Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Irving F. Rounds, Jr., Petitioner v. Maura T. Healey, Governor of Massachusetts, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 9, 2023

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Supreme Court of tfje Stniteb States

IRVING F. ROUNDS JR.,

Petitioner,

vs.

CHARLIE BAKER, GOVERNOR ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Irving F. Rounds, Jr.

Petitioner (Pro Se)

48 N. Sturbridge Road

Apt. B

Charlton, MA 01517

781.504.8974

Email: roundsmechanica!5@protonmail.com

MW l

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Has Irving Rounds, Jr. (hereinafter “Petitioner”) been

deprived of his due process rights under the 5th and

14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States where the lower courts:

A. Failed to provide him with the police department

public records to stop irreparable harm to the Peti

tioner?

B. Failed to properly weigh the evidence presented in

the Massachusetts Superior, Appeals and Supreme

courts and grant hearings?

C. In the instance of the Massachusetts Superior

court (Campo, J.), failed to recuse himself from the

matter before him?

LIST OF PARTIES

Defendants-Appellees

Defendant# 1

Former Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker

Defendant#2 Former Massachusetts Attorney General

and Massachusetts Governor Maura Tracey Healey

Defendant#3 Secretary of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts William Francis Galvin

Defendant#4 Massachusetts Public Records Division

Plaintiff-Appellant

IRVING F. ROUNDS, JR.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Case No. FAR-29170

Defendants

Former Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker

Former Massachusetts Attorney General and

Massachusetts Governor Maura Tracey Healey

Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts

William Francis Galvin

Massachusetts Public Records Division

Plaintiff

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. 48 N Sturbridge Road APT B

Charlton, MA 01507

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Civil Action

NO: FAR-29170

Ill

RELATED CASES

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. Environmental Protection

Agency, No. 1:15-CV-13541-MLW, U.S. District Court

Boston, Massachusetts, Judgement entered August 22,

2016

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. Environmental Protection

Agency Et al, No. 4:17-CV-40072-TSH, U.S. District

Court Worcester Massachusetts, Judgement entered

February 12, 2018

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. Charles Koch Et al, No. 4:18CV-40066-DHH, U.S. District Court Worcester Massa

chusetts, Judgement entered June 22, 2018

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. Charles Koch Et al, No. 19-1094,

U.S. Court of Appeals for The First Circuit, Judgement

entered February 27, 2020

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. United States Department of

Justice Et al, No. 19-11388-FDS, U.S. District Court

Boston, Massachusetts, Judgement entered January

30, 2020

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. Charles Koch Et al, No. 20-248,

Supreme Court of The United States, Judgements en

tered November 2nd, 2020, January 11, 2021

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. United States Department of

Justice Et al, No. 21-40117-TSH, U.S. District Court

Worcester, Massachusetts, Judgement entered Sep

tember 8,2022

RELATED CASES - Continued

Irving F. Rounds, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Massachu

setts Governor Charlie Baker Et al, No. 1984CV03692,

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Suffolk County Su

perior Court, Judgement entered December 9, 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented........................

List of Parties...................................

Related Cases...................................

Table of Contents.............................

Table of Authorities.........................

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.........

Opinions Below.................................

Jurisdiction.......................................

Constitutional Provisions Involved

Statement of the Case.....................

1. THE PETITIONER’S LEGAL EFFORTS

TO REPORT (BLOW THE WHISTLE) ON

HIS FORMER EMPLOYER FOR VIOLA

TIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO

THE U.S. EPA FOR ILLEGALLY VENT

ING REFRIGERANTS................................

2. MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR, APPEALS

AND SUPREME COURTS...........................

TO AVOID ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATIONS

OF THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, THIS

COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE DECI

SIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS, SUPE

RIOR APPEALS AND SUPREME JUDICIAL

COURTS IN BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

DENYING THE PETITIONER DUE PRO

CESS BY NOT ALLOWING A HEARING,

FAILING TO PROPERLY WEIGH THE EVI

DENCE AND FAILING TO RECUSE..............

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PE

TITIONS: MOTION FOR RECONSIDER

ATION OF THE DECISION OF THE U.S.

DISTRICT COURT...................................... 11

4. THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DECI

SION; INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL TO

THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT................................. 14

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Conclusion..................................

APPENDIX

Massachusetts Appeals Court, Memorandum

and Order, November 22, 2022............

..App. 1

Superior Court, Order, June 16, 2021.....

..App. 7

Superior Court, Order, May 6, 2021........

App. 10

Superior Court, Order, December 9, 2019

App. 17

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Rele

App. 20

vant Docket Entries

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).

Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200 (1st Cir.

1996).........................................................................

Caperton v. AT. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868

(2009)........................................................................ 15,16

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)...........

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)..................

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).....................

Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).............

In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)..................

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v.

McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).............................

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422

(1982)........................................................................

Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908)..

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).......

Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197

(1958)........................................................................

Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)........................ 15-17

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).........................

Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57

(1972)....................................................................... 16,17

Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir.

1979).........................................................................

Vlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)..

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).................. 16, 20

Wright v. Town of Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506

(D. Mass. Jan. 15, 2009)........................................ 12,13

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const, amend. V..........

.2, 17,19-21

U.S. Const, amend. XIV......

2,15,17,21

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Petitioner, an individual who resides in Charl

ton, Massachusetts, respectfully petitions this Court

for a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgment of the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

Rounds v. Baker et al.

Rounds v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.

Rounds v. Koch et al.

Rounds v. U. S. Department of Justice et al.

The decision by the Massachusetts Superior, Ap

peals and Supreme Judicial Courts in Boston Massa

chusetts denied the Petitioner’s Requests for the police

records. These rulings and orders are attached at Ap

pendix (“App.”) at 1-4.

JURISDICTION

The Petitioner invokes this Court’s jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), having timely filed this pe

tition for a Writ of Certiorari within ninety (90) days of

judgment of the Massachusetts SJC Court in Boston.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment V

“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law;...”

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV

“nor deny to any person . . . jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws:...”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. THE PETITIONER’S LEGAL EFFORTS TO

REPORT (BLOW THE WHISTLE) ON HIS

FORMER EMPLOYER FOR VIOLATIONS OF

THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO THE U.S. EPA FOR

ILLEGALLY VENTING REFRIGERANTS

In January of 1998 the Petitioner was employed

with Artron Heating and Ar Conditioning, Inc.,

(herein “Artron”) formerly of Oldsmar, Florida in the

State of Florida. At this time he reported his employer

to Special Agent Daniel Green of the Criminal Investi

gation Division (CID) of the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) at the agency’s Tampa, Florida field of

fice relative to numerous violations of the Clean Ar

Act (i.e. illegal venting of refrigerants, exploiting the

elderly through illegal sales of HVAC equipment that

they didn’t need, mold problems with installations of

HVAC systems, etc.). The Petitioner was concerned

with his safety and that of his ex-wife having received

death threats; he requested witness protection and

Agent Green guaranteed it. Over the ensuing months,

Agent Green would renege on this promise. Group

MAC, the parent company of the Petitioner’s employer,

Airtron, was partially owned by Charles and David

Koch (a/k/a the Koch Brothers). During a period of sub

sequent years and to the present, the Petitioner has

been systematically threatened, harassed and intimi

dated by agents and employees of Airtron, the Koch

Brothers and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to

the extent that his health, his employment career and

his privacy (including but not limited to all communi

cations) have been severely compromised.

2. MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR, APPEALS

AND SUPREME COURTS

The Petitioner filed a complaint with attached Re

quest for Injunction on November 25, 2019. A subse

quent hearing took place on December 3, 2019. At the

hearing the Petitioner presented factual evidence and

claimed a necessity to be provided with those public

records in order to secure a restraining order against

this one individual that had been threatening the Pe

titioner and physically harming him.

On December 10, 2019, Honorable Tochka, J., dis

missed the case on the grounds that the Defendants

had not withheld documents from the Petitioner, but

instead stated no such documents existed. The Court

stated that the Defendants had no remedy in this

instance and moreover the ability to appeal the

board’s findings had expired.

The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for re

consideration on order of dismissal. On March 4, 2020,

a hearing was held on the Petitioner’s motion for re

consideration on order of dismissal. At that hearing the

Petitioner pointed out that the Town of Clinton Police

detective Schmidt did admit that he conducted an in

vestigation by contacting the Burlington Police De

partment. He had also said some very untrue and

disparaging things about the Petitioner to one of his

attorneys assisting him in this case. Under Massachu

setts law (M.G.L., c. 66) a Police Department is re

quired to generate a police report where there has been

filed a citizen’s valid complaint. The Petitioner further

argued that the Superior Court has available (again at

M.G.L., c. 66) all remedies at law and in equity in this

instance. The sitting judge claimed that there exists a

separation of powers between the judiciary branch and

the executive branch of the government: he stated that

the judicial branch had no authority to order the exec

utive branch to investigate the police action (or inac

tion) in this instance.

The Petitioner even posed the hypothetical ques

tion of his life being at stake and potentially that of his

neighbors. The court further insisted that it didn’t

have the authority. The Petitioner had expressed legit

imate concerns for not only his safety but that of the

public as well; this individual is allegedly one of the

five managers involved with the Petitioner’s ex-wife

staged car crash on March 5th, 2015, which the

Petitioner met with then Sergeant Bruce O’Rourke

twice in 2015 at his Middlesex District Attorneys in

Woburn Massachusetts. The meeting was not only

about the Petitioner’s ex-wife’s staged car crash, but

about over inflated energy costs being also incurred by

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from the Koch

brothers. Sergeant O’Rourke works for the Massachu

setts State Police Detectives unit in the homicide in

vestigation unit. The Petitioner had also provided the

Court with a proposed Order in which the Petitioner

requested that the Court contact the US Attorney Gen

eral’s Office on the Petitioner’s behalf to try to stop the

DOJ from threatening and harassing the Petitioner.

The Petitioner had offered the same order subsequent

to both the Massachusetts Appeals and SJC Courts.

The Petitioner made multiple requests to the court

for a hearing on the Petitioner’s motion for reconsider

ation. On March 25, 2021, subsequent to the Peti

tioner’s filing of these multiple motions, a hearing was

granted with the new Judge Campo in place of the

retired Judge Tochka. At the hearing Judge Campo

stated that the case was dismissed because the Peti

tioner had filed a motion for reconsideration that the

Judge had never ruled on. The Petitioner’s motion #8

filed on March 9, 2020, cited several instances includ

ing a Fall River matter where a judge ordered the Po

lice Department to stop charging individuals from

panhandling as well as another case in Chicago where

a Superior Court judge ordered the Chicago Police

Department to turn over police, public records. Judge

Campo went on to say at this point that another hear

ing would need to be scheduled.

The Petitioner further argued that he was being

physically harmed by these individuals (the resulting

stress was taking a serious toll upon his well-being, a

finding which was made by two medical doctors and a

licensed social worker). The Petitioner then asked the

judge how he should go about stopping these individu

als from threatening him. The court then indicated to

the Petitioner that in the abstract that is his redress

to assess: if the Petitioner thinks he is facing some

harm, then he should take the appropriate legal steps.

At the March 25, 2021, Zoom hearing between the

parties mentioned above. After all the evidence the

Petitioner had furnished to Judge Campo and the

Court, Judge Campo spoke to the Petitioner in a de

meaning and condescending manner.

At the end of the March 25, 2021, hearing, the Pe

titioner asked Judge Campo on how he might stop

these individuals from physically harming him and

threatening the Petitioner and the public. After provid

ing Judge Campo with all the voluminous evidence and

weekly mass shootings, he could have and should have

ordered the immediate release of the public records

and issued TROs against these individuals. But in

stead, Judge Campo replied by saying “yeah” in a de

meaning and condescending manner.

The Petitioner had provided two pictures of the

individual threatening the Petitioner and the public

with what appears to be a pocket pistol firearm; he was

going to discharge it at the Petitioner. Other evidence

of potential harm by the other individuals was also

presented.

The Petitioner had also provided Judge Campo

with other evidence of the individual (Richard Ciruolo)

who almost struck the Plaintiff and his dogs with a

motor vehicle (which almost struck the apartment in

the process with my neighbors inside the building).

This man is presumed to be one of five managers in

volved in my ex-wife’s staged car crash on March 5,

2015, in which the Petitioner met with the State Police.

It is presumed that the Massachusetts State Police

know that the DOJ perpetuated this event.

The Petitioner had stated in email correspondence

that the reason these two individuals had potential

motives for threatening the Petitioner, is that they

could be potentially charged with their involvement in

my ex-wife’s staged car crash on March 5, 2015.

Because of all the inconsistencies with the Massa

chusetts Superior Court Clerk Melissa Doris Juarez,

Judge Tochka’s coincidental retirement along with

Judge Campo had been appointed by Defendant Baker

and how Judge Campo spoke to the Petitioner at the

March 25, 2021, hearing, to avoid erroneous depriva

tions of the right to due process, this court should re

consider the decisions of the Massachusetts, Superior

Appeals and Supreme Judicial Courts in Boston, Mas

sachusetts denying the Petitioner due process by not

allowing a hearing, failing to properly weigh the evi

dence and failing to recuse. The Petitioner had also

requested a hearing at a different venue at a different

Massachusetts County Superior Court. Both of those

requests were denied. On June 14,2021, a hearing was

conducted on the Petitioner’s motion for reconsidera

tion. At that hearing the Petitioner had prepared the

Petitioner’s joint appendix for memorandum with his

motion for reconsideration. The Petitioner pointed out

that he had addressed the motion for reconsideration

on three matters: 1) that it was filed in the correct

county 2) the motion for reconsideration from the pub

lic records division was filed in a timely manner and 3)

the Petitioner had filed the lawsuit specifically against

the three offices of the state which had authority over

the Public Records Division. More specifically, the Pe

titioner asserted that the records existed but were not

being released for whatever reason.

The Petitioner clearly stated that he was being

physically harmed by these individuals and that the

District Court in Clinton, Massachusetts required

these records in order to secure restraining orders

against these individuals. Both individuals were in

volved with my ex-wife’s staged car crash on March 5,

2015; the Petitioner also possessed a photograph of a

man running down the street after he had pointed a

firearm at him. Judge Campo then stated that if the

Petitioner felt he was being harassed in some way,

shape or form a Chapter 258 E filing is available to him

or a Chapter 209A Complaint is available to any family

member. The Plaintiff then clarified with the court that

he was not being harassed; in reality, he was being

threatened and that there exists a distinct difference.

On June 16,2021, Judge Campo denied the Petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration.

The Petitioner then appealed the decision to the

Massachusetts Appeals Court. The Petitioner had

made numerous motions to the Court to request a

hearing after presenting evidence to the Court that the

Petitioner was being continually threatened by these

named individuals in the injunctions (including at

work over the phone where the Petitioner is a school

teacher) and the Court never granted the Petitioner a

hearing.

The Petitioner then appealed the decision to the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The Petitioner

again had made numerous motions to the Court to re

quest a hearing after presenting evidence to the Court

that the Petitioner was being continually threatened

by these named individuals in the injunctions (includ

ing at work over the phone where the Petitioner is a

schoolteacher along with a video being threatened at

the Petitioner’s gym) and the Court never granted the

Petitioner a hearing. The Court didn’t even allow a

hearing and denied the application for further appel

late review on April 13, 2023, just 17 days after the

mass shooting in Nashville Tennessee.

The Petitioner has noted the destruction of public

records by the various defendants, the political influ

ence defendants Baker and Healey along with defen

dant Healey’s wife (Gabrielle Wolohojian Associate

Justice of the Massachusetts Appeals Court) also other

factors to not allow the Petitioner judicial unbiased in

all of these courts.

The Petitioner as noted to the lower Courts that

he has proven that there is no doubt that these public

records exist and they are not being released for what

ever reason. The Petitioner has also proven through

the voluminous exhibits presented to the lower Courts

that he is being threatened by these individuals in

volved with his ex-wife’s staged car crash and by

Charles Koch’s agents that he met with twice then

Sergeant Bruce O’Rourke from the Massachusetts

State Police Detectives Unit in the year of 2015.

The Petitioner has made over a half a dozen offers

to settle this matter out of court. Those offers were to

settle for no monetary damages and the Petitioner

would be willing to sign a gag order.

Defendant Governor Maura Tracy Healey is the

Massachusetts top officer for the state. She has been

using that position and previous position of Massachu

setts Attorney General since the beginning of January

2022 to try to “illegally” fire the Petitioner as an em

ployee for the state of Massachusetts as a school

teacher, as noted in the lower court’s filings of motions

of exhibits to stop her.

The Petitioner is in the process of going public

with this matter and writing a book “MANIPULATED

SYSTEM’S, A WHISTLEBLOWERS STORY, BY IRV

ROUNDS”. Again, the reason why Mr. Ciruolo along

with other multiple DOJ Agents keep threating, intim

idating, stalking, and harassing the Petitioner is that

they could be potentially criminally charged for their

involvement in the Petitioner ex-wife’s staged car

crash along with potentially causing a constitutional

crisis with the DOJ and the Courts involved.

3. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PETI

TIONS: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

OF THE DECISION OF THE U.S. DISTRICT

COURT

The Petitioner has previously filed Complaints in

the United States District Courts in Boston and

Worcester, Massachusetts seeking redress against sev

eral agencies and representatives of the United States

Government as well as private individuals for these

threats, intimidation and harassment (even though

the cases mentioned in the United States Courts are

“not” on appeal to this Writ of Certiorari from the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), they are

all related to this case). Included in these actions are

the Petitioner’s various Motions seeking Injunctive

Relief for which the Petitioner specifically requested

hearings before the Court. At no time did the District

Courts (Hillman, J. and Saylor, J.) allow the Petitioner

an opportunity to be heard and present his substan

tive and voluminous evidence before the Courts while

seeking injunctive relief. Furthermore, these judges

summarily dismissed the accompanying Complaints

without seriously entertaining the Petitioner’s Mo

tions or properly weighing the evidence as outlined in

Petitioner’s Complaints and as substantiated in his

materials.

The U.S. District Court (Saylor, J.) concluded that

the case was barred by the doctrine of sovereign im

munity, that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking

and therefore the Complaint was dismissed. That the

Court should ignore the Complaint of the Petitioner on

narrow immunity and jurisdictional grounds is not suf

ficient argument which would warrant the outright

dismissal of this matter at this juncture.

Admittedly, the Petitioner, as a Pro se Complain

ant, does not enjoy the legal training and knowledge of

the seasoned, legal practitioner prosecuting his claims

in the Federal Courts. The Court has made allowances

for Pro se litigants in numerous cases throughout our

history. The District Court (Saylor, J.) pointed this out

in its opinion citing the “less stringent standard” of the

Pro se litigant:

“When, as here, a motion to dismiss is filed against

a pro se litigant, any document filed by the pro se party

‘is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less strin

gent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. J » Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Despite this allowance, the District Court goes on to

add that the Pro se plaintiff still has the responsibility

to state his/her Complaint with factual integrity: “ . . .

even a pro se plaintiff is required to ‘set forth factual

allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting

each material element necessary to sustain recovery

under some actionable legal theory.’ ” Wright v. Town

of Southbridge, 2009 WL 415506 at *2 (D. Mass. Jan.

15, 2009). The Court, when analyzing the Pro se

Complainant’s factual allegations, must give the Com

plainant the benefit of the doubt as to their truthful

ness at least in the first instance: “. .. the district court

must construe the complaint liberally, treating all

well-pleaded facts as true and analyzing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff” Aversa v. United

States, 99 F.3d 1200,1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996).

In this case, the Pro se Petitioner, lacking the level

of sophistication of the legal draftsman, buttressed his

“bare bones” allegations with Appendix materials

which he believed would sustain his case. Conse

quently, his factual allegations contained in the body

of his Complaint are “brought to life” by his volumi

nous documentation presented to the courts. This is

how this Petitioner “ . . . set forth his factual allega

tions and respect(ed) each material element necessary

to sustain his recovery under (an) actionable legal the

ory.” (Wright v. Town of Southbridge noted above).

Lacking legal training, the Petitioner has not been

able to appreciate the legal niceties of the doctrine of

sovereign immunity and an asserted waiver of same,

appropriate subject-matter jurisdiction, the necessity

of administrative exhaustion of remedies and claims

advanced under the Federal Tort Claims Act. His argu

ments contained in his Complaint are limited to the

difference between right and wrong which are ad

vanced in a rudimentary way and guided by a fervent

belief in the Constitution of the United States of Amer

ica and the requisite due process of law thereunder.

As a result, the opinion of the District Court

(Saylor, J.) contains language and legal references with

which this Petitioner was unfamiliar when filing his

Complaint and advancing his Appeals. Here, factual

allegations have been substantiated to the best of the

Petitioner’s ability with the aid of his Appendix.

The Petitioner’s Motion to the District Court to

have Judge Saylor recuse himself from the Petitioner’s

case was warranted and advanced in good faith. Judge

Saylor’s prior service as an Assistant United States

Attorney for the District of Massachusetts from 1987

through 1990 as well as his work as special counsel

and Chief of Staff to Robert Mueller, (a party in a mat

ter related to this litigation) Assistant Attorney Gen

eral of the Criminal Division of the United States

Department of Justice (a party in this case) in Wash

ington, D.C. from 1990 through 1993 should have in

fluenced the judge’s decision on the Motion.

4. THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION;

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL TO THE U.S.

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIR

CUIT

The Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals indi

cated that the Petitioner had “ . . . fail(ed) to provide

any developed argumentation or legal authority in

support of his position” and alternatively that the

lower Court had not abused its discretion.

The Petitioner had filed with the Appeals Court

(as well as the District Court) extensive, factual

material contained in his Appendix which substanti

ated his allegations against the defendants. At a mini

mum, his documentation, when weighed in its best

light, supported the need for injunctive relief or alter

natively, a hearing where oral argument provided the

Petitioner with an opportunity to be heard. The ruling

of the Appeals Court, particularly in its finding that

the lower Court had not abused its discretion, did lend

misplaced credence to the decision of the District

Court(s) which had ignored Petitioner’s justified plea

for injunctive relief and a hearing on the merits (even

though the cases mentioned in the United States

Courts are “not” on appeal to this Writ of Certiorari

from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

(SJC), they are all related to this case).

This Court’s Precedents Confirm That the Due

Process Clause Requires Impartial Adjudicators.

This Court has long applied the Due Process

Clause to guarantee the impartial adjudicators the

Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment found lacking

in some Civil War-era courts. In so doing, this Court

has recognized that the Due Process Clause’s proscrip

tion extends more broadly than the common law pro

hibition on judges serving in cases in which they have

a direct pecuniary interest, but rather encompasses

those cases in which a judge’s interest “might lead him

not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true.” Tumey,

273 U.S. at 532. As this Court explained most recently

in Caperton, “[a]s new problems have emerged that

were not discussed at common law . . . the Court has

identified additional instances which, as an objective

matter, require recusal. These are circumstances ‘in

which experience teaches that the probability of actual

bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too

high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” 556 U.S. at 877

(quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).

In Tumey v. Ohio, the Court considered a situation

in which the judge had a financial interest, albeit a

small one, in the outcome of the case because he would

receive a supplement to his salary if he convicted the

defendant. There, the Court held that the judge

should have been disqualified “both because of his di

rect pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because

of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine

to help the financial needs of the village.” 273 U.S. at

535 (emphasis added). As the Court explained, “the re

quirement of due process of law in judicial procedure

is not satisfied by the argument that men of the high

est honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it

on without danger of injustice.” Id. at 532. Rather,

“[ejvery procedure which would offer a possible temp

tation to the average man as a judge to forget the bur

den of proof required to convict the defendant, or which

might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and

true between the state and the accused denies the lat

ter due process of law.” Id.

In a subsequent case, the Court underscored that

“ [t] he fact that the mayor [in Tumey] shared directly in

the fees and costs did not define the limits of the prin

ciple.” Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57,

60 (1972). Again, the Court emphasized that “the test”

is whether the judge might be tempted “ ‘not to hold

the balance nice, clear, and true.’”Id. (quoting Tumey,

273 U.S. at 532). Thus, in that case, the Court held

that it violated Due Process for a mayor to convict a

defendant of traffic offenses where the fines from those

offenses would help support the village of which he

was mayor. Id. at 59; see id. at 60 (“that ‘possible temp

tation’ may also exist when the mayor’s executive re

sponsibilities for village finances may make him

partisan to maintain the high level of contribution

from the mayor’s court”). Any other result, the Court

concluded, would have denied the defendant the “neu

tral and detached judge” to which he was entitled. Id.

at 62.

Because of how severely the DOJ has broken the

law against the Petitioner and has influenced the De

fendants to break the law, the Petitioner’s Due Process

for fair treatment and an unbiased tribunal has been

denied, “nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law;”

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

Constitution of the United States guarantee that indi

viduals in the United States shall not be unfairly de

prived of their basic constitutional rights to life, liberty

and property by all levels of government.

Over the course of the evolution of American con

stitutional law, the Court has interpreted and defined

the substantive and procedural contours and require

ments of these due process provisions when confronted

with appropriate cases and controversies. In the early

years of the twentieth century the Court in Hebert v.

Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926) declared that the Due

Process Clause requires “ . . . that state action . . . shall

be consistent with the fundamental principles of lib

erty and justice ...” Eight years later, the Court in

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934)

concluded that “Due Process of law requires that the

proceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative

term, not an absolute concept . . . What is fair in one

set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in an

other.”

Justice Frankfurter’s opinions during the 1950’s

demonstrated a valiant attempt to outline several

factors for courts to balance when dealing with due

process questions (e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee

Commission v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)) as well

as the evolving nature of the concept itself (see Griffin

v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)): “Due Process is the least

frozen concept of our law” which can “ . . . absorb the

progressive social standards of modern society.” Jus

tice Harlan described due process as “fundamental

fairness” in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)

at a time when the country faced significant unrest

and social upheaval.

It was the Court in Londoner v. City of Denver, 210

U.S. 373 (1908) which had declared that sometimes the

right to a fair hearing implies the right to oral argu

ment. In Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197

(1958), the Court noted the impact of the Due Process

Clause particularly within the sphere of civil litigation:

“The Court traditionally has held that the Due Process

Clause protects civil litigants who seek recourse in

the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect

their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress

grievances.” Furthermore, the Court found in the same

case that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

imposed “ . . . constitutional limitations upon the

power of courts, even in aid of their own valid pro

cesses, to dismiss an action without affording a party

the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his case.”

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found in

Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 733, 801-802 (7th Cir.

1979) that there must be a showing of a deprivation of

a liberty or property right to constitute a due process

violation under the Constitution. The Supreme Court

in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)

declared that a legal cause of action was a kind of prop

erty protected by the Due Process Clause.

In the case before the Court, the Petitioner has in

curred the deprivation of a property right (i.e. a fair

hearing of his legal cause of action). As a consequence

of that deprivation his right to due process under the

Constitution has been violated. He was denied an op

portunity to be heard on his Motion for equitable relief

as well as the underlying cause of action. When the

Court failed to properly weigh his evidence, he suffered

from yet another due process omission. Finally, when

the Court refused to recuse (himself), the Petitioner

was again denied a fair hearing via due process before

an impartial tribunal.

We know from the case law that “Bias or prejudice

of an appellate judge can (also) deprive a litigant of

due process” as was the finding in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).

Furthermore, “ .. . under our precedents, the Due

Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even

when a judge has no actual bias.” (Aetna) In order to

satisfy the demands of due process under the Fifth

Amendment, there must be a finding that there exists

a distinct probability that bias will infiltrate the pro

ceedings. The Court has declared that “Recusal is re

quired when, objectively speaking, the probability of

actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker

is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Given Judge Campo’s

background, it should be clear that recusal was war

ranted at the Massachusetts Superior Court. The prob

ability that such a failure to recuse could result in a

lack of due process fairness to the Petitioner before the

Court would appear to have called for an allowance of

his Motion.

CONCLUSION

The Petitioner has been effectively stigmatized by

his pursuit of justice in this matter despite the fact

that he has a right to avoid such an intrusion by the

actions of the defendants (Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480

(1980)). Where governmental activity has caused the

stigma to occur, the intrusion is particularly egregious

and the need for due process is paramount. As the

Court mentioned in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400

U.S. 433, 437 (1971), “Where a person’s good name,

reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of

what the government is doing to him, notice and an

opportunity to be heard are essential.” In the instant

case, even the appearance of impropriety should have

been enough for the Court to avoid the designation of

a (civil) “one-man grand jury” (see In re Murchinson,

349 U.S. 133 (1955)).

The Court should reconsider the decisions of the

Superior, Appeals and Supreme Courts in Boston Mas

sachusetts denying the Petitioner Due Process under

the 5th and 14th Amendments by not allowing him a

hearing, failing to properly weigh the evidence, and

failing to recuse.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should re

verse the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Courts de

cision for further proceedings to release the public

records that the Petitioner has been seeking.

Respectfully submitted,

Irving F. Rounds, Jr.

Petitioner (Pro Se)

48 N. Sturbridge Road

Apt. B

Charlton, MA 01517

781.504.8974

Email: roundsmechanical5@

protonmail.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.