Application — Louisiana, et al., Applicants v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al.
Supreme Court briefApr 27, 2022
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No. 21A ____
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF LOUISIANA; et al.,
Applicants,
v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official capacity as
President of the United States; et al.,
Respondents.
APPENDIX TO APPLICATION TO VACATE AN ORDER OF THE U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT STAYING AN INJUNCTION FROM
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
To the Honorable Samuel Alito
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
and Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit
TYLER R. GREEN
DANIEL SHAPIRO
CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC
222 S. Main Street, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(703) 243-9423
JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL*
Solicitor General
*Counsel of Record
JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN
SHAE MCPHEE
Deputy Solicitors General
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
(225) 326-6766
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov
April 27, 2022
Counsel for Applicants
Appendix A
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL
CASE NO. 2:21-CV-01074
VERSUS
JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
JOSEPH R BIDEN JR ET AL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a “Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. 53) filed by the
States of Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Dakota,
Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming (collectively referred to as the “Plaintiff States”). The
Plaintiff States move pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a
preliminary injunction against Defendants Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Cecilia Rouse, Shalanda
Young, Kei Koizumi, Janet Yellen, Deb Haaland, Tom Vilsack, Gina Raimondo, Xavier
Becerra, Pete Buttigieg, Jennifer Granholm, Brenda Mallory, Michael S. Regan, Gina
McCarthy, Brian Deese, Jack Danielson, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.
Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, U.S.
Department of Interior, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, and the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”).
Plaintiff States also move to make the Order effective immediately and to remain in
effect pending the final resolution of this case, or until further orders of this Court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, or the United States Supreme Court.
App. A-1
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I.
BACKGROUND
On April 22, 2021, the Plaintiff States filed a Complaint [doc. 1] against the
Government Defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as a result of Executive
Order 13990 (“EO 13990”). EO 13990 reinstated the Interagency Working Group (“IWG”)
on Social Costs of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (“SC-GGE”) and ordered the IWG to
publish Interim Estimates for the Social Cost of Carbon, Nitrous Oxide, and Methane
(collectively referred to as “SC-GHG Estimates”) for agencies to use when monetizing the
value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant
agency actions. EO 13990 provides as follows:
Accounting for the Benefits of Reducing Climate Pollution
(a) It is essential that agencies capture the full costs of greenhouse gas emissions as
accurately as possible, including by taking global damages into account. Doing
so facilitates sound decision-making, recognizes the breadth of climate impacts,
and supports the international leadership of the United States on climate issues.
The “social cost of carbon” (SCC), social cost of nitrous oxide” (SCN), and
“social cost of methane” (SCM) are estimates of the monetized damages
associated with incremental increases in greenhouse gas emissions. They are
intended to include changes in net agricultural productivity, human health,
property damage from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services.
An accurate social cost is essential for agencies to accurately determine the
social benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions when conducting costbenefit analyses of regulatory and other actions.
(b) There is hereby established an Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost
of Greenhouse Gases (the “Working Group”). The Chair of the Council of
Economic Advisers, Director or OMB, and Director of the office of Science and
Technology Policy shall serve as Co-Chairs of the Working Group.
(i)
Membership. The Working Group shall also include the following other
officers, or their designees: the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary
of the Interior; the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of Commerce;
the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Secretary of
Transportation; the Secretary of Energy; the Chair of the Council on
App. A-2
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(ii)
Environmental Quality; the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency; the Assistant to the President and National Climate
advisor; and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and
director of the National Economic council.
Mission and Work. The Working Group shall, as appropriate and
consistent with applicable law:
(A)
Publish an interim SCC, SCN, and SCM within 30 days of the date of this
order, which agencies shall use when monetizing the value of changes in
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant
agency actions until final values are published;
(B)
Publish a final SCC, SCN, and SCM by no later than January 2022;
(C)
Provide recommendations to the President, by no later than September 1,
2021, regarding areas of decisions-making, budgeting, and procurement by
the Federal Government where the SCC, SCN, and SCM should be applied;
(D)
Provide recommendations, by no later than June 1, 2022, regarding a process
for reviewing, and, as appropriate, updating, the SCC, SCN, and SCM to
ensure that these costs are based on the best available economics and science;
and
(E)
Provide recommendations, to be published with the final SCC, SCN, and
SCM under subparagraph (A) if feasible, and in any event by no later than
June 1, 2022, to revise methodologies for calculating the SCC, SCN, and
SCM, to the extent that current methodologies do not adequately take
account of climate risk, environmental justice, and intergenerational equity.
(iii) Methodology. In carrying out its activities, the working Group shall
consider the recommendations of the National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine as reported in Value Climate Damages: Updating
Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide (2017) and other pertinent
scientific literature; solicit public comment; engage with the public and
stakeholders; seek the advice of ethics experts; and ensure that the SCC, SCN,
and SCM reflect the interests of future generations in avoiding threats posed by
climate change.
App. A-3
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1.
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
The Plaintiff States seek injunctive and declaratory relief on three grounds. First,
they assert that the SC-GHG Estimates violate the procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) as a substantive rule that did not undergo the
requisite notice-and-comment process. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Second, the Plaintiff States
claim that President Biden, through EO 13990, and the IWG lack the authority to enforce
the estimates as they are substantively unlawful under the APA and contravene existing
law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C). Third, the Plaintiff States maintain that the Government
Defendants acted beyond any congressional authority by basing regulatory policy upon
global considerations.
The Plaintiff States request a preliminary injunction: (1) ordering Defendants to
disregard the SC-GHG Estimates and prohibiting them from adopting, employing, treating
as binding, or relying upon the work product of the Interagency Working Group (“IWG”);
(2) enjoining Defendants from independently relying upon the IWG’s methodology
considering global effects, discount rates, and time horizons; and (3) ordering Defendants
to return to the guidance of Circular A-4, explained infra, in conducting regulatory
analysis.
The issues presently before the Court are: (1) whether the Plaintiff States satisfy the
doctrine of standing; (2) whether the Plaintiff States assert claims subject to judicial review
under the APA; and (3) whether the Plaintiff States satisfy the requirements to obtain a
preliminary injunction.
App. A-4
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To be clear, the Court is ruling only on the actions of the federal agencies and
whether the agencies, by implementing the estimates and considering global effects—
violate the APA and whether President Biden upon signing EO 13990, violated the
separations of powers clause of the United States Constitution. The Court has the authority
to enjoin federal agencies from implementing a rule—mandated by an executive order or
not—that violates the APA or violates the separation of powers clause. Importantly, the
Court is not opining as to the scientific issues regarding greenhouse gas emissions, their
effects on the environment, or whether they contribute to global warming.
2.
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND
CIRCULAR A-4
(i)
The Administrative Procedure Act and Circular A-4
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) is one of the foremost checks on the
“growth of the Executive Branch [.]” Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010). The APA mandates that agencies take action only
pursuant to express legal authority, in a transparent manner, with opportunity for public
input, in a nonarbitrary manner, and with judicial review. See Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d 134
(5th Cir. 2015).
Another check on the growth of the Administrative State is the consensus on
cost/benefits analysis required by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. See
Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37
Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol’y 447, 454–57 (2014). President Clinton issued Executive Order
12866, which instructs agencies to “assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory
App. A-5
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alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating” when “deciding whether and how
to regulate.” 1
In 2003, President George W. Bush’s Office of Management and Budget issued
Circular A-4 to implement EO 12866 and ensure agencies use a “standardiz[ed]” way of
“measur[ing] and report[ing]” the “benefits and costs of Federal regulatory actions.”2
Circular A-4 has become the cornerstone of regulatory analysis in the Executive Branch.3
Circular A-4 provides “highly detailed guidance to the agencies on the key elements
of a ‘good regulatory analysis’ under EO 12866—specifically it includes a clear baseline
for comparative purposes, specifically states assumptions, an assessment of the sensitivity
of the analytical results to changes in those assumptions, and attention to ancillary
impacts.” Mendelson & Wiener, supra, at 457—58. Relevant to this litigation, Circular A4 contains two key instructions: (1) agencies are to use both 3 and 7 percent discount rates
when conducting regulatory cost/benefit analysis; and (2) agencies are to consider
domestic, rather than global, costs and benefits.4
Discount factors are used to adjust the estimated benefits and costs for differences
in timing. The further in the future the benefits and costs are expected to occur, the more
they should be discounted.5 “When, and only when, the estimated benefits and costs have
been discounted, they can be added to determine the overall value of net benefits.”6
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 1 attached to St. John Declaration Doc. 55.
Id. attached as exhibit 5, Circular A-4, p. 1.
3
Anne E. Smith, Ph.D. Declaration, ¶ ¶ 18-19, Doc. 56.
4
Plaintiff’s exhibit 5, Circular A-4.
5
Id. p. 32.
6
Id.
1
2
App. A-6
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Prior to Circular A-4, the Executive Branch used a 7 percent discount rate because
it “reflects the returns to reals estate and small business capital as well as corporate capital”7
and “approximates the opportunity cost of capital, and it is the appropriate discount rate
whenever the main effect of a regulation is to displace or alter the use of capital in the
private sector.”8 In certain circumstances a lower discount rate may be appropriate,
therefore Circular A-4 instructs agencies to “provide estimates of net benefits using both 3
and 7 percent.”9
The second instruction in Circular A-4 requires agencies to make domestic effects
the basis of their analysis.10 See Wyoming v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 2020 WL
7641067 at *21 (D. Wyo. Oct. 8, 2020) (noting that Circular A-4 mandates a national
focus): States v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 286 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(“While Plaintiff argue that the same Circular directs BLM to encompass ‘all the important
benefits and costs likely to result from the rule,’ including ‘any important ancillary
benefits,’ it does not specifically mandate that agencies consider global impacts.”)
(ii)
The Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases
Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, also referred to as greenhouse gases11
are ever-present byproducts that are produced by activity from energy production to
agriculture to waste disposal.
7
Id.
Id.
9
Id. at p. 34.
10
“Your analysis should focus on benefits and costs that accrue to citizens and residents of the United States. Where
you choose to evaluate a regulation that is likely to have effects beyond the borders of the United States, these
effects should be reported separately.” Id. at p. 15.
11
Gases that trap heat in the atmosphere are called greenhouse gases. Exhibit 42 attached to Plaintiffs’ exhibit 1, p.
2, St. John Declaration. Doc. 55-42.
8
App. A-7
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Carbon dioxide is produced from burning fossils fuels such as coal, natural gas, and
oil, and solid wastes, trees, chemical reactions,12 and other biological materials.13 Carbon
dioxide is removed from the atmosphere when it is absorbed by plants as part of the
biological carbon cycle.14
Methane is emitted during the production and transport of coal, natural gas, and oil.
Methane emissions also result from livestock and other agricultural practices, land use and
by the decay of organic waste in municipal solid waste landfills.15
Nitrous oxide is emitted during agricultural practices, land use, industrial activities,
combustion of fossil fuels and solid waste, as well as during treatment of wastewater.16
Fluorinated
gases
include
hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons,
sulfur
hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride. They are synthetic, powerful greenhouse gases
emitted from a variety of industrial process. These gases are typically emitted in smaller
quantities, but because they are potent greenhouse gases, they are sometimes referred to as
High Global Warming Potential (“High GWP gases”).17
Each gas’s effect on climate change depends upon: (1) how much is in the
atmosphere; (2) how long they stay in the atmosphere; and (3) how strongly they impact
the atmosphere.18
12
E.g., manufacture of cement.
Exhibit 42 attached to Plaintiffs’ exhibit 1, St. John Declaration.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
13
App. A-8
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(iii)
President Obama’s role
In 2009, President Obama convened an Interagency Working Group (“IWG”) to
establish estimates of the social cost of carbon (“SCC”) that all agencies must use in their
regulatory cost/benefit analysis. In the Spring of 2010, the IWG presented final SCC
estimates which purported to use Circular A-4 as its starting point but rejected two of its
fundamental tenets—the 3 and 7 percent discount rates, and the domestic effects as the
basis of their analysis. In 2016, the IWG issued estimates for the Social Cost of Methane
(“SCM”) and the Social Cost of Nitrous Oxide (“SCN”).
The IWG established by the Obama administration was dismantled by the Trump
administration,19 and reinstated by the Biden administration through Executive Order
13990, issued on January 20, 2021.
(iv)
President Biden’s Executive Order 13990
On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13990. 86 Fed. Reg.
7037 (Jan. 20, 2021). Section 5 of EO 13990 directs federal agencies to “capture the full
costs of greenhouse gas emissions as accurately as possible, including by taking global
damages into account.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 7040. Section 5(b)(ii)(A) further provides that “the
Working Group shall . . . publish an interim SCC, SCN, and SCM within 30 days of the
date of this order, which agencies shall use when monetizing the value of changes in
19
In 2017, the Trump administration disbanded the IWG, rescinded its technical support documents, and directed
agencies to return to Circular A-4’s guidance when analyzing the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions. Exec.
Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
App. A-9
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greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant agency actions until
final values are published.” Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7040 (Jan. 20,
2021).
On February 26, 2021, the IWG announced the SC-GHG Estimates as directed by
EO 13990 (“Current SC-GHG Estimates”). The Current SC-GHG Estimates are identical
to those issued by the Obama Administration in the 2016 Technical Support Document
and addendum, adjusted for inflation.
(v)
Relief sought
Plaintiff States move to enjoin and restrain Defendants from:
(1) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon the work product of
the Interagency Working Group, including without limitation, any and all Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gas estimates published by the Interagency Working Group;
(2) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gas estimates based on global effects or that otherwise fails to
comply with applicable law;
(3) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any estimate of Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases that does not utilize discount rates of 3 and 7 percent
or that otherwise does not comply with Circular A-4; and
(4) Relying upon or implementing Section 5 of Executive Order 13990 in any
manner.
App. A-10
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II.
STANDING
The Court must first address the threshold question regarding whether the Plaintiff
States have standing to bring this suit.
Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559, 112 S. Ct. 2130,
(1992). One “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement” is the
doctrine of standing. Id. at 560. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 133 S. Ct.
1138, 1148, 185 (2013). “In the preliminary-injunction context, plaintiffs must make a
‘clear showing’ of standing” to obtain relief. Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d
168, 178 (5th Cir. 2020) cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1124 (2021); see Tex. All. for Retired Ams.
v. Hughs, 976 F.3d 564, 567 n.1. (5th Cir. 2020) (contrasting the ordinary showing of
standing as opposed to what is required to maintain a preliminary injunction”).
Accordingly, plaintiffs must satisfy the three elements that constitute “the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing”: (1) injury in fact; (2) causal connection (the injury
has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action); and (3) redressability (the injury must
be likely, as opposed to merely speculative that it will be redressed by a favorable decision).
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. “[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. &
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). Yet, “a plaintiff must
demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is
App. A-11
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sought.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017)
(citation omitted).
Importantly, “states are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
Accordingly, the presumption of “special solicitude” may be available to a state “exercising
a procedural right created by Congress and protecting a quasi-sovereign interest.” Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134, 162 (5th Cir. 2015).
1. Injury in fact
To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, the Plaintiffs must show that they
“suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’
and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural and hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 856, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Allegations of
“future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending’ or there is a
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.
149, 158, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)).
Plaintiff States allege direct injury to their sovereign, fiscal, procedural, and parens
patriae interests. As to their sovereign interests, Plaintiff States claim that they are directly
injured by the Government Defendants’ alteration of cooperative federalism programs.
Specifically, they contend that the SC-GHG Estimates impose new obligations on them
when they participate in cooperative federalism programs. The Fifth Circuit has
recognized that this type of “increased regulatory burden typically satisfies the injury in
App. A-12
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fact requirement.” Contender Farms, L.L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 779 F.3d 258, 266 (5th
Cir. 2015).
To establish direct injury, Plaintiff States assert that: (1) they are substantial
producers of energy and rely upon tax revenue from energy production to perform their
sovereign duties; (2) the SC-GHG Estimates will impose additional duties upon Plaintiff
States when they implement cooperative federalism programs; and (3) the SC-GHG
Estimates will harm Plaintiff States’ ability to purchase affordable energy to carry out their
sovereign functions.
Plaintiffs States argue that the increased SC-GHG Estimates will necessarily cause
regulatory standards for air quality, energy efficiency, and power plant regulation to
become more stringent and result in significant costs increases.20 Moreover, this increased
stringency will directly harm the economies and revenues of Plaintiff States.
For example, the SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm Louisiana’s energy,
chemical manufacturing, and agricultural industries by increasing their regulatory burdens
and driving up the price of electricity that these businesses need to stay in business and
continue to employ Louisianians and contribute to tax revenues.21 The SC-GHG Estimates
will harm Louisiana, the nation’s number two oil producer and a top five national natural
20
See Smith Decl. ¶ ¶ 85092; Dismukes Decl. ¶ 23 (“The use of unsupported SC-GHG estimates in NEPA and other
regulatory analysis will result in the approval of new regulations that will impose significant costs on Louisiana’s
economy and business that are not justified by an accurate assessment of their costs and benefits.”)
21
Dismukes Decl. ¶ ¶ 22-26.
App. A-13
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gas producer,22 resulting in significantly reduced royalties from leasing sales under Outer
Continental Shelf Act (“OCSLA”).
The SC-GHG will directly harm Kentucky’s economic welfare,23 as demonstrated
by the Obama Administration’s SCC-justified Clean Power Plan by making a new CPP
justifiable under cost/benefit analysis principles. The SC-GHG will harm Alabama’s
ability to exploit its energy resources and harm its industrial sector, and Florida’s tourism
industry by driving up the transportation costs and energy prices.24
Plaintiff States also allege that the SC-GHG Estimates impose additional duties on
them when carrying out cooperative federalism programs because they are compelled to
employ the IWG’s methodology as a condition of approving significant funding and State
environmental implementation plans. For example, states must comply with federal
standards in programs such as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”),
42 U.S.C. § 7410. Under that statute, it is the states’ burden “to propose plans adequate for
compliance with NAAQS.” E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489,
498, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). Plaintiff States assert that the EPA has instructed that NAAQS
are now required to be set based on the IWG’s SC-GHG Estimates.25 Likewise, the states
must use the SC-GHG Estimates or risk having their state implementation plans
disapproved. Yet, even if a state implementation plan is disapproved by the EPA, the EPA
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Louisiana: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Apr. 15, 2021). (St. John
Dec. Ex. 30).
23
Kentucky is one of the top coal-producing states. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Coal FAQ” (St.
John Decl. Ex. 32).
24
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Florida: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Nov. 19, 2020) (St. John
Decl. Ex. 33).
25
See Doc. 1 at 45–46, ¶124.
22
App. A-14
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will impose a federal implementation plan upon the state—which also must be based upon
the SC-GHG Estimates. 26
Defendants challenge Plaintiff States assertion of the use of the SC-GHG Estimates
by the NAAQS, and argue that there are no NAAQS for greenhouse gases, see Utility Air
REgul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 308 (2014) (listing the “six pollutants” for which “EPA
has issued NAAQS”). Plaintiff States offer no explanation of how the SC-GHG Estimates
would be used in setting or revising NAAQS for non-greenhouse-gas pollutants.
The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm Georgia’s industrial sector by increasing
stationary source regulatory stringency.27 The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm
Mississippi’s energy infrastructure including its petroleum refinery, natural gas processing
plant and LNG terminal.28 The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm South Dakota’s
industrial and agricultural capacities.29 The SC-GHG Estimates will directly harm Texas,
the nation’s leading energy producer.30 The SC-GHG Estimates will be fatal to West
Virginia’s economy, the fifth-largest energy producer in the nation—specifically its coal
industry as realized by the Obama administration’s CPP.31 The SC-GHG will directly harm
26
Doc. 1 at 45–46, ¶¶123–125.
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Georgia: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Nov. 19, 2020) (St. John
Dec. Ex. 34).
28
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Mississippi: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated July 16, 2020) (St.
John Decl. Ex. 35).
29
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., South Dakota: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Apr. 16, 2020) (St.
John Dec. Ex. 36).
30
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Texas: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Apr. 15, 2021) (St. John
Decl. Ex. 37).
31
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “West Virginia: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Oct. 15, 2020) (St.
John Decl. Ex. 38).
27
App. A-15
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Wyoming, the largest net energy supplier in the nation and a major producer of coal, natural
gas, and oil.32
The Plaintiff States argue that the harms to these States are imminent and directly
traceable to EO 13990 and the SC-GHG Estimates. The Plaintiff States remark that the
chain of causation is clear and confirmed by history: agencies will apply EO 13990’s
unambiguous command to apply the IWG’s unlawful SC-GHG Estimates in a manner that
will harm Plaintiff States’ legally cognizable interests.
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff States have failed to affirmatively show an
Article III injury to establish standing. Plaintiff States insist that the Executive Branch is
employing the SC-GHG Estimates in a range of rulemaking across statutory regimes.
Plaintiff States provide the following examples of final rules using the SC-GHG to increase
costs in various industries:
• EPA, Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 74434 (Dec. 30, 2021).33 Defendants remark
that EPA explained that it “is not required to conduct formal costs benefit
analysis to determine the appropriate standard under Section 202” of the Clean
Air Act, and that “analysis of monetized GHG was not material to its decision.
In summation, “the decisions reached and standards put in place do not depend
on the 2021 SC-GHG interim estimates.” EPA, Revised 2023 and Later Model
Year Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions Standards: Response to Comments
(Dec. 2021), https://perma.cc/RX8S-FFPJ.
• DOE, General Service Lamps, 86 Fed. Reg. 70755 (Dec. 13, 2021).34
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Wyoming: State Profile and Energy Estimates” (updated Mar. 18, 2021) (St. John
Decl. Ex. 39).
33
Plaintiff’s exhibit 1, Daigle Decl. (This rule will impose unprecedented costs on the American auto industry;
specifically, the EPA’s estimate of benefits “include[d] climate-related economic benefits from reducing emissions
of GHG’s that contribute to climate change” based on the SC-GHG Estimates). Id. at 74443.
34
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 2, Daigle Decl. at 70768. (This proposed rule employs the SC-GHG Estimates in calculating
benefits).
32
App. A-16
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• EPA, Oil and Gas New Modified Sources, 86 Fed. Reg. 63110 (Nov. 15, 2021).35
• Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fact Sheet: analyzing the effects of fossil
fuel leasing and development on greenhouse gases (Oct. 29, 2021).36
• DOE, Manufactured Housing, 86 Fed. Reg. 59042 (October 26, 2021).37
• Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR), Minimizing Climate Change in
Federal Acquisitions, 86 Fed. Reg. 57404 (October 15, 2021).38
• Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), NEPA Implementing Regulations
Revisions, 86 Fed. Reg. 55757 (Oct. 7, 2021).39
• EPA, Phasedown of Hydrofluorocarbons, 86 Fed. Reg. 55116 (Oct. 5, 2021).40
Defendants contend that EPA did not rely on the SC-GHG Estimates, and the
proposed rule explained that it would implement an explicit congressional
command in the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020, Pub. L.
No. 116–260, 134 Stat. 1182 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7675), which “directs EPA
to address HFCs by providing new authorities” to “phase down the production
and consumption of listed HFCs” on a “schedule prescribed by Congress.” 86
Fed.Reg. at 27,153, 27,159.
The Court is concerned that Defendants’ arguments are somewhat misleading
considering that the following statement is made in the Regulatory Impact
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 3, Daigle Decl. (EPA uses SC-GHG Estimates in proposing stricter standards on GHG
emissions for the oil and gas industry; the effect is billions of dollars of compliance costs).
36
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 4, Daigle Decl. (The BLM issues a fact sheet and announced a “[s]tandardized methodology for
consideration of the social cost of greenhouse gases in lease sales.” Id., at 1. The fact sheet relies on the SC-GHG
Estimates and the Executive Order—“BLM’s analysis uses the interim estimates of the social costs of carbon,
methane and nitrous oxide published by the IWG in February 2021.) Id. at 2.
37
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 5. (DOE explicitly relies on the Executive Order and Estimates in determining whether the rule
is justified; “DOE calculates the value of the reduced emissions of CO2, CH4, and N20 (collectively, greenhouse
gases of GHGs) using a range of values per metric ton of pollutant, consistent with the interim estimates issued in
February 2021 under Executive Order 13990.”) Id. at 59043.
38
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 6, Daigle Decl. (FAR released an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking stating that it is
considering the SC-GHG Estimates in promulgating a new regulation that would evaluate federal acquisition
contracts based on the IWG’s SC-GHG Estimates.) Id. at 57405.
39
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 7. (CEQ issued a proposed rule repealing the previous Administration’s final NEPA
implantation-regulation revisions. The proposed rule specifically directs agencies to use the SC-GHG Estimates. Id.
at 55763, n.5.)
40
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 8. (EPA issued a final rule seeking to phase down hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”) which imposes
massively increased regulatory costs on the myriad of products that rely on HFCs, including refrigeration, airconditioning, building insulation, and aerosols. The EPA relied on the same models, methodologies, and
assumptions as the Working Group’s SC-GHG Estimates, and specifically cited the Working Group’s “interim”
Technical Support Documents as authority. See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. at 55119; see also EPA, Regulatory Impact
Analysis for Phasing Down Production and Consumption of Hydrofluorocarbons (HCFs) at 103-15 (Sept. 2021),
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 9, Daigle Decl.
35
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Analysis for Phasing Down
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),41
Production
and
Consumption
of
These SC-HFC estimates were developed using methodologies that
are consistent with the methodology underlying the social cost of
carbon, methane, and nitrous oxide estimates presented in the
Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and
Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates under Executive Order 13990 (IWG
2021). The social cost of GHG estimates presented in IWG (2021) are
interim values developed under E.O. 13990 for use in benefit-cost
analyses until an improved estimate of the impacts of climate change
can be developed based on the best available science and economics.
Therefore, EPA views the SC-HCF estimates used in analysis to be
appropriate for use in benefit-cost analysis until improved estimates
of the social cost of other GHGs are developed.42
• National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 2024-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 49602
(Sept. 3, 2021).43
• Dep’t of the Interiors (DOI), Secretarial Order no. 3399, Department-Wide
Approach to the Climate Crisis and Restoring Transparency and Integrity to the
Decisions-Making Process (April 16, 2021).44
Plaintiff States maintain that: (1) the FAR Climate rule will directly harm Plaintiff
States’ ability to contract with the federal government; (2) the vehicle regulations will
increase the prices Plaintiff States must pay for vehicles for official use; (3) CEQ’s NEPA
regulation revisions will harm Plaintiff States in their sovereign capacity by pressuring
them to change their approach to NEPA analysis in their capacity as joint lead agencies;
(4) DOI and BLM’s activities are depressing the Plaintiff States’ statutorily entitled
41
Doc. 91-11.
Id. at p. 104.
43
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 10, Daigle Decl. (NHTSA used SC-GHG estimates to calculate and include “benefits” of
reduced GHG emissions in a proposed rulemaking to impose more costly and burdensome fuel economy standards).
44
Doc. 55-28. (Secretary of the DOI issues an order directing agencies, including BLM and the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (BOEM) to employ the SC-GHG Estimates as “an essential tool” in their cost-benefit analysis
whenever they “determine[] that a monetized assessment of socioeconomic impacts is relevant” specifically citing
EO 13990.Id. at 1 and 4).
42
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proceeds from lease sales and production by artificially reducing both the number of
parcels available and the activities that can be conducted on those parcels.
Plaintiff States have submitted evidence to posit that the SC-GHG Estimates are
currently in use in NEPA analyses. Examples include the following:
• Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, Bluewater Texas
Terminal Deepwater Port Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Oct.
2021).45
• Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Wyoming First Quarter Oil and Gas Lease
Sale Environmental Analysis (Nov. 1, 2021).46
• BLM, Utah First Quarter Oil and Gas Lease Sale Environmental Analysis (Nov.
1, 2021).47
• DOE, Notice of Intent to Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for the Alaska LNG Project, 86 Fed. Reg. 35280 (July 2, 2021).48
First, the Plaintiff States have asserted a concrete and particularized injury:
mandatory implementation of the SC-GHG Estimates imposes new obligations on the
states and increases regulatory burdens when they participate in cooperative federalism
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 11, Daigle Decl. (DOT used the SC-GHG Estimates to examine the Bluewater Texas Deepwater
port project in the draft environmental impact statement, in both the constructions and emissions phases of the
project.). Id. at 3-323.
46
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 12, Daigle Decl. (BLM used the SC-GHG Estimates in “accordance with th[e] direction” of EO
13990 to estimate staggering cost estimates for holding the lease sale. Id. at 34, resulting in a smaller sale causing
the States of Wyoming a significant loss of revenue.) See also Nicole Pollack, Less than half of proposed Wyoming
oil and gas leases recommended for upcoming sale, Casper Star Tribune (Dec. 7, 2021). Plaintiffs’ exhibit 13.
47
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 15 (BLM used the SC-GHG Estimates in analyzing alternative for the First Quarter 2022 Utah
oil and gas lease sale held under the MLA.) Id. at 40-43.
48
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 16, Daigle Decl. (In light of E.O 13990, the Biden Administration reopens a previously granted
authorization to Alaska LNG Project LLC “to export LNG produced from Alaska sources to any country with which
the United States has not entered into a free trade agreement (FTA) requiring national treatment for trade in natural
gas, and with which trade is not prohibited by U.S. law or policy (non-FTA countries.”) Id. at 35280. In the order
(Alaska LNG Project LLC, DOE/FE Order No. 3643-B, FE Docket 14-96-LNG, Order on Rehearing (Apr. 15, 2021)
(Plaintiffs’ exhibit 17) granting the rehearing, the DOE expressly relied on E.O. 13990 and subsequently issued a
notice of intent, citing E.O. 13990 to prepare an entirely new Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement.) 86
Fed. Reg. at 35281.
45
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programs. Second, the Plaintiff States have shown that the alleged injury is both actual and
imminent. The injury is “actual” as to the executive agencies that have already employed
the SC-GHG Estimates, such as the EPA in disapproving state implementation plans under
the NAAQS good neighbor provisions and imposing federal implementation plans on
several Plaintiff States including Louisiana, Kentucky, and Texas. 86 Fed. Reg. 23054,
23061 (Apr. 30, 2021). In addition, future injury is imminent and certainly impending
because other agencies engaged in cooperative federalism programs with the states are
required to employ the SC-GHG Estimates, and as shown by the NAAQS example, the
states are confronted with a forced choice: either they employ the Estimates in developing
their state implementation plan, or the EPA subjects them to a federal plan based on the
SC-GHG Estimates.49
To be sure, the Administration’s use of the SC-GHG’s Estimates in NEPA reviews
to analyze the climate impact of oil and gas lease sales under the MLA directly causes harm
to the Plaintiff States’ statutorily vested rights to proceeds from MLA oil and gas leases.
In other words, the SC-GHG Estimates artificially increase the cost estimates of lease sales,
which in effect, reduces the number of parcels being leased, resulting in the States receiving
less in bonus bids, ground rents, and production royalties.
Plaintiff States suggest that the EPA’s mandate that the FERC use the SC-GHG
Estimates has caused significant delays in project approvals causing the Plaintiff States to
lose property tax revenues.50
49
86 Fed. Reg. 23054, 23061, 23153-155.
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 24, Daigle Dec., Columbia Gulf Transmissions, LLC, Resource Report 5: Socioeconomics, East
Lateral Express Project at 5-9 to 5-12, Docket No. CP20-527-000 (Sept. 24, 2020).
50
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The Court is persuaded that the Biden Administration’s agencies are using the SCGHG. The Court finds that the Plaintiff States have established injury-in-fact.
2.
Causal link
To establish causation, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the injury is “fairly
traceable” to the challenged conduct of the defendant rather than the result of “the
independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560,
(quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41–42, 96 S. Ct.
1917, 1926 (1976)).
Defendants argue that because Plaintiff States’ alleged harm is so speculative, one
cannot know in advance whether that harm would have any causal connection to E.O.
13990 or the SC-GHG Estimates. In other words, there is no way to predict how the SCGHG Estimates will affect an agency’s analysis. The Court respectfully disagrees. Plaintiff
States have clearly established that: (1) the SC-GHG Estimates create a new cost measure
the Plaintiff States must use when running cooperative federalism programs or risk serious
consequences; (2) the SC-GHG Estimates significantly increase cost numbers that directly
harm Plaintiffs’ revenues; (3) the Plaintiff States have been deprived of the right to submit
comments which prevented Plaintiff States from raising important reliance interests and
other flaws that directly affect the States; and (4) the SC-GHG Estimates create a new
GHG cost measure that agencies must use in their regulatory actions that has caused greater
regulatory burdens and harm to Plaintiff States’ citizens’ economic well-being.
The Court is persuaded that the SC-GHG Estimates are being applied and are
increasing regulatory costs. Thus, Plaintiff States have met their burden of alleging that
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their injury is “fairly traceable” to the challenged act. Jindal v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2015
WL 854132, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 26, 2015).
3. Redressability
Lastly, the doctrine of standing demands that it “be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 560 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.
Ct. 1917, 1926, (1976)).
Plaintiff States maintain that an injunction and eventual vacatur will result in the
prior regulatory regime based on Circular A-4 to retake effect and redress Plaintiff States’
injury. The Court agrees with Plaintiff States that the remedy they seek will redress their
injury.
Plaintiff States also maintain that even if they did not have standing under the
traditional analysis, they have standing under “special solicitude.” “States may have
standing based on … federal assertions of authority to regulate matters they believe they
control.” Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 153 (5th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff States argue
that the SC-GHG Estimates “affect[] the states’ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests by imposing
substantial pressure on them to change their” practices and laws to remain in compliance
with federal standards. Id. at 153. The Court finds that the Plaintiff States also have
standing as they are entitled to special solicitude in the standing inquiry. See also Texas v.
United States 2021 WL 2096669, at *20 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2021) (“Although the record
demonstrates no express intention of any party to convince Texas to change its detention
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or education budgets, the pressure exerted on Texas to reconfigure its budget in those areas
is just as ‘direct’ and ‘substantial’ as the pressure on the States in Texas v. United States.”)
III.
REVIEWABILITY
In addition to finding that the Plaintiff States have standing, the Court must ensure
that the asserted claims are reviewable under the APA. The APA provides for judicial
review of agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. Indeed, there is a “strong presumption”
favoring reviewability of administrative action. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Phys., 476
U.S. 667, 670, 106 S. Ct. 2133 (1986). This review is restricted, however, by four factors.
First, the challenged conduct must constitute a “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.
Second, the states must satisfy the zone-of-interests test. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish
Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210, 183 (2021).
Third, the APA makes agency action unreviewable if the organic statute “precludes judicial
review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Fourth, the APA makes agency action unreviewable if the
“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).51
The Plaintiff States assert three claims under the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”). First, they claim that the defendants violated the APA by failing to comply with
the notice-and-comment procedures required by 5 U.S.C. § 553. Second, they claim that
the Defendants failed to engage in reasoned decision making rendering the SC-GHG
Estimates arbitrary and capricious under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Third, they claim that the
SC-GHG Estimates contravene the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), Clean
51
No argument has been made by Defendants as to this criteria, therefore it will not be addressed.
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Air Act (“CAA”), National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), Mineral Leasing Act
(“MLA”), and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) by directing agencies to
consider the global effects of greenhouse gas emissions.
1. Final Agency Action
“Agency action” is defined as “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
The Supreme Court has articulated two conditions for an agency’s action to qualify as
“final.” First, the action may not be “merely tentative or interlocutory” in nature; rather, it
“must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154, 178, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Second, the action
“must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences flow.” Id.
Defendants contend that all the Plaintiff States’ claims fail for the lack of any “final
agency action.” As to the first Bennett condition, Defendants maintain that the SC-GHG
Estimates do not “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process”
because “they have no significance unless and until they are actually used in some future
rulemaking.”52 Referring to the Estimates as “interim,” Defendants further explain that the
SC-GHG Estimates “mark only the (potential) beginning of dozens of separate regulatory
processes, which may eventually culminate in the issuance of regulations that are final
agency action.” Id. (emphasis in original/emphasis added)
52
Doc. 31-1, at 38.
App. A-24
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The Plaintiff States argue that the Interim Estimates are legislative rules, and thus,
automatically constitute final agency action.53 Even still, the Plaintiff States contend the
SC-GHG Estimates also meet the two-part test for “final agency action.” The Court agrees.
The first prong is analyzed by determining “whether an action is properly
attributable to the agency itself and represents the culmination of that agency’s
consideration of an issue,” or is “only the ruling of a subordinate official, or tentative.”
Here, the SC-GHG Estimates were issued by the IWG under the authority of EO 13990
and were the culmination of the IWG’s consideration of the issue of how to account for the
social costs of greenhouse gas emissions in regulatory cost-benefit analyses. The label
“interim” does not alter the inherent finality of the rule for purposes of APA review. “As
long as an agency has completed its decisionmaking on the challenged rule—even one
interim in nature—the rule satisfies the first prong of the finality test.” Louisiana v. Biden,
2021 WL 2446010 at *1, *13 (W.D. La. June 15, 2021).
The “interim” SC-GHG Estimates are the final directive from the IWG on how
agencies are to conduct their cost-benefit analyses until a different, “permanent” rule is
issued. Significantly, during the pendency of this suit, the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs announced that the target date for publishing the next set of SC-GHG
Estimates is January 2022. Indeed, the “interim” Estimates have already been utilized by
executive agencies, indicating that the agencies interpret the SC-GHG Estimates as final
and binding. As noted above, Plaintiff States have provided numerous instances where
53
Doc. 48, at 39.
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agencies are using the SC-GHG Estimates that this Court finds are causing a direct harm
to the Plaintiff States in increased costs, delayed projects and the loss of Plaintiff States’
revenues. As a result, the “Interim” SC-GHG Estimates are indeed final; the next set of
SC-GHG Estimates was due to be finalized in January 2022. As of this date, they have yet
to be finalized and the Defendants inform the Court that they will probably not be finalized
until the summer of 2022.54 Accordingly, the IWG’s SC-GHG Estimates constitute a final
agency action under the APA.
2.
Zone of Interests
Next, the Plaintiff States must satisfy the zone-of-interests test to pursue claims
under the APA. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2021). Specifically, the Plaintiff States must show that
the interest asserted is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute” claimed to be violated. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S. Ct. 827 (1970). The Supreme Court has emphasized that this
standard “is not meant to be especially demanding” and is evaluated in keeping with the
underlying
presumption
of
reviewability.
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish
Band
of
Pottawatomi Indians, 132 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S.
388, 399, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987)). Furthermore, “the benefit of any doubt goes to the
plaintiff,” and suit should be foreclosed “only when ‘a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably
54
Defendant Supplemental Memorandum, p. 23, Doc. 90.
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be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’” Id. (quoting Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479
U.S. at 399–400, 107 S. Ct. 827).
Here, the interests the Plaintiff States seek to protect undoubtedly fall within the
zone of interests embodied in the statutes they claim to be violated by Defendants—the
APA, EPCA, CAA, NEPA, MLA, and OCSLA.
3.
Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review
The APA exempts agency action from judicial review if the organic statute
“precludes judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). Considering the “well-settled
presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative
action,” an intent to preclude such review will be found “only if presented with ‘clear and
convincing evidence.’” Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64, 113 S. Ct.
2485 (1993) (quoting McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496, 111 S. Ct.
888 (1991); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967)).
Establishing unreviewability is an onerous burden, and “where substantial doubt about the
congressional intent exists, the general presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action is controlling.” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351, 104
S. Ct. 2450 (1984).
This Court has not found, nor have Defendants cited any statute(s) indicating an
intent to preclude judicial review of the Plaintiff States’ claims. Accordingly, the claims
are not excluded from judicial review under Section 701(a)(1).
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(IV) LAW AND ANALYSIS
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff States must show: “(1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the
injunction is not issued; (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs
any harm that will result if the injunction is granted; and (4) that the grant of an injunction
will not disserve the public interest.” Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir.
2013).
1.
Plaintiff States Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Plaintiff States argue that they are likely to succeed on the merits because (1)
the President and the IWG lack authority to promulgate and enforce the SC-GHG
Estimates, or consider the global effects in domestic regulatory policymaking, (2) the SCGHG Estimates were promulgated without complying with the APA’s notice and comment
requirements, (3) the SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and
(4) the SC-GHG Estimates are contrary to law.
The Plaintiff States suggest that in effect, the President and the IWG’s decision to
drop the 7 percent discount rate and increase the time frame of relevant effects to three
centuries, will fundamentally transform regulatory analysis and the national economy. The
Plaintiff States argue that the Executive Branch does not have the authority to issue
Executive Order 13990 because it causes “an enormous and transformative expansion in
[its] regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.” Util. Air Regulatory
Grp., 573 U.S. at 324.
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(i)
The President and the IWG lack authority
“In order for an executive or independent agency to exercise regulatory authority
over a major policy question of great economic and political importance, Congress must
either: (i) expressly and specifically decide the major policy question itself and delegate to
the agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate
to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy question and to regulate and
enforce.” Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342 (2019) (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994);
Stephen A. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev.
363, 370 (1986)).
The Executive cannot “bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in
[its] regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.” Util. Air Regulatory
Grp., 573 U.S. at 324; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159.
(Rejecting executive claim to “jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant
portion of the American economy” absent clear congressional authorization.) The Supreme
Court “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency, decisions of
vast ‘economic and political significance.” Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. at
324.
Defendants argue that Article II of the United States Constitution supplied President
Biden the authority to issue EO 13990. Defendants contend that EO 13990 is a routine
exercise of traditional presidential control over subordinates as part of supervising
App. A-29
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subordinates’ actions. In other words, the issuance of EO 13990 falls within the President’s
authority—and duty—to “supervise and guide” agencies “in order to secure that unitary
and uniform execution of the law which Article II of the Constitution evidently
contemplated in vesting general executive power in the President alone.” Bldg. & Const.
Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 406 n. 524 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
Defendants also rely on the text from EO 13990, that “[n]othing in this order shall
be construed to impair or otherwise affect . . . the authority granted by law to an executive
department or agency.” Id. § 8(a)(i); see also Id. § § 5(b)(ii), 8(b) (“This order shall be
implemented in a manner consistent with applicable law.”)
Defendants suggest that the “major questions doctrine” has no bearing on the
President’s authority to issue EO 13990 because the President is not a creature of statute.
Plaintiff States argue that the SC-GHG Estimates implicate a matter of major importance
and there is no statutory authority for the Executive branch to issue the SC-GHG Estimates.
The major questions doctrine ensures that agencies do not impose new obligations
of “vast ‘economic and political significance’” upon private parties and States unless
Congress “speaks clearly.” Util. Air Reg. Grp., 573 U.S. at 324 (2014). The major questions
doctrine consists of two steps for the Court to determine: (1) if the assertion of Executive
authority implicates matters of “vast ‘economic and political significance,’” and (2) if
Congress has “expressly and specifically” delegated authority over the issue to the
Executive. Paul v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 342 (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J.,
App. A-30
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respecting denial of certiorari) (collecting cases); NFIB v. OSHA, 2022 WL 120952, at *3
(U.S. Jan. 13, 2022).
The major questions doctrine enforces the Nondelegation Doctrine by “protect[ing]
the separation of powers and ensur[ing] that any new laws governing the lives of
Americans are subject to the robust democratic processes the Constitution demands.”
NFIB, 2022 WL 120952, at *6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Plaintiff States assert that the SC-GHG Estimates will impose significant costs on
the economy.55 “The total cost of these 83 regulatory actions [using social costs] is
estimated to be between $447 billion and $561 billion (in 2020 dollars).” 56 Courts have
found that less costly and far-reaching regulations have triggered the major questions
doctrine. For example, the Fifth Circuit recently held that the OSHA Vaccine Mandate,
which imposed almost $3 billion in compliance costs, triggered the major questions
doctrine. BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 617 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Id. at
617–18 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 2131 (1994) (declining to
hold that the FCC could eliminate telecommunications rate-filing requirements); FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–160 (2000) (declining to hold that
the FDA could regulate cigarettes); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006)
(declining to allow DOJ to ban physician-assisted suicide).
Additionally, Plaintiff States contend that Defendants have failed to identify clear
statutory authorization for issuing EO 13990. “[W]hen Congress wishes to ‘alter the
55
56
Plaintiffs’ exhibit 26, p.2.
Doc. 57 ¶ ¶ 14-26.
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fundamental details of a regulatory scheme,’ . . . we would expect it to speak with the
requisite clarity to place that intent beyond dispute.” U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River
Pres. Ass’n 140 S.Ct. 1837, 1848–49 (2020). “When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 (1952).
Specifically, Plaintiff States challenge the SC-GHG Estimates’ consideration of
global effects as opposed to national or domestic effects. Plaintiff States assert that
Congress has addressed the issue of whether agencies can consider global or domestic
effects and informs the Court that Congress has emphatically articulated that agencies may
only consider effects to our Nation. To support their position, Plaintiff States note that (1)
EPCA directs the Executive “to consider the need for national energy and water
conservation,” 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added), (2) “the need of the United
States to conserve energy,” 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (emphasis added), (3) the Clean Air Act
directs the Executive “to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so
as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population,”
42 U.S.C. 7401(b)(1) (emphasis added), (4) NEPA directs agencies to “assure for all
Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings,” U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (emphasis added), (5) the MLA directs the Executive
to consider the “public welfare” of the United States in conducting oil and gas lease sales,
30 U.S.C. § 187 (emphasis added), and (6) the OCSLA directs the Executive to make the
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Outer Continental Shelf “available for expeditious and orderly development, subject to
environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of
competition and other national needs.” 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff States argue that EO 13990 and the SC-GHG Estimates mandate outcomes
with massive numbers for the cost side of the scale, unlike EO12866 and Circular A-4,
which provided a framework for agencies to calculate the costs and benefits of regulation
and determine how to weigh them under their statutory authority. Thus, EO 13990 and the
SC-GHG Estimates are a legislative rule that dictates specific numerical values for use
across all decisionmaking affecting private parties. See e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives v.
Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Judge Friendly wrote that when an agency
wants to state a principle ‘in numerical terms,’ terms that cannot be derived from a
particular record, the agency is legislating and should act through rulemaking.”)
Plaintiff States also maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates alter rights and obligations
and remove agency discretion. See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 442 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f
a statement denies the [agency] discretion in the area of its coverage[,] then the statement
is binding, and creates rights or obligations.”) Plaintiff States note that the SC-GHG
Estimates direct agencies to use specific social cost numbers, not only in rulemaking, but
in “other relevant agency actions,” such as project-level NEPA reviews. Doc. 55-27, pp. 56, 24-25; Doc. 55-26, p. 5.
The Court finds that EO 13990 contradicts Congress’ intent regarding legislative
rulemaking by mandating consideration of the global effects. The Court further finds that
the President lacks power to promulgate fundamentally transformative legislative rules in
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areas of vast political, social, and economic importance, thus, the issuance of EO 13990
violates the major questions doctrine.
(ii)
The SC-GHG Estimates were promulgated without complying with the
APA’s notice and comment requirements
Next, the Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG were promulgated without
complying with the APA’s notice and comment requirements. The Plaintiff States remark
that the SC-GHG Estimates are a legislative rule because they prescribe valuations, costs
or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
Agency legislative rules must go through the APA’s notice-and-comments
procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 723856, at *43 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 23, 2021). Consequently, the SC-GHG Estimates were required to go through
the APA’s notice and comment procedures. See Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617
F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“When an agency wants to state a principle ‘in numerical
terms,’ terms that cannot be derived from a particular record, the agency is legislating and
should act through rulemaking.”); see also Hoctor v. U.S .Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170
(7th Cir. 1996) (“When agencies base rules on arbitrary choices they are legislating, and
so these rules are legislative or substantive and require notice and comment rulemaking, a
procedure that is analogous to the procedure employed by legislatures in making statutes.”)
In addition, Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates effectively repeal
key provisions of two regulatory actions that went through the notice and comment
procedure—the 7 percent discount rate and focus on domestic effects. Clean Water Action
v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 936 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2019) (an agency must
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“follow the same process to revise a rule as it used to promulgate it”) (citing Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 100 (2015)).
Next, the SC-GHG Estimates revise CEQ’s recent NEPA final rule’s causation
standard. Specifically, the CEQ’s rule requires agencies to exclude effects that “are remote
in time, geographically remote, or the product of a lengthy causal chain,” 85 Fed. Reg.
43304, 43375 (July 16, 2020); the SC-GHG Estimates require agencies to consider remote
effects which contradicts the CEQ’s rule.57
The Plaintiff States note that the Administration was entitled to amend the rules but
was required to “use the same procedures” in amending as it “used to issue the rule in the
first instance.” Clean Water Action, 936 F.3d at 313–14 (quoting Perez, 575 U.S. at 101).
However, the SC-GHG Estimates were promulgated “without observance of procedure
required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). The Court finds that EO 13990 was promulgated
without complying with the APA’s notice and comment requirements.
(iii).
The SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and capricious under the APA
The Plaintiff States further maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and
capricious under the APA. Under the APA, courts are to “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Federal administrative agencies are required to engage
in ‘reasoned decisionmaking,’” Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 723856, at *39, meaning
57
The CEQ’s rule was published only after complying with the APA’s notice and comment procedure.
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that “[n]ot only must an agency’s decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority,
but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.” Id.
The Plaintiff States argue that the Biden SC-GHG Estimates are based on a
fundamentally flawed methodology that does not take into account statutory
considerations, ignores decades of best regulatory practices, and sub silentio depart from
regulatory documents that remain in force. Cf. California v. Bernhardt, 472 F.Supp.3d 573,
600–01 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“While the Executive branch holds the power to issue executive
orders, an agency cannot flip-flop regulations on the whims of each new administration.
The APA requires reasoning, deliberation, and process. These requirements exist in part,
because markets and industries rely on stable regulations.”) In other words, the SC-GHG
Estimates are neither “reasonable” nor “reasonably explained.” Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n
v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S.Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). The Plaintiff States present
numerous arguments as to why the SC-GHG Estimates are arbitrary and capricious.
• The SC-GHG Estimates fail to consider the positive externalities of energy
production.
• The IWG failed to consider whether “there was ‘legitimate reliance’ on the”
prior administration’s method of focusing on domestic effects and using higher
discount rates. Dep’t of Homeland Security. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140
S.Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517
U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
• The SC-GHG Estimates ignore specific factual findings made by the previous
Administration justifying its reliance on Circular A-4 in regulatory proceedings.
• There is a “significant mismatch” between the SC-GHG Estimates’ conclusions
and the administrative record.58
58
The Plaintiff States remark that the IWG acknowledged that its SC-GHG Estimate was based on antiquated
models, needed updating and was based largely on guesswork, but instead of allowing for the comment period for
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• The IWG fails to justify the SC-GHG’s use of a global rather than domestic
scope in calculating costs.
• The SC-GHG arbitrarily departs from decades of prior Executive Branch
cost/benefit practice regarding discount rates.59
• The SC-GHG Estimates are based on the same three inherently flawed models
that produced the Obama SCC, SCM, and SCN.
• The SC-GHG Estimates reject recent standards set by the Council on
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) concerning the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) regulations.60
• The IWG relied upon statutorily impermissible factors by considering global
rather than domestic effects.
• The IWG ignores significant federalism costs caused by the SC-GHG Estimates,
an important aspect of regulatory analysis.61 Specifically, the IWG neglected to
consider the effect the SC-GHG Estimates will have upon State revenues; the
Biden SC-GHG Estimates will result in significantly fewer tracts of land being
made available for lease sales.62
(iv).
The SC-GHG Estimates are contrary to law
The Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates are contrary to law
because they direct agencies to consider factors Congress did not authorize. Specifically,
the Plaintiff States assert that the SC-GHG contravenes (1) the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (“EPCA”) because the EPCA unambiguously precludes the
consideration of global effects, (2) the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), which does not authorize
the Administrator of the EPA to consider global effects in setting air pollution standards
outside input, the IWG issued the SC-GHG in a month in order to comply with Biden’s EO 13990’s demand to
impose more stringent regulation.
59
Prior Executive Branch agencies utilized standard discount rates of 3 and 7 percent as embodied in Circular A-4.
60
85 Fed. Reg. 43304, 43375 (July 16, 2020).
61
EO 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255, 43256 (August 4, 1999).
62
See, e.gl., Dep’t of Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3399 (Apr. 16, 2021) (noting intent to employ SC-GHG).
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for new motor vehicles and stationary sources, (3) the NEPA, wherein the CEQ’s
regulation implementing NEPA precludes both the SC-GHG Estimates’ consideration of
global effects and approach to causation, (4) the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”) because it
prevents the Secretary of the Interior’s duty to ensure the expeditious development of
public land, and (5) the OCSLA by disrupting its statutory leasing program which promotes
the development of resources on the Outer Continental Shelf63 and by compelling a global
effects analysis.
(v).
The SC-GHG Estimates are subject to APA review
The Plaintiff States maintain that the SC-GHG Estimates are final agency action and
thus subject to APA review. The APA allows judicial review only of a “final agency
action,” “that (1) mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and
(2) “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997).
The Plaintiff States argue that the SC-GHG Estimates mark the consummation of
the IWG’s decisionmaking process because they are the IWG’s last word until at least 2022
and because there are no further steps in the process; thus, the SC-GHG Estimates for 2021
meet the finality test. See Louisiana, 2021 WL 2446010, at *12 (“As long as an agency has
completed its decisionmaking on a challenged rule—even one interim in nature—the rule
satisfies the first prong of the finality test.”) (citing NRDC v. Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68, 80
(D.C. Cir. 2020)).
63
43 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1337, 1340, 1344, 1345, and 1351.
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As to the second prong, the Plaintiff States argue that the SC-GHG Estimates bind
the entire Executive Branch to a particular numerical measure of the social cost of
greenhouse gases. Furthermore, the SC-GHG Estimates “denies the decisionmaker
discretion in the area of its coverage[,] then the statement is binding, and creates rights or
obligations.” Texas, 809 F.3d at 171.
The Plaintiff States maintain that the IWG is an “agency” for purposes of the APA
because it has been granted authority by EO 13990 to act “with substantial independent
authority in the exercise of specific functions.” Soucie v. David, 48 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Specifically, the IWG has been granted authority to create SC-GHG Estimates
that will be binding on executive agencies. See Pac Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl.
Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (The power to “issue guidelines to federal
agencies for the preparation of” regulatory review is a hallmark of an APA agency.)
Lastly, the Plaintiff States maintain that they have an ultra vires cause of action to
challenge Section 5 of EO 13990 because it is not authorized by any statute and is in direct
conflict with several statutes. Ultra vires review is available to review “whether the
President has violated the Constitution, the statute under which the challenged action was
taken, or other statutes, or did not have statutory authority to take a particular action.”
Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection, 801 F.Supp.2d 383,
406 (D.Ma. 2011) (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136
(D.C. Cir. 2002)); see also Associated Builders & Contractors of SE Texas v. Rung, 2016
WL 8188655, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 216) (“The DOL, a federal agency also operating
within the Executive Branch, has implemented the President’s Executive Order by issuing
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the Guidance incorporated by reference in the new Rule. Therefore, the Executive Order
may be challenged by Plaintiffs on both statutory and non-statutory grounds.”) (citing
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
The Plaintiff States thus argue that they have demonstrated multiple independently
sufficient grounds to vacate the SC-GHG Estimate and therefore have shown a strong
likelihood of success on the merits. The Court agrees and finds that the Plaintiff States have
shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits.
2.
Irreparable Harm
The Plaintiff States maintain that they easily meet the threshold requirement that if
an injunction is not issued, they will suffer inevitable and irreparable harm. Plaintiff states
must show that they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365
(2008). For their injury to be sufficiently “irreparable,” the Plaintiff States need only show
it “cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 304
(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338
(5th Cir. 1981).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff States’ alleged harm is speculative at best because
no specific agency action has caused them injury. Or, better yet, it is speculative to assume
that EO 13990 will dictate policy outcomes that concretely harm Plaintiff States. In other
words, Plaintiff States’ injury-in-fact assumes that they will be harmed by future
hypothetical agency actions. Additionally, Defendants contend that it is unknowable in
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advance if any harm caused by future regulations is causally connected to EO 13990 and
the SC-GHG Estimates.
The Plaintiff States submit that they are substantial producers of energy and rely
upon tax revenues from energy production to perform their sovereign duties. As such, the
increased SC-GHG Estimates will cause regulatory standards affecting air quality, energy
efficiency, power plant regulation to increase in stringency, which will directly harm the
economies and revenues of Plaintiff States. As noted above, the Plaintiff States maintain
that Texas, Louisiana, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, South Dakota, Mississippi, Alabama,
West Virginia, and Wyoming and their citizens will all be imminently harmed by EO 13990
and the SC-GHG Estimates by causing increased energy costs. The Plaintiff States argue
that the chain of causation is clear and confirmed by history.
Plaintiff States also contend that the SC-GHG Estimates will impose additional
duties upon Plaintiff States when they implement cooperative federalism programs, as well
as the harm to the Plaintiff States’ ability to purchase affordable energy to carry out their
sovereign functions. Furthermore, the SC-GHG Estimates will adversely impact Plaintiff
States’ revenues and Louisiana’s coastline will be threatened by directly reducing the funds
necessary to maintain the state’s coastal lands.
The Plaintiff States remark that the IWG’s failure to employ notice and comment
divested them of their procedural rights under the APA and various other federal statutes
to be consulted and offer views regarding administrative actions impacting concrete State
interests. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (“[A] ‘persons who
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has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right
without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.’”)
Finally, the Plaintiff States argue that they have parens patriae standing to vindicate
the economic injuries the SC-GHG Estimates will impose on their citizens. See Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (parens patriae
standing appropriate when based on State’s “interest in the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of its residents in general”).
As noted by Defendants, EO 13990 instructs agencies that “[i]t is essential that
agencies capture the full costs of greenhouse gas emissions as accurately as possible,
including by taking global damages into account,” and that “[a]n accurate social cost is
essential for agencies to accurately determine the social benefits of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions when conducting cost-benefit analyses of regulatory and other actions.” EO
13990 § 5. The EO is not a recommendation, nor is it guidance; EO 13990 directs that
agencies “shall use” the SC-GHG Estimates “when monetizing the value of changes in
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations and other relevant agency actions.”
Id.
Plaintiff States have sufficiently identified the kinds of harms to support injunctive
relief. Moreover, the Court finds that the Plaintiff States have made a clear showing of an
injury-in-fact, and that such injury “cannot be undone through monetary remedies,”
Louisiana v. Biden, 2021 WL 2446010, at *21 (W.D. La. June 15, 2021), such that they
need immediate relief now, lest they be unable to ever obtain meaningful judicial relief in
the future. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 186 (5th Cir. 2015) (financial injury
App. A-42
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irreparable); Louisiana v. Biden, 2021 WL 2446010, at *21 (financial and parens patriae
harm irreparable); State v. Biden, 2021 WL 3603341, at *26 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2021)
(financial injuries irreparable); Texas v. United States, 2021 WL 2096669, at *47 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 23, 2021) (same); see also e.g., Texas, 2021 WL 3683913, at *59 (injuries to
Plaintiff States’ sovereign powers are irreparable); Nevada v. U. S. Dep’t of Lab.,218
F.Supp.3d 520, 532 (E.D. Tex. 2016).
2. Will the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweigh any harm
that will result if the injunction is not issued?
Plaintiff States maintain that the harms to their States and their citizens’ economic
well-being more than suffice to establish standing and the possibility of irreparable harm.
As previously noted, the SC-GHG Estimates will harm Plaintiff States’ ability to purchase
affordable energy to carry out their sovereign functions as the directive to use the SC-GHG
Estimates will significantly drive up costs while simultaneously significantly decrease
States revenues resulting in the inability of the Plaintiff States to carry out their sovereign
duties to their citizens.64 Specifically, Louisiana will be directly harmed by the reduction
of funds necessary to maintain the state’s coastal lands. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at
519 & n. 17. (State’s “independent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’” and
“well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory” supports standing).65 In addition,
64
See Dismukes Decl. ¶ ¶ 17-26.
Plaintiff States note that the deprivation of those funds directly harms Louisiana’s territory. Louisiana is losing
swaths of coastal land—nearly two thousand square miles and counting—due to follow-on effects from environmental
catastrophes. See Louisiana, 2021 WL 2446010, at *21 (noting irreparable harm form “damages for reduced funding
to the Coastal Master Plan, which would reduce proceeds that are used in Louisiana’s coastal recovery and restoration
program”)
65
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the implementation of SC-GHG Estimates without complying with the APA and the notice
and comment period have divested Plaintiff States of their procedural rights.
The Court finds that the balance of the injuries weighs substantially in favor of the
Plaintiff States.
3.
Will the Injunction Harm Defendant or Disserve the Public Interest?
The Plaintiff States maintain that the public interest and balance of equities weigh
in favor of granting a preliminary injunction because Defendants “have no legitimate
interest in the implementation of [the] unlawful” SC-GHG Estimates. See Texas, 2021 WL
7236, at *49. The Plaintiff States argue that the public has an overriding interest in ensuring
that vast regulatory programs are implemented lawfully, in compliance with the
constitutional separation of powers and the APA, whereas the Defendants would suffer no
harm from an injunction. Thus, the Plaintiff States maintain that the public interest and
balance of harms weigh heavily in Plaintiff States’ favor. The Court agrees that the public
interest and balance of equities weigh heavily in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be
granted in its entirety.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 11th day of February, 2022.
_____________________________________
JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL
CASE NO. 2:21-CV-01074
VERSUS
JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
JOSEPH R BIDEN JR ET AL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Ruling,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 53) is hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants,1 Cecilia Rouse, Shalanda
Young, Kei Koizumi, Janet Yellen, Deb Haaland, Tom Vilsack, Gina Raimondo, Xavier
Becerra, Pete Buttigieg, Jennifer Granholm, Brenda Mallory, Michael S. Regan, Gina
McCarthy, Brian Deese, Jack Danielson, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.
Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, U.S.
Department of Interior, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, and the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases
are ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from:
(1) adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon the work product of
the Interagency Working Group (“IWG”); (2) enjoining Defendants from
independently relying upon the IWG’s methodology considering global effects,
1
With the exception of President Biden as he is not an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act.
App. A-45
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discount rates, and time horizons; and (3) ordering Defendants to return to the
guidance of Circular A-4 in conducting regulatory analysis;
(2) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gas estimates based on global effects or that otherwise fails to
comply with applicable law;
(3) Adopting, employing, treating as binding, or relying upon any estimate of Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases that does not utilize discount rates of 3 and 7 percent
or that otherwise does not comply with Circular A-4; and
(4) Relying upon or implementing Section 5 of Executive Order 13990 in any
manner.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall become effective immediately
and shall remain in effect, pending the final resolution of this case or until further orders
of this Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, or the United States
Supreme Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no security bond shall be required under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 11th day of February, 2021.
_____________________________________
JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
App. A-46
Appendix B
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
STATE OF LOUISIANA ET AL
CASE NO. 2:21-CV-01074
VERSUS
JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
JOSEPH R BIDEN JR ET AL
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is “Defendants’ Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal” (Doc. 102)
wherein Defendants seek a stay of this Court’s preliminary injunction concerning President
Biden’s Executive Order 13990.1 Defendants inform the Court that should the Court not
rule on this motion by February 28, 2022, Defendants will seek relief from the United
States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit.2 It goes without saying that Plaintiffs
vehemently oppose this motion.
As noted by Plaintiff States, Defendants have repeatedly insisted that the Executive
Branch does not rely on the SC-GHG Estimates to justify administrative actions. This
Court believes without doubt that the Estimates were being used and are currently being
used, despite this Courts’ injunction,3 to justify final agency action that will artificially
1
Doc. 99.
Id. p. 1.
3
See Dep’t of Energy, Proposed Rule, Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Variable
Refrigerant Flow Multi-Split Air conditioners and Heat Pumps, 87 Fed. Reg. 11335, 11348 (Mar. 1, 2022) (“DOE
uses the social cost of greenhouse gases from the most recent update of the Interagency Working Group on Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States Government (“IWG”) working group, which are available in the Technical
Support document: Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide Interim Estimates under Executive Order
13990. The IWG recommended global values be used for regulatory analysis.”)
2
App. B-1
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increase costs in the cost/benefit analysis4 and systematically increase regulatory burdens
on Plaintiff States.
STANDARD FOR MOTION TO STAY
The Court considers the following four factors in assessing a motion for stay
pending appeal: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely
to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceedings; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434
(2009); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d
406, 410 (5th Cir. 2013). A stay “is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might
otherwise result to the appellant.’”5 Id. at 410, see also Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d
962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (Movants “bear[] the burden on all four factors, and the first two
are the most critical.” Axiall Canada Inc. v. MECS, Inc., 2021 WL 6062356, at *1 (W.D.
La. Apr. 8, 2021) (quoting Weingarten Realty Investors v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 910 (5th
Cir. 2011)).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that the Preliminary Injunction is overbroad. The Court issued the
Preliminary Injunction to restrain executive officers from complying with Executive Order
13990, and/or employing the SG-GHG Estimates. The Defendants complain that the
Preliminary Injunction will delay pending rulemakings and that these agencies will now
4
EO 13990 mandates massive numbers on the cost side of the cost/benefit scale.
Nken held that if the petitioner has not made a certain threshold showing regarding irreparable harm … then a stay
may not issue, regardless of the petitioner’s proof regarding the other stay factors.”)
5
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abandon actions due to an inability to redo related environmental analyses in time to meet
deadlines.
Success on the merits
Movants bear the burden of making a “strong showing that they are likely to succeed
on the merits.” U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden, 2022 WL 594375, at *10 (5th Cir. Feb. 28,
2022). Defendants make the same arguments here that were made in their opposition to the
subject motion for preliminary injunction. The Court will not regurgitate its reasoning here.
Suffice it to say that the Court has no doubt that prior to the preliminary injunction, the
SG-GHG Estimates were being utilized, and EO 13990 is a final agency action. The
administration’s directive to federal agencies to use the SG-GHG estimates violate the
Administrative Procedure Act, violate the Major Questions Doctrine, and amount to a
transformative legislative rule in a manner not clearly authorized by Congress.
Irreparable injury
Defendants complain that they will suffer irreparable injury because (now admitting
that the SG-GHG Estimates are being used) “agencies would be required to redirect
resources to revise already-drafted proposed rules and regulatory impact analyses,
including in instances where a draft rule that incorporates the Working Group’s Interim
Estimates has already been submitted to OMB.”6
Mancini Dec. ¶ ¶ 17–23. “The Department of Energy noted approximately twenty-one initially-identified
rulemakings that will be so affected; the EPA has noted approximately five; the Department of Transportation has
noted approximately nine; and the Department of the Interior has noted approximately three.” Defendant’s
Memorandum, p. 37, Doc. 108, citing Id. ¶ 18,
6
App. B-3
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The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “[j]udicial interference with a government
agency’s policies often constitutes irreparable injury.” Texas v. United States, 14 F.4th 332,
340 (5th Cir. 2021), opinion vacated on reh’g enbanc, 24 F.4th 407 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing
Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 2020)). However, “the Government cannot
claim an irreparable injury from being enjoined against an action that has no statutory
authorization to take.” State v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538, 558 (5th Cir. 2021). The Court finds it
interesting that the Defendants argued in their opposition to Plaintiff States’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction that the SG-GHG Estimates were of no moment because they were
not being utilized, nor do they have a major impact on Executive Branch decisionmaking,
yet, they now complain that the preliminary injunction, which enjoins the use of the SGGHG Estimates, will wholesale prevent the Executive Branch from functioning.
The Court concluded that President Biden lacked authority to issue EO 13990, thus
there can be no irreparable injury. See Biden, 10 F.4th at 558.
Substantial injury/public interest
Defendants complain that the preliminary injunction is against the public interest
and does substantial harm because it prevents the Working Group from taking measures to
tackle the climate crisis. Plaintiff States maintain that the public interest and balance of
harms weigh heavily against a stay because Defendants have no legitimate interest in the
implementation of the unlawful SC-GHG Estimates. “[T]he ‘public interest [is] in having
governmental agencies abide the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.’”
Biden, 10 F.4th at 559. Moreover, “public interest favors maintenance of [an] injunction”
App. B-4
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that “maintains the separation of powers.” Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 768 (5th
Cir. 2015).
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the balance of equities, public interest, and irreparable harm
factors weigh heavily against Defendants, and furthermore, Defendants have failed to show
they are likely to succeed on the merits. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal is hereby
DENIED.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 9th day of March, 2022.
___________________________________
JAMES D. CAIN, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
App. B-5
Appendix C
Case: 22-30087
Document: 00516242341
Page: 1
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 16, 2022
No. 22-30087
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
The State of Louisiana, by and through its Attorney General, Jeff
Landry; The State of Alabama, by and through its Attorney General,
Steve Marchall; The State of Florida, by and through its Attorney
General, Ashley Moody; The State of Georgia, by and through its
Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr; The Commonwealth of
Kentucky, by and through its Attorney General, Daniel Cameron; The
State of Mississippi, by and through its Attorney General, Lynn Fitch;
The State of South Dakota, by and through its Governor, Kristi
Noem; The State of Texas, by and through its Attorney General, Ken
Paxton; The State of West Virginia, by and through its Attorney
General, Patrick Morrisey; The State of Wyoming, by and through its
Attorney General, Bridget Hill,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United
States; Cecilia Rouse, in her official capacity as Chairwoman of the Council
of Economic Advisers; Shalanda Young, in her official capacity as Acting
Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Kei Koizumi, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; Janet
Yellen, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury; Deb Haaland,
Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; Tom Vilsack, in his official
capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; Gina Raimondo, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Commerce; Xavier Becerra, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services; Pete Buttigieg, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Transportation; Jennifer Granholm, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Energy; Brenda Mallory, in her official capacity as
Chairwoman of the Council on Environmental Quality; Michael S. Regan,
App. C-1
Case: 22-30087
Document: 00516242341
Page: 2
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 22-30087
in his official capacity as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;
Gina McCarthy, in her official capacity as White House National Climate
Advisor; Brian Deese, in his official capacity as Director of the National
Economic Council; Jack Danielson, in his official capacity as Executive
Director of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; United
States Environmental Protection Agency; United
States
Department
of
Energy;
United
States
Department
of
Transportation;
United
States
Department of Agriculture; United States Department
of Interior; National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration; Interagency Working Group on Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases,
Defendants—Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:21-CV-1074
Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
IT IS ORDERED that the opposed motion of Appellants for stay
pending appeal is GRANTED.
When federal agencies promulgate regulations or take other agency
action with economically significant effects, they conduct a cost-benefit
analysis. This has been done since the Carter administration, although
presidential oversight of regulatory action through a systematic review
process began as early as the Nixon administration. In 1993, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12866 which, among other things, mandates
the prepublication review process for economically significant regulations.
Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,736, 51,741 (Sep. 30, 1993).
EO 12866 also states “[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the
benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and
2
App. C-2
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Document: 00516242341
Page: 3
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 22-30087
benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a
reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs.” Later administrations retained EO 12866’s commitment to costbenefit analyses and strengthened it with additional directives or guidelines
for regulatory analysis.
In 2003, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued
Circular A-4 to provide guidance to agencies on how to conduct the costbenefit analysis implemented by EO 12866. See OMB Circular A-4 (Sept. 17,
2003). Compliance with Circular A-4 is not required by any statute or
regulation and is not binding on any agency.
In conducting cost-benefit analyses, agencies consider the impact of
the emissions of greenhouse gases. The impact of these emissions on various
factors like health, agriculture, and sea levels, can be quantified into dollar
amounts per ton of gas emitted—i.e., the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases
(SC-GHG).
To encourage consistency in determining SC-GHG, in 2009,
President Obama instituted the Interagency Working Group (IWG) to
develop a method for quantifying the costs and effects of emissions. In 2010,
the IWG developed a method to quantify GHG emissions into social costs
estimates based on peer-reviewed frameworks.
In 2017, President Trump disbanded the IWG and its method for
quantifying SC-GHG in Executive Order 13783. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82
Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (March 31, 2017). That order still contemplated,
however, that agencies would continue to “monetize the value of changes in
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from regulations” and that estimates
would be consistent with Circular A-4 (to the extent permitted by law). 82
Fed. Reg. 16,096.
3
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Document: 00516242341
Page: 4
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 22-30087
In January 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 13990 and
reinstated the IWG to advise him on the SC-GHG. See Exec. Order No.
13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037, 7,040, § 5(b)(ii)(A) (Jan. 20, 2021). The IWG was
also directed to develop new estimates for the SC-GHG, and until those new
estimates are published, to develop Interim Estimates within 30 days, as
appropriate and consistent with applicable law. Pursuant to EO 13990,
agencies must use the Interim Estimates when they conduct cost-benefit
analyses for regulatory or other agency action. The IWG published the
Interim Estimates in February 2021. The Interim Estimates are the same as
the SC-GHG estimates from 2016, adjusted for inflation.
The Plaintiff States sued the United States’ Government Defendants
in April 2021 to preemptively challenge the Interim Estimates. They claim
the Interim Estimates will lead to increased regulatory burdens when
agencies conduct cost-benefit analyses. The Plaintiff States therefore
brought several challenges to Interim Estimates pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Plaintiff States’ claims are
premised solely on the broad use of the Interim Estimates. They do not
challenge any specific regulation or other agency action.
In February 2022, the district court entered a preliminary injunction
enjoining the Government Defendants from using, in any manner, the
Interim Estimates. The Government Defendants move to stay the injunction
pending appeal arguing, among other things, the Plaintiff States lack
standing, their claims are not ripe, and the Interim Estimates are not final
agency action under the APA. Because we conclude the Government
Defendants have made a strong showing that they are likely to succeed on the
merits, and the balance of harms to the parties favors granting the stay, we
GRANT the Government Defendants’ motion.
4
App. C-4
Case: 22-30087
Document: 00516242341
Page: 5
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 22-30087
Whether to enter a stay is left to the court’s discretion. See Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). That discretion is bound to four factors:
“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies.” Id. (citation omitted). The first two factors “are the most critical.” Id.
The Government Defendants are likely to succeed on the merits
because the Plaintiff States lack standing. The Plaintiff States’ claimed injury
is “increased regulatory burdens” that may result from the consideration of
SC-GHG, and the Interim Estimates specifically. This injury, however,
hardly meets the standards for Article III standing because it is, at this point,
merely hypothetical. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(stating “injury in fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339–40 (2016) (requiring an
injury to actually exist and affect a plaintiff in a “personal and individual
way”). The Government Defendants are also likely to succeed in showing
that the Plaintiff States have failed to meet their burden on causation and
redressability. The increased regulatory burdens the Plaintiff States fear will
come from the Interim Estimates appear untraceable because agencies
consider a great number of other factors in determining when, what, and how
to regulate or take agency action (and the Plaintiff States do not challenge a
specific regulation or action). See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398,
411–13 (2013) (assuming claimed injury was imminent pursuant to Lujan but
noting redressability was absent because there was a number of other
methods to inflict the same injury which were not challenged in the case).
5
App. C-5
Case: 22-30087
Document: 00516242341
Page: 6
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 22-30087
The Interim Estimates on their own do nothing to the Plaintiff States.
So we discern no injury that would satisfy Article III at this stage. See
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 55 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (concluding
organizations lacked standing because among other things, the plaintiffs were
not the subject of the challenged regulations). The Plaintiff States’ claims
therefore amount to a generalized grievance of how the current
administration is considering SC-GHG. And that fails to meet the standards
of Article III standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568 (“[R]espondents chose to
challenge a more generalized level of Government action,” instead of
“specifically identifiable Government violations of law,” which is “rarely if
ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.” (citation omitted)).
The Government Defendants have shown they will be irreparably
harmed absent a stay. The preliminary injunction halts the President’s
directive to agencies in how to make agency decisions, before they even make
those decisions. It also orders agencies to comply with a prior administration’s
internal guidance document that embodies a certain approach to regulatory
analysis, even though that document was not mandated by any regulation or
statute in the first place. The preliminary injunction sweeps broadly and
prohibits reliance on § 5 of EO 13990, which creates the IWG, a group created
to advise the President on policy questions in addition to creating the Interim
Estimates. It is unclear how the Plaintiff States’ qualms with the Interim
Estimates justify halting the President’s IWG. All of this effectively stops or
delays agencies in considering SC-GHG in the manner the current
administration has prioritized within the bounds of applicable law. The
preliminary injunction’s directive for the current administration to comply
with prior administrations’ policies on regulatory analysis absent a specific
agency action to review also appears outside the authority of the federal
courts. We therefore find the Government Defendants are irreparably
harmed absent a stay of the injunction. Cf. E.T. v. Paxton, 19 F.4th 760, 770
6
App. C-6
Case: 22-30087
Document: 00516242341
Page: 7
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 22-30087
(5th Cir. 2021) (concluding state was irreparably harmed when an injunction
prevented the state from carrying out public policy and enforcing its own
laws).
On the other hand, a stay of the injunction will impose minimal injury
on the Plaintiff States. In consideration of this factor, the maintenance of the
status quo is important. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 439 U.S. 1358,
1359 (1978). The Interim Estimates were published in February 2021. This
lawsuit was filed in April 2021. The Plaintiff States moved for a preliminary
injunction in July 2021. And the preliminary injunction was entered in
February 2022. By the time the preliminary injunction was entered, the
Interim Estimates had been in place for one year. The status quo at this point
is the continued use of the Interim Estimates. See E.T., 19 F.4th at 770
(concluding status quo was leaving state order in effect because it had been
in effect for nearly four months and plaintiffs alleged a tenuous and
speculative injury). And because the claimed injury, increased regulatory
burdens, has yet to occur, the continued use of the Interim Estimates will not
harm the Plaintiff States until a regulation or agency action is promulgated
from the actual use of the Interim Estimates. To the extent the agencies will
use, or are using, the Interim Estimates in reaching a specific final agency
action, we discern no obstacle to prevent the Plaintiff States from challenging
a specific agency action in the manner provided by the APA.
In sum, the Plaintiff States’ claims are based on a generalized
grievance of the use of Interim Estimates in cost-benefit analyses of
regulations and agency action. But their claimed injury does not stem from
the Interim Estimates themselves, it stems from any forthcoming,
speculative, and unknown regulation that may place increased burdens on
them and may result from consideration of SC-GHG. We conclude the
standing inquiry shows the Government Defendants’ likelihood of success
7
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Document: 00516242341
Page: 8
Date Filed: 03/16/2022
No. 22-30087
on the merits in this appeal, and the other factors, including the public
interest, favor granting a stay of the injunction.
The Government Defendants’ motion to stay the preliminary
injunction pending appeal is GRANTED. The district court’s preliminary
injunction entered on February 11, 2022 is STAYED pending this appeal.
8
App. C-8
Appendix D
Case: 22-30087
Document: 00516280397
Page: 1
Date Filed: 04/14/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
___________
No. 22-30087
___________
The State of Louisiana, by and through its Attorney General, Jeff
Landry; The State of Alabama, by and through its Attorney General,
Steve Marchall; The State of Florida, by and through its Attorney
General, Ashley Moody; The State of Georgia, by and through its
Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr; The Commonwealth of
Kentucky, by and through its Attorney General, Daniel Cameron; The
State of Mississippi, by and through its Attorney General, Lynn Fitch;
The State of South Dakota, by and through its Governor, Kristi
Noem; The State of Texas, by and through its Attorney General, Ken
Paxton; The State of West Virginia, by and through its Attorney
General, Patrick Morrisey; The State of Wyoming, by and through its
Attorney General, Bridget Hill,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in his official capacity as President of the United
States; Cecilia Rouse, in her official capacity as Chairwoman of the
Council of Economic Advisers; Shalanda Young, in her official capacity
as Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Kei Koizumi,
in his official capacity as Acting Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy; Janet Yellen, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury; Deb
Haaland, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior; Tom Vilsack, in
his official capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; Gina Raimondo,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce; Xavier Becerra, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Pete Buttigieg, in his
official capacity as Secretary of Transportation; Jennifer Granholm,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy; Brenda Mallory, in her official
capacity as Chairwoman of the Council on Environmental Quality; Michael
App. D-1
Case: 22-30087
Document: 00516280397
Page: 2
Date Filed: 04/14/2022
No. 22-30087
S. Regan, in his official capacity as Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency; Gina McCarthy, in her official capacity as White
House National Climate Advisor; Brian Deese, in his official capacity as
Director of the National Economic Council; Jack Danielson, in his official
capacity as Executive Director of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration; United States Environmental Protection
Agency; United States Department of Energy; United
States Department of Transportation; United States
Department of Agriculture; United States Department
of Interior; National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration; Interagency Working Group on Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:21-CV-1074
______________________________
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a motion for
reconsideration (5th Cir. R. 35 I.O.P.), the motion for reconsideration
is DENIED. Because no member of the panel or judge in regular active
service requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc (Fed. R.
App. P. 35 and 5th Cir. R. 35), the petition for rehearing en banc is
DENIED.
2
App. D-2
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.