Joint Appendix — Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Moab Partners, L.P., et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 13, 2023

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No. 22-1165

In the Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE CORP., JAMES HOOKE,

JAY DAVIS, LIAM STEWART, RICHARD D. COURTNEY,

ROBERT CHOI, MARTIN STANLEY, NORMAN H. BROWN,

JR., GEORGE W. CARMANY, III, HENRY E. LENTZ, OUMA

SANANIKONE, WILLIAM H. WEBB, and MACQUARIE

INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT (USA) INC.,

Petitioners,

v.

MOAB PARTNERS, L.P., ET AL.,

on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated,

Respondents.

____________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

____________________

JOINT APPENDIX

____________________

LINDA COBERLY

Winston & Strawn LLP

35 West Wacker Drive

Chicago, IL 60613

(312) 558-8768

lcoberly@winston.com

DAVID C. FREDERICK

Kellogg, Hansen, Todd,

Figel & Frederick, P.L.L.C.

1615 M Street, NW, Suite 400

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 326-7900

dfrederick@kellogghansen.com

Counsel of Record for Petitioners

Counsel of Record for Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari Filed May 30, 2023

Certiorari Granted September 29, 2023

(Additional counsel on inside cover)

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton

& Garrison LLP

2001 K Street, NW

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

Counsel of Record for Respondent Barclays Capital Inc.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Docket Excerpts, Moab Partners, L.P. v.

Macquarie Infrastructure Corp.,

No. 21-2524 (2d Cir.) ........................................ JA1

Docket Excerpts, City of Riviera Beach General

Employees Retirement System v. Macquarie

Infrastructure Corp., No. 18-cv-3608

(S.D.N.Y.) .......................................................... JA8

Consolidated Class Action Complaint for

Violations of the Federal Securities Laws

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2019) ................................. JA16

The following documents have been omitted from this

joint appendix because they appear on the following

pages in the appendix to the petition for a writ of certiorari:

Summary Order and Judgment (2d Cir. Dec.

20, 2022)............................................................... 1a

Opinion & Order Granting Defendants’ Motion

To Dismiss (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2021) ................. 14a

Order Denying Defendants’ Petition for

Rehearing En Banc (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 2023) ...... 49a

15 U.S.C. § 78j......................................................... 51a

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 .............................................. 51a

ii

17 C.F.R. § 229.303 ................................................. 52a

Number and Percentage of Item 303 Cases in

Relevant Circuits ............................................... 62a

List of Item 303 Cases in Relevant Circuits .......... 64a

List of Law Firm Communications and

Commentary Addressing MD&A

Disclosures ......................................................... 76a

JA1

General Docket

Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit

Docketed: 10/07/2021

Termed: 12/20/2022

Court of Appeals Docket #: 21-2524

Nature of Suit: 3850 STATUTES-Secur Comm

Exchange

City of Riviera Beach General v. Macquarie Infrastructure Corpo

Appeal From: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)

Fee Status: Paid

Case Type Information:

1) Civil

2) Private

3) Originating Court Information:

District: 0208-1:182-cv-3608

Trial Judge: Vernon S. Broderick,

U.S. District Judge

Date Filed: 04/23/2018

Date Order/Judgment: 10/07/2021

Date Order/Judgment EOD: 10/07/2021

Date NOA Filed: 10/07/2021

Date Rec’d COA: 10/07/2021

Prior Cases:

None

Current Cases:

None

Panel Assignment:

Not available

JA2

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

10/07/2021

1

NOTICE OF CIVIL APPEAL,

with district court docket, on

behalf of Appellant Moab Partners, L.P., FILED.

10/07/2021

2

DISTRICT COURT OPINION

AND ORDER, dated

09/07/2021, RECEIVED.

10/07/2021

3

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT, dated 10/07/2021, RECEIVED.

12/17/2021

44

BRIEF & SPECIAL APPENDIX, on behalf of Appellant

Moab Partners, L.P., FILED.

Service date 12/17/2021 by

CM/ECF.

12/17/2021

45

JOINT APPENDIX, volume 1 of

4, (pp. 1-291), on behalf of Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,

FILED. Service date 12/17/2021

by CM/ECF.

12/17/2021

46

JOINT APPENDIX, volume 2 of

4, (pp. 292-552), on behalf of

Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,

FILED. Service date 12/17/2021

by CM/ECF.

12/17/2021

47

JOINT APPENDIX, volume 3 of

4, (pp. 553-825), on behalf of

Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,

FILED. Service date 12/17/2021

by CM/ECF.

JA3

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

12/17/2021

48

JOINT APPENDIX, volume 4 of

4, (pp. 826-1053), on behalf of

Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,

FILED. Service date 12/17/2021

by CM/ECF.

02/04/2022

66

BRIEF, on behalf of Appellee

Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam Stewart, Richard D.

Courtney, Robert Choi, Martin

Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr.,

George W. Carmany, III, Henry

E. Lentz, Ouma Sananikone

and William H. Webb, FILED.

Service date 02/04/2022 by

CM/ECF.

02/04/2022

67

LETTER, on behalf of Appellee

Barclays Capital Inc., joining in

the brief of Appellee Macquarie

Infrastructure Corporation,

James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam

Stewart, Richard D. Courtney,

Robert Choi, Martin Stanley,

Norman H. Brown, Jr., George

W. Carmany, III, Henry E.

Lentz, Ouma Sananikone and

William H. Webb, RECEIVED.

Service date 02/04/2022 by

CM/ECF.

JA4

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

02/04/2022

68

LETTER, on behalf of Appellee

Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc., joining in

the brief of Appellee Macquarie

Infrastructure Corporation,

James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam

Stewart, Richard D. Courtney,

Robert Choi, Martin Stanley,

Norman H. Brown, Jr., George

W. Carmany, III, Henry E.

Lentz, Ouma Sananikone and

William H. Webb, RECEIVED.

Service date 02/04/2022 by

CM/ECF.

02/25/2022

79

REPLY BRIEF, on behalf of Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,

FILED. Service date 02/25/2022

by CM/ECF.

11/09/2022

121 CASE, before PNL, RR, MP,

HEARD.

12/20/2022

123 SUMMARY ORDER AND

JUDGMENT, we vacate the

judgment of the district court

dismissing Plaintiff ’s Complaint, and we remand this case

for further proceedings consistent with this order, by PNL,

RR, MP, FILED.

12/20/2022

124 CERTIFIED ORDER, dated

12/20/2022, to SDNY (NEW

YORK CITY), ISSUED.

JA5

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

01/03/2023

128 PETITION FOR REHEARING/REHEARING EN BANC,

on behalf of Appellee Norman

H. Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany, III, Robert Choi, Richard

D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James

Hooke, Henry E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma Sananikone, Martin

Stanley, Liam Stewart and William H. Webb, FILED. Service

date 01/03/2023 by CM/ECF.

01/03/2023

129 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee

Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc., regarding

MIMUSA joins in the Petition

for Rehearing En Banc and

Panel Rehearing RECEIVED.

Service date 01/03/2023 by

CM/ECF.

01/03/2023

130 LETTER, on behalf of Appellee

Barclays Capital Inc., regarding

Barclays Capital Inc. joins in

the petition RECEIVED. Service date 01/03/2023 by

CM/ECF.

01/27/2023

133 ORDER, petition for rehearing/rehearing en banc denied,

FILED.

JA6

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

02/02/2023

134 MOTION, to stay mandate, on

behalf of Appellee Norman H.

Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany, III, Robert Choi, Richard

D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James

Hooke, Henry E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma Sananikone, Martin

Stanley, Liam Stewart and William H. Webb, FILED. Service

date 02/02/2023 by CM/ECF.

02/13/2023

138 OPPOSITION TO MOTION, to

stay mandate [134], on behalf of

Appellant Moab Partners, L.P.,

FILED. Service date 02/13/2023

by CM/ECF.

02/21/2023

144 REPLY TO OPPOSITION

[138], on behalf of Appellee Norman H. Brown, Jr., George W.

Carmany, III, Robert Choi,

Richard D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James Hooke, Henry E.

Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma

Sananikone, Martin Stanley,

Liam Stewart and William H.

Webb, FILED. Service date

02/21/2023 by CM/ECF.

02/23/2023

148 MOTION ORDER, denying motion to stay mandate [134] filed

by Appellee Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, James

JA7

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam Stewart, Richard D. Courtney, Robert Choi, Martin Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr., George W.

Carmany, III, Henry E. Lentz,

Ouma Sananikone and William

H. Webb, by PNL, RR, MP,

FILED.

02/23/2023

149 JUDGMENT MANDATE, ISSUED.

JA8

U.S. District Court

Southern District of New York (Foley Square)

CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:18-cv-03608VSB

City of Riviera Beach General Employees Retirement System v. Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation et al

Assigned to:

Judge Vernon S. Broderick

Related Cases:

1:18-cv-03744-VSB

1:18-cv-07174-VSB

Cause:

15:78j(b)ss Stockholder Suit

Date Filed: 04/23/2018

Jury Demand: Plaintiff

Nature of Suit: 850 Securities/Commodities

Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

04/23/2018

1

COMPLAINT against Richard

D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James

Hooke, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Liam Stewart. (Filing Fee $ 400.00, Receipt Number 020814978368)

Document filed by City of Riviera Beach General Employees

Retirement System.

02/20/2019

56

AMENDED COMPLAINT

amending 1 Complaint, against

Richard D. Courtney, Jay Davis, James Hooke, Macquarie

Infrastructure Corporation,

Liam Stewart, Barclay Capital

Inc., Robert Choi, Martin Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr.,

JA9

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

George W. Carmany III, Henry

E. Lentz, Ouma Sananikone,

William H. Webb, Macquarie

Infrastructure Management

(USA) Inc. with JURY DEMAND. Document filed by

Moab Partners, L.P. Related

document: 1 Complaint.

04/04/2019

83

STIPULATION TO CLARIFY

COMPLAINT: NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and

between Plaintiff and Macquarie Management, that the

Consolidated Class Action Complaint does not name Macquarie

Management as a Defendant in

Count I, but only as to Count II,

Count III, and Count VI. SO

ORDERED. (Signed by Judge

Vernon S. Broderick on

4/4/2019)

04/22/2019

100 MOTION to Dismiss. Document

filed by Robert Choi, Norman

H. Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany III, Richard D. Courtney,

Jay Davis, James Hooke, Henry

E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma

Sananikone, Martin Stanley,

Liam Stewart, William H.

Webb.

JA10

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

04/22/2019

101 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in

Support re: 100 MOTION to

Dismiss. Document filed by

Robert Choi, Norman H.

Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany

III, Richard D. Courtney, Jay

Davis, James Hooke, Henry E.

Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma

Sananikone, Martin Stanley,

Liam Stewart, William H.

Webb.

04/22/2019

102 MOTION to Dismiss. Document

filed by Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc.

04/22/2019

103 MEMORANDUM OF LAW in

Support re: 102 MOTION to

Dismiss. Document filed by

Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc.

04/22/2019

104 DECLARATION of John E.

Schreiber in Support re: 100

MOTION to Dismiss. Document

filed by Robert Choi, Norman

H. Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany III, Richard D. Courtney,

Jay Davis, James Hooke, Henry

E. Lentz, Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Ouma

Sananikone, Martin Stanley,

Liam Stewart, William H.

Webb. (Attachments: #l Exhibit

A - Feb. 27, 2009 MIC 10-K

JA11

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

(Excerpt), #2 Exhibit B - May 3,

2012 MIC Earnings Call, #3 Exhibit C - Feb. 18, 2015 MIC

10-K (Excerpt), #4 Exhibit D Feb. 23, 2016 MIC 8-K (Excerpt), #5 Exhibit E - Feb. 23,

2016 MIC Earnings Call, #6 Exhibit F - Feb. 23, 2016 MIC

10-K (Excerpt), #7 Exhibit G May 2, 2016 MIC 10-Q (Excerpt), #8 Exhibit H - May 12,

2016 MIC Investor Day, #9 Exhibit I - Aug. 1, 2016 MIC 10-Q

(Excerpt), #10 Exhibit J - Aug.

2, 2016 MIC Earnings Call, #11

Exhibit K - Oct. 31, 2016 Blog

Post, #12 Exhibit L - Nov. 1,

2016 MIC 10-Q (Excerpt), #13

Exhibit M - Nov. 1, 2016 MIC

Earnings Call, #14 Exhibit N Nov. 3, 2016 MIC Prospectus

Suppl. (Excerpt), #15 Exhibit O

- 2017 Seatrade Maritime

Whitepaper, #16 Exhibit P Feb. 3, 2017 MIC Press Release,

#17 Exhibit Q - Feb. 21, 2017

MIC 10-K (Excerpt), #18 Exhibit R - May 3, 2017 MIC 10-Q

(Excerpt), #19 Exhibit S - May

10, 2017 Oppenheimer Conference, #20 Exhibit T - May 18,

2017 TPA Conference, #21 Exhibit U - June 27, 2017 JP Morgan Conference, #22 Exhibit V -

JA12

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

Aug. 2, 2017 MIC 10-Q (Excerpt), #23 Exhibit W - Aug. 3,

2017 MIC Earnings Call, #24

Exhibit X - Aug. 31, 2017 TPA

Conference, #25 Exhibit Y Sept. 11, 2017 MIC 8-K, #26

Exhibit Z -Nov. 1, 2017 MIC

10-Q (Excerpt), #27 Exhibit AA

- Nov. 2, 2017 MIC Earnings

Call, #28 Exhibit BB - Nov. 10,

2017 Email, #29 Exhibit CC Nov. 16, 2017 TPA Conference,

#30 Exhibit DD - Dec. 2017

MIC Presentation, #31 Exhibit

EE - Feb. 21, 2018 MIC 10-K

(Excerpt), #32 Exhibit FF - Feb.

22, 2018 MIC Earnings Call,

#33 Exhibit GG - May 3, 2018

MIC Earnings Call, #34 Exhibit

HH - May 3, 2018 MIC

FormDEFA14A, #35 Exhibit II Feb. 20, 2019 MIC 10-K (Excerpt), #36 Exhibit JJ - Chart)

04/22/2019

105 MOTION to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint. Document filed by Barclays Capital Inc.

04/22/2019

106 JOINDER to join re: 101 Memorandum of Law in Support of

Motion. Document filed by Barclays Capital Inc.

09/07/2021

121 OPINION & ORDER: re: (102

in 1:18-cv-03608-VSB)

JA13

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

MOTION to Dismiss filed by

Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc., (100 in

1:18-cv-03608-VSB) MOTION

to Dismiss filed by Henry E.

Lentz, Richard D. Courtney,

Robert Choi, Norman H.

Brown, Jr., George W. Carmany

III, Macquarie Infrastructure

Corporation, Martin Stanley,

Liam Stewart, James Hooke,

Ouma Sananikone, William H.

Webb, Jay Davis, (105 in l:18cv-03608-VSB) MOTION to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint filed by Barclays Capital Inc. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

The Clerk’s office is directed to

terminate the open motions on

the docket and to post notice of

this Opinion & Order on the

docket for the related action

numbered 18-cv-3744. So Ordered. (Signed by Judge Vernon

S. Broderick on 9/7/2021) Filed

In Associated Cases: 1:18-cv03608-VSB, 1:18-cv-03744-VSB

10/06/2021

122 NOTICE OF APPEAL from 121

Memorandum & Opinion. Document filed by Moab Partners,

L.P. Filing fee $505.00, receipt

number ANYSDC-25160827.

JA14

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

Form C and Form D are due

within 14 days to the Court of

Appeals, Second Circuit.

10/07/2021

123 CLERK’S JUDGMENT re: (29

in 1:18-cv-03744-VSB, 121 in

1:18-cv-03608-VSB) Memorandum & Opinion, in favor of Barclay Capital Inc., Barclays Capital Inc., Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, Macquarie Infrastructure Management

(USA) Inc., Daniel Fajardo,

George W. Carmany III, Henry

E. Lentz, James Hooke, Jay Davis, Liam Stewart, Martin Stanley, Norman H. Brown, Jr.,

Ouma Sananikone, Richard D.

Courtney, Robert Choi, William

H. Webb against City of Riviera

Beach General Employees Retirement System, Moab Partners, L.P., Daniel Fajardo. It is

hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

That for the reasons stated in

the Court’s Opinion and Order

dated September 7, 2021, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED. The Clerk’s office is

directed to post notice of this

Opinion & Order on the docket

for the related action numbered

18-cv-3744. (Signed by Clerk of

Court Ruby Krajick on

JA15

Date Filed

#

Docket Text

10/7/2021) (Attachments: # 1

Notice of Right to Appeal) Filed

In Associated Cases: 1:18-cv-03

608-VSB, 1:18-cv-03744-VSB

10/07/2021

124 CORRECTED NOTICE OF APPEAL re: 122 Notice of Appeal,

121 Memorandum & Opinion,

123 Clerk’s Judgment. Document filed by Moab Partners,

L.P.

JA16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH

GENERAL EMPLOYEES

RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

on behalf of itself and all

others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

No. 1:18-cv-03608

CLASS ACTION

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

v.

MACQUARIE INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION, JAMES HOOKE,

JAY DAVIS, LIAM STEWART, and RICHARD D.

COURTNEY,

Defendants.

CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

JA17

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1

A.

Background of the Fraud ........................... 2

B.

The Truth Is Revealed ................................ 7

JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................... 8

III. PARTIES ............................................................. 9

A.

Lead Plaintiff .............................................. 9

B.

Corporate Defendants ................................ 9

C.

Officer Defendants .................................... 10

D.

Securities Act Defendants ........................ 11

IV. SUMMARY OF THE EXCHANGE ACT

CLAIMS ........................................................... 12

A.

The Exchange Act Defendants Sell

Macquarie’s “Unsexy Business

Model” To Investors By Promising

“Steady, Predictable” Dividends ............. 12

B.

Macquarie Depends On IMTT To

Fuel Its “Total Attractive Return” ........... 17

JA18

C.

D.

The Exchange Act Defendants Conceal That Macquarie’s “Total Return

Opportunity” Is Not Sustainable. ............ 23

1.

The No. 6 fuel oil industry

faces a “paradigm shift.”................... 24

2.

By the beginning of the Class

Period, investors are unaware

of IMTT’s exposure to the “brutal changes” in the No. 6 fuel

oil industry. ...................................... 28

3.

During the Class Period, the

Exchange Act Defendants conceal IMTT’s reliance on No. 6

fuel oil................................................ 30

4.

Just weeks after IMO 2020 is

confirmed, Macquarie Management profits from nearly $235

million in sales to investors.............. 34

5.

As IMTT’s utilization begins to

fall, Macquarie acquires Epic

Midstream in a largely-stock

transaction. ....................................... 41

The Exchange Act Defendants Continue To Falsely Tout IMTT’s Utilization And Promise Macquarie’s

Dividend Even As Customers Cancel Valuable No. 6 Fuel Oil Storage

Contracts ................................................... 42

JA19

E.

V.

Throughout The Class Period, The

Market Relied On The Exchange

Act Defendants’ Misrepresentations

About IMTT .............................................. 47

THE TRUTH EMERGES ................................. 48

VI. POST CLASS PERIOD EVENTS .................... 54

VII. THE EXCHANGE ACT DEFENDANTS’

FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS .............................. 60

A.

B.

The Exchange Act Defendants’ Materially False And Misleading Statements And Omissions In Earnings

Releases, Conference Calls And Investor Presentations Concerning

The Company’s Reliance On No. 6

Fuel Oil And Dividend Growth Plan ....... 61

1.

Fourth Quarter and Year End

2015 Misrepresentations ................. 61

2.

2016 Misrepresentations .................. 65

3.

2017 Misrepresentations .................. 69

The Exchange Act Defendants’ Materially False and Misleading Statements and Omissions in Macquarie’s Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and Offering Documents ...................................... 79

VIII.LOSS CAUSATION .......................................... 83

JA20

IX. SUMMARY OF SCIENTER ALLEGATIONS ............................................................... 84

X.

PRESUMPTION OF RELIANCE ................... 92

XI. INAPPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY

SAFE HARBOR ............................................... 94

XII. CLAIMS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO

THE EXCHANGE ACT .................................... 95

XIII. CLAIMS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO

THE SECURITIES ACT .................................. 98

A.

Securities Act Parties ............................... 99

B.

False and Misleading Statements

and Omissions in the Offering Documents..................................................... 101

C.

The Securities Act Defendants’ Failure To Exercise Reasonable Care Or

To Conduct A Reasonable Investigation In Connection With The Offering ............................................................ 106

XIV. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ................. 111

XV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF .................................. 113

XVI. JURY DEMAND ............................................. 114

APPENDIX A .......................................................... 116

JA21

Lead Plaintiff Moab Partners, L.P. (“Moab” or

“Lead Plaintiff ”), by and through its counsel, alleges

the following upon information and belief, except as to

those allegations concerning Lead Plaintiff, which are

alleged upon personal knowledge. Lead Plaintiff ’s information and belief is based upon, inter alia, counsel’s

investigation, which includes, among other things, review and analysis of: (a) Macquarie Infrastructure

Corporation’s (“Macquarie” or the “Company”) regulatory filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); (b) press releases, conference call transcripts, and media reports issued and

disseminated by the Company; (c) analyst and media

reports concerning Macquarie; (d) interviews with witnesses, including former Macquarie employees;

(e) consultation with industry experts and participants; and (f) other public information regarding the

Company.

I.

INTRODUCTION

1. This securities class action arises from a series

of material misrepresentations and omissions by Macquarie and its top executives regarding Macquarie’s

most important operating division, International-Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”), one of the largest independent bulk liquid storage terminals businesses in

the United States. Throughout the Class Period, Macquarie faced clear and present risks from IMTT’s concealed reliance on revenue from the storage of No. 6

fuel oil, a broadly defined group of high-sulfur heavy

and residual fuel oils facing fast-approaching “brutal

changes” that would effectively eliminate the only remaining demand for the commodity. Defendants omitted and actively misrepresented Macquarie’s exposure

to these risks. Indeed, as Macquarie’s stock began to

JA22

decline in 2017, investors directly asked Defendants

about these risks, and Defendants falsely stated that

they stored “very little” No. 6 fuel oil.

2. The omissions and misrepresentations set

forth below enabled Defendant Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc. (“Macquarie Management”), the controlling manager of Macquarie’s businesses, to cash out 40% of its ownership interest in

Macquarie in a November 2016 secondary public offering for a total of $235 million (the “Offering”), and to

thereafter accrue additional hundreds of millions of

dollars in management fees based on the Company’s

inflated share price and dividends. However, public investors suffered enormous losses when the truth about

the Company was revealed. As discussed in more detail below, after four years of assurances that IMTT

was stable and protected from commodity pressures,

on February 21, 2018, the Company abruptly slashed

the dividend that was its key selling point as a direct

result of the cancellation of a material number of previously-concealed No. 6 fuel oil storage contracts and

the consequential need to devote hundreds of millions

of dollars to a never-before publicly discussed “planned

repurposing” on a significant number of these now

empty tanks.

3. In response, Macquarie’s stock price declined

over 40% in a single trading day, dropping from $63.62

per share on February 21, 2018 to $37.41 per share on

February 22, 2018—a stunning decline from its Class

Period high of $84.13 per share in September 2016.

JA23

A.

Background of the Fraud

4. For years, Macquarie has been known as—and

actively cultivated a reputation as—a “total return opportunity” based on its stable and growing dividend.

For example, in early 2017, analysts named Macquarie

a “Top Dividend Stock,” noting the Company’s strong

quarterly dividend history, diversified business operations, and favorable long-term, multi-year growth

rates.

5. However, by the start of the Class Period, Macquarie faced a major industry ban that threatened its

ability to continue to deliver the historically high dividend that it promised investors. Specifically, the Exchange Act Defendants (defined below) knew that

IMTT, Macquarie’s top asset and largest profit-driver,

was materially exposed to upcoming regulations

strongly limiting the primary use of No. 6 fuel oil, a

heavily-regulated commodity that secretly comprised

well over 40% of IMTT’s tank storage capacity but for

which demand had been falling for years. Although—

as Macquarie would later admit—the impending limits on No. 6 fuel oil were known to the public, during

the Class Period Macquarie did not disclose but instead actively misled investors about the severe effects

of those limits on its business operations.

6. Not only did these regulations and the general

decline in demand leave IMTT secretly vulnerable to a

meaningful loss of revenue, but the noxious qualities

of No. 6 fuel oil contaminated even the pores of steel

and the tank, meaning that, at a minimum, IMTT’s

tanks could not be used to store other commodities

without a difficult, time-consuming, and expensive

cleaning process. Even after cleaning, some of the

JA24

tanks that IMTT had built to store No. 6 fuel oil were

so massive that there simply was no market to store

more in-demand commodities in them, as no other

commodities traded in sufficiently large volumes. For

that reason, one former employee described several of

these tanks—IMTT’s largest tanks, at its largest and

most important terminal in St. Rose, Louisiana—as

“obsolete” for storing anything lighter than No. 6 fuel

oil, the heaviest of the heavy fuel oils and which faced

imminent “brutal changes.”

7. Defendants had carefully guarded Macquarie’s

reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, leaving investors completely

in the dark as to this fast-approaching threat. Macquarie last acknowledged exposure to No. 6 fuel oil in

2012, at which time Defendants stated that—consistent with the industry at large—they had “concluded that it would be IMTT’s long-term best interests to begin to convert a portion of the residual oil

storage at Bayonne [IMTT’s second-largest terminal]

to clean product storage.” 1 For years afterward, Defendants made it impossible for investors to independently determine how industrywide changes might

impact IMTT by scrupulously avoiding stating that

they had any exposure to No. 6 fuel oil, instead describing the commodities stored only by very general

categories (such as “chemicals, vegetable and animal

oils, crude and asphalt, and refined petroleum products”) and telling investors—as IMTT’s CEO, Defendant Courtney, did at a May 12, 2016 Macquarie investor day—that IMTT had “flexibility” and “optionality”

in its tanks.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis herein is added.

JA25

8. Rather than provide additional information,

Defendants continuously assured investors that Macquarie’s businesses were “boringly predictable” even in

a “volatile and excited” world because of their “inherently more stable asset class” and “stable essential services nature.” Indeed, Defendants told the market that

IMTT in particular was not “sensitive to what is going

on in the exploration and production, or in interstate

product movement” and “is simply not [a] macroeconomically sensitive enterprise.”

9. Defendants continued to conceal IMTT’s reliance on No. 6 fuel oil storage revenue even after the

imminent end of demand for the commodity was confirmed. In October 2016, the International Maritime

Organization (“IMO”) confirmed that a long-scheduled, aggressive 0.5% sulfur cap on global shipping

fuels would begin by the start of 2020. Because in recent years the only sustained demand for No. 6 fuel oil

has come from shipping vessels, it was widely understood that IMO 2020 would cause “brutal changes” for

all those in the supply chain for No. 6 fuel oil. While

Macquarie ultimately acknowledged—after the Class

Period—that IMO 2020 dramatically shifted the industry away from No. 6 fuel oil, during the Class Period Defendants conspicuously avoided discussing

IMO 2020, despite their obligation under Item 303 of

Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.303) to disclose “any

known trends or uncertainties that have had or that

the registrant reasonably expects will have a material

favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”

10. Instead, just weeks after IMO 2020 was confirmed to proceed on schedule, Defendants told investors to “[r]emember” that “none of MIC’s business are

JA26

exposed directly to the price of crude oil or petroleum

products” as Macquarie Management sold investors

over $235 million of Macquarie common stock in a secondary public offering in the November 2016 Offering.

11. As the Class Period progressed, the demand for

No. 6 fuel oil continued to decline, but Defendants continued to tell investors—as Macquarie’s head of investor relations, Defendant Davis, did at a May 10, 2017

Oppenheimer Industrial Growth Conference—that

IMTT had “no commodity exposure other than the very

broad macroeconomic factors influencing supply and

demand more broadly.” Then, during the Company’s

August 3, 2017 earnings call, Defendant Hooke played

down declines in IMTT’s storage utilization as temporary and due only to routine maintenance, such as

tank cleaning and inspection, assured investors that

IMTT remained “a case of steady as she goes,” and

emphatically denied that there were “any commoditydriven factors that would cause a decline in utilization.”

12. All the while, Defendants told investors that

the Company would execute its growth goals and continue to deliver its dividend. For example, during Macquarie’s November 2, 2017 earnings call, Defendant

Hooke forcefully told investors not to expect Macquarie to “slash our dividend to deploy capital internally,” but rather to expect that “[g]rowing distributions to shareholders in a steady, predictable fashion

while investing for the future will continue to be part

of [Macquarie’s] strategy.”

13. As they did throughout the Class Period, at the

end of that November 2, 2017 call, Defendants actively

invited investors to contact them with further

JA27

questions. As a result, throughout the Class Period,

Defendants had regular discussions and exchanges

with analysts and investors during which Defendants

reiterated and provided additional color to their public

statements made in SEC filings, press releases, and

conference calls. Indeed, Macquarie would later

acknowledge that, as a result of its “Proactive Investor

Engagement,” it had “in excess of 1,200 individual

interactions with current and potential shareholders” in 2017 alone.

14. As the Class Period neared its end, with Macquarie’s stock price in decline, investors reached out to

Macquarie with specific questions about IMTT’s storage of fuel oils impacted by IMO 2020. In response, Defendants falsely misrepresented by half the amount of

heavy fuel oil (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil) stored by IMTT, and

also minimized the consequences of its storage of the

commodity. For example, on or around this time, Defendant Davis directly told an investor that No. 6 fuel

oil was only a small percent of IMTT’s utilization.

15. As another example, on September 22, 2017,

Defendant Davis spoke on the phone with another institutional investor, who told Defendant Davis that

the investor learned from one of Macquarie’s competitors that No. 6 fuel oil was 20% of IMTT’s capacity, and

that the market for No. 6 fuel oil was weak at the time

and specifically had “some real structural challenges

given” IMO 2020. In response, Davis told the institutional investor that IMO 2020 should not have much

of an impact—and in fact could end up a positive—and,

if needed, Macquarie could convert IMTT’s tanks for a

nominal amount.

JA28

16. Similarly, on November 7, 2017, Lead Plaintiff

emailed Defendant Davis and sought information on

the percentage of IMTT’s storage that was in “heavy

oil” and the impact, if any, of IMO 2020 on IMTT’s

heavy oil storage and tanks. In response, Defendant

Davis told Lead Plaintiff—consistent with information

made available to other investors—that only “20%” of

IMTT’s oil was heavy, and further minimized the impact of IMO 2020 by indicating that the banned heavy

oil could easily “be blended with distillate to meet the

new spec.” Davis even stated that the new regulations

“could well be a positive for storage demand at

IMTT-Bayonne given the deep water access at the facility.”

17. Defendant Davis repeated similar messages to

investors at a Three Part Advisors Investor Conference one week later, on November 16, 2017, telling the

audience that Defendants have “very good visibility

into the cash generating capacity of [IMTT] over a

longer period of time,” and that “very little” of IMTT’s

storage is in any “heavy product”—i.e., No. 6 fuel oil.

18. Then, on November 28, 2017, Macquarie and

Defendants Hooke, Stewart, and Davis hosted a dinner for approximately 12 institutional investors, during which they said that IMTT would be a “growth

driver for 2018” as a result of pricing and operational

improvements expected to push EBITDA margins

higher.

19. The following month, Defendants delivered an

investor presentation entitled “Overview of the IMTT

Segment.” The presentation stated that IMTT’s “[c]onsistently high utilization reflects essential services nature of IMTT’s services,” while any “[u]nused capacity

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is generally attributable to tank inspections, repairs,

and modifications.”

20. These statements were blatant lies. In fact, the

Company would later disclose that heavy and residual

fuel oil—No. 6 fuel oil—constituted well over 40% of

IMTT’s storage. This amount was far from the “very

little” that Defendant Davis had told an audience at an

investor conference, and over twice what Davis had

told Lead Plaintiff and other investors. Further, while

Davis misleadingly implied to investors, including

Lead Plaintiff, that compliance with IMO 2020 would

be straightforward and even possibly a “positive,” in

fact Macquarie would later acknowledge that IMO

2020 had triggered a “structural decline in the 6 oil

market” that caused IMTT to begin losing storage contracts at least a month earlier, in October 2017. Ultimately, as Macquarie admitted, decline in No. 6 fuel

oil caused utilization to fall to 89% by the end of the

fourth quarter 2017, and would cause utilization to fall

even farther, to an “average in the mid-80%

range”—a double-digit decline that was not “generally

attributable to tank inspections, repairs, and modifications.” In addition, Davis’s claim that No. 6 fuel oil

could simply “be blended with distillate to meet the

new spec” misled investors about the expensive cleaning required to scrub the highly noxious No. 6 fuel oil

from IMTT’s tanks before they could be used for other

commodities. Even then, because IMO 2020 effectively

killed the demand for high sulfur fuel oils (like No. 6

fuel oil), it could never be a “positive” for the Company:

many of IMTT’s No. 6 fuel oil tanks were so large that

they were (in the words of a former employee) largely

“obsolete” for storing less sulfuric commodities because no such commodities traded in sufficient volumes to make use of those tanks economical.

JA30

Ultimately, IMTT was so imperiled by its exposure to

No. 6 fuel oil that Macquarie had to slash its dividend

to afford the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary

to “repurpose” the tanks for other uses.

B.

The Truth Is Revealed

21. On February 21, 2018, after the close of trading, Macquarie surprised the market by announcing a

shocking decline in IMTT utilization, to the lowest

level that Macquarie had ever publicly reported;

fourth quarter earnings that fell well short of analysts’

estimates; and a 31% cut to the Company’s dividend—

just weeks after telling analysts that the dividend was

“sacrosanct.”

22. The next day, Macquarie blamed the bad news

directly on one culprit: No. 6 fuel oil. Revealing for the

first time the depth of IMTT’s exposure, Macquarie explained that it had to siphon money away from the dividend because the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil

would require Macquarie to spend hundreds of millions of dollars repurposing IMTT’s storage tanks to

accommodate other commodities. Analysts immediately noted their surprise, calling the Company’s

statements “troubling” and questioning management’s

credibility. In response to this news, Macquarie’s stock

price fell from $63.62 per share on February 21, 2018,

to $37.41 per share on February 22, 2018. The stock

price has not recovered since then. Instead, Macquarie

received a public reprimand from leading investment

advisory group Institutional Shareholder Services,

Inc., for creating a “credibility crisis” and “mistrust,”

and Macquarie Management was forced to cap its fee

to pacify investor rebellion. All the while, the damage

from Macquarie’s concealed reliance on No. 6 fuel oil

JA31

has continued to prove disastrous: on February 20,

2019, Macquarie disclosed that IMTT ended 2018 with

utilization of just 82%, far below the constantly affirmed “historical mean” of 94% investors were told to

expect during the Class Period.

23. As a result of Defendants’ wrongful acts and

omissions, and the resulting decline in the market

value of Macquarie’s stock, Lead Plaintiff and other

Class members have suffered significant losses and

damages.

II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

24. The claims asserted herein arise under Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Exchange Act,

15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a), 78t-1; Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5;

and Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act,

15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2), and 77o.

25. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject

matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1337; Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa;

and Section 22 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v.

26. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1391(b); Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15

U.S.C. § 78aa(a); and Section 22 of the Securities Act,

15 U.S.C. § 77v. Macquarie maintains its corporate

headquarters in New York, New York, which is situated in this District, conducts substantial business in

this District, and many of the acts and conduct that

constitute the violations of law complained of herein,

including the preparation and dissemination to the

public of materially false and misleading information,

occurred in this District. In connection with the acts

JA32

alleged in this Complaint, Defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including the mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of the national securities markets.

III. PARTIES

A.

Lead Plaintiff

27. Lead Plaintiff Moab Partners, L.P. is a sophisticated institutional investor located in New York,

New York. As shown in Lead Plaintiff ’s certification

(see ECF No. 37-1), Moab purchased over 500,000

shares of Macquarie common stock during the Class

Period, including 18,800 shares of Macquarie common

stock traceable to the Offering at a price of $81.90 per

share directly from Securities Act Defendant Barclays.

Moab suffered damages as a result of the violations of

the federal securities laws alleged in this Complaint.

B.

Corporate Defendants

28. Defendant Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation (“Macquarie” or the “Company”) is a Delaware corporation headquartered at 125 West 55th Street, New

York, New York 10019. Macquarie is a holding company that owns and operates a portfolio of infrastructure and infrastructure-like businesses. Outside of

these operating segments, Macquarie does not have

any employees, but instead relies on personnel assigned by Macquarie Management. The Company’s

common stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange

(“NYSE”), which is an efficient market, under the

ticker symbol “MIC.” Macquarie currently has over 85

million shares of common stock outstanding, owned by

at least hundreds or thousands of investors.

JA33

29. Defendant Macquarie Infrastructure Management (USA) Inc. (“Macquarie Management”) acts as

manager of Macquarie and is responsible for Macquarie’s day-to-day operations and affairs and oversight of the management teams of Macquarie’s operating segments. In accordance with its management services agreement, Macquarie Management assigned

certain of its employees, including Defendant James

Hooke—Macquarie’s CEO through most of the Class

Period—and Defendant Liam Stewart—Macquarie’s

CFO throughout the Class Period—to Macquarie. In a

secondary public offering conducted by Macquarie in

November 2016, Macquarie Management sold

2,870,000 shares of Macquarie common stock, comprising nearly 40% of Macquarie Management’s holdings,

for a profit of over $234 million. Macquarie Management is named as a defendant in Count II (for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act), Count III

(for violations of Section 20A of the Exchange Act), and

Count VI (for violations of Section 15 of the Securities

Act).

C.

Officer Defendants

30. Defendant James Hooke (“Hooke”) was an employee of Defendant Macquarie Management assigned

to serve as Chief Executive Officer of Macquarie from

May 8, 2009 to December 31, 2017. Hooke also served

as a Director of Macquarie from September 8, 2017 to

September 5, 2018. Hooke also served as a member of

IMTT’s Board of Directors from May 2009 until July

2014, IMTT’s interim-CEO from July 2014 until February 2015, and Executive Chairman of IMTT’s Board

of Directors from July 2014 until December 31, 2017.

Hooke signed Macquarie’s materially misstated public

filings including the Registration Statement for the

JA34

Offering filed with the SEC on April 5, 2016, and made

other materially false and misleading statements to

investors as set forth below. Hooke is named as a defendant in Count I (for violations of Section 10(b) of the

Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder), Count II

(for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act),

Count III (for violations of Section 20A of the Exchange

Act), Count IV (for violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act), and Count VI (for violations of Section 15 of

the Securities Act).

31. Defendant Jay Davis (“Davis”) has served as

the Head of Investor Relations and Vice President of

Macquarie since March 2008. Davis made materially

false and misleading statements to investors as set

forth below. Davis is named as a defendant in Count I

(for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and

Rule 10b-5 thereunder) and Count II (for violations of

Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act).

32. Defendant Liam Stewart (“Stewart”) is an employee of Defendant Macquarie Management who has

been assigned to serve as Chief Financial Officer of

Macquarie since June 2015. Stewart made materially

false and misleading statements to investors as set

forth below. Stewart is named as a defendant in

Count I (for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange

Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder), Count II (for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act), Count IV

(for violations of Section 11 of the Securities Act), and

Count VI (for violations of Section 15 of the Securities

Act).

33. Defendant Richard D. Courtney (“Courtney”)

has served as the Chief Executive Officer and President of IMTT, a wholly-owned subsidiary of

JA35

Macquarie, since February 2015. Courtney first joined

IMTT in 1982, and previously served as IMTT’s President and Chief Operating Officer. According to his profile on IMTT’s website, prior to becoming CEO, “Courtney’s previous responsibilities with IMTT have included budgeting and long-term forecasting, new venture and project analysis, treasury management, and

tax planning.” Courtney made materially false and

misleading statements to investors as set forth below.

Courtney is named as a defendant in Count I (for violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule

10b-5 thereunder) and Count II (for violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act).

34. Defendants Hooke, Davis, Stewart, and Courtney are collectively referred to hereinafter as the “Officer Defendants.” The Officer Defendants, because of

their positions with Macquarie, possessed the power

and authority to control the contents of Macquarie’s

reports to the SEC, press releases, and presentations

to securities analysts, money and portfolio managers,

and institutional investors. Each of the Officer Defendants was provided with copies of the Company’s reports and press releases alleged herein to be misleading prior to, or shortly after, their issuance and had the

ability and opportunity to prevent their issuance or

cause them to be corrected. Because of their positions

and access to material non-public information, each of

the Officer Defendants knew that the adverse facts

specified herein had not been disclosed to, and were

being concealed from, the public, and that the positive

representations which were being made were then materially false and/or misleading.

JA36

35. Macquarie, Macquarie Management, and the

Officer Defendants are collectively referred to as the

“Exchange Act Defendants.”

D.

Securities Act Defendants

36. Additional defendants—defined along with certain of the above-named Defendants as the “Securities

Act Defendants”—are named in Section XIII.A. below.

IV. SUMMARY

CLAIMS

A.

OF

THE

EXCHANGE

ACT

The Exchange Act Defendants Sell Macquarie’s “Unsexy Business Model” To

Investors By Promising “Steady, Predictable” Dividends

37. Macquarie owns, operates, and invests in a diversified group of infrastructure businesses that provide services to customers in the United States and

Canada. Throughout the Class Period, Macquarie had

four operating segments: (1) IMTT, a bulk liquid terminals business providing storage, handling, and related services at a dozen terminals in the United

States and Canada; (2) Atlantic Aviation, a provider of

fuel, terminal, hangaring, and other services to 70 airports throughout the United States; (3) Contracted

Power, comprised of controlling interests in wind and

solar power facilities in the United States, and—until

October 12, 2018—a gas-fired facility; and (4) MIC Hawaii, comprised of companies that provide energy services in Hawaii.

38. According to the Exchange Act Defendants,

Macquarie’s primary “objective” was to “consolidate all

of the cash being produced” by their businesses—

JA37

which the Exchange Act Defendants referred to as

“free cash flow”—“and distribute the majority of that

out to investors in the form of a quarterly cash dividend.” The Exchange Act Defendants repeatedly assured the market that the dividend was “stable” and

“predictable” because Macquarie’s businesses were

“characteristically providers of essential services” insulated from market fluctuations, which gave the Exchange Act Defendants “good visibility” into their

“cash-generating capacity over time.” As Defendant

Hooke colorfully told investors at the start of the Class

Period, “While the world around us is volatile and excited, MIC’s businesses have been boringly predictable. That is just the kind of unsexy business model

we want.”

39. Further, the Exchange Act Defendants told investors that Macquarie would deliver consistent dividend growth because they “actively managed” Macquarie’s operating segments. During an investor conference on August 30, 2016, Defendant Davis explained: “This is not a passive strategy. We are looking

to grow the topline performance managing the expenses down or manage the rate of growth and expenses and optimize the capital structure in each of

the businesses.” Davis continued that, when “managed

and capitalized well,” IMTT and the other businesses

would deliver “growing streams of distributable cash

flow that we then upstream to investors.”

40. Again more colorfully, on May 12, 2016, Defendant Hooke told investors that the Officer Defendants’ management was so heavy-handed that Macquarie’s operating segments compared it to “like walking around with a wedgie all the time . . . . [T]hat is the

way we try and fulfill which is perennially ensure that

JA38

there is a sense of accountability at the businesses we

operate.”

41. By the start of the Class Period, Macquarie had

reported nine consecutive quarters of dividend growth.

In a press release on February 22, 2016—the start of

the Class Period—Defendant Hooke bragged that this

“growth has been achieved despite the volatility in

markets broadly and reinforces a basic premise of infrastructure—namely, that it is an inherently more

stable asset class.”

42. The market had reacted exuberantly to Macquarie’s dividend policy. Investors flocked to the stock,

causing the stock to rise from $3.40 when Defendant

Hooke became CEO on May 8, 2009, to $62.83 by the

start of the Class Period.

43. Likewise, analysts had praised the Company’s

dividend payout. For example, on January 11, 2016—

just before the start of the Class Period—J.P. Morgan

wrote that “MIC’s portfolio of defensive businesses

drives a predictable dividend stream . . . that should

attract income-oriented investors seeking refuge from

commodity price volatility.” The report concluded,

“Among all stocks under coverage MIC remains a favorite.”

44. Throughout the Class Period, the Exchange

Act Defendants continued to stress the importance of

Macquarie’s dividend while they consecutively increased the payout, and analysts in turn continued to

focus on the Company’s dividend. For example, in its

report on May 2, 2016, Oppenheimer wrote that “we

continue to believe MIC’s dividend is well funded and

JA39

may grow at least 14% in 2016 . . . Maintain Outperform[.]”

45. On February 3, 2017, the Company guided investors to expect Macquarie’s free cash flow—the underlying source of its dividend—to grow 10%-15% in

2017 and 2018, and that Macquarie’s quarterly dividends in 2017 would correspondingly grow 10%.

46. The market reacted positively. For example, in

its report dated February 21, 2017, Oppenheimer

wrote, “[A]dding confidence in our thesis, management

increased the dividend payment meaningfully and reiterated its target to grow . . . . MIC remains a compelling buy, in our view. Maintain Outperform[.]”

47. The Exchange Act Defendants affirmatively

denounced any skepticism that they would be unable

to grow the increasing amount of free cash flow required to meet their guidance. During an earnings call

on February 22, 2017, Defendant Hooke addressed

“the conspiracy theorists amongst you,” stating that

Macquarie’s guided dividends were actually “more

conservative” than in 2016 and that the Exchange Act

Defendants could deliver the promised dividend

growth while continuing to fund Company’s growth

given the Company’s “$1.4 billion of available credit.”

48. As the year continued—and the dividend payments increased as guided—the Exchange Act Defendants ever more firmly rejected investor skepticism.

During Macquarie’s earnings call for its second quarter 2017 results on August 3, 2017, an analyst asked

whether investors “shouldn’t necessarily expect, modify or think about your retained cash flow, either as a

percent of capital deployment opportunities, or said

JA40

another way, adjusting payout ratio to more internally

fund?” In response, Hooke stated: “No . . . . I don’t

think we will suddenly say there’s a great set of opportunities, we’re going to massively reduce the payout

ratio and stop growing the dividend . . . . I think you’ll

see steady as she goes, . . . reserving rights to do minor tweaks at the side.”

49. In November 2017, the Company announced

that it was revising its 2017 guidance for free cash flow

growth down to 9%, but otherwise left its guidance unchanged and remained, according to Defendant Hooke,

“excited about our prospects in 2018.” During Macquarie’s November 2, 2017 earnings call, Hooke forcefully assured investors that Macquarie would not

“pivot towards what the market values and not as

much maximizing dividend growth but more retaining

cash flow,” stating, “People slashing their dividend

saying we’re going to slash our dividend to deploy capital internally, I don’t think you’ll see us do that . . . .

Growing distributions to shareholders in a steady, predictable fashion while investing for the future will continue to be part of MIC’s strategy[.]”

50. Throughout the Class Period, the Officer Defendants actively solicited investors to contact them

directly. For example, at the end of earnings calls

throughout the Class Period, Defendant Hooke consistently noted that the Officer Defendants would be

“on the road participating in a number of road shows

and conferences” and told investors to let the Officer

Defendants know “[i]f there is someone you think we

should be introduced to the MIC story[.]” Similarly,

during a June 27, 2017 investor conference, Defendant

Stewart told investors to contact Davis and another executive, who would be “happy to help with any

JA41

additional insight into our operations or to assist with

any modeling matters.”

51. As a result, the Officer Defendants frequently

met directly with investors and analysts. In April

2018, the Company bragged about its “Proactive Investor Engagement” and “longstanding commitment to

engagement with all shareholders,” and disclosed that

it had “in excess of 1,200 individual interactions

with current and potential shareholders” in 2017

alone.

52. During those interactions, the Officer Defendants reiterated and provided additional color to their

public statements made in SEC filings, press releases,

and conference calls. Analysts often relayed to investors those statements made by the Exchange Act Defendants, which confirmed the public nature of those

statements. For example, on March 23, 2016, J.P. Morgan published an analyst report describing meetings

with Defendant Hooke and other Macquarie management that the firm hosted for investors. J.P. Morgan

wrote, “We walked away confident in MIC’s strong positioning during this difficult market environment.

The company retains numerous levers to achieve the

stated dividend growth . . . and payout targets[.]”

53. As another example, on August 12, 2016, RBC

Capital Markets wrote a report describing “Highlights

from investor meetings,” stating that they “had MIC

on the road this week in NYC and the mid-Atlantic.

We continue to view MIC as a solid total-return play,

with increasing visibility to hit . . . dividend/share

growth.”

JA42

54. Similarly, on November 3, 2016, Oppenheimer

wrote of its “Thoughts from Management Meeting”

that “Management remains bullish,” and concluded

that “[o]verall the MIC story is well intact. The underlying businesses all appear stable, if not improving; and, when coupled with attractive opportunities

for growth capital, we believe the company has multiple years of . . . dividend growth. Maintain Outperform[.]”

55. In its report on March 6, 2017, Barclays wrote

its “[t]akeaways” from investor meetings it hosted

with Defendants Hooke and Davis, including that

Macquarie’s growth in free cash flow that drove Macquarie’s dividend growth “may not be limited to

2017/2018. The team seems to have a path to not only

meet its growth objective, but potentially exceed the

growth target in 2018[.]”

56. As the Class Period neared its end, the Officer

Defendants continued to directly engage investors and

analysts, affirming the market’s reliance on Macquarie’s growth guidance and ever-increasing dividends. For example, on November 28, 2017, Macquarie

hosted a dinner for approximately a dozen institutional investors, including Lead Plaintiff. At this dinner, which was attended by Defendants Hooke, Stewart, and Davis, as well as Macquarie’s then-COO and

future-CEO, Mr. Frost, the Officer Defendants present

at the dinner told Lead Plaintiff and the other investors that Macquarie would have continued dividend

growth in 2018.

57. As another example, on or around December 7,

2017, Macquarie senior employees met with institutional investors during the Wells Fargo 2017 Pipeline,

JA43

MLP, and Utility Symposium in New York City. Likely

referencing that meeting, in its later report dated February 23, 2018, Wells Fargo stated that, “as recently

as December the dividend was described as ‘sacrosanct’ to us.”

58. Macquarie’s generous dividends did not just

benefit investors, but also Macquarie Management.

Pursuant to its management services agreement, Macquarie Management received fees based on the “New

Investment Value” of Macquarie, calculated as:

(a) Macquarie’s market capitalization; plus (b) the

amount of the Company’s borrowings; plus (c) the

value of the Company’s future investments; less

(d) cash and cash equivalents held. Accordingly, Macquarie Management’s fee benefitted directly from paying out as much cash to investors as possible.

59. The fee arrangement also meant that Macquarie Management directly benefitted from increasing the Company’s debt levels, further incentivizing

Defendants to spend the Company’s cash on the dividend above all else. In fact, during the Class Period—

as Macquarie continued to funnel its available cash

into dividend payments—Macquarie’s leverage multiples rose from 4.1x o [sic] 4.8x. FE-1—who had worked

as Chief Financial Officer at IMTT from the 1970s until 2011—stated that, when he was at IMTT, Macquarie had “virtually insisted” that IMTT not use operating cash flow, accumulated or current year, for its

fixed assets for any reason other than maintenance.

They wanted all new capital expenditures to be financed by borrowing. FE-1 described this as Macquarie’s “law of the land.”

JA44

60. Finally, because Macquarie Management’s fee

was—in Macquarie’s own words—“based primarily on

our market capitalization,” Macquarie Management

also benefitted directly from continually increasing

dividends and promising continued dividend growth

because doing so caused the market to assign higher

targets for the stock price, which drove the price of

Macquarie shares higher—generating higher fees for

Macquarie Management.

B.

Macquarie Depends On IMTT To Fuel

Its “Total Attractive Return”

61. Macquarie depended heavily on IMTT to provide the fuel for its dividend. During the Class Period,

IMTT’s contributions dwarfed those of the other operating segments, providing approximately 46% of Macquarie’s EBITDA. Even more impressive, in what Defendants told investors was “the true top line we use

at MIC for IMTT and our other businesses,” IMTT’s

net income amounted to 54% and 80% of the Company’s total in 2016 and 2017, respectively. This meant

that, of all the operating segments, IMTT provided the

vast majority of Macquarie’s free cash flow, and therefore contributed most to Macquarie’s dividend.

62. Investors understood that IMTT not only contributed the most to the dividend, but also that IMTT

was critical to delivering on Macquarie’s promised

growth based on Defendants’ representations that—as

Oppenheimer wrote in its May 12, 2016 report discussing a Macquarie investor day—“even in a somewhat

challenged energy environment . . . the business remains rock-solid.” For example, in its report dated

June 27, 2017, J.P. Morgan wrote that “IMTT[]

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continues to play the biggest role in MIC growth” and

“remain[s] the key driver of MIC’s ongoing growth.”

63. IMTT was originally founded in 1939 by James

J. Coleman, Sr. Over the following 75-years, Coleman

and his family expanded IMTT to become one of the

largest third-party providers of bulk liquid storage and

handling services in the United States, operating over

a dozen terminals handling petroleum, biofuels, chemicals, and vegetable/tropical oil products. Between

1975 to 1999, IMTT was operated in a partnership

with the Van Ommeren Company, which later became

Royal Vopak, N.V. (“Vopak”). Macquarie would later

disclose Vopak as one of IMTT’s “main terminal operation competitors.”

64. Macquarie first became involved with IMTT in

2006, when it acquired a 50% stake in IMTT. From the

start, FE-1 (IMTT’s former CFO) explained that Macquarie was “meticulous” in tracking IMTT’s performance and would “watch everything,” including

through an on-site Macquarie employee. FE-1 stated

that IMTT provided Macquarie with every “scintilla”

of information they asked for, and, as a result, Macquarie “[c]ertainly had enough to manage and micromanage the business.” FE-1 also explained that

Macquarie “knew in great detail” about IMTT’s contracts and what was stored in IMTT’s tanks, information that was continuously available through an inventory system that FE-1 personally helped to develop, known as “BLIS” (an abbreviation for Bulk Liquid Information System). In addition, FE-1 explained

that IMTT provided Macquarie with its annual

budget, which was prepared near the end of each calendar year and formally approved in the early part of

the year. FE-1 said that preparing the budget involved

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a conversation between marketing and accounting departments, and that Defendant Courtney—IMTT’s

Chief Operating Officer at the time—was very often

directly involved. 2 FE-1 said that built into the budget

was an assessment of the likelihood of renewal for contracts expiring in that year, which was information

typically provided directly by Courtney, who “absolutely” had “constant contact with customers, contracts, and trends.” FE-1 also stated that, in addition

to getting IMTT’s budget, Macquarie did its own projections, which went further out than a year.

65. In 2010, Defendant Hooke gave a presentation

in support of an IMTT application for a credit facility,

in which he corroborated the depth of Macquarie’s involvement with IMTT. Hooke said that Macquarie was

“completely joined at the hip with” IMTT, and that

he and Macquarie had become very familiar with

IMTT’s operations: “[F]rom MIC’s perspective . . . it’s

been a fortunate perspective for me to learn so much

about the business from [Thomas Coleman, then-CEO

of IMTT] and the rest of the management team.” 3

66. However, FE-1 explained, the relationship between IMTT and Macquarie gradually deteriorated.

FE-1 explained that IMTT and Macquarie disagreed

on a number of issues, including the extent to which

IMTT’s cash flow should be reinvested into the

2 This is consistent with Defendant Courtney’s profile on IMTT’s

website, which states that his “previous responsibilities with

IMTT have included budgeting and long-term forecasting,

new venture and project analysis, treasury management, and tax

planning.” See https://www.imtt.com/about-us/executive-team/.

3 See Macquarie Terminal Holdings LLC v. Voting Trust of IMTT

Holdings, Inc., Arbitration Award, ICDR File No. 50 125 T 00245

11.

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business as opposed to distributed to Macquarie shareholders in the dividend.

67. Years later, Defendant Hooke would

acknowledge that—consistent with FE-1’s information—Macquarie had “a disagreement over a number of issues” with the Coleman family, including “predominantly over the dividend policy.” Macquarie

pursued, and succeeded in, an arbitration against the

Colemans for unpaid dividend amounts from IMTT.

Then, according to Hooke, Macquarie’s “articulated

[dividend] strategy clearly [told] what we needed to

settle the differences with the co-investor”—by taking

complete control of IMTT.

68. On July 16, 2014, Macquarie acquired the remaining 50% interest in IMTT for $1 billion, making

IMTT the largest business in Macquarie’s portfolio. In

connection with the acquisition, the Company completed concurrent public offerings of approximately

$665.0 million in additional shares and $305.0 million

in convertible debt on July 9, 2014.

69. Immediately afterwards, the Exchange Act Defendants took total control of IMTT—so much so that,

when allegations arose just months later concerning

emissions of noxious fumes from St. Rose, a court in

the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that “[t]he level

of control exercised by Hooke, May, and the IMTT

Board [which was entirely controlled by Macquarie

employees] indicates that the ‘center of overall direction, control, and coordination’” for IMTT was actually

Macquarie’s offices in New York. See Rowell v. Shell

Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK, 2015 WL

7306435 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2015).

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70. In deposition testimony for Rowell, Defendant

Hooke described how he and Macquarie had taken

“proactive steps . . . to take control of IMTT” and put

in place a “MIC delegated authority framework. . . . It

was pretty important for us . . . to actually take full

control and see exactly what was going on in the business and implement the changes that we wanted to.” 4

As part of that effort, Macquarie appointed its CEO,

Hooke, to also serve as IMTT’s interim CEO—the first

and only time that Hooke has ever been the CEO of

one of Macquarie’s operating segments. Hooke explained his unusual involvement, stating that this

“was the biggest transaction MIC had ever done. And

the success of IMTT following that transaction was

probably the most important single event in [Macquarie’s] history, other than probably its IPO . . . I

wanted to make sure that went well.” During his time

as IMTT’s interim-CEO, Defendant Hooke personally

negotiated storage contracts.

71. Macquarie’s “full control” (in Defendant

Hooke’s words) continued throughout the Class Period. Even after Macquarie hand-selected Defendant

Courtney to serve as IMTT’s CEO in February 2015,

Hooke continued to serve as IMTT’s Executive Chairman until his exit from Macquarie in December 2017,

and Courtney reported directly to Hooke. Macquarie

also appointed Macquarie asset director James May as

IMTT’s CFO and to the IMTT Board of Directors. In a

deposition taken in Rowell, James May explained that,

prior to Macquarie’s complete control, he had served

as Macquarie’s “investor representative” to IMTT,

through which he “very much . . . was involved with

4 Rowell v. Shell Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK,

ECF No. 38-3 (E.D. La.).

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[IMTT] and . . . understood the company.” After being

appointed as IMTT’s CFO, May became “involved in

the decision-making processes for [IMTT].” 5 In addition, Macquarie took complete control of IMTT’s board,

which was responsible for approving major contracts

and appointing IMTT executives, among other things.

72. Further, the Exchange Act Defendants also appointed additional Macquarie personnel to head up an

expanded financial planning and analysis function at

IMTT and, as Defendant Hooke described during an

August 2, 2016 earnings call, spent an “enormous

amount of time” putting in place their exacting controls, including “rolling out proper maintenance

CapEx management processes and systems.”

73. As part of this process, Defendants Hooke and

Courtney, along with IMTT CFO James May and others, oversaw “Project One.” In a memorandum bearing

the logos of both IMTT and Macquarie, Hooke stated

that Project One sought to “shar[e] . . . knowledge and

best practice across terminals as fast as possible” and

directly solicited feedback from IMTT employees:

5 Rowell v. Shell Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK,

ECF No. 38-4 (E.D. La.).

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6

74. FE-2, who worked at IMTT from the 1970s until December 2015, most recently as terminal manager

of IMTT’s largest facility, St. Rose, described the

changes after Macquarie’s purchase of IMTT more

bluntly: IMTT became “100% a Macquarie show.”

75. Macquarie’s grip on IMTT tightened in 2016

with the introduction of Macquarie’s “shared services

model,” which consolidated HR, accounting, and other

services for all operating segments, and which the Exchange Act Defendants explicitly stated was designed

to “share knowledge” and “capture efficiencies” among

all of the businesses. On May 18, 2017, Defendant Davis explained that this shared services model was motivated by Defendants’ desire to “actively manage each

6 Rowell v. Shell Chemical, L.P., No. 2:14-cv-02392-CJB-DEK,

ECF No. 38-4 (E.D. La.).

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business, not a passive PE-type strategy where we just

parachute in every quarter, look at the books and say,

‘Nice job. See you next quarter.’ This is active day-today management driving top line improvement, typically increasing or optimizing pricing, trying to drive

volume increases and margin expansion.”

76. At the same time as Macquarie took even

greater control of IMTT, it also reduced the disclosures

it had historically provided about IMTT. For example,

an analyst noted during the February 23, 2016 earnings call that Macquarie had “stopped disclosing yearon-year storage rates for IMTT,” which Defendant

Hooke said was done to stop investors from reading too

much into a decline in utilization in 2014: “[P]eople

were spooked as to is it really offline for cleaning and

inspection? Will it ever come back or are you just saying that because your utilization is down?”

77. As another example, in the first Form 10-K

filed after obtaining complete ownership of IMTT in

2014, Macquarie also stopped providing granular capacity information about St. Rose—its largest terminal—but instead disclosed only the aggregate capacity

for the “Louisiana Terminals,” a category that included St. Rose and three other terminals.

78. Finally, after acquiring IMTT, Macquarie

ended its historical practice of disclosing its growth

capital expenditures for each operating segment,

providing only Company-wide growth capital expenditures. The Exchange Act Defendants understood that

this information was particularly critical to investors:

as Defendant Davis stated on August 31, 2017, Macquarie’s “attractive gains in cash flow generation, both

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cash flow generation and dividend growth” depended

on the “effective execution” of growth capital.

79. At the JPMorgan Energy Equity Investor Conference on June 26, 2017, Defendant Stewart acknowledged that Macquarie’s filed financial statements were

“not particularly helpful when it comes to determining

the cash generated by the enterprise.”

C.

The Exchange Act Defendants Conceal

That Macquarie’s “Total Return Opportunity” Is Not Sustainable

80. Contrary to their statements to investors, the

Exchange Act Defendants knew that Macquarie could

not sustain the dividend that it sold investors on.

81. Specifically, the Exchange Act Defendants

knew, but concealed from investors, that IMTT relied

heavily on the involvement of it [sic] largest terminal,

St. Rose, in a commodity that was widely known to be

in decline: “No. 6 fuel oil.” No. 6 fuel oil refers to a

broadly defined group of heavy and residual fuel oils,

sometimes simply known as “heavy” or “residual” fuel

oil, that are generally what is left in the bottom of the

barrel at the end of the petroleum refinement process.

82. As a result of its concealed reliance on No. 6

fuel oil, Macquarie would lose revenue as the No. 6 fuel

oil market dried up and contracts failed to renew, lose

more revenue as it had to take St. Rose tanks offline,

and then spend substantial capital to “repurpose”

those tanks—all of which cannibalized the cash flow

that Macquarie needed to fund the dividend promised

to investors.

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1.

The No. 6 fuel oil industry faces a

“paradigm shift.”

83. IMTT had become heavily involved in storing

No. 6 fuel oil in the 1970s. FE-2 and FE-1 explained

that, during that time, IMTT had built at its St. Rose

facility four massive tanks, each with a capacity of

500,000 barrels and a diameter larger than a football

field, specifically with the intention of storing No. 6

fuel oil. FE-2 and FE-1 both stated that also around

this time IMTT built eight additional 250,000 barrel

tanks at St. Rose, which FE-2 said were also dedicated

to No. 6 fuel oil. (FE-1 recalled that at least some were

dedicated to No. 6 fuel oil.) FE-1 stated that building

these tanks turned out to be a “major turning point”

and “huge overall change in direction and scope” for

IMTT—and ultimately transformed IMTT from a “relatively small and sleepy” company to a “force in the

industry” worldwide.

84. During the 1980s, FE-2 said, St. Rose became

“the big gorilla” in the Port of New Orleans / Port of

South Louisiana market for independent storage of

No. 6 fuel oil. Since that time, however, use of No. 6

fuel oil has declined significantly:

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85. As explained by a December 9, 2011 “Today in

Energy” article by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, “[c]hanges on both the residual fuel supply and demand side of the equation are contributing

to the downward trend” in consumption.

86. Supply was reduced because more competitive

alternatives were developed, causing refineries to focus operations to maximize production of those more

profitable products, including by installing ‘cokers,’ devices that convert No. 6 fuel oil, thereby reducing the

amount of No. 6 fuel oil at the source.

87. Meanwhile, demand was reduced because domestic and international governments, municipalities,

and institutions increasingly took steps to ban or heavily limit the use of No. 6 fuel oil as a result of its numerous noxious qualities, including that it contains

high amounts of pollutants such as sulfur; requires

specialized heating systems for storage and use; degrades slowly; and complicates cleanup efforts with its

viscous and sticky nature.

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88. These efforts had a significant impact on the

market for No. 6 fuel oil. In a June 11, 2013 presentation at the 10th Annual Bunker and Residual Fuel Oil

Conference, Tod D. McGreevy of industry consultants

Muse, Stancil & Co. noted that “The U.S. power sector

has all but eliminated residual oils as a fuel source,”

and stated that “Last year U.S. heavy product demand

continued the downward trend that has been firmly in

place since 2005, declining by more than 18% year on

year.” McGreevy also noted that, “[i]n response to declining domestic demand, U.S. refiners have reduced

production of heavy fuel oil – Aggregate production of

fuel oil is down by more than 35 percent since early in

the last decade.”

89. By the start of the Class Period, the primary

remaining users of No. 6 fuel oil were large shipping

vessels—so much so that it is at times referred to

simply as “bunker fuel.” In a June 2014 article titled

“Implications of Residual Fuel Oil Phase Out,” Dr. David Ramberg of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology noted that, while “[m]ost, if not all, developed

economics prohibit burning high-sulfur fuel oil” (i.e.,

No. 6 fuel oil), “the decline in residual fuel oil usage is

masked by increase in its use as a fuel for maritime

bunkering.” 7

7 http://www.usaee.org/usaee2014/submissions/onlineproceedin

gs/implications%20of%20rfo%20 phase%20out-ramberg&vanva

ctor.pdf

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90. However, Dr. Ramberg wrote, “the bunker

market is poised for big changes by 2020.” Dr. Ramberg was referring to actions taken by the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), the United Nations agency charged with regulating global shipping.

In response to heightening environmental concerns, in

2005 the IMO put into force Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from

Ships (“MARPOL”), which would phase in increasingly

stricter sulfur caps for shipping vessel fuel beginning

with an immediate limit of 4.5%. In October 2008, the

IMO revised MARPOL Annex VI with strengthened

requirements, including a 3.5% sulfur limit beginning

in 2012.

91. However, because the sulfur content of even

the heaviest fuel oil (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil) typically only

goes up to 3%, these limits were considered easy to

comply with and had very attenuated impacts on the

global markets. MARPOL Annex VI’s next and last

global sulfur limit, also adopted in October 2008, will

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be far more dramatic: a sulfur cap of 0.5% to begin by

the start of 2020, commonly referred to as “IMO 2020.”

92. It is widely understood that IMO 2020 will effectively eliminate the use of No. 6 fuel oil for global

shipping—the only sustained demand for the commodity—and therefore vastly reduce the overall demand

for No. 6 fuel oil. For example, in 2014, Dr. Ramberg

concluded that, given current trends, “total residual

fuel oil demand will drop by nearly half ” as a result

of IMO 2020.

93. Similarly, in its Medium-Term Market Report,

dated February 11, 2015, the International Energy

Agency wrote that, “The marine industry had long

been one of the last strongholds of high-sulphur residual fuel oil (RFO) [i.e. No. 6 fuel oil] demand, but international regulations are catching up with the sector,” and IMO 2020 “will greatly lighten the quality of

the global demand barrel as most shippers . . . are expected to switch from RFO to lower-sulphur marine

gasoil to meet the tighter standards.” The report also

predicted a “fuel oil collapse as bunkers switch to

lower sulphur fuels” as a result of IMO 2020.

94. The October / November 2014 issue of Bunkerspot, a periodical about the bunker fuel industry,

explained that a downward trend in No. 6 fuel oil was

already underway, writing that, as IMO 2020 “comes

closer into view . . . owners and operators [of marine

vessels] have been notably proactive in making the

shift to ‘greener’ shipping . . . a momentous—and

costly—transition[.]”

95. Consequentially, IMO 2020 will not just impact

global shipping, but rather all those involved in the

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supply chain for No. 6 fuel oil. On June 25-26, 2015,

S&P Global Platt’s hosted its annual Bunker and Residual Fuel Oil Conference. Among other speakers,

fuel industry consultant Turner, Mason & Company

gave a presentation entitled “The Outlook for Residual

Fuel Production in 2020” at an industry conference, in

which it discussed how the “[u]pcoming shift to low

sulfur bunker fuel in 2020 [will] present problems and

challenges for ship owners and refiners.”

96. According to a July 30, 2015 article by

MFame.com, a bunker fuel industry observer, as a result of the radical decrease in demand for heavy fuel

oil “[c]ome 2020,” “[m]any refineries are putting up

coking plants to use up surplus heavy fuels”—in other

words, getting rid of No. 6 fuel oil as it is created, and

thereby reducing the supply that might need storage

by bulk liquid terminal operators like IMTT.

97. Most dramatically, industry observer Seatrade

Maritime News described IMO 2020 in 2017 as ushering in “not step changes but brutal changes” that required “paradigm shifts on ship engines” and, in particular, a “need for huge logistics involving transport

between refineries, storage and delivery vessels.”

98. Indeed, since its 2013 Form 10-K filed on February 14, 2014, World Fuel Services Corp.—a fuel distributor that also operates storage facilities—has

listed IMO 2020 as an example of an “adverse condition[]” that could “reduce the demand for our products

and services” and “have a material adverse effect on

our business or on the businesses of our customers.”

Macquarie made no such disclosure.

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2.

By the beginning of the Class Period, investors are unaware of

IMTT’s exposure to the “brutal

changes” in the No. 6 fuel oil industry.

99. By the start of the Class Period, the market

was well aware of the declining use of No. 6 fuel oil and

even its coming ultimate demise from IMO 2020. For

example, in an article dated October 9, 2015, the U.S.

Energy Information Administration wrote that

“Health and environmental concerns related to the

high sulfur content of residual fuel oil (RFO) have led

to new policies and regulations that have significantly lowered expectations for future RFO use

globally. As the demand for RFO declines, the need

for the refining upgrades to convert residual material

to lighter, cleaner products will increase.”

100. Undisclosed to investors, declines in the No. 6

fuel oil industry had apparently already begun to impact IMTT. FE-3, an IT Operations Support / Network

Engineer at IMTT’s St. Rose facility from 2011-2016

relayed that, at IMTT’s Christmas luncheon at the end

of 2015, employees were told things were “a little bit

bleak,” and IMTT was not where it wanted to be as far

as customers buying storage as opposed to moving out

of storage. FE-3 recalled that IMTT attributed this to

general industry trends.

101. On the day that the Class Period begins, February 22, 2016, the International Energy Agency published a Medium-Term Oil Market Report, stating that

IMO 2020 was “due to come into force on 1 January

2020” and “will have global repercussions,” including

that “infrastructure will have to be constructed and

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adapted . . . involv[ing] the reconfiguration of

storage tanks to hold clean products rather than

fuel oil.”

102. However, only the Exchange Act Defendants

knew that—unlike the rest of the industry, which had

gradually shifted from No. 6 fuel oil in response to the

declining market—Macquarie remained incredibly reliant on the commodity. In reality, as was revealed after the end of the Class Period, No. 6 fuel oil was the

largest category of product stored by IMTT, amounting to at least 17.3 million barrels, or 40% of IMTT’s

total 45 million barrels of capacity.

103. Until that disclosure, Macquarie had last

acknowledged its exposure to No. 6 fuel oil in 2012—

nearly four years before the start of the Class Period—

as New York City was in the midst of implementing its

own high-profile ban on No. 6 fuel oil.

104. In 2011, New York City estimated the 1% of

city buildings burning No. 6 and other heavy fuel oils

caused 86% of the City’s building-related soot pollution. As a result, New York City issued regulations in

2011 requiring buildings to convert to cleaner alternatives. The use of No. 6 fuel oil was nearly completely

phased out by June 30, 2015, and as a result the use of

No. 6 fuel oil across the New York area fell dramatically.

105. Against this backdrop, Defendant Hooke

acknowledged during Macquarie’s May 3, 2012 earnings call that “[w]e’ve all read the articles” about ongoing “uncertainty” in oil production, and stated that

there may be an impact on the “demand for storage of

heavy oil residual product” (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil).

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However, Hooke said, IMTT could shift to storing the

clean products in increasing demand (as a result of the

shift to clean fuel oil), with “a one-off increase in capital expenditures to convert the heavy product tanks to

service the clean product.” Hooke said that “[t]hese

sorts of conversions have been completed before, including at Bayonne,” and would be beneficial because

“the storage rates for gasoline are higher than for residual product.” However, Hooke said, the Exchange

Act Defendants’ strategy was to continue to watch the

market—“to wait and see[.]”

106. In Macquarie’s next earnings call, on August 2,

2012, Defendant Hooke updated investors on the Exchange Act Defendants’ monitoring, stating, “While

the liquid hydrocarbon business is constantly evolving,

and we see this evolution continuing in the Gulf Coast,

the New York market is certainly more nuanced than

normal.” Based on their assessment, Hooke stated, the

Exchange Act Defendants “don’t see an immediate

need to convert large amounts of existing heavy oil

storage at Bayonne [IMTT’s second largest terminal,

after St. Rose] to clean products.”

107. However, before the end of the year, the Company told investors that they had changed their minds.

On November 1, 2012, Defendant Hooke told investors

that the Company had “continue[d] to access [sic] the

desirability of converting some residual product storage at Bayonne,” and “[o]ver the past couple of months

we’ve concluded that it would be IMTT’s long-term

best interests to begin to convert a portion of the

residual oil storage at Bayonne to clean product

storage” because “[w]e can achieve decidedly better

rates on clean product storage and we believe that reducing the amount of six oil in New York harbor will

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enhance pricing for that product.” As a result, Hooke

said, IMTT would be converting “some 1.2 million barrels of storage capacity at Bayonne from residual oil

or six oil to two oil,” a lighter grade fuel. Defendant

Hooke reminded investors that doing so would “involve[] cleaning the tanks and related pipes so we incur some up front OpEx to facilitate higher storage

rates on the new contracts.”

3.

During the Class Period, the Exchange Act Defendants conceal

IMTT’s reliance on No. 6 fuel oil.

108. Defendant Hooke’s discussion in 2012 of converting No. 6 fuel oil tanks would be the last time that

the Exchange Act Defendants would publicly discuss

the storage of No. 6 fuel oil was stored in IMTT’s tanks

until near the end of the Class Period, when Defendant

Davis explicitly and falsely told investors that “very

little” of IMTT’s storage is in “heavy product” (i.e.,

No. 6 fuel oil), among other similar comments to investors.

109. Otherwise, the Exchange Act Defendants only

generically disclosed that half of IMTT’s storage capacity was used for “refined petroleum products,” which

refers to a broad variety of products, ranging from

No. 6 fuel oil to gasoline and kerosene. Particularly

given that, in 2012, Hooke had discussed shifting from

No. 6 fuel oil at IMTT’s second-largest facility, Bayonne, and also acknowledged then that they saw the

“evolution continuing in the Gulf Coast,” investors reasonably interpreted the Exchange Act Defendants’ silence about No. 6 fuel oil to mean that IMTT’s Louisiana Terminals on the gulf coast—including IMTT’s

largest terminal, St. Rose—did not materially rely on

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the storage of No. 6 fuel oil but instead conformed with

the general shift and continuing evolution away from

the commodity.

110. The Exchange Act Defendants affirmatively reinforced investors’ wrong understanding by making

false and misleading statements that IMTT had limited exposure to macroeconomic pressure, implicitly

referencing trends such as the global decline in No. 6

fuel oil.

111. On the first day of the Class Period, February

22, 2016, Macquarie issued a press release in which

Defendant Hooke told investors that IMTT was “uncorrelated with the exploration and production

(E&P) portion of the oil industry.” Macquarie made a

similar claim in its 2015 Form 10-K filed the next day,

that the “essential services nature of the business and

continued strong demand for the products

stored” by IMTT offset any risk from “uncertainty

among industry participants” because of “sizeable and

largely unforeseen volatility in petroleum product

prices.”

112. Defendant Hooke continued to emphasize this

message during an earnings call the next day, stating

that [sic] IMTT’s utilization remains high [and] firm

commitments are up . . . . But none of this should come

as a huge surprise. This is not a business that is

sensitive to what is going on in the exploration

and production, or in interstate product movement.” Hooke further downplayed any impact to IMTT

from changing petroleum demand in particular. While

acknowledging that IMTT has “some sensitivity to

end-user demand,” Hooke said that sensitivity was

“least in the petroleum segment of its operations.”

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Finally, Hooke concluded that, “In short, we feel confident in the continued stable contribution from IMTT

to our overall results. The Business is simply not [a]

macroeconomically sensitive enterprise . . . . [W]e

run unsexy businesses with limited volatility.”

113. The Exchange Act Defendants continued to

make similar claims as the year went on. On May 2,

2016, in connection with the release of Macquarie’s

first quarter 2016 results, Defendant Hooke described

IMTT and Macquarie’s other operating segments as

“fundamentally sound businesses, operating in segments of the economy that are proven to be quite robust over the long-term” and delivering the “stable

performance for which the asset class is known.”

114. During a Macquarie investor day on May 12,

2016, Defendant Courtney—IMTT’s CEO—also misled investors about IMTT’s susceptibility to the global

changes in No. 6 fuel oil demand, stating, “Most of the

problems that are happening right now is affecting the

upstream, crude, exploration and the gathering. For

us, we are kind of downstream. Our assets are in a different part of the logistics and distribution chain.”

115. Defendant Courtney—who according to FE-1

“absolutely” had “constant contact with customers,

contracts, and trends”—also told investors that IMTT

“only deal[s] with major oil companies, major chemical

companies, utilities, major agricultural companies. We

have few other customers. We’ve got them very well.”

Courtney also stated, “there have to be catastrophic

[sic] for those ports not to be busy.”

116. Defendant Courtney further affirmatively misled investors about IMTT’s considerable storage of

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No. 6 fuel oil by stating that “our assets and our infrastructure” give IMTT the “flexibility” and “optionality” to change when “one day our customer . . . want

gasoline in his tanks, next day he may want distillate.”

To the contrary, FE-2 explained that cleaning the

“sticky, gooey” No. 6 fuel oil from tanks was “difficult,

time consuming, and expensive.” Only after the end of

the Class Period did Macquarie provide the following

timeline for repurposing these tanks, showing that it

could take up to nine months to repurpose tanks—

during which time the tanks require millions in capital

expenditures while generating no revenue themselves:

117. Moreover, both FE-2 and FE-1 explained that

the sheer size of some of IMTT’s No. 6 fuel oil tanks at

St. Rose limited their use. This is because storage imposes fixed costs proportionate to the size of the tank,

irrespective of the volume of material actually stored

inside. As a result, FE-2 explained that the 12 massive

tanks that IMTT had built at St. Rose specifically to

store No. 6 fuel oil—four 500,000 barrel tanks and

eight additional 250,000 barrel tanks—had become

largely “obsolete” for storing anything less sulfurous

than No. 6 fuel oil, because no such commodities trade

in sufficient volumes to make economical the high

fixed costs of using those tanks. FE-1 similarly said it

was “unequivocally a huge marketing challenge” to get

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any products lighter than No. 6 fuel oil (the heaviest

fuel oil) stored in IMTT’s “monster” 500,000 barrel

No. 6 fuel oil tanks at St. Rose. Because those “monster” tanks were not easily repurposed or re-contracted, FE-1 said any “disturbance in the force”—

even a “sneeze”—concerning those tanks immediately

got attention, and contract renewal efforts began at

least a year in advance of contract expiration.

118. On August 30, 2016, Defendant Davis told an

audience at the Three Part Advisors IDEAS Investor

Conference that IMTT is “dealing in refined products

and demand for refined products has likely been

quite strong.” By referencing the demand for refined

products as a general category, Davis misled investors

about IMTT’s reliance on storing No. 6 fuel oil, the demand for which had been declining for years—and was

about to plummet even further.

4.

Just weeks after IMO 2020 is confirmed, Macquarie Management

profits from nearly $235 million in

sales to investors.

119. As the fourth quarter 2016 began, the fuel oil

industry braced for confirmation that IMO 2020 would

come into effect as planned. In an article dated October 4, 2016, Reuters wrote:

The global shipping industry is bracing for a

key regulatory decision that could mark a

milestone in reducing maritime pollution, but

which could nearly double fuel costs in a sector already reeling from its worst downturn in

decades . . . .

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The issue has been brewing for more than a

decade and shippers said the industry was

now bracing for tighter regulation to be introduced sooner rather than later due to political

pressure . . . .

For traded oil markets, the shift to lowsulfur fuel will “substantially reduce demand for bunkers in the run up to 2020

and increase demand for gasoil and alternative fuels including LNG,” said

Christopher Haines, head of oil and gas at

BMI Research.

120. On October 27, 2016, the IMO announced that

it had concluded its review and, as expected, formally

fixed the global 0.5% cap on sulfur in bunker fuel to

begin in 2020.

121. The IMO’s decision was widely reported. For

example, in an article published on October 27, 2016,

Reuters quoted Alan Gelder of energy consultancy firm

Wood Mackenzie as discussing “how disruptive this is

going to be,” and that “refineries will need to run in a

way they have never run before . . . . Refineries that do

not have the ability to convert the fuel oil into higher

quality products will struggle to remain profitable as

this big outlet for lower-quality fuel disappears.”

122. According to S&P Global Platts’ October 2016

special report, the IMO’s October 2016 decision had an

immediate impact on demand: “Although we won’t

know the full price impact of the decision until we

reach 2020, the forward curves are already pricing in

the likelihood of a dramatically different fuel oil

market.”

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123. On October 31, 2016, Dr. Rudy Kassinger published an article for industry consultants Turner, Mason & Company entitled, “2020 or 2025: The Decision

Has Been Made.” In it, Dr. Kassinger wrote, “While

this move was widely expected . . . [t]his forthcoming

change is the equivalent of opening Pandora’s

Box.” Dr. Kassinger also said that the “recent IMO decision . . . will be one of the dominant issues facing the

global refinery industry in the next ten years.”

124. Yet, in its earnings call the next day, on November 1, 2016, Macquarie did not mention IMO 2020.

Instead, Defendant Hooke continued to suggest that

IMTT was immune to these sorts of dramatic shifts in

the market, stating:

[C]ontracts for storage and services at IMTT

continued to renew for longer durations than

they had been early in the year. This suggests

that producers, refiners, shippers and others

probably believe that commodity prices going

forward will not be either as low or as volatile

as has been the case over the last couple of

years. Remember, none of MIC’s businesses

are exposed directly to the price of crude

oil or petroleum products.

125. During that call, Defendant Hooke also spoke

personally about efforts to secure renewals in IMTT’s

storage contracts, stating that the Exchange Act Defendants’ “first emphasis [in contract renewals] is adding tenor to customer contracts, and then our emphasis would be adding pricing. And then our emphasis

after that would be on adding capacity . . . . [W]e continue to make nice progress on adding tenor to the contracts, so I’m sort of pleased with that.” Hooke also

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showed his awareness of contract renewals on a granular level, discussing how contract renewal “varies

terminal to terminal, product category to product category, chemicals are a little different than petroleum.”

126. Particularly in light of the momentous recent

developments for IMO 2020, the implication of Hooke’s

statements was clear even without explicit reference—

IMO 2020 did not pose any risk to IMTT or Macquarie.

127. This implication is even clearer by comparison

to statements made around this time by other operators of liquid storage terminals. For example, just days

earlier, the CEO of World Fuel Services Corp., a fuel

distributor that also operates storage facilities, discussed the company’s ability to “navigate through” the

“significant amount of changes coming into the marketplace” from IMO 2020, which is “certainly is going

to change the fuel diet. It’s going to become more complex. You’re going to have global imbalances in terms

of various products.”

128. Similarly, during a November 7, 2016 earnings

call for Vopak—the company that previously operated

IMTT in a partnership with the Coleman family, and

which Macquarie had identified as one of IMTT’s

“main terminal operation competitors”—its CFO discussed “the implications for global imbalances of diesel

and fuel oil” as a result of IMO 2020, which he said

raised the questions “what does it mean for the storage

of the products?” and “what we are doing . . . as a business?”

129. However, because the Exchange Act Defendants had concealed Macquarie’s heavy reliance on

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No. 6 fuel oil (and thereby its exposure to IMO 2020)—

and, further, misleadingly told investors that it was

macroeconomically protected—investors did not believe that Macquarie was facing the same questions

posed by Vopak, and prices of Macquarie common

stock actually climbed to Class Period highs during

this time. For example, on October 5, 2016—the day

after Reuters wrote about the industry bracing for IMO

2020—Macquarie reached its second-highest Class Period price of $85.

130. Then, on November 1, 2016—just days after

IMO 2020 was confirmed, and the same day as Hooke

assured investors that “none of MIC’s businesses are

exposed directly to the price of . . . petroleum products”—Macquarie stock climbed to its all-time Class

Period high of $85.45.

131. Within days, on November 3, 2016, the Exchange Act Defendants announced the Offering: a secondary public offering of 2,870,000 shares of Macquarie common stock by Macquarie Management,

comprising nearly 40% of Macquarie Management’s

holdings.

132. The Offering was conducted pursuant to the

Company’s existing shelf registration statement filed

with the SEC on April 5, 2016 (the “Registration Statement”), as updated by a prospectus supplement dated

November 3, 2016 (the “Prospectus Supplement”; with

the Registration Statement, the “Offering Documents”). The Offering Documents did not discuss

IMTT’s reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, IMO 2020, or even

the decline in No. 6 fuel oil generally. In fact, the Offering Documents remarkably suggested that “strict

environmental regulations” benefitted IMTT by

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providing one of “several barriers” to entry that protected IMTT from competition. In reliance on these

statements in the Offering Documents, investors purchased over $235,053,000 in Macquarie common stock

from Macquarie Management.

133. By comparison, beginning with its 2013 Form

10-K filed on February 14, 2014, World Fuel Services

Corp.—a fuel distributor that also operates storage facilities—has explicitly discussed IMO 2020 in its

Forms 10-K as an example of an “adverse condition[]”

that could “reduce the demand for our products and

services” and “have a material adverse effect on our

business or on the businesses of our customers.”

134. As 2016 ended and 2017 began, the bulk liquid

storage industry at large continued to discuss the impact of IMO 2020 and the declining No. 6 fuel oil market. For example, on December 19, 2016, the storage

industry periodical Tank Storage Magazine devoted a

full article to IMO 2020, describing it as “A Significant

Change For All Supply Chain Players.”

135. Then, on February 8, 2017, Tank Storage Magazine stated that a survey of 171 storage operator industry experts “highlight[ed] that operators are very

mindful of ever-stringent environmental standards,

such as the recent International Maritime Organisation decision regarding sulphur fuel content[.]”

136. On February 18, 2017, Vopak—the company

that previously operated IMTT in a partnership with

the Coleman family, and which Macquarie had identified as one of IMTT’s “main terminal operation competitors”—disclosed in its 2016 Annual Report listed

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IMO 2020 as a “key theme” that its “overall business

environment in 2016 has been influenced by.”

137. Later that month, on February 21, 2017, during its earnings call, Galp Energia—a corporation

whose business includes, among other things, the storage of liquid fuels—described IMO 2020 as a “disruption that [Galp] will face across all the industry,” and

explained that consequentially the company was “taking in consideration that we are addressing the challenges of new conversion capacity”—“This is a trend

and we have to fine tune our strategy . . . . [W]e

have to start to keep that in our mind and progressively allocate CapEx to this new economy . . . . So we

have to be working and competing on that space.”

138. The next day, on February 22, 2017, Tank Storage Magazine published in its first issue of the year an

editorial entitled “An Unpredictable Market,” stating

that “2017 could throw up its fair share of surprises for

the global market—particularly with . . . moves towards implementing the IMO’s 2020 marine fuel

cap[.]”

139. By that time, IMTT was already underway attempting to renew expiring No. 6 fuel oil contracts.

FE-4—who began working at IMTT in 1982, and later

reported directly to IMTT CFO (and Macquarie Management employee James May) as a Director of Insurance Risk—stated that, by the time he left IMTT in

February 2017, IMTT was already working on the renewals of the various No. 6 fuel oil contracts, and

would have been starting to get a feel of customers’

needs. FE-4 also said that—consistent with FE-1’s information—Defendant Courtney would have renegotiated the contracts.

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140. Nonetheless, Macquarie’s 2016 Form 10-K,

filed February 21, 2017, simply rehashed similar boilerplate risk factors as its prior year Form 10-K, claiming that the “essential services nature of the business

and continued strong demand for the products

stored” by IMTT offset any risk from “uncertainty

among industry participants” because of “historically

low and volatile petroleum product prices.”

141. Particularly in light of IMO 2020’s confirmation—and the concurrent impact on the market, described above—the Exchange Act Defendants’ decision

to repeat these generic risk disclosures told the market

that IMTT had no exposure to IMO 2020 or the decline

of the No. 6 fuel oil industry generally.

142. The Exchange Act Defendants continued to affirmatively mislead the market about IMTT’s protection from market trends. During Macquarie’s first

earnings call of the year on February 22, 2017, Defendant Hooke misleadingly told investors that “[s]torage

prices were stable” and affirmatively said that there

was “nothing we see coming down the pipe” that

would cause utilization to “revert to historically normal levels . . . we have every incentive to keep those

tanks as full as we can, and we will.”

143. In contrast, on March 31, 2017, Odfjell—which

Macquarie had previously identified as one of IMTT’s

“main terminal operation competitors”—published its

2016 annual report, in which the company stated that

it “must carefully consider consequences of the new requirements on sulphur emissions coming into effect

from 2020[.]”

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144. Nonetheless, on May 10, 2017, Defendant Davis discussed IMTT at an Oppenheimer Industrial

Growth Conference, and again did not discuss IMO

2020 specifically but instead assured investors that

IMTT’s storage and logistics services were secure, with

“no commodity exposure other than the very

broad macroeconomic factors influencing supply

and demand more broadly.”

145. Defendant Davis made similar misleading

statements one week later, during the May 18, 2017

Three Part Advisors East Coast Investor Conference.

Discussing IMTT, Davis stated, “There is no commodity exposure directly, other than that it results

from macroeconomic factors influencing supply and

demand more broadly.” Davis also conspicuously omitted No. 6 fuel oil from his description of refined petroleum products stored by IMTT: “A little over half of the

capacity . . . is in service for petroleum products, specifically refined petroleum products of gasoline,

diesel, heating oil, things of that nature.”

146. Defendant Davis also made other misleading

statements at the May 18, 2017 conference. For example, in response to a question about “environmental . . .

issues that arise out of the operation of this kind of

business,” Davis acknowledged that such issues are

“an important consideration,” but did not discuss IMO

2020 or other environmental concerns pushing the industry away from No. 6 fuel oil.

147. In addition, Defendant Davis misled investors

by stating that, “the easiest way to think of [IMTT] is

as a multimodal distribution hub for liquid products.

This is not the place where you would store it if

you’re playing contango or backwardation

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games. This is a distribution center for these

products.” 8 This statement further suggested that

IMTT was insulated from market fluctuations by conveying that IMTT’s customers were not speculative

commodity traders.

148. All the while, the tank storage industry at

large continued to focus on IMO 2020. On June 12,

2017, Tony Quinn of TankBank International (an international advisory and professional networking organization for bulk liquid storage) discussed the impact of IMO 2020 as part of a presentation called “A

Global Perspective on Liquid Storage” that he gave at

the International Liquid Terminals Association

(“ILTA”) 37th annual 2017 International Operating

Conference & Trade Show. Senior IMTT employees

certainly knew of, if not attended, Quinn’s presentation: IMTT’s COO throughout the Class Period, Michael Burgett, personally helped “shape the conference

program content” as a member of the 2017 Conference

Advisory Committee, and other IMTT personnel also

presented at the conference, including Rene Gurdian

(IMTT’s Regional Terminal Manager, based at IMTT’s

headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana) and Jordan

Blasi (IMTT Fire Chief).

149. Later that month, on June 27, 2017, Defendant

Stewart spoke at the JPMorgan Energy Equity Investor Conference. With the industry and investors focused on IMO 2020, Stewart boasted that IMTT

8 “Backwardation” and “contango” are industry terms referring to

the relationship between the current (spot) and futures prices of

commodities. Backwardation is when the current price is higher

than a future cost, and is seen as a sign of higher immediate demand. Conversely, contango is when the futures price is higher

than the spot price.

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“benefits from stable, generally growing demand” and

that “the opportunity set at IMTT is as good as it has

been in quite some time,” with frequent “requests for

additional capacity and capability.” Notably,

though Defendant Stewart did not address the decline

in No. 6 fuel oil explicitly, he was asked specifically

about the “renewal risk” in the “bulk liquid storage

market in general” given “the current environment,”

and responded that “the market is one that’s in relative equilibrium at the moment.”

5.

As IMTT’s utilization begins to fall,

Macquarie acquires Epic Midstream in a largely-stock transaction.

150. By the end of the second quarter 2017, the increasing decline in demand for No. 6 fuel oil began to

drag down IMTT’s utilization, falling to 94%, down

from 96% year-over-year. Nonetheless, during Macquarie’s earnings call for the quarter, on August 3,

2017, Defendant Hooke told investors that IMTT remained “a case of steady as she goes” and emphatically denied that there were “any commodity-driven

factors that would cause a decline in utilization,” stating:

No, no. The totality of the change in utilization was driven by tanks offline for tank

cleaning and inspection. But the other I would

– so there’s no – well, there’s nothing – there’s

no other commodity noise or other noise

or counter-party issues there. It’s purely

that.

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151. Defendant Hooke’s outright denial that any

“commodity-driven factors” threatened IMTT’s utilization contrasted dramatically with statements made

the very same day in the earnings call for PBF Energy,

a petroleum refiner and supplier. During that call,

PBF Energy’s CEO stated that IMO 2020’s impact on

the market is “going to be significant . . . for a period

of time . . . . I think it’s a very, very significant thing

going forward.”

152. This contrast between Hooke’s emphatic assurances during Macquarie’s earnings call and the larger

market assessment so misled investors that, in its report dated August 3, 2017, SunTrust remarkably

wrote that it actually “expect[s] a slight uptick in

[IMTT’s] utilization for the remainder of the year.”

153. In fact, at this time in particular, the Exchange

Act Defendants needed the market’s continued belief

in Macquarie’s strength (including Macquarie’s commitment to its dividend): on the same day as they disclosed IMTT’s slip in utilization, the Exchange Act Defendants also announced that Macquarie was acquiring Epic Midstream (“Epic”) for $171.5 million, to be

paid largely in shares of Macquarie stock. Similar to

IMTT, Epic operates a portfolio of storage terminals—

but, unlike IMTT, Epic was protected against the fallout in the heavy fuel oil industry because it principally

stored jet fuel, including for the Department of Defense as part of a longstanding relationship. Accordingly, Epic offered Macquarie a chance to buffer the

Company against IMO 2020—as Defendant Hooke

would later acknowledge, “jet fuel is the sort of reason

for Epic.”

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154. The use of stock to fund the majority of the

transaction reflected the Exchange Act Defendants’

growing awareness that Macquarie was facing a capital shortfall as IMTT would require enormous expenditures to repurpose the tanks that had been dedicated

to storing No. 6 fuel oil. In fact, FE-5, Epic’s Chief

Commercial Officer from Feb 2016 to August 2017,

participated in meetings with Macquarie and IMTT

employees in early 2017—including Defendant Courtney—and recalled that Macquarie sought to fund the

purchase entirely with stock.

155. Accordingly, it was critical that the Exchange

Act Defendants maintain the value of Macquarie’s

stock even in the face of the declining utilization rate.

When the Epic Acquisition finally closed on August 8,

2017, Macquarie ultimately issued 1,650,104 shares of

Macquarie stock for the Epic Acquisition—meaning

each share was valued at approximately $75.75. In

contrast, when the truth became known, the price of

Macquarie shares would plummet 50% of that value,

to just $37.41 per share. In other words, but for the

Exchange Act Defendants’ false and misleading statements and omissions, the Exchange Act Defendants

would have had to have issued up to twice as much

stock to complete the purchase.

156. On August 31, 2017, Defendant Davis participated in the Three Part Advisors Midwest IDEAS Investor Conference, where Davis stated that only Macquarie’s Atlantic Aviation segment had “exposure to

cyclicality or macroeconomic sensitivity . . . [Atlantic

Aviation is] definitely the one business in the portfolio

that has more or a greater potential to have macroeconomic sensitivity.” Davis also described as a “misperception” that Macquarie had “issues or potential

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exposures” from “volatility in the commodity price . . .

given the basic services nature of the visibility we have

into the cash-generating capacity of these businesses.”

D.

The Exchange Act Defendants Continue

To Falsely Tout IMTT’s Utilization And

Promise Macquarie’s Dividend Even As

Customers Cancel Valuable No. 6 Fuel

Oil Storage Contracts

157. Just one month after completing the Epic Acquisition, on September 11, 2017, Macquarie unexpectedly announced that Hooke would step down as

CEO in early 2018. The news surprised investors,

who—as one analyst stated during Macquarie’s earnings call two months later—“kind of always envisioned

[Hooke] being at MIC for life, it felt like.” However,

months later, as the truth about the Exchange Act Defendants’ fraud became known, some analysts began

to see the timing of Hooke’s departure as something

more suspicious: for example, in its February 22, 2018

analyst report, J.P. Morgan noted that, “in the first

quarter after the departure of former CEO James

Hooke,” there was a “sharp departure from prior messaging” around “underlying business issues.”

158. In connection with the release of its third quarter 2017 earnings in November 2017, Macquarie reported that it was lowering its 2017 free cash flow

guidance to 9%, rather than the 10-15% previously

provided, and disclosed that IMTT’s utilization had

continued to decline, now to 92.7% (down year-overyear from 96.7%). Nonetheless, Macquarie announced

that it raised its quarterly dividend yet again, consistent with its guidance that the dividend would grow

10%.

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159. During Macquarie’s November 2, 2017 earnings call—Hooke’s last—Hooke forcefully downplayed

the drop in IMTT utilization as related only to cleaning

tanks, and stated that, “[i]n general, IMTT’s operating

results for the third quarter and year-to-date periods

were stable.” During the November 2, 2017 earnings

call, Hooke also dismissed an analyst’s suggestion that

Macquarie might “pivot towards what the market values and not as much maximizing dividend growth but

more retaining cash flow,” stating:

Exuberant dividend growth at all costs where

people were urging us to guide to 7 years’ visibility of 20% plus dividend growth, we never

did that. People slashing their dividend

saying we’re going to slash our dividend

to deploy capital internally, I don’t think

you’ll see us do that. . . .

[Y]ou’ve never seen us make radical lurching

changes of, sort of, revisiting capital policy

and dividend policy, et cetera. I would be

pretty surprised if anything changes going

forward . . . .

[E]verything we’ve done to date, we can fund

without going to the market for more capital

. . . we fund–that standard 350 of growth

CapEx.

160. As throughout the Class Period, Defendant

Hooke’s statements contrasted significantly with those

of their competitors. For example, just days later during its November 6, 2017 earnings call, Vopak—the

company that previously operated IMTT in a partnership with the Coleman family, and which Macquarie

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had identified as one of IMTT’s “main terminal operation competitors”—stated that “the fuel oil market

structure remains challenging for our customers,

mainly due to uncertainty around long-term demand

for high sulfur fuel oil cost by the uncertain fuel oil demand implications of IMO 2020. In addition, the fuel

oil market is in backwardation, not stimulating any

additional trading activities. The uncertainties around

the exact IMO 2020 consequences is a global phenomenon affecting the whole industry from suppliers to traders, bunkering agencies, ship owners and also tank storage companies.”

161. At the end of the November 2017 earnings call,

as the Officer Defendants had throughout the Class

Period, Defendant Hooke invited investors to personally contact Defendant Davis. In fact, Macquarie

would later disclose that Defendants engaged in “in

excess of 1,200 individual interactions with current and potential shareholders” during 2017, including “investor interactions in November 2017” after

the earnings call.

162. Many of these direct communications were motivated by a decline in Macquarie’s stock price,

prompting several investors to specifically inquire

about IMTT’s storage of heavy fuel oil and exposure to

IMO 2020.

163. For example, as Defendants frequently referred to, they participated in numerous roadshows

during the Class Period. (See, e.g., ¶50.) During these

presentations, which were at times attended and/or

hosted by analyst firms covering Macquarie during the

Class Period, Macquarie representatives were directly

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asked about IMO 2020, and responded that the Company did not see IMO 2020 as a big impact on IMTT.

164. Similarly, in September 2017, an institutional

investor told Defendant Davis that this investor

learned from one of Macquarie’s competitors that No. 6

fuel oil was 20% of IMTT’s capacity, and that the market for No. 6 fuel oil was weak at the time and specifically had “some real structural challenges given” IMO

2020. During a phone call with this investor on September 22, 2017, Davis responded (as he did with other

investors) that IMO 2020 should not have much of an

impact on Macquarie and in fact could end up a positive for the Company. Davis also said that, if needed,

Macquarie could convert IMTT’s tanks for a nominal

amount.

165. In other instances, the Officer Defendants

falsely told investors that IMTT stored only half of the

amount of heavy oil (i.e., No. 6 fuel oil) that it actually

stored, and further minimized the consequences of

that exposure. For example, on or around this time,

Defendant Davis directly told an investor that No. 6

fuel oil was only a small percent of IMTT’s utilization.

166. Similarly, on November 10, 2017, Defendant

Davis—Macquarie’s head of investor relations—sent

the following in response to a question from Lead

Plaintiff:

[Lead Plaintiff:] What percent of IMTT’s

storage is in heavy oil? We heard new regulations are coming out in 2020 that prevent

fuel ships from using heavy oil unless improved scrubbers are also installed to clean

exhaust – how will this impact demand for

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heavy oil? Can heavy oil storage tanks be easily converted?

[Davis:] About 20%. Your information is consistent with our understanding of the proposed regulatory changes. The regs will require Sulphur content to move from a max of

3% today to .5% - what we are seeing in our

facility is already at about 1.5%. Some ships

will install scrubbers and continue to burn the

less expensive, high Sulphur product. Since

you cannot not produce black oil, going forward some of it will be blended with distillate

to meet the new spec, refiners will also look

for way to crack the #6, or the product will be

exported for power gen (or purposes other

than ship propulsion) in other parts of the

world. The latter could well be a positive for

storage demand at IMTT-Bayonne given the

deep water access at the facility.

Heavy tanks can be converted and we have

converted some in the past – in late 2012 we

converted about 1.2mm bbls of heavy storage

to distillate. There is a maintenance capex

cost associated with cleaning the tanks and

associated pipes, and potentially a growth

capex spend for new capability (floating roof,

for example) depending on the end use.

167. One week later, on November 16, 2017, Defendant Davis participated in another Three Part Advisors

IDEAS Investor Conference, during which he similarly

(and falsely) assured investors by misrepresenting

IMTT’s exposure to No. 6 fuel oil, stating that “[a] little

over 1/2 of [IMTT’s] capacity is in service in petroleum

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products, and as I say, very little of that is in crude or

asphalt, any -- or heavy product”—and stating that

the Exchange Act Defendants have “very good visibility into the cash generating capacity of this business

over a longer period of time.”

168. On November 28, 2017, Macquarie hosted a

dinner on November 28, 2017 for approximately a

dozen institutional investors, including Lead Plaintiff.

At this dinner, which was attended by Defendants

Hooke, Stewart, and Davis, as well as Macquarie’s

then-COO and future-CEO, Mr. Frost, the Officer Defendants told Lead Plaintiff and the other guests that

Macquarie would have continued dividend growth in

2018, citing among other things that IMTT would

serve as a “growth driver for 2018” as a result of pricing and operational improvements expected to drive

EBITDA margins higher.

169. In December 2017, the Exchange Act Defendants gave an investor presentation entitled “Overview

of the IMTT Segment,” in which they stated that

IMTT’s “[c]onsistently high utilization reflects essential services nature of IMTT’s services,” while any

“[u]nused capacity is generally attributable to tank inspections, repairs, and modifications.”

170. In fact, reconciling Macquarie’s later disclosures indicates that significant No. 6 fuel oil storage

contracts had not renewed by the beginning of November, at the latest, causing IMTT’s utilization to decline

to below the oft-stated historical average before Defendants’ reassuring statements discussed above. Specifically, Macquarie later disclosed that IMTT utilization at the end of the third quarter 2017 was 93.2%,

while the utilization at the end of the fourth quarter

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was 89.6%. To reconcile that decline with the reported

average utilization rate for the fourth quarter of 90.6%

means that there must have been at least 66 days of

89.6% utilization rate, or that the decline started as

early as October 25, 2017.

171. Nonetheless, the Exchange Act Defendants did

not disclose the contract non-renewals or give anything other than positive indications for IMTT, Macquarie, and the Company’s dividend.

E.

Throughout The Class Period, The Market Relied On The Exchange Act Defendants’ Misrepresentations About

IMTT

172. Throughout, the market took note of the Exchange Act Defendants’ claims about IMTT as positive

signs for the Company and its dividend.

173. For example, in its analyst report just before

the start of the Class Period, on January 11, 2016, J.P.

Morgan concluded that “Macquarie does not possess

the same commodity price exposure and volumetric

risk as others in our coverage universe . . . we believe

investors should flock to, not flea from, MIC’s niche

businesses that diversify away from riskier portions of

energy infrastructure. . . . Among all stocks under coverage MIC remains a favorite.”

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174. J.P. Morgan’s January 11, 2016 report also

noted “macroeconomic sensitivity” as a risk only for

Atlantic Aviation—not the Company’s other operating

segments, such as IMTT. J.P. Morgan would continue

to state similarly in reports throughout the Class Period, including on November 1, 2016.

175. For example, in an analyst report dated May

12, 2016, Oppenheimer discussed Macquarie’s “bullish

investor day,” and stated that Defendant Courtney

“presented a positive outlook [for IMTT] even in a

somewhat challenged energy environment. While

lower prices have affected sentiment, the business remains rock-solid.”

176. Similarly, in its analyst report dated October

31, 2016, Oppenheimer wrote that IMTT’s “core business outperformed . . . . Utilizations now stand at

~96.7%, reflecting strong demand across the petroleum storage markets. . . . We continue to believe the

company can grow its dividend double digits, as organic growth remains healthy[.]”

177. An analyst report by Wells Fargo issued just

weeks later, on November 18, 2016, also confirmed the

effectiveness of the Exchange Act Defendants’ deception: though the report discussed regulatory risks to

Macquarie’s Hawaii Gas segment, it did not discuss

any similar risk to IMTT—instead stating that, “[d]espite significant exposure to oil as a commodity, oil

prices do not have a significant impact on cash flow as

IMTT primarily works with downstream products. Refined oil product use tends to increase as oil prices (and

gas prices) drop.” Ultimately, the report concluded,

“We consider the dividend to be secure, with 8+% annual growth potential. Finally, we consider MIC’s

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management team to be knowledgeable and contemplative, with a conservative approach[.]”

178. Similarly, on March 20, 2017, SunTrust Robinson Humphrey initiated analyst coverage of Macquarie with a “Buy” rating. SunTrust noted that IMTT

provided 47% of Macquarie’s free cash flow with “longterm fee-based contracts provide the segment with

generally stable cash flows and MIC works to minimize any additional sources of risk to the business

model . . . minimizing its risk to commodity movements.”

179. Finally, in its June 26, 2017 analyst report, J.P.

Morgan wrote that IMTT “continues to play the biggest role in MIC growth . . . [and] remains the key

driver of MIC’s ongoing growth.”

V.

THE TRUTH EMERGES

180. On February 21, 2018, after the close of trading, Macquarie announced disappointing fourth-quarter earnings of $0.43 per share, well short of analysts’

prior estimate of $0.51 per share. In addition, IMTT’s

fourth quarter utilization rate was just 90.60% in the

fourth quarter, ending the year at 89.6%—far below

the consistently affirmed “historical mean” utilization

rate of 94%.

181. Macquarie also revealed a stunning collapse in

its free cash flow: rather than the 10-15% growth in

free cash flow that it had consistently guided investors

to expect—or even the downward revision to 9% free

cash flow growth that it gave in November 2017—Macquarie’s free cash flow increased only 8%. Remarkably,

Macquarie also now stated that it expected its free

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cash flow to decline by 8-10% during 2018—far from

the 10-15% growth guidance previously provided.

182. Most alarmingly, Macquarie revealed that it

would be cutting its quarterly 2018 dividend guidance

by 31%—ending over four years of consecutive quarterly dividend growth—primarily to fund the repurposing of IMTT fuel oil tanks to accommodate new

products. The earnings announcement quoted Macquarie’s new CEO Frost as stating, “[W]e have made

the decision to reduce our 2018 dividend in favor of

internally funding the repurposing of the assets

at International-Matex Tank Terminals and to

take advantage of the incentives to invest in growth

projects that are a part of recent tax reform.”

183. In Macquarie’s earnings call the following day,

Frost blamed all this bad news on one culprit: No. 6

fuel oil.

184. For the first time, Macquarie acknowledged

the “structural decline in the 6 Oil market,” a “broadly

defined group of residual and heavy oils” for which,

Frost said, “[p]rices are in backwardation, demand for

the product is declining and less of it is being produced

domestically as a consequence of the shale revolution

and the lighter feedstocks going to U.S. refineries.”

185. However, even as Frost acknowledged the

truth—that “it is well known to the market that 6 oil

is a declining market”—Frost suggested that IMTT’s

tumbling utilization somehow uniquely caught Macquarie off-guard, stating: “In December and early January, a number of customers terminated contracts for

a significant amount of 6 Oil capacity at IMTT’s facility in St. Rose. Not only did they terminate those

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contracts, in some cases, they shut down their operations and exited the industry.” Frost said this “was

quite sudden and it did happen to a number of contracts, whether the notice period came up. And it is

quite common that these do occur at the end of the

year. But it was something that was a surprise.”

186. In reality, investors were the ones who were

surprised. The Exchange Act Defendants had not once

during the Class Period disclosed or even hinted at the

importance of the No. 6 fuel oil segment to IMTT and

to the Company’s overall performance, nor had the Exchange Act Defendants ever revealed that “many” of

IMTT’s “long-term customers” were storing No. 6 fuel

oil—a product for which, as Frost accurately stated,

“the long-term trend . . . has been well understood” to

be in decline. To the contrary, the Exchange Act Defendants had, as recently as November 2017, actively

misrepresented that the Company had “very little” involvement in heavy fuel oils. Further, throughout the

Class Period, the Exchange Act Defendants had consistently reassured investors that these were exactly

the sorts of market forces that IMTT was shielded

against, such as when Defendant Hooke told investors

on February 22, 2017—shortly after IMO 2020 was

confirmed to proceed on schedule, immediately causing disruption in the No. 6 fuel oil market—that there

was “nothing we see coming down the pipe” that

would cause utilization to “revert to historically normal levels”—much less the lowest utilization that

Macquarie had ever publicly reported, as it had now

fallen to.

187. Former employees FE-2 and FE-1 also expressed outright skepticism at management’s purported “surprise” in February 2018. FE-1 stated that

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management’s explanation “doesn’t ring true,” because “it defies logic that the decline in No. 6 fuel oil

markets snuck up on them in one quarter”—the decline of an oil product like No. 6 fuel oil does not occur

overnight and such a trend does not “show up between

quarters.” FE-1 said bluntly that FE-1 “flat-ass

[doesn’t] believe there was a change in market that

caught them off guard and came on overnight.” Because demand for IMTT’s tanks had historically been

robust, FE-1 stated that Macquarie would have seen a

decline in demand coming, noting in particular that

Defendant Courtney was “absolutely” in “constant contact with customers, contracts, and trends.” Further,

FE-1 explained, because St. Rose’s “monster” 500,000

barrel tanks built to store No. 6 fuel oil could not be

“easily repurposed or re-contracted,” FE-1 said any

“disturbance in the force”—even a “sneeze”—concerning those tanks immediately got attention, and contract renewal efforts began at least a year in advance

of contract expiration.

188. Similarly, FE-2 stated his understanding that,

from a marketing standpoint, IMTT—a “100%” Macquarie show—would have been monitoring the length

of its contracts and making sure their customers were

satisfied, and would have had some feel for how long a

customer is “destined” to stay or go.

189. In fact, FE-4 confirmed that, by February 2017,

IMTT was already working on the renewals of the

No. 6 fuel oil contracts.

190. FE-1 and FE-2 also both confirmed that Defendant Courtney—IMTT’s CEO during the Class Period—would have been up to date on IMTT’s involvement in No. 6 fuel oil. FE-1, who personally knew

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Defendant Courtney, said that Courtney’s strength is

knowing the market, the customers and the facility’s

tanks, and can talk “for hours” about which tanks are

in service and what each customer is doing. FE-1 said

that Courtney is “assuredly” as up to date on the No. 6

fuel oil market as anyone, and “absolutely” had “constant contact with customers, contracts, and trends.”

191. FE-2 reported directly to Defendant Courtney

during 2015 and stated that Courtney would generally

know that IMTT was storing a lot of No. 6 fuel oil. FE-2

stated that he would oversee the preparation of

monthly reports on the utilization and in- and out-flow

of St. Rose’s storage tanks that would indicate whether

those tanks stored No. 6 fuel oil, and these reports

were provided to Courtney as well as IMTT’s CFO (and

Macquarie Management employee) James May. FE-2

also stated that Courtney and IMTT CFO / Macquarie

Management employee May occasionally participated

in monthly reporting meetings at IMTT, during which

any abnormalities in IMTT’s storage tanks’ throughput would be discussed.

192. What’s more, while Frost and Defendant Stewart attempted to downplay the loss of these IMTT customers as “an issue having to do with one product, in

one market, in one of our businesses,” the guidance for

projected utilization rates made clear the broader significance of No. 6 fuel oil to IMTT. After years of telling

investors to expect a historical mean of 94%, Macquarie now revealed that they expect utilization to

“average in the mid-80% range.”

193. The contrast was jarring: just months earlier,

investors had heard that IMTT would revert to its historical utilization average of around 94% and that

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IMTT would be a growth driver for 2018, but now

heard that a stunning decline in utilization would be

“the primary driver behind the year-on-year [projected] decrease in EBITDA.”

194. The explanation for the projected utilization

rate was almost as jarring. Frost claimed that the

lower guided utilization rate resulted from “spen[ding]

a considerable amount of time reviewing those contracts that are expected to come up for renewal.” This

revelation called into question what the Exchange Act

Defendants had been doing in the contract renewal efforts they had positively discussed throughout the

Class Period—all while consistently reaffirming

IMTT’s projected utilization—as Defendant Hooke had

done on November 1, 2016, when he personally asserted, “[W]e continue to make nice progress on adding

tenor to the contracts, so I’m sort of pleased with that.”

195. In addition, Frost’s explanation that “it is quite

common that these [contract renewals] occur at the

end of the year” made all the more misleading that, as

2017 drew to a close, the Exchange Act Defendants

had affirmed IMTT’s projected utilization and the

Company’s stability generally, knowing that a significant number of contracts for the storage of No. 6 fuel

oil—a commodity facing “brutal changes” and for

which demand had been declining—were up for renewal.

196. Discussing the decision to cut the dividend,

Frost stated:

We’ve spent the last month looking at various

options for dealing with this issue in 2018.

They all lead us back to one conclusion, we

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need to repurpose some of the IMTT tanks

into the storage and handling of bulk liquids

other than 6 Oil. This is nothing new. IMTT

has repurposed tanks opportunistically in response to changing market conditions. We believe, we are better off repurposing these 6 Oil

tanks now, given the long-term structural decline of this product . . . .

As a consequence of recent changes in demand, the handling of 6 Oil at St. Rose, we

now expect IMTT’s contribution to our 2018

results to be down . . . . We are reducing our

forecast 2018 dividend to $1 per share per

quarter. The capital retained as a result of reducing the dividend will be used to strengthen

our balance sheet and fund the portion of the

projects that we believe will generate incremental federal income tax shield and contribute to growth in cash generation in the future . . . .

Among these are expected to be the repurposing of some of IMTT’s tanks to take advantage

of favorable growth trends in certain bulk liquids.

197. Once repurposed, Frost said, Macquarie would

still “have exposure to the 6 Oil . . . [b]ut the type of

customer that we are likely to have exposure to, we believe will provide more stability in terms of 6 Oil revenues.”

198. Again, these revelations sharply contrasted

with the Exchange Act Defendants’ statements during

the Class Period, such as Defendant Hooke’s

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statement in May 2016 that IMTT was a “fundamentally sound business[], operating in segments of the

economy that are proven to be quite robust over the

long-term.”

199. In addition, the “favorable growth trends” that

Frost said that IMTT would look to take advantage of

were not recent trends, but in fact had been known and

identified since well before the Class Period—including by Defendant Hooke himself in 2012.

200. During the Class Period, the Exchange Act Defendants had repeatedly told investors that Macquarie

could fund its continued growth in part with its ample

credit facilities—for example, on February 21, 2017,

Defendant Hooke had told “the conspiracy theorists”

that the Exchange Act Defendants could deliver dividends while continuing to fund growth given Macquarie’s “$1.4 billion of available credit.” Now, however, Frost explained that Macquarie’s weakened economic state from IMTT’s concealed dependence on

No. 6 fuel oil left the Company “limit[ed] to using internally-generated resources” to “deploy[] capital into

attractive new projects, particularly those related to

the repurposing of IMTT,” which he said was “the

highest priority for us at the moment.”

201. The news shocked the market, and in response

Macquarie’s stock price fell over 41% in a single trading day, from $63.62 per share on February 21, 2018,

to $37.41 per share on February 22, 2018—a decline of

over 54% from the Offering price of $81.90 per share.

202. In its analyst report dated February 21, 2018,

RBC Capital Markets wrote: “The customer losses,

dividend cut and strategic re-purposing of IMTT come

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as a surprise to us as IMTT utilization was holding up

decently in 2017 (and peers had not indicated this level

of potential future distress).”

203. In its report dated February 22, 2018, J.P. Morgan was even more critical about the “significant shift

in the outlook for IMTT,” writing that “IMTT woes surprise . . . IMTT utilization declined to 90.6% in 4Q17,

below the 92-94% historical range previously . . . . The

rapid decline comes as a surprise given mgmt’s

prior steadfast commentary on the strength of the

business.” Overall, J.P. Morgan concluded, “MIC

likely moves into a ‘show me’ camp for investors.”

204. Similarly, in its report dated February 22,

2018, Alembic Global Advisors—who had hosted Defendant Davis for a roadshow just two months prior,

on December 11-12, 2017—wrote that the “surprisingly disappointing.” Noting the revelation that “[a]

global shift in the production and consumption of refined petroleum products” would impact “IMTT’s overall storage demand and price,” Alembic wrote that,

“[p]ost 3Q17, management was quite optimistic

about IMTT, so we were taken aback by its sudden

weakness—this, a business long-viewed as MIC’s most

stable asset” and its “bellwether.”

205. Finally, in its report dated February 23, 2018,

Wells Fargo downgraded its rating for Macquarie

stock, writing that “management’s credibility has

been called into question – as recently as December

the dividend was described as ‘sacrosanct’ to us.”

VI. POST CLASS PERIOD EVENTS

206. On May 3, 2018, Macquarie conducted an earnings call in which CEO Frost provided additional

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detail on the decline in IMTT’s utilization and the decision to reduce MIC’s dividend.

207. First, Frost made clear that the Company’s

February 2018 disclosures about No. 6 fuel oil referred

to heavy and residual oil generally, stating that in February “we used the word 6 Oil as a shorthand for a

range of heavy and residual oils rather than discussing

the specifics of a number of subcategories.”

208. Then, for the first time, Frost revealed that

“IMTT’s customers are a mix of commodity traders and

system players, customers who use IMTT storage and

handling facilities as part of production processes or

supply chains.” In fact, Frost continued, “[o]ver time,

both the Lower Mississippi and Bayonne facilities

have had a meaningful contingent of commodity

traders as customers, as much as 20% both by contract

number and lease capacity. Commodity traders typically move in and out of the market based on shortterm opportunities.” This revelation facially contradicted several claims made by the Exchange Act Defendants during the Class Period, including that IMTT

“only deal[s] with major oil companies, major chemical

companies, utilities, major agricultural companies. We

have few other customers” (¶115), and that “[t]his is

not the place where you would store it if you’re playing

contango or backwardation games. This is a distribution center for these products” (¶147).

209. The materiality of those false and misleading

statements was further emphasized by Frost’s revelation that, while purportedly “a substantial majority of

IMTT customers are system players,” “the counterparties who did not renew their [No. 6 fuel oil] contracts

were mainly commodity traders, not system players.”

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210. Frost also further elaborated on the timing,

amounts, and location of the No. 6 fuel oil contract nonrenewals, stating:

Over the course of the fourth quarter, approximately 1.6 million barrels of storage capacity

was not renewed. Additionally, in December

2017, IMTT was notified by 7 major commodity traders that contracts for approximately

1.8 million barrels of storage capacity coming

up for renewal in December and January

would not be renewed . . . . In addition, we

were notified that another 1.6 million barrels

currently under contract would only be under

contract through the middle of December

2018 as a result of a refinery closure[.]

[T]he capacity involved was located at IMTT’s

St. Rose facility.

211. Frost also explicitly linked Macquarie’s declining fortune to IMO 2020, stating that the commodity

traders “exited the market as a consequence of a backwardation in heavy and residual oils. We believe heavy

and residual oils are in backwardation in part as a result of the uncertainty surrounding the implementation of new regulations related to low sulfur fuel oil in

2020. Because they don’t need the storage per se, traders have low barriers to exit.”

212. In addition, in connection with that May 3,

2018 earnings call, Macquarie released an investor

presentation, filed with the SEC in a Form 8-K, which

revealed that, as of March 31, 2018, heavy and residual oils were the largest product type stored by IMTT,

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amounting to 17.3 million of IMTT’s total 45 million

barrels of capacity, or nearly 40%.

213. The presentation also stated, “Two third of existing [Heavy & Residual] capacity located in the

Lower Mississippi River,” where IMTT’s St. Rose terminal is located. Further, a footnote to the presentation revealed that this information was as of March 31,

2018—i.e., prior to the calamitous fall in utilization

and costly repurposing of, according to Frost, 1.3 million barrels of No. 6 fuel oil storage that Macquarie began in response to the non-renewals. In other words,

No. 6 fuel oil was likely half if not more of IMTT’s

storage capacity during the Class Period, and at a minimum well over 40% at the time that the Exchange Act

Defendants told investors the amount was “about

20%” (¶166) and “very little” (¶167). Indeed, even the

amount that Frost told investors that Macquarie

would “rightsize[]” heavy and residual capacity to—14

million barrels, or approximately 31% of the

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capacity—still exceeded what Defendants told investors during the Class Period.

214. The presentation also revealed something

else—though the Exchange Act Defendants had, on

February 22, 2018, claimed that repurposing IMTT’s

tanks “is nothing new,” information now provided by

Macquarie suggested otherwise:

215. Specifically, the chart above makes clear that

IMTT’s earlier drops in utilization that the Exchange

Act Defendants purportedly corrected through repurposing were both far milder (i.e., stayed closer to the

historical utilization average) and lasted only a brief

time. In contrast, Macquarie now predicted a fardeeper—and much longer lasting—impact to utilization as a result of the concealed No. 6 fuel oil exposure.

216. Analysts at Wells Fargo—who had previously

written that management’s credibility was called into

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question—were not swayed by the new disclosures,

writing on May 4, 2018 that, “[w]hile the Q1 report offered additional transparency into the underlying

businesses, most notably IMTT, we believe that MIC

remains a ‘show me’ as management looks to restore

credibility with the investment community.”

217. In May 2018, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (“ISS”), a proxy advisory firm retained by

investment funds to advise on shareholder votes, issued a report recommending that Macquarie shareholders vote against Defendant Hooke and the Company’s two other current directors—Norman Brown

and George Carmany—for re-election to the Board of

Directors. Citing a “credibility crisis,” ISS wrote in its

report that the “[t]he extent of the one-day stock price

drop [on February 22, 2018 (¶201)], which wiped out

more than $2 billion in shareholder value, suggests, at

a bare minimum, a failed communications strategy.”

218. ISS also took particular aim at the Company’s

explanation for IMTT’s declining utilization, calling it

“weak[]” and stating that Macquarie “has thus far

failed to provide a conclusive, fact-based argument

that definitively disproves the . . . assumptions or calculations” indicating that the Company must have

known of the contract non-renewals earlier than December 2017 (¶170). ISS criticized the Company’s refusal to provide utilization details as creating “mistrust,” and also stated its alarm at “the fact pattern

surrounding the Q4 earnings release” in February

2018 that disclosed the truth about the Officer Defendants’ fraud (¶¶180-205), stating that “[a]nnouncing

such an abrupt shift in the company’s dividend strategy – which the board claims to have thoroughly

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debated – less than two months after a management

changeover first announced in September 2017 further

undermines shareholder confidence in the board’s

long-term focus.”

219. On May 16, 2018, Macquarie held its annual

shareholder meeting, during which Frost further elaborated on IMTT’s involvement in storing No. 6 fuel oil,

stating:

At the Lower Mississippi, we have a class of

customers, which are either commodity traders or blenders that would trade or blend the

6 Oil product or a subcategory of this heavy

and residual oil. There is increasing uncertainty with respect to the global demand

for that product as a result of the impending introduction of this IMO 2020, which

is going to require the world fleet to burn

lower sulfur fuel. And given these are traders or blenders who would buy this product,

mix it with other products and then sell it,

given this uncertainty, it has been very difficult for these operators to make money. And

therefore, they are exiting the business or

exiting the industry and, therefore, are

no longer demanding storage or handling facilities with respect to this business. . . . [T]hat is why we are looking at repurposing some of the storage and handling

facilities, which deal with this heavy and residual oil, into these cleaner products because

we’re seeing a growth market in that.

220. Frost’s explanation again contradicted numerous of the Exchange Act Defendants’ statements

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during the Class Period as discussed above, including

as to the types of IMTT’s customers and the purported

stability of IMTT’s business in the face of now

acknowledged “increasing uncertainty with respect to

the global demand” for No. 6 fuel oil. Frost’s statement

also even more thoroughly linked IMTT’s decline to

IMO 2020 and the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil.

221. Also at that May 16, 2018 meeting, the Chairman of Macquarie’s Board of Directors (and Securities

Act Defendant) Martin Stanley explained further the

relation of Macquarie’s dividend cut to IMTT’s No. 6

fuel oil exposure, stating that there “were a whole series of things that we took into account at the point

that we made the decision to reduce the dividend, and

it wasn’t taken lightly. . . . We took into consideration

the things that were going on with respect to IMTT in

terms of the softening that we were seeing there and

the cancellation of contracts. Not only the cancellation

of certain contracts in the back end of last year but also

a deep view of what was going on into the future.”

222. On September 5, 2018, Defendant Hooke resigned from Macquarie’s Board of Directors.

223. On October 31, 2018, in response to shareholder concerns, Macquarie announced revisions to its

management services agreement with Macquarie

Management. Pursuant to these revisions, Macquarie

Management capped the amount of fees it received at

no greater than 1% of Macquarie’s market capitalization, and also waived fees to the Company’s debt and

future investments. Macquarie also announced that

its CEO and CFO—employees of Macquarie Management—will be required to purchase and maintain a position in Macquarie not less than six times and two

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times their base compensation, respectively. In its

press release announcing the change, Macquarie

stated that its Board’s Compensation Committee “will

participate to a greater extent in an annual process

with the Manager of setting performance objectives,

evaluating actual performance, and providing input to

the Manager on annual compensation decisions.”

224. In its October 31, 2018 “Flash Comment,”

Wells Fargo—who had earlier written that management’s credibility was in question—wrote that it

viewed the “shareholder friendly changes” “favorably,”

but “question[ed] whether they will be enough to flip

investor sentiment towards the stock and the structure in general.”

225. On November 15, 2018, Defendant Davis spoke

at the Three Part Advisors Southwest IDEAS Conference, during which he again linked IMTT’s decline in

utilization to IMO 2020. Discussing IMTT’s shift from

No. 6 fuel oil, Davis stated that, “Historically, most

of that has been used in power generation and

ship propulsion, but the rules around ship propulsion are changing. We had some traitors in that

marketplace leave us. And we said, rather than sit

with empty capacity, we’re going to put it back into

service, but it’s going to be in clean petroleum, chemicals project -- products or agricultural products, get

out of the heavy and resid.”

226. On February 20, 2019, Macquarie released its

fourth quarter and full-year 2018 financial results.

The disclosure revealed that IMTT utilization in the

fourth quarter 2018 was 82%—dramatically lower

than the historical mean of 94% that the Exchange Act

Defendants had guided during the Class Period, and

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even lower than the “mid-80% range” that Macquarie

guided after the truth emerged in February 2018. Macquarie also revealed that at least 1.3 million barrels of

IMTT storage capacity were out of service for nearly

the entire year, with less than half coming back into

service only in December 2018, to carry out the repurposing required by its concealed reliance on No. 6 fuel

oil storage. Due to IMTT’s utilization decline and lower

storage rates, IMTT’s 2018 EBITDA was down 12.1%

versus 2017—and Macquarie forecasted that IMTT

EBITDA would decline another 12% in 2019.

VII. THE EXCHANGE ACT DEFENDANTS’

FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS

AND OMISSIONS

227. During the Class Period, Defendant Macquarie

and the Officer Defendants each made materially false

and misleading statements and omissions, which were

disseminated to investors in the Company’s SEC filings, press releases, conference calls and investor

presentations. These misrepresentations and omissions concealed, among other things, (a) IMTT’s anticipated loss of revenue from the storage and heating of

No. 6 fuel oil, a commodity comprising well over 40%

of IMTT’s refined petroleum storage capacity, which

was scheduled to be largely phased out of its primary

use by 2020; (b) the need to undertake significant capital expenditures to repurpose IMTT’s unused No. 6

fuel oil storage tanks, which would cost hundreds of

millions of dollars of capital expenditures and lost revenue; and (c) the falsity of statements concerning Macquarie’s growth plan that hinged on the sustainability

and stability of Macquarie’s “sacrosanct” quarterly

dividends, which were made possible throughout the

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Class Period by Macquarie’s and the Officer Defendants’ misrepresentations.

A.

The Exchange Act Defendants’ Materially False And Misleading Statements

And Omissions In Earnings Releases,

Conference Calls And Investor Presentations Concerning The Company’s Reliance On No. 6 Fuel Oil And Dividend

Growth Plan

1.

Fourth Quarter and Year End 2015

Misrepresentations

228. On February 22, 2016, the first day of the Class

Period, Macquarie issued a press release announcing

its financial results for the fourth quarter and full-year

2015. This press release was filed the next day, February 23, 2016, as an exhibit to a Form 8-K signed by

Defendant Hooke. In the press release, Macquarie

stated:

Macquarie

Infrastructure

Corporation

(NYSE:MIC) announced its financial results

for the fourth quarter and full-year 2015 including an authorization of the payment of a

cash dividend for the fourth quarter of 2015 of

$1.15 per share ($4.60 per share annualized).

For the full year 2015, dividends paid by MIC

increased by 14.7% compared with 2014.

MIC’s fourth quarter 2015 dividend will be

paid on March 8, 2016 to shareholders of record on March 3, 2016. MIC has increased its

cash dividend in each of the last nine quarters.

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229. In the press release, Hooke discussed the dividend, stating, “We are pleased to have grown our dividend in excess of our guidance.” Hooke continued,

“What is most pleasing is that the increase has been

underpinned by substantial growth in the Free Cash

Flow generated by our businesses. That growth has

been achieved despite the volatility in markets

broadly and reinforces a basic premise of infrastructure – namely, that it is an inherently more

stable asset class.” Hooke commented on Macquarie’s dividend guidance, stating that “Given our

pipeline of growth projects, and assuming the continued stable performance of our businesses, we are confident in our ability to deliver value to our shareholders in the form of an attractive rate of

growth in our dividend.”

230. The Company described in the press release

that “[r]efined petroleum product storage and handling represents approximately 55% of IMTT’s total

revenue,” but did not break down in any detail the

types of refined petroleum product stored by IMTT.

Defendant Hooke continued, “[t]he performance of

IMTT in both the quarter and the full year periods reflects the downstream services nature of the business

overall, as well as the extent to which it is uncorrelated with the exploration and production (E&P)

portion of the oil industry,” and that “[w]hile upstream E&P companies are under considerable financial pressure, the vast majority of the hydrocarbons

stored at IMTT have already been refined. Given the

refined product focus, IMTT saw no signs of counter-party distress during 2015.”

231. The above statements (¶¶229-230) were materially false and misleading, omitted material facts, and

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lacked a reasonable basis when made. For example, it

was misleading for Defendant Hooke to state that

IMTT was “an inherently more stable asset class” and

that he “saw no signs of counter-party distress during

2015” when in truth, the downward trend in the use of

No. 6 fuel oil—a primary source of IMTT’s revenue—

and imminent further restrictions on its use posed a

direct threat to Macquarie’s “attractive rate of growth”

and quarterly dividends. Moreover, it was materially

misleading for Hooke to state that “IMTT saw no signs

of counter-party distress” in its refined products when,

in reality, the Company concealed that nearly half of

its “refined petroleum product storage and handling”

was tied to heavy fuel oils, and specifically No. 6 fuel

oil, the use of which had been in decline and for which

the only sustained demand, marine shipping, was set

to be largely phased out in the coming years. By electing to speak publicly about the demand for fuel storage, the stable nature of the business, and the flexibility of the Company’s storage services—and thereby

putting these subjects into play—Defendants had a

duty to fully, completely, and truthfully disclose all

material facts regarding this subject so as not to mislead investors. As a result of the foregoing undisclosed

material facts, Defendants’ public statements lacked a

reasonable basis when made and were materially false

and misleading at all relevant times.

232. The next day, on February 23, 2016, Defendants Hooke and Davis participated in Macquarie’s

earnings conference call, during which Hooke made

additional false and misleading statements. Hooke

stated that “While the world around us is volatile and

excited, MIC’s businesses have been boringly predictable. That is just the kind of unsexy business

model we want.” Hooke continued, discussing IMTT

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and stating: “This is not a business that is sensitive

to what is going on in the exploration and production, or in interstate product movement. It is a

business that has some sensitivity to end-user demand, but least in the petroleum segment of its operations.” Hooke affirmed to investors that Defendants “feel confident in the continued stable contribution from IMTT to our overall results,” that

IMTT “is simply not [a] macroeconomically sensitive enterprise,” and that “in aggregate, we run unsexy businesses with limited volatility.”

233. Defendant Hooke’s statements in the above

paragraph (¶232) were materially false and misleading, omitted material facts, and lacked a reasonable

basis when made. It was misleading for Defendant

Hooke to stated that Macquarie’s businesses were

“boringly predictable,” “unsexy,” and with “limited volatility,” and that IMTT had little sensitivity to “enduser demand” in the “petroleum segment,” and was

“simply not [a] macroeconomically sensitive enterprise,” when in reality, and unknown to investors (but

as ensuing admissions confirmed), well over 40% of

IMTT’s terminal tanks were devoted solely to the storage and handling of No. 6 fuel oil—a primary source of

IMTT’s revenue, the use of which had been in decline

and for which the only sustained demand, marine

shipping, was set to be largely phased out in a few

years. As Macquarie later admitted, those specialized

No. 6 oil tanks could not be refurbished or repurposed

to store and handle any other lighter, more salable fuel

without the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars over the course of many months. These statements

were also false and misleading because the football

field-sized tanks used to store and heat No. 6 fuel oil

were unsuitable for any other use absent the

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investment of hundreds of millions of dollars spent in

repurposing, leaving Macquarie’s “contribution from

IMTT to [its] overall results” anything but stable and

assured. By electing to speak publicly about the demand for fuel storage and the stable and “boringly predictable” nature of the business—and thereby putting

these subjects into play—Defendants had a duty to

fully, completely, and truthfully disclose all material

facts regarding this subject so as not to mislead investors. As a result of the foregoing undisclosed material

facts, Defendants’ public statements lacked a reasonable basis when made and were materially false and

misleading at all relevant times. Analysts commented

on Macquarie’s misleading statements. Oppenheimer

reported on February 22, 2016 that “[m]anagement

highlighted the stability of refined product mix (55%

vs. ~3% for crude/asphalt). It also reported no signs of

counterparty distress during 2015.” Wells Fargo reported on February 23, 2016 that “the company increased its quarterly dividend rate to $1.15/share, up

2% from the prior quarter--this is the 9th consecutive

quarter of dividend increase. Dividend yield is 7.3% on

the current share price. Year-over-year, MIC’s dividend increased +14.7% and management reiterated its

prior guidance with respect to dividend growth and expects to distribute between $5.00-5.10/sh in 2016. We

believe the dividend growth rate is sustainable in the

medium term without major acquisitions or an increase in leverage. The outlook should be a positive to

investors that appeared concerned that core operations were deteriorating or that MIC was going to get

aggressive with acquisitions – it doesn’t appear either

are happening based on the Q4’15 results and commentary from management.”

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234. Moreover, on March 23, 2016, J.P. Morgan issued a “Model Update” on Macquarie, following an investors’ meeting with Defendant Hooke and “other

members of MIC management.” In that report, J.P.

Morgan reported that “We walked away confident in

MIC’s strong positioning during this difficult market

environment. The company retains numerous levers to

achieve the stated dividend growth (~13% for 2016)

and payout targets (75-85%), while keeping leverage

healthy (~4x debt/EBITDA) and continuing to develop

a high quality growth backlog.”

2.

2016 Misrepresentations

235. On May 12, 2016, Defendants Hooke, Davis,

and Courtney participated in Macquarie’s Investor

Day corporate analyst meeting, during which Defendant Courtney spoke about IMTT’s Lower Mississippi

ports, stating, “there have to be catastrophic [sic] for

those ports not to be busy.” He continued:

[W]e are the best service provider, we pride

ourselves in our assets and our infrastructure . . . . We have to have flexibility because we will change from -- one day our customer, one day he want[s] gasoline in his

tanks, next day he may want distillate. We

have to have the flexibility, we have to

have the optionality for traders.

236. Defendant Courtney’s statements in the above

paragraph (¶235) was materially misleading. It was

misleading for Defendant Courtney to represent that

IMTT had “flexibility” and “optionality” in its Louisiana terminal tanks when, in reality and unknown to

investors (but as ensuing admissions confirmed), well

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over two-thirds of IMTT’s Louisiana terminal tanks

were devoted solely to the storage and handling of

No. 6 fuel oil—a petroleum product that secretly constituted well over 40% of IMTT’s storage capacity and

was a primary source of IMTT’s revenue, the use of

which had been in decline and for which the only sustained demand, marine shipping, was set to be largely

phased out in a few years. As Macquarie later admitted, those specialized tanks could not be refurbished or

repurposed to store and handle any other lighter, more

salable fuel without the expenditure of hundreds of

millions of dollars over the course of many months.

What’s more, both FE-2 and FE-1 explained that the

sheer size of IMTT’s No. 6 fuel oil tanks at St. Rose—

seve

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Joint Appendix — Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation, et al., Petitioners v. Moab Partners, L.P., et al. | Frix