Application — Louisiana, et al., Applicants v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al.

Supreme Court briefApr 27, 2022

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No. 21A ____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF LOUISIANA; et al.,

Applicants,

v.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official capacity as

President of the United States; et al.,

Respondents.

APPENDIX TO APPLICATION TO VACATE AN ORDER OF THE U.S. COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT STAYING AN INJUNCTION FROM

THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

To the Honorable Samuel Alito

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

and Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit

TYLER R. GREEN

DANIEL SHAPIRO

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

222 S. Main Street, 5th Floor

Salt Lake City, UT 84101

(703) 243-9423

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL*

Solicitor General

*Counsel of Record

JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN

SHAE MCPHEE

Deputy Solicitors General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 326-6766

murrille@ag.louisiana.gov

April 27, 2022

Counsel for Applicants

Appendix A

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL

CASE NO. 2:21-CV-01074

VERSUS

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

JOSEPH R BIDEN JR ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a “Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. 53) filed by the

States of Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Dakota,

Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming (collectively referred to as the “Plaintiff States”). The

Plaintiff States move pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a

preliminary injunction against Defendants Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Cecilia Rouse, Shalanda

Young, Kei Koizumi, Janet Yellen, Deb Haaland, Tom Vilsack, Gina Raimondo, Xavier

Becerra, Pete Buttigieg, Jennifer Granholm, Brenda Mallory, Michael S. Regan, Gina

McCarthy, Brian Deese, Jack Danielson, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.

Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of

Agriculture, U.S.

Department of Interior, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, and the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”).

Plaintiff States also move to make the Order effective immediately and to remain in

effect pending the final resolution of this case, or until further orders of this Court, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, or the United States Supreme Court.

App. A-1

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I.

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2021, the Plaintiff States filed a Complaint [doc. 1] against the

Government Defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as a result of Executive

Order 13990 (“EO 13990”). EO 13990 reinstated the Interagency Working Group (“IWG”)

on Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (“SC-GGE”) and ordered the IWG to

publish Interim Estimates for the Social Cost of Carbon, Nitrous Oxide, and Methane

(collectively referred to as “SC-GHG Estimates”) for agencies to use when monetizing the

value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant

agency actions. EO 13990 provides as follows:

Accounting for the Benefits of Reducing Climate Pollution

(a) It is essential that agencies capture the full costs of greenhouse gas emissions as

accurately as possible, including by taking global damages into account. Doing

so facilitates sound decision-making, recognizes the breadth of climate impacts,

and supports the international leadership of the United States on climate issues.

The “social cost of carbon” (SCC), social cost of nitrous oxide” (SCN), and

“social cost of methane” (SCM) are estimates of the monetized damages

associated with incremental increases in greenhouse gas emissions. They are

intended to include changes in net agricultural productivity, human health,

property damage from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services.

An accurate social cost is essential for agencies to accurately determine the

social benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions when conducting costbenefit analyses of regulatory and other actions.

(b) There is hereby established an Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost

of Greenhouse Gases (the “Working Group”). The Chair of the Council of

Economic Advisers, Director or OMB, and Director of the office of Science and

Technology Policy shall serve as Co-Chairs of the Working Group.

(i)

Membership. The Working Group shall also include the following other

officers, or their designees: the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary

of the Interior; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce;

the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Secretary of

Transportation; the Secretary of Energy; the Chair of the Council on

App. A-2

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(ii)

Environmental Quality; the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency; the Assistant to the President and National Climate

advisor; and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and

director of the National Economic council.

Mission and Work. The Working Group shall, as appropriate and

consistent with applicable law:

(A)

Publish an interim SCC, SCN, and SCM within 30 days of the date of this

order, which agencies shall use when monetizing the value of changes in

greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant

agency actions until final values are published;

(B)

Publish a final SCC, SCN, and SCM by no later than January 2022;

(C)

Provide recommendations to the President, by no later than September 1,

2021, regarding areas of decisions-making, budgeting, and procurement by

the Federal Government where the SCC, SCN, and SCM should be applied;

(D)

Provide recommendations, by no later than June 1, 2022, regarding a process

for reviewing, and, as appropriate, updating, the SCC, SCN, and SCM to

ensure that these costs are based on the best available economics and science;

and

(E)

Provide recommendations, to be published with the final SCC, SCN, and

SCM under subparagraph (A) if feasible, and in any event by no later than

June 1, 2022, to revise methodologies for calculating the SCC, SCN, and

SCM, to the extent that current methodologies do not adequately take

account of climate risk, environmental justice, and intergenerational equity.

(iii) Methodology. In carrying out its activities, the working Group shall

consider the recommendations of the National Academies of Science,

Engineering, and Medicine as reported in Value Climate Damages: Updating

Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide (2017) and other pertinent

scientific literature; solicit public comment; engage with the public and

stakeholders; seek the advice of ethics experts; and ensure that the SCC, SCN,

and SCM reflect the interests of future generations in avoiding threats posed by

climate change.

App. A-3

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1.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

The Plaintiff States seek injunctive and declaratory relief on three grounds. First,

they assert that the SC-GHG Estimates violate the procedural requirements of the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as a substantive rule that did not undergo the

requisite notice-and-comment process. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Second, the Plaintiff States

claim that President Biden, through EO 13990, and the IWG lack the authority to enforce

the estimates as they are substantively unlawful under the APA and contravene existing

law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C). Third, the Plaintiff States maintain that the Government

Defendants acted beyond any congressional authority by basing regulatory policy upon

global considerations.

The Plaintiff States request a preliminary injunction: (1) ordering Defendants to

disregard the SC-GHG Estimates and prohibiting them from adopting, employing, treating

as binding, or relying upon the work product of the Interagency Working Group (“IWG”);

(2) enjoining Defendants from independently relying upon the IWG’s methodology

considering global effects, discount rates, and time horizons; and (3) ordering Defendants

to return to the guidance of Circular A-4, explained infra, in conducting regulatory

analysis.

The issues presently before the Court are: (1) whether the Plaintiff States satisfy the

doctrine of standing; (2) whether the Plaintiff States assert claims subject to judicial review

under the APA; and (3) whether the Plaintiff States satisfy the requirements to obtain a

preliminary injunction.

App. A-4

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To be clear, the Court is ruling only on the actions of the federal agencies and

whether the agencies, by implementing the estimates and considering global effects—

violate the APA and whether President Biden upon signing EO 13990, violated the

separations of powers clause of the United States Constitution. The Court has the authority

to enjoin federal agencies from implementing a rule—mandated by an executive order or

not—that violates the APA or violates the separation of powers clause. Importantly, the

Court is not opining as to the scientific issues regarding greenhouse gas emissions, their

effects on the environment, or whether they contribute to global warming.

2.

HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND

CIRCULAR A-4

(i)

The Administrative Procedure Act and Circular A-4

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) is one of the foremost checks on the

“growth of the Executive Branch [.]” Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting

Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). The APA mandates that agencies take action only

pursuant to express legal authority, in a transparent manner, with opportunity for public

input, in a nonarbitrary manner, and with judicial review. See Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d 134

(5th Cir. 2015).

Another check on the growth of the Administrative State is the consensus on

cost/benefits analysis required by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. See

Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37

Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol’y 447, 454–57 (2014). President Clinton issued Executive Order

12866, which instructs agencies to “assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory

App. A-5

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alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating” when “deciding whether and how

to regulate.” 1

In 2003, President George W. Bush’s Office of Management and Budget issued

Circular A-4 to implement EO 12866 and ensure agencies use a “standardiz[ed]” way of

“measur[ing] and report[ing]” the “benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions.”2

Circular A-4 has become the cornerstone of regulatory analysis in the Executive Branch.3

Circular A-4 provides “highly detailed guidance to the agencies on the key elements

of a ‘good regulatory analysis’ under EO 12866—specifically it includes a clear baseline

for comparative purposes, specifically states assumptions, an assessment of the sensitivity

of the analytical results to changes in those assumptions, and attention to ancillary

impacts.” Mendelson & Wiener, supra, at 457—58. Relevant to this litigation, Circular A4 contains two key instructions: (1) agencies are to use both 3 and 7 percent discount rates

when conducting regulatory cost/benefit analysis; and (2) agencies are to consider

domestic, rather than global, costs and benefits.4

Discount factors are used to adjust the estimated benefits and costs for differences

in timing. The further in the future the benefits and costs are expected to occur, the more

they should be discounted.5 “When, and only when, the estimated benefits and costs have

been discounted, they can be added to determine the overall value of net benefits.”6

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 1 attached to St. John Declaration Doc. 55.

Id. attached as exhibit 5, Circular A-4, p. 1.

3

Anne E. Smith, Ph.D. Declaration, ¶ ¶ 18-19, Doc. 56.

4

Plaintiff’s exhibit 5, Circular A-4.

5

Id. p. 32.

6

Id.

1

2

App. A-6

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Prior to Circular A-4, the Executive Branch used a 7 percent discount rate because

it “reflects the returns to reals estate and small business capital as well as corporate capital”7

and “approximates the opportunity cost of capital, and it is the appropriate discount rate

whenever the main effect of a regulation is to displace or alter the use of capital in the

private sector.”8 In certain circumstances a lower discount rate may be appropriate,

therefore Circular A-4 instructs agencies to “provide estimates of net benefits using both 3

and 7 percent.”9

The second instruction in Circular A-4 requires agencies to make domestic effects

the basis of their analysis.10 See Wyoming v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 2020 WL

7641067 at *21 (D. Wyo. Oct. 8, 2020) (noting that Circular A-4 mandates a national

focus): States v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

(“While Plaintiff argue that the same Circular directs BLM to encompass ‘all the important

benefits and costs likely to result from the rule,’ including ‘any important ancillary

benefits,’ it does not specifically mandate that agencies consider global impacts.”)

(ii)

The Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases

Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, also referred to as greenhouse gases11

are ever-present byproducts that are produced by activity from energy production to

agriculture to waste disposal.

7

Id.

Id.

9

Id. at p. 34.

10

“Your analysis should focus on benefits and costs that accrue to citizens and residents of the United States. Where

you choose to evaluate a regulation that is likely to have effects beyond the borders of the United States, these

effects should be reported separately.” Id. at p. 15.

11

Gases that trap heat in the atmosphere are called greenhouse gases. Exhibit 42 attached to Plaintiffs’ exhibit 1, p.

2, St. John Declaration. Doc. 55-42.

8

App. A-7

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Carbon dioxide is produced from burning fossils fuels such as coal, natural gas, and

oil, and solid wastes, trees, chemical reactions,12 and other biological materials.13 Carbon

dioxide is removed from the atmosphere when it is absorbed by plants as part of the

biological carbon cycle.14

Methane is emitted during the production and transport of coal, natural gas, and oil.

Methane emissions also result from livestock and other agricultural practices, land use and

by the decay of organic waste in municipal solid waste landfills.15

Nitrous oxide is emitted during agricultural practices, land use, industrial activities,

combustion of fossil fuels and solid waste, as well as during treatment of wastewater.16

Fluorinated

gases

include

hydrofluorocarbons,

perfluorocarbons,

sulfur

hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride. They are synthetic, powerful greenhouse gases

emitted from a variety of industrial process. These gases are typically emitted in smaller

quantities, but because they are potent greenhouse gases, they are sometimes referred to as

High Global Warming Potential (“High GWP gases”).17

Each gas’s effect on climate change depends upon: (1) how much is in the

atmosphere; (2) how long they stay in the atmosphere; and (3) how strongly they impact

the atmosphere.18

12

E.g., manufacture of cement.

Exhibit 42 attached to Plaintiffs’ exhibit 1, St. John Declaration.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

13

App. A-8

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(iii)

President Obama’s role

In 2009, President Obama convened an Interagency Working Group (“IWG”) to

establish estimates of the social cost of carbon (“SCC”) that all agencies must use in their

regulatory cost/benefit analysis. In the Spring of 2010, the IWG presented final SCC

estimates which purported to use Circular A-4 as its starting point but rejected two of its

fundamental tenets—the 3 and 7 percent discount rates, and the domestic effects as the

basis of their analysis. In 2016, the IWG issued estimates for the Social Cost of Methane

(“SCM”) and the Social Cost of Nitrous Oxide (“SCN”).

The IWG established by the Obama administration was dismantled by the Trump

administration,19 and reinstated by the Biden administration through Executive Order

13990, issued on January 20, 2021.

(iv)

President Biden’s Executive Order 13990

On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13990. 86 Fed. Reg.

7037 (Jan. 20, 2021). Section 5 of EO 13990 directs federal agencies to “capture the full

costs of greenhouse gas emissions as accurately as possible, including by taking global

damages into account.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 7040. Section 5(b)(ii)(A) further provides that “the

Working Group shall . . . publish an interim SCC, SCN, and SCM within 30 days of the

date of this order, which agencies shall use when monetizing the value of changes in

19

In 2017, the Trump administration disbanded the IWG, rescinded its technical support documents, and directed

agencies to return to Circular A-4’s guidance when analyzing the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions. Exec.

Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).

App. A-9

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greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant agency actions until

final values are published.” Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7040 (Jan. 20,

2021).

On February 26, 2021, the IWG announced the SC-GHG Estimates as directed by

EO 13990 (“Current SC-GHG Estimates”). The Current SC-GHG Estimates are identical

to those issued by the Obama Administration in the 2016 Technical Support Document

and addendum, adjusted for inflation.

(v)

Relief sought

Plaintiff States move to enjoin and restrain Defendants from:

(1) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon the work product of

the Interagency Working Group, including without limitation, any and all Social

Cost of Greenhouse Gas estimates published by the Interagency Working Group;

(2) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any Social Cost of

Greenhouse Gas estimates based on global effects or that otherwise fails to

comply with applicable law;

(3) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any estimate of Social

Cost of Greenhouse Gases that does not utilize discount rates of 3 and 7 percent

or that otherwise does not comply with Circular A-4; and

(4) Relying upon or implementing Section 5 of Executive Order 13990 in any

manner.

App. A-10

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II.

STANDING

The Court must first address the threshold question regarding whether the Plaintiff

States have standing to bring this suit.

Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to “Cases” and

“Controversies.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559, 112 S. Ct. 2130,

(1992). One “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement” is the

doctrine of standing. Id. at 560. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 133 S. Ct.

1138, 1148, 185 (2013). “In the preliminary-injunction context, plaintiffs must make a

‘clear showing’ of standing” to obtain relief. Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d

168, 178 (5th Cir. 2020) cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1124 (2021); see Tex. All. for Retired Ams.

v. Hughs, 976 F.3d 564, 567 n.1. (5th Cir. 2020) (contrasting the ordinary showing of

standing as opposed to what is required to maintain a preliminary injunction”).

Accordingly, plaintiffs must satisfy the three elements that constitute “the irreducible

constitutional minimum of standing”: (1) injury in fact; (2) causal connection (the injury

has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action); and (3) redressability (the injury must

be likely, as opposed to merely speculative that it will be redressed by a favorable decision).

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. “[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy

Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. &

Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). Yet, “a plaintiff must

demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is

App. A-11

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sought.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017)

(citation omitted).

Importantly, “states are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal

jurisdiction.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).

Accordingly, the presumption of “special solicitude” may be available to a state “exercising

a procedural right created by Congress and protecting a quasi-sovereign interest.” Texas v.

United States, 809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015).

1. Injury in fact

To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, the Plaintiffs must show that they

“suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’

and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural and hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578

U.S. 856, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Allegations of

“future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending’ or there is a

‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.

149, 158, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5,

133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)).

Plaintiff States allege direct injury to their sovereign, fiscal, procedural, and parens

patriae interests. As to their sovereign interests, Plaintiff States claim that they are directly

injured by the Government Defendants’ alteration of cooperative federalism programs.

Specifically, they contend that the SC-GHG Estimates impose new obligations on them

when they participate in cooperative federalism programs. The Fifth Circuit has

recognized that this type of “increased regulatory burden typically satisfies the injury in

App. A-12

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fact requirement.” Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 F.3d 258, 266 (5th

Cir. 2015).

To establish direct injury, Plaintiff States assert that: (1) they are substantial

producers of energy and rely upon tax revenue from energy production to perform their

sovereign duties; (2) the SC-GHG Estimates will impose additional duties upon Plaintiff

States when they implement cooperative federalism programs; and (3) the SC-GHG

Estimates will harm Plaintiff States’ ability to purchase affordable energy to carry out their

sovereign functions.

Plaintiffs States argue that the increased SC-GHG Estimates will necessarily cause

regulatory standards for air quality, energy efficiency, and power plant regulation to

become more stringent and result in significant costs increases.20 Moreover, this increased

stringency will directly harm the economies and revenues of Plaintiff States.

For example, the SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm Louisiana’s energy,

chemical manufacturing, and agricultural industries by increasing their regulatory burdens

and driving up the price of electricity that these businesses need to stay in business and

continue to employ Louisianians and contribute to tax revenues.21 The SC-GHG Estimates

will harm Louisiana, the nation’s number two oil producer and a top five national natural

20

See Smith Decl. ¶ ¶ 85092; Dismukes Decl. ¶ 23 (“The use of unsupported SC-GHG estimates in NEPA and other

regulatory analysis will result in the approval of new regulations that will impose significant costs on Louisiana’s

economy and business that are not justified by an accurate assessment of their costs and benefits.”)

21

Dismukes Decl. ¶ ¶ 22-26.

App. A-13

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gas producer,22 resulting in significantly reduced royalties from leasing sales under Outer

Continental Shelf Act (“OCSLA”).

The SC-GHG will directly harm Kentucky’s economic welfare,23 as demonstrated

by the Obama Administration’s SCC-justified Clean Power Plan by making a new CPP

justifiable under cost/benefit analysis principles. The SC-GHG will harm Alabama’s

ability to exploit its energy resources and harm its industrial sector, and Florida’s tourism

industry by driving up the transportation costs and energy prices.24

Plaintiff States also allege that the SC-GHG Estimates impose additional duties on

them when carrying out cooperative federalism programs because they are compelled to

employ the IWG’s methodology as a condition of approving significant funding and State

environmental implementation plans. For example, states must comply with federal

standards in programs such as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”),

42 U.S.C. § 7410. Under that statute, it is the states’ burden “to propose plans adequate for

compliance with NAAQS.” E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489,

498, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). Plaintiff States assert that the EPA has instructed that NAAQS

are now required to be set based on the IWG’s SC-GHG Estimates.25 Likewise, the states

must use the SC-GHG Estimates or risk having their state implementation plans

disapproved. Yet, even if a state implementation plan is disapproved by the EPA, the EPA

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Louisiana: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Apr. 15, 2021). (St. John

Dec. Ex. 30).

23

Kentucky is one of the top coal-producing states. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Coal FAQ” (St.

John Decl. Ex. 32).

24

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Florida: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Nov. 19, 2020) (St. John

Decl. Ex. 33).

25

See Doc. 1 at 45–46, ¶124.

22

App. A-14

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will impose a federal implementation plan upon the state—which also must be based upon

the SC-GHG Estimates. 26

Defendants challenge Plaintiff States assertion of the use of the SC-GHG Estimates

by the NAAQS, and argue that there are no NAAQS for greenhouse gases, see Utility Air

REgul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 308 (2014) (listing the “six pollutants” for which “EPA

has issued NAAQS”). Plaintiff States offer no explanation of how the SC-GHG Estimates

would be used in setting or revising NAAQS for non-greenhouse-gas pollutants.

The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm Georgia’s industrial sector by increasing

stationary source regulatory stringency.27 The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm

Mississippi’s energy infrastructure including its petroleum refinery, natural gas processing

plant and LNG terminal.28 The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm South Dakota’s

industrial and agricultural capacities.29 The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm Texas,

the nation’s leading energy producer.30 The SC-GHG Estimates will be fatal to West

Virginia’s economy, the fifth-largest energy producer in the nation—specifically its coal

industry as realized by the Obama administration’s CPP.31 The SC-GHG will directly harm

26

Doc. 1 at 45–46, ¶¶123–125.

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Georgia: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Nov. 19, 2020) (St. John

Dec. Ex. 34).

28

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Mississippi: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated July 16, 2020) (St.

John Decl. Ex. 35).

29

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., South Dakota: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Apr. 16, 2020) (St.

John Dec. Ex. 36).

30

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Texas: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Apr. 15, 2021) (St. John

Decl. Ex. 37).

31

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “West Virginia: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Oct. 15, 2020) (St.

John Decl. Ex. 38).

27

App. A-15

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Wyoming, the largest net energy supplier in the nation and a major producer of coal, natural

gas, and oil.32

The Plaintiff States argue that the harms to these States are imminent and directly

traceable to EO 13990 and the SC-GHG Estimates. The Plaintiff States remark that the

chain of causation is clear and confirmed by history: agencies will apply EO 13990’s

unambiguous command to apply the IWG’s unlawful SC-GHG Estimates in a manner that

will harm Plaintiff States’ legally cognizable interests.

Defendants maintain that Plaintiff States have failed to affirmatively show an

Article III injury to establish standing. Plaintiff States insist that the Executive Branch is

employing the SC-GHG Estimates in a range of rulemaking across statutory regimes.

Plaintiff States provide the following examples of final rules using the SC-GHG to increase

costs in various industries:

• EPA, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas

Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 30, 2021).33 Defendants remark

that EPA explained that it “is not required to conduct formal costs benefit

analysis to determine the appropriate standard under Section 202” of the Clean

Air Act, and that “analysis of monetized GHG was not material to its decision.

In summation, “the decisions reached and standards put in place do not depend

on the 2021 SC-GHG interim estimates.” EPA, Revised 2023 and Later Model

Year Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions Standards: Response to Comments

(Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/RX8S-FFPJ.

• DOE, General Service Lamps, 86 Fed. Reg. 70755 (Dec. 13, 2021).34

See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Wyoming: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Mar. 18, 2021) (St. John

Decl. Ex. 39).

33

Plaintiff’s exhibit 1, Daigle Decl. (This rule will impose unprecedented costs on the American auto industry;

specifically, the EPA’s estimate of benefits “include[d] climate-related economic benefits from reducing emissions

of GHG’s that contribute to climate change” based on the SC-GHG Estimates). Id. at 74443.

34

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 2, Daigle Decl. at 70768. (This proposed rule employs the SC-GHG Estimates in calculating

benefits).

32

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• EPA, Oil and Gas New Modified Sources, 86 Fed. Reg. 63110 (Nov. 15, 2021).35

• Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fact Sheet: analyzing the effects of fossil

fuel leasing and development on greenhouse gases (Oct. 29, 2021).36

• DOE, Manufactured Housing, 86 Fed. Reg. 59042 (October 26, 2021).37

• Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR), Minimizing Climate Change in

Federal Acquisitions, 86 Fed. Reg. 57404 (October 15, 2021).38

• Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), NEPA Implementing Regulations

Revisions, 86 Fed. Reg. 55757 (Oct. 7, 2021).39

• EPA, Phasedown of Hydrofluorocarbons, 86 Fed. Reg. 55116 (Oct. 5, 2021).40

Defendants contend that EPA did not rely on the SC-GHG Estimates, and the

proposed rule explained that it would implement an explicit congressional

command in the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020, Pub. L.

No. 116–260, 134 Stat. 1182 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7675), which “directs EPA

to address HFCs by providing new authorities” to “phase down the production

and consumption of listed HFCs” on a “schedule prescribed by Congress.” 86

Fed.Reg. at 27,153, 27,159.

The Court is concerned that Defendants’ arguments are somewhat misleading

considering that the following statement is made in the Regulatory Impact

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 3, Daigle Decl. (EPA uses SC-GHG Estimates in proposing stricter standards on GHG

emissions for the oil and gas industry; the effect is billions of dollars of compliance costs).

36

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 4, Daigle Decl. (The BLM issues a fact sheet and announced a “[s]tandardized methodology for

consideration of the social cost of greenhouse gases in lease sales.” Id., at 1. The fact sheet relies on the SC-GHG

Estimates and the Executive Order—“BLM’s analysis uses the interim estimates of the social costs of carbon,

methane and nitrous oxide published by the IWG in February 2021.) Id. at 2.

37

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 5. (DOE explicitly relies on the Executive Order and Estimates in determining whether the rule

is justified; “DOE calculates the value of the reduced emissions of CO2, CH4, and N20 (collectively, greenhouse

gases of GHGs) using a range of values per metric ton of pollutant, consistent with the interim estimates issued in

February 2021 under Executive Order 13990.”) Id. at 59043.

38

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 6, Daigle Decl. (FAR released an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking stating that it is

considering the SC-GHG Estimates in promulgating a new regulation that would evaluate federal acquisition

contracts based on the IWG’s SC-GHG Estimates.) Id. at 57405.

39

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 7. (CEQ issued a proposed rule repealing the previous Administration’s final NEPA

implantation-regulation revisions. The proposed rule specifically directs agencies to use the SC-GHG Estimates. Id.

at 55763, n.5.)

40

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 8. (EPA issued a final rule seeking to phase down hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) which imposes

massively increased regulatory costs on the myriad of products that rely on HFCs, including refrigeration, airconditioning, building insulation, and aerosols. The EPA relied on the same models, methodologies, and

assumptions as the Working Group’s SC-GHG Estimates, and specifically cited the Working Group’s “interim”

Technical Support Documents as authority. See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. at 55119; see also EPA, Regulatory Impact

Analysis for Phasing Down Production and Consumption of Hydrofluorocarbons (HCFs) at 103-15 (Sept. 2021),

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 9, Daigle Decl.

35

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Analysis for Phasing Down

Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),41

Production

and

Consumption

of

These SC-HFC estimates were developed using methodologies that

are consistent with the methodology underlying the social cost of

carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide estimates presented in the

Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and

Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990 (IWG

2021). The social cost of GHG estimates presented in IWG (2021) are

interim values developed under E.O. 13990 for use in benefit-cost

analyses until an improved estimate of the impacts of climate change

can be developed based on the best available science and economics.

Therefore, EPA views the SC-HCF estimates used in analysis to be

appropriate for use in benefit-cost analysis until improved estimates

of the social cost of other GHGs are developed.42

• National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 2024-2026

Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 49602

(Sept. 3, 2021).43

• Dep’t of the Interiors (DOI), Secretarial Order no. 3399, Department-Wide

Approach to the Climate Crisis and Restoring Transparency and Integrity to the

Decisions-Making Process (April 16, 2021).44

Plaintiff States maintain that: (1) the FAR Climate rule will directly harm Plaintiff

States’ ability to contract with the federal government; (2) the vehicle regulations will

increase the prices Plaintiff States must pay for vehicles for official use; (3) CEQ’s NEPA

regulation revisions will harm Plaintiff States in their sovereign capacity by pressuring

them to change their approach to NEPA analysis in their capacity as joint lead agencies;

(4) DOI and BLM’s activities are depressing the Plaintiff States’ statutorily entitled

41

Doc. 91-11.

Id. at p. 104.

43

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 10, Daigle Decl. (NHTSA used SC-GHG estimates to calculate and include “benefits” of

reduced GHG emissions in a proposed rulemaking to impose more costly and burdensome fuel economy standards).

44

Doc. 55-28. (Secretary of the DOI issues an order directing agencies, including BLM and the Bureau of Ocean

Energy Management (BOEM) to employ the SC-GHG Estimates as “an essential tool” in their cost-benefit analysis

whenever they “determine[] that a monetized assessment of socioeconomic impacts is relevant” specifically citing

EO 13990.Id. at 1 and 4).

42

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proceeds from lease sales and production by artificially reducing both the number of

parcels available and the activities that can be conducted on those parcels.

Plaintiff States have submitted evidence to posit that the SC-GHG Estimates are

currently in use in NEPA analyses. Examples include the following:

• Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Bluewater Texas

Terminal Deepwater Port Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Oct.

2021).45

• Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Wyoming First Quarter Oil and Gas Lease

Sale Environmental Analysis (Nov. 1, 2021).46

• BLM, Utah First Quarter Oil and Gas Lease Sale Environmental Analysis (Nov.

1, 2021).47

• DOE, Notice of Intent to Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact

Statement for the Alaska LNG Project, 86 Fed. Reg. 35280 (July 2, 2021).48

First, the Plaintiff States have asserted a concrete and particularized injury:

mandatory implementation of the SC-GHG Estimates imposes new obligations on the

states and increases regulatory burdens when they participate in cooperative federalism

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 11, Daigle Decl. (DOT used the SC-GHG Estimates to examine the Bluewater Texas Deepwater

port project in the draft environmental impact statement, in both the constructions and emissions phases of the

project.). Id. at 3-323.

46

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 12, Daigle Decl. (BLM used the SC-GHG Estimates in “accordance with th[e] direction” of EO

13990 to estimate staggering cost estimates for holding the lease sale. Id. at 34, resulting in a smaller sale causing

the States of Wyoming a significant loss of revenue.) See also Nicole Pollack, Less than half of proposed Wyoming

oil and gas leases recommended for upcoming sale, Casper Star Tribune (Dec. 7, 2021). Plaintiffs’ exhibit 13.

47

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 15 (BLM used the SC-GHG Estimates in analyzing alternative for the First Quarter 2022 Utah

oil and gas lease sale held under the MLA.) Id. at 40-43.

48

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 16, Daigle Decl. (In light of E.O 13990, the Biden Administration reopens a previously granted

authorization to Alaska LNG Project LLC “to export LNG produced from Alaska sources to any country with which

the United States has not entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) requiring national treatment for trade in natural

gas, and with which trade is not prohibited by U.S. law or policy (non-FTA countries.”) Id. at 35280. In the order

(Alaska LNG Project LLC, DOE/FE Order No. 3643-B, FE Docket 14-96-LNG, Order on Rehearing (Apr. 15, 2021)

(Plaintiffs’ exhibit 17) granting the rehearing, the DOE expressly relied on E.O. 13990 and subsequently issued a

notice of intent, citing E.O. 13990 to prepare an entirely new Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement.) 86

Fed. Reg. at 35281.

45

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programs. Second, the Plaintiff States have shown that the alleged injury is both actual and

imminent. The injury is “actual” as to the executive agencies that have already employed

the SC-GHG Estimates, such as the EPA in disapproving state implementation plans under

the NAAQS good neighbor provisions and imposing federal implementation plans on

several Plaintiff States including Louisiana, Kentucky, and Texas. 86 Fed. Reg. 23054,

23061 (Apr. 30, 2021). In addition, future injury is imminent and certainly impending

because other agencies engaged in cooperative federalism programs with the states are

required to employ the SC-GHG Estimates, and as shown by the NAAQS example, the

states are confronted with a forced choice: either they employ the Estimates in developing

their state implementation plan, or the EPA subjects them to a federal plan based on the

SC-GHG Estimates.49

To be sure, the Administration’s use of the SC-GHG’s Estimates in NEPA reviews

to analyze the climate impact of oil and gas lease sales under the MLA directly causes harm

to the Plaintiff States’ statutorily vested rights to proceeds from MLA oil and gas leases.

In other words, the SC-GHG Estimates artificially increase the cost estimates of lease sales,

which in effect, reduces the number of parcels being leased, resulting in the States receiving

less in bonus bids, ground rents, and production royalties.

Plaintiff States suggest that the EPA’s mandate that the FERC use the SC-GHG

Estimates has caused significant delays in project approvals causing the Plaintiff States to

lose property tax revenues.50

49

86 Fed. Reg. 23054, 23061, 23153-155.

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 24, Daigle Dec., Columbia Gulf Transmissions, LLC, Resource Report 5: Socioeconomics, East

Lateral Express Project at 5-9 to 5-12, Docket No. CP20-527-000 (Sept. 24, 2020).

50

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The Court is persuaded that the Biden Administration’s agencies are using the SCGHG. The Court finds that the Plaintiff States have established injury-in-fact.

2.

Causal link

To establish causation, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the injury is “fairly

traceable” to the challenged conduct of the defendant rather than the result of “the

independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560,

(quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41–42, 96 S. Ct.

1917, 1926 (1976)).

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff States’ alleged harm is so speculative, one

cannot know in advance whether that harm would have any causal connection to E.O.

13990 or the SC-GHG Estimates. In other words, there is no way to predict how the SCGHG Estimates will affect an agency’s analysis. The Court respectfully disagrees. Plaintiff

States have clearly established that: (1) the SC-GHG Estimates create a new cost measure

the Plaintiff States must use when running cooperative federalism programs or risk serious

consequences; (2) the SC-GHG Estimates significantly increase cost numbers that directly

harm Plaintiffs’ revenues; (3) the Plaintiff States have been deprived of the right to submit

comments which prevented Plaintiff States from raising important reliance interests and

other flaws that directly affect the States; and (4) the SC-GHG Estimates create a new

GHG cost measure that agencies must use in their regulatory actions that has caused greater

regulatory burdens and harm to Plaintiff States’ citizens’ economic well-being.

The Court is persuaded that the SC-GHG Estimates are being applied and are

increasing regulatory costs. Thus, Plaintiff States have met their burden of alleging that

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their injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged act. Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2015

WL 854132, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 26, 2015).

3. Redressability

Lastly, the doctrine of standing demands that it “be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely

‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 560 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.

Ct. 1917, 1926, (1976)).

Plaintiff States maintain that an injunction and eventual vacatur will result in the

prior regulatory regime based on Circular A-4 to retake effect and redress Plaintiff States’

injury. The Court agrees with Plaintiff States that the remedy they seek will redress their

injury.

Plaintiff States also maintain that even if they did not have standing under the

traditional analysis, they have standing under “special solicitude.” “States may have

standing based on … federal assertions of authority to regulate matters they believe they

control.” Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 153 (5th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff States argue

that the SC-GHG Estimates “affect[] the states’ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests by imposing

substantial pressure on them to change their” practices and laws to remain in compliance

with federal standards. Id. at 153. The Court finds that the Plaintiff States also have

standing as they are entitled to special solicitude in the standing inquiry. See also Texas v.

United States 2021 WL 2096669, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2021) (“Although the record

demonstrates no express intention of any party to convince Texas to change its detention

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or education budgets, the pressure exerted on Texas to reconfigure its budget in those areas

is just as ‘direct’ and ‘substantial’ as the pressure on the States in Texas v. United States.”)

III.

REVIEWABILITY

In addition to finding that the Plaintiff States have standing, the Court must ensure

that the asserted claims are reviewable under the APA. The APA provides for judicial

review of agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. Indeed, there is a “strong presumption”

favoring reviewability of administrative action. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Phys., 476

U.S. 667, 670, 106 S. Ct. 2133 (1986). This review is restricted, however, by four factors.

First, the challenged conduct must constitute a “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Second, the states must satisfy the zone-of-interests test. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish

Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210, 183 (2021).

Third, the APA makes agency action unreviewable if the organic statute “precludes judicial

review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Fourth, the APA makes agency action unreviewable if the

“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).51

The Plaintiff States assert three claims under the Administrative Procedures Act

(“APA”). First, they claim that the defendants violated the APA by failing to comply with

the notice-and-comment procedures required by 5 U.S.C. § 553. Second, they claim that

the Defendants failed to engage in reasoned decision making rendering the SC-GHG

Estimates arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Third, they claim that the

SC-GHG Estimates contravene the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), Clean

51

No argument has been made by Defendants as to this criteria, therefore it will not be addressed.

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Air Act (“CAA”), National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), Mineral Leasing Act

(“MLA”), and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) by directing agencies to

consider the global effects of greenhouse gas emissions.

1. Final Agency Action

“Agency action” is defined as “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license,

sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).

The Supreme Court has articulated two conditions for an agency’s action to qualify as

“final.” First, the action may not be “merely tentative or interlocutory” in nature; rather, it

“must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 178, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Second, the action

“must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal

consequences flow.” Id.

Defendants contend that all the Plaintiff States’ claims fail for the lack of any “final

agency action.” As to the first Bennett condition, Defendants maintain that the SC-GHG

Estimates do not “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process”

because “they have no significance unless and until they are actually used in some future

rulemaking.”52 Referring to the Estimates as “interim,” Defendants further explain that the

SC-GHG Estimates “mark only the (potential) beginning of dozens of separate regulatory

processes, which may eventually culminate in the issuance of regulations that are final

agency action.” Id. (emphasis in original/emphasis added)

52

Doc. 31-1, at 38.

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The Plaintiff States argue that the Interim Estimates are legislative rules, and thus,

automatically constitute final agency action.53 Even still, the Plaintiff States contend the

SC-GHG Estimates also meet the two-part test for “final agency action.” The Court agrees.

The first prong is analyzed by determining “whether an action is properly

attributable to the agency itself and represents the culmination of that agency’s

consideration of an issue,” or is “only the ruling of a subordinate official, or tentative.”

Here, the SC-GHG Estimates were issued by the IWG under the authority of EO 13990

and were the culmination of the IWG’s consideration of the issue of how to account for the

social costs of greenhouse gas emissions in regulatory cost-benefit analyses. The label

“interim” does not alter the inherent finality of the rule for purposes of APA review. “As

long as an agency has completed its decisionmaking on the challenged rule—even one

interim in nature—the rule satisfies the first prong of the finality test.” Louisiana v. Biden,

2021 WL 2446010 at *1, *13 (W.D. La. June 15, 2021).

The “interim” SC-GHG Estimates are the final directive from the IWG on how

agencies are to conduct their cost-benefit analyses until a different, “permanent” rule is

issued. Significantly, during the pendency of this suit, the Office of Information and

Regulatory Affairs announced that the target date for publishing the next set of SC-GHG

Estimates is January 2022. Indeed, the “interim” Estimates have already been utilized by

executive agencies, indicating that the agencies interpret the SC-GHG Estimates as final

and binding. As noted above, Plaintiff States have provided numerous instances where

53

Doc. 48, at 39.

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agencies are using the SC-GHG Estimates that this Court finds are causing a direct harm

to the Plaintiff States in increased costs, delayed projects and the loss of Plaintiff States’

revenues. As a result, the “Interim” SC-GHG Estimates are indeed final; the next set of

SC-GHG Estimates was due to be finalized in January 2022. As of this date, they have yet

to be finalized and the Defendants inform the Court that they will probably not be finalized

until the summer of 2022.54 Accordingly, the IWG’s SC-GHG Estimates constitute a final

agency action under the APA.

2.

Zone of Interests

Next, the Plaintiff States must satisfy the zone-of-interests test to pursue claims

under the APA. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,

__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2021). Specifically, the Plaintiff States must show that

the interest asserted is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated

by the statute” claimed to be violated. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,

397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S. Ct. 827 (1970). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this

standard “is not meant to be especially demanding” and is evaluated in keeping with the

underlying

presumption

of

reviewability.

Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish

Band

of

Pottawatomi Indians, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S.

388, 399, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987)). Furthermore, “the benefit of any doubt goes to the

plaintiff,” and suit should be foreclosed “only when ‘a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally

related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably

54

Defendant Supplemental Memorandum, p. 23, Doc. 90.

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be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’” Id. (quoting Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479

U.S. at 399–400, 107 S. Ct. 827).

Here, the interests the Plaintiff States seek to protect undoubtedly fall within the

zone of interests embodied in the statutes they claim to be violated by Defendants—the

APA, EPCA, CAA, NEPA, MLA, and OCSLA.

3.

Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review

The APA exempts agency action from judicial review if the organic statute

“precludes judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Considering the “well-settled

presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative

action,” an intent to preclude such review will be found “only if presented with ‘clear and

convincing evidence.’” Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64, 113 S. Ct.

2485 (1993) (quoting McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496, 111 S. Ct.

888 (1991); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967)).

Establishing unreviewability is an onerous burden, and “where substantial doubt about the

congressional intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of

administrative action is controlling.” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351, 104

S. Ct. 2450 (1984).

This Court has not found, nor have Defendants cited any statute(s) indicating an

intent to preclude judicial review of the Plaintiff States’ claims. Accordingly, the claims

are not excluded from judicial review under Section 701(a)(1).

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(IV) LAW AND ANALYSIS

To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff States must show: “(1) a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the

injunction is not issued; (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs

any harm that will result if the injunction is granted; and (4) that the grant of an injunction

will not disserve the public interest.” Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir.

2013).

1.

Plaintiff States Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Plaintiff States argue that they are likely to succeed on the merits because (1)

the President and the IWG lack authority to promulgate and enforce the SC-GHG

Estimates, or consider the global effects in domestic regulatory policymaking, (2) the SCGHG Estimates were promulgated without complying with the APA’s notice and comment

requirements, (3) the SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and

(4) the SC-GHG Estimates are contrary to law.

The Plaintiff States suggest that in effect, the President and the IWG’s decision to

drop the 7 percent discount rate and increase the time frame of relevant effects to three

centuries, will fundamentally transform regulatory analysis and the national economy. The

Plaintiff States argue that the Executive Branch does not have the authority to issue

Executive Order 13990 because it causes “an enormous and transformative expansion in

[its] regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.” Util. Air Regulatory

Grp., 573 U.S. at 324.

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(i)

The President and the IWG lack authority

“In order for an executive or independent agency to exercise regulatory authority

over a major policy question of great economic and political importance, Congress must

either: (i) expressly and specifically decide the major policy question itself and delegate to

the agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate

to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy question and to regulate and

enforce.” Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342 (2019) (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.

E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120

(2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994);

Stephen A. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev.

363, 370 (1986)).

The Executive cannot “bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in

[its] regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.” Util. Air Regulatory

Grp., 573 U.S. at 324; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159.

(Rejecting executive claim to “jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant

portion of the American economy” absent clear congressional authorization.) The Supreme

Court “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency, decisions of

vast ‘economic and political significance.” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. at

324.

Defendants argue that Article II of the United States Constitution supplied President

Biden the authority to issue EO 13990. Defendants contend that EO 13990 is a routine

exercise of traditional presidential control over subordinates as part of supervising

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subordinates’ actions. In other words, the issuance of EO 13990 falls within the President’s

authority—and duty—to “supervise and guide” agencies “in order to secure that unitary

and uniform execution of the law which Article II of the Constitution evidently

contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.” Bldg. & Const.

Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle,

657 F.2d 298, 406 n. 524 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

Defendants also rely on the text from EO 13990, that “[n]othing in this order shall

be construed to impair or otherwise affect . . . the authority granted by law to an executive

department or agency.” Id. § 8(a)(i); see also Id. § § 5(b)(ii), 8(b) (“This order shall be

implemented in a manner consistent with applicable law.”)

Defendants suggest that the “major questions doctrine” has no bearing on the

President’s authority to issue EO 13990 because the President is not a creature of statute.

Plaintiff States argue that the SC-GHG Estimates implicate a matter of major importance

and there is no statutory authority for the Executive branch to issue the SC-GHG Estimates.

The major questions doctrine ensures that agencies do not impose new obligations

of “vast ‘economic and political significance’” upon private parties and States unless

Congress “speaks clearly.” Util. Air Reg. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324 (2014). The major questions

doctrine consists of two steps for the Court to determine: (1) if the assertion of Executive

authority implicates matters of “vast ‘economic and political significance,’” and (2) if

Congress has “expressly and specifically” delegated authority over the issue to the

Executive. Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342 (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J.,

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respecting denial of certiorari) (collecting cases); NFIB v. OSHA, 2022 WL 120952, at *3

(U.S. Jan. 13, 2022).

The major questions doctrine enforces the Nondelegation Doctrine by “protect[ing]

the separation of powers and ensur[ing] that any new laws governing the lives of

Americans are subject to the robust democratic processes the Constitution demands.”

NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Plaintiff States assert that the SC-GHG Estimates will impose significant costs on

the economy.55 “The total cost of these 83 regulatory actions [using social costs] is

estimated to be between $447 billion and $561 billion (in 2020 dollars).” 56 Courts have

found that less costly and far-reaching regulations have triggered the major questions

doctrine. For example, the Fifth Circuit recently held that the OSHA Vaccine Mandate,

which imposed almost $3 billion in compliance costs, triggered the major questions

doctrine. BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 617 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Id. at

617–18 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 2131 (1994) (declining to

hold that the FCC could eliminate telecommunications rate-filing requirements); FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–160 (2000) (declining to hold that

the FDA could regulate cigarettes); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006)

(declining to allow DOJ to ban physician-assisted suicide).

Additionally, Plaintiff States contend that Defendants have failed to identify clear

statutory authorization for issuing EO 13990. “[W]hen Congress wishes to ‘alter the

55

56

Plaintiffs’ exhibit 26, p.2.

Doc. 57 ¶ ¶ 14-26.

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fundamental details of a regulatory scheme,’ . . . we would expect it to speak with the

requisite clarity to place that intent beyond dispute.” U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River

Pres. Ass’n 140 S.Ct. 1837, 1848–49 (2020). “When the President takes measures

incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,

for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional

powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.

579, 637 (1952).

Specifically, Plaintiff States challenge the SC-GHG Estimates’ consideration of

global effects as opposed to national or domestic effects. Plaintiff States assert that

Congress has addressed the issue of whether agencies can consider global or domestic

effects and informs the Court that Congress has emphatically articulated that agencies may

only consider effects to our Nation. To support their position, Plaintiff States note that (1)

EPCA directs the Executive “to consider the need for national energy and water

conservation,” 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added), (2) “the need of the United

States to conserve energy,” 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (emphasis added), (3) the Clean Air Act

directs the Executive “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so

as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population,”

42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1) (emphasis added), (4) NEPA directs agencies to “assure for all

Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing

surroundings,” U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (emphasis added), (5) the MLA directs the Executive

to consider the “public welfare” of the United States in conducting oil and gas lease sales,

30 U.S.C. § 187 (emphasis added), and (6) the OCSLA directs the Executive to make the

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Outer Continental Shelf “available for expeditious and orderly development, subject to

environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of

competition and other national needs.” 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff States argue that EO 13990 and the SC-GHG Estimates mandate outcomes

with massive numbers for the cost side of the scale, unlike EO12866 and Circular A-4,

which provided a framework for agencies to calculate the costs and benefits of regulation

and determine how to weigh them under their statutory authority. Thus, EO 13990 and the

SC-GHG Estimates are a legislative rule that dictates specific numerical values for use

across all decisionmaking affecting private parties. See e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives v.

Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Judge Friendly wrote that when an agency

wants to state a principle ‘in numerical terms,’ terms that cannot be derived from a

particular record, the agency is legislating and should act through rulemaking.”)

Plaintiff States also maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates alter rights and obligations

and remove agency discretion. See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 442 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f

a statement denies the [agency] discretion in the area of its coverage[,] then the statement

is binding, and creates rights or obligations.”) Plaintiff States note that the SC-GHG

Estimates direct agencies to use specific social cost numbers, not only in rulemaking, but

in “other relevant agency actions,” such as project-level NEPA reviews. Doc. 55-27, pp. 56, 24-25; Doc. 55-26, p. 5.

The Court finds that EO 13990 contradicts Congress’ intent regarding legislative

rulemaking by mandating consideration of the global effects. The Court further finds that

the President lacks power to promulgate fundamentally transformative legislative rules in

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areas of vast political, social, and economic importance, thus, the issuance of EO 13990

violates the major questions doctrine.

(ii)

The SC-GHG Estimates were promulgated without complying with the

APA’s notice and comment requirements

Next, the Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG were promulgated without

complying with the APA’s notice and comment requirements. The Plaintiff States remark

that the SC-GHG Estimates are a legislative rule because they prescribe valuations, costs

or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).

Agency legislative rules must go through the APA’s notice-and-comments

procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 723856, at *43 (S.D.

Tex. Feb. 23, 2021). Consequently, the SC-GHG Estimates were required to go through

the APA’s notice and comment procedures. See Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617

F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“When an agency wants to state a principle ‘in numerical

terms,’ terms that cannot be derived from a particular record, the agency is legislating and

should act through rulemaking.”); see also Hoctor v. U.S .Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170

(7th Cir. 1996) (“When agencies base rules on arbitrary choices they are legislating, and

so these rules are legislative or substantive and require notice and comment rulemaking, a

procedure that is analogous to the procedure employed by legislatures in making statutes.”)

In addition, Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates effectively repeal

key provisions of two regulatory actions that went through the notice and comment

procedure—the 7 percent discount rate and focus on domestic effects. Clean Water Action

v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 936 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2019) (an agency must

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“follow the same process to revise a rule as it used to promulgate it”) (citing Perez v. Mortg.

Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 100 (2015)).

Next, the SC-GHG Estimates revise CEQ’s recent NEPA final rule’s causation

standard. Specifically, the CEQ’s rule requires agencies to exclude effects that “are remote

in time, geographically remote, or the product of a lengthy causal chain,” 85 Fed. Reg.

43304, 43375 (July 16, 2020); the SC-GHG Estimates require agencies to consider remote

effects which contradicts the CEQ’s rule.57

The Plaintiff States note that the Administration was entitled to amend the rules but

was required to “use the same procedures” in amending as it “used to issue the rule in the

first instance.” Clean Water Action, 936 F.3d at 313–14 (quoting Perez, 575 U.S. at 101).

However, the SC-GHG Estimates were promulgated “without observance of procedure

required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). The Court finds that EO 13990 was promulgated

without complying with the APA’s notice and comment requirements.

(iii).

The SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and capricious under the APA

The Plaintiff States further maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and

capricious under the APA. Under the APA, courts are to “hold unlawful and set aside

agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Federal administrative agencies are required to engage

in ‘reasoned decisionmaking,’” Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 723856, at *39, meaning

57

The CEQ’s rule was published only after complying with the APA’s notice and comment procedure.

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that “[n]ot only must an agency’s decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority,

but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.” Id.

The Plaintiff States argue that the Biden SC-GHG Estimates are based on a

fundamentally flawed methodology that does not take into account statutory

considerations, ignores decades of best regulatory practices, and sub silentio depart from

regulatory documents that remain in force. Cf. California v. Bernhardt, 472 F.Supp.3d 573,

600–01 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“While the Executive branch holds the power to issue executive

orders, an agency cannot flip-flop regulations on the whims of each new administration.

The APA requires reasoning, deliberation, and process. These requirements exist in part,

because markets and industries rely on stable regulations.”) In other words, the SC-GHG

Estimates are neither “reasonable” nor “reasonably explained.” Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n

v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S.Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). The Plaintiff States present

numerous arguments as to why the SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and capricious.

• The SC-GHG Estimates fail to consider the positive externalities of energy

production.

• The IWG failed to consider whether “there was ‘legitimate reliance’ on the”

prior administration’s method of focusing on domestic effects and using higher

discount rates. Dep’t of Homeland Security. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140

S.Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517

U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).

• The SC-GHG Estimates ignore specific factual findings made by the previous

Administration justifying its reliance on Circular A-4 in regulatory proceedings.

• There is a “significant mismatch” between the SC-GHG Estimates’ conclusions

and the administrative record.58

58

The Plaintiff States remark that the IWG acknowledged that its SC-GHG Estimate was based on antiquated

models, needed updating and was based largely on guesswork, but instead of allowing for the comment period for

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• The IWG fails to justify the SC-GHG’s use of a global rather than domestic

scope in calculating costs.

• The SC-GHG arbitrarily departs from decades of prior Executive Branch

cost/benefit practice regarding discount rates.59

• The SC-GHG Estimates are based on the same three inherently flawed models

that produced the Obama SCC, SCM, and SCN.

• The SC-GHG Estimates reject recent standards set by the Council on

Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) concerning the National Environmental Policy

Act (“NEPA”) regulations.60

• The IWG relied upon statutorily impermissible factors by considering global

rather than domestic effects.

• The IWG ignores significant federalism costs caused by the SC-GHG Estimates,

an important aspect of regulatory analysis.61 Specifically, the IWG neglected to

consider the effect the SC-GHG Estimates will have upon State revenues; the

Biden SC-GHG Estimates will result in significantly fewer tracts of land being

made available for lease sales.62

(iv).

The SC-GHG Estimates are contrary to law

The Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates are contrary to law

because they direct agencies to consider factors Congress did not authorize. Specifically,

the Plaintiff States assert that the SC-GHG contravenes (1) the Energy Policy and

Conservation Act (“EPCA”) because the EPCA unambiguously precludes the

consideration of global effects, (2) the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), which does not authorize

the Administrator of the EPA to consider global effects in setting air pollution standards

outside input, the IWG issued the SC-GHG in a month in order to comply with Biden’s EO 13990’s demand to

impose more stringent regulation.

59

Prior Executive Branch agencies utilized standard discount rates of 3 and 7 percent as embodied in Circular A-4.

60

85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43375 (July 16, 2020).

61

EO 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255, 43256 (August 4, 1999).

62

See, e.gl., Dep’t of Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3399 (Apr. 16, 2021) (noting intent to employ SC-GHG).

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for new motor vehicles and stationary sources, (3) the NEPA, wherein the CEQ’s

regulation implementing NEPA precludes both the SC-GHG Estimates’ consideration of

global effects and approach to causation, (4) the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”) because it

prevents the Secretary of the Interior’s duty to ensure the expeditious development of

public land, and (5) the OCSLA by disrupting its statutory leasing program which promotes

the development of resources on the Outer Continental Shelf63 and by compelling a global

effects analysis.

(v).

The SC-GHG Estimates are subject to APA review

The Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates are final agency action and

thus subject to APA review. The APA allows judicial review only of a “final agency

action,” “that (1) mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and

(2) “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal

consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997).

The Plaintiff States argue that the SC-GHG Estimates mark the consummation of

the IWG’s decisionmaking process because they are the IWG’s last word until at least 2022

and because there are no further steps in the process; thus, the SC-GHG Estimates for 2021

meet the finality test. See Louisiana, 2021 WL 2446010, at *12 (“As long as an agency has

completed its decisionmaking on a challenged rule—even one interim in nature—the rule

satisfies the first prong of the finality test.”) (citing NRDC v. Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68, 80

(D.C. Cir. 2020)).

63

43 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1337, 1340, 1344, 1345, and 1351.

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As to the second prong, the Plaintiff States argue that the SC-GHG Estimates bind

the entire Executive Branch to a particular numerical measure of the social cost of

greenhouse gases. Furthermore, the SC-GHG Estimates “denies the decisionmaker

discretion in the area of its coverage[,] then the statement is binding, and creates rights or

obligations.” Texas, 809 F.3d at 171.

The Plaintiff States maintain that the IWG is an “agency” for purposes of the APA

because it has been granted authority by EO 13990 to act “with substantial independent

authority in the exercise of specific functions.” Soucie v. David, 48 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C.

Cir. 1971). Specifically, the IWG has been granted authority to create SC-GHG Estimates

that will be binding on executive agencies. See Pac Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl.

Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (The power to “issue guidelines to federal

agencies for the preparation of” regulatory review is a hallmark of an APA agency.)

Lastly, the Plaintiff States maintain that they have an ultra vires cause of action to

challenge Section 5 of EO 13990 because it is not authorized by any statute and is in direct

conflict with several statutes. Ultra vires review is available to review “whether the

President has violated the Constitution, the statute under which the challenged action was

taken, or other statutes, or did not have statutory authority to take a particular action.”

Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 801 F.Supp.2d 383,

406 (D.Ma. 2011) (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136

(D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also Associated Builders & Contractors of SE Texas v. Rung, 2016

WL 8188655, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 216) (“The DOL, a federal agency also operating

within the Executive Branch, has implemented the President’s Executive Order by issuing

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the Guidance incorporated by reference in the new Rule. Therefore, the Executive Order

may be challenged by Plaintiffs on both statutory and non-statutory grounds.”) (citing

Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

The Plaintiff States thus argue that they have demonstrated multiple independently

sufficient grounds to vacate the SC-GHG Estimate and therefore have shown a strong

likelihood of success on the merits. The Court agrees and finds that the Plaintiff States have

shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits.

2.

Irreparable Harm

The Plaintiff States maintain that they easily meet the threshold requirement that if

an injunction is not issued, they will suffer inevitable and irreparable harm. Plaintiff states

must show that they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary

relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365

(2008). For their injury to be sufficiently “irreparable,” the Plaintiff States need only show

it “cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 304

(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338

(5th Cir. 1981).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff States’ alleged harm is speculative at best because

no specific agency action has caused them injury. Or, better yet, it is speculative to assume

that EO 13990 will dictate policy outcomes that concretely harm Plaintiff States. In other

words, Plaintiff States’ injury-in-fact assumes that they will be harmed by future

hypothetical agency actions. Additionally, Defendants contend that it is unknowable in

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advance if any harm caused by future regulations is causally connected to EO 13990 and

the SC-GHG Estimates.

The Plaintiff States submit that they are substantial producers of energy and rely

upon tax revenues from energy production to perform their sovereign duties. As such, the

increased SC-GHG Estimates will cause regulatory standards affecting air quality, energy

efficiency, power plant regulation to increase in stringency, which will directly harm the

economies and revenues of Plaintiff States. As noted above, the Plaintiff States maintain

that Texas, Louisiana, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, South Dakota, Mississippi, Alabama,

West Virginia, and Wyoming and their citizens will all be imminently harmed by EO 13990

and the SC-GHG Estimates by causing increased energy costs. The Plaintiff States argue

that the chain of causation is clear and confirmed by history.

Plaintiff States also contend that the SC-GHG Estimates will impose additional

duties upon Plaintiff States when they implement cooperative federalism programs, as well

as the harm to the Plaintiff States’ ability to purchase affordable energy to carry out their

sovereign functions. Furthermore, the SC-GHG Estimates will adversely impact Plaintiff

States’ revenues and Louisiana’s coastline will be threatened by directly reducing the funds

necessary to maintain the state’s coastal lands.

The Plaintiff States remark that the IWG’s failure to employ notice and comment

divested them of their procedural rights under the APA and various other federal statutes

to be consulted and offer views regarding administrative actions impacting concrete State

interests. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (“[A] ‘persons who

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has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right

without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”)

Finally, the Plaintiff States argue that they have parens patriae standing to vindicate

the economic injuries the SC-GHG Estimates will impose on their citizens. See Alfred L.

Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (parens patriae

standing appropriate when based on State’s “interest in the health and well-being—both

physical and economic—of its residents in general”).

As noted by Defendants, EO 13990 instructs agencies that “[i]t is essential that

agencies capture the full costs of greenhouse gas emissions as accurately as possible,

including by taking global damages into account,” and that “[a]n accurate social cost is

essential for agencies to accurately determine the social benefits of reducing greenhouse

gas emissions when conducting cost-benefit analyses of regulatory and other actions.” EO

13990 § 5. The EO is not a recommendation, nor is it guidance; EO 13990 directs that

agencies “shall use” the SC-GHG Estimates “when monetizing the value of changes in

greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant agency actions.”

Id.

Plaintiff States have sufficiently identified the kinds of harms to support injunctive

relief. Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiff States have made a clear showing of an

injury-in-fact, and that such injury “cannot be undone through monetary remedies,”

Louisiana v. Biden, 2021 WL 2446010, at *21 (W.D. La. June 15, 2021), such that they

need immediate relief now, lest they be unable to ever obtain meaningful judicial relief in

the future. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 186 (5th Cir. 2015) (financial injury

App. A-42

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irreparable); Louisiana v. Biden, 2021 WL 2446010, at *21 (financial and parens patriae

harm irreparable); State v. Biden, 2021 WL 3603341, at *26 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2021)

(financial injuries irreparable); Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 2096669, at *47 (S.D.

Tex. Feb. 23, 2021) (same); see also e.g., Texas, 2021 WL 3683913, at *59 (injuries to

Plaintiff States’ sovereign powers are irreparable); Nevada v. U. S. Dep’t of Lab.,218

F.Supp.3d 520, 532 (E.D. Tex. 2016).

2. Will the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweigh any harm

that will result if the injunction is not issued?

Plaintiff States maintain that the harms to their States and their citizens’ economic

well-being more than suffice to establish standing and the possibility of irreparable harm.

As previously noted, the SC-GHG Estimates will harm Plaintiff States’ ability to purchase

affordable energy to carry out their sovereign functions as the directive to use the SC-GHG

Estimates will significantly drive up costs while simultaneously significantly decrease

States revenues resulting in the inability of the Plaintiff States to carry out their sovereign

duties to their citizens.64 Specifically, Louisiana will be directly harmed by the reduction

of funds necessary to maintain the state’s coastal lands. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at

519 & n. 17. (State’s “independent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’” and

“well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory” supports standing).65 In addition,

64

See Dismukes Decl. ¶ ¶ 17-26.

Plaintiff States note that the deprivation of those funds directly harms Louisiana’s territory. Louisiana is losing

swaths of coastal land—nearly two thousand square miles and counting—due to follow-on effects from environmental

catastrophes. See Louisiana, 2021 WL 2446010, at *21 (noting irreparable harm form “damages for reduced funding

to the Coastal Master Plan, which would reduce proceeds that are used in Louisiana’s coastal recovery and restoration

program”)

65

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the implementation of SC-GHG Estimates without complying with the APA and the notice

and comment period have divested Plaintiff States of their procedural rights.

The Court finds that the balance of the injuries weighs substantially in favor of the

Plaintiff States.

3.

Will the Injunction Harm Defendant or Disserve the Public Interest?

The Plaintiff States maintain that the public interest and balance of equities weigh

in favor of granting a preliminary injunction because Defendants “have no legitimate

interest in the implementation of [the] unlawful” SC-GHG Estimates. See Texas, 2021 WL

7236, at *49. The Plaintiff States argue that the public has an overriding interest in ensuring

that vast regulatory programs are implemented lawfully, in compliance with the

constitutional separation of powers and the APA, whereas the Defendants would suffer no

harm from an injunction. Thus, the Plaintiff States maintain that the public interest and

balance of harms weigh heavily in Plaintiff States’ favor. The Court agrees that the public

interest and balance of equities weigh heavily in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be

granted in its entirety.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 11th day of February, 2022.

_____________________________________

JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL

CASE NO. 2:21-CV-01074

VERSUS

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

JOSEPH R BIDEN JR ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Ruling,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 53) is hereby

GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants,1 Cecilia Rouse, Shalanda

Young, Kei Koizumi, Janet Yellen, Deb Haaland, Tom Vilsack, Gina Raimondo, Xavier

Becerra, Pete Buttigieg, Jennifer Granholm, Brenda Mallory, Michael S. Regan, Gina

McCarthy, Brian Deese, Jack Danielson, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.

Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of

Agriculture, U.S.

Department of Interior, National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration, and the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases

are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from:

(1) adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon the work product of

the Interagency Working Group (“IWG”); (2) enjoining Defendants from

independently relying upon the IWG’s methodology considering global effects,

1

With the exception of President Biden as he is not an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act.

App. A-45

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discount rates, and time horizons; and (3) ordering Defendants to return to the

guidance of Circular A-4 in conducting regulatory analysis;

(2) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any Social Cost of

Greenhouse Gas estimates based on global effects or that otherwise fails to

comply with applicable law;

(3) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any estimate of Social

Cost of Greenhouse Gases that does not utilize discount rates of 3 and 7 percent

or that otherwise does not comply with Circular A-4; and

(4) Relying upon or implementing Section 5 of Executive Order 13990 in any

manner.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall become effective immediately

and shall remain in effect, pending the final resolution of this case or until further orders

of this Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, or the United States

Supreme Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no security bond shall be required under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 11th day of February, 2021.

_____________________________________

JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

App. A-46

Appendix B

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL

CASE NO. 2:21-CV-01074

VERSUS

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

JOSEPH R BIDEN JR ET AL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is “Defendants’ Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal” (Doc. 102)

wherein Defendants seek a stay of this Court’s preliminary injunction concerning President

Biden’s Executive Order 13990.1 Defendants inform the Court that should the Court not

rule on this motion by February 28, 2022, Defendants will seek relief from the United

States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit.2 It goes without saying that Plaintiffs

vehemently oppose this motion.

As noted by Plaintiff States, Defendants have repeatedly insisted that the Executive

Branch does not rely on the SC-GHG Estimates to justify administrative actions. This

Court believes without doubt that the Estimates were being used and are currently being

used, despite this Courts’ injunction,3 to justify final agency action that will artificially

1

Doc. 99.

Id. p. 1.

3

See Dep’t of Energy, Proposed Rule, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Variable

Refrigerant Flow Multi-Split Air conditioners and Heat Pumps, 87 Fed. Reg. 11335, 11348 (Mar. 1, 2022) (“DOE

uses the social cost of greenhouse gases from the most recent update of the Interagency Working Group on Social

Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government (“IWG”) working group, which are available in the Technical

Support document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates under Executive Order

13990. The IWG recommended global values be used for regulatory analysis.”)

2

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increase costs in the cost/benefit analysis4 and systematically increase regulatory burdens

on Plaintiff States.

STANDARD FOR MOTION TO STAY

The Court considers the following four factors in assessing a motion for stay

pending appeal: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely

to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;

(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceedings; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434

(2009); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d

406, 410 (5th Cir. 2013). A stay “is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might

otherwise result to the appellant.’”5 Id. at 410, see also Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d

962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (Movants “bear[] the burden on all four factors, and the first two

are the most critical.” Axiall Canada Inc. v. MECS, Inc., 2021 WL 6062356, at *1 (W.D.

La. Apr. 8, 2021) (quoting Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 910 (5th

Cir. 2011)).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that the Preliminary Injunction is overbroad. The Court issued the

Preliminary Injunction to restrain executive officers from complying with Executive Order

13990, and/or employing the SG-GHG Estimates. The Defendants complain that the

Preliminary Injunction will delay pending rulemakings and that these agencies will now

4

EO 13990 mandates massive numbers on the cost side of the cost/benefit scale.

Nken held that if the petitioner has not made a certain threshold showing regarding irreparable harm … then a stay

may not issue, regardless of the petitioner’s proof regarding the other stay factors.”)

5

App. B-2

Case 2:21-cv-01074-JDC-KK Document 111 Filed 03/09/22 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: 4435

abandon actions due to an inability to redo related environmental analyses in time to meet

deadlines.

Success on the merits

Movants bear the burden of making a “strong showing that they are likely to succeed

on the merits.” U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden, 2022 WL 594375, at *10 (5th Cir. Feb. 28,

2022). Defendants make the same arguments here that were made in their opposition to the

subject motion for preliminary injunction. The Court will not regurgitate its reasoning here.

Suffice it to say that the Court has no doubt that prior to the preliminary injunction, the

SG-GHG Estimates were being utilized, and EO 13990 is a final agency action. The

administration’s directive to federal agencies to use the SG-GHG estimates violate the

Administrative Procedure Act, violate the Major Questions Doctrine, and amount to a

transformative legislative rule in a manner not clearly authorized by Congress.

Irreparable injury

Defendants complain that they will suffer irreparable injury because (now admitting

that the SG-GHG Estimates are being used) “agencies would be required to redirect

resources to revise already-drafted proposed rules and regulatory impact analyses,

including in instances where a draft rule that incorporates the Working Group’s Interim

Estimates has already been submitted to OMB.”6

Mancini Dec. ¶ ¶ 17–23. “The Department of Energy noted approximately twenty-one initially-identified

rulemakings that will be so affected; the EPA has noted approximately five; the Department of Transportation has

noted approximately nine; and the Department of the Interior has noted approximately three.” Defendant’s

Memorandum, p. 37, Doc. 108, citing Id. ¶ 18,

6

App. B-3

Case 2:21-cv-01074-JDC-KK Document 111 Filed 03/09/22 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: 4436

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “[j]udicial interference with a government

agency’s policies often constitutes irreparable injury.” Texas v. United States, 14 F.4th 332,

340 (5th Cir. 2021), opinion vacated on reh’g enbanc, 24 F.4th 407 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing

Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 2020)). However, “the Government cannot

claim an irreparable injury from being enjoined against an action that has no statutory

authorization to take.” State v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538, 558 (5th Cir. 2021). The Court finds it

interesting that the Defendants argued in their opposition to Plaintiff States’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction that the SG-GHG Estimates were of no moment because they were

not being utilized, nor do they have a major impact on Executive Branch decisionmaking,

yet, they now complain that the preliminary injunction, which enjoins the use of the SGGHG Estimates, will wholesale prevent the Executive Branch from functioning.

The Court concluded that President Biden lacked authority to issue EO 13990, thus

there can be no irreparable injury. See Biden, 10 F.4th at 558.

Substantial injury/public interest

Defendants complain that the preliminary injunction is against the public interest

and does substantial harm because it prevents the Working Group from taking measures to

tackle the climate crisis. Plaintiff States maintain that the public interest and balance of

harms weigh heavily against a stay because Defendants have no legitimate interest in the

implementation of the unlawful SC-GHG Estimates. “[T]he ‘public interest [is] in having

governmental agencies abide the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.’”

Biden, 10 F.4th at 559. Moreover, “public interest favors maintenance of [an] injunction”

App. B-4

Case 2:21-cv-01074-JDC-KK Document 111 Filed 03/09/22 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: 4437

that “maintains the separation of powers.” Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 768 (5th

Cir. 2015).

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the balance of equities, public interest, and irreparable harm

factors weigh heavily against Defendants, and furthermore, Defendants have failed to show

they are likely to succeed on the merits. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal is hereby

DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 9th day of March, 2022.

___________________________________

JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

App. B-5

Appendix C

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516242341

Page: 1

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 16, 2022

No. 22-30087

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

The State of Louisiana, by and through its Attorney General, Jeff

Landry; The State of Alabama, by and through its Attorney General,

Steve Marchall; The State of Florida, by and through its Attorney

General, Ashley Moody; The State of Georgia, by and through its

Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr; The Commonwealth of

Kentucky, by and through its Attorney General, Daniel Cameron; The

State of Mississippi, by and through its Attorney General, Lynn Fitch;

The State of South Dakota, by and through its Governor, Kristi

Noem; The State of Texas, by and through its Attorney General, Ken

Paxton; The State of West Virginia, by and through its Attorney

General, Patrick Morrisey; The State of Wyoming, by and through its

Attorney General, Bridget Hill,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United

States; Cecilia Rouse, in her official capacity as Chairwoman of the Council

of Economic Advisers; Shalanda Young, in her official capacity as Acting

Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Kei Koizumi, in his official

capacity as Acting Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; Janet

Yellen, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury; Deb Haaland,

Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; Tom Vilsack, in his official

capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; Gina Raimondo, Secretary, U.S.

Department of Commerce; Xavier Becerra, Secretary, U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services; Pete Buttigieg, in his official capacity as

Secretary of Transportation; Jennifer Granholm, Secretary, U.S.

Department of Energy; Brenda Mallory, in her official capacity as

Chairwoman of the Council on Environmental Quality; Michael S. Regan,

App. C-1

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516242341

Page: 2

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

No. 22-30087

in his official capacity as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;

Gina McCarthy, in her official capacity as White House National Climate

Advisor; Brian Deese, in his official capacity as Director of the National

Economic Council; Jack Danielson, in his official capacity as Executive

Director of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; United

States Environmental Protection Agency; United

States

Department

of

Energy;

United

States

Department

of

Transportation;

United

States

Department of Agriculture; United States Department

of Interior; National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration; Interagency Working Group on Social

Cost of Greenhouse Gases,

Defendants—Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:21-CV-1074

Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

IT IS ORDERED that the opposed motion of Appellants for stay

pending appeal is GRANTED.

When federal agencies promulgate regulations or take other agency

action with economically significant effects, they conduct a cost-benefit

analysis. This has been done since the Carter administration, although

presidential oversight of regulatory action through a systematic review

process began as early as the Nixon administration. In 1993, President

Clinton issued Executive Order 12866 which, among other things, mandates

the prepublication review process for economically significant regulations.

Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,736, 51,741 (Sep. 30, 1993).

EO 12866 also states “[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the

benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and

2

App. C-2

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Document: 00516242341

Page: 3

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

No. 22-30087

benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a

reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its

costs.” Later administrations retained EO 12866’s commitment to costbenefit analyses and strengthened it with additional directives or guidelines

for regulatory analysis.

In 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued

Circular A-4 to provide guidance to agencies on how to conduct the costbenefit analysis implemented by EO 12866. See OMB Circular A-4 (Sept. 17,

2003). Compliance with Circular A-4 is not required by any statute or

regulation and is not binding on any agency.

In conducting cost-benefit analyses, agencies consider the impact of

the emissions of greenhouse gases. The impact of these emissions on various

factors like health, agriculture, and sea levels, can be quantified into dollar

amounts per ton of gas emitted—i.e., the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases

(SC-GHG).

To encourage consistency in determining SC-GHG, in 2009,

President Obama instituted the Interagency Working Group (IWG) to

develop a method for quantifying the costs and effects of emissions. In 2010,

the IWG developed a method to quantify GHG emissions into social costs

estimates based on peer-reviewed frameworks.

In 2017, President Trump disbanded the IWG and its method for

quantifying SC-GHG in Executive Order 13783. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82

Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (March 31, 2017). That order still contemplated,

however, that agencies would continue to “monetize the value of changes in

greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations” and that estimates

would be consistent with Circular A-4 (to the extent permitted by law). 82

Fed. Reg. 16,096.

3

App. C-3

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516242341

Page: 4

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

No. 22-30087

In January 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 13990 and

reinstated the IWG to advise him on the SC-GHG. See Exec. Order No.

13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037, 7,040, § 5(b)(ii)(A) (Jan. 20, 2021). The IWG was

also directed to develop new estimates for the SC-GHG, and until those new

estimates are published, to develop Interim Estimates within 30 days, as

appropriate and consistent with applicable law. Pursuant to EO 13990,

agencies must use the Interim Estimates when they conduct cost-benefit

analyses for regulatory or other agency action. The IWG published the

Interim Estimates in February 2021. The Interim Estimates are the same as

the SC-GHG estimates from 2016, adjusted for inflation.

The Plaintiff States sued the United States’ Government Defendants

in April 2021 to preemptively challenge the Interim Estimates. They claim

the Interim Estimates will lead to increased regulatory burdens when

agencies conduct cost-benefit analyses. The Plaintiff States therefore

brought several challenges to Interim Estimates pursuant to the

Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Plaintiff States’ claims are

premised solely on the broad use of the Interim Estimates. They do not

challenge any specific regulation or other agency action.

In February 2022, the district court entered a preliminary injunction

enjoining the Government Defendants from using, in any manner, the

Interim Estimates. The Government Defendants move to stay the injunction

pending appeal arguing, among other things, the Plaintiff States lack

standing, their claims are not ripe, and the Interim Estimates are not final

agency action under the APA. Because we conclude the Government

Defendants have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the

merits, and the balance of harms to the parties favors granting the stay, we

GRANT the Government Defendants’ motion.

4

App. C-4

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516242341

Page: 5

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

No. 22-30087

Whether to enter a stay is left to the court’s discretion. See Nken v.

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). That discretion is bound to four factors:

“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to

succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured

absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the

other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest

lies.” Id. (citation omitted). The first two factors “are the most critical.” Id.

The Government Defendants are likely to succeed on the merits

because the Plaintiff States lack standing. The Plaintiff States’ claimed injury

is “increased regulatory burdens” that may result from the consideration of

SC-GHG, and the Interim Estimates specifically. This injury, however,

hardly meets the standards for Article III standing because it is, at this point,

merely hypothetical. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)

(stating “injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which

is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339–40 (2016) (requiring an

injury to actually exist and affect a plaintiff in a “personal and individual

way”). The Government Defendants are also likely to succeed in showing

that the Plaintiff States have failed to meet their burden on causation and

redressability. The increased regulatory burdens the Plaintiff States fear will

come from the Interim Estimates appear untraceable because agencies

consider a great number of other factors in determining when, what, and how

to regulate or take agency action (and the Plaintiff States do not challenge a

specific regulation or action). See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398,

411–13 (2013) (assuming claimed injury was imminent pursuant to Lujan but

noting redressability was absent because there was a number of other

methods to inflict the same injury which were not challenged in the case).

5

App. C-5

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516242341

Page: 6

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

No. 22-30087

The Interim Estimates on their own do nothing to the Plaintiff States.

So we discern no injury that would satisfy Article III at this stage. See

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 55 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (concluding

organizations lacked standing because among other things, the plaintiffs were

not the subject of the challenged regulations). The Plaintiff States’ claims

therefore amount to a generalized grievance of how the current

administration is considering SC-GHG. And that fails to meet the standards

of Article III standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568 (“[R]espondents chose to

challenge a more generalized level of Government action,” instead of

“specifically identifiable Government violations of law,” which is “rarely if

ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.” (citation omitted)).

The Government Defendants have shown they will be irreparably

harmed absent a stay. The preliminary injunction halts the President’s

directive to agencies in how to make agency decisions, before they even make

those decisions. It also orders agencies to comply with a prior administration’s

internal guidance document that embodies a certain approach to regulatory

analysis, even though that document was not mandated by any regulation or

statute in the first place. The preliminary injunction sweeps broadly and

prohibits reliance on § 5 of EO 13990, which creates the IWG, a group created

to advise the President on policy questions in addition to creating the Interim

Estimates. It is unclear how the Plaintiff States’ qualms with the Interim

Estimates justify halting the President’s IWG. All of this effectively stops or

delays agencies in considering SC-GHG in the manner the current

administration has prioritized within the bounds of applicable law. The

preliminary injunction’s directive for the current administration to comply

with prior administrations’ policies on regulatory analysis absent a specific

agency action to review also appears outside the authority of the federal

courts. We therefore find the Government Defendants are irreparably

harmed absent a stay of the injunction. Cf. E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760, 770

6

App. C-6

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516242341

Page: 7

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

No. 22-30087

(5th Cir. 2021) (concluding state was irreparably harmed when an injunction

prevented the state from carrying out public policy and enforcing its own

laws).

On the other hand, a stay of the injunction will impose minimal injury

on the Plaintiff States. In consideration of this factor, the maintenance of the

status quo is important. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 439 U.S. 1358,

1359 (1978). The Interim Estimates were published in February 2021. This

lawsuit was filed in April 2021. The Plaintiff States moved for a preliminary

injunction in July 2021. And the preliminary injunction was entered in

February 2022. By the time the preliminary injunction was entered, the

Interim Estimates had been in place for one year. The status quo at this point

is the continued use of the Interim Estimates. See E.T., 19 F.4th at 770

(concluding status quo was leaving state order in effect because it had been

in effect for nearly four months and plaintiffs alleged a tenuous and

speculative injury). And because the claimed injury, increased regulatory

burdens, has yet to occur, the continued use of the Interim Estimates will not

harm the Plaintiff States until a regulation or agency action is promulgated

from the actual use of the Interim Estimates. To the extent the agencies will

use, or are using, the Interim Estimates in reaching a specific final agency

action, we discern no obstacle to prevent the Plaintiff States from challenging

a specific agency action in the manner provided by the APA.

In sum, the Plaintiff States’ claims are based on a generalized

grievance of the use of Interim Estimates in cost-benefit analyses of

regulations and agency action. But their claimed injury does not stem from

the Interim Estimates themselves, it stems from any forthcoming,

speculative, and unknown regulation that may place increased burdens on

them and may result from consideration of SC-GHG. We conclude the

standing inquiry shows the Government Defendants’ likelihood of success

7

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Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516242341

Page: 8

Date Filed: 03/16/2022

No. 22-30087

on the merits in this appeal, and the other factors, including the public

interest, favor granting a stay of the injunction.

The Government Defendants’ motion to stay the preliminary

injunction pending appeal is GRANTED. The district court’s preliminary

injunction entered on February 11, 2022 is STAYED pending this appeal.

8

App. C-8

Appendix D

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516280397

Page: 1

Date Filed: 04/14/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

___________

No. 22-30087

___________

The State of Louisiana, by and through its Attorney General, Jeff

Landry; The State of Alabama, by and through its Attorney General,

Steve Marchall; The State of Florida, by and through its Attorney

General, Ashley Moody; The State of Georgia, by and through its

Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr; The Commonwealth of

Kentucky, by and through its Attorney General, Daniel Cameron; The

State of Mississippi, by and through its Attorney General, Lynn Fitch;

The State of South Dakota, by and through its Governor, Kristi

Noem; The State of Texas, by and through its Attorney General, Ken

Paxton; The State of West Virginia, by and through its Attorney

General, Patrick Morrisey; The State of Wyoming, by and through its

Attorney General, Bridget Hill,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United

States; Cecilia Rouse, in her official capacity as Chairwoman of the

Council of Economic Advisers; Shalanda Young, in her official capacity

as Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Kei Koizumi,

in his official capacity as Acting Director of the Office of Science and Technology

Policy; Janet Yellen, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury; Deb

Haaland, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; Tom Vilsack, in

his official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; Gina Raimondo,

Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce; Xavier Becerra, Secretary,

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Pete Buttigieg, in his

official capacity as Secretary of Transportation; Jennifer Granholm,

Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy; Brenda Mallory, in her official

capacity as Chairwoman of the Council on Environmental Quality; Michael

App. D-1

Case: 22-30087

Document: 00516280397

Page: 2

Date Filed: 04/14/2022

No. 22-30087

S. Regan, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency; Gina McCarthy, in her official capacity as White

House National Climate Advisor; Brian Deese, in his official capacity as

Director of the National Economic Council; Jack Danielson, in his official

capacity as Executive Director of the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration; United States Environmental Protection

Agency; United States Department of Energy; United

States Department of Transportation; United States

Department of Agriculture; United States Department

of Interior; National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration; Interagency Working Group on Social

Cost of Greenhouse Gases,

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:21-CV-1074

______________________________

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a motion for

reconsideration (5th Cir. R. 35 I.O.P.), the motion for reconsideration

is DENIED. Because no member of the panel or judge in regular active

service requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc (Fed. R.

App. P. 35 and 5th Cir. R. 35), the petition for rehearing en banc is

DENIED.

2

App. D-2

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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