Respondents Brief — Corner Post, Inc., Petitioner v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Supreme Court briefJun 16, 2023

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 22-1008

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CORNER POST, INC., PETITIONER

v.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL

RESERVE SYSTEM

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

BRIAN M. BOYNTON

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

DANIEL TENNY

SARAH CLARK

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the court of appeals correctly held that petitioner’s freestanding challenge to a rule adopted by

the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

in 2011 was untimely under the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) because petitioner had

brought that challenge more than six years after the

rule was adopted.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statement ...................................................................................... 1

Argument....................................................................................... 7

Conclusion ................................................................................... 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) ..................... 22

Auction Co. of America v. FDIC,

132 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................................. 13

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) ............................ 15, 23

Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension

Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc.,

522 U.S. 192 (1997).............................................................. 12

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).............................. 8, 11

California Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec.,

Inc., 582 U.S. 497 (2017) ..................................................... 15

California Sea Urchin Comm’n v. Bean,

828 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................. 17

Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton,

453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006) ............................................. 7

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402 (1971)........................................................ 16, 22

Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell,

751 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ............................................. 12

Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v.

United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,

101 F.3d 939 (3d Cir. 1996) ................................................ 17

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds,

566 U.S. 221 (2012).............................................................. 16

(III)

IV

Cases—Continued:

Page

Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States,

386 U.S. 503 (1967).............................................................. 13

Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc.

v. National Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283

(5th Cir. 1997)............................................................ 6, 14, 17

Hardin v. Jackson, 625 F.3d 739 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ............... 8

Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809 (2004) ............................... 7, 9, 17

Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co.,

571 U.S. 99 (2013) ............................................................... 10

Herr v. United States Forest Serv.,

803 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 2015) ...................................... 7, 18-21

Hire Order Ltd. v. Marianos,

698 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2012) ............................................... 17

Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Kimbell,

558 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2009) ................................................. 6

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .......... 17

Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n,

497 U.S. 871 (1990).............................................................. 10

NACS v. Board of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.:

958 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2013) ..................................... 4

746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied,

574 U.S. 1121 (2015) ........................................... 2-4, 14

National Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Def.,

138 S. Ct. 617 (2018) ......................................................... 2, 9

Odyssey Logistics & Tech. Corp. v. Iancu,

959 F.3d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ........................................... 18

Outdoor Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Department

of Homeland Sec., 983 F.3d 671 (4th Cir. 2020),

cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 425 (2021) ....................................... 6

PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris

Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051 (2019) ......................... 15

V

Cases—Continued:

Page

Paucar v. Attorney Gen.,

545 Fed. Appx. 121 (3d Cir. 2013) ....................................... 6

Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

498 F.3d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2007), withdrawn

and superseded on reh’g, 517 F.3d 1299

(Fed. Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 7

Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58 (1926) ........................... 12

Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States,

906 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................... 7

Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 1997) .............. 7

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) ................................ 22

Trafalgar Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Cuomo,

159 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

527 U.S. 1035 (1999).............................................................. 6

Wilkins v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 870 (2023) .................... 9

Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009) ........................... 6

Statutes and regulations:

Administrative Orders Review Act,

ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq.) ................ 12

28 U.S.C. 2344 .................................................................. 12

Administrative Procedure Act,

Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392

(5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., 701 et seq.) .......................................... 1

sec. 1, § 702, 80 Stat. 392 ................................................. 10

5 U.S.C. 553(e) ........................................................... 15, 23

5 U.S.C. 555(e) ................................................................. 15

5 U.S.C. 702 ...............................................10, 11, 13, 15, 16

5 U.S.C. 703 ...................................................................... 15

5 U.S.C. 704 .............................................................. 2, 8, 10

5 U.S.C. 706 ...................................................................... 15

5 U.S.C. 706(2) ................................................................... 4

VI

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

Page

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) .............................................................. 8

5 U.S.C. 706(2)(C) .............................................................. 8

Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.................. 12

33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) ........................................................ 12

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform

and Consumer Protection Act,

Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 .................................... 3

Electronic Fund Transfer Act,

15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq. ............................................................ 3

15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(a)(2) ..................................................... 3

15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(a)(3)(A) ................................................ 3

15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(c)(8)...................................................... 2

Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987,

Pub. L. No. 100-184, 101 Stat. 1274 .................................. 18

§ 5, 101 Stat. 1275-1276 ................................................... 18

12 U.S.C. 1848 ........................................................................ 13

16 U.S.C. 7804(d)(1) ............................................................... 13

21 U.S.C. 348(g)(1) ................................................................. 13

28 U.S.C. 2401(a) .......................................... 2, 5-11, 13, 15, 20

29 U.S.C. 655(f ) ...................................................................... 13

39 U.S.C. 3663 ........................................................................ 13

49 U.S.C. 30161(a) ................................................................. 13

12 C.F.R.:

Section 235.3(b).................................................................. 3

Section 235.4 ...................................................................... 3

Miscellaneous:

Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing:

75 Fed. Reg. 81,722 (Dec. 28, 2010) ................................. 3

76 Fed. Reg. 43,394 (July 20, 2011) ............................. 2, 3

80 Fed. Reg. 48,684 (Aug. 14, 2015) ................................. 4

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 22-1008

CORNER POST, INC., PETITIONER

v.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL

RESERVE SYSTEM

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-15)

is reported at 55 F.4th 634. The order of the district

court (Pet. App. 16-40) is not published in the Federal

Supplement but is available at 2022 WL 909317.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

December 14, 2022. On March 8, 2023, Justice Kavanaugh extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including April 13,

2023, and the petition was filed on that date. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L.

No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., 701 et seq.),

(1)

2

authorizes “suit in a federal district court to obtain review of any ‘final agency action for which there is no

other adequate remedy in a court.’ ” National Ass’n of

Mfrs. v. Department of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2018)

(quoting 5 U.S.C. 704). “Those suits generally must be

filed within six years after the claim accrues,” id. at 626627, because of the general-purpose statute of limitations for claims against the United States. That provision states that, except in certain government-contracting

disputes, civil actions against the United States are

“barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).

2. This case involves an APA suit brought in 2021 to

obtain judicial review of a regulation adopted in 2011 by

the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

(Board). Pet. App. 1-4; see Debit Card Interchange

Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394 (July 20, 2011).

The rule in question addresses certain fees charged

in connection with the use of debit cards. When a consumer uses a debit card to make a purchase from a merchant, the merchant typically bears the cost of, inter

alia, an “interchange fee” received by the bank that issued the debit card. 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,394 n.2, 43,396.

The interchange fee “compensat[es] [the] issuer for its

involvement” in the transaction. Id. at 43,394 n.2; see

15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(c)(8) (defining “interchange transaction fee”). Its amount is set by the networks, such as

Visa and Mastercard, that process debit-card transactions. 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396.

Until 2010, networks had complete discretion to determine the interchange-fee amount, as well as an incentive to increase that amount in order to compete for

business from the issuing banks. See NACS v. Board of

Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 746 F.3d 474, 479 (D.C. Cir.

3

2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1121 (2015). Merchants had

little power to resist rising interchange fees short of refusing to accept Visa and Mastercard debit cards altogether. Ibid. As a result, by 2009, the average interchange fee for all debit-card transactions had grown to

44 cents per transaction, or 1.15% of the average transaction amount. 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,397.

To address rising interchange fees, Congress enacted the “Durbin Amendment” as part of the 2010

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124

Stat. 1376; see NACS, 746 F.3d at 479-480; Pet. App. 2.

The amendment modified the Electronic Fund Transfer

Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq., to require, inter alia, that

“[t]he amount of any interchange transaction fee * * *

be reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by

the issuer with respect to the transaction.” 15 U.S.C.

1693o-2(a)(2). The amendment also directed the Board

to promulgate regulations implementing that requirement. 15 U.S.C. 1693o-2(a)(3)(A).

In late 2010, the Board issued a notice of proposed

rulemaking. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722 (Dec. 28, 2010). The Board received thousands of comments on the proposed rule, including comments from issuers, networks, merchants,

consumers, consumer advocates, trade associations,

and Members of Congress. In July 2011, after evaluating those comments, the Board issued a final rule known

as Regulation II. 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394. Regulation II

capped the interchange fee at 21 cents per transaction,

plus 0.05% of the transaction’s value. Id. at 43,422; see

12 C.F.R. 235.3(b). Eligible issuers may also receive

a one-cent addition known as the fraud-prevention adjustment. See 12 C.F.R. 235.4.

4

3. Shortly thereafter, several merchant groups, including NACS (formerly the National Association of

Convenience Stores) and the National Retail Federation, brought an APA challenge to Regulation II in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Contending that the fee cap was too high, those

plaintiffs alleged that Regulation II violated the Durbin

Amendment and was arbitrary, capricious, and an

abuse of discretion. See NACS, 746 F.3d at 481-482;

5 U.S.C. 706(2). As relevant here, the district court

agreed with the merchant groups that the interchangefee portion of Regulation II violated the APA, and held

that the proper remedy was to vacate that portion of the

rule (though the court stayed its judgment pending appeal). NACS v. Board of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.,

958 F. Supp. 2d 85, 99, 115-116 (D.D.C. 2013); see Mem.

Order, NACS, supra, No. 11-cv-2075 (Sept. 19, 2013)

(granting stay pending appeal).

The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that “the interchange fee rule generally rests on a reasonable interpretation of the statute.” NACS, 746 F.3d at 493. The

court did “remand one minor issue—the Board’s treatment of so-called transactions-monitoring costs”—to

the Board for further explanation. Id. at 477, 492-493.

The court recognized, however, that “vacatur of the rule

would be disruptive” because it “would lead to an entirely unregulated market, allowing the average interchange fee to once again reach or exceed 44 cents per

transaction.” Id. at 493. Anticipating that the Board

might “well be able to articulate a sufficient explanation” on remand, the court determined that vacatur was

unnecessary. Ibid. On remand, the Board issued an additional explanation of its reasoning on transactionsmonitoring costs. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and

5

Routing, 80 Fed. Reg. 48,684 (Aug. 14, 2015) (Clarification). The plaintiffs that had previously challenged

Regulation II did not challenge that explanation, and

the rule has accordingly remained in effect for more

than a decade.

4. a. In April 2021, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA) filed a new APA suit challenging Regulation II in the United States District

Court for the District of North Dakota. Pet. App. 18

n.2, 23-24. NDRA and NDPMA, which had both submitted comments in response to the Board’s 2010 notice

of proposed rulemaking, asserted claims “nearly identical to the claims” previously considered in NACS. Id.

at 23; see id. at 14.

In July 2021, after the Board moved to dismiss based

on the statute of limitations, NDRA and NDPMA

amended their complaint to add petitioner, Corner

Post, Inc., as a plaintiff. Pet. App. 3. Petitioner operates a truck stop and convenience store in Watford City,

North Dakota, and is a member of both NDRA and

NDPMA. Id. at 52-53. It incorporated on June 26, 2017,

and commenced operations in March 2018. Id. at 52.

Petitioner asserted the same claims and requested the

same relief as NDRA and NDPMA. Id. at 84-85.

b. The district court granted the government’s renewed motion to dismiss. Pet. App. 16-40.

The district court held, inter alia, that in an APA

challenge to an agency regulation, Section 2401(a)’s sixyear statute of limitations “begins to run on the publication date” of the regulation in the Federal Register.

Pet. App. 32. The court concluded that, because Regulation II was published on July 20, 2011, “all facial challenges must have been brought before July 20, 2017.”

6

Ibid. The court explained that, although Corner Post

“did not exist as a legal entity until June 26, 2017,” that

fact had “no bearing on when the statute of limitations

runs.” Id. at 32-33. The court noted that Section

2401(a) would not foreclose challenges to “further

[agency] action applying” Regulation II to a particular

party, but pointed out that the challenge here is not of

that nature. Id. at 35 n.8 (citation omitted).

c. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-15.

The court of appeals held that, “when plaintiffs bring

a facial challenge to a final agency action, the right of

action accrues, and the limitations period begins to run,

upon publication of the regulation.” Pet. App. 11.1 Under that approach, “[f ]or facial challenges, liability is

fixed and plaintiffs have a complete and present cause

of action upon publication of the final agency action.”

Id. at 12. The court observed that this result comported

with its own precedent, id. at 11 (citing Izaak Walton

League of America, Inc. v. Kimbell, 558 F.3d 751, 761

(8th Cir. 2009)), and with the decisions of other courts

of appeals, id. at 7-11 (citing, inter alia, Trafalgar Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Cuomo, 159 F.3d 21, 34 (1st Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Wong v. Doar,

571 F.3d 247, 263 (2d Cir. 2009); Paucar v. Attorney

Gen., 545 Fed. Appx. 121, 124 (3d Cir. 2013); Outdoor

Amusement Bus. Ass’n v. Department of Homeland

Sec., 983 F.3d 671, 681-682 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,

142 S. Ct. 425 (2021); Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1287

The court of appeals used the term “facial challenge” to refer to

a challenge to an agency’s adoption of a generally applicable regulation, as distinct from an “as-applied” challenge brought with respect to an agency’s application of an existing regulation to a particular party. See Pet. App. 10-11; Pet. 17.

1

7

(5th Cir. 1997); Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631

(6th Cir. 1997); Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United

States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); Center for

Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 13341335 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Harris v. FAA, 353

F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809

(2004); Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 498

F.3d 1265, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 517 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).

In urging a later accrual date, the plaintiffs relied in

part on Herr v. United States Forest Service, 803 F.3d

809 (2015), in which the Sixth Circuit found that a different accrual rule applied when the plaintiff “does not

suffer any injury until after the agency’s final action.”

Pet. App. 10 (quoting Herr, 803 F.3d at 820). The court

of appeals observed, however, that while the Herr decision “did not distinguish between as-applied and facial

challenges,” ibid., treating the two differently was consistent with the precedents of other circuits, see id. at

10-12. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument

that “the statute of limitations renewed when the Board

published the Clarification in 2015.” Id. at 4. The court

explained that “[t]he Clarification did nothing to change

Regulation II, which remains the final agency action

since its publication in 2011.” Id. at 5.2

ARGUMENT

Petitioner contends (Pet. 20-31) that, under Section

2401(a), a newly incorporated entity has six years to file

APA challenges against any pre-existing agency regulations that might affect its interests, regardless of how

Petitioner does not seek review of the court of appeals’ determination with respect to the 2015 Clarification. See Pet. i.

2

8

long ago those agency regulations were adopted and regardless of whether the agency has taken any steps to

enforce the regulations against the newly incorporated

entity. The court of appeals correctly rejected that contention, and its decision is consistent with other circuits’

decisions concerning the time limits for pursuing facial

challenges to agency rules. This case would in any event

be a poor vehicle in which to address the question presented. The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

1. a. Subject to certain exceptions, the APA establishes a cause of action to challenge “final agency action” that, as relevant here, is “arbitrary,” “capricious,”

“in excess of statutory * * * authority,” or “short of

statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. 704, 706(2)(A) and (C); see

5 U.S.C. 704 (providing that “final agency action for

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court” is

“subject to judicial review”). In order to qualify as final

agency action subject to challenge under that cause of

action, “two conditions must be satisfied.” Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997). “First, the action must

mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” rather than a “tentative or interlocutory”

step. Id. at 177-178 (citation omitted). “And second, the

action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations [will]

have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’ ” Id. at 178 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, when an agency makes a final decision

that determines legal rights or obligations, or that gives

rise to legal consequences, the “right of action” established by the APA “accrues.” 28 U.S.C. 2401(a). Under

Section 2401(a), a challenger must then bring suit

within six years, or its claim “shall be barred.” Ibid.;

see, e.g., Hardin v. Jackson, 625 F.3d 739, 743 (D.C. Cir.

9

2010) (“Under this statute, a party challenging final

agency action must commence his suit within six years

after the right of action accrues and the ‘right of action

first accrues on the date of the final agency action.’ ”)

(quoting Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809 (2004)); see also National

Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Department of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 626627 (2018) (applying 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) to APA claim).

And because that time limit applies exclusively to suits

“against the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), it directly implicates the “general proposition” that “ ‘a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity . . . must be

strictly construed.’ ” Wilkins v. United States, 143

S. Ct. 870, 879 (2023) (citation omitted).

Under this approach, an APA challenge to an agency

regulation “first accrues” when the regulation becomes

final and therefore subject to judicial review, without

regard to the circumstances of an individual plaintiff.

That reading is supported by a limited tolling rule incorporated into Section 2401(a). The last sentence of

Section 2401(a) states that “[t]he action of any person

under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the

claim accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases.” 28 U.S.C. 2401(a). That language presupposes that a claim can “accrue[]” even

while a specific potential plaintiff is subject to a “legal

disability.” Ibid. Petitioner’s view of the statute, under

which a claim cannot accrue until the plaintiff satisfies

all legal prerequisites to suit (see Pet. 20, 22), is inconsistent with that premise.

NDRA and NDPMA filed this suit in April 2021, and

petitioner was added as a plaintiff in July 2021, more

than ten years after the Board finalized Regulation II.

10

See Pet. App. 3, 43. Section 2401(a) accordingly barred

the suit from going forward. See id. at 4-15.

b. Petitioner contends (Pet. 21-25) that Section 1 of

the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, requires a different result. That

argument is incorrect.

Under the first sentence of Section 702, a plaintiff

must be “adversely affected or aggrieved” by final

agency action in order to maintain an APA challenge to

that action. 5 U.S.C. 702. A plaintiff thus “must establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement,

or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the ‘zone of

interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.” Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871,

883 (1990) (citation and emphases omitted). “[T]his

Court has often construed statutes of limitations to

commence when the plaintiff is permitted to file suit.”

Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571

U.S. 99, 106 (2013). Based on that line of authority, petitioner argues (Pet. 20-25) that the statute of limitations on a particular plaintiff ’s APA claim cannot begin

to run until that plaintiff has been adversely affected or

aggrieved within the meaning of Section 702.

Petitioner’s argument reflects a misunderstanding

of Section 702’s role in the statutory scheme. As explained above, at least in the context of facial challenges

to agency rules, a “right of action first accrues” within

the meaning of Section 2401(a) when the relevant

agency rule becomes final and thus reviewable under

5 U.S.C. 704. Section 702 performs the distinct function

of identifying the class of persons who can sue at that

time. Nothing in Section 702’s text suggests that the

provision is also intended to establish an alternative

11

deadline for filing suit in the (relatively uncommon) circumstance where a person who was not injured when

the rule was promulgated becomes injured at a later

date. To the contrary, Section 702’s final sentence

states that “[n]othing herein”—i.e., nothing within Section 702—“affects other limitations on judicial review or

the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or

deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable

ground.” 5 U.S.C. 702.

Section 702 therefore cannot delay the running of the

statute of limitations once the other predicates to APA

review are complete—i.e., once the agency finalizes

a decision that establishes legal rights or obligations.

See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177. At that point, affected

parties have six years to bring suit in cases governed by

Section 2401(a), as NACS and the National Retail Federation did with respect to Regulation II. See pp. 4-5,

supra. But once the limitations period expires, plaintiffs cannot bring new challenges years or decades later

on the ground that Section 702 precluded them from doing so at an earlier date.

c. The approach described above, which petitioner

acknowledges (Pet. 13-16) has been applied in the lower

courts for decades, is hardly anomalous. See Pet. App.

7-11 (collecting lower-court cases). In a variety of circumstances, Congress has established deadlines for suit

that run from the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, without regard to any circumstances peculiar to

the plaintiff. That choice generally reflects “practical

considerations” that “require that the period should

begin to run from [a] definitely ascertained” time, “rather than the uncertain time” that would result if commencement of the limitations period remained in the

control of, or dependent upon, potential plaintiffs.

12

Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 64 (1926); see id. at

65 (“An interpretation of a statute purporting to set

a definite limitation * * * which would, nevertheless,

leave defendants subject indefinitely to actions for the

wrong done, would, we think, defeat its obvious purpose.”).

Such considerations are especially pronounced in the

context of broadly applicable agency regulations. See,

e.g., Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, 751 F.3d 659,

663 (D.C. Cir. 2014). A belated facial challenge to an

agency rule may implicate the reliance interests not

only of the agency involved, but also of other private

parties (such as the networks whose interchange fees

are governed by Regulation II) that have a practical

stake in the rule’s validity. It is therefore commonplace

for Congress to provide that challenges to agency action

are untimely if they are not brought within a specified

period after the agency acts, even if a particular plaintiff did not yet have “a complete and present cause of

action.” Pet. 4 (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry

Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,

Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)).

Challenges under the Administrative Orders Review

Act (Hobbs Act), ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (28 U.S.C. 2341

et seq.), for example, must be brought “within 60 days

after * * * entry” of the order in question. 28 U.S.C.

2344. Challenges to certain standards adopted by the

Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., must be filed

“within 120 days from the date of ” the agency order. 33

U.S.C. 1369(b)(1). And as petitioner recognizes (Pet. 24),

other administrative-review statutes contain “a whole

host of similar time restrictions” that commence to run

13

upon the occurrence of specified agency actions, without regard to a particular plaintiff ’s capacity to sue at

that time.

See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 1848; 16 U.S.C.

7804(d)(1); 21 U.S.C. 348(g)(1); 29 U.S.C. 655(f ); 39

U.S.C. 3663; 49 U.S.C. 30161(a). The existence of such

limitations provisions disproves petitioner’s assertion

(Pet. 29) that applying an identical rule for APA claims

would produce “absurd results.”

Petitioner observes (Pet. 2, 25) that those other

administrative-review statutes explicitly refer to the

date of the agency action, while Section 2401(a) does

not. But that difference simply reflects Section 2401(a)’s

status as a “catch-all limit for non-tort actions against

the United States.” Auction Co. of America v. FDIC,

132 F.3d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see 28 U.S.C. 2401(a)

(providing rule under which “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred,” with

one narrow exception). It therefore would make no

sense for Section 2401(a) to specify the date of any particular type of agency action as the point at which its

limitations period begins to run. Cf. Crown Coat Front

Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517 (1967) (“The

Court has pointed out before * * * the hazards * * *

in attempting to define for all purposes when a ‘cause of

action’ first ‘accrues.’ ”). Instead, Congress specified in

the APA that the injury-or-aggrievement requirement

in Section 702 would not “affect[] other limitations on

judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. 702. Because all of the other

prerequisites to judicial review under the APA are necessarily satisfied on the date of the challenged agency

action, that restriction ensures that the limitations period in Section 2401(a) begins to run on that date without any need for Section 2401(a) itself to refer to agency

action.

14

d. Contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 26), interpreting the limitations period for APA challenges to

operate in the same manner as the limitations periods

applicable to other administrative-review provisions

does not “improperly insulate[] agency actions from judicial review.” Judicial review remains available in numerous ways. First, agency actions that affect significant numbers of individuals or businesses often face

timely challenges by associations that represent their

members’ interests, as the 2011 suit by NACS, the National Retail Federation, and other merchant groups illustrates. See NACS v. Board of Governors of Fed. Res.

Sys., 746 F.3d 474, 480-481 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1121 (2015). There is no reason to believe

that petitioner would have filed its own challenge if it

had existed when NACS was proceeding. Petitioner did

not even join this suit until the government moved to

dismiss as untimely the claims brought by NDRA and

NDPMA (of which petitioner was already a member),

and petitioner ultimately pressed claims that were

“nearly identical” to those asserted in NACS a decade

earlier. Pet. App. 23.

Second, when an agency takes new final agency action, adversely affected parties may bring a timely APA

challenge to that new action. That includes (but is not

limited to) circumstances in which the agency applies an

existing regulation to a plaintiff that chose not to challenge, or was unable to challenge, the rule when it was

first adopted. See Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1287

(5th Cir. 1997) (stating that cases allowing such challenges “do not create an exception from the general rule

that the limitations period begins to run from the date

of publication in the Federal Register,” but “merely

15

stand for the proposition that an agency’s application of

a rule to a party creates a new, six-year cause of action

to challenge * * * the agency’s constitutional or statutory authority”).

Third, entities like petitioner can pursue another

course “set forth explicitly in the APA: a petition to the

agency for rulemaking, denial of which must be justified

by a statement of reasons, and can be appealed to the

courts.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 459 (1997) (citing 5 U.S.C. 553(e), 555(e), 702, 706).

Fourth, when an agency relies on a pre-existing regulation in “civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement,” the regulation is generally “subject to judicial review” in that proceeding even if the time for

bringing a freestanding challenge has passed. 5 U.S.C.

703; see PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2062 (2019) (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that Congress ordinarily allows for “as-applied review in enforcement proceedings”).

Those existing mechanisms provide ample opportunities for judicial review. Policy concerns about agencies engaging in “machinations to evade judicial scrutiny,” Pet. 26, accordingly do not support petitioner’s

approach to Section 2401(a).

e. Indeed, to the extent policy considerations are

relevant, the practical problems with petitioner’s approach weigh against imputing it to Congress. See California Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 582

U.S. 497, 514 (2017) (rejecting a proffered interpretation of a particular statute of limitations in part because

“[t]he limitless nature of [the] argument * * * reveals

its implausibility”).

16

As the district court observed, “[u]nder [petitioner’s]

theory, anytime an individual wanted to bring a facial

challenge against an agency rule or regulation beyond

the six-year statute of limitations, all a party would

need to do is create a new entity that would be subject

to the Rule.” Pet. App. 35-36. That understanding

“plainly contravenes the purpose of the statute of limitations,” id. at 36, which is “to protect defendants

against stale or unduly delayed claims,” Credit Suisse

Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 566 U.S. 221, 227 (2012)

(citation omitted) (describing “the general purpose of

statutes of limitations”).

Petitioner’s rule would also present serious problems of judicial administration. The present suit was

filed a decade after the Board adopted the challenged

regulation, and petitioner’s approach would allow for

challenges to regulations that have been on the books

for far longer—indeed, it has no logical stopping point.

Under that approach, the passage of time between the

challenged agency action and the filing of the complaint

could make it difficult or impossible for an agency to assemble “the full administrative record that was before

the Secretary at the time he made his decision,” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

420 (1971), which ordinarily provides the basis for judicial review.

Moreover, if the statute of limitations on an APA

claim began to run only when a particular plaintiff possessed a justiciable cause of action, courts could be

forced to conduct retrospective analyses to determine

when the plaintiff became “aggrieved” by the challenged action within the meaning of Section 702. To decide whether a conservation organization’s challenge to

the construction of a new dam was timely, for example,

17

a court might need to determine whether any of the organization’s members had first formed “concrete plans”

to “observe an animal species” threatened by construction of the dam more than six years before the suit was

filed. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562,

564 (1992). “[C]ourts are not well suited” to that sort

of “hypothetical retrospective ripeness analysis.” Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. United States

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d

Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.). Routinely requiring such analyses

“would wreak havoc with the congressional intention

that repose be brought to final agency action.” Ibid. (citation omitted).

2. Petitioner contends that the decision below implicates a “square, entrenched circuit split.” Pet. 11 (emphasis omitted). That too is incorrect.

Petitioner recognizes (Pet. 13-16) that most courts of

appeals to address the question presented have rejected

petitioner’s approach. See, e.g., California Sea Urchin

Comm’n v. Bean, 828 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2016)

(noting longstanding holdings that the applicable limitations period “runs from when the agency action becomes final and is published in the Federal Register”

and “may run against a plaintiff even if it is not injured

until more than six years after the relevant agency action became final”); Hire Order Ltd. v. Marianos, 698

F.3d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that

challenge to 1969 firearms regulation “did not accrue

until [plaintiffs] became federally licensed firearms

dealers in 2008”); Harris, 353 F.3d at 1012-1013 (D.C.

Cir.) (holding that six-year statute of limitation started

to run when the agency published its 1993 notice, “notwithstanding [plaintiffs’] pocketbooks did not feel it until years later”); Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest,

18

Inc., 112 F.3d at 1287 (5th Cir.) (“On a facial challenge

to a regulation, the limitations period begins to run

when the agency publishes the regulation in the Federal

Register.”); see also Odyssey Logistics & Tech. Corp. v.

Iancu, 959 F.3d 1104, 1111-1112 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2020)

(observing that the Federal Circuit’s rule for facial challenges “accords with” the consensus approach).

Petitioner argues that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in

Herr v. United States Forest Service, 803 F.3d 809

(2015), conflicts with the approach taken in other circuits, but that argument disregards the specific claim at

issue in Herr. The claim there arose under the Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-184, 101

Stat. 1274, which authorizes the Forest Service to regulate motorboat use on Crooked Lake in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, “[s]ubject to valid existing rights.” § 5,

101 Stat. 1275-1276. In 2006, the Forest Service added

to its management plan for the region a provision that

banned motorboat use on most of the lake, with an exception limited to boats using electric motors with less

than four horsepower. Herr, 803 F.3d at 812. But the

agency did not initially enforce that restriction against

lakefront landowners, who had a state-law right to use

“the entire surface of the lake for boating and sailing.”

Id. at 813.

In 2010, David and Pamela Herr purchased lakefront

property at the site after being assured that the prior

owner had been able to “boat[] ‘on the entire surface of

Crooked Lake without hindrance by the Forest Service.’ ” Herr, 803 F.3d at 813 (citation and emphasis

omitted). They were initially permitted to use a Forest

Service boat launch for their gas-powered motorboat.

Ibid. But “[t]hings changed in 2013,” when the Forest

Service “informed the Herrs by letter” that it would

19

begin enforcing the 2006 restriction against lakefront

landowners, apparently for the first time. Ibid.

The Herrs brought an APA challenge, asserting that

the Forest Service’s restrictions on motorboat use violated their “existing rights” as lakefront landowners under state law and seeking “to enjoin the Forest Service

from enforcing the motorboat restriction against them.”

Herr, 803 F.3d at 813 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit held that the claim was timely, even though it implicated a policy the Forest Service had originally

adopted more than six years earlier. Id. at 818-823.

Emphasizing that “[d]ifferent legal wrongs give rise to

different rights of action,” the court explained that the

specific “legal wrong” that formed the basis for the

Herrs’ suit was the Forest Service’s “infringement of a

property right in violation of the Michigan Wilderness

Act.” Id. at 820. That violation could not have occurred

until the Herrs acquired lakefront property (with an accompanying state-law right to use the lake for boating)

in 2010, and the court held that the statute of limitations

on their claim accordingly could not have begun to run

before then. Ibid.

Petitioner’s challenge differs in fundamental respects from the Herr plaintiffs’ claim. The Herr plaintiffs did not contend that the Forest Service’s restrictions on motorboat use were facially invalid, only

that they were invalid as applied to lakefront landowners. See Herr, 803 F.3d at 819. That conflict between

agency policy and the landowners’ state-law rights did

not exist until 2013, when the agency first expressed its

intent to enforce its motorboat restrictions against the

Herrs. See id. at 813 (“Things changed in 2013.”).

Here, in contrast, the alleged legal wrong occurred in

2011, when the Board authorized interchange fees in

20

Regulation II that petitioner contends were higher than

the Durbin Amendment permits. See Pet. App. 70-79

(amended complaint). While petitioner did not feel the

effects of that regulation until 2017 or 2018, that delay

was not attributable to any change in the Board’s own

conduct or policies. Rather, any violation the Board

may have committed was complete in July 2011, and the

statute of limitations accordingly started to run at that

time. See pp. 8-17, supra.

As petitioner emphasizes (Pet. 12), the court in Herr

identified the plaintiffs’ acquisition of the relevant lakefront property, rather than the Forest Service’s 2013

change in enforcement policy, as the event that triggered a new six-year period for filing suit. See Herr,

803 F.3d at 819. The Sixth Circuit also did not distinguish between APA claims (like the claim in Herr) that

arise from application of a pre-existing rule to a specific

plaintiff , and APA claims (like petitioner’s) that present

facial challenges unrelated to a particular plaintiff ’s circumstances. See Pet. App. 10. Other courts of appeals

have consistently drawn that distinction, however, recognizing that the limitations period on as-applied challenges begins to run when the rule is applied to the

plaintiff, while the period for bringing facial challenges

begins to run when the rule is adopted. See id. at 10-11

(collecting cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and

D.C. Circuits). Because the Sixth Circuit in Herr had

before it only an as-applied challenge for which the

plaintiffs’ status as lakefront landowners was crucial, it

had no occasion to decide how Section 2401(a) would apply to a facial challenge. See id. at 9-10.

The court in Herr also stated that “[r]egulated parties may always assail a regulation as exceeding the

21

agency’s statutory authority in enforcement proceedings against them,” and that allowing the Herrs to pursue such a challenge “without waiting for enforcement

proceedings” would “add[] only a modest wrinkle to this

regime.” 803 F.3d at 821-822. But petitioner is not a

“[r]egulated part[y]” under Regulation II, id. at 821,

which regulates issuers rather than merchants. See

Pet. 29. For the same reason, there is no prospect that

petitioner will ever be subject to “enforcement proceedings” under the regulation. Herr, 803 F.3d at 821. And

while petitioner asserts that Regulation II “exceeds the

Board’s statutory authority” (Pet. 8), the substance of

its challenge is that the Board should have restricted

interchange fees more stringently than it did. See p. 5,

infra.

3. Even if the question presented otherwise warranted review, this case would be a poor vehicle in which

to address it.

a. This case involves an atypical fact-pattern in

which petitioner joined a pre-existing suit filed by other

plaintiffs whose own claims were untimely at the time

the suit was commenced. Pet. App. 14-15. Even on petitioner’s theory, this civil action as first filed in 2021

was time-barred because the original plaintiffs (NDRA

and NDPMA) could have brought suit in 2011 when the

Board adopted Regulation II. See ibid. Petitioner is a

member of those plaintiff associations and joined the

case only when the timeliness of their claims was contested, and all of the plaintiffs were represented below

by the National Retail Federation, itself one of the challengers in the NACS litigation. See id. at 3, 52, 86. Petitioner’s coordination with those related parties for the

evident purpose of circumventing the limitations bar to

22

their own claims—and the preclusive effect of the decision in NACS—raises serious questions about the equity of considering petitioner’s challenge. See Abbott

Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967) (observing

that “equitable defenses may be interposed” in APA

suits); cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 895 (2008)

(“[A] party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive force by relitigating through a proxy.”).

b. Some of the allegations in petitioner’s complaint

highlight the Board’s failure to engage in new rulemaking during the years since Regulation II was adopted.

The amended complaint alleges that, “[s]ince adopting

Regulation II,” the Board has “refuse[d] to revise the

interchange fee” despite repeated meetings with “merchants and retailers” who “rais[ed] concerns about (and

provid[ed] evidence of ) how Regulation II’s fee cap far

exceeds covered issuers’ average [authorization, clearance, or settlement] costs.” Pet. App. 67 (emphasis

omitted). The amended complaint also invokes reports

issued by the Board in “2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019” as

further evidence that Regulation II’s authorized interchange fee is too high. Id. at 69. And in this Court,

petitioner asserts (Pet. 7) that “[t]he Board has never

explained how [the] fee cap” established by Regulation

II is reasonable given the data the Board has gathered

“since 2011.”

None of those post-2011 considerations, however,

provides a proper basis for challenging the agency’s

original adoption of Regulation II. See Citizens to Pres.

Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 420. If petitioner’s current suit were allowed to go forward, the only question

properly before the reviewing court would be whether

the Board in 2011 acted reasonably given the infor-

23

mation in the administrative record at that time. Instead, “[t]he proper procedure for pursuit” of a claim

that the agency has been “ ‘capricious’ not to conduct

amendatory rulemaking” in light of intervening events

is the one “set forth explicitly in the APA”—i.e., seeking

review of the agency’s denial of a petition for rulemaking. Auer, 519 U.S. at 459.

That is particularly so given that the gravamen of petitioner’s challenge is that the maximum interchange

fee specified by Regulation II is too high. Having

framed its challenge as one to the original adoption of

Regulation II, petitioner has sought declaratory and injunctive relief “finding the standard for reasonable and

proportional interchange fees in Regulation II * * * invalid and setting it aside.” Pet. App. 85. But the immediate effect of such a remedy would be to leave interchange fees unregulated, potentially subjecting petitioner to higher fees than it currently pays. Given petitioner’s view (Pet. 7) that interchange fees should be

more stringently limited, the appropriate course is to

petition the Board for a regulatory amendment reducing the cap on permissible interchange fees, see 5

U.S.C. 553(e), and to seek judicial review if the Board

declines.

24

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

Solicitor General

BRIAN M. BOYNTON

Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General

DANIEL TENNY

SARAH CLARK

Attorneys

JUNE 2023

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.