Respondents Brief — Kent Chandler, in His Official Capacity as Chairman and Commissioner of Kentucky Public Service Commission, et al., Petitioners v. Foresight Coal Sales, LLC
Supreme Court briefAug 7, 2023
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No. 22-1083
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
KENT CHANDLER,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONER OF
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, et al.,
v.
Petitioners,
FORESIGHT COAL SALES, LLC,
Respondent.
-----------------------------------------ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
------------------------------------------
Joshua I. Hammack
Counsel of Record
Nicholas S. Johnson
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP
1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW
Suite 540
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 463-2101
jhammack@baileyglasser.com
njohnson@baileyglasser.com
Counsel for Respondent
GibsonMoore Appellate Services, LLC
206 East Cary Street ♦ Richmond, VA 23219
804-249-7770 ♦ www.gibsonmoore.net
isa
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Appendix to Brief in Opposition
Page:
House Resolution 144
dated March 14, 2019 ........................................ 1sa
Letter from Governor’s Energy and
Environment Cabinet to the Chairman of the
Kentucky Public Service Commission
dated March 29, 2019 ......................................... 3sa
Excerpt from Meeting of the
Kentucky Public Service Commission
on April 16, 2019 ................................................ 6sa
Statement of Consideration
Relating to 807 KAR 5:056
dated June 14, 2019 ......................................... 10sa
LG&E Request for Proposal
dated September 12, 2019 ................................ 48sa
Letter from the Kentucky Public
Service Commission to All Electric Utilities
re Constitutional Challenge to Administrative
Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)
dated January 8, 2020...................................... 55sa
Letter from the Kentucky Public Service
Commission to All Electric Utilities re
Constitutional Challenge to Administrative
Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)
dated March 4, 2020 ......................................... 62sa
Agreement between Foresight Coal Sales, LLC,
the Kentucky Public Service Commission
Defendants, and Kentucky
Attorney General Daniel Cameron
dated November 30, 2020 ................................ 70sa
iisa
Excerpt from Hearing
before the Kentucky Senate Standing
Committee on Natural Resources and Energy
on March 3, 2021 .............................................. 74sa
Excerpt from Hearing
before the Kentucky House Standing
Committee on Natural Resources
on March 11, 2021 ............................................ 78sa
Excerpt from
Kentucky House Floor Proceeding
on March 15, 2021 ............................................ 86sa
Excerpt from Transcript from
30(b)(6) Deposition of the Kentucky
Public Service Commission
on May 27, 2021 ............................................... 89sa
Excerpt from Transcript of
Audio Oral Argument U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
on June 7, 2022............................................... 108sa
1sa
[DATED MARCH 14, 2019]
19 RS BR 1916
A RESOLUTION urging the Public Service
Commission to consider all costs related to the
importation of coal for electricity generation.
WHEREAS, the amount of coal produced in
Kentucky has decreased from 109,018,240 tons in
2011 to 39,587,320 tons in 2018; and
WHEREAS, revenue from the sale of Kentucky
coal is reinvested by the Kentucky coal industry in
local economies creating multiplier effects of other
direct and indirect benefits; and
WHEREAS, in 2017, the largest contributor to
real gross domestic product growth in Kentucky was
mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, which
accounted for 0.65 percent of the total growth in real
gross domestic product; and
WHEREAS, in 2018, annual coal employment
declined to 6,409; and
WHEREAS, differences in severance tax policies of
other states have impacted the competitiveness of
Kentucky coal; and
WHEREAS, approximately 54 percent of coal
consumed in Kentucky by electric-generating units
was imported from Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wyoming;
NOW, THEREFORE,
Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of
the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky:
2sa
→ Section 1. The Kentucky House of
Representatives urges the Public Service Commission
to amend its administrative regulations to consider
all costs, including fossil fuel-related economic
impacts within Kentucky, when analyzing coal
purchases under the fuel adjustment clause.
→ Section 2. The Clerk of the House of
Representatives shall send a copy of this Resolution
and notification of its adoption to Public Service
Commission Chairman Michael Schmitt, Vice
Chairman Robert Cicero, and Commissioner Talina
Mathews.
3sa
[DATED MARCH 29, 2019]
Matthew G. Bevin
GOVERNOR
Charles G. Snavely
SECRETARY
R. Bruce Scott
DEPUTY SECRETARY
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT CABINET
300 Sower Boulevard Deputy Secretary
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40601
Telephone: 502-564-3350
Telefax: 502-564-7484
March 29, 2019
VIA ELECTRONIC AND MESSENGER MAIL
Mr. Michael J. Schmitt
Chairman
Kentucky Public Service Commission
200 Sower Boulevard
Frankfort, KY 40601
Dear Chairman:
I write to make a formal request that the Public
Service Commission consider amending its
regulations relating to the Fuel Adjustment Clause
(FAC) requirements for Kentucky utilities. As you are
aware, the Kentucky coal industry has experienced a
decline of at least 50% within the past ten years. This
decline has resulted in severe adverse impacts upon
the economies of both the eastern and western
coalfields of the Commonwealth. The Energy and
Environment Cabinet, through its Office of Energy
Policy, has conducted research and participated in
discussions with stakeholders and with members of
the legislature on actions to mitigate the economic
decline.
4sa
We discovered that although Kentucky power plants
burn approximately 25 million tons of coal annually,
13 million tons, or 54%, is imported from other states.
One reason utilities purchase coal from other states is
for environmental or technological needs for specific
coal. However, the primary reason is because the Fuel
Adjustment Clause requirements in 807 KAR 5:056
cause utilities to purchase imported coals if they cost
less than Kentucky coals.
The fallacy in that regulatory compliance analysis is
that Kentucky imposes a severance tax of 4.5% of the
gross value of the sale of coals mined in Kentucky,
while several other states do not impose that tax on
their sales. Illinois and Indiana do not impose a
severance tax at all, and Ohio’s tax rate is less than
15 cents per ton. These three states alone account for
half of the 13 million tons of coal imported into
Kentucky each year. The discrepancy in excise tax
rates often creates a perverse incentive for our own
utilities to purchase coals from other states and create
further economic distress in Kentucky.
Given that Governor Bevin’s administration believes
in making use of our own natural resources and
supporting our own economy, the administration
supports the resolution that Kentucky’s House of
Representatives recently passed. This resolution, HR
144, a copy of which is attached, urges the PSC to
amend its regulations to address the tax discrepancy
issue by considering the overall economic impact to
Kentucky. On behalf of the Bevin Administration, I
request that the Commission give this resolution
serious consideration and determine whether the
5sa
current PSC regulatory requirements relating to
fossil fuel purchases should be amended.
6sa
[ON APRIL 16, 2019]
KENTUCKY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
*
*
*
PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN CICERO: Would
themselves and anyone with them?
staff
identify
MR. PINNEY: Yes, Your Honor: My name is Jeff
Pinney. I’m with the Office of General Counsel for the
Public Service Commission. Today I’m accompanies
[sic] by Sarah Jankowski from our Division of
Financial Analysis.
CHAIRMAN CICERO: Thank you. Do you have
any questions for the witnesses?
MR. PINNEY: Just a few.
CHAIRMAN CICERO: Please proceed.
MR. PINNEY: So refreshingly, I have no questions
about GreenHat. My first question I’d ask ref -- for
you to look at KU and LG&E’s response to data
request 4, the Commission’s first request, and it’s a
confidential information. I’ll do my best to ask the
questions so we don’t have to go into confidential
session. Just let me know when you all are ready.
Okay. And on -- I -- this is page 1 of 2, our attachment
to response, page 1 of 2. And here, it says, “The action
taken states that an amount of coal in tons was lower
than the offered amount by -- that was offered by the
coal company. Say to this -- state if this had any effect
of the final cost per ton, and if the final cost per ton is
different than the amount listed under the offer, then
explain why the cost is different.”
7sa
MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. It did
not have any impact on the cost of the fuel. We
-- we purchased it at the same price offered for the
300,000 tons. We just purchased less because at the
time, we did not need 300,000 tons. We only needed
200,000 tons.
MR. PINNEY: Okay. Thank you. I’ve no more
questions with any confidential information. So my
next question simply refers to the Kentucky soal
(phonetic) -- Coal Severance Tax. You’ve heard the
questions I’ve asked of the other utilities. We’ve
established that it is assessed on coal mined in
Kentucky. Is -- are KU or LG&E aware of how that
cost is factored into the cost of coal procured in
Kentucky? Is it broken down into the coal
procurement sheets that you receive or is it lumped
together or what?
MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. It is
not broken out separately on the offers that we’ve
received.
MR. PINNEY: Okay. And are you aware of what
effect, if any, the Kentucky Coal Severance Tax would
have on KU and LG&E’s coal procurement practices?
MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. On
our practices, I think our practices would remain the
same. The way those coals might evaluate could be
different if, you know, Coal Severance Tax was
factored into the evaluation sheet.
MR. PINNEY: Okay. And then are you aware of
other states from which LG&E and KU procures coal,
if those states have a severance tax or some kind of
extraction tax similar to that in Kentucky?
8sa
MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. We
buy coal from several states. Some states do have
severance tax similar to Kentucky, maybe different
rates. Some states that we purchase from do not.
MR. PINNEY: No further questions, Your Honor.
CHAIRMAN CICERO: Chairman Schmitt?
MR. SCHMITT: Do you -- have you had a chance
to review the proposed regulation that was published,
what, yesterday?
MR. BILLITER: Delbert Billiter responding. I just
briefly reviewed it maybe ten minutes ago, sir.
MR. SCHMITT: Well, I guess the -- the bottom line
is, the -- the purpose of at least the portion of the
regulation that deals with the Kentucky Coal
Severance Tax is to either remove a disincentive or to
incentify -- incentivize Kentucky Utilities to purchase
Kentucky coal. And that would require someone to
calculate the severance tax and for purposes of
reasonableness, the Commission would not -- would
-- would not consider the higher price to be
unreasonable under the -- under the circumstances. I
think that’s what all the questioning ultimately goes
down to is an attempt to remove from consideration
the increase in cost of Kentucky coal as a result of the
Kentucky Coal Severance Tax. And that request was
made by the Kentucky General Assembly or House of
Representatives essentially to us. I have no further
questions or statement.
CHAIRMAN CICERO: If it doesn’t require a
response on your part -- I -- I have no questions. Any
cross?
MS. STURGEON: No.
9sa
CHAIRMAN CICERO: Mr. Pinney?
MR. PINNEY: No further questions.
CHAIRMAN CICERO: And that being the case,
then this case is adjourned.
MS. STURGEON: Okay. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN CICERO: You may be excused.
(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)
10sa
[DATED JUNE 14, 2019]
STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATION
Relating to 807 KAR 5:056
Energy and Environment Cabinet, Public Service
Commission
(Amended After Comments)
I. The public hearing on 807 KAR 5:056 was
conducted as scheduled on May 30, 2019, at 9:30
a.m. at the Kentucky Public Service Commission.
The following people attended the public hearing:
Name and Title
Organization/Entity/Other
Jeb Pinney, Acting
General Counsel
KY Public Service
Commission
Benjamin Bellamy,
Staff Attorney Ill
KY Public Service
Commission
Nat Adams
KIUC/NAS
Kurt J. Boehm,
Counsel for KIUC
Boehm, Kurtz, & Lowry
Jeff Broch
Alliance Coal
Patrick Keal
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.
Kendrick Riggs,
Counsel for LG&E
and KU
Stoll Keenan Ogden, PLLC
Robert Conroy, Vice
President, St.
Regulation/Rates
LG&E and KU Energy, LLC
Derek Rahn
LG&E and KU Energy, LLC
Allyson Sturgeon
LG&E and KU Energy, LLC
Amy Jeffries
Kentucky Power Company
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Christen Blend
Kentucky Power Company
Brian West
Kentucky Power Company
Ranie Wohnhas
Kentucky Power Company
Mark Overstreet,
Counsel for
Kentucky Power
Stites and Harbison, PLLC
John Pollum,
Counsel for
Kentucky Power
Stites and Harbison, PLLC
Kent Chandler
KY Office of Attorney General
Public comments were offered at the hearing by Kurt
Boehm, Kendrick Riggs, Robert Conroy, and John
Pollum. Public comments were received at the
hearing by Jeb Pinney and Benjamin Bellamy.
II. The following people submitted written comments:
Name and Title
Organization/Entity/Other
Tyler White, President
Kentucky Coal Association
Kurt J. Boehm,
Counsel for KIUC
Boehm, Kurtz, & Lowry
Tyson Kamuf;
Corporate Attorney
Big Rivers Electric
Corporation
Rocco O. D’Ascenzo,
Deputy General
Counsel
Duke Energy Kentucky,
Inc.
Kendrick Riggs,
Counsel for LG&E and
KU
Stoll Keenan Ogden,
PLLC
12sa
Robert Conroy, Vice
President, St.
Regulation/Rates
LG&E and KU Energy,
LLC
Mark Overstreet,
Counsel for Kentucky
Power
Stites and Harbison,
PLLC
John Pollum, Counsel
for Kentucky Power
Stites and Harbison,
PLLC
David Smart, General EKPC
Counsel
Ill. The following people from the promulgating
administrative body responded to the comments:
Name and Title
Gwen Pinson, Executive Director
Jeb Pinney, Acting General Counsel
Benjamin Bellamy, Staff Attorney III
IV Summary of Comments and Responses
(1) Subject Matter: Enforceability of Section 3(5)
under Dormant Commerce Clause
(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf
of LG&E and KU, argued in written comments
and at the public hearing that Section 3(5), as
proposed in the amendment, violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution and suggested that the Commission
to delete Section 3(5) as proposed.
Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of
Kentucky Power, argued in written comments
that the proposed amendment adding Section
3(5) violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution and suggested
13sa
that the Commission delete Section 3(5) as
proposed, or in the alternative, that the
Commission amend Section 3(5) to remove coal
severance taxes from all states not just those
imposed by Kentucky pursuant to KRS 143.020.
John Pollum - Mr. Pollum, on behalf of Kentucky
Power, indicated at the public hearing that
Kentucky Power agreed with LG&E and KU’s
position regarding the legality of Section 3(5) and
referred to the written comments filed by Mr.
Overstreet on behalf of Kentucky Power.
Rocco O. D’Ascenzo- Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of
Duke Kentucky, stated that the proposed
amendment adding Section 3(5) may place
Kentucky sourced coal on an unequal and more
advantageous level than coal sourced from other
states that also have a similar assessment, which
raises potential constitutional concerns under
the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution and makes the regulations
enforceability questionable. He suggested
deleting Section 3(5) as proposed. Alternatively,
he suggested amending Section 3(5) to exclude
taxes from all states from the Commission’s
review and to make the exclusion of such taxes
discretionary.
David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,
argued in written comments that Section 3(5), as
proposed in the amendment, violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution and suggested that the Commission
withdrawal the proposed amendment to Section
3(5) to review its potential impacts.
14sa
Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of KCA,
argued in written comments that Section 3(5), as
proposed in the amendment, does not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution and argued that it should be placed
in effect as written.
(b) Response: The Commission understands the
commenters
concerns
regarding
the
enforceability of the regulation under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. To address those
concerns, the Commission will amend Section
3(5), as proposed, to remove coal severance taxes
from all states from the reasonableness
evaluation as suggested by a number of the
commenters. Specifically, the Commission will
amend Section 3(5) as follows:
... the commission shall, in determining
the reasonableness of fuel costs in
procurement
contracts
and
fuel
procurement practices. evaluate the
reasonableness of fuel costs in contracts
and competing bids based on the cost of
the fuel less [any tax collected under
KRS 143.020] any coal severance tax
imposed by any jurisdiction upon
coal physically removed from the
earth.
The amendments after comment are in bold.
(2) Subject Matter: Section 3(5) applies a different
standard than those used in other jurisdictions
(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf
of LG&E and KU, argued that other jurisdictions
in which LG&E and KU operate will not evaluate
15sa
coal contracts less any taxes collected pursuant
KRS 143.020, and therefore, will likely disallow
costs if the companies comply with Section 3(5),
which will adversely affect the companies’
financial health and increase the cost of raising
capital. Mr. Riggs suggested that the Commission
delete Section 3(5) from the proposed amendment.
Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E and
KU, stated that the companies are regulated by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
and the Virginia commission and noted that it was
questionable as to whether those Commission’s
[sic] would allow recovery for increased fuel costs
arising from Section 3(5), as proposed.
Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky
Coal Association, supported the proposed
amendment and argued that Section 3(5) will not
put utilities at risk for fuel cost disallowances in
other jurisdictions, because the proposed
amendment will “only control how costs are
calculated for the fuel commodity relative to
Kentucky.” Mr. White noted that it is not
uncommon for utilities operating in multiple
jurisdictions to be subject to different regulatory
frameworks. He also argues that fuel cost
disallowances are generally rare. He suggested
that there was no need to amend the regulation to
make clear that it would apply retroactively.
(b) Response: The Commission does not disagree that
Section 3(5) will result in the Commission
evaluating the reasonableness of coal contracts in
a manner that is different than other jurisdictions.
However, it is not usually [sic] for utility
commissions in different jurisdictions to impose
16sa
different regulatory schemes, for utility
commissions in different jurisdictions to evaluate
the reasonableness of costs based on different
criteria, or for one jurisdiction to find that a cost is
reasonable and another to find that it is
unreasonable. For that reason, most rate
proceedings for utilities that operate in multiple
jurisdictions require utilities to allocate costs
between the jurisdictions in which it operates and
require utility commissions to review those cost
allocations to determine if they are reasonable.
Any cost increase arising from Section 3(5) could
be addressed in a similar manner. Thus, the
concerns raised by these comments do not support
withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).
(3) Subject Matter: Potential effects of Section 3(5) on
cost of energy
(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf
of LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as
proposed, will require utilities to select a higher
cost fuel source, which will result in increased
costs to customers and affect off system sales. Mr.
Riggs proposed that the amendment to 807 KAR
5:056 to add Section 3(5) be deleted.
Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E
and KU, argued that Section 3(5) could result in
an increase in the cost of coal and the cost to
customers.
Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of
Kentucky Power, argued that Section 3(5), as
proposed, will require utilities to select a higher
cost fuel source, which will result in increased
costs to customers and is contrary to the
Commission’s long-standing least cost principles.
17sa
Mr. Overstreet proposed that the amendment to
807 KAR 5:056 to add Section 3(5) be deleted.
Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of
Duke Kentucky, argued that Section 3(5), as
proposed, could require utilities to purchase more
expensive coal-he gave an example in which
Kentucky coal at a price of $50.00 per ton would
be assessed as lower cost than non-Kentucky coal
priced at $49.00 per ton based on the proposed
amendment to Section 3(5)—and he noted that
Kentucky utility customers would then have to
pay the difference, which he argues places utilities
in the untenable position of having to purchase
more expensive coal or be questioned on the
reasonableness of its fuel procurement practices.
He suggested deleting Section 3(5) as proposed.
Alternatively, he suggested amending Section 3(5)
to exclude taxes from all states from the
Commission’s review and to make the exclusion of
such taxes discretionary.
David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,
argued in written comments that the Commission
does not currently know the effects that Section
3(5), as proposed, will have on utilities coal
procurement practices, or the costs and benefits
that will arise, and believes that the Commission
should gather more information to determine the
impacts of the proposal the proposed Section 3(5)
before implementing it.
Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky
Coal Association, supported the proposed
amendment and argued that it would not result in
a significant increase in costs to customers, if any.
18sa
Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of KIUC,
stated that KIUC supported the proposed
amendment to Section 3(5). He acknowledged that
it might result in a slight increase in fuel costs. but
argued that the benefits of the proposed
amendment would significantly outweigh the
costs.
(b) Response: There are occasions when Section 3(5)
will require utilities to select a fuel source that is
slightly more expensive than the alternative based
on the proposed language. However, the increased
cost would at most be the amount of the coal
severance tax, and the increased cost of coal would
generally be significantly lower. Additionally, the
cost of coal is only one of many costs incurred by
electric utilities, so a minor increase in the cost of
coal would not significantly affect electric rates.
Further, KIUC, which is the only group
representing utility customers that commented on
the regulation, argued that the benefits of the
proposed regulation would outweigh the expected
costs, and the Commission agrees with that
comment. Thus, the potential increase in fuel costs
do not support withdrawing Section 3(5), as
amended.
(4) Subject Matter: Section 3(5) incentivizes
companies subject to KRS 143.020 to increase
prices
(a) Comments: Tyson Kamuf - Mr. Kamuf, on behalf
of Big Rivers, noted that Big Rivers generally
selects suppliers based on the lowest cost at
delivery and that Big Rivers currently gets about
93% of its coal from Western Kentucky coal mines.
Although he noted that the effects are uncertain,
19sa
he argued that the proposed amendment to
Section 3(5) creates an incentive for Kentucky coal
suppliers to increase their bids without any
corresponding benefit to Big Rivers, its
memberowners, or their retail-customer owners.
This would increase the cost of electricity to
customers and reduce off system sales, which in
turn would further increase the cost of electricity
for customers. He recommended that the
Commission delete Section 3(5) until it can further
investigate its potential effects.
(b) Response: While there is a potential that suppliers
may attempt to increase prices, the Commission
does not believe it would be a significant issue or
that it would have a significant effect on coal
prices. Utilities generally engage in competitive
bidding when procuring coal, so Kentucky
suppliers would still have an incentive to keep
their bids low. Further, coal prices are volatile and
contracts are generally long term, so Kentucky
suppliers would not simply be able to add 4.5% to
their previous bids and expect to obtain contracts
they were previously award [sic]. Finally, the
amendment the Commission made after
comments to Section 3(5) further eliminates the
risk that suppliers would increase prices. Thus,
the incentive to increase in fuel costs does not
support withdrawing Section 3(5), as amended.
(5) Subject Matter: Regulatory burdens imposed by
Section 3(5)
(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf
of LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as
proposed, requires utilities to develop and
maintain more complex fuel cost information to
20sa
provide to the Commission, including information
regarding taxes paid or to be paid pursuant to KRS
143.020, and that they will have to rely on
suppliers, who may manipulate the information,
to provide it. Mr. Riggs suggested that the
Commission delete Section 3(5) from the proposed
amendment.
Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of
Kentucky Power, argues that Section 3(5), as
proposed, will require Kentucky Power to change
its requests for proposals to require bidders to
identify separately the amount of any tax imposed
by KRS 143.020 and will require it to change the
manner in which it analyzes coal bids to exclude
the tax, which is contrary to the Commission’s
Regulatory Impact and Tiering Analysis. Mr.
Overstreet indicated that Kentucky Power
believes it could make those changes but
questioned whether some suppliers would be
willing to submit bids if they had to calculate the
taxes and whether out of state suppliers would
even bother submitting, which could reduce
competition and artificially increase prices. Mr.
Overstreet suggested that the Commission delete
Section 3(5) from the proposed amendment to
ensure a more competitive market.
Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of
Duke Kentucky, observed that Duke Kentucky
does not currently receive information from its
suppliers regarding the taxes included in their
bids and would therefore have to request this
information be included as part of any future
solicitation if Section 3(5) is adopted.
21sa
David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,
argued in written comments that Section 3(5), as
proposed in the amendment, would create
additional burdens on utilities, contrary to the
Commission’s impact statement, by requiring
them to obtain the tax information from suppliers,
because severance taxes are not currently
disclosed separately by suppliers in response to
bids.
Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of the
Kentucky Coal Association, argued in written
comments that Section 3(5), as proposed, would
not impose significant additional regulatory
burdens on utilities and that any manipulation of
the taxes in bids could be remedied without
amending the regulation.
(b) Response: The regulation will require utilities to
obtain information from suppliers regarding the
amount of taxes that have been paid or will be paid
pursuant to KRS 143.020 in order to evaluate the
cost of coal pursuant to Section 3(5). However,
utilities should be able to accomplish it by
including a requirement in their requests for bids
that suppliers provide an estimate of the taxes
they paid or expect to pay based on the source and
cost of the coal. Moreover, the Commission expects
suppliers will be eager to provide this information,
because it will permit utilities to evaluate the cost
of those suppliers’ coal less any coal severance
taxes when determining which contracts to accept.
Thus, the Commission does not believe that
Section 3(5) imposes a significant burden on
utilities.
22sa
There will likely be situations in which suppliers
will not provide accurate tax information with
their
bids,
whether
intentionally
or
unintentionally. However, there are numerous
situations in which utilities enter into contracts
based on cost or other estimates based on
information from suppliers, i.e. expected useful life
of equipment, as they would be required to do to
comply with Section 3(5). A utility’s review of the
tax information when making decisions regarding
coal contracts would be no different than the
numerous other reviews it regularly completes to
make purchasing and other decisions. Moreover,
utilities could contractually shift the risk of
unreasonable estimates of coal severance taxes to
suppliers through indemnity or similar provisions
in contracts, which would incentivize suppliers to
provide accurate figures and reduce the risk of
manipulation.1 Thus, the commenters [sic] concern
regarding the burden of obtaining accurate
information to apply Section 3(5) does not justified
[sic] withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).
(6) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on regulation
by other states
(a) Rocco O. D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of
Duke Kentucky, stated that the proposed
amendment adding Section 3(5) may inspire
similar provisions by other states that would
negatively affect coal markets. He suggested
1 If taxes were disallowed based on misrepresentations from the
suppliers in a manner raised by LG&E and KU, utilities should
also be able to assert claims for intentional and negligent
misrepresentation to recover any cost that was disallowed even
absent a contractual remedy, which similarly would incentivize
suppliers to provide accurate information.
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deleting Section 3(5) as proposed or amending
Section 3(5) to exclude taxes from all states from
the Commission’s review and to make the
exclusion of such taxes discretionary.
(b) Response: The Commission does believe that
actions taken by other states would be dependent
on whether it moves forward with this proposed
amendment. Moreover, given the amendment
after comment, the Commission does not believe
that it would have negative effects if other states
passed similar regulations.
(7) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on a utilities
recovery of severance taxes
(a) Comment: Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on
behalf of Duke Kentucky, argued that the
proposed amendment to the regulation is
ambiguous as to whether utilities will be
permitted to recover any increased cost arising
from the application of Section 3(5) and that the
proposed regulation should at minimum be
clarified to state that utilities would still be
permitted to recover the additional fuel costs
associated with the severance tax through their
fuel adjustment clauses regardless of whether it is
considered as part of reasonableness evaluation.
Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of
Kentucky Power, argued that the proposed
amendment to the regulation should be amended
to make clear that a utility is entitled to recover
its total contract cost of fuel, including any coal
severance taxes, without regard to the exclusion of
coal severance taxes for purpose of the
Commission’s reasonableness review.
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Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of Kentucky
Coal Association, argued that the proposed
amendment would not affect the utilities [sic]
ability to collect taxes collected pursuant KRS
143.020.
(b) Response: With the proposed amendments,
Section 1 of the fuel adjustment clause governs the
amounts included in the calculation of the fuel
adjustment. It does not require exclusion of
severance taxes. Moreover, Section 3(5) indicates
that it only applies to the evaluation of the
contracts, not to the calculation of the fuel
adjustment. Thus, no amendment to the proposed
regulation is necessary to ensure that 807 KAR
5:056 is interpreted as allowing utilities to recover
the amounts excluded in the evaluation of
reasonableness pursuant to Section 3(5) through
their fuel adjustment clause.
(8) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on the
Commission’s review of generation unit
dispatching
(a) Comments: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf
of LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as
proposed, does not address how the required
exclusion of the Kentucky severance tax will affect
the Commission’s evaluation of an electric utility’s
dispatch of its generation units.
Tyler White - Tyler White, on behalf of the
Kentucky Coal Association, argued in written
comments that Section 3(5), as proposed, does not
speak to utilities dispatching decisions and
therefore should not affect utilities dispatching
decisions.
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(b) Response: The proposed amendment to the
regulation does not create ambiguity regarding
the Commission’s evaluation of an electric utility’s
dispatch of its generation units, because it
specifically states that the change in Section 3(5)
applies the Commission’s review of “the
reasonableness of fuel costs in procurement
contracts and fuel procurement practices” and
makes no mention of the Commission’s evaluation
of generation dispatching, so there is no basis for
interpreting the proposed amendments as
effecting [sic] the Commission’s review of the
dispatching of utility’s generation units. Thus, the
commenter’s concern regarding whether Section
3(5) effects dispatching decisions does not justify
withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).
(9) Subject Matter: Effect of Section 3(5) on utilities’
economic dispatching of generation units
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as
proposed, could have the perverse effect of making
their coal generation facilities less economical and
thereby could reduce their consumption of coal
when they dispatch units based on the least cost
alternative.
(b) Response: Utilities are required to use their
existing generation assets in order of the lowest
cost to the highest cost when possible, so it is
possible that an increase in costs could affect the
dispatching of coal units. However, as noted above,
Section 3(5) will not result in a significant increase
in the cost of coal generation. Moreover, a number
of other factors affect how a utility typically
dispatches
generation
assets,
including
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limitations on when generation assets can be used
i.e. solar, start-up procedures for the generation
units, and the size of the generation units among
many others. The coal units that currently are
dispatched will likely continue to be dispatched
due to the de minimis impact of this regulation on
the marginal cost of electricity. Thus, this issue
does not justify withdrawing or amending Section
3(5).
(10)Subject Matter: Retroactive application of Section
3(5)
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU, noted that Section 3(5), as
proposed, does not make any provision for existing
contracts or for contracts into which utilities might
enter prior to the effective date of the section and
argued that application of the new standard of
review to those contracts would unlawfully
penalize utilities in a retroactive manner.
Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E
and KU, noted that it was unclear how Section 3(5)
would apply to contracts in existence prior to the
effective date of the section.
Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky
Coal Association, supported the proposed
amendment and argued that the current language
does not indicate that fuel costs for contracts
executed before the effective date of the proposed
amendment would be disallowed based on Section
3(5). He acknowledged that it was unclear whether
Section 3(5), as proposed, is intended to apply only
to fuel contracts entered after the effective date.
He noted that even if it were applied retroactively
that there is no evidence that it would result in
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inequities. He suggested that there was no need to
amend the regulation to make clear that it would
not apply retroactively.
(b) Response: Section 3(5) was not intended to apply
to contracts formed before it became effective.
While the Commission felt it would be implied
based on the current language and law, the
comments have indicated that is not the case, and
the Commission now agrees that it is ambiguous
as to whether it is intended to apply retroactively.
The Commission further agrees that it would be
inequitable to apply Section 3(5) retroactively,
because doing so could result in the disallowance
of costs for contracts the utilities entered before
they had notice of the change. Thus, to make it
clear that Section 3(5) is not intended to apply to
contracts formed prior to its effective date, the
Commission has amended Section 3(5) based on
the comments as shown below:
(5) For any contracts entered into
[Beginning) three (3) or more months
after the effective date of this regulation
...
The Commission’s amendments based on the
comments are in bold.
(11)Subject Matter: Applicability of Section 3(5) to
fuels other than coal
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU, argued that Section 3(5), as
proposed, is not fuel specific so it will require
utilities to request the severance information
when procuring oil and natural gas in addition to
coal.
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(b) Response: KRS 143.020 is specific to coal, so it
would be reasonable for a utility to assume that no
severance tax was paid pursuant to that statute in
connection with natural gas, oil, or other fuels.
There would be no reason for utilities to request
information regarding the payment of taxes
pursuant to KRS 143.020 when procuring natural
gas, oil, and other fuels. Thus, this issue does not
justify withdrawing or amending Section 3(5).
(12)Subject Matter: Purpose of Section 3(5)
(a) Comments: Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on
behalf of Kentucky Power, argues that Section
3(5), as proposed, is inconsistent with its stated
purpose of ensuring that fuel costs are evaluated
on a more level basis regardless of their state of
origin, because it only excludes coal severance
taxes from Kentucky from the analysis of
reasonableness. He suggested that Section 3(5) be
modified to exclude “any coal severance or similar
tax applicable to the fuel” to accomplish the stated
purpose. Alternatively, he suggested that the
pertinent language could be modified to provide
“based on the cost of the fuel less any tax of the
nature of the tax imposed by KRS 143.020.”
Tyler White - Mr. White, on behalf of Kentucky
Coal Association, supported the proposed
amendment and argued that it allows coal severed
or processed in Kentucky to be evaluated fairly
against the coal of certain border states that have
eliminated similar taxes.
(b) Response: There are a number of states that do not
charge any severance tax on coal in a manner
consistent with KRS 143.020. Section 3(5) allows
coal subject to KRS 143.020 to be evaluated
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against the coal severed and processed in states
that do not charge a severance tax based on the
actual cost to produce the coal. Moreover, the
amendment the Commission made to Section 3(5)
after receiving Comments, which is discussed
above, further addresses Kentucky Power’s
concern, because coal from all states will be
evaluated without regard to the coal severance
taxes. Thus, it allows coal to be evaluated more
fairly based on the actual cost to produce the coal.
(13)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to
Section 1(1) on costs recoverable through fuel
adjustment clauses
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU. Opposed changing the word
“expense” in the phrase “Where F is the expense of
fossil fuel” in Section 1(1) to “cost,” and argued
those terms have different meanings, and that the
amendment could change the meaning of the
regulation and result in Kentucky’s fuel
adjustment
regulation
being
interpreted
differently from the federal regulation on which it
was based. He recommended that the proposed
substitution be withdrawn and that “expense”
continue to be used in Section 1(1) to define F(b)
and F(m).
Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E
and KU, stated that it was unclear how the change
from “expense” to “cost” in Section 1(1) would
affect amounts recoverable pursuant to the fuel
adjustment clause.
(b) Response: Section 1(1) of the regulation, in its
current form and as proposed, provides the
formula used to calculate utilities’ fuel
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adjustments. The formula includes the variable
“F” and the variable “S” in the base and the
current periods. Currently, Section 1(1) states,
among other things, that “Fis the expense of fossil
fuel ... ; and “S is sales ... , all as defined below.”
Section 1(3) then states that “Fuel costs (F) shall
be ...” before listing specific items that should be
included and excluded from “Fuel cost (F).” Section
1(4) and Section 1(6) then further define and limit
the items listed in Section 1(3) as being included
in the variable F of the fuel adjustment formula.
If “expense of fossil fuel” and “Fuel cost (F)” had
different meanings, then Section 1(3), which
defines F, would have no meaning whatsoever.
Since courts interpret regulations to give effect to
all provisions, courts will not interpret “expense of
fossil fuel” and “Fuel cost” as having different
meaning, because they both refer to the variable
F. See Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-op. Corp. , 189
S.W.3d 87, 91 (Ky. 2005) (“Statutes should be
construed in such a way that they do not become
ineffectual or meaningless.”); see also Marksberry
v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 753 (Ky. App. 2003)
(indicating that the rules of construction that
apply to statutes also apply to regulations). This is
particularly true given that Section 1(1), in which
“expense of fossil fuel” is used to refer to F,
specifically indicates that F is “defined below.”
Thus, the proposed amendment should not change
the definition of the variable F or the
interpretation of the regulation, because “F” is
specifically defined below.
However, the language of the regulation is
ambiguous in its current form, because the
variable F is referred to as “fuel cost” and the
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“expense of fossil fuel.” That ambiguity can be
resolved as discussed above through construction
of the regulation, but the proposed change makes
it clearer that the variable F as used in Section 1
(1) is the same variable F that is more explicitly
defined in Section 1(3), (4), and (6) without having
to engage in construction of the regulation. This
clarity should ease the burden on parties
attempting to apply the regulation. Thus, the
commenters [sic] concern regarding the change
from “expense” to “cost” in Section 1(1) does not
provide a basis for amending or withdrawing that
proposed change.
(14)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to
Section 1(3)(c) on costs recoverable through fuel
adjustment clauses
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU, oppose [sic] the revision of
language in Section 1(3)(c) and argue [sic] that
moving the phrase “irrespective of the designation
assigned to such transaction” as proposed would
result in that phrase modifying “energy
purchases” as opposed to “demand charges” as it
was originally intended. He recommends that the
Commission withdraw that proposed amendment.
Robert Conroy- Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E
and KU, made the same point as Mr. Rigg’s on this
subject.
(b) Response: LG&E and KU appear to be correct
regarding this proposed amendment. The phrase
“irrespective of the designation assigned to such
transaction” is intended to modify “capacity or
demand changes” and now modifies “energy
purchases.”
Thus,
the
Commission
will
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withdrawal the proposed amendment to Section
1(3)(c), except that the Commission will remove
the parentheses and include a comma after
“transaction” to make it clear that the phrase
“when such energy is purchased on an economic
dispatch basis” modifies the phrase “[t]he net
energy cost of energy purchases.”
(15)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to
Section 1(6) on costs recoverable through fuel
adjustment clauses
(a) Comment: Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on
behalf of Kentucky Power, claims that the
proposed amendment to Section 1(6) changed the
meaning of the “cost of fossil fuel,” as used therein,
by limiting it to items listed in FERC Account 151
whereas Section 1(6) currently defines the “cost of
fossil fuel” to include items beyond those listed in
FERC Account 151, including amounts listed in
FERC Account 152 and “fuel-related” PJM billing
line items in FERC Accounts 447 and 555. He
suggested that the proposed amendment be
deleted, and the current language be retained, or
that the provision be amended to recognize
unambiguously that fuel-related costs other than
those listed in FERC Account 151 are properly
treated as fossil fuel costs for the purposes of the
regulation.
John Pollum - Mr. Pollum, on behalf of Kentucky
Power, argued that this amendment should be
struck or further clarified for the reasons
discussed by Mr. Overstreet.
(b) Response: The proposed amendment to Section
1(6) does not narrow the meaning of the “cost of
fossil fuel” in a manner that excludes items that
33sa
are currently recoverable under the plain
language of the regulation, and therefore,
Kentucky Power’s concern regarding the meaning
of Section 1(6) does not justify withdrawing this
proposed amendment. In its current form, the first
sentence of Section 1(6) limits the cost of fossil fuel
to “the invoice price of fuel less any cash or other
discounts.” The second sentence then further
defines “the invoice price of fuel” by stating that it
“include[s] the cost of the fuel itself and necessary
charges for transportation of the fuel from the
point of acquisition to the unloading point, as
listed in Account 151 of FERC Uniform System of
Accounts for Public Utilities and Licensees.” The
proposed amendment simply moves the definition
of the “invoiced price of fossil fuel” up to the first
sentence and indicates that the cost of fuel only
includes those items.
As asserted by Kentucky Power, the use of the
term “include” in the second sentence would
generally be interpreted as “including but not
limited to,” which would allow for the “cost of fossil
fuel” to include items not specifically listed in the
second sentence. However, as currently written,
the first sentence explicitly limits the definition of
the “cost of fossil fuel” to the “invoiced price of
fuel.”
The term “invoiced priced of fuel” is not defined, so
courts would generally hold that it should be
interpreted according to its plain meaning.
However, where a term or phrase is technical in
nature or is a term of art, courts will generally
apply the technical meaning of the term. See Lach
v. Man O’War, LLC, 256 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Ky.
2008) (“technical words and phrases, and such
34sa
others as may have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in the law, shall be
construed according to such meaning”).
The phrase “invoiced price of fuel less any cash or
other discounts” is a technical term used by FERC
to define items that should be recorded in FERC
Account 151. Specifically, FERC regulations state
that Account 151 should include:
1. Invoice price of fuel less any cash
or other discounts.
2. Freight, switching, demurrage and
other transportation charges, not
including, however, any charges for
unloading from the shipping medium.
3. Excise taxes, purchasing agents’
commissions, insurance and other
expenses directly assignable to cost of
fuel.
4.
Operating,
maintenance
and
depreciation expenses and ad valorem
taxes on utility-owned transportation
equipment used to transport fuel from
the point of acquisition to the unloading
point.
5. Lease or rental costs of transportation
equipment used to transport fuel from
the point of acquisition to the unloading
point.
18 C.F.R. Part 101, Account 151 (emphasis added).
Given the use of the exact same phrase, there is a
strong argument that as currently written the
“cost of fossil fuel” is limited to the “invoice price
35sa
of fuel less any cash or other discounts” as used in
FERC Account 151, or rather, 1 of 5 items listed in
Account 151. Under that interpretation, the
second sentence, as plainly written, could be
interpreted as referring to the actual cost of coal
and transportation costs in the invoice price of
fuel, because in context with the first sentence, it
would be limited to costs included in the invoiced
price of fuel. Conversely, the language that refers
to transportation costs in the second sentence of
Section 1(6) could be interpreted as expanding the
definition of “cost of fossil fuel” to include
additional items listed in FERC Account 151,
because the language used to refer to
transportation costs in the second sentence of
Section 1(6) is similar to the language used to
define the transportation costs listed in FERC
Account 151. However, there is no reasonable
interpretation of Section 1(6), in its current form,
that would allow items other than those listed in
FERC Account 151 to be included within the
meaning of the “cost of fossil fuel,” because to give
effect to both sentences of Section 1(6), the “cost of
fossil fuel” must be limited to the “invoice price of
fuel less any cash or other discounts,” which is an
item in FERC Account 151; and cost of the fuel and
transportation charges “as listed in Account 151 of
FERC Uniform System of Accounts for Public
Utilities and Licensees.”
As noted by Kentucky Power, the phrase “as listed
in Account 151 of FERC Uniform System of
Accounts for Public Utilities and Licensees” in the
proposed amendment would likely be interpreted
as modifying the “cost of the fuel itself and
necessary charges for transportation” and would
36sa
thereby limit the cost of fossil fuel to items listed
in FERC Account 151. However, as discussed
above, this limitation should be no more restrictive
than the limitation on the definition of the cost of
fossil fuel in the regulation as currently written.
Moreover, restricting the “cost of fossil fuel” to
items listed in FERC Account 151 is consistent
with the purpose of the fuel adjustment regulation
to allow timely recover of volatile fuel costs,
because FERC Account 151 includes those items
that could be attributed to the commodity cost of
the fuel.2 Conversely, FERC Account 152 includes
2 In fact, 807 KAR 5:056, as currently written, was based on
FERC’s fuel adjustment regulation, which explicitly limits the
“cost of fossil fuel” to items listed in Account 151 of FERC’s
Uniform System of Accounts. Case No. 1992-00493, A [sic]
examination by the Public Service Commission of the Application
of the Fuel Adjustment Clause of Kentucky Utilities Company
from November 1, 1990 to October 31, 1992, Order at FN12 (Ky.
PSC Jan. 2, 1997) (The Commission, noting that Kentucky’s fuel
clause regulation was nearly identical to FERC’s regulation,
held that buyout costs for not purchasing fuel pursuant to a
contract were not recoverable, because they were not items
recorded in FERC Account 151.); but see Case No. 1996-00089,
The Application of Louisville Gas and Electric Company for an
Order Approving Certain Accounting Treatment for and
Authorizing Recovery of Coal Contract Termination Costs, Order
(Ky. PSC Aug. 21, 1996)(The Commission allowed recovery of
coal contract termination costs after it was granted permission
to create a deferred debit and charge it to FERC Account 151.);
Case No. 1994-00453, Big Rivers Electric Corporations Proposed
Mechanism to Credit Customers Amounts Recovered in Judicial
Proceedings Involving Fuel Procurement Contracts, Order (Ky.
PSC Feb. 21, 1997)(The Commission indicated that Kentucky’s
fuel adjustment clause was based on FERC’s, that the definition
of the cost of fuel was narrow, and that amounts recovered in
litigation against fuel suppliers and their agents did not meet
the definition of the cost of fuel); Case No. 1993-00113,
Application of Kentucky Utilities Company to Amortize, by means
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those operational costs for handling the fuel once
it has been unloaded at a utility’s plant, which
would not be volatile like the commodity cost of
fuel and therefore can be recovered through base
electric rates like any other operational cost. 18
C.F.R. Part 101, Account 151.
The Commission understands Kentucky Power’s
concern regarding the recovery of fossil fuel costs
attributed to purchase power and recoverable
pursuant to Section 1(3)(b). That section allows
utilities to recover “the actual identifiable fossil ...
fuel costs associated with energy purchased”
through their fuel adjustment clauses. Those costs
would not be record [sic] in a utility’s FERC
Account 151, so if the “cost of fossil fuel” were
limited in the utilities FERC Account 151, then it
would not be able to recover those costs.
However, 807 KAR 5:056 does not refer specifically
to items listed in the utility’s FERC Account 151,
but rather, generally refers to items listed in
“Account 151 of FERC Uniform System of
Accounts for Public Utilities and Licensees.”
Moreover, Section 1(3)(b) clearly intended for
utilities to recover fossil fuel costs associated with
purchased power, subject to certain limitations,
of Temporary Decrease in Rates, Net Fuel Cost Savings Recovered
in Coal Contract Litigation, Order 3-5 (Ky. PSC Dec. 8, 1993)
(The Commission held that a refund of coal costs that had been
paid by ratepayers through the fuel adjustment clause before
being refunded to Kentucky Utilities following litigation against
the supplier could not be reimbursed through the fuel
adjustment clause, because it did not meet the very narrow
definition of the cost of fuel in Kentucky’s fuel adjustment
regulation which was based on FERC’s fuel adjustment
regulation).
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and those amounts would not be recorded in
Account 151 of the utility that is purchasing the
power. Rather, in context, the “fossil fuel costs”
referred to in Section 1(3)(b) would be those
identifiable fuel costs that the generator would be
expected to record in Account 151.3 Thus, limiting
the cost of fossil fuel to items listed in FERC
Account 151 would not prohibit Kentucky Power
from recovering the “the actual identifiable
fossil….fuel costs associated with energy
purchased” pursuant to Section 1(3)(b), so the
concern raised by Kentucky Power does not justify
amending or withdrawing the proposed edit.
(16)Subject Matter: Effect of the amendment to
Section 1 (7) [Re-codified as Section 2(1)]
(a) Comment: Mark Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on
behalf of Kentucky Power, opposed the proposed
amendment to Section 1(7) that explicitly stated
that utilities must file all fuel contracts when they
seek to reestablish the base period and that they
should file “any other documents and information
required by 807 KAR 5:001 and 807 KAR 5:011,”
and argued that those changes created ambiguity
regarding which provisions of 807 KAR 5:001 and
807 KAR 5:011 would apply when they seek to
reestablish the base period. Mr. Overstreet
suggested that the proposed amendment by [sic]
modified to remove the references to 807 KAR
3 FERC limits the definition of the “cost of fossil fuel” to items
listed in Account 151 and includes nearly identical language
regarding the recovery of identifiable fossil fuel costs in energy
purchases, so there is no reason to expect that Kentucky’s
regulation would be applied differently than FERCs regulation.
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5:001 and 807 KAR 5:011 or to specify which
sections of those regulations apply.
John Pollum - Mr. Pollum, on behalf of Kentucky
Power, argued that this amendment should be
struck or further clarified for the reasons
discussed by Mr. Overstreet.
(b) Response: The intent of the proposed amendment
to Section 1(7) [Re-codified as Section 2(1)] was to
make it clear that the requirement that utilities
file all fuel contracts when proposing a fuel
adjustment clause or seeking to establish a new
base period for a fuel adjustment clause is in
addition to as opposed to in lieu of any applicable
filing requirements in 807 KAR 5:001 and 807
KAR 5:011. However, as noted by Kentucky
Power, the relevant provisions of 807 KAR 5:001
and 807 KAR 5:011 would still apply even if they
are not referenced in this regulation. Thus, to
avoid the confusion identified by Kentucky Power,
the Commission will amend Section 1(7) [Recodified as Section 2(1)] based on the comments as
shown below:
(1)[(7) At the time the fuel clause is
initially filed,] If a utility initially
proposes a fuel adjustment clause[ or
proposes to reset the base period
fuel costs used in a fuel adjustment
clause], the utility shall submit copies
of each fossil fuel purchase contract not
otherwise on file with the commission
and all other agreements, options,
amendments. modifications. and[or]
similar such documents[, and all
amendments and modifications thereof]
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related to the procurement of fuel
supply[and] or purchased power[ in
addition to any other documents
and information required by 807
KAR
5:001
and
807
KAR
5:011].[Incorporation by reference is
permissible.]
The amendments in response to comments are in
bold.
(17)Subject Matter: Public Hearings in review
proceedings
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU, stated in written comments that
the companies support the commission’s proposed
amendments to Section 1(11) [re-codified as
Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12) [recodified as
Section 3(4)] that making public hearings
regarding fuel adjustment clauses discretionary,
because the amendments eliminate unnecessary
hearings but allow the Commission to adequately
review utilities’ fuel adjustments and conduct
hearings when appropriate. However, he observed
that the proposed amendment, as written, only
includes a standard for determining when a
hearing should take place in the provision
discussing the 2 year review. He suggested that
the standard applicable to the 2 year review would
be appropriate for the 6 month review also.
Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E
and KU, indicated that the companies agreed with
the Commission’s decision to make hearings on the
fuel adjustment clauses discretionary.
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Mark R. Overstreet - Mr. Overstreet, on behalf of
Kentucky Power, stated in written comments that
Kentucky Power supported the proposed
amendments to Section 1(11) [re-codified as
Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12) [re-codified as
Section 3(4)] making public hearings regarding
fuel adjustment clauses discretionary, because the
amendments eliminate unnecessary hearings,
which impose a cost on utilities that are passed on
to ratepayers, but allow the Commission to
adequately review utilities’ fuel adjustments and
conduct hearings when appropriate.
Tyson Kamuf - Mr. Kamuf, on behalf of Big Rivers,
stated in written comments that Big Rivers
supported the proposed amendments to Section
1(11) [re-codified as Section 3(3)) and Section 1(12)
[re-codified as Section 3(4)] making public
hearings regarding fuel adjustment clauses
discretionary, which Big Rivers believes will
eliminate public hearings when they are
unnecessary and will thereby eliminate
unnecessary costs.
Rocco D’Ascenzo - Mr. D’Ascenzo, on behalf of
Duke Kentucky, stated that Duke Kentucky
supported the proposed amendments to Section
1(11) [re-codified as Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12)
[re-codified as Section 3(4)] making public
hearings regarding fuel adjustment clauses
discretionary, because the hearings are often a
formality simply to satisfy the regulation but still
impose costs.
Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of KIUC,
supported the proposed amendments to Section
1(11) [re-codified as Section 3(3)] and Section 1(12)
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[recodified as Section 3(4)] making public hearings
regarding fuel adjustment clauses discretionary.
David Smart - Mr. Smart, on behalf of EKPC,
supported the proposal to make the hearing
requirements discretionary but recommend
changing the standard for determining whether to
conduct a hearing to whether a hearing is
“necessary” as opposed to whether a hearing is
“necessary for the protection of a substantial
interest or is in the public interest.”
(b) Response: The Commission continues to believe
that the hearings should be discretionary for the
reasons previously stated and for those reasons
stated by the commenters. The Commission does
not believe it is necessary to amend Section 1(11)
[re-codified as Section 3(3)) or Section 1(12) [recodified as Section 3(4)) to include a standard in
Section 3(3) for when a hearing should be
conducted. The Commission notes that the
standard in Section 3(4) is consistent with the
standard in 807 KAR 5:001, which would apply in
the absence of a standard.
(18)Subject Matter: Provision that permits the
Commission to grant deviations
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs - Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU, requested that the Commission
include a provision in 807 KAR 5:056 that allows
it to grant deviations.
Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E
and KU, requested that the Commission include a
provision in 807 KAR 5:056 that allows it to grant
deviations.
43sa
Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of KIUC,
supported LG&E and KU’s comment that the
Commission include a provision in 807 KAR 5:056
that allows it to grant deviations.
(b) Response: The Commission observes that utilities
included fuel adjustment clauses in their tariffs
long before the Commission promulgated 807 KAR
5:056. Further, the Commission adopted 807 KAR
5:056, in part, to standardize utilities’ fuel
adjustment clauses. This standardization of fuel
adjustment clauses permits to Commission to
efficiently review utilities adjustments each
month in a manner that would be difficult if each
utility’s fuel adjustment clause were different or
modified by numerous, unique deviations.
Even without language in the regulation
permitting deviations, parties regularly attempt
to expand the definition of fuel costs as used in the
regulation to pass additional costs through the
fuel adjustment clause. If language were included
to allow the Commission to grant deviations to 807
KAR 5:056, then the Commission expects that it
would regularly receive requests for additional
costs to be passed through utilities’ fuel
adjustment clauses, which would increase the
complexity of the Commission’s review of fuel
adjustments, make oversight more difficult, and
affect the ability of utility customers to
understand the fuel adjustments on their bills.
Moreover, since the cost of fuel is already
recoverable under the fuel adjustment, the
Commission expects that any substantive
deviations requested would be to pass items other
than fuel costs through the fuel adjustment clause.
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It would be inconsistent with the purpose of the
regulation, which is to allow timely recover [sic] of
volatile fuel costs, to pass such costs through the
fuel adjustment clauses. The Commission also has
other mechanisms that allow utilities to account
for and pass unexpected costs and windfalls
through to customers, including the creation of
regulatory liabilities and assets that can later to
be passed through to customers as part of a base
rate adjustment. Thus, the Commission submits
that allowing deviations to 807 KAR 5:056 is not
justified at this time.
(19)Subject Matter: Deleting Section 1(10) [re-codified
as Section 2(5))
(a) Comment: Kendrick Riggs- Mr. Riggs, on behalf of
LG&E and KU, requested that the Commission
delete Section 1(10) [re-codified as Section 2(5)],
because the Commission could then keep coal
contracts confidential. He argued that suppliers
[sic] current review such contracts and that they
can use that information to increase bids, which,
in turn, increases prices to customers.
Robert Conroy - Mr. Conroy, on behalf of LG&E
and KU, requested that the Commission delete
Section 1(10) [re-codified as Section 2(5)] to allow
the Commission to keep coal contracts
confidential.
(b) Response: The Commission does not believe that
removing the provision referred to by LG&E/KU
would actually affect whether the items should be
exempt from disclosure, because the Commission
previously found that the contracts were subject to
disclosure pursuant to the Kentucky Opens
Records Act, which regulations cannot modify. See,
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e.g. Case No. 1997-00197, Petition of Kentucky
Utilities Company for Confidential Protection of
Certain Information Contained in Barge
Transportation and Coal Purchase Contracts,
Order (Ky. PSC Mar 18, 1998).
(20)Subject Matter: Levelized Fuel Adjustments for
Energy Intensive Users
(a) Comment: Kurt Boehm - Mr. Boehm, on behalf of
KIUC, suggested that the Commission propose
allowing “energy intensive customers” to contract
with utilities or petition the Commission to
levelize the fuel adjustments over a longer period,
perhaps a year, to allow such customers to set
prices based on a fixed cost. He noted the month to
month volatility creates significant issues for high
intensity users, which can cause swings of tens of
thousands of dollars or more in expenses. He
suggested a mechanism to provide a true-up to the
utilities at the end of each period. He provided
draft language and requested that the
Commission consider adding that or similar
language to 807 KAR 5:056.
(b) Response: KIUC’s proposal is, in part, is contrary
to the intent of the fuel adjustment clause
regulations to permit timely recovery of volatile
fuel
costs.
Conversely,
the
Commission
understands the benefits of levelizing costs for
certain customers. which, among other things,
could allow them to more effectively set prices.
However, KIUC’s proposal would represent a
significant change in the manner in which fuel
costs are determined. Moreover, as proposed, it
would create an ad hoc approach that would be
difficult to manage (as noted above, one purpose of
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the fuel adjustment clause regulation was to
standardize fuel adjustment clauses). The
Commission believes that it would need to
investigate this matter further and obtain input
from other stakeholders before it could support
such an amendment. Thus, the Commission has
not proposed to adopt KIUC’s proposed
amendment at this time.
V. Summary of Statement of Consideration and
Action Taken by Promulgating Administrative
Body
The public hearing on this administrative
regulation was conducted, and the Commission
received comments at the hearing. Additionally,
written comments were received. The Commission
responded to the comments and amends the
administrative regulation as follows:
Page 2
Section 1 (3)(c)
Line 21-22
After “purchases,” [sic for punctuation through the
end of 47sa], delete “irrespective of the designation
assigned to such transaction and”.
Page 2
Section 1 (3)(c)
Line 22-23
After “charges”, add “irrespective of
designation assigned to such transaction,”
Page 4
Section 2(1)
Line 16-17
the
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After “clause’’, delete “or proposes to reset the
base period fuel costs used in a fuel adjustment
clause”.
Page 4
Section 2(1)
Line 20-21
After “power”, delete “in addition to any other
documents and information required by 807 KAR
5:001 and 807 KAR 5:011”.
Page 6
Section 3(5)
Line 16
Delete “Beginning”.
Before “three”, insert “For any contracts entered
into”.
After “three (3)”, insert “or more”.
Page 6
Section 3(5)
Line 19
After “less”, delete “any tax collected under KRS
143.020”
After “less, insert “any coal severance tax imposed
by any jurisdiction upon coal physically removed
from the earth”
48sa
[DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 2019]
September 12, 2019
RE: SPOT AND TERM BID INVITATION:
LG&E/KU/19-05
Deadline for Bids: 5:00 p.m. EDT
Thursday, October 10, 2019
Louisville Gas and Electric Company (“LG&E”) and
Kentucky Utilities Company (“KU”), the “Company”
collectively, are soliciting proposals for steam coal for
LG&E’s Trimble County and Mill Creek Generating
Stations and KU’s Ghent and Brown Generating
Stations.
Please note that the Company is interested in
evaluating longer term proposals and will consider
offers for up to ten (10) years.
High Sulfur Rail Coal: Term coal for up to ten (10)
years in length, beginning January 2021 for Mill
Creek and E.W. Brown Stations.
High Sulfur Barge Coal: Term coal for up to ten
(10) years in length, beginning January 2021 for
Trimble County, Mill Creek, and Ghent Stations.
This Bid Package contains a cover letter, Exhibit A –
Coal Supply Bid, Exhibit B – Coal Quality
Specifications, Exhibit C – Sample Coal Payment
Calculation,
and
Exhibit
D
–
Sample
Insurance
Requirements.
These
documents
can be downloaded from the website: apps.lge-
49sa
ku.com/RegulatedFuelBids/. The bid form (Exhibit A)
must be used in submitting your bid. Failure to use
this bid form may result in the rejection of your bid.
The bid must be fully completed in ink or in
typewritten form and submitted as described below
and in the bid documents.
COAL SEVERANCE TAX:
The Kentucky Public Service Commission is now
requiring utilities to evaluate the reasonableness of
fuel costs in contracts and competing bids based on
the cost of the fuel less any coal severance tax imposed
by any jurisdiction. Therefore, Bidders must provide
the severance tax that the producer would pay, in
dollars per ton, for each year coal is offered. All
calculations used to arrive at this annual severance
tax amount must be included, in addition to any
supporting information.
BIDDER MAY OFFER ANY COAL (OR
ALTERNATIVE FUELS), INCLUDING VOLUME
FLEXIBILITY
Bidder is invited to submit more than one quotation
for differing coal specifications. However, all
requested information must be provided for each
individual set of coal specifications proposed,
including a COAL SUPPLY BID (Exhibit A), an
ULTIMATE COAL ANALYSIS, and MINERAL ASH
ANALYSIS. Bidder must provide a recent
ULTIMATE COAL ANALYSIS, along with an
ASH MINERAL, TRACE ELEMENTS, and
EQUILIBRIUM MOISTURE ANALYSIS for the
bid to be considered.
No premium for lower ash and/or sulfur will be
added to the agreed upon price.
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FOB RAIL/BARGE QUOTES: Prices quoted shall
be inclusive of any and all costs, including but not
limited to taxes, fees, insurance requirements, barge
fleeting and switching charges, harbor costs,
port costs, third party costs, etc., which are the
responsibility of the Bidder and shall be priced
F.O.B. railcar or F.O.B. barge. The barges
should be free of all costs to the Company’s
barge transportation contractor. Any and all
additional costs must be included in the quoted
price of the coal. The price shall include all
costs up to the point the Buyer’s transportation
contractor takes possession and control of the
barge(s) and/or railcars.
Attached is a coal quality specification sheet (Exhibit
B). Quality offered should be quality delivered on a
monthly weighted average, subject to contract
rejection limits.
All quotations may be subject to a pre-award audit,
which may include an examination of the Bidder’s
operational and financial records and operations (as
reasonably necessary), to ensure that the Bidder is
financially stable and has the coal of the quantity and
quality as offered herein.
The Company reserves the right to have its
representative(s) visit the mine(s) and loading
facilities of the Bidder, to take coal samples for
analysis, to obtain other information as to the
suitability of the coal, and to evaluate the Bidder’s
capability to perform, etc. Acceptance of bid(s) may be
made conditional upon the results of such
investigations.
Bidder must be willing to warrant that there are
reserves equivalent to the total required to supply the
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tonnage and quality for the proposed term. Bidder
must furnish recent coal quality analysis of the coal
being offered. This data must be supplied as an
attachment to Exhibit A. Such analyses should show
the ranges of coal quality and who performed the
testing. Guaranteed Coal Quality should be supplied
on sheets 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Exhibit A.
ENCLOSED IS A COPY OF THE BID FORM
(EXHIBIT A) WHICH MUST BE USED IN
SUBMITTING YOUR BID. FAILURE TO USE THIS
BID FORM MAY RESULT IN THE REJECTION OF
YOUR BID. THE BID MUST BE FULLY
COMPLETED IN INK OR IN TYPEWRITTEN
FORM AND SUBMITTED AS DESCRIBED BELOW.
A COPY SHOULD BE RETAINED FOR YOUR
RECORDS.
AN ORIGINAL OF EACH BID PROPOSAL MUST
BE SUBMITTED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE AND
THE ENVELOPE MUST BE MARKED: LG&E/KU
COAL OFFER LGE/KU 19-05. BIDS SHOULD BE
EITHER MAILED BY CERTIFIED MAIL OR
DELIVERED BY THE BIDDER TO:
Mr. Delbert Billiter
Manager LG&E and KU Fuels
LG&E and KU Energy LLC
220 W. Main Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Bids must be received on or before 5:00 p.m. EDT, on
Thursday, October 10, 2019 at the above address.
Bids shall remain in effect until 5:00 p.m. EST, on
Thursday, December 12, 2019 and may not be
withdrawn within this period unless a written
request from the Bidder is approved by the Company.
52sa
A “Short List” of Bidders (a list of the finalists) will be
developed taking into account, but not limited to such
factors as:
1. Suitability of the coal.
2. Bidder’s ability to meet quality specifications
based on coal reserve characteristics and quality
control procedures.
3. Total evaluated cost to the Company (to include
assessment of transportation costs and quality
impact on operating costs) of burning the coal (in
cents per million BTU).
4. Demonstrated reliability of supplier.
5. Reserves.
6. Financial capabilities and strength.
7. Results of test shipment(s) of coal, if required.
8. Geological evaluation and testing.
9. References.
10. Interstate Experience Modification Rate
(EMR)
The Company also reserves the right to require the
Bidder to furnish a performance bond of an amount
sufficient to provide adequate protection to the
Company in the event the Bidder is unable to
satisfactorily perform the duties and obligations
imposed on Bidder, under any contract which is
entered into as a result of this bid.
Each bidder must sign the proposal letter with its
usual signature and shall give its full business
address. Bids shall be signed in the official corporate
name of the corporation, followed by the signature
and the designation of the president, secretary, or
other persons signing who are authorized to bind the
corporation. The names of all persons signing shall
also be typed or printed below the signature. For non-
53sa
corporate proposers, evidence of authority to sign and
legally bind the entity must be provided.
The Company will retain in confidence, all proposals
and other information received pursuant to this
Request, but reserves the right to disclose such
information and/or proposals to consultants that the
Company may retain to assist in the evaluation and
contract effort, or when so requested by a court or
government agency.
Bidder will be responsible for the completeness and
accuracy of all information contained or used in
preparation of the proposal and will also be
responsible for supplying all necessary supporting
information.
THE COMPANY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO
MODIFY OR WITHDRAW THIS REQUEST, TO
REQUEST ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, TO
WAIVE TECHNICALITIES OR IRREGULARITIES,
TO REJECT ANY OR ALL PROPOSALS, AND TO
TERMINATE ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS
AT ANY TIME. THE COMPANY ALSO RESERVES
THE RIGHT TO ACCEPT ONE OR MORE
PROPOSAL(S) FOR A PORTION OR FOR ALL OF
THE QUANTITIES OF COAL. THE COMPANY
ALSO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE
WITH BIDDER THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF THIS QUOTATION.
Nothing herein shall obligate the Company to
compensate or reimburse Bidder for any costs or
expenses incurred in the preparation of this proposal,
or the submission of any information or data in
connection therewith, and we shall not be obligated
under any contract or order resulting from any
proposal unless and until the contract or order has
54sa
been signed by a duly authorized official of the
Company.
The Bidders placed on the “Short List” will be notified
of their selection to the list as promptly as possible.
55sa
[DATED JANUARY 8, 2020]
Andy Beshear
Governor
Michael J. Schmitt
Chairman
Rebecca W. Goodman
Secretary
Energy and Environment Cabinet
Robert Cicero
Vice Chairman
Talina R. Mathews
Commissioner
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Public Service Commission
211 Sower Blvd.
P.O. Box 615
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615
Telephone; (502) 564-3940
Fax; (502) 564-3460
psc.ky.gov
January 8, 2020
To: All Electric Utilities
RE: Constitutional Challenge to Administrative
Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)
To Whom It May Concern:
The Commission is issuing this letter to inform
you of a possible legal challenge to Administrative
Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, (“807 KAR 5:056”). The
Commission has received notice of a potential
constitutional challenge by Foresight Coal Sales,
LLC, (“Foresight”), that Foresight intends to pursue
legal action to invalidate as unconstitutional 807 KAR
5:056 Section 3(5), (“Section 3(5)”).
The Commission has requested a legal opinion
from the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of
56sa
Kentucky regarding the constitutionality of Section
3(5). A copy of the request is attached, which includes
a copy of Foresight’s letter. In light of that pending
request and the potential for a legal challenge to
Section 3(5), the Commission is suspending
enforcement of the requirements of Section 3(5) until
the Attorney General has rendered an opinion on the
constitutionality of Section 3(5). After the Attorney
General renders his opinion, the Commission will
determine the next steps regarding Section 3(5).
If you have any questions, please contact J.E.B.
Pinney, Acting General Counsel, at (502) 782-2587
or ieb.pinney@ky.qov.
CC: Nicholas S. Johnson
57sa
Andy Beshear
Governor
Michael J. Schmitt
Chairman
Rebecca W. Goodman
Secretary
Energy and Environment Cabinet
Robert Cicero
Vice Chairman
Talina R. Mathews
Commissioner
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Public Service Commission
211 Sower Blvd.
P.O. Box 615
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615
Telephone; (502) 564-3940
Fax; (502) 564-3460
psc.ky.gov
January 8, 2020
Hon. Daniel Cameron
Attorney General
Commonwealth of Kentucky
700 Capital Avenue
Suite 118
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Re: Constitutionality of Administrative
Regulation 807 KAR 5:056
Attorney General Cameron:
The Kentucky Public Service Commission
(“Commission”) is submitting this letter requesting a
legal opinion from your office regarding the
constitutionality of a recent amendment to
Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:056 (“807 KAR
5:056”). The Commission has received notice of a
potential constitutional challenge by Foresight Coal
58sa
Sales, LLC, (“Foresight”), a copy of which is attached
to this letter, that Foresight intends to pursue legal
action to invalidate as unconstitutional 807 KAR
5:056, Section 3(5) (“Section 3(5)”). The Commission
will cease enforcement of Section 3(5) until it receives
an opinion from your office.
Background
807 KAR 5:056 is the Commission’s regulation
addressing the Fuel Adjustment Clause (“FAC”). The
FAC is a mechanism by which the Commission, inter
alia, reviews fossil fuel and power purchases of
utilities in Kentucky that generate their own
electricity, making adjustments to the utilities’ FAC
surcharges recovered from a monthly surcharge on
customers’ bills. Several amendments to 807 KAR
5:056 became effective on August 20, 2019, among
those amendments was a new section, Section 3(5)
which provides that the Commission would review the
reasonableness of the costs of proposals to supply
fossil fuels “based on the cost of the fuel less any coal
severance tax imposed by any jurisdiction.” The
Commission adopted this amendment in response to
House Resolution 144 from the 2019 Regular Session,
which noted a decline in Kentucky coal production;
noted that much of the coal consumed in Kentucky
was imported from out of state, including from
Illinois; and urged the Commission to consider “all
costs, including fossil fuel-related economic impacts
within Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases
under the fuel adjustment clause.”
On December 5, 2019, the Commission received a
letter from Foresight, dated November 29, 2019, the
purpose of which was “to place [the Commission] on
notice that it intends to pursue legal action to
59sa
invalidate an unconstitutional regulation found at
[807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)], unless [Foresight is]
sooner advised that the subject regulation has been
revoked or otherwise held in abeyance from applying
to contracts.” Foresight alleges that Section 3(5)
violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution because it was enacted with the
intent of providing a competitive advantage to
Kentucky coal.
As of the date of this letter, litigation has not yet
been initiated in this matter but has been threatened
by Foresight. Foresight also indicated that it is
currently in discussions with the Illinois Coal
Association to bring a lawsuit on its behalf and on
behalf of other coal producers in Illinois.
Specifically, Foresight observes that the original
language proposed by the Commission required that
the cost of coal be evaluated “based on the cost of the
fuel less any tax collected under KRS 143.020,” i.e.,
Kentucky’s coal severance tax statute. Foresight
alleges that despite the change in the language that
“the intent of the regulation remains the same:
improperly advantaging Kentucky coal producers to
the detriment of the direct competition in Illinois and
Indiana, where no severance tax exists.”
Foresight further alleges that “statements issued
in the notice and comment period for the rule make it
clear the intent behind the rule.” Foresight noted
that:
Those comments state that the idea behind the
rule is “to incentivize Kentucky utilities to
purchase Kentucky coal . . . [and is] an attempt
to remove from [a utility’s] consideration the
increase in the cost of Kentucky coal as a result
60sa
of the Kentucky coal severance tax.”
Commenters lauded the PSC’s “efforts to
protect coal jobs in Kentucky.” Further,
commenters specifically noted the intent to
make Kentucky coal artificially appear more
competitive “with out of state coal that
originates from states that do not apply coal
severance taxes, such as Illinois and Indiana.”
Foresight noted, among other things, that the
United States Supreme Court in West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) “struck
down a Massachusetts milk-pricing order which
employed a tax on all milk sold to fund a subsidy to
in-state producers” because the Court, according to
Foresight, “viewed the regulation as a tariff or
customs duty-neutralizing the advantage possessed
by lower cost out of state producers.” Foresight argued
that is the motivation, intent, and effect of 807 KAR
5:056, Section 3(5).
Foresight further pointed to the decision of the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals in Alliance for Clean Coal v.
Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995), that held that an
Illinois law, which required, among other things, that
“utilities formulate Clean Air Act compliance plans
that took into account the need to use coal mined in
Illinois in an environmentally responsible manner in
the production of electricity and the need to maintain
and preserve as a valuable State resource the mining
of coal in Illinois,” violated the dormant Commerce
Clause. Foresight argued Section 3(5), like the Illinois
law, violates the cardinal rule of nondiscrimination
and, therefore, will be invalidated.
Foresight indicated that it has notified the
affected utilities that it intends to initiate legal action
61sa
regarding the regulation and cautioned them against
entering into contracts based on Section 3(5). Further,
it indicated that it intends to seek judicial review of
the rule and reserves the right to use any remedies
available to recover any damages arising from this
rule.
Request for an Opinion
The Commission’s request is simple: is Section 3(5)
unconstitutional because it violates the dormant
commerce clause by discriminating against coal from
states with no severance tax? The regulation is not
facially discriminatory, as the effect of the regulation
will be to reduce the cost of coal subject to severance
taxes imposed by any jurisdiction for the purpose of
the Commission’s cost evaluation.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission
respectfully requests an opinion regarding the
Constitutionality of 807 KAR 5:056 Section 3(5).
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[DATED MARCH 4, 2020]
Andy Beshear
Governor
Michael J. Schmitt
Chairman
Rebecca W. Goodman
Secretary
Energy and Environment Cabinet
Robert Cicero
Vice Chairman
Talina R. Mathews
Commissioner
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Public Service Commission
211 Sower Blvd.
P.O. Box 615
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602-0615
Telephone; (502) 564-3940
Fax; (502) 564-3460
psc.ky.gov
March 4, 2020
To: All Electric Utilities
RE: Constitutional Challenge to Administrative
Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, Section 3(5)
To Whom It May Concern:
On January 8, 2020, the Commission issued a
letter to inform you of a possible legal challenge to
Administrative Regulation 807 KAR 5:056, (“807
KAR 5:056”). The Commission had received notice of
a potential constitutional challenge by Foresight Coal
Sales, LLC, (“Foresight”), that Foresight intended to
pursue legal action to invalidate as unconstitutional
807 KAR 5:056 Section 3(5), (“Section 3(5)”). The
January 8, 2020 letter stated that the Commission
had requested a legal opinion from the Attorney
General for the Commonwealth of Kentucky
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(“Attorney General”) regarding the constitutionality
of Section 3(5). The letter also stated that, in light of
that pending request and the potential for a legal
challenge to Section 3(5), the Commission was
suspending enforcement of the requirements of
Section 3(5) until the Attorney General had rendered
an opinion on the constitutionality of Section 3(5).
On March 4, 2020, the Commission received the
attached opinion of the Attorney General in which the
Attorney General concluded that Section 3(5) does not
violate on its face the dormant commerce clause and
is therefore constitutional. Having received this
opinion from the Attorney General, the Commission
will no longer suspend enforcement of the
requirements of Section 3(5).
If you have any questions, please contact J.E.B.
Pinney, Acting General Counsel, at (502) 782-2587 or
ieb.pinney@ky.qov.
CC: Nicholas S. Johnson
64sa
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Office of the Attorney General
Daniel Cameron
Attorney General
Capitol Building, Suite 118
700 Capital Avenue
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
(502) 696-5300
Fax: (502) 564-2894
March 4, 2020
OAG 20-04
Subject:
Whether 807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5) violates
the dormant commerce clause.
Requested by:
J.E.B. Pinney, Acting General Counsel
Public Service Commission
Written by:
Carmine G. laccarino, Executive
Director
Brett R. Nolan, Special Litigation
Counsel
Syllabus:
807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5) does not violate
the dormant commerce clause.
Opinion of the Attorney General
The Kentucky Public Service Commission
requests this Office’s opinion on whether 807 KAR
5:056 § 3(5) (the “Regulation”) is unconstitutional
under the “dormant commerce cause” of the United
States Constitution. For the reasons that follow, the
Office finds that the Regulation is not
unconstitutional.
“The Commerce Clause provides that the Congress
shall have Power to regulate Commerce among the
65sa
several States.” Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (quoting
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3) (cleaned up). Despite its name, the socalled “dormant commerce clause” is nowhere found
in a clause to the United States Constitution. Tyler
Pipe Indus., Inc. u. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Court for over a century has engaged in an enterprise
that it has been unable to justify by textual
support[.]”). Regardless, it “denies the States the
power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden
the interstate flow of articles of commerce.” Or. Waste
Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 98. Thus, states may not engage
in “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter.” Id. at 99. On the other hand,
“nondiscriminatory regulations that have only
incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.” Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). Despite the negative thrust of
the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has
recognized that “the Framers’ distrust of economic
Balkanization was limited by their federalism
favoring a degree of local autonomy.” Dep’t of Revenue
of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (citing The
Federalist Nos. 7 (A. Hamilton), 11 (A. Hamilton), and
42 (J. Madison), and 51 (J. Madison)).
According to the Commission, “807 KAR 5:056 is
the Commission’s regulation addressing the Fuel
Adjustment Clause (‘FAC’). The FAC is a mechanism
by which the Commission ... reviews fossil fuel and
power purchases of utilities in Kentucky that
generate their own electricity, making adjustments to
66sa
the utilities’ FAC surcharges recovered from a
monthly surcharge on customers’ bills.” Relevant to
this Office’s inquiry, the Regulation provides:
For any contracts entered into on or after
December 1, 2019, the commission shall, in
determining the reasonableness of fuel costs in
procurement contracts and fuel procurement
practices, evaluate the reasonableness of fuel
costs in contracts and competing bids based on
the cost of the fuel less any coal severance tax
imposed by any jurisdiction.
807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5).
“Severance taxes are excise taxes on natural
resources ‘severed’ from the earth.” https://www
.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/2011-state-severancetaxcollections.aspx (last accessed Feb. 27, 2020).
Kentucky’s severance tax is 4.5% on coal severed or
processed in Kentucky. KRS 143.020. Ohio,
Tennessee, and West Virginia have also enacted their
own severance taxes for coal mined in those states.
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5749.02; Tenn. Code Ann.
67-7-103; W. Va. Code 11-13A-3. Indiana and Illinois
have not enacted coal severance taxes.
In the 2019 Regular Session of the General
Assembly, the Kentucky House of Representatives
passed House Resolution 144, which “urg[ed] the
Public Service Commission to amend its
administrative regulations to consider all costs,
including fossil fuel-related economic impacts within
Kentucky, when analyzing coal purchases under the
fuel adjustment clause.” House Resolution 144
prompted the Commission amend 807 KAR 5:056 §
3(5).
67sa
Based on the plain text of the Regulation, this
Office agrees with the Public Service Commission
that the Regulation “is not facially discriminatory.”
Request at 3. The Regulation provides that coal
severance taxes “imposed by any jurisdiction” should
not
be
considered
when
evaluating
the
reasonableness of fuel costs. 807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5)
(emphasis added). This does not require the
“differential treatment of instate and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter.” Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at
99. Rather, it requires treating all economic interests
the same by deducting the coal severance tax imposed
by any jurisdiction when evaluating “the
reasonableness of fuel costs in contracts and
competing bids.” 807 KAR 5:056 § 3(5). Because the
Regulation treats coal sourced from within the
Commonwealth the same as coal sourced from outside
its borders, it is not facially discriminatory.
Laws that are facially neutral might nevertheless
violate the dormant commerce clause if “the burden
imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.” Or. Waste
Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 99; see also Pike, 397 U.S. at 137
(“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”). But this is a narrower kind
of claim that often involves weighing factual issues
that are difficult to balance. See Bendix Autolite Corp.
v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Weighing the governmental
interests of a State against the needs of interstate
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commerce is, by contrast, a task squarely within the
responsibility of Congress ....”). So “[s]tate laws
frequently survive this Pike scrutiny,” Dep’t of
Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 339 (collecting cases), in
part because it requires high deference to the state’s
policy choices. See Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass’n v.
Bredesen, 556 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that any challenge under Pike must
demonstrate that the burden on interstate commerce
is “clearly excessive”) (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, N. Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)).
Though this Office’s analysis is necessarily limited
without a factual record to consider, it is not clear that
the Regulation will burden interstate commerce.
States are free to enact coal severance taxes at a
chosen rate. An adjustment to offset coal severance
taxes would cause Kentucky coal to be priced more
competitively in comparison to some states and less
competitively with respect to other states, depending
on which states have chosen to enact severance taxes
and at what rate. Kentucky has enacted a coal
severance tax of 4.5% on coal severed or processed in
Kentucky, but states like Indiana and Illinois have
not enacted a coal severance tax. So while the
Regulation might arguably benefit coal producers in
Kentucky relative to those in Indiana or Illinois, the
same logic would mean that it could hurt Kentucky
coal producers relative to those states where the
severance tax may be higher. Either way, nothing
prevents states from altering their severance tax if
they believe it will provide their coal producers with
a competitive advantage in Kentucky. Thus, there is
no merit to the argument that discounting severance
taxes in the Commission’s consideration will favor
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Kentucky coal producers to the detriment of all outof-state interests.
For these reasons, this Office concludes that the
Regulation does not violate the so-called “dormant
commerce clause.”
Daniel Cameron
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Brett R. Nolan, Special Litigation Counsel
Carmine G. Iaccarino, Executive Director
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[DATED NOVEMBER 30, 2020]
AGREEMENT
This Agreement is entered into by and between: (i)
Foresight Coal Sales, LLC (“‘Foresight”); (ii) Michael
Schmitt, Talina Mathews, Kent Chandler, and the
Public Service Commission’s Executive Director, all
in their official capacities (the “PSC Defendants”);
and (iii) Daniel Cameron, in his official capacity (the
“Attorney General”) (all parties together, the
“Parties”).
The Parties hereby agree as follows:
1. The PSC Defendants agree that the Public
Service
Commission
will
notify
Kentucky’s
jurisdictional electric utilities via letter that,
beginning
immediately,
the
Public
Service
Commission will no longer apply 807 Ky. Admin. Reg.
5:056 § 3(5) (the “Challenged Regulation”) and that
the Challenged Regulation will be withdrawn through
the Public Service Commission’s ordinary regulatory
process. This letter will be sent promptly upon this
Agreement becoming effective.
2. The PSC Defendants agree that the Public
Service Commission will withdraw the Challenged
Regulation through the ordinary regulatory process
outlined in KRS Chapter l 3A. The PSC Defendants
agree that the Public Service Commission will submit
a regulatory amendment withdrawing the Challenged
Regulation to the Legislative Research Commission
by December 15, 2020.
3. The Parties agree to jointly move to dismiss the
appeal in Foresight Coal Sales, LLC v. Schmitt, at al.,
No. 20-5549 (6th Cir.) (the “Sixth Circuit matter”),
and to seek remand of the oral argument scheduled
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for December 4, 2020. This joint motion will be
promptly filed upon this Agreement becoming
effective.
4. The Parties agree to jointly move to stay and
remand all deadlines in Foresight Coal Sales, LLC v.
Schmitt, et al., 3:20-cv-21 (E.D. Ky.) (the “ District
Court matter”), until the Challenged Regulation has
been officially withdrawn through the ordinary
regulatory process. This joint motion will be promptly
filed upon this Agreement becoming effective. Once
the Challenged Regulation has been officially
withdrawn, the Parties agree to dismiss the District
Court matter with prejudice.
5. Once the Challenged Regulation is officially
withdrawn, Foresight expressly waives any right or
entitlement to, and will not seek, reimbursement of
its attorneys’ fees and/or any of its costs or expenses
associated with the District Court matter and/or the
Sixth Circuit matter.
6. By entering into this Agreement, no party
admits any liability to any other party with respect to
any claim or matter raised in the District Court
matter or the Sixth Circuit matter, including but not
limited to with respect to the Challenged Regulation.
This Agreement shall not be construed as an
admission of liability by any party.
7. This Agreement is governed by, and shall be
construed in accordance with, Kentucky law. Any
dispute regarding this Agreement shall be resolved in
a Kentucky court of competent jurisdiction.
8. This Agreement is binding on the Parties and
their successors.
72sa
9. This Agreement constitutes the entirety of the
Parties’ agreement. This Agreement supersedes all
prior or existing agreements among the Parties or
their representatives relating thereto. No amendment
to or modification of this Agreement shall be effective
unless in writing executed by the Parties.
10. This Agreement
counterparts.
may
be
executed
in
11. This Agreement is effective on November 30,
2020.
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[ON MARCH 3, 2021]
EXCERPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE
SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY
*
*
*
PROCEEDINGS
CLERK: Senator Carpenter? Senator Castlen?
SENATOR CASTLEN: Here.
CLERK: Senator Embry?
SENATOR EMBRY: Here, in the room.
CLERK: Senator Harper Angel?
SENATOR HARPER ANGEL: Present remotely in
my district.
CLERK: Thank you, Senator. Senator Schickel?
Senator Southworth?
SENATOR SOUTHWORTH: Here.
CLERK: Senator Webb?
SENATOR WEBB: Present.
CLERK: Senator Westerfield?
SENATOR WESTERFIELD: Here.
CLERK: Senator Wheeler?
SENATOR WHEELER: Here.
CLERK: Senator Turner?
SENATOR TURNER: Here.
CLERK: Chair Smith?
CHAIRMAN SMITH: Present. And a quorum?
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CLERK: Yes.
CHAIRMAN SMITH: All right. Very good. I need
a motion on our minutes for our previous meeting.
Motion and a second. All those in favor, sign of aye.
Opposed, likewise. Motion carries. All right. We have
a very, very busy meeting, and so I’d like to ask each
one of those that are going to be presenting to please
be conscious of the other people that are going to go.
And I will apologize to Senator Southwood. I actually,
due to a scheduling conflict, need to actually let
Senator Mills go ahead of you. And like I said, a
thousand apologies, but if Senator Mills is here -Senator Mills, please go ahead. There is going to get
-- we -- we have a lot of bills to get through, so I ask
you to -- to be as informed as you can be and as brief
as you can be. So I’m going to turn it over to you.
Thank you.
SENATOR MILLS: Thank you, Chairman Smith.
I’m Robby Mills. I represent the Fourth Senate
District in Western Kentucky, and I’m talking about
Senate Bill 257 today that you have before you. 257 is
a fuel -- it’s a fuel adjustment. It addresses a fuel
adjustment issue with the PSC. As you all know, the
PSC periodically reviews the utility fuel-buying
decisions, and they’re charged with assessing the
reasonableness of those charges. What this bill does
is helps emphasize the re -- the word
“reasonableness,” and it allows -- it allows the coal
severance tax that is added to coal in the State of
Kentucky to be considered reasonable when compared
with coal contracts that do not have a severance tax
on there. And the reason that it is reasonable is
because we all know what coal severance tax does for
our community and what it returns back to the state,
and those are benefits above and beyond just the price
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for the consumers. I know, in Webster County, that
takes -- gets some coal severance back. We’ve built a
senior citizen center. We’ve built walking trails.
We’ve done a lot of good things with this severance
tax, so...
CHAIRMAN SMITH: I’ve got a motion and second.
Do you have anybody else that’s going to speak
with you?
SENATOR MILLS: I do not.
CHAIRMAN SMITH: Very good. I ask the clerk to
call the roll.
CLERK: Senator Carpenter? Senator Castlen?
SENATOR CASTLEN: Aye.
CLERK: Senator Embry?
SENATOR EMBRY: Aye.
CLERK: Senator Schickel?
SENATOR SCHICKEL: Aye.
CLERK: Senator Southworth?
SENATOR SOUTHWORTH: Aye.
CLERK: Senator Turner?
SENATOR TURNER: Aye.
CLERK: Senator Webb?
SENATOR WEBB: Aye.
CLERK: Senator Westerfield?
SENATOR WESTERFIELD: Aye.
CLERK: Senator Wheeler?
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SENATOR WHEELER: Mr. Chairman, to explain
my vote, I think this is a great bill. I’m proud to cosponsor it with Senator Mills, and I proudly vote aye.
SENATOR MILLS: Thank you.
CLERK: Chair Smith?
CHAIRMAN SMITH: I vote aye, and the motion’s
approved favorable. Your bill passes. Do I have
motion to put this on consent? Second? All those in
favor, sign of aye.
SENATE: Aye.
CHAIRMAN SMITH: Opposed, likewise. Senator
Mills, thank you for coming in front of our committee.
(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)
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[ON MARCH 11, 2021]
EXCERPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE
SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON NATURAL RESOURCES
*
*
*
PROCEEDINGS
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Okay. Next, we’re going to
take up Senate Bill 257. Representative Mills.
SENATOR MILLS: Chairman
Committee, thank you for having me.
Gooch
and
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes.
SENATOR MILLS: I’m Robby Mills. I represent
the Fourth District in Western Kentucky, and that’s
coal country, and this is what our bills is about today.
If it’s okay to go ahead and proceed?
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes. Go right ahead.
SENATOR MILLS: Okay. Very good. So Senate
Bill 257 deals with the Public Service Commission,
and hopefully you’ve read it. It was a long bill, about
two paragraphs, and -- but it is an important bill. If
you’re not aware, every so often, the PSC periodically
reviews purchase contracts to make sure that electric
utilities fuel-buying decisions are reasonable, and
when considering whether a fuel purchase is
reasonable, the PSC should -- and this is what the bill
is about -- consider more than just the cost of the fuel.
They should fact -- they should look at factors like
reliable fuel source. I know you’ve talked -- we’ve
talked about this in this committee, and in the Senate
committee, about coal as a reliable fuel source. It’s
sitting there in a pile. It’s ready to go. All it has to do
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is be burned. And the other thing that they should
consider is the economic benefits of the severance tax
that’s paid on that coal, and those economic benefits
are spread out in two ways. They’re spread ·out
through the state budget, and they’re also spread out
individually in the -- in the communities that that fuel
and that coal come from through the state. So a low
-- cost coal contract doesn’t always mean that it’s the
most reasonable contract. And so what this bill does
is this bill asks the Public Service Commission to -- in
determining the reasonableness of the fuel cost in
procurement of the contracts for the fuel, to evaluate
the reasonableness of the fuel cost in contracts and
competing bids based on the cost of the fuel less any
coal severance tax imposed by any jurisdiction.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: And thank you, Senator, for
bringing this. I know I was taking testimony one time
in a committee when I first got here, and I can
remember, of course, the PSC at the time wanted to
make sure you had the lowest cost or whatever, and
there was one utility that testified that they were
buying some compliant West Virginia coal that was
eight cents a ton cheaper than what the same
compliant coal in Kentucky was. Now, we’re talking
about eight cents pers ton -SENATOR MILLS: Yeah.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- which wouldn’t even been
measured in cost, and when you looked at, you know,
the -- the employment, the economic development, the
way the dollars turned over, the coal severance, and
all of that, that certainly was not something that
really made any sense to this -SENATOR MILLS: Right.
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CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- state, and -- and, you
know, it’s one thing to, you know, allow someone to -to take the lowest bid or whatever, but for the state to
actually promote something –
SENATOR MILLS: Right.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- like that, you know,
certainly was not in our best interest, and so with
that, are they any questions? Representative
Blanton?
REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Mills for bringing this piece. I do
support the legislation.
SENATOR MILLS: Thank you.
REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: Just a curious
question. Is this similar language that PSC actually
had in a reg a few years ago and they removed?
SENATOR MILLS: Yeah. Yeah, it is. We -- the
House actually passed a resolution, like, 99 to one,
two years ago. The PSC had this in a regulation, and
they were as -- they’re asking us to put it in statute,
and it gives them more firm ground to stand on in
doing this.
REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: All right. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR MILLS: Thank you. Good question.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Okay. Any other questions?
Tom Fitzgerald, are you on the line? Did you want to
make any comments?
MR. FITZGERALD: Mr. Chairman, thank you
very much. I -- I was just curious, and -- and Senator
Mills may or may not know this, but I was -- I’d -- I’d
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like to -- Representative Blanton, I support the bill. I
was just curious -- I know when the cabinet -- or when
the PSC had this in their regulation, they were sued
by an out-of-state coal company, and they settled the
case by agreeing to remove the language, and -- and I
think the reg is actually -- just was -- was just heard
by the administrative reg committee. I’m just curious
-- I know the AG had looked at the language and had
said there didn’t seem to be a constitutional issue, but
I didn’t know whether Senator Mills -- how confident
we are that if this goes into the statute, we’re not
going to get another suit saying that we’re violating
interstate commerce.
SENATOR MILLS: Yeah, that’s -- that’s a great
question, and, you know, I think the reason the PSC
did away with the regulation that they were operating
under is really because -- really because of the cost of
pursuing that, and I think it’s kind of a -- as a kind of
a backup situation. It’s easier for them to come to the
legislature and give, you know -- ask for a statute that
gives them more solid ground, and from the folks that
I’ve talked to, I believe the statute puts them on, like
I said, much more solid ground if there are any legal
challenges moving forward.
MR. FITZGERALD: Okay. And I would hope that
the AG’s office will -- will stand behind their opinion
and will vigorously defend the statute if there is
another challenge claiming that it was a civil rights
violation. I think that was what -- and I think the PSC
acted prudently in settling that because of the
potential liability that they were facing.
SENATOR MILLS: It is -MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, sir.
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SENATOR MILLS: I’ll -- I’ll reach out to the
Attorney General after this and touch base with him.
Good question. Thank you.
MR. FITZGERALD: That would be -- that would
be great. Thank you, Senator.
SENATOR MILLS: You’re welcome.
MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Thanks, Tom. And I think
we often realize -- and we’ve seen this a lot of times -where regulatory groups will be sued by a – you know,
some group out there, and -- and they’ll -- they’ll settle
in court and -SENATOR MILLS: Yeah.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- that settlement
sometimes becomes kind of a consent decree that it’s
hard to overturn or do -- do much with -SENATOR MILLS: Sure.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- but we’re hopeful in this
case, and we don’t -SENATOR MILLS: Right.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- know until we try, and,
you know, certainly, people can sue, and interstate
com -- being afoul of the interstate commerce clause
is something that I’ve been trying to, you know – kind
of looking at in things that I’ve done here for 26 years
-- seven years, so -SENATOR MILLS: Yep.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: -- it is an issue. Any other
questions or comments? We ask the clerk to call the
roll, please.
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CLERK: Representative Blanton?
REPRESENTATIVE BLANTON: Aye.
CLERK: Representative Bowling?
REPRESENTATIVE BOWLING: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Bridges?
REPRESENTATIVE BRIDGES: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Burch?
REPRESENTATIVE BURCH: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Cantrell?
REPRESENTATIVE CANTRELL: I vote yes. I
couldn’t tell when I looked into the interstate
commerce market just a little bit in large (Inaudible).
Based on my reading I did, it doesn’t look
discriminatory -- it doesn’t say an interference with
interstate commerce just to the extent that the entity
here might say it (Inaudible) which is pretty -- you
know, pretty fair and reasonable because a lot of
entities do effect from this board, (Inaudible) so I vote
yes.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Thank you.
CLERK: Representative Dossett?
REPRESENTATIVE DOSSETT: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Dotson?
REPRESENTATIVE DOTSON: Yes.
CLERK: Representative DuPlessis?
REPRESENTATIVE DUPLESSIS: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Flannery?
REPRESENTATIVE FLANNERY: Yes.
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CLERK: Representative Fugate?
REPRESENTATIVE FUGATE: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Johnson?
REPRESENTATIVE JOHNSON: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Kirk-McCormick?
REPRESENTATIVE KIRK-MCCORMICK: Yes.
May I explain my vote?
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes.
REPRESENTATIVE KIRK-MCCORMICK: Yes, I
am from the coal fields, too, so anything that’s going
to support, I’m for it. Thank you.
CLERK: Representative Marzian?
REPRESENTATIVE MARZIAN: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Miles?
REPRESENTATIVE MILES: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Gibbons Prunty?
REPRESENTATIVE GIBSON-PRUNTY: Yes.
CLERK: Representative Scott?
REPRESENTATIVE SCOTT: Pass.
CLERK: Representative Stevenson?
REPRESENTATIVE STEVENSON: (No audible
response.)
CLERK: Representative Wesley?
REPRESENTATIVE WESLEY: Yes.
CLERK: Representative White?
REPRESENTATIVE WHITE: Yes.
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CLERK: Chair Gooch?
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Yes. And thank you that -I always want to point out that this is my Senator
bringing good bills before our committee, and the bill
does pass with favorable expression that things
should pass.
SENATOR MILLS: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN GOOCH: Thank you.
(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)
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[ON MARCH 15, 2021]
EXCERPT OF HOUSE FLOOR PROCEEDING
*
*
*
PROCEEDINGS
SPEAKER
McCracken.
OSBORNE:
Gentleman
from
REPRESENTATIVE RUDY: Mr. Speaker, I move
you, sir, that Senate Bill 257 be taken from its place
in the orders of the day, read for a third time by title
and sponsor only, and placed upon its passage.
SPEAKER OSBORNE: Motion’s made and
seconded that Senate Bill 257 be taken from its place
in the orders of the day, read for the third time by title
and sponsor only, and placed upon its passage. Clerk,
please report.
CLERK: Senate Bill 257, an act relating to utility
fuel costs, Senator Mills.
SPEAKER
McCracken.
OSBORNE:
Gentleman
from
REPRESENTATIVE RUDY: Mr. Speaker, I yield
to the gentleman from Webster for explanation of the
bill and motion thereon.
SPEAKER OSBORNE: The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Webster for explanation of the bill
and a motion thereon.
REPRESENTATIVE GOOCH: Thank you, Mr.
Speaker, ladies and gentlemen. Senate Bill 257 is a -a very simple bill. It passed the Senate 36 to nothing.
And what it applies to is reasonableness of costs in
procurement contracts about fuel procedures,
procurement, and practices. I think, as many of you
87sa
know, we sometimes see on our fuel bills -- our utility
bills a fuel adjustment clause, and this allows the
utilities to pass on the cost or even sometimes the
decreased cost of the fuel cost that they’re purchasing.
This is something that they’re allowed to do, but from
time to time, the PSC periodically reviews these to
make sure that the most reasonable fuel costs are
being used. But the purpose of this bill is to make sure
that the PSC understands that sometimes you may
need to consider more than just cost. For instance,
factors like reliable fuel sources, and other factors like
economic benefits need to sometimes also be
considered. A perfect example of this -- I remember,
several years ago, I was in a committee where we
actually heard a utility testify that they had actually
bought compliant West Virginia coal over Kentucky
coal because it was eight cents a ton cheaper. Now, I
think we all know that eight cents a ton was so
miniscule that it would not have really affected the
rates at all, but when you consider the -- the loss of -of those severance taxes that went to those local
communities, and the jobs, and the taxes that the
state was paid from -- from the employment on those
jobs, that we really would have been much better off
to have paid eight cents a ton more and got the
benefits of the coal severance and -- and -- and those
jobs. So many of you remember that in 2019, I had a
bill that -- actually, it was a resolution where we
asked the Public Service Commission to consider
more than just the – the lowest cost possible, and they
did that. They wrote some regulations, but they were
recently sued by an out-of-state coal company. We -we understand that these types of laws cannot run
afoul of interstate commerce. That’s why this bill has
been drafted in a way that makes sure that any
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jurisdiction, not just the State of Kentucky, that
provides or has severance taxes, that those would also
be considered there as well. The Public Service
Commission feels that it would be better for us to put
this in the statute than passing a resolution such as I
did in 2019, and then having them just make
regulations. So with that, I’d be happy to answer any
questions, but I would move for passage of Senate Bill
257.
SPEAKER OSBORNE: Question before the body
is passage of Senate Bill 257. Is there any discussion?
Seeing none, the clerk will sound the chimes. Those
in favor, vote aye. Those opposed, vote nay. And roll
call is open for your voting. Have all members voted?
Does any member wish to change or explain their
vote? The clerk will take the roll. Being 93 members
voting aye, one member voting nay, Senate Bill 257 is
passed. Gentleman from Webster.
REPRESENTATIVE
clincher.
GOOCH:
Move
for
the
SPEAKER OSBORNE: That objection clincher is
applied.
(CONCLUSION OF EXCERPT)
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[ON MAY 27, 2021]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
3 3:21-cv-00016-GFVT-EBA
FORESIGHT COAL SALES, LLC,
PLAINTIFF,
vs.
MICHAEL SCHMITT, et al.,
DEFENDANTS.
_________________________________________________
WITNESS: JEB PINNEY
_________________________________________________
The remote videotaped deposition of Jeb Pinney,
30(b)(6) designee of the Kentucky Public Service
Commission, was taken before Janine N. Leroux,
Stenographic Court Reporter and Notary Public in
and for the State of Kentucky at Large on Thursday,
May 27, 2021, commencing at the approximate hour
of 1:04 p.m. Said deposition was taken pursuant to
Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
90sa
*
*
*
Q. All right. Mr. Pinney, there was a draft
regulation and enacted regulation and now there’s SB
257, right?
A. When you refer to the regulation, you mean 807
Kentucky Administrative Regulation 5:056?
Q. 3 Sub 5, yes. The language specifically about
the backing out any coal severance tax from any
jurisdiction, right? That’s how the adopted regulation
was worded, correct?
A. Without looking at the regulation, that seems
consistent with what I would think.
*
*
*
Q. And that SB 257 language is virtually identical
to the language of the adopted regulation, correct?
A. With a few changes, I think materially it seems
to be the same.
Q. Materially it’s the same, right?
A. It appears to be, yes.
*
*
*
Q. Okay. And let’s look at 257 again, and again I’ll
ask you that this language instructs the PSC to treat
coal differently depending on where it was produced,
correct?
MR. KUHN: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I can answer?
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MR. KUHN: You can answer.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Under the law the only characteristic
that leads to differential treatment is the state of
origin for the coal, correct?
A. You -- you -- when you say under the law, are
you referring specifically to Senate Bill 257?
Q. Yes.
A. And then your question is that the only -- it only
relates to fuel coal severance taxes?
Q. My question was: Under SB 257 the only
characteristic that leads to differential treatment is
the coal’s state of origin, correct?
A. Okay. I thought you said under the law. But
under Senate Bill 257 I would agree, yes.
*
*
*
Q. When PSC is reviewing the reasonableness of a
coal purchase, the primary driver is cost, right?
A. I would say that there are other factors when
the commission is reviewing it, but I believe we
discussed some of those factors, including reliability
of -- of supply.
Q. Holding those things constant, cost drives the
analysis, agreed?
MR. KUHN: Objection, asked and answered.
Object to the form. You can answer.
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A. I would say it would be fair to characterize that
the cost is a -- one of the most substantial factors.
Q. And just to finish that thought, cost is one of the
most substantial factors in the PSC’s analysis of the
reasonableness of coal purchases, correct?
A. Yes.
*
*
*
Q. Okay. So when the PSC conducts its review for
reasonableness, it is required by SB 257 to use that
evaluated bid price minus coal severance taxes,
correct?
MR. KUHN: Objection, asked and answered.
A. That’s what the statute says.
Q. Okay. So for Kentucky, that would mean that
the PSC will review the utility’s evaluated price
minus 4.5 percent, correct?
A. Once again, assuming that that’s the -- the
Kentucky tax severance tax rate, correct.
Q. Okay. And when the PSC reviews a utility’s
purchase of an Illinois coal, it will not have any credit
for any kind of tax paid by that Illinois coal company,
correct?
MR. KUHN: Object to form. You can answer.
A. If Illinois has a severance tax, then that would
also be removed from the evaluation.
Q. Does Illinois have a severance tax?
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A. I honestly don’t know. I would hazard a guess
that because your client is based in Illinois, that it
does not.
*
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*
Q. Is there any other tax that would be backed out
from the Illinois coal producer’s evaluated cost?
A. Not under Senate Bill 257.
Q. Under any other PSC regulation?
A. Not of which I’m aware.
*
*
*
Q. Okay. So you told me earlier today that the PSC
is a creature of statute, right?
A. Correct.
Q. And SB 257 is a statute, right?
A. Yes.
Q. The PSC will follow that statute, right?
A. As a creature of statute, the commission would.
Q. Okay. In all instance, regardless of state of
origin, the utility actually pays the producer’s bid
price, right?
A. I -- I can assume that they do.
*
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Q. Let’s return to the regulation, the enacted
regulation for just a minute.
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The PSC’s purpose in promulgating that
regulation was to level the competitive landscape by
eliminating coal severance tax as a consideration in
utility’s coal purchasing decisions, right?
MR. KUHN: Object to the form.
A. Well, they -- there were several purposes to
amending the regulation, one of which was to -- and I
think -- yeah, it was to evaluate costs in a more
levelized basis and seek diverse -- diverse fuel
sources.
*
*
*
Q. In what way was it intended to level the
consideration?
A. You mean levelize?
Q. Sure.
A. By backing out the cost of any severance taxes.
Q. Why coal severance taxes in particular?
A. I -- I’m really not -- I cannot remember why that
was specifically chosen.
Q. Well, coal severance taxes vary from state to
state, right?
A. I would assume so.
Q. And lots of other taxes vary from state to state,
too, right?
A. I would assume so.
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Q. And other politically driven costs might vary
from state to state, right?
MR. KUHN: Object to form. What are politically
driven costs?
Q. As an example, minimum wage laws vary from
state to state, right?
A. That’s outside my ken of knowledge, but I would
assume so, yes.
Q. And environmental laws vary from state to
state, right?
A. I would assume so.
Q. Property taxes vary from state to state, right?
A. I would assume so.
Q. If we describe all of those things as politically
driven costs, meaning producers bear them because
states impose them, does that make sense?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And the PSC selected just one politically
driven cost for special treatment, correct?
MR. KUHN: Object to form.
A. Correct.
*
*
*
Q. Sure. The regulation did not levelized [sic]
consideration of competing interstate bids with
respect to politically driven costs, right?
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MR. KUHN: Object to form.
A. Do you mean all politically driven costs?
Q. I do.
A. Then it did not.
Q. The only thing it did was single out coal
severance tax, right?
MR. KUHN: Object to the form.
A. That is what the regulation says.
Q. And the same is true of SB 257, correct?
A. Correct.
*
*
*
Q. Sure. Neither the regulation nor SB 257 was
levelizing the consideration with respect to those
other taxes, correct?
A. If -- if you are referring to what you previously
called politically driven costs, then, yes.
Q. Okay. By backing out coal severance taxes, the
regulation was intended to make Kentucky coal more
competitive, correct?
MR. KUHN: Object to form.
A. I don’t believe that the regulation as
promulgated does that.
Q. Was it intended to do that?
A. Not as it was promulgated.
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Q. Was it intended to do that when it was first
drafted?
A. I think that it would be fair to say that because
it identified specifically the severance tax applied in
Kentucky, then it would -- it was originally drafted to
do so.
*
*
*
Q. Was the regulation adopted in response to HR
144?
A. In part, yes.
*
*
*
Q. Okay. Setting aside coal severance tax for a
moment, the PSC doesn’t assess how much of the
evaluated cost is caused by various state tax
structures, does it?
A. Not in my experience it does not.
Q. And it doesn’t assess how much was caused by
differing minimum wage laws, right?
A. In my experience the commission has not.
Q. And it doesn’t assess how any of those other
politically driven costs are baked into the evaluated
cost, right?
A. In my experience the commission has not.
Q. From the PSC’s perspective, there’s no effort to
differentiate earned competitive benefits from
unearned competitive benefits, is there?
MR. KUHN: Object to form.
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A. Could you describe both of those terms before I
answer?
Q. Let’s say that politically driven costs create
unearned competitive benefits. Does that make
sense?
A. Unearned? Unearned by whom?
Q. By the producer. So, for example, let’s say the
producer operates in a state with lower taxes, lower
minimum wage laws, et cetera, and is thus able to bid
lower amounts. Does that make sense?
A. Yes.
Q. Does the PSC undertake any effort to
differentiate those unearned competitive benefits
driven by politics from earned competitive benefits?
A. In my experience the commission has not.
*
*
*
Q. Okay. So you are aware of evidence that a
utility was reducing coal severance taxes from bid
prices, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And Foresight got no such deduction,
right?
A. Correct.
Q. Did Kentucky producers get that deduction
from that utility?
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A. Subject to check, I don’t know if in every
situation the -- the providence, the origin of the coal,
was listed. It just listed the subtraction of the
severance tax. So I -- in some cases the -- the name of
the -- of the coal company might have Kentucky in its
name, but in other situations it might not.
Q. Okay. I guess, in any event, some producers
were getting that deduction from the utility for coal
severance taxes, right?
A. Correct.
*
*
*
Q. And this is responses to the PSC from Kentucky
Utilities Company. Do you see that, Mr. Pinney?
A. I do.
*
*
*
Q. All right. So we are looking at the same request
and then this utility’s responses. Do you see that, Mr.
Pinney?
A. I do.
Q. And, again, they provided, it looks like, a
confidential set of bid evaluation sheets, is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. And do you have those sheets?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. Do you know whether this utility backed
out coal severance taxes on the bid evaluation sheets
you have in front of you?
100sa
A. Yes, they did. And I will say, it’s not just one
utility because both Louisville Gas & Electric and
Kentucky Utilities are somewhat the same company,
so their coal solicitations are done together.
*
*
*
Q. But it sounds like you’re saying that in this case
reducing the evaluated costs by severance taxes did
not affect the ranking, is that correct?
A. It -- it didn’t affect the award of the contracts.
Q. But it did affect the ranking?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So which rankings would change based
on severance tax? Or strike that.
Which rankings did change because of severance
tax?
A. Give me a second to double-check. This is -- it’s
really fine print. It takes me a second to read it.
Q. Sure.
A. It -- it appears that it changed the rankings for
three of the contracts.
Q. I’m sorry, when you say three of the contracts,
do you mean bids?
A. Yes, I apologize for that.
Q. Yeah, okay. I just want to be sure we’re talking
about the same thing.
101sa
So three of the bids would have been ranked
differently had coal severance tax not been deducted,
correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And they would have been ranked higher,
right?
A. Let me think about that. Yes.
Q. Okay. Would any of them have moved into a
position where they would have been awarded the
contract?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Not in this case anyway, right?
A. Yes.
*
*
*
Q. Is that true that the PSC did not want SB 257
to be enacted?
A. I think it’s accurate to say the commission did
not ask for it at all.
Q. Well, that’s a different question. Did they want
it to be enacted?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because -- honestly, because we wanted to wrap
up the litigation, put it behind us. I have a great deal
of respect for our attorneys from the Attorney
102sa
General’s Office, but the commission is not interested
in paying attorneys’ fees.
Q. So basically you didn’t want to get sued again,
in short?
A. Yes.
*
*
*
Q. All right. I want to just make sure that I
understood a couple of things from our conversation
about the bid evaluation sheets.
One is that the PSC has received information from
utilities to show that the regulation affected
evaluated prices, correct?
A. Once again, I don’t know that the regulation
affects the utilities. The commission asked for that
information.
Q. Well, I guess maybe a different way of putting
it would be that you received information showing
that utilities were backing out coal severance taxes
from evaluated prices, correct?
A. Some utilities, correct.
Q. Okay. And that information also shows that at
least in one instance the utilities backing out coal
severance taxes changed the rankings of bids, correct?
A. Not -- the rankings, but not the awards.
Q. Right, yeah, just the rankings.
A. Yes.
103sa
Q. Correct?
A. Yes.
*
*
*
Q. And, Mr. Pinney, you are the speaker here. Do
you see that?
A. Yes. Can you make it just slightly a bit smaller?
I can’t see one of the edges.
Q. Sure.
A. Okay. Thank you. Hold on. I have to switch
glasses to see that now.
Q. I want to direct your attention toward the
bottom of the kind of top right rectangle there to Line
21.
A. Right.
Q. And you say in 2019, in response to the joint
resolution from the legislature: The PSC undertook to
amend many of the provisions in the fuel adjustment
clause. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And one of them was to address a request to
incent the burning of Kentucky coal over others, do
you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. What does that mean?
104sa
A. I believe that meant that by backing out -- and
this is in the original version, not the one that was
enacted. The one that’s going to be deleted -Q. SB 257 -A. -- per the regulation.
Q. Go ahead.
A. I’m sorry. I was -- this was in regard to the -the original version of the -- of the regulation before it
was amended before comment.
Q. Right. And it was intended to incentivize
utilities to burn Kentucky coal?
A. That was one -- one of the reasons. I don’t think
that that’s -- yeah, yeah, yeah.
Q. The PSC’s response to all of these concerns
about utilities having to buy more expensive coal was
that there are occasions when Section 3, Sub 5 will
require utilities to select a fuel source that is slightly
more expensive than the alternative based on the
proposed language. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
*
*
*
Q. So I’m asking whether the first sentence of that
response you see in Part B is true.
A. Yes.
*
*
*
105sa
Q. And we talked earlier about how the regulation
and SB 257 are in all material respects identical,
right?
A. Yes.
*
*
*
Q. Okay. Why would the regulation require
utilities to select a fuel source that is slightly more
expensive?
A. Well, I think that if -- if read with the totality of
the rest of the -- the rest of the discussion, that it’s
just one factor to be considered in the reasonableness
of the purchase of -- of fuel.
Q. Yeah, not my question.
A. Oh.
Q. The question -- you’ve already said that the
statement is true. I’m asking: Why would the
regulation require utilities to select a fuel source
that’s slightly more expensive?
MR. KUHN: Objection, asked and answered. You
can answer.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
A. It would not -- it would require the utility to
purchase that fuel in this -- under the penalty or
under the possibility, not the penalty, that the
commission might disallow certain fuel costs.
*
*
*
106sa
Q. Okay. This is the Attorney General’s letter, and
he says: The adjustment to offset coal severance tax
would cause Kentucky coal to be priced more
competitively in comparison to some states and less
competitively with respect to other states. Do you see
that?
MR. HAMMACK: Manny, you can highlight it for
him.
A. Is that about the third sentence down?
Q. Yeah.
A. Okay. I see that.
Q. Is that statement true?
A. In a vacuum, yes.
Q. Okay. A couple lines down it says: While the
regulation might arguably benefit coal producers in
Kentucky relative to those in Indiana or Illinois. Do
you see that?
A. I’m sorry, in relative, is that -Q. The regulation might arguably benefit the coal
producers in Kentucky relative to those in Indiana or
Illinois.
MR. HAMMACK: Manny, you can highlight it for
him?
A. I’ve got it.
Q. Okay. Is that statement true?
A. I would give a qualified yes.
107sa
Q. Okay. What’s the qualification?
A. That there are still other factors that go into a
general coal electricity generator’s evaluation of -- of
the cost of the fuel.
*
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*
Q. Do you agree that it favors Kentucky coal
producers to the detriment of some out-of-state
interests?
MR. KUHN: Object to the form.
A. No, I don’t agree.
Q. Well, you just said that it would make Kentucky
coal more competitive as compared to Illinois and
Indiana, right?
A. Yes.
*
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*
108sa
[ON JUNE 7, 2022]
TRANSCRIPTION OF AUDIO OF
THE ORAL ARGUMENTS FROM THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH CIRCUIT
RE: FORESIGHT COAL SALES v.
KENT CHANDLER
APPEARANCES:
JUDGE ALICE BATCHELDER
JUDGE ERIC CLAY
JUDGE JOAN LARSEN
JOSHUA HAMMACK, ESQ.
MATTHEW F. KUHN, ESQ.
*
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JUDGE LARSEN: But going back to facial
discrimination, it seems to me that you argue that the
purpose here is to level the playing field, and you
argue that in order to survive, an advantage must be
earned by the industry. What does an “earned
advantage” mean? Why don’t they earn their
advantage by not having a severance tax?
MR. KUHN: So I think we have to look at Hunt as
an example of what’s earned. The Washington apple
industry there was investing roughly a million dollars
a year in complying with Washington state grade, and
the court -JUDGE LARSEN: Which was mandated by the
Washington state legislature.
MR. KUHN: State law, correct.
109sa
And so they were spending a million dollars a year
of their own money to grade -JUDGE LARSEN: Under compulsion.
MR. KUHN: Under compulsion. They were
businesses there to make money.
JUDGE LARSEN: Right.
MR. KUHN: That were grade -JUDGE LARSEN: But the state made them do
that. So it was state law that required them to do that.
So you can’t be saying well, they didn’t earn their
advantage because there’s no state law that imposes
the severance tax.
MR. KUHN: If you look at the quote from the
opinion in Hunt, it talks about the Washington apple
industry earning the advantage. They were able to
command -JUDGE LARSEN: Earned it under compulsion by
a state agency. Okay.
MR. KUHN: Another way to think about that
though is would you say that having to -- not to pay a
coal severance tax allows somebody to command a
market advantage?
JUDGE LARSEN: Sure. Why not? So their
minimum wage is $12 an hour.
MR. KUHN: So ---
JUDGE LARSEN: Your minimum wage is 7.25. So
MR. KUHN: Assuming that’s true, then --
JUDGE LARSEN: -- didn’t you earn an advantage
in your labor market by not raising your minimum
110sa
wage above the federal minimum wage? They got to
pay higher labor costs in Illinois.
MR. KUHN: So I think the problem with that
argument is we get to a point where Kentucky can
never repeal its coal severance tax -JUDGE LARSEN: Why?
MR. KUHN: -- because it’s created, under their
paradigm has created an advantage for out-of-state
coal producers that’s protected by the Dormant
Commerce Clause. They’re saying their advantage -JUDGE LARSEN: I don’t understand that here.
Can you -MR. KUHN: So they’re saying that the advantage
that they have by not paying a coal severance tax is
protected by the Dormant Commerce Clause. If that
advantage is protected by the constitution, how can
Kentucky eliminate that?
JUDGE LARSEN: Well, it’s -- it’s just that you
can’t -- you’d have to impose the costs on your own
people. You’d have to -- you could withdraw the
severance tax. If you withdraw -- drew the severance
tax, Kentucky coffers would be diminished. You just
wouldn’t be exporting the costs to another state.
MR. KUHN: Think about this from an effects
perspective, though. If we repealed our severance tax
-JUDGE LARSEN: Uh-huh.
MR. KUHN: -- a Kentucky coal producer and an
Illinois coal producer would be in the exact same
shoes than the -- than Senate Bill 257, if Senate Bill
257 were in effect.
111sa
I don’t understand how you can get to a
discriminatory effect -JUDGE LARSEN: Because you want to have your
cake and eat it, too. You want the revenue from the
severance tax, and you want your -- you want your
market for coal not to be affected by the fact that they
don’t have -- so let me just ask the question. Could
they do the same thing with respect to the labor
component of producing coal, so they – so Illinois
could enact the exact same thing for its regulated coal
industry? It’s just going to discount the prices by the
$5 an hour labor gap.
MR. KUHN: Of course. It’s a -- it is an -- just like
Kentucky could reduce its minimum wage, they could
reduce the minimum wage. They could regulate in the
same way.
*
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*
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.