Respondents Brief — Kent Chandler, in His Official Capacity as Chairman and Commissioner of Kentucky Public Service Commission, et al., Petitioners v. Foresight Coal Sales, LLC

Supreme Court briefAug 7, 2023

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No. 22-1083

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

KENT CHANDLER,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONER OF

KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION, et al.,

v.

Petitioners,

FORESIGHT COAL SALES, LLC,

Respondent.

-----------------------------------------ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

-----------------------------------------SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

------------------------------------------

Joshua I. Hammack

Counsel of Record

Nicholas S. Johnson

BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP

1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW

Suite 540

Washington, DC 20007

(202) 463-2101

jhammack@baileyglasser.com

njohnson@baileyglasser.com

Counsel for Respondent

GibsonMoore Appellate Services, LLC

206 East Cary Street ♦ Richmond, VA 23219

804-249-7770 ♦ www.gibsonmoore.net

isa

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix to Brief in Opposition

Page:

House Resolution 144

dated March 14, 2019 ........................................ 1sa

Letter from Governor’s Energy and

Environment Cabinet to the Chairman of the

Kentucky Public Service Commission

dated March 29, 2019 ......................................... 3sa

Excerpt from Meeting of the

Kentucky Public Service Commission

on April 16, 2019 ................................................ 6sa

Statement of Consideration

Relating to 807 KAR 5:056

dated June 14, 2019 ......................................... 10sa

LG&E Request for Proposal

dated September 12, 2019 ................................ 48sa

Letter from the Kentucky Public

Service Commission to All Electric Utilities

re Constitutional Challenge to Administrative

Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)

dated January 8, 2020...................................... 55sa

Letter from the Kentucky Public Service

Commission to All Electric Utilities re

Constitutional Challenge to Administrative

Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)

dated March 4, 2020 ......................................... 62sa

Agreement between Foresight Coal Sales, LLC,

the Kentucky Public Service Commission

Defendants, and Kentucky

Attorney General Daniel Cameron

dated November 30, 2020 ................................ 70sa

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Excerpt from Hearing

before the Kentucky Senate Standing

Committee on Natural Resources and Energy

on March 3, 2021 .............................................. 74sa

Excerpt from Hearing

before the Kentucky House Standing

Committee on Natural Resources

on March 11, 2021 ............................................ 78sa

Excerpt from

Kentucky House Floor Proceeding

on March 15, 2021 ............................................ 86sa

Excerpt from Transcript from

30(b)(6) Deposition of the Kentucky

Public Service Commission

on May 27, 2021 ............................................... 89sa

Excerpt from Transcript of

Audio Oral Argument U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

on June 7, 2022............................................... 108sa

1sa

[DATED MARCH 14, 2019]

19 RS BR 1916

A RESOLUTION urging the Public Service

Commission to consider all costs related to the

importation of coal for electricity generation.

WHEREAS, the amount of coal produced in

Kentucky has decreased from 109,018,240 tons in

2011 to 39,587,320 tons in 2018; and

WHEREAS, revenue from the sale of Kentucky

coal is reinvested by the Kentucky coal industry in

local economies creating multiplier effects of other

direct and indirect benefits; and

WHEREAS, in 2017, the largest contributor to

real gross domestic product growth in Kentucky was

mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, which

accounted for 0.65 percent of the total growth in real

gross domestic product; and

WHEREAS, in 2018, annual coal employment

declined to 6,409; and

WHEREAS, differences in severance tax policies of

other states have impacted the competitiveness of

Kentucky coal; and

WHEREAS, approximately 54 percent of coal

consumed in Kentucky by electric-generating units

was imported from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,

Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wyoming;

NOW, THEREFORE,

Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of

the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of

Kentucky:

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→ Section 1. The Kentucky House of

Representatives urges the Public Service Commission

to amend its administrative regulations to consider

all costs, including fossil fuel-related economic

impacts within Kentucky, when analyzing coal

purchases under the fuel adjustment clause.

→ Section 2. The Clerk of the House of

Representatives shall send a copy of this Resolution

and notification of its adoption to Public Service

Commission Chairman Michael Schmitt, Vice

Chairman Robert Cicero, and Commissioner Talina

Mathews.

3sa

[DATED MARCH 29, 2019]

Matthew G. Bevin

GOVERNOR

Charles G. Snavely

SECRETARY

R. Bruce Scott

DEPUTY SECRETARY

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT CABINET

300 Sower Boulevard Deputy Secretary

FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40601

Telephone: 502-564-3350

Telefax: 502-564-7484

March 29, 2019

VIA ELECTRONIC AND MESSENGER MAIL

Mr. Michael J. Schmitt

Chairman

Kentucky Public Service Commission

200 Sower Boulevard

Frankfort, KY 40601

Dear Chairman:

I write to make a formal request that the Public

Service Commission consider amending its

regulations relating to the Fuel Adjustment Clause

(FAC) requirements for Kentucky utilities. As you are

aware, the Kentucky coal industry has experienced a

decline of at least 50% within the past ten years. This

decline has resulted in severe adverse impacts upon

the economies of both the eastern and western

coalfields of the Commonwealth. The Energy and

Environment Cabinet, through its Office of Energy

Policy, has conducted research and participated in

discussions with stakeholders and with members of

the legislature on actions to mitigate the economic

decline.

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We discovered that although Kentucky power plants

burn approximately 25 million tons of coal annually,

13 million tons, or 54%, is imported from other states.

One reason utilities purchase coal from other states is

for environmental or technological needs for specific

coal. However, the primary reason is because the Fuel

Adjustment Clause requirements in 807 KAR 5:056

cause utilities to purchase imported coals if they cost

less than Kentucky coals.

The fallacy in that regulatory compliance analysis is

that Kentucky imposes a severance tax of 4.5% of the

gross value of the sale of coals mined in Kentucky,

while several other states do not impose that tax on

their sales. Illinois and Indiana do not impose a

severance tax at all, and Ohio’s tax rate is less than

15 cents per ton. These three states alone account for

half of the 13 million tons of coal imported into

Kentucky each year. The discrepancy in excise tax

rates often creates a perverse incentive for our own

utilities to purchase coals from other states and create

further economic distress in Kentucky.

Given that Governor Bevin’s administration believes

in making use of our own natural resources and

supporting our own economy, the administration

supports the resolution that Kentucky’s House of

Representatives recently passed. This resolution, HR

144, a copy of which is attached, urges the PSC to

amend its regulations to address the tax discrepancy

issue by considering the overall economic impact to

Kentucky. On behalf of the Bevin Administration, I

request that the Commission give this resolution

serious consideration and determine whether the

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current PSC regulatory requirements relating to

fossil fuel purchases should be amended.

6sa

[ON APRIL 16, 2019]

KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

*

*

*

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN CICERO: Would

themselves and anyone with them?

staff

identify

MR. PINNEY: Yes, Your Honor: My name is Jeff

Pinney. I’m with the Office of General Counsel for the

Public Service Commission. Today I’m accompanies

[sic] by Sarah Jankowski from our Division of

Financial Analysis.

CHAIRMAN CICERO: Thank you. Do you have

any questions for the witnesses?

MR. PINNEY: Just a few.

CHAIRMAN CICERO: Please proceed.

MR. PINNEY: So refreshingly, I have no questions

about GreenHat. My first question I’d ask ref -- for

you to look at KU and LG&E’s response to data

request 4, the Commission’s first request, and it’s a

confidential information. I’ll do my best to ask the

questions so we don’t have to go into confidential

session. Just let me know when you all are ready.

Okay. And on -- I -- this is page 1 of 2, our attachment

to response, page 1 of 2. And here, it says, “The action

taken states that an amount of coal in tons was lower

than the offered amount by -- that was offered by the

coal company. Say to this -- state if this had any effect

of the final cost per ton, and if the final cost per ton is

different than the amount listed under the offer, then

explain why the cost is different.”

7sa

MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. It did

not have any impact on the cost of the fuel. We

-- we purchased it at the same price offered for the

300,000 tons. We just purchased less because at the

time, we did not need 300,000 tons. We only needed

200,000 tons.

MR. PINNEY: Okay. Thank you. I’ve no more

questions with any confidential information. So my

next question simply refers to the Kentucky soal

(phonetic) -- Coal Severance Tax. You’ve heard the

questions I’ve asked of the other utilities. We’ve

established that it is assessed on coal mined in

Kentucky. Is -- are KU or LG&E aware of how that

cost is factored into the cost of coal procured in

Kentucky? Is it broken down into the coal

procurement sheets that you receive or is it lumped

together or what?

MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. It is

not broken out separately on the offers that we’ve

received.

MR. PINNEY: Okay. And are you aware of what

effect, if any, the Kentucky Coal Severance Tax would

have on KU and LG&E’s coal procurement practices?

MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. On

our practices, I think our practices would remain the

same. The way those coals might evaluate could be

different if, you know, Coal Severance Tax was

factored into the evaluation sheet.

MR. PINNEY: Okay. And then are you aware of

other states from which LG&E and KU procures coal,

if those states have a severance tax or some kind of

extraction tax similar to that in Kentucky?

8sa

MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. We

buy coal from several states. Some states do have

severance tax similar to Kentucky, maybe different

rates. Some states that we purchase from do not.

MR. PINNEY: No further questions, Your Honor.

CHAIRMAN CICERO: Chairman Schmitt?

MR. SCHMITT: Do you -- have you had a chance

to review the proposed regulation that was published,

what, yesterday?

MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. I just

briefly reviewed it maybe ten minutes ago, sir.

MR. SCHMITT: Well, I guess the -- the bottom line

is, the -- the purpose of at least the portion of the

regulation that deals with the Kentucky Coal

Severance Tax is to either remove a disincentive or to

incentify -- incentivize Kentucky Utilities to purchase

Kentucky coal. And that would require someone to

calculate the severance tax and for purposes of

reasonableness, the Commission would not -- would

-- would not consider the higher price to be

unreasonable under the -- under the circumstances. I

think that’s what all the questioning ultimately goes

down to is an attempt to remove from consideration

the increase in cost of Kentucky coal as a result of the

Kentucky Coal Severance Tax. And that request was

made by the Kentucky General Assembly or House of

Representatives essentially to us. I have no further

questions or statement.

CHAIRMAN CICERO: If it doesn’t require a

response on your part -- I -- I have no questions. Any

cross?

MS. STURGEON: No.

9sa

CHAIRMAN CICERO: Mr. Pinney?

MR. PINNEY: No further questions.

CHAIRMAN CICERO: And that being the case,

then this case is adjourned.

MS. STURGEON: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CICERO: You may be excused.

(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)

10sa

[DATED JUNE 14, 2019]

STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATION

Relating to 807 KAR 5:056

Energy and Environment Cabinet, Public Service

Commission

(Amended After Comments)

I. The public hearing on 807 KAR 5:056 was

conducted as scheduled on May 30, 2019, at 9:30

a.m. at the Kentucky Public Service Commission.

The following people attended the public hearing:

Name and Title

Organization/Entity/Other

Jeb Pinney, Acting

General Counsel

KY Public Service

Commission

Benjamin Bellamy,

Staff Attorney Ill

KY Public Service

Commission

Nat Adams

KIUC/NAS

Kurt J. Boehm,

Counsel for KIUC

Boehm, Kurtz, & Lowry

Jeff Broch

Alliance Coal

Patrick Keal

Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.

Kendrick Riggs,

Counsel for LG&E

and KU

Stoll Keenan Ogden, PLLC

Robert Conroy, Vice

President, St.

Regulation/Rates

LG&E and KU Energy, LLC

Derek Rahn

LG&E and KU Energy, LLC

Allyson Sturgeon

LG&E and KU Energy, LLC

Amy Jeffries

Kentucky Power Company

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Christen Blend

Kentucky Power Company

Brian West

Kentucky Power Company

Ranie Wohnhas

Kentucky Power Company

Mark Overstreet,

Counsel for

Kentucky Power

Stites and Harbison, PLLC

John Pollum,

Counsel for

Kentucky Power

Stites and Harbison, PLLC

Kent Chandler

KY Office of Attorney General

Public comments were offered at the hearing by Kurt

Boehm, Kendrick Riggs, Robert Conroy, and John

Pollum. Public comments were received at the

hearing by Jeb Pinney and Benjamin Bellamy.

II. The following people submitted written comments:

Name and Title

Organization/Entity/Other

Tyler White, President

Kentucky Coal Association

Kurt J. Boehm,

Counsel for KIUC

Boehm, Kurtz, & Lowry

Tyson Kamuf;

Corporate Attorney

Big Rivers Electric

Corporation

Rocco O. D’Ascenzo,

Deputy General

Counsel

Duke Energy Kentucky,

Inc.

Kendrick Riggs,

Counsel for LG&E and

KU

Stoll Keenan Ogden,

PLLC

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Robert Conroy, Vice

President, St.

Regulation/Rates

LG&E and KU Energy,

LLC

Mark Overstreet,

Counsel for Kentucky

Power

Stites and Harbison,

PLLC

John Pollum, Counsel

for Kentucky Power

Stites and Harbison,

PLLC

David Smart, General EKPC

Counsel

Ill. The following people from the promulgating

administrative body responded to the comments:

Name and Title

Gwen Pinson, Executive Director

Jeb Pinney, Acting General Counsel

Benjamin Bellamy, Staff Attorney III

IV Summary of Comments and Responses

(1) Subject Matter: Enforceability of Section 3(5)

under Dormant Commerce Clause

(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf

of LG&E and KU, argued in written comments

and at the public hearing that Section 3(5), as

proposed in the amendment, violates the

Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution and suggested that the Commission

to delete Section 3(5) as proposed.

Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of

Kentucky Power, argued in written comments

that the proposed amendment adding Section

3(5) violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of

the United States Constitution and suggested

13sa

that the Commission delete Section 3(5) as

proposed, or in the alternative, that the

Commission amend Section 3(5) to remove coal

severance taxes from all states not just those

imposed by Kentucky pursuant to KRS 143.020.

John Pollum - Mr. Pollum, on behalf of Kentucky

Power, indicated at the public hearing that

Kentucky Power agreed with LG&E and KU’s

position regarding the legality of Section 3(5) and

referred to the written comments filed by Mr.

Overstreet on behalf of Kentucky Power.

Rocco O. D’Ascenzo- Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of

Duke Kentucky, stated that the proposed

amendment adding Section 3(5) may place

Kentucky sourced coal on an unequal and more

advantageous level than coal sourced from other

states that also have a similar assessment, which

raises potential constitutional concerns under

the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United

States Constitution and makes the regulations

enforceability questionable. He suggested

deleting Section 3(5) as proposed. Alternatively,

he suggested amending Section 3(5) to exclude

taxes from all states from the Commission’s

review and to make the exclusion of such taxes

discretionary.

David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,

argued in written comments that Section 3(5), as

proposed in the amendment, violates the

Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution and suggested that the Commission

withdrawal the proposed amendment to Section

3(5) to review its potential impacts.

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Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of KCA,

argued in written comments that Section 3(5), as

proposed in the amendment, does not violate the

Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States

Constitution and argued that it should be placed

in effect as written.

(b) Response: The Commission understands the

commenters

concerns

regarding

the

enforceability of the regulation under the

Dormant Commerce Clause. To address those

concerns, the Commission will amend Section

3(5), as proposed, to remove coal severance taxes

from all states from the reasonableness

evaluation as suggested by a number of the

commenters. Specifically, the Commission will

amend Section 3(5) as follows:

... the commission shall, in determining

the reasonableness of fuel costs in

procurement

contracts

and

fuel

procurement practices. evaluate the

reasonableness of fuel costs in contracts

and competing bids based on the cost of

the fuel less [any tax collected under

KRS 143.020] any coal severance tax

imposed by any jurisdiction upon

coal physically removed from the

earth.

The amendments after comment are in bold.

(2) Subject Matter: Section 3(5) applies a different

standard than those used in other jurisdictions

(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf

of LG&E and KU, argued that other jurisdictions

in which LG&E and KU operate will not evaluate

15sa

coal contracts less any taxes collected pursuant

KRS 143.020, and therefore, will likely disallow

costs if the companies comply with Section 3(5),

which will adversely affect the companies’

financial health and increase the cost of raising

capital. Mr. Riggs suggested that the Commission

delete Section 3(5) from the proposed amendment.

Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E and

KU, stated that the companies are regulated by the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)

and the Virginia commission and noted that it was

questionable as to whether those Commission’s

[sic] would allow recovery for increased fuel costs

arising from Section 3(5), as proposed.

Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky

Coal Association, supported the proposed

amendment and argued that Section 3(5) will not

put utilities at risk for fuel cost disallowances in

other jurisdictions, because the proposed

amendment will “only control how costs are

calculated for the fuel commodity relative to

Kentucky.” Mr. White noted that it is not

uncommon for utilities operating in multiple

jurisdictions to be subject to different regulatory

frameworks. He also argues that fuel cost

disallowances are generally rare. He suggested

that there was no need to amend the regulation to

make clear that it would apply retroactively.

(b) Response: The Commission does not disagree that

Section 3(5) will result in the Commission

evaluating the reasonableness of coal contracts in

a manner that is different than other jurisdictions.

However, it is not usually [sic] for utility

commissions in different jurisdictions to impose

16sa

different regulatory schemes, for utility

commissions in different jurisdictions to evaluate

the reasonableness of costs based on different

criteria, or for one jurisdiction to find that a cost is

reasonable and another to find that it is

unreasonable. For that reason, most rate

proceedings for utilities that operate in multiple

jurisdictions require utilities to allocate costs

between the jurisdictions in which it operates and

require utility commissions to review those cost

allocations to determine if they are reasonable.

Any cost increase arising from Section 3(5) could

be addressed in a similar manner. Thus, the

concerns raised by these comments do not support

withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).

(3) Subject Matter: Potential effects of Section 3(5) on

cost of energy

(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf

of LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as

proposed, will require utilities to select a higher

cost fuel source, which will result in increased

costs to customers and affect off system sales. Mr.

Riggs proposed that the amendment to 807 KAR

5:056 to add Section 3(5) be deleted.

Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E

and KU, argued that Section 3(5) could result in

an increase in the cost of coal and the cost to

customers.

Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of

Kentucky Power, argued that Section 3(5), as

proposed, will require utilities to select a higher

cost fuel source, which will result in increased

costs to customers and is contrary to the

Commission’s long-standing least cost principles.

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Mr. Overstreet proposed that the amendment to

807 KAR 5:056 to add Section 3(5) be deleted.

Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of

Duke Kentucky, argued that Section 3(5), as

proposed, could require utilities to purchase more

expensive coal-he gave an example in which

Kentucky coal at a price of $50.00 per ton would

be assessed as lower cost than non-Kentucky coal

priced at $49.00 per ton based on the proposed

amendment to Section 3(5)—and he noted that

Kentucky utility customers would then have to

pay the difference, which he argues places utilities

in the untenable position of having to purchase

more expensive coal or be questioned on the

reasonableness of its fuel procurement practices.

He suggested deleting Section 3(5) as proposed.

Alternatively, he suggested amending Section 3(5)

to exclude taxes from all states from the

Commission’s review and to make the exclusion of

such taxes discretionary.

David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,

argued in written comments that the Commission

does not currently know the effects that Section

3(5), as proposed, will have on utilities coal

procurement practices, or the costs and benefits

that will arise, and believes that the Commission

should gather more information to determine the

impacts of the proposal the proposed Section 3(5)

before implementing it.

Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky

Coal Association, supported the proposed

amendment and argued that it would not result in

a significant increase in costs to customers, if any.

18sa

Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of KIUC,

stated that KIUC supported the proposed

amendment to Section 3(5). He acknowledged that

it might result in a slight increase in fuel costs. but

argued that the benefits of the proposed

amendment would significantly outweigh the

costs.

(b) Response: There are occasions when Section 3(5)

will require utilities to select a fuel source that is

slightly more expensive than the alternative based

on the proposed language. However, the increased

cost would at most be the amount of the coal

severance tax, and the increased cost of coal would

generally be significantly lower. Additionally, the

cost of coal is only one of many costs incurred by

electric utilities, so a minor increase in the cost of

coal would not significantly affect electric rates.

Further, KIUC, which is the only group

representing utility customers that commented on

the regulation, argued that the benefits of the

proposed regulation would outweigh the expected

costs, and the Commission agrees with that

comment. Thus, the potential increase in fuel costs

do not support withdrawing Section 3(5), as

amended.

(4) Subject Matter: Section 3(5) incentivizes

companies subject to KRS 143.020 to increase

prices

(a) Comments: Tyson Kamuf - Mr. Kamuf, on behalf

of Big Rivers, noted that Big Rivers generally

selects suppliers based on the lowest cost at

delivery and that Big Rivers currently gets about

93% of its coal from Western Kentucky coal mines.

Although he noted that the effects are uncertain,

19sa

he argued that the proposed amendment to

Section 3(5) creates an incentive for Kentucky coal

suppliers to increase their bids without any

corresponding benefit to Big Rivers, its

memberowners, or their retail-customer owners.

This would increase the cost of electricity to

customers and reduce off system sales, which in

turn would further increase the cost of electricity

for customers. He recommended that the

Commission delete Section 3(5) until it can further

investigate its potential effects.

(b) Response: While there is a potential that suppliers

may attempt to increase prices, the Commission

does not believe it would be a significant issue or

that it would have a significant effect on coal

prices. Utilities generally engage in competitive

bidding when procuring coal, so Kentucky

suppliers would still have an incentive to keep

their bids low. Further, coal prices are volatile and

contracts are generally long term, so Kentucky

suppliers would not simply be able to add 4.5% to

their previous bids and expect to obtain contracts

they were previously award [sic]. Finally, the

amendment the Commission made after

comments to Section 3(5) further eliminates the

risk that suppliers would increase prices. Thus,

the incentive to increase in fuel costs does not

support withdrawing Section 3(5), as amended.

(5) Subject Matter: Regulatory burdens imposed by

Section 3(5)

(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf

of LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as

proposed, requires utilities to develop and

maintain more complex fuel cost information to

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provide to the Commission, including information

regarding taxes paid or to be paid pursuant to KRS

143.020, and that they will have to rely on

suppliers, who may manipulate the information,

to provide it. Mr. Riggs suggested that the

Commission delete Section 3(5) from the proposed

amendment.

Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of

Kentucky Power, argues that Section 3(5), as

proposed, will require Kentucky Power to change

its requests for proposals to require bidders to

identify separately the amount of any tax imposed

by KRS 143.020 and will require it to change the

manner in which it analyzes coal bids to exclude

the tax, which is contrary to the Commission’s

Regulatory Impact and Tiering Analysis. Mr.

Overstreet indicated that Kentucky Power

believes it could make those changes but

questioned whether some suppliers would be

willing to submit bids if they had to calculate the

taxes and whether out of state suppliers would

even bother submitting, which could reduce

competition and artificially increase prices. Mr.

Overstreet suggested that the Commission delete

Section 3(5) from the proposed amendment to

ensure a more competitive market.

Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of

Duke Kentucky, observed that Duke Kentucky

does not currently receive information from its

suppliers regarding the taxes included in their

bids and would therefore have to request this

information be included as part of any future

solicitation if Section 3(5) is adopted.

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David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,

argued in written comments that Section 3(5), as

proposed in the amendment, would create

additional burdens on utilities, contrary to the

Commission’s impact statement, by requiring

them to obtain the tax information from suppliers,

because severance taxes are not currently

disclosed separately by suppliers in response to

bids.

Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of the

Kentucky Coal Association, argued in written

comments that Section 3(5), as proposed, would

not impose significant additional regulatory

burdens on utilities and that any manipulation of

the taxes in bids could be remedied without

amending the regulation.

(b) Response: The regulation will require utilities to

obtain information from suppliers regarding the

amount of taxes that have been paid or will be paid

pursuant to KRS 143.020 in order to evaluate the

cost of coal pursuant to Section 3(5). However,

utilities should be able to accomplish it by

including a requirement in their requests for bids

that suppliers provide an estimate of the taxes

they paid or expect to pay based on the source and

cost of the coal. Moreover, the Commission expects

suppliers will be eager to provide this information,

because it will permit utilities to evaluate the cost

of those suppliers’ coal less any coal severance

taxes when determining which contracts to accept.

Thus, the Commission does not believe that

Section 3(5) imposes a significant burden on

utilities.

22sa

There will likely be situations in which suppliers

will not provide accurate tax information with

their

bids,

whether

intentionally

or

unintentionally. However, there are numerous

situations in which utilities enter into contracts

based on cost or other estimates based on

information from suppliers, i.e. expected useful life

of equipment, as they would be required to do to

comply with Section 3(5). A utility’s review of the

tax information when making decisions regarding

coal contracts would be no different than the

numerous other reviews it regularly completes to

make purchasing and other decisions. Moreover,

utilities could contractually shift the risk of

unreasonable estimates of coal severance taxes to

suppliers through indemnity or similar provisions

in contracts, which would incentivize suppliers to

provide accurate figures and reduce the risk of

manipulation.1 Thus, the commenters [sic] concern

regarding the burden of obtaining accurate

information to apply Section 3(5) does not justified

[sic] withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).

(6) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on regulation

by other states

(a) Rocco O. D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of

Duke Kentucky, stated that the proposed

amendment adding Section 3(5) may inspire

similar provisions by other states that would

negatively affect coal markets. He suggested

1 If taxes were disallowed based on misrepresentations from the

suppliers in a manner raised by LG&E and KU, utilities should

also be able to assert claims for intentional and negligent

misrepresentation to recover any cost that was disallowed even

absent a contractual remedy, which similarly would incentivize

suppliers to provide accurate information.

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deleting Section 3(5) as proposed or amending

Section 3(5) to exclude taxes from all states from

the Commission’s review and to make the

exclusion of such taxes discretionary.

(b) Response: The Commission does believe that

actions taken by other states would be dependent

on whether it moves forward with this proposed

amendment. Moreover, given the amendment

after comment, the Commission does not believe

that it would have negative effects if other states

passed similar regulations.

(7) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on a utilities

recovery of severance taxes

(a) Comment: Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on

behalf of Duke Kentucky, argued that the

proposed amendment to the regulation is

ambiguous as to whether utilities will be

permitted to recover any increased cost arising

from the application of Section 3(5) and that the

proposed regulation should at minimum be

clarified to state that utilities would still be

permitted to recover the additional fuel costs

associated with the severance tax through their

fuel adjustment clauses regardless of whether it is

considered as part of reasonableness evaluation.

Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of

Kentucky Power, argued that the proposed

amendment to the regulation should be amended

to make clear that a utility is entitled to recover

its total contract cost of fuel, including any coal

severance taxes, without regard to the exclusion of

coal severance taxes for purpose of the

Commission’s reasonableness review.

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Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of Kentucky

Coal Association, argued that the proposed

amendment would not affect the utilities [sic]

ability to collect taxes collected pursuant KRS

143.020.

(b) Response: With the proposed amendments,

Section 1 of the fuel adjustment clause governs the

amounts included in the calculation of the fuel

adjustment. It does not require exclusion of

severance taxes. Moreover, Section 3(5) indicates

that it only applies to the evaluation of the

contracts, not to the calculation of the fuel

adjustment. Thus, no amendment to the proposed

regulation is necessary to ensure that 807 KAR

5:056 is interpreted as allowing utilities to recover

the amounts excluded in the evaluation of

reasonableness pursuant to Section 3(5) through

their fuel adjustment clause.

(8) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on the

Commission’s review of generation unit

dispatching

(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf

of LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as

proposed, does not address how the required

exclusion of the Kentucky severance tax will affect

the Commission’s evaluation of an electric utility’s

dispatch of its generation units.

Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of the

Kentucky Coal Association, argued in written

comments that Section 3(5), as proposed, does not

speak to utilities dispatching decisions and

therefore should not affect utilities dispatching

decisions.

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(b) Response: The proposed amendment to the

regulation does not create ambiguity regarding

the Commission’s evaluation of an electric utility’s

dispatch of its generation units, because it

specifically states that the change in Section 3(5)

applies the Commission’s review of “the

reasonableness of fuel costs in procurement

contracts and fuel procurement practices” and

makes no mention of the Commission’s evaluation

of generation dispatching, so there is no basis for

interpreting the proposed amendments as

effecting [sic] the Commission’s review of the

dispatching of utility’s generation units. Thus, the

commenter’s concern regarding whether Section

3(5) effects dispatching decisions does not justify

withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).

(9) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on utilities’

economic dispatching of generation units

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as

proposed, could have the perverse effect of making

their coal generation facilities less economical and

thereby could reduce their consumption of coal

when they dispatch units based on the least cost

alternative.

(b) Response: Utilities are required to use their

existing generation assets in order of the lowest

cost to the highest cost when possible, so it is

possible that an increase in costs could affect the

dispatching of coal units. However, as noted above,

Section 3(5) will not result in a significant increase

in the cost of coal generation. Moreover, a number

of other factors affect how a utility typically

dispatches

generation

assets,

including

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limitations on when generation assets can be used

i.e. solar, start-up procedures for the generation

units, and the size of the generation units among

many others. The coal units that currently are

dispatched will likely continue to be dispatched

due to the de minimis impact of this regulation on

the marginal cost of electricity. Thus, this issue

does not justify withdrawing or amending Section

3(5).

(10)Subject Matter: Retroactive application of Section

3(5)

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU, noted that Section 3(5), as

proposed, does not make any provision for existing

contracts or for contracts into which utilities might

enter prior to the effective date of the section and

argued that application of the new standard of

review to those contracts would unlawfully

penalize utilities in a retroactive manner.

Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E

and KU, noted that it was unclear how Section 3(5)

would apply to contracts in existence prior to the

effective date of the section.

Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky

Coal Association, supported the proposed

amendment and argued that the current language

does not indicate that fuel costs for contracts

executed before the effective date of the proposed

amendment would be disallowed based on Section

3(5). He acknowledged that it was unclear whether

Section 3(5), as proposed, is intended to apply only

to fuel contracts entered after the effective date.

He noted that even if it were applied retroactively

that there is no evidence that it would result in

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inequities. He suggested that there was no need to

amend the regulation to make clear that it would

not apply retroactively.

(b) Response: Section 3(5) was not intended to apply

to contracts formed before it became effective.

While the Commission felt it would be implied

based on the current language and law, the

comments have indicated that is not the case, and

the Commission now agrees that it is ambiguous

as to whether it is intended to apply retroactively.

The Commission further agrees that it would be

inequitable to apply Section 3(5) retroactively,

because doing so could result in the disallowance

of costs for contracts the utilities entered before

they had notice of the change. Thus, to make it

clear that Section 3(5) is not intended to apply to

contracts formed prior to its effective date, the

Commission has amended Section 3(5) based on

the comments as shown below:

(5) For any contracts entered into

[Beginning) three (3) or more months

after the effective date of this regulation

...

The Commission’s amendments based on the

comments are in bold.

(11)Subject Matter: Applicability of Section 3(5) to

fuels other than coal

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as

proposed, is not fuel specific so it will require

utilities to request the severance information

when procuring oil and natural gas in addition to

coal.

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(b) Response: KRS 143.020 is specific to coal, so it

would be reasonable for a utility to assume that no

severance tax was paid pursuant to that statute in

connection with natural gas, oil, or other fuels.

There would be no reason for utilities to request

information regarding the payment of taxes

pursuant to KRS 143.020 when procuring natural

gas, oil, and other fuels. Thus, this issue does not

justify withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).

(12)Subject Matter: Purpose of Section 3(5)

(a) Comments: Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on

behalf of Kentucky Power, argues that Section

3(5), as proposed, is inconsistent with its stated

purpose of ensuring that fuel costs are evaluated

on a more level basis regardless of their state of

origin, because it only excludes coal severance

taxes from Kentucky from the analysis of

reasonableness. He suggested that Section 3(5) be

modified to exclude “any coal severance or similar

tax applicable to the fuel” to accomplish the stated

purpose. Alternatively, he suggested that the

pertinent language could be modified to provide

“based on the cost of the fuel less any tax of the

nature of the tax imposed by KRS 143.020.”

Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky

Coal Association, supported the proposed

amendment and argued that it allows coal severed

or processed in Kentucky to be evaluated fairly

against the coal of certain border states that have

eliminated similar taxes.

(b) Response: There are a number of states that do not

charge any severance tax on coal in a manner

consistent with KRS 143.020. Section 3(5) allows

coal subject to KRS 143.020 to be evaluated

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against the coal severed and processed in states

that do not charge a severance tax based on the

actual cost to produce the coal. Moreover, the

amendment the Commission made to Section 3(5)

after receiving Comments, which is discussed

above, further addresses Kentucky Power’s

concern, because coal from all states will be

evaluated without regard to the coal severance

taxes. Thus, it allows coal to be evaluated more

fairly based on the actual cost to produce the coal.

(13)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to

Section 1(1) on costs recoverable through fuel

adjustment clauses

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU. Opposed changing the word

“expense” in the phrase “Where F is the expense of

fossil fuel” in Section 1(1) to “cost,” and argued

those terms have different meanings, and that the

amendment could change the meaning of the

regulation and result in Kentucky’s fuel

adjustment

regulation

being

interpreted

differently from the federal regulation on which it

was based. He recommended that the proposed

substitution be withdrawn and that “expense”

continue to be used in Section 1(1) to define F(b)

and F(m).

Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E

and KU, stated that it was unclear how the change

from “expense” to “cost” in Section 1(1) would

affect amounts recoverable pursuant to the fuel

adjustment clause.

(b) Response: Section 1(1) of the regulation, in its

current form and as proposed, provides the

formula used to calculate utilities’ fuel

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adjustments. The formula includes the variable

“F” and the variable “S” in the base and the

current periods. Currently, Section 1(1) states,

among other things, that “Fis the expense of fossil

fuel ... ; and “S is sales ... , all as defined below.”

Section 1(3) then states that “Fuel costs (F) shall

be ...” before listing specific items that should be

included and excluded from “Fuel cost (F).” Section

1(4) and Section 1(6) then further define and limit

the items listed in Section 1(3) as being included

in the variable F of the fuel adjustment formula.

If “expense of fossil fuel” and “Fuel cost (F)” had

different meanings, then Section 1(3), which

defines F, would have no meaning whatsoever.

Since courts interpret regulations to give effect to

all provisions, courts will not interpret “expense of

fossil fuel” and “Fuel cost” as having different

meaning, because they both refer to the variable

F. See Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op. Corp. , 189

S.W.3d 87, 91 (Ky. 2005) (“Statutes should be

construed in such a way that they do not become

ineffectual or meaningless.”); see also Marksberry

v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 753 (Ky. App. 2003)

(indicating that the rules of construction that

apply to statutes also apply to regulations). This is

particularly true given that Section 1(1), in which

“expense of fossil fuel” is used to refer to F,

specifically indicates that F is “defined below.”

Thus, the proposed amendment should not change

the definition of the variable F or the

interpretation of the regulation, because “F” is

specifically defined below.

However, the language of the regulation is

ambiguous in its current form, because the

variable F is referred to as “fuel cost” and the

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“expense of fossil fuel.” That ambiguity can be

resolved as discussed above through construction

of the regulation, but the proposed change makes

it clearer that the variable F as used in Section 1

(1) is the same variable F that is more explicitly

defined in Section 1(3), (4), and (6) without having

to engage in construction of the regulation. This

clarity should ease the burden on parties

attempting to apply the regulation. Thus, the

commenters [sic] concern regarding the change

from “expense” to “cost” in Section 1(1) does not

provide a basis for amending or withdrawing that

proposed change.

(14)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to

Section 1(3)(c) on costs recoverable through fuel

adjustment clauses

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU, oppose [sic] the revision of

language in Section 1(3)(c) and argue [sic] that

moving the phrase “irrespective of the designation

assigned to such transaction” as proposed would

result in that phrase modifying “energy

purchases” as opposed to “demand charges” as it

was originally intended. He recommends that the

Commission withdraw that proposed amendment.

Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E

and KU, made the same point as Mr. Rigg’s on this

subject.

(b) Response: LG&E and KU appear to be correct

regarding this proposed amendment. The phrase

“irrespective of the designation assigned to such

transaction” is intended to modify “capacity or

demand changes” and now modifies “energy

purchases.”

Thus,

the

Commission

will

32sa

withdrawal the proposed amendment to Section

1(3)(c), except that the Commission will remove

the parentheses and include a comma after

“transaction” to make it clear that the phrase

“when such energy is purchased on an economic

dispatch basis” modifies the phrase “[t]he net

energy cost of energy purchases.”

(15)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to

Section 1(6) on costs recoverable through fuel

adjustment clauses

(a) Comment: Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on

behalf of Kentucky Power, claims that the

proposed amendment to Section 1(6) changed the

meaning of the “cost of fossil fuel,” as used therein,

by limiting it to items listed in FERC Account 151

whereas Section 1(6) currently defines the “cost of

fossil fuel” to include items beyond those listed in

FERC Account 151, including amounts listed in

FERC Account 152 and “fuel-related” PJM billing

line items in FERC Accounts 447 and 555. He

suggested that the proposed amendment be

deleted, and the current language be retained, or

that the provision be amended to recognize

unambiguously that fuel-related costs other than

those listed in FERC Account 151 are properly

treated as fossil fuel costs for the purposes of the

regulation.

John Pollum - Mr. Pollum, on behalf of Kentucky

Power, argued that this amendment should be

struck or further clarified for the reasons

discussed by Mr. Overstreet.

(b) Response: The proposed amendment to Section

1(6) does not narrow the meaning of the “cost of

fossil fuel” in a manner that excludes items that

33sa

are currently recoverable under the plain

language of the regulation, and therefore,

Kentucky Power’s concern regarding the meaning

of Section 1(6) does not justify withdrawing this

proposed amendment. In its current form, the first

sentence of Section 1(6) limits the cost of fossil fuel

to “the invoice price of fuel less any cash or other

discounts.” The second sentence then further

defines “the invoice price of fuel” by stating that it

“include[s] the cost of the fuel itself and necessary

charges for transportation of the fuel from the

point of acquisition to the unloading point, as

listed in Account 151 of FERC Uniform System of

Accounts for Public Utilities and Licensees.” The

proposed amendment simply moves the definition

of the “invoiced price of fossil fuel” up to the first

sentence and indicates that the cost of fuel only

includes those items.

As asserted by Kentucky Power, the use of the

term “include” in the second sentence would

generally be interpreted as “including but not

limited to,” which would allow for the “cost of fossil

fuel” to include items not specifically listed in the

second sentence. However, as currently written,

the first sentence explicitly limits the definition of

the “cost of fossil fuel” to the “invoiced price of

fuel.”

The term “invoiced priced of fuel” is not defined, so

courts would generally hold that it should be

interpreted according to its plain meaning.

However, where a term or phrase is technical in

nature or is a term of art, courts will generally

apply the technical meaning of the term. See Lach

v. Man O’War, LLC, 256 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Ky.

2008) (“technical words and phrases, and such

34sa

others as may have acquired a peculiar and

appropriate meaning in the law, shall be

construed according to such meaning”).

The phrase “invoiced price of fuel less any cash or

other discounts” is a technical term used by FERC

to define items that should be recorded in FERC

Account 151. Specifically, FERC regulations state

that Account 151 should include:

1. Invoice price of fuel less any cash

or other discounts.

2. Freight, switching, demurrage and

other transportation charges, not

including, however, any charges for

unloading from the shipping medium.

3. Excise taxes, purchasing agents’

commissions, insurance and other

expenses directly assignable to cost of

fuel.

4.

Operating,

maintenance

and

depreciation expenses and ad valorem

taxes on utility-owned transportation

equipment used to transport fuel from

the point of acquisition to the unloading

point.

5. Lease or rental costs of transportation

equipment used to transport fuel from

the point of acquisition to the unloading

point.

18 C.F.R. Part 101, Account 151 (emphasis added).

Given the use of the exact same phrase, there is a

strong argument that as currently written the

“cost of fossil fuel” is limited to the “invoice price

35sa

of fuel less any cash or other discounts” as used in

FERC Account 151, or rather, 1 of 5 items listed in

Account 151. Under that interpretation, the

second sentence, as plainly written, could be

interpreted as referring to the actual cost of coal

and transportation costs in the invoice price of

fuel, because in context with the first sentence, it

would be limited to costs included in the invoiced

price of fuel. Conversely, the language that refers

to transportation costs in the second sentence of

Section 1(6) could be interpreted as expanding the

definition of “cost of fossil fuel” to include

additional items listed in FERC Account 151,

because the language used to refer to

transportation costs in the second sentence of

Section 1(6) is similar to the language used to

define the transportation costs listed in FERC

Account 151. However, there is no reasonable

interpretation of Section 1(6), in its current form,

that would allow items other than those listed in

FERC Account 151 to be included within the

meaning of the “cost of fossil fuel,” because to give

effect to both sentences of Section 1(6), the “cost of

fossil fuel” must be limited to the “invoice price of

fuel less any cash or other discounts,” which is an

item in FERC Account 151; and cost of the fuel and

transportation charges “as listed in Account 151 of

FERC Uniform System of Accounts for Public

Utilities and Licensees.”

As noted by Kentucky Power, the phrase “as listed

in Account 151 of FERC Uniform System of

Accounts for Public Utilities and Licensees” in the

proposed amendment would likely be interpreted

as modifying the “cost of the fuel itself and

necessary charges for transportation” and would

36sa

thereby limit the cost of fossil fuel to items listed

in FERC Account 151. However, as discussed

above, this limitation should be no more restrictive

than the limitation on the definition of the cost of

fossil fuel in the regulation as currently written.

Moreover, restricting the “cost of fossil fuel” to

items listed in FERC Account 151 is consistent

with the purpose of the fuel adjustment regulation

to allow timely recover of volatile fuel costs,

because FERC Account 151 includes those items

that could be attributed to the commodity cost of

the fuel.2 Conversely, FERC Account 152 includes

2 In fact, 807 KAR 5:056, as currently written, was based on

FERC’s fuel adjustment regulation, which explicitly limits the

“cost of fossil fuel” to items listed in Account 151 of FERC’s

Uniform System of Accounts. Case No. 1992-00493, A [sic]

examination by the Public Service Commission of the Application

of the Fuel Adjustment Clause of Kentucky Utilities Company

from November 1, 1990 to October 31, 1992, Order at FN12 (Ky.

PSC Jan. 2, 1997) (The Commission, noting that Kentucky’s fuel

clause regulation was nearly identical to FERC’s regulation,

held that buyout costs for not purchasing fuel pursuant to a

contract were not recoverable, because they were not items

recorded in FERC Account 151.); but see Case No. 1996-00089,

The Application of Louisville Gas and Electric Company for an

Order Approving Certain Accounting Treatment for and

Authorizing Recovery of Coal Contract Termination Costs, Order

(Ky. PSC Aug. 21, 1996)(The Commission allowed recovery of

coal contract termination costs after it was granted permission

to create a deferred debit and charge it to FERC Account 151.);

Case No. 1994-00453, Big Rivers Electric Corporations Proposed

Mechanism to Credit Customers Amounts Recovered in Judicial

Proceedings Involving Fuel Procurement Contracts, Order (Ky.

PSC Feb. 21, 1997)(The Commission indicated that Kentucky’s

fuel adjustment clause was based on FERC’s, that the definition

of the cost of fuel was narrow, and that amounts recovered in

litigation against fuel suppliers and their agents did not meet

the definition of the cost of fuel); Case No. 1993-00113,

Application of Kentucky Utilities Company to Amortize, by means

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those operational costs for handling the fuel once

it has been unloaded at a utility’s plant, which

would not be volatile like the commodity cost of

fuel and therefore can be recovered through base

electric rates like any other operational cost. 18

C.F.R. Part 101, Account 151.

The Commission understands Kentucky Power’s

concern regarding the recovery of fossil fuel costs

attributed to purchase power and recoverable

pursuant to Section 1(3)(b). That section allows

utilities to recover “the actual identifiable fossil ...

fuel costs associated with energy purchased”

through their fuel adjustment clauses. Those costs

would not be record [sic] in a utility’s FERC

Account 151, so if the “cost of fossil fuel” were

limited in the utilities FERC Account 151, then it

would not be able to recover those costs.

However, 807 KAR 5:056 does not refer specifically

to items listed in the utility’s FERC Account 151,

but rather, generally refers to items listed in

“Account 151 of FERC Uniform System of

Accounts for Public Utilities and Licensees.”

Moreover, Section 1(3)(b) clearly intended for

utilities to recover fossil fuel costs associated with

purchased power, subject to certain limitations,

of Temporary Decrease in Rates, Net Fuel Cost Savings Recovered

in Coal Contract Litigation, Order 3-5 (Ky. PSC Dec. 8, 1993)

(The Commission held that a refund of coal costs that had been

paid by ratepayers through the fuel adjustment clause before

being refunded to Kentucky Utilities following litigation against

the supplier could not be reimbursed through the fuel

adjustment clause, because it did not meet the very narrow

definition of the cost of fuel in Kentucky’s fuel adjustment

regulation which was based on FERC’s fuel adjustment

regulation).

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and those amounts would not be recorded in

Account 151 of the utility that is purchasing the

power. Rather, in context, the “fossil fuel costs”

referred to in Section 1(3)(b) would be those

identifiable fuel costs that the generator would be

expected to record in Account 151.3 Thus, limiting

the cost of fossil fuel to items listed in FERC

Account 151 would not prohibit Kentucky Power

from recovering the “the actual identifiable

fossil….fuel costs associated with energy

purchased” pursuant to Section 1(3)(b), so the

concern raised by Kentucky Power does not justify

amending or withdrawing the proposed edit.

(16)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to

Section 1 (7) [Re-codified as Section 2(1)]

(a) Comment: Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on

behalf of Kentucky Power, opposed the proposed

amendment to Section 1(7) that explicitly stated

that utilities must file all fuel contracts when they

seek to reestablish the base period and that they

should file “any other documents and information

required by 807 KAR 5:001 and 807 KAR 5:011,”

and argued that those changes created ambiguity

regarding which provisions of 807 KAR 5:001 and

807 KAR 5:011 would apply when they seek to

reestablish the base period. Mr. Overstreet

suggested that the proposed amendment by [sic]

modified to remove the references to 807 KAR

3 FERC limits the definition of the “cost of fossil fuel” to items

listed in Account 151 and includes nearly identical language

regarding the recovery of identifiable fossil fuel costs in energy

purchases, so there is no reason to expect that Kentucky’s

regulation would be applied differently than FERCs regulation.

39sa

5:001 and 807 KAR 5:011 or to specify which

sections of those regulations apply.

John Pollum - Mr. Pollum, on behalf of Kentucky

Power, argued that this amendment should be

struck or further clarified for the reasons

discussed by Mr. Overstreet.

(b) Response: The intent of the proposed amendment

to Section 1(7) [Re-codified as Section 2(1)] was to

make it clear that the requirement that utilities

file all fuel contracts when proposing a fuel

adjustment clause or seeking to establish a new

base period for a fuel adjustment clause is in

addition to as opposed to in lieu of any applicable

filing requirements in 807 KAR 5:001 and 807

KAR 5:011. However, as noted by Kentucky

Power, the relevant provisions of 807 KAR 5:001

and 807 KAR 5:011 would still apply even if they

are not referenced in this regulation. Thus, to

avoid the confusion identified by Kentucky Power,

the Commission will amend Section 1(7) [Recodified as Section 2(1)] based on the comments as

shown below:

(1)[(7) At the time the fuel clause is

initially filed,] If a utility initially

proposes a fuel adjustment clause[ or

proposes to reset the base period

fuel costs used in a fuel adjustment

clause], the utility shall submit copies

of each fossil fuel purchase contract not

otherwise on file with the commission

and all other agreements, options,

amendments. modifications. and[or]

similar such documents[, and all

amendments and modifications thereof]

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related to the procurement of fuel

supply[and] or purchased power[ in

addition to any other documents

and information required by 807

KAR

5:001

and

807

KAR

5:011].[Incorporation by reference is

permissible.]

The amendments in response to comments are in

bold.

(17)Subject Matter: Public Hearings in review

proceedings

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU, stated in written comments that

the companies support the commission’s proposed

amendments to Section 1(11) [re-codified as

Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12) [recodified as

Section 3(4)] that making public hearings

regarding fuel adjustment clauses discretionary,

because the amendments eliminate unnecessary

hearings but allow the Commission to adequately

review utilities’ fuel adjustments and conduct

hearings when appropriate. However, he observed

that the proposed amendment, as written, only

includes a standard for determining when a

hearing should take place in the provision

discussing the 2 year review. He suggested that

the standard applicable to the 2 year review would

be appropriate for the 6 month review also.

Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E

and KU, indicated that the companies agreed with

the Commission’s decision to make hearings on the

fuel adjustment clauses discretionary.

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Mark R. Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of

Kentucky Power, stated in written comments that

Kentucky Power supported the proposed

amendments to Section 1(11) [re-codified as

Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12) [re-codified as

Section 3(4)] making public hearings regarding

fuel adjustment clauses discretionary, because the

amendments eliminate unnecessary hearings,

which impose a cost on utilities that are passed on

to ratepayers, but allow the Commission to

adequately review utilities’ fuel adjustments and

conduct hearings when appropriate.

Tyson Kamuf - Mr. Kamuf, on behalf of Big Rivers,

stated in written comments that Big Rivers

supported the proposed amendments to Section

1(11) [re-codified as Section 3(3)) and Section 1(12)

[re-codified as Section 3(4)] making public

hearings regarding fuel adjustment clauses

discretionary, which Big Rivers believes will

eliminate public hearings when they are

unnecessary and will thereby eliminate

unnecessary costs.

Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of

Duke Kentucky, stated that Duke Kentucky

supported the proposed amendments to Section

1(11) [re-codified as Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12)

[re-codified as Section 3(4)] making public

hearings regarding fuel adjustment clauses

discretionary, because the hearings are often a

formality simply to satisfy the regulation but still

impose costs.

Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of KIUC,

supported the proposed amendments to Section

1(11) [re-codified as Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12)

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[recodified as Section 3(4)] making public hearings

regarding fuel adjustment clauses discretionary.

David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,

supported the proposal to make the hearing

requirements discretionary but recommend

changing the standard for determining whether to

conduct a hearing to whether a hearing is

“necessary” as opposed to whether a hearing is

“necessary for the protection of a substantial

interest or is in the public interest.”

(b) Response: The Commission continues to believe

that the hearings should be discretionary for the

reasons previously stated and for those reasons

stated by the commenters. The Commission does

not believe it is necessary to amend Section 1(11)

[re-codified as Section 3(3)) or Section 1(12) [recodified as Section 3(4)) to include a standard in

Section 3(3) for when a hearing should be

conducted. The Commission notes that the

standard in Section 3(4) is consistent with the

standard in 807 KAR 5:001, which would apply in

the absence of a standard.

(18)Subject Matter: Provision that permits the

Commission to grant deviations

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU, requested that the Commission

include a provision in 807 KAR 5:056 that allows

it to grant deviations.

Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E

and KU, requested that the Commission include a

provision in 807 KAR 5:056 that allows it to grant

deviations.

43sa

Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of KIUC,

supported LG&E and KU’s comment that the

Commission include a provision in 807 KAR 5:056

that allows it to grant deviations.

(b) Response: The Commission observes that utilities

included fuel adjustment clauses in their tariffs

long before the Commission promulgated 807 KAR

5:056. Further, the Commission adopted 807 KAR

5:056, in part, to standardize utilities’ fuel

adjustment clauses. This standardization of fuel

adjustment clauses permits to Commission to

efficiently review utilities adjustments each

month in a manner that would be difficult if each

utility’s fuel adjustment clause were different or

modified by numerous, unique deviations.

Even without language in the regulation

permitting deviations, parties regularly attempt

to expand the definition of fuel costs as used in the

regulation to pass additional costs through the

fuel adjustment clause. If language were included

to allow the Commission to grant deviations to 807

KAR 5:056, then the Commission expects that it

would regularly receive requests for additional

costs to be passed through utilities’ fuel

adjustment clauses, which would increase the

complexity of the Commission’s review of fuel

adjustments, make oversight more difficult, and

affect the ability of utility customers to

understand the fuel adjustments on their bills.

Moreover, since the cost of fuel is already

recoverable under the fuel adjustment, the

Commission expects that any substantive

deviations requested would be to pass items other

than fuel costs through the fuel adjustment clause.

44sa

It would be inconsistent with the purpose of the

regulation, which is to allow timely recover [sic] of

volatile fuel costs, to pass such costs through the

fuel adjustment clauses. The Commission also has

other mechanisms that allow utilities to account

for and pass unexpected costs and windfalls

through to customers, including the creation of

regulatory liabilities and assets that can later to

be passed through to customers as part of a base

rate adjustment. Thus, the Commission submits

that allowing deviations to 807 KAR 5:056 is not

justified at this time.

(19)Subject Matter: Deleting Section 1(10) [re-codified

as Section 2(5))

(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs- Mr. Riggs, on behalf of

LG&E and KU, requested that the Commission

delete Section 1(10) [re-codified as Section 2(5)],

because the Commission could then keep coal

contracts confidential. He argued that suppliers

[sic] current review such contracts and that they

can use that information to increase bids, which,

in turn, increases prices to customers.

Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E

and KU, requested that the Commission delete

Section 1(10) [re-codified as Section 2(5)] to allow

the Commission to keep coal contracts

confidential.

(b) Response: The Commission does not believe that

removing the provision referred to by LG&E/KU

would actually affect whether the items should be

exempt from disclosure, because the Commission

previously found that the contracts were subject to

disclosure pursuant to the Kentucky Opens

Records Act, which regulations cannot modify. See,

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e.g. Case No. 1997-00197, Petition of Kentucky

Utilities Company for Confidential Protection of

Certain Information Contained in Barge

Transportation and Coal Purchase Contracts,

Order (Ky. PSC Mar 18, 1998).

(20)Subject Matter: Levelized Fuel Adjustments for

Energy Intensive Users

(a) Comment: Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of

KIUC, suggested that the Commission propose

allowing “energy intensive customers” to contract

with utilities or petition the Commission to

levelize the fuel adjustments over a longer period,

perhaps a year, to allow such customers to set

prices based on a fixed cost. He noted the month to

month volatility creates significant issues for high

intensity users, which can cause swings of tens of

thousands of dollars or more in expenses. He

suggested a mechanism to provide a true-up to the

utilities at the end of each period. He provided

draft language and requested that the

Commission consider adding that or similar

language to 807 KAR 5:056.

(b) Response: KIUC’s proposal is, in part, is contrary

to the intent of the fuel adjustment clause

regulations to permit timely recovery of volatile

fuel

costs.

Conversely,

the

Commission

understands the benefits of levelizing costs for

certain customers. which, among other things,

could allow them to more effectively set prices.

However, KIUC’s proposal would represent a

significant change in the manner in which fuel

costs are determined. Moreover, as proposed, it

would create an ad hoc approach that would be

difficult to manage (as noted above, one purpose of

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the fuel adjustment clause regulation was to

standardize fuel adjustment clauses). The

Commission believes that it would need to

investigate this matter further and obtain input

from other stakeholders before it could support

such an amendment. Thus, the Commission has

not proposed to adopt KIUC’s proposed

amendment at this time.

V. Summary of Statement of Consideration and

Action Taken by Promulgating Administrative

Body

The public hearing on this administrative

regulation was conducted, and the Commission

received comments at the hearing. Additionally,

written comments were received. The Commission

responded to the comments and amends the

administrative regulation as follows:

Page 2

Section 1 (3)(c)

Line 21-22

After “purchases,” [sic for punctuation through the

end of 47sa], delete “irrespective of the designation

assigned to such transaction and”.

Page 2

Section 1 (3)(c)

Line 22-23

After “charges”, add “irrespective of

designation assigned to such transaction,”

Page 4

Section 2(1)

Line 16-17

the

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After “clause’’, delete “or proposes to reset the

base period fuel costs used in a fuel adjustment

clause”.

Page 4

Section 2(1)

Line 20-21

After “power”, delete “in addition to any other

documents and information required by 807 KAR

5:001 and 807 KAR 5:011”.

Page 6

Section 3(5)

Line 16

Delete “Beginning”.

Before “three”, insert “For any contracts entered

into”.

After “three (3)”, insert “or more”.

Page 6

Section 3(5)

Line 19

After “less”, delete “any tax collected under KRS

143.020”

After “less, insert “any coal severance tax imposed

by any jurisdiction upon coal physically removed

from the earth”

48sa

[DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019]

September 12, 2019

RE: SPOT AND TERM BID INVITATION:

LG&E/KU/19-05

Deadline for Bids: 5:00 p.m. EDT

Thursday, October 10, 2019

Louisville Gas and Electric Company (“LG&E”) and

Kentucky Utilities Company (“KU”), the “Company”

collectively, are soliciting proposals for steam coal for

LG&E’s Trimble County and Mill Creek Generating

Stations and KU’s Ghent and Brown Generating

Stations.

Please note that the Company is interested in

evaluating longer term proposals and will consider

offers for up to ten (10) years.

High Sulfur Rail Coal: Term coal for up to ten (10)

years in length, beginning January 2021 for Mill

Creek and E.W. Brown Stations.

High Sulfur Barge Coal: Term coal for up to ten

(10) years in length, beginning January 2021 for

Trimble County, Mill Creek, and Ghent Stations.

This Bid Package contains a cover letter, Exhibit A –

Coal Supply Bid, Exhibit B – Coal Quality

Specifications, Exhibit C – Sample Coal Payment

Calculation,

and

Exhibit

D

–

Sample

Insurance

Requirements.

These

documents

can be downloaded from the website: apps.lge-

49sa

ku.com/RegulatedFuelBids/. The bid form (Exhibit A)

must be used in submitting your bid. Failure to use

this bid form may result in the rejection of your bid.

The bid must be fully completed in ink or in

typewritten form and submitted as described below

and in the bid documents.

COAL SEVERANCE TAX:

The Kentucky Public Service Commission is now

requiring utilities to evaluate the reasonableness of

fuel costs in contracts and competing bids based on

the cost of the fuel less any coal severance tax imposed

by any jurisdiction. Therefore, Bidders must provide

the severance tax that the producer would pay, in

dollars per ton, for each year coal is offered. All

calculations used to arrive at this annual severance

tax amount must be included, in addition to any

supporting information.

BIDDER MAY OFFER ANY COAL (OR

ALTERNATIVE FUELS), INCLUDING VOLUME

FLEXIBILITY

Bidder is invited to submit more than one quotation

for differing coal specifications. However, all

requested information must be provided for each

individual set of coal specifications proposed,

including a COAL SUPPLY BID (Exhibit A), an

ULTIMATE COAL ANALYSIS, and MINERAL ASH

ANALYSIS. Bidder must provide a recent

ULTIMATE COAL ANALYSIS, along with an

ASH MINERAL, TRACE ELEMENTS, and

EQUILIBRIUM MOISTURE ANALYSIS for the

bid to be considered.

No premium for lower ash and/or sulfur will be

added to the agreed upon price.

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FOB RAIL/BARGE QUOTES: Prices quoted shall

be inclusive of any and all costs, including but not

limited to taxes, fees, insurance requirements, barge

fleeting and switching charges, harbor costs,

port costs, third party costs, etc., which are the

responsibility of the Bidder and shall be priced

F.O.B. railcar or F.O.B. barge. The barges

should be free of all costs to the Company’s

barge transportation contractor. Any and all

additional costs must be included in the quoted

price of the coal. The price shall include all

costs up to the point the Buyer’s transportation

contractor takes possession and control of the

barge(s) and/or railcars.

Attached is a coal quality specification sheet (Exhibit

B). Quality offered should be quality delivered on a

monthly weighted average, subject to contract

rejection limits.

All quotations may be subject to a pre-award audit,

which may include an examination of the Bidder’s

operational and financial records and operations (as

reasonably necessary), to ensure that the Bidder is

financially stable and has the coal of the quantity and

quality as offered herein.

The Company reserves the right to have its

representative(s) visit the mine(s) and loading

facilities of the Bidder, to take coal samples for

analysis, to obtain other information as to the

suitability of the coal, and to evaluate the Bidder’s

capability to perform, etc. Acceptance of bid(s) may be

made conditional upon the results of such

investigations.

Bidder must be willing to warrant that there are

reserves equivalent to the total required to supply the

51sa

tonnage and quality for the proposed term. Bidder

must furnish recent coal quality analysis of the coal

being offered. This data must be supplied as an

attachment to Exhibit A. Such analyses should show

the ranges of coal quality and who performed the

testing. Guaranteed Coal Quality should be supplied

on sheets 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Exhibit A.

ENCLOSED IS A COPY OF THE BID FORM

(EXHIBIT A) WHICH MUST BE USED IN

SUBMITTING YOUR BID. FAILURE TO USE THIS

BID FORM MAY RESULT IN THE REJECTION OF

YOUR BID. THE BID MUST BE FULLY

COMPLETED IN INK OR IN TYPEWRITTEN

FORM AND SUBMITTED AS DESCRIBED BELOW.

A COPY SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR YOUR

RECORDS.

AN ORIGINAL OF EACH BID PROPOSAL MUST

BE SUBMITTED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE AND

THE ENVELOPE MUST BE MARKED: LG&E/KU

COAL OFFER LGE/KU 19-05. BIDS SHOULD BE

EITHER MAILED BY CERTIFIED MAIL OR

DELIVERED BY THE BIDDER TO:

Mr. Delbert Billiter

Manager LG&E and KU Fuels

LG&E and KU Energy LLC

220 W. Main Street

Louisville, KY 40202

Bids must be received on or before 5:00 p.m. EDT, on

Thursday, October 10, 2019 at the above address.

Bids shall remain in effect until 5:00 p.m. EST, on

Thursday, December 12, 2019 and may not be

withdrawn within this period unless a written

request from the Bidder is approved by the Company.

52sa

A “Short List” of Bidders (a list of the finalists) will be

developed taking into account, but not limited to such

factors as:

1. Suitability of the coal.

2. Bidder’s ability to meet quality specifications

based on coal reserve characteristics and quality

control procedures.

3. Total evaluated cost to the Company (to include

assessment of transportation costs and quality

impact on operating costs) of burning the coal (in

cents per million BTU).

4. Demonstrated reliability of supplier.

5. Reserves.

6. Financial capabilities and strength.

7. Results of test shipment(s) of coal, if required.

8. Geological evaluation and testing.

9. References.

10. Interstate Experience Modification Rate

(EMR)

The Company also reserves the right to require the

Bidder to furnish a performance bond of an amount

sufficient to provide adequate protection to the

Company in the event the Bidder is unable to

satisfactorily perform the duties and obligations

imposed on Bidder, under any contract which is

entered into as a result of this bid.

Each bidder must sign the proposal letter with its

usual signature and shall give its full business

address. Bids shall be signed in the official corporate

name of the corporation, followed by the signature

and the designation of the president, secretary, or

other persons signing who are authorized to bind the

corporation. The names of all persons signing shall

also be typed or printed below the signature. For non-

53sa

corporate proposers, evidence of authority to sign and

legally bind the entity must be provided.

The Company will retain in confidence, all proposals

and other information received pursuant to this

Request, but reserves the right to disclose such

information and/or proposals to consultants that the

Company may retain to assist in the evaluation and

contract effort, or when so requested by a court or

government agency.

Bidder will be responsible for the completeness and

accuracy of all information contained or used in

preparation of the proposal and will also be

responsible for supplying all necessary supporting

information.

THE COMPANY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO

MODIFY OR WITHDRAW THIS REQUEST, TO

REQUEST ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, TO

WAIVE TECHNICALITIES OR IRREGULARITIES,

TO REJECT ANY OR ALL PROPOSALS, AND TO

TERMINATE ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS

AT ANY TIME. THE COMPANY ALSO RESERVES

THE RIGHT TO ACCEPT ONE OR MORE

PROPOSAL(S) FOR A PORTION OR FOR ALL OF

THE QUANTITIES OF COAL. THE COMPANY

ALSO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE

WITH BIDDER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS

OF THIS QUOTATION.

Nothing herein shall obligate the Company to

compensate or reimburse Bidder for any costs or

expenses incurred in the preparation of this proposal,

or the submission of any information or data in

connection therewith, and we shall not be obligated

under any contract or order resulting from any

proposal unless and until the contract or order has

54sa

been signed by a duly authorized official of the

Company.

The Bidders placed on the “Short List” will be notified

of their selection to the list as promptly as possible.

55sa

[DATED JANUARY 8, 2020]

Andy Beshear

Governor

Michael J. Schmitt

Chairman

Rebecca W. Goodman

Secretary

Energy and Environment Cabinet

Robert Cicero

Vice Chairman

Talina R. Mathews

Commissioner

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Public Service Commission

211 Sower Blvd.

P.O. Box 615

Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615

Telephone; (502) 564-3940

Fax; (502) 564-3460

psc.ky.gov

January 8, 2020

To: All Electric Utilities

RE: Constitutional Challenge to Administrative

Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)

To Whom It May Concern:

The Commission is issuing this letter to inform

you of a possible legal challenge to Administrative

Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, (“807 KAR 5:056”). The

Commission has received notice of a potential

constitutional challenge by Foresight Coal Sales,

LLC, (“Foresight”), that Foresight intends to pursue

legal action to invalidate as unconstitutional 807 KAR

5:056 Section 3(5), (“Section 3(5)”).

The Commission has requested a legal opinion

from the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of

56sa

Kentucky regarding the constitutionality of Section

3(5). A copy of the request is attached, which includes

a copy of Foresight’s letter. In light of that pending

request and the potential for a legal challenge to

Section 3(5), the Commission is suspending

enforcement of the requirements of Section 3(5) until

the Attorney General has rendered an opinion on the

constitutionality of Section 3(5). After the Attorney

General renders his opinion, the Commission will

determine the next steps regarding Section 3(5).

If you have any questions, please contact J.E.B.

Pinney, Acting General Counsel, at (502) 782-2587

or ieb.pinney@ky.qov.

CC: Nicholas S. Johnson

57sa

Andy Beshear

Governor

Michael J. Schmitt

Chairman

Rebecca W. Goodman

Secretary

Energy and Environment Cabinet

Robert Cicero

Vice Chairman

Talina R. Mathews

Commissioner

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Public Service Commission

211 Sower Blvd.

P.O. Box 615

Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615

Telephone; (502) 564-3940

Fax; (502) 564-3460

psc.ky.gov

January 8, 2020

Hon. Daniel Cameron

Attorney General

Commonwealth of Kentucky

700 Capital Avenue

Suite 118

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

Re: Constitutionality of Administrative

Regulation 807 KAR 5:056

Attorney General Cameron:

The Kentucky Public Service Commission

(“Commission”) is submitting this letter requesting a

legal opinion from your office regarding the

constitutionality of a recent amendment to

Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:056 (“807 KAR

5:056”). The Commission has received notice of a

potential constitutional challenge by Foresight Coal

58sa

Sales, LLC, (“Foresight”), a copy of which is attached

to this letter, that Foresight intends to pursue legal

action to invalidate as unconstitutional 807 KAR

5:056, Section 3(5) (“Section 3(5)”). The Commission

will cease enforcement of Section 3(5) until it receives

an opinion from your office.

Background

807 KAR 5:056 is the Commission’s regulation

addressing the Fuel Adjustment Clause (“FAC”). The

FAC is a mechanism by which the Commission, inter

alia, reviews fossil fuel and power purchases of

utilities in Kentucky that generate their own

electricity, making adjustments to the utilities’ FAC

surcharges recovered from a monthly surcharge on

customers’ bills. Several amendments to 807 KAR

5:056 became effective on August 20, 2019, among

those amendments was a new section, Section 3(5)

which provides that the Commission would review the

reasonableness of the costs of proposals to supply

fossil fuels “based on the cost of the fuel less any coal

severance tax imposed by any jurisdiction.” The

Commission adopted this amendment in response to

House Resolution 144 from the 2019 Regular Session,

which noted a decline in Kentucky coal production;

noted that much of the coal consumed in Kentucky

was imported from out of state, including from

Illinois; and urged the Commission to consider “all

costs, including fossil fuel-related economic impacts

within Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases

under the fuel adjustment clause.”

On December 5, 2019, the Commission received a

letter from Foresight, dated November 29, 2019, the

purpose of which was “to place [the Commission] on

notice that it intends to pursue legal action to

59sa

invalidate an unconstitutional regulation found at

[807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)], unless [Foresight is]

sooner advised that the subject regulation has been

revoked or otherwise held in abeyance from applying

to contracts.” Foresight alleges that Section 3(5)

violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United

States Constitution because it was enacted with the

intent of providing a competitive advantage to

Kentucky coal.

As of the date of this letter, litigation has not yet

been initiated in this matter but has been threatened

by Foresight. Foresight also indicated that it is

currently in discussions with the Illinois Coal

Association to bring a lawsuit on its behalf and on

behalf of other coal producers in Illinois.

Specifically, Foresight observes that the original

language proposed by the Commission required that

the cost of coal be evaluated “based on the cost of the

fuel less any tax collected under KRS 143.020,” i.e.,

Kentucky’s coal severance tax statute. Foresight

alleges that despite the change in the language that

“the intent of the regulation remains the same:

improperly advantaging Kentucky coal producers to

the detriment of the direct competition in Illinois and

Indiana, where no severance tax exists.”

Foresight further alleges that “statements issued

in the notice and comment period for the rule make it

clear the intent behind the rule.” Foresight noted

that:

Those comments state that the idea behind the

rule is “to incentivize Kentucky utilities to

purchase Kentucky coal . . . [and is] an attempt

to remove from [a utility’s] consideration the

increase in the cost of Kentucky coal as a result

60sa

of the Kentucky coal severance tax.”

Commenters lauded the PSC’s “efforts to

protect coal jobs in Kentucky.” Further,

commenters specifically noted the intent to

make Kentucky coal artificially appear more

competitive “with out of state coal that

originates from states that do not apply coal

severance taxes, such as Illinois and Indiana.”

Foresight noted, among other things, that the

United States Supreme Court in West Lynn

Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) “struck

down a Massachusetts milk-pricing order which

employed a tax on all milk sold to fund a subsidy to

in-state producers” because the Court, according to

Foresight, “viewed the regulation as a tariff or

customs duty-neutralizing the advantage possessed

by lower cost out of state producers.” Foresight argued

that is the motivation, intent, and effect of 807 KAR

5:056, Section 3(5).

Foresight further pointed to the decision of the 7th

Circuit Court of Appeals in Alliance for Clean Coal v.

Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995), that held that an

Illinois law, which required, among other things, that

“utilities formulate Clean Air Act compliance plans

that took into account the need to use coal mined in

Illinois in an environmentally responsible manner in

the production of electricity and the need to maintain

and preserve as a valuable State resource the mining

of coal in Illinois,” violated the dormant Commerce

Clause. Foresight argued Section 3(5), like the Illinois

law, violates the cardinal rule of nondiscrimination

and, therefore, will be invalidated.

Foresight indicated that it has notified the

affected utilities that it intends to initiate legal action

61sa

regarding the regulation and cautioned them against

entering into contracts based on Section 3(5). Further,

it indicated that it intends to seek judicial review of

the rule and reserves the right to use any remedies

available to recover any damages arising from this

rule.

Request for an Opinion

The Commission’s request is simple: is Section 3(5)

unconstitutional because it violates the dormant

commerce clause by discriminating against coal from

states with no severance tax? The regulation is not

facially discriminatory, as the effect of the regulation

will be to reduce the cost of coal subject to severance

taxes imposed by any jurisdiction for the purpose of

the Commission’s cost evaluation.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission

respectfully requests an opinion regarding the

Constitutionality of 807 KAR 5:056 Section 3(5).

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[DATED MARCH 4, 2020]

Andy Beshear

Governor

Michael J. Schmitt

Chairman

Rebecca W. Goodman

Secretary

Energy and Environment Cabinet

Robert Cicero

Vice Chairman

Talina R. Mathews

Commissioner

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Public Service Commission

211 Sower Blvd.

P.O. Box 615

Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615

Telephone; (502) 564-3940

Fax; (502) 564-3460

psc.ky.gov

March 4, 2020

To: All Electric Utilities

RE: Constitutional Challenge to Administrative

Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)

To Whom It May Concern:

On January 8, 2020, the Commission issued a

letter to inform you of a possible legal challenge to

Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, (“807

KAR 5:056”). The Commission had received notice of

a potential constitutional challenge by Foresight Coal

Sales, LLC, (“Foresight”), that Foresight intended to

pursue legal action to invalidate as unconstitutional

807 KAR 5:056 Section 3(5), (“Section 3(5)”). The

January 8, 2020 letter stated that the Commission

had requested a legal opinion from the Attorney

General for the Commonwealth of Kentucky

63sa

(“Attorney General”) regarding the constitutionality

of Section 3(5). The letter also stated that, in light of

that pending request and the potential for a legal

challenge to Section 3(5), the Commission was

suspending enforcement of the requirements of

Section 3(5) until the Attorney General had rendered

an opinion on the constitutionality of Section 3(5).

On March 4, 2020, the Commission received the

attached opinion of the Attorney General in which the

Attorney General concluded that Section 3(5) does not

violate on its face the dormant commerce clause and

is therefore constitutional. Having received this

opinion from the Attorney General, the Commission

will no longer suspend enforcement of the

requirements of Section 3(5).

If you have any questions, please contact J.E.B.

Pinney, Acting General Counsel, at (502) 782-2587 or

ieb.pinney@ky.qov.

CC: Nicholas S. Johnson

64sa

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Office of the Attorney General

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General

Capitol Building, Suite 118

700 Capital Avenue

Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

(502) 696-5300

Fax: (502) 564-2894

March 4, 2020

OAG 20-04

Subject:

Whether 807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5) violates

the dormant commerce clause.

Requested by:

J.E.B. Pinney, Acting General Counsel

Public Service Commission

Written by:

Carmine G. laccarino, Executive

Director

Brett R. Nolan, Special Litigation

Counsel

Syllabus:

807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5) does not violate

the dormant commerce clause.

Opinion of the Attorney General

The Kentucky Public Service Commission

requests this Office’s opinion on whether 807 KAR

5:056 § 3(5) (the “Regulation”) is unconstitutional

under the “dormant commerce cause” of the United

States Constitution. For the reasons that follow, the

Office finds that the Regulation is not

unconstitutional.

“The Commerce Clause provides that the Congress

shall have Power to regulate Commerce among the

65sa

several States.” Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl.

Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (quoting

Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (cleaned up). Despite its name, the socalled “dormant commerce clause” is nowhere found

in a clause to the United States Constitution. Tyler

Pipe Indus., Inc. u. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483

U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he

Court for over a century has engaged in an enterprise

that it has been unable to justify by textual

support[.]”). Regardless, it “denies the States the

power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden

the interstate flow of articles of commerce.” Or. Waste

Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 98. Thus, states may not engage

in “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state

economic interests that benefits the former and

burdens the latter.” Id. at 99. On the other hand,

“nondiscriminatory regulations that have only

incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid

unless the burden imposed on such commerce is

clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

benefits.” Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397

U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). Despite the negative thrust of

the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has

recognized that “the Framers’ distrust of economic

Balkanization was limited by their federalism

favoring a degree of local autonomy.” Dep’t of Revenue

of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citing The

Federalist Nos. 7 (A. Hamilton), 11 (A. Hamilton), and

42 (J. Madison), and 51 (J. Madison)).

According to the Commission, “807 KAR 5:056 is

the Commission’s regulation addressing the Fuel

Adjustment Clause (‘FAC’). The FAC is a mechanism

by which the Commission ... reviews fossil fuel and

power purchases of utilities in Kentucky that

generate their own electricity, making adjustments to

66sa

the utilities’ FAC surcharges recovered from a

monthly surcharge on customers’ bills.” Relevant to

this Office’s inquiry, the Regulation provides:

For any contracts entered into on or after

December 1, 2019, the commission shall, in

determining the reasonableness of fuel costs in

procurement contracts and fuel procurement

practices, evaluate the reasonableness of fuel

costs in contracts and competing bids based on

the cost of the fuel less any coal severance tax

imposed by any jurisdiction.

807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5).

“Severance taxes are excise taxes on natural

resources ‘severed’ from the earth.” https://www

.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/2011-state-severancetaxcollections.aspx (last accessed Feb. 27, 2020).

Kentucky’s severance tax is 4.5% on coal severed or

processed in Kentucky. KRS 143.020. Ohio,

Tennessee, and West Virginia have also enacted their

own severance taxes for coal mined in those states.

See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5749.02; Tenn. Code Ann.

67-7-103; W. Va. Code 11-13A-3. Indiana and Illinois

have not enacted coal severance taxes.

In the 2019 Regular Session of the General

Assembly, the Kentucky House of Representatives

passed House Resolution 144, which “urg[ed] the

Public Service Commission to amend its

administrative regulations to consider all costs,

including fossil fuel-related economic impacts within

Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases under the

fuel adjustment clause.” House Resolution 144

prompted the Commission amend 807 KAR 5:056 §

3(5).

67sa

Based on the plain text of the Regulation, this

Office agrees with the Public Service Commission

that the Regulation “is not facially discriminatory.”

Request at 3. The Regulation provides that coal

severance taxes “imposed by any jurisdiction” should

not

be

considered

when

evaluating

the

reasonableness of fuel costs. 807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5)

(emphasis added). This does not require the

“differential treatment of instate and out-of-state

economic interests that benefits the former and

burdens the latter.” Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at

99. Rather, it requires treating all economic interests

the same by deducting the coal severance tax imposed

by any jurisdiction when evaluating “the

reasonableness of fuel costs in contracts and

competing bids.” 807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5). Because the

Regulation treats coal sourced from within the

Commonwealth the same as coal sourced from outside

its borders, it is not facially discriminatory.

Laws that are facially neutral might nevertheless

violate the dormant commerce clause if “the burden

imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive

in relation to the putative local benefits.” Or. Waste

Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99; see also Pike, 397 U.S. at 137

(“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to

effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its

effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it

will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such

commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the

putative local benefits.”). But this is a narrower kind

of claim that often involves weighing factual issues

that are difficult to balance. See Bendix Autolite Corp.

v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Weighing the governmental

interests of a State against the needs of interstate

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commerce is, by contrast, a task squarely within the

responsibility of Congress ....”). So “[s]tate laws

frequently survive this Pike scrutiny,” Dep’t of

Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 339 (collecting cases), in

part because it requires high deference to the state’s

policy choices. See Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass’n v.

Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2009)

(explaining that any challenge under Pike must

demonstrate that the burden on interstate commerce

is “clearly excessive”) (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v.

Town of Clarkstown, N. Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)).

Though this Office’s analysis is necessarily limited

without a factual record to consider, it is not clear that

the Regulation will burden interstate commerce.

States are free to enact coal severance taxes at a

chosen rate. An adjustment to offset coal severance

taxes would cause Kentucky coal to be priced more

competitively in comparison to some states and less

competitively with respect to other states, depending

on which states have chosen to enact severance taxes

and at what rate. Kentucky has enacted a coal

severance tax of 4.5% on coal severed or processed in

Kentucky, but states like Indiana and Illinois have

not enacted a coal severance tax. So while the

Regulation might arguably benefit coal producers in

Kentucky relative to those in Indiana or Illinois, the

same logic would mean that it could hurt Kentucky

coal producers relative to those states where the

severance tax may be higher. Either way, nothing

prevents states from altering their severance tax if

they believe it will provide their coal producers with

a competitive advantage in Kentucky. Thus, there is

no merit to the argument that discounting severance

taxes in the Commission’s consideration will favor

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Kentucky coal producers to the detriment of all outof-state interests.

For these reasons, this Office concludes that the

Regulation does not violate the so-called “dormant

commerce clause.”

Daniel Cameron

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Brett R. Nolan, Special Litigation Counsel

Carmine G. Iaccarino, Executive Director

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[DATED NOVEMBER 30, 2020]

AGREEMENT

This Agreement is entered into by and between: (i)

Foresight Coal Sales, LLC (“‘Foresight”); (ii) Michael

Schmitt, Talina Mathews, Kent Chandler, and the

Public Service Commission’s Executive Director, all

in their official capacities (the “PSC Defendants”);

and (iii) Daniel Cameron, in his official capacity (the

“Attorney General”) (all parties together, the

“Parties”).

The Parties hereby agree as follows:

1. The PSC Defendants agree that the Public

Service

Commission

will

notify

Kentucky’s

jurisdictional electric utilities via letter that,

beginning

immediately,

the

Public

Service

Commission will no longer apply 807 Ky. Admin. Reg.

5:056 § 3(5) (the “Challenged Regulation”) and that

the Challenged Regulation will be withdrawn through

the Public Service Commission’s ordinary regulatory

process. This letter will be sent promptly upon this

Agreement becoming effective.

2. The PSC Defendants agree that the Public

Service Commission will withdraw the Challenged

Regulation through the ordinary regulatory process

outlined in KRS Chapter l 3A. The PSC Defendants

agree that the Public Service Commission will submit

a regulatory amendment withdrawing the Challenged

Regulation to the Legislative Research Commission

by December 15, 2020.

3. The Parties agree to jointly move to dismiss the

appeal in Foresight Coal Sales, LLC v. Schmitt, at al.,

No. 20-5549 (6th Cir.) (the “Sixth Circuit matter”),

and to seek remand of the oral argument scheduled

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for December 4, 2020. This joint motion will be

promptly filed upon this Agreement becoming

effective.

4. The Parties agree to jointly move to stay and

remand all deadlines in Foresight Coal Sales, LLC v.

Schmitt, et al., 3:20-cv-21 (E.D. Ky.) (the “ District

Court matter”), until the Challenged Regulation has

been officially withdrawn through the ordinary

regulatory process. This joint motion will be promptly

filed upon this Agreement becoming effective. Once

the Challenged Regulation has been officially

withdrawn, the Parties agree to dismiss the District

Court matter with prejudice.

5. Once the Challenged Regulation is officially

withdrawn, Foresight expressly waives any right or

entitlement to, and will not seek, reimbursement of

its attorneys’ fees and/or any of its costs or expenses

associated with the District Court matter and/or the

Sixth Circuit matter.

6. By entering into this Agreement, no party

admits any liability to any other party with respect to

any claim or matter raised in the District Court

matter or the Sixth Circuit matter, including but not

limited to with respect to the Challenged Regulation.

This Agreement shall not be construed as an

admission of liability by any party.

7. This Agreement is governed by, and shall be

construed in accordance with, Kentucky law. Any

dispute regarding this Agreement shall be resolved in

a Kentucky court of competent jurisdiction.

8. This Agreement is binding on the Parties and

their successors.

72sa

9. This Agreement constitutes the entirety of the

Parties’ agreement. This Agreement supersedes all

prior or existing agreements among the Parties or

their representatives relating thereto. No amendment

to or modification of this Agreement shall be effective

unless in writing executed by the Parties.

10. This Agreement

counterparts.

may

be

executed

in

11. This Agreement is effective on November 30,

2020.

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[ON MARCH 3, 2021]

EXCERPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE

SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE

ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY

*

*

*

PROCEEDINGS

CLERK: Senator Carpenter? Senator Castlen?

SENATOR CASTLEN: Here.

CLERK: Senator Embry?

SENATOR EMBRY: Here, in the room.

CLERK: Senator Harper Angel?

SENATOR HARPER ANGEL: Present remotely in

my district.

CLERK: Thank you, Senator. Senator Schickel?

Senator Southworth?

SENATOR SOUTHWORTH: Here.

CLERK: Senator Webb?

SENATOR WEBB: Present.

CLERK: Senator Westerfield?

SENATOR WESTERFIELD: Here.

CLERK: Senator Wheeler?

SENATOR WHEELER: Here.

CLERK: Senator Turner?

SENATOR TURNER: Here.

CLERK: Chair Smith?

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Present. And a quorum?

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CLERK: Yes.

CHAIRMAN SMITH: All right. Very good. I need

a motion on our minutes for our previous meeting.

Motion and a second. All those in favor, sign of aye.

Opposed, likewise. Motion carries. All right. We have

a very, very busy meeting, and so I’d like to ask each

one of those that are going to be presenting to please

be conscious of the other people that are going to go.

And I will apologize to Senator Southwood. I actually,

due to a scheduling conflict, need to actually let

Senator Mills go ahead of you. And like I said, a

thousand apologies, but if Senator Mills is here -Senator Mills, please go ahead. There is going to get

-- we -- we have a lot of bills to get through, so I ask

you to -- to be as informed as you can be and as brief

as you can be. So I’m going to turn it over to you.

Thank you.

SENATOR MILLS: Thank you, Chairman Smith.

I’m Robby Mills. I represent the Fourth Senate

District in Western Kentucky, and I’m talking about

Senate Bill 257 today that you have before you. 257 is

a fuel -- it’s a fuel adjustment. It addresses a fuel

adjustment issue with the PSC. As you all know, the

PSC periodically reviews the utility fuel-buying

decisions, and they’re charged with assessing the

reasonableness of those charges. What this bill does

is helps emphasize the re -- the word

“reasonableness,” and it allows -- it allows the coal

severance tax that is added to coal in the State of

Kentucky to be considered reasonable when compared

with coal contracts that do not have a severance tax

on there. And the reason that it is reasonable is

because we all know what coal severance tax does for

our community and what it returns back to the state,

and those are benefits above and beyond just the price

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for the consumers. I know, in Webster County, that

takes -- gets some coal severance back. We’ve built a

senior citizen center. We’ve built walking trails.

We’ve done a lot of good things with this severance

tax, so...

CHAIRMAN SMITH: I’ve got a motion and second.

Do you have anybody else that’s going to speak

with you?

SENATOR MILLS: I do not.

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Very good. I ask the clerk to

call the roll.

CLERK: Senator Carpenter? Senator Castlen?

SENATOR CASTLEN: Aye.

CLERK: Senator Embry?

SENATOR EMBRY: Aye.

CLERK: Senator Schickel?

SENATOR SCHICKEL: Aye.

CLERK: Senator Southworth?

SENATOR SOUTHWORTH: Aye.

CLERK: Senator Turner?

SENATOR TURNER: Aye.

CLERK: Senator Webb?

SENATOR WEBB: Aye.

CLERK: Senator Westerfield?

SENATOR WESTERFIELD: Aye.

CLERK: Senator Wheeler?

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SENATOR WHEELER: Mr. Chairman, to explain

my vote, I think this is a great bill. I’m proud to cosponsor it with Senator Mills, and I proudly vote aye.

SENATOR MILLS: Thank you.

CLERK: Chair Smith?

CHAIRMAN SMITH: I vote aye, and the motion’s

approved favorable. Your bill passes. Do I have

motion to put this on consent? Second? All those in

favor, sign of aye.

SENATE: Aye.

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Opposed, likewise. Senator

Mills, thank you for coming in front of our committee.

(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)

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[ON MARCH 11, 2021]

EXCERPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE

SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE

ON NATURAL RESOURCES

*

*

*

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Okay. Next, we’re going to

take up Senate Bill 257. Representative Mills.

SENATOR MILLS: Chairman

Committee, thank you for having me.

Gooch

and

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes.

SENATOR MILLS: I’m Robby Mills. I represent

the Fourth District in Western Kentucky, and that’s

coal country, and this is what our bills is about today.

If it’s okay to go ahead and proceed?

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes. Go right ahead.

SENATOR MILLS: Okay. Very good. So Senate

Bill 257 deals with the Public Service Commission,

and hopefully you’ve read it. It was a long bill, about

two paragraphs, and -- but it is an important bill. If

you’re not aware, every so often, the PSC periodically

reviews purchase contracts to make sure that electric

utilities fuel-buying decisions are reasonable, and

when considering whether a fuel purchase is

reasonable, the PSC should -- and this is what the bill

is about -- consider more than just the cost of the fuel.

They should fact -- they should look at factors like

reliable fuel source. I know you’ve talked -- we’ve

talked about this in this committee, and in the Senate

committee, about coal as a reliable fuel source. It’s

sitting there in a pile. It’s ready to go. All it has to do

79sa

is be burned. And the other thing that they should

consider is the economic benefits of the severance tax

that’s paid on that coal, and those economic benefits

are spread out in two ways. They’re spread ·out

through the state budget, and they’re also spread out

individually in the -- in the communities that that fuel

and that coal come from through the state. So a low

-- cost coal contract doesn’t always mean that it’s the

most reasonable contract. And so what this bill does

is this bill asks the Public Service Commission to -- in

determining the reasonableness of the fuel cost in

procurement of the contracts for the fuel, to evaluate

the reasonableness of the fuel cost in contracts and

competing bids based on the cost of the fuel less any

coal severance tax imposed by any jurisdiction.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: And thank you, Senator, for

bringing this. I know I was taking testimony one time

in a committee when I first got here, and I can

remember, of course, the PSC at the time wanted to

make sure you had the lowest cost or whatever, and

there was one utility that testified that they were

buying some compliant West Virginia coal that was

eight cents a ton cheaper than what the same

compliant coal in Kentucky was. Now, we’re talking

about eight cents pers ton -SENATOR MILLS: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- which wouldn’t even been

measured in cost, and when you looked at, you know,

the -- the employment, the economic development, the

way the dollars turned over, the coal severance, and

all of that, that certainly was not something that

really made any sense to this -SENATOR MILLS: Right.

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CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- state, and -- and, you

know, it’s one thing to, you know, allow someone to -to take the lowest bid or whatever, but for the state to

actually promote something –

SENATOR MILLS: Right.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- like that, you know,

certainly was not in our best interest, and so with

that, are they any questions? Representative

Blanton?

REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: Thank you, Mr.

Chairman, Senator Mills for bringing this piece. I do

support the legislation.

SENATOR MILLS: Thank you.

REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: Just a curious

question. Is this similar language that PSC actually

had in a reg a few years ago and they removed?

SENATOR MILLS: Yeah. Yeah, it is. We -- the

House actually passed a resolution, like, 99 to one,

two years ago. The PSC had this in a regulation, and

they were as -- they’re asking us to put it in statute,

and it gives them more firm ground to stand on in

doing this.

REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: All right. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR MILLS: Thank you. Good question.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Okay. Any other questions?

Tom Fitzgerald, are you on the line? Did you want to

make any comments?

MR. FITZGERALD: Mr. Chairman, thank you

very much. I -- I was just curious, and -- and Senator

Mills may or may not know this, but I was -- I’d -- I’d

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like to -- Representative Blanton, I support the bill. I

was just curious -- I know when the cabinet -- or when

the PSC had this in their regulation, they were sued

by an out-of-state coal company, and they settled the

case by agreeing to remove the language, and -- and I

think the reg is actually -- just was -- was just heard

by the administrative reg committee. I’m just curious

-- I know the AG had looked at the language and had

said there didn’t seem to be a constitutional issue, but

I didn’t know whether Senator Mills -- how confident

we are that if this goes into the statute, we’re not

going to get another suit saying that we’re violating

interstate commerce.

SENATOR MILLS: Yeah, that’s -- that’s a great

question, and, you know, I think the reason the PSC

did away with the regulation that they were operating

under is really because -- really because of the cost of

pursuing that, and I think it’s kind of a -- as a kind of

a backup situation. It’s easier for them to come to the

legislature and give, you know -- ask for a statute that

gives them more solid ground, and from the folks that

I’ve talked to, I believe the statute puts them on, like

I said, much more solid ground if there are any legal

challenges moving forward.

MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. And I would hope that

the AG’s office will -- will stand behind their opinion

and will vigorously defend the statute if there is

another challenge claiming that it was a civil rights

violation. I think that was what -- and I think the PSC

acted prudently in settling that because of the

potential liability that they were facing.

SENATOR MILLS: It is -MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, sir.

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SENATOR MILLS: I’ll -- I’ll reach out to the

Attorney General after this and touch base with him.

Good question. Thank you.

MR. FITZGERALD: That would be -- that would

be great. Thank you, Senator.

SENATOR MILLS: You’re welcome.

MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Thanks, Tom. And I think

we often realize -- and we’ve seen this a lot of times -where regulatory groups will be sued by a – you know,

some group out there, and -- and they’ll -- they’ll settle

in court and -SENATOR MILLS: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- that settlement

sometimes becomes kind of a consent decree that it’s

hard to overturn or do -- do much with -SENATOR MILLS: Sure.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- but we’re hopeful in this

case, and we don’t -SENATOR MILLS: Right.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- know until we try, and,

you know, certainly, people can sue, and interstate

com -- being afoul of the interstate commerce clause

is something that I’ve been trying to, you know – kind

of looking at in things that I’ve done here for 26 years

-- seven years, so -SENATOR MILLS: Yep.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- it is an issue. Any other

questions or comments? We ask the clerk to call the

roll, please.

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CLERK: Representative Blanton?

REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: Aye.

CLERK: Representative Bowling?

REPRESENTATIVE BOWLING: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Bridges?

REPRESENTATIVE BRIDGES: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Burch?

REPRESENTATIVE BURCH: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Cantrell?

REPRESENTATIVE CANTRELL: I vote yes. I

couldn’t tell when I looked into the interstate

commerce market just a little bit in large (Inaudible).

Based on my reading I did, it doesn’t look

discriminatory -- it doesn’t say an interference with

interstate commerce just to the extent that the entity

here might say it (Inaudible) which is pretty -- you

know, pretty fair and reasonable because a lot of

entities do effect from this board, (Inaudible) so I vote

yes.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Thank you.

CLERK: Representative Dossett?

REPRESENTATIVE DOSSETT: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Dotson?

REPRESENTATIVE DOTSON: Yes.

CLERK: Representative DuPlessis?

REPRESENTATIVE DUPLESSIS: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Flannery?

REPRESENTATIVE FLANNERY: Yes.

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CLERK: Representative Fugate?

REPRESENTATIVE FUGATE: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Johnson?

REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Kirk-McCormick?

REPRESENTATIVE KIRK-MCCORMICK: Yes.

May I explain my vote?

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE KIRK-MCCORMICK: Yes, I

am from the coal fields, too, so anything that’s going

to support, I’m for it. Thank you.

CLERK: Representative Marzian?

REPRESENTATIVE MARZIAN: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Miles?

REPRESENTATIVE MILES: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Gibbons Prunty?

REPRESENTATIVE GIBSON-PRUNTY: Yes.

CLERK: Representative Scott?

REPRESENTATIVE SCOTT: Pass.

CLERK: Representative Stevenson?

REPRESENTATIVE STEVENSON: (No audible

response.)

CLERK: Representative Wesley?

REPRESENTATIVE WESLEY: Yes.

CLERK: Representative White?

REPRESENTATIVE WHITE: Yes.

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CLERK: Chair Gooch?

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes. And thank you that -I always want to point out that this is my Senator

bringing good bills before our committee, and the bill

does pass with favorable expression that things

should pass.

SENATOR MILLS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Thank you.

(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)

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[ON MARCH 15, 2021]

EXCERPT OF HOUSE FLOOR PROCEEDING

*

*

*

PROCEEDINGS

SPEAKER

McCracken.

OSBORNE:

Gentleman

from

REPRESENTATIVE RUDY: Mr. Speaker, I move

you, sir, that Senate Bill 257 be taken from its place

in the orders of the day, read for a third time by title

and sponsor only, and placed upon its passage.

SPEAKER OSBORNE: Motion’s made and

seconded that Senate Bill 257 be taken from its place

in the orders of the day, read for the third time by title

and sponsor only, and placed upon its passage. Clerk,

please report.

CLERK: Senate Bill 257, an act relating to utility

fuel costs, Senator Mills.

SPEAKER

McCracken.

OSBORNE:

Gentleman

from

REPRESENTATIVE RUDY: Mr. Speaker, I yield

to the gentleman from Webster for explanation of the

bill and motion thereon.

SPEAKER OSBORNE: The Chair recognizes the

gentleman from Webster for explanation of the bill

and a motion thereon.

REPRESENTATIVE GOOCH: Thank you, Mr.

Speaker, ladies and gentlemen. Senate Bill 257 is a -a very simple bill. It passed the Senate 36 to nothing.

And what it applies to is reasonableness of costs in

procurement contracts about fuel procedures,

procurement, and practices. I think, as many of you

87sa

know, we sometimes see on our fuel bills -- our utility

bills a fuel adjustment clause, and this allows the

utilities to pass on the cost or even sometimes the

decreased cost of the fuel cost that they’re purchasing.

This is something that they’re allowed to do, but from

time to time, the PSC periodically reviews these to

make sure that the most reasonable fuel costs are

being used. But the purpose of this bill is to make sure

that the PSC understands that sometimes you may

need to consider more than just cost. For instance,

factors like reliable fuel sources, and other factors like

economic benefits need to sometimes also be

considered. A perfect example of this -- I remember,

several years ago, I was in a committee where we

actually heard a utility testify that they had actually

bought compliant West Virginia coal over Kentucky

coal because it was eight cents a ton cheaper. Now, I

think we all know that eight cents a ton was so

miniscule that it would not have really affected the

rates at all, but when you consider the -- the loss of -of those severance taxes that went to those local

communities, and the jobs, and the taxes that the

state was paid from -- from the employment on those

jobs, that we really would have been much better off

to have paid eight cents a ton more and got the

benefits of the coal severance and -- and -- and those

jobs. So many of you remember that in 2019, I had a

bill that -- actually, it was a resolution where we

asked the Public Service Commission to consider

more than just the – the lowest cost possible, and they

did that. They wrote some regulations, but they were

recently sued by an out-of-state coal company. We -we understand that these types of laws cannot run

afoul of interstate commerce. That’s why this bill has

been drafted in a way that makes sure that any

88sa

jurisdiction, not just the State of Kentucky, that

provides or has severance taxes, that those would also

be considered there as well. The Public Service

Commission feels that it would be better for us to put

this in the statute than passing a resolution such as I

did in 2019, and then having them just make

regulations. So with that, I’d be happy to answer any

questions, but I would move for passage of Senate Bill

257.

SPEAKER OSBORNE: Question before the body

is passage of Senate Bill 257. Is there any discussion?

Seeing none, the clerk will sound the chimes. Those

in favor, vote aye. Those opposed, vote nay. And roll

call is open for your voting. Have all members voted?

Does any member wish to change or explain their

vote? The clerk will take the roll. Being 93 members

voting aye, one member voting nay, Senate Bill 257 is

passed. Gentleman from Webster.

REPRESENTATIVE

clincher.

GOOCH:

Move

for

the

SPEAKER OSBORNE: That objection clincher is

applied.

(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)

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[ON MAY 27, 2021]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION

FRANKFORT

3 3:21-cv-00016-GFVT-EBA

FORESIGHT COAL SALES, LLC,

PLAINTIFF,

vs.

MICHAEL SCHMITT, et al.,

DEFENDANTS.

_________________________________________________

WITNESS: JEB PINNEY

_________________________________________________

The remote videotaped deposition of Jeb Pinney,

30(b)(6) designee of the Kentucky Public Service

Commission, was taken before Janine N. Leroux,

Stenographic Court Reporter and Notary Public in

and for the State of Kentucky at Large on Thursday,

May 27, 2021, commencing at the approximate hour

of 1:04 p.m. Said deposition was taken pursuant to

Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

90sa

*

*

*

Q. All right. Mr. Pinney, there was a draft

regulation and enacted regulation and now there’s SB

257, right?

A. When you refer to the regulation, you mean 807

Kentucky Administrative Regulation 5:056?

Q. 3 Sub 5, yes. The language specifically about

the backing out any coal severance tax from any

jurisdiction, right? That’s how the adopted regulation

was worded, correct?

A. Without looking at the regulation, that seems

consistent with what I would think.

*

*

*

Q. And that SB 257 language is virtually identical

to the language of the adopted regulation, correct?

A. With a few changes, I think materially it seems

to be the same.

Q. Materially it’s the same, right?

A. It appears to be, yes.

*

*

*

Q. Okay. And let’s look at 257 again, and again I’ll

ask you that this language instructs the PSC to treat

coal differently depending on where it was produced,

correct?

MR. KUHN: Object to the form.

THE WITNESS: I can answer?

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MR. KUHN: You can answer.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Under the law the only characteristic

that leads to differential treatment is the state of

origin for the coal, correct?

A. You -- you -- when you say under the law, are

you referring specifically to Senate Bill 257?

Q. Yes.

A. And then your question is that the only -- it only

relates to fuel coal severance taxes?

Q. My question was: Under SB 257 the only

characteristic that leads to differential treatment is

the coal’s state of origin, correct?

A. Okay. I thought you said under the law. But

under Senate Bill 257 I would agree, yes.

*

*

*

Q. When PSC is reviewing the reasonableness of a

coal purchase, the primary driver is cost, right?

A. I would say that there are other factors when

the commission is reviewing it, but I believe we

discussed some of those factors, including reliability

of -- of supply.

Q. Holding those things constant, cost drives the

analysis, agreed?

MR. KUHN: Objection, asked and answered.

Object to the form. You can answer.

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A. I would say it would be fair to characterize that

the cost is a -- one of the most substantial factors.

Q. And just to finish that thought, cost is one of the

most substantial factors in the PSC’s analysis of the

reasonableness of coal purchases, correct?

A. Yes.

*

*

*

Q. Okay. So when the PSC conducts its review for

reasonableness, it is required by SB 257 to use that

evaluated bid price minus coal severance taxes,

correct?

MR. KUHN: Objection, asked and answered.

A. That’s what the statute says.

Q. Okay. So for Kentucky, that would mean that

the PSC will review the utility’s evaluated price

minus 4.5 percent, correct?

A. Once again, assuming that that’s the -- the

Kentucky tax severance tax rate, correct.

Q. Okay. And when the PSC reviews a utility’s

purchase of an Illinois coal, it will not have any credit

for any kind of tax paid by that Illinois coal company,

correct?

MR. KUHN: Object to form. You can answer.

A. If Illinois has a severance tax, then that would

also be removed from the evaluation.

Q. Does Illinois have a severance tax?

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A. I honestly don’t know. I would hazard a guess

that because your client is based in Illinois, that it

does not.

*

*

*

Q. Is there any other tax that would be backed out

from the Illinois coal producer’s evaluated cost?

A. Not under Senate Bill 257.

Q. Under any other PSC regulation?

A. Not of which I’m aware.

*

*

*

Q. Okay. So you told me earlier today that the PSC

is a creature of statute, right?

A. Correct.

Q. And SB 257 is a statute, right?

A. Yes.

Q. The PSC will follow that statute, right?

A. As a creature of statute, the commission would.

Q. Okay. In all instance, regardless of state of

origin, the utility actually pays the producer’s bid

price, right?

A. I -- I can assume that they do.

*

*

*

Q. Let’s return to the regulation, the enacted

regulation for just a minute.

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The PSC’s purpose in promulgating that

regulation was to level the competitive landscape by

eliminating coal severance tax as a consideration in

utility’s coal purchasing decisions, right?

MR. KUHN: Object to the form.

A. Well, they -- there were several purposes to

amending the regulation, one of which was to -- and I

think -- yeah, it was to evaluate costs in a more

levelized basis and seek diverse -- diverse fuel

sources.

*

*

*

Q. In what way was it intended to level the

consideration?

A. You mean levelize?

Q. Sure.

A. By backing out the cost of any severance taxes.

Q. Why coal severance taxes in particular?

A. I -- I’m really not -- I cannot remember why that

was specifically chosen.

Q. Well, coal severance taxes vary from state to

state, right?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And lots of other taxes vary from state to state,

too, right?

A. I would assume so.

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Q. And other politically driven costs might vary

from state to state, right?

MR. KUHN: Object to form. What are politically

driven costs?

Q. As an example, minimum wage laws vary from

state to state, right?

A. That’s outside my ken of knowledge, but I would

assume so, yes.

Q. And environmental laws vary from state to

state, right?

A. I would assume so.

Q. Property taxes vary from state to state, right?

A. I would assume so.

Q. If we describe all of those things as politically

driven costs, meaning producers bear them because

states impose them, does that make sense?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And the PSC selected just one politically

driven cost for special treatment, correct?

MR. KUHN: Object to form.

A. Correct.

*

*

*

Q. Sure. The regulation did not levelized [sic]

consideration of competing interstate bids with

respect to politically driven costs, right?

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MR. KUHN: Object to form.

A. Do you mean all politically driven costs?

Q. I do.

A. Then it did not.

Q. The only thing it did was single out coal

severance tax, right?

MR. KUHN: Object to the form.

A. That is what the regulation says.

Q. And the same is true of SB 257, correct?

A. Correct.

*

*

*

Q. Sure. Neither the regulation nor SB 257 was

levelizing the consideration with respect to those

other taxes, correct?

A. If -- if you are referring to what you previously

called politically driven costs, then, yes.

Q. Okay. By backing out coal severance taxes, the

regulation was intended to make Kentucky coal more

competitive, correct?

MR. KUHN: Object to form.

A. I don’t believe that the regulation as

promulgated does that.

Q. Was it intended to do that?

A. Not as it was promulgated.

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Q. Was it intended to do that when it was first

drafted?

A. I think that it would be fair to say that because

it identified specifically the severance tax applied in

Kentucky, then it would -- it was originally drafted to

do so.

*

*

*

Q. Was the regulation adopted in response to HR

144?

A. In part, yes.

*

*

*

Q. Okay. Setting aside coal severance tax for a

moment, the PSC doesn’t assess how much of the

evaluated cost is caused by various state tax

structures, does it?

A. Not in my experience it does not.

Q. And it doesn’t assess how much was caused by

differing minimum wage laws, right?

A. In my experience the commission has not.

Q. And it doesn’t assess how any of those other

politically driven costs are baked into the evaluated

cost, right?

A. In my experience the commission has not.

Q. From the PSC’s perspective, there’s no effort to

differentiate earned competitive benefits from

unearned competitive benefits, is there?

MR. KUHN: Object to form.

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A. Could you describe both of those terms before I

answer?

Q. Let’s say that politically driven costs create

unearned competitive benefits. Does that make

sense?

A. Unearned? Unearned by whom?

Q. By the producer. So, for example, let’s say the

producer operates in a state with lower taxes, lower

minimum wage laws, et cetera, and is thus able to bid

lower amounts. Does that make sense?

A. Yes.

Q. Does the PSC undertake any effort to

differentiate those unearned competitive benefits

driven by politics from earned competitive benefits?

A. In my experience the commission has not.

*

*

*

Q. Okay. So you are aware of evidence that a

utility was reducing coal severance taxes from bid

prices, right?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. And Foresight got no such deduction,

right?

A. Correct.

Q. Did Kentucky producers get that deduction

from that utility?

99sa

A. Subject to check, I don’t know if in every

situation the -- the providence, the origin of the coal,

was listed. It just listed the subtraction of the

severance tax. So I -- in some cases the -- the name of

the -- of the coal company might have Kentucky in its

name, but in other situations it might not.

Q. Okay. I guess, in any event, some producers

were getting that deduction from the utility for coal

severance taxes, right?

A. Correct.

*

*

*

Q. And this is responses to the PSC from Kentucky

Utilities Company. Do you see that, Mr. Pinney?

A. I do.

*

*

*

Q. All right. So we are looking at the same request

and then this utility’s responses. Do you see that, Mr.

Pinney?

A. I do.

Q. And, again, they provided, it looks like, a

confidential set of bid evaluation sheets, is that right?

A. Correct.

Q. And do you have those sheets?

A. I do.

Q. Okay. Do you know whether this utility backed

out coal severance taxes on the bid evaluation sheets

you have in front of you?

100sa

A. Yes, they did. And I will say, it’s not just one

utility because both Louisville Gas & Electric and

Kentucky Utilities are somewhat the same company,

so their coal solicitations are done together.

*

*

*

Q. But it sounds like you’re saying that in this case

reducing the evaluated costs by severance taxes did

not affect the ranking, is that correct?

A. It -- it didn’t affect the award of the contracts.

Q. But it did affect the ranking?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So which rankings would change based

on severance tax? Or strike that.

Which rankings did change because of severance

tax?

A. Give me a second to double-check. This is -- it’s

really fine print. It takes me a second to read it.

Q. Sure.

A. It -- it appears that it changed the rankings for

three of the contracts.

Q. I’m sorry, when you say three of the contracts,

do you mean bids?

A. Yes, I apologize for that.

Q. Yeah, okay. I just want to be sure we’re talking

about the same thing.

101sa

So three of the bids would have been ranked

differently had coal severance tax not been deducted,

correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And they would have been ranked higher,

right?

A. Let me think about that. Yes.

Q. Okay. Would any of them have moved into a

position where they would have been awarded the

contract?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Not in this case anyway, right?

A. Yes.

*

*

*

Q. Is that true that the PSC did not want SB 257

to be enacted?

A. I think it’s accurate to say the commission did

not ask for it at all.

Q. Well, that’s a different question. Did they want

it to be enacted?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. Because -- honestly, because we wanted to wrap

up the litigation, put it behind us. I have a great deal

of respect for our attorneys from the Attorney

102sa

General’s Office, but the commission is not interested

in paying attorneys’ fees.

Q. So basically you didn’t want to get sued again,

in short?

A. Yes.

*

*

*

Q. All right. I want to just make sure that I

understood a couple of things from our conversation

about the bid evaluation sheets.

One is that the PSC has received information from

utilities to show that the regulation affected

evaluated prices, correct?

A. Once again, I don’t know that the regulation

affects the utilities. The commission asked for that

information.

Q. Well, I guess maybe a different way of putting

it would be that you received information showing

that utilities were backing out coal severance taxes

from evaluated prices, correct?

A. Some utilities, correct.

Q. Okay. And that information also shows that at

least in one instance the utilities backing out coal

severance taxes changed the rankings of bids, correct?

A. Not -- the rankings, but not the awards.

Q. Right, yeah, just the rankings.

A. Yes.

103sa

Q. Correct?

A. Yes.

*

*

*

Q. And, Mr. Pinney, you are the speaker here. Do

you see that?

A. Yes. Can you make it just slightly a bit smaller?

I can’t see one of the edges.

Q. Sure.

A. Okay. Thank you. Hold on. I have to switch

glasses to see that now.

Q. I want to direct your attention toward the

bottom of the kind of top right rectangle there to Line

21.

A. Right.

Q. And you say in 2019, in response to the joint

resolution from the legislature: The PSC undertook to

amend many of the provisions in the fuel adjustment

clause. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And one of them was to address a request to

incent the burning of Kentucky coal over others, do

you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. What does that mean?

104sa

A. I believe that meant that by backing out -- and

this is in the original version, not the one that was

enacted. The one that’s going to be deleted -Q. SB 257 -A. -- per the regulation.

Q. Go ahead.

A. I’m sorry. I was -- this was in regard to the -the original version of the -- of the regulation before it

was amended before comment.

Q. Right. And it was intended to incentivize

utilities to burn Kentucky coal?

A. That was one -- one of the reasons. I don’t think

that that’s -- yeah, yeah, yeah.

Q. The PSC’s response to all of these concerns

about utilities having to buy more expensive coal was

that there are occasions when Section 3, Sub 5 will

require utilities to select a fuel source that is slightly

more expensive than the alternative based on the

proposed language. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

*

*

*

Q. So I’m asking whether the first sentence of that

response you see in Part B is true.

A. Yes.

*

*

*

105sa

Q. And we talked earlier about how the regulation

and SB 257 are in all material respects identical,

right?

A. Yes.

*

*

*

Q. Okay. Why would the regulation require

utilities to select a fuel source that is slightly more

expensive?

A. Well, I think that if -- if read with the totality of

the rest of the -- the rest of the discussion, that it’s

just one factor to be considered in the reasonableness

of the purchase of -- of fuel.

Q. Yeah, not my question.

A. Oh.

Q. The question -- you’ve already said that the

statement is true. I’m asking: Why would the

regulation require utilities to select a fuel source

that’s slightly more expensive?

MR. KUHN: Objection, asked and answered. You

can answer.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

A. It would not -- it would require the utility to

purchase that fuel in this -- under the penalty or

under the possibility, not the penalty, that the

commission might disallow certain fuel costs.

*

*

*

106sa

Q. Okay. This is the Attorney General’s letter, and

he says: The adjustment to offset coal severance tax

would cause Kentucky coal to be priced more

competitively in comparison to some states and less

competitively with respect to other states. Do you see

that?

MR. HAMMACK: Manny, you can highlight it for

him.

A. Is that about the third sentence down?

Q. Yeah.

A. Okay. I see that.

Q. Is that statement true?

A. In a vacuum, yes.

Q. Okay. A couple lines down it says: While the

regulation might arguably benefit coal producers in

Kentucky relative to those in Indiana or Illinois. Do

you see that?

A. I’m sorry, in relative, is that -Q. The regulation might arguably benefit the coal

producers in Kentucky relative to those in Indiana or

Illinois.

MR. HAMMACK: Manny, you can highlight it for

him?

A. I’ve got it.

Q. Okay. Is that statement true?

A. I would give a qualified yes.

107sa

Q. Okay. What’s the qualification?

A. That there are still other factors that go into a

general coal electricity generator’s evaluation of -- of

the cost of the fuel.

*

*

*

Q. Do you agree that it favors Kentucky coal

producers to the detriment of some out-of-state

interests?

MR. KUHN: Object to the form.

A. No, I don’t agree.

Q. Well, you just said that it would make Kentucky

coal more competitive as compared to Illinois and

Indiana, right?

A. Yes.

*

*

*

108sa

[ON JUNE 7, 2022]

TRANSCRIPTION OF AUDIO OF

THE ORAL ARGUMENTS FROM THE

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SIXTH CIRCUIT

RE: FORESIGHT COAL SALES v.

KENT CHANDLER

APPEARANCES:

JUDGE ALICE BATCHELDER

JUDGE ERIC CLAY

JUDGE JOAN LARSEN

JOSHUA HAMMACK, ESQ.

MATTHEW F. KUHN, ESQ.

*

*

*

JUDGE LARSEN: But going back to facial

discrimination, it seems to me that you argue that the

purpose here is to level the playing field, and you

argue that in order to survive, an advantage must be

earned by the industry. What does an “earned

advantage” mean? Why don’t they earn their

advantage by not having a severance tax?

MR. KUHN: So I think we have to look at Hunt as

an example of what’s earned. The Washington apple

industry there was investing roughly a million dollars

a year in complying with Washington state grade, and

the court -JUDGE LARSEN: Which was mandated by the

Washington state legislature.

MR. KUHN: State law, correct.

109sa

And so they were spending a million dollars a year

of their own money to grade -JUDGE LARSEN: Under compulsion.

MR. KUHN: Under compulsion. They were

businesses there to make money.

JUDGE LARSEN: Right.

MR. KUHN: That were grade -JUDGE LARSEN: But the state made them do

that. So it was state law that required them to do that.

So you can’t be saying well, they didn’t earn their

advantage because there’s no state law that imposes

the severance tax.

MR. KUHN: If you look at the quote from the

opinion in Hunt, it talks about the Washington apple

industry earning the advantage. They were able to

command -JUDGE LARSEN: Earned it under compulsion by

a state agency. Okay.

MR. KUHN: Another way to think about that

though is would you say that having to -- not to pay a

coal severance tax allows somebody to command a

market advantage?

JUDGE LARSEN: Sure. Why not? So their

minimum wage is $12 an hour.

MR. KUHN: So ---

JUDGE LARSEN: Your minimum wage is 7.25. So

MR. KUHN: Assuming that’s true, then --

JUDGE LARSEN: -- didn’t you earn an advantage

in your labor market by not raising your minimum

110sa

wage above the federal minimum wage? They got to

pay higher labor costs in Illinois.

MR. KUHN: So I think the problem with that

argument is we get to a point where Kentucky can

never repeal its coal severance tax -JUDGE LARSEN: Why?

MR. KUHN: -- because it’s created, under their

paradigm has created an advantage for out-of-state

coal producers that’s protected by the Dormant

Commerce Clause. They’re saying their advantage -JUDGE LARSEN: I don’t understand that here.

Can you -MR. KUHN: So they’re saying that the advantage

that they have by not paying a coal severance tax is

protected by the Dormant Commerce Clause. If that

advantage is protected by the constitution, how can

Kentucky eliminate that?

JUDGE LARSEN: Well, it’s -- it’s just that you

can’t -- you’d have to impose the costs on your own

people. You’d have to -- you could withdraw the

severance tax. If you withdraw -- drew the severance

tax, Kentucky coffers would be diminished. You just

wouldn’t be exporting the costs to another state.

MR. KUHN: Think about this from an effects

perspective, though. If we repealed our severance tax

-JUDGE LARSEN: Uh-huh.

MR. KUHN: -- a Kentucky coal producer and an

Illinois coal producer would be in the exact same

shoes than the -- than Senate Bill 257, if Senate Bill

257 were in effect.

111sa

I don’t understand how you can get to a

discriminatory effect -JUDGE LARSEN: Because you want to have your

cake and eat it, too. You want the revenue from the

severance tax, and you want your -- you want your

market for coal not to be affected by the fact that they

don’t have -- so let me just ask the question. Could

they do the same thing with respect to the labor

component of producing coal, so they – so Illinois

could enact the exact same thing for its regulated coal

industry? It’s just going to discount the prices by the

$5 an hour labor gap.

MR. KUHN: Of course. It’s a -- it is an -- just like

Kentucky could reduce its minimum wage, they could

reduce the minimum wage. They could regulate in the

same way.

*

*

*

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Respondents Brief — Kent Chandler, in His Official Capacity as Chairman and Commissioner of Kentucky Public Service Commission, et al., Petitioners v. Foresight Coal Sales, LLC | Frix