
Macquarie
Infrastructure
Corporation
(NYSE:MIC) announced its financial results
for the fourth quarter and full-year 2015 including an authorization of the payment of a
cash dividend for the fourth quarter of 2015 of
$1.15 per share ($4.60 per share annualized).
For the full year 2015, dividends paid by MIC
increased by 14.7% compared with 2014.
MIC’s fourth quarter 2015 dividend will be
paid on March 8, 2016 to shareholders of record on March 3, 2016. MIC has increased its
cash dividend in each of the last nine quarters.
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229. In the press release, Hooke discussed the dividend, stating, “We are pleased to have grown our dividend in excess of our guidance.” Hooke continued,
“What is most pleasing is that the increase has been
underpinned by substantial growth in the Free Cash
Flow generated by our businesses. That growth has
been achieved despite the volatility in markets
broadly and reinforces a basic premise of infrastructure – namely, that it is an inherently more
stable asset class.” Hooke commented on Macquarie’s dividend guidance, stating that “Given our
pipeline of growth projects, and assuming the continued stable performance of our businesses, we are confident in our ability to deliver value to our shareholders in the form of an attractive rate of
growth in our dividend.”
230. The Company described in the press release
that “[r]efined petroleum product storage and handling represents approximately 55% of IMTT’s total
revenue,” but did not break down in any detail the
types of refined petroleum product stored by IMTT.
Defendant Hooke continued, “[t]he performance of
IMTT in both the quarter and the full year periods reflects the downstream services nature of the business
overall, as well as the extent to which it is uncorrelated with the exploration and production (E&P)
portion of the oil industry,” and that “[w]hile upstream E&P companies are under considerable financial pressure, the vast majority of the hydrocarbons
stored at IMTT have already been refined. Given the
refined product focus, IMTT saw no signs of counter-party distress during 2015.”
231. The above statements (¶¶229-230) were materially false and misleading, omitted material facts, and
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lacked a reasonable basis when made. For example, it
was misleading for Defendant Hooke to state that
IMTT was “an inherently more stable asset class” and
that he “saw no signs of counter-party distress during
2015” when in truth, the downward trend in the use of
No. 6 fuel oil—a primary source of IMTT’s revenue—
and imminent further restrictions on its use posed a
direct threat to Macquarie’s “attractive rate of growth”
and quarterly dividends. Moreover, it was materially
misleading for Hooke to state that “IMTT saw no signs
of counter-party distress” in its refined products when,
in reality, the Company concealed that nearly half of
its “refined petroleum product storage and handling”
was tied to heavy fuel oils, and specifically No. 6 fuel
oil, the use of which had been in decline and for which
the only sustained demand, marine shipping, was set
to be largely phased out in the coming years. By electing to speak publicly about the demand for fuel storage, the stable nature of the business, and the flexibility of the Company’s storage services—and thereby
putting these subjects into play—Defendants had a
duty to fully, completely, and truthfully disclose all
material facts regarding this subject so as not to mislead investors. As a result of the foregoing undisclosed
material facts, Defendants’ public statements lacked a
reasonable basis when made and were materially false
and misleading at all relevant times.
232. The next day, on February 23, 2016, Defendants Hooke and Davis participated in Macquarie’s
earnings conference call, during which Hooke made
additional false and misleading statements. Hooke
stated that “While the world around us is volatile and
excited, MIC’s businesses have been boringly predictable. That is just the kind of unsexy business
model we want.” Hooke continued, discussing IMTT
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and stating: “This is not a business that is sensitive
to what is going on in the exploration and production, or in interstate product movement. It is a
business that has some sensitivity to end-user demand, but least in the petroleum segment of its operations.” Hooke affirmed to investors that Defendants “feel confident in the continued stable contribution from IMTT to our overall results,” that
IMTT “is simply not [a] macroeconomically sensitive enterprise,” and that “in aggregate, we run unsexy businesses with limited volatility.”
233. Defendant Hooke’s statements in the above
paragraph (¶232) were materially false and misleading, omitted material facts, and lacked a reasonable
basis when made. It was misleading for Defendant
Hooke to stated that Macquarie’s businesses were
“boringly predictable,” “unsexy,” and with “limited volatility,” and that IMTT had little sensitivity to “enduser demand” in the “petroleum segment,” and was
“simply not [a] macroeconomically sensitive enterprise,” when in reality, and unknown to investors (but
as ensuing admissions confirmed), well over 40% of
IMTT’s terminal tanks were devoted solely to the storage and handling of No. 6 fuel oil—a primary source of
IMTT’s revenue, the use of which had been in decline
and for which the only sustained demand, marine
shipping, was set to be largely phased out in a few
years. As Macquarie later admitted, those specialized
No. 6 oil tanks could not be refurbished or repurposed
to store and handle any other lighter, more salable fuel
without the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars over the course of many months. These statements
were also false and misleading because the football
field-sized tanks used to store and heat No. 6 fuel oil
were unsuitable for any other use absent the
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investment of hundreds of millions of dollars spent in
repurposing, leaving Macquarie’s “contribution from
IMTT to [its] overall results” anything but stable and
assured. By electing to speak publicly about the demand for fuel storage and the stable and “boringly predictable” nature of the business—and thereby putting
these subjects into play—Defendants had a duty to
fully, completely, and truthfully disclose all material
facts regarding this subject so as not to mislead investors. As a result of the foregoing undisclosed material
facts, Defendants’ public statements lacked a reasonable basis when made and were materially false and
misleading at all relevant times. Analysts commented
on Macquarie’s misleading statements. Oppenheimer
reported on February 22, 2016 that “[m]anagement
highlighted the stability of refined product mix (55%
vs. ~3% for crude/asphalt). It also reported no signs of
counterparty distress during 2015.” Wells Fargo reported on February 23, 2016 that “the company increased its quarterly dividend rate to $1.15/share, up
2% from the prior quarter--this is the 9th consecutive
quarter of dividend increase. Dividend yield is 7.3% on
the current share price. Year-over-year, MIC’s dividend increased +14.7% and management reiterated its
prior guidance with respect to dividend growth and expects to distribute between $5.00-5.10/sh in 2016. We
believe the dividend growth rate is sustainable in the
medium term without major acquisitions or an increase in leverage. The outlook should be a positive to
investors that appeared concerned that core operations were deteriorating or that MIC was going to get
aggressive with acquisitions – it doesn’t appear either
are happening based on the Q4’15 results and commentary from management.”
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234. Moreover, on March 23, 2016, J.P. Morgan issued a “Model Update” on Macquarie, following an investors’ meeting with Defendant Hooke and “other
members of MIC management.” In that report, J.P.
Morgan reported that “We walked away confident in
MIC’s strong positioning during this difficult market
environment. The company retains numerous levers to
achieve the stated dividend growth (~13% for 2016)
and payout targets (75-85%), while keeping leverage
healthy (~4x debt/EBITDA) and continuing to develop
a high quality growth backlog.”
2.
2016 Misrepresentations
235. On May 12, 2016, Defendants Hooke, Davis,
and Courtney participated in Macquarie’s Investor
Day corporate analyst meeting, during which Defendant Courtney spoke about IMTT’s Lower Mississippi
ports, stating, “there have to be catastrophic [sic] for
those ports not to be busy.” He continued:
[W]e are the best service provider, we pride
ourselves in our assets and our infrastructure . . . . We have to have flexibility because we will change from -- one day our customer, one day he want[s] gasoline in his
tanks, next day he may want distillate. We
have to have the flexibility, we have to
have the optionality for traders.
236. Defendant Courtney’s statements in the above
paragraph (¶235) was materially misleading. It was
misleading for Defendant Courtney to represent that
IMTT had “flexibility” and “optionality” in its Louisiana terminal tanks when, in reality and unknown to
investors (but as ensuing admissions confirmed), well
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over two-thirds of IMTT’s Louisiana terminal tanks
were devoted solely to the storage and handling of
No. 6 fuel oil—a petroleum product that secretly constituted well over 40% of IMTT’s storage capacity and
was a primary source of IMTT’s revenue, the use of
which had been in decline and for which the only sustained demand, marine shipping, was set to be largely
phased out in a few years. As Macquarie later admitted, those specialized tanks could not be refurbished or
repurposed to store and handle any other lighter, more
salable fuel without the expenditure of hundreds of
millions of dollars over the course of many months.
What’s more, both FE-2 and FE-1 explained that the
sheer size of IMTT’s No. 6 fuel oil tanks at St. Rose—
seve
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