Application — Louisiana, et al., Applicants v. American Rivers, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2022

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Text

No. ______

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;

STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF TEXAS;

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,

APPLICANTS,

v.

AMERICAN RIVERS; MICHAEL S. REGAN; and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ET AL.

RESPONDENTS.

APPENDIX TO APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

VOLUME IV OF IV

On Application For Stay, Or, In The Alternative, On Petition For A Writ Of

Certiorari To The U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

To the Honorable Elena Kagan

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

and Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

Riverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 788-8262

(804) 788-8218 (fax)

gsibley@huntonak.com

DEIDRE G. DUNCAN

ERICA N. PETERSON

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

SEAN T.H. DUTTON

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

(312) 759-1939 (fax)

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

1001 Haxall Point,

15th Floor

Richmond, VA 23219

Attorneys for Applicants

[Additional counsel on following page.]

CLARE ELLIS

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

50 California Street

Suite 1700

San Francisco, CA 94111

Attorneys for Applicants American

Petroleum Institute and Interstate

Natural Gas Association of America

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,

SOLICITOR GENERAL

JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,

DEPUTY SOLICITOR

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70804

(225) 326-6739

murrille@ag.louisiana.gov

stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov

CHARLES SENSIBA

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

401 9th Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004-2146

ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

Three Embarcadero Center

Suite 800

San Francisco, CA 94111-4057

Attorneys for Applicant National

Hydropower Association

Attorneys for Applicant State of

Louisiana

JAMES KASTE

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE

109 State Capitol

Cheyenne, WY 82002

Additional Counsel:

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General of Montana

LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Attorney General of Arkansas

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of Mississippi

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West Virginia

ERIC SCHMITT

Attorney General of Missouri

Attorneys for Applicants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume I

Order Regarding Motion to Relate, ECF No. 23, In re Clean Water

Act Rulemaking, No.3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 08, 2020) ................. App. 1

Motion to Intervene by the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,

Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, ECF No. 27, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-JSC (N.D. Cal.

Aug. 28, 2020) ....................................................................................................... App. 2

Order Relating to Case No.20-04869, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 02, 2020)

............................................................................................................................. App. 95

Declaration of Robin Rorick for the American Petroleum Institute In

Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support of Defendants,

ECF No.56-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA;

3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ................................................. App. 96

Declaration of Joan Dreskin for the Interstate Natural Gas Association

of America In Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support

of Defendants, ECF No. 56-2, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. September 04,

2020) .................................................................................................................. App. 105

Order Granting Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 62, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 17, 2020)................................................................................................... App. 115

First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020) .................. App. 116

Joint Case Management Statement, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water

Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA;

3:20-cv-06137 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020) ........................................................... App. 148

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 96, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 30, 2020) .................................................................................................... App. 165

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 98, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-06137-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 02, 2020) ................................................................................................... App. 197

Order Regarding Proposed Timeline For Administrative Record Completion,

ECF No. 116, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020) .................................................................................. App. 224

Order Regarding Joint Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance, ECF

No. 132, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021) ................................................................................. App. 225

EPA’S Motion for Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 143, In re Clean

Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

July 01, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 226

Volume II

Plaintiff’s Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 145, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 244

Plaintiff States’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 146, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 267

Declaration of Eileen Sobeck in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion

for Remand, ECF No. 146-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021).......................................... App. 299

American Rivers’ Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 147, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 424

EPA’s Reply In Support Of Motion For Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 153, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 450

Intervenor Defendants’ Reply In Support Of Motion To Strike, ECF No. 155,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

August 19, 2021) ............................................................................................... App. 473

- ii -

Volume III

Intervenor Defendants’ Supplemental Brief On Allied-Signal Factors,

ECF No. 172, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2021) ..................................................................................... App. 478

August 2, 2021, Letter Comments From American Fuel & Petrochemical

Manufacturers, et al., Regarding Section 401 Rule, ECF No. 172-1,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 04, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 497

Declaration Of David M.S. Dewhirst, ECF No. 172-2, In re Clean Water

Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 04, 2021) ............. App. 549

Order Regarding Motion to Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 173,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 21, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 552

Final Judgment, ECF No. 176, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2021) ......................................... App. 570

Intervenor Defendants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 179,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 17, 2021) ................................................................................................... App. 571

Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 191, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Dec. 07, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 612

Intervenor National Hydropower Association’s Notice of Motion &

Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ........................................ App. 626

American Petroleum Institute and Interstate Natural Gas of America’s

Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support Thereof, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) .................. App. 638

Order Granting Intervention, ECF No. 113, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. October 09, 2020) .............. App. 666

- iii -

Volume IV

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants’ and Intervenors-Appellants’

Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 20, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. December 15, 2021)............................... App. 667

Federal Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Intervenor Defendants/

Appellants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 26, In re Clean

Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 11, 2022) ............... App. 757

Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Appellate

Jurisdiction, ECF No. 33, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 19, 2022) ....................................................... App. 783

Order Denying Stay, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. February 24, 2022) ...................................................... App. 799

- iv -

Case: 21-16958, 12/15/2021, ID: 12317167, DktEntry: 20, Page 1 of 90

No. 21-16958

In the United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE: CLEAN WATER ACT RULEMAKING

AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS

UNITED; COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER; SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE

PAIUTE TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE

WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;

STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF

COLORADO; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; COMMONWEALTH OF

VIRGINIA; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE

OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE OF MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH OF

MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF MAINE; and

STATE OF ILLINOIS,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

v.

ANDREW R. WHEELER and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

DEFENDANTS,

and

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,

INTERVENORS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

AND

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;

STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; and STATE OF

TEXAS,

INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS.

On Appeals from the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of California

Case Nos. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA, -04869-WHA, -06137-WHA

The Honorable William H. Alsup, Judge

INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ AND

INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY PENDING

APPEAL

[Counsel Listed On Following Pages]

- App. 667 -

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No. 21-16958

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

Riverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 788-8262

(804) 788-8218 (fax)

gsibley@huntonak.com

dduncan@huntonak.com

MISHA TSEYTLIN

TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON

SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe Street,

Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

(312) 759-1939 (fax)

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

DIERDRE G. DUNCAN

ERICA N. PETERSON

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 955-1932

epeterson@huntonak.com

CHARLES SENSIBA

TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON

SANDERS LLP

401 9th Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004-2146

(202) 274-2850

(202) 274-2994 (fax)

charles.sensiba@troutman.com

CLARE ELLIS

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

50 California Street

Suite 1700

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 975-3708

(415) 975-3701 (fax)

cellis@huntonak.com

Attorneys for IntervenorDefendants-Appellants

American Petroleum Institute

and Interstate Natural Gas

Association of America

- App. 668 -

ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS

TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON

SANDERS LLP

Three Embarcadero Center

Suite 800

San Francisco, CA 94111-4057

(415) 477-5700

(415) 477-5710 (fax)

elizabeth.andrews@troutman

.com

Attorneys for Intervenor

Defendant-Appellant National

Hydropower Association

Case: 21-16958, 12/15/2021, ID: 12317167, DktEntry: 20, Page 3 of 90

No. 21-16958

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,

SOLICITOR GENERAL

JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,

DEPUTY SOLICITOR

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70804

(225) 326-6739

murrille@ag.louisiana.gov

stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov

JAMES KASTE

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL’S

OFFICE

109 State Capitol

Cheyenne, WY 82002

(307) 777-7895 (phone)

(307) 777-3542 (fax)

james.kaste@wyo.gov

Attorneys for Intervenor

Defendant-Appellant State of

Louisiana

LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Attorney General of Arkansas

Additional Counsel:

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of

Mississippi

ERIC SCHMITT

Attorney General of Missouri

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General of Montana

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of

Virginia

- App. 669 -

West

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), American

Petroleum Institute states that it has no parent corporation and no

publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Dated: December 15, 2021

/s/ George P. Sibley, III

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), Interstate

Natural Gas Association of America states that it has no parent

corporation and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Dated: December 15, 2021

/s/ George P. Sibley, III

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), National

Hydropower Association states that it has no parent corporation and no

publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Dated: December 15, 2021

/s/ Misha Tseytlin

MISHA TSEYTLIN

- App. 670 -

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 2

A. Clean Water Act ............................................................................ 2

B. Certain States Abused Their Section 401 Certification

Authority ....................................................................................... 3

C. EPA Adopts The Section 401 Certification Rule ......................... 4

D. This Lawsuit And The Order Vacating The Rule ....................... 6

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 8

I. This Court Should Stay The District Court’s Vacatur Decision

Pending Appeal ................................................................................. 8

A. Intervenors Are Likely—Indeed, Certain—To Succeed On

The Merits Of Their Appeal ......................................................... 9

1. The APA Requires A Complete Administrative Record

And Full Briefing On The Merits Before A Reviewing

Court May Set Aside Agency Action ....................................... 9

2. The District Court’s Application Of The Allied-Signal

Factors Was Erroneous .......................................................... 14

B. Intervenors Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent A Stay,

While Neither Plaintiffs Nor the Public Will Suffer Harm

If This Court Grants A Stay ....................................................... 19

II. This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction .......................................... 25

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 28

- App. 671 -

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

OTHER CASES

Al Otro Lado v. Wolf

952 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020) .................................................................. 8

Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC

643 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .......................................................... 4, 17

Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ...................................................... passim

Alsea Valley All. v. Dep’t of Commerce

358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) .................................................. 26, 27, 28

Am. Ironworks v. N. Am. Constr.

248 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................ 26

Beveridge v. City of Spokane

No. 20-35848, 2021 WL 3082003 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021) ................. 26

Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. U.S. EPA

688 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 16

Califano v. Yamasaki

442 U.S. 682 (1979) .............................................................................. 25

Carlson v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n

938 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 15, 17

City of Milwaukee v. Ill. & Mich.

451 U.S. 304 (1981) ................................................................................ 3

Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC

673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .............................................................. 20

Crow Indian Tribe v. United States

965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020) .......................................................... 26, 28

- ii - App. 672 -

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Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham

640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) ............................................................ 22

Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.

525 U.S. 255 (1999) .............................................................................. 10

East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden

993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2021) ................................................................ 17

Gill v. Whitford

138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) .......................................................................... 25

Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell

424 U.S. 366 (1976) .............................................................................. 21

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. All. Bond Fund

527 U.S. 308 (1999) .............................................................................. 13

Harmon v. Thornburgh

878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) .............................................................. 17

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC

913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .............................................................. 4

Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe

794 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 22

Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States

476 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2020) ....................................... 19

Lair v. Bullock

697 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 8

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages

423 U.S. 276 (1976) .............................................................................. 20

Montes v. United States

37 F.3d 1347 (9th Cir. 1994) .................................................... 25, 26, 27

N. Mariana Islands v. United States

686 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2009) .......................................................... 20

- iii - App. 673 -

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N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs

No. 4:19-cv-44, Dkt. 131-1:¶14 (D. Mont. Apr. 27, 2020) ................... 22

N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC

884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018) ............................................................. 4, 17

Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’cns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.

545 U.S. 967 (2005) .............................................................................. 16

Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Salazar

660 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2009) .......................................................... 12

Pac. Rivers Council v. Shepard

No. 03:11-CV-00442-HU, 2011 WL 7562961 (D. Or. Sept.

29, 2011) ............................................................................................... 12

Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.

446 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006) .......................................................... 26, 27

Phillip Morris USA Inc. v Scott

561 U.S. 1301 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers) ................................... 22

Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv.

615 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) ........................................................ 27, 28

Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S. EPA

806 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................... 10, 13, 14

PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of

Ecology

511 U.S. 700 (1994) .......................................................................... 7, 16

Regan v. Time, Inc.

468 U.S. 641 (1984) .............................................................................. 17

Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC

588 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ............................................................ 12

Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc.

402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ................................................ 10

- iv - App. 674 -

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Skagit Cty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Shalala

80 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................ 27, 28

Texas v. EEOC

933 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................................................ 20

Texas v. U.S. EPA

829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 23

Transp. Div. of the Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, &

Transp. Workers v. Fed. R.R. Admin.

988 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) .............................................................. 20

Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C. v. U.S. FDA

16 F.4th 1130 (5th Cir. 2021) .............................................................. 23

Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson

No. 21-463, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2021 WL 5855551 (Dec. 10,

2021) ..................................................................................................... 14

FEDERAL STATUTES

5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c), 551(5) ................................................................... 20

5 U.S.C. § 706(2) ............................................................................... passim

28 U.S.C. § 1291........................................................................................ 25

33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) ..................................................................................... 3

Clean Water Act ............................................................................... passim

Administrative Procedure Act ......................................................... passim

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,

Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (Oct. 16, 1972) (codified

at 33 U.S.C. § 1341) ............................................................................... 3

Judiciary Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73) ............................................................... 13

Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, 84

Stat. 91, 108 (Apr. 3, 1970) .................................................................... 3

-v- App. 675 -

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OTHER AUTHORITIES

40 C.F.R. § 121.1 ......................................................................................... 5

40 C.F.R. § 121.2 ......................................................................................... 5

40 C.F.R. § 121.3 ......................................................................................... 5

40 C.F.R. § 121.4 ......................................................................................... 5

40 C.F.R. §§ 121.5-9 .................................................................................... 6

40 C.F.R. § 121.7 ......................................................................................... 6

40 C.F.R. §§ 121.8–9 ................................................................................... 6

40 C.F.R. §§ 121.11–121.16 ................................................................ 16, 17

40 C.F.R. §§ 121.11–16 ............................................................................... 6

44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,856 (June 7, 1979) ............................................. 18

85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020) ........................................................... 4

85 Fed. Reg. at 42,237 ................................................................................ 5

85 Fed. Reg. 42,256..................................................................................... 6

86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021) ............................................................ 7

EO 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021) ........................................... 7

Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review, White House

(Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheetlistofagency-actions-for-review/ ............................................................. 7

Joint EPA Army Memorandum on 401 Implementation (Aug.

19, 2021), available at https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020rule-implementati on-material ............................................................ 24

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INTRODUCTION

This stay application asks this Court to stop remarkable judicial

overreach.

In June 2021, EPA formally announced its intent to

reconsider the 2020 Clean Water Act (“CWA”) Section 401 Certification

Rule (the “Rule”), a landmark rule promulgated by the prior

Administration. EPA then filed a motion for remand without vacatur

because the pending rulemaking could address many of Plaintiffs’

arguments against the Rule. The district court agreed to remand the

Rule, but took the extraordinary step of vacating the Rule in its entirety,

even though the court had not found the Rule unlawful or even received

a single merits brief. But the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) only

empowers courts to “set aside” agency actions after finding them

unlawful, and that has not occurred here. This Court should immediately

stay that ruling pending appeal.

Intervenors will prevail on the merits for multiple reasons. The

district court lacked authority to vacate the Rule without first

determining it was legally deficient, and, in any event, its reasoning for

vacatur fails on its own terms. Considerations of irreparable harms and

the equities also call out for a stay. Absent a stay, Intervenors will suffer

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irreparable harm from losing their rights to be protected by the Rule

absent agency repeal through notice-and-comment rulemaking or a

court’s finding the Rule violates the APA. And there’s more: other States

will infringe the Intervenor States’ sovereignty by burdening their

commercial interests, and Intervenors will be forced to pay unrecoverable

costs as they attempt to comply with the whipsawing regulatory

framework for certification requests. In contrast, a stay will not impose

any meaningful harm on Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs can litigate the Rule’s

legality on the merits, following the APA’s processes.1

BACKGROUND

A.

Clean Water Act

In 1970, Congress required that “[a]ny applicant for a Federal

license or permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any

discharge into the navigable waters . . . shall provide the licensing or

permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge

originates or will originate.” Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 27-1(2), Intervenors state that Plaintiffs

and EPA oppose any stay of the district court’s vacatur order. Pursuant

to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(2), Intervenors state that they

sought a stay in the district court, which the court denied. A33–A46.

1

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Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, 108 (Apr. 3, 1970). Then, in 1972, Congress

enacted the CWA, a “total restructuring” and “complete rewriting” of the

nation’s water-pollution-control laws, City of Milwaukee v. Ill. & Mich.,

451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981), narrowing the certification requirement from

proof that any “activity . . . will not violate applicable water quality

standards,” 84 Stat. at 108 (emphases added), to whether a “discharge

will comply with” the CWA.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (Oct. 16, 1972)

(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1341) (emphases added). Congress also created a

prominent role for States and Tribes in implementing this new program.

33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).

In particular, federal agencies cannot permit

activities that may result in a discharge into waters of the United States

unless any State or authorized Tribe where the discharge would originate

certifies that the discharge complies with applicable water quality

requirements or waives the requirement. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.

B.

Certain States Abused Their Section 401 Certification

Authority

Despite the statutory change in 1972, EPA failed to revise its 1971

regulations governing the certification process.

As a result, EPA’s

regulations were incongruent with the new statutory language.

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Some States exploited this regulatory ambiguity to indefinitely

extend the time for acting on a certification request or to deny permits

based on non-water quality concerns, effectively vetoing projects. For

example, the State of Washington denied certification based on purported

concerns about the interstate rail system and the ability to accommodate

additional vessels in ports, despite expressly concluding the project

would not result in significant adverse effects on water quality, aquatic

life, or designated uses. See ECF No.172-1. Similar examples of State

and Tribal overreach abound in the administrative record. See ECF

No.56-2:¶¶13–14.

Indeed, courts repeatedly recognized that States’

gamesmanship was violating the CWA. See, e.g., Hoopa Valley Tribe v.

FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2019); N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl.

Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 2018); Alcoa Power

Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

C.

EPA Adopts The Section 401 Certification Rule

Pointing to these abuses, a coalition of states led by Louisiana

petitioned for an update to the 1971 regulations to conform them to the

1972 CWA amendments, and to provide clarity and transparency. 85

Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020). EPA’s response was in accord: “The

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Agency’s longstanding failure to update its regulations created the

confusion and regulatory uncertainty that were ultimately the cause of

th[e] controversial section 401 certification actions” that underlay

Louisiana’s petition. Id. at 42,227.

The Rule fixes these problems. It begins by defining fourteen key

terms, 40 C.F.R. § 121.1; see also 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,237, and it reaffirms

EPA’s longstanding interpretation of when CWA Section 401 requires a

water quality certification. 40 C.F.R. § 121.2; 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,237. It

also sets out the permissible scope of certification, as developed through

the rulemaking process. 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. The Rule ensures meaningful

coordination between project proponents and State and Tribal certifying

authorities before the certification process even begins, 40 C.F.R. § 121.4,

and it provides uniform procedures for establishing the time period for

States and Tribes to act on a certification request, clear rules for when

that period begins and ends, and a procedure for communicating to all

parties when the period begins and ends, 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.5-9.

Furthermore, the Rule requires any action on a certification request—a

grant, grant with conditions, or denial of certification—to be in writing

and contain certain information that explains the State’s or Tribe’s

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action, or else certification is waived. 40 C.F.R. § 121.7; 85 Fed. Reg.

42,256. The Rule also describes the effect of certain actions and explains

how waiver of the certification requirement can occur proactively or by

operation of law. 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.8–9. Finally, it provides a procedure

for neighboring jurisdictions to participate in the certification process

and describes how certification conditions should be enforced. 40 C.F.R.

§§ 121.11–16.

D.

This Lawsuit And The Order Vacating The Rule

Plaintiffs are three groups who filed complaints in the U.S. District

Court for the Northern District of California: a group of environmental

organizations (collectively “Plaintiff Groups”), twenty States and the

District of Columbia (collectively “Plaintiff States”), and conservation

associations and Indian Tribes (collectively “Plaintiff Tribes”).

ECF

Nos.75, 96, 98. Undersigned intervened to defend the Rule. ECF Nos.23,

27, 41, 62; Docket No.3:20-cv-04869-WHA, ECF Nos.75, 84, 113.

In January 2021, President Biden directed agencies to “take action

to address the promulgation of Federal regulations and other actions

during the last 4 years that conflict with” his Administration’s objectives,

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EO 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021), including the Rule.2

Thereafter, EPA announced its intent to reconsider the Rule, 86 Fed. Reg.

29,541 (June 2, 2021), and moved for remand without vacatur, ECF

No.143:2, 13. Plaintiffs then argued for remand with vacatur in their

oppositions, while failing to discuss meaningfully most aspects of the

Rule. ECF Nos.145–47.

On October 21, 2021, the district court vacated and remanded the

Rule to EPA, A15–A32, and entered final judgment, ECF No.176. The

court concluded nothing in the APA “expressly preclude[d]” its issuing

the equitable remedy of vacatur “without a decision on the merits[.]” It

then applied the two-step test for “considering vacatur of agency actions

found to be erroneous,” announced in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A22, A26–A31.

Regarding the Rule’s purported deficiencies—although EPA did “not

admit fault”—the court concluded the Rule was “antithetical” to PUD No.

1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700

(1994), and “harbor[ed] significant doubts” about the Rule, A27–A28.

Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review, White House

(Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-listofagency-actions-for-review/.

2

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Turning to the consequences of vacatur, the court reasoned that because

the Rule “has only been in effect for thirteen months,” and “has been

under attack since before day one,” there was no justifiable reliance on

the Rule. Id. at 15. Intervenors moved the district court for a stay

pending appeal, ECF No.179, which the district court denied on

December 7, A33–A46.

ARGUMENT

I.

This Court Should Stay The District Court’s Vacatur

Decision Pending Appeal

In deciding whether to grant a stay, a court must consider

“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will

substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and

(4) where the public interest lies.” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). This

Court uses a “sliding scale” approach, balancing the elements “so that a

stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of

another.” Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 2020).

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Applying these factors, the vacatur order is an extraordinary overreach

that this Court should stay immediately.

A.

Intervenors Are Likely—Indeed, Certain—To Succeed

On The Merits Of Their Appeal

Intervenors will succeed on the merits of their appeal for two

independent reasons: (1) the district court had no authority to vacate the

rule without receiving full merits briefing and deciding the rule’s legality

on the merits; and (2) the district court misapplied the Allied-Signal

analysis, even if it were applicable in this procedural posture.

1.

The APA Requires A Complete Administrative

Record And Full Briefing On The Merits Before A

Reviewing Court May Set Aside Agency Action

a. With the APA, Congress provided federal district courts with

jurisdiction to review agencies’ final actions, but only authorized courts

to set aside such actions when they are “found” to be “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

law,” “without observance of procedure required by law,” or “in excess of

statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory

right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Congress further provided that in “making

[those] determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those

parts of it cited by a party.” Id.

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The APA does not permit courts to vacate a rule without first

concluding that it is unlawful. See id.; see also Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at

150–51 (applying test only after determining the agency acted without

“reasoned decision-making”); Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S.

EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) (“not supported by substantial

evidence”). The plain import of that explicit requirement, under the

expressio unius canon, is that Congress did not intend for courts to set

aside agency action absent such a finding. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures

Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Indeed, because

the APA waives sovereign immunity, the expressio unius canon applies

with particular force, Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255,

261 (1999) (citation omitted), thereby limiting a court’s vacatur authority

to instances where agency action is unlawful, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

Ignoring these explicit limitations affords plaintiffs complete relief

without ever proving their case, while also circumventing the APA’s

notice-and-comment requirements for repeal of a rule. It invites litigants

to seek process-free elimination of agency rules whenever the Presidency

changes parties. Advocacy groups aligned with the policy agenda of the

new administration urge pre-adjudication vacatur with the hope that a

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single federal judge will find authority in “equity” to give them

instantaneous relief without the burdens of administrative due process.

As happened here, a new Administration can achieve its aims of

eliminating the rule from the books by expressing “significant doubt” or

“deep concern” about the challenged rule and throwing up spurious

jurisdictional roadblocks to appellate review of patently unlawful

district-court action.3 The APA cannot tolerate such abuse and evasion.

b. The district court’s decision to vacate the Rule here thus violates

the plain text of the APA. The vacatur order does not find the Rule

unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), instead only asserting

“significant doubt . . . that EPA correctly promulgated the rule.” In so

holding, the Order relies largely on EPA’s decision to reconsider the Rule.

A27–A29. Yet EPA never conceded that the Rule is unlawful or that it

would rescind the entire Rule on remand, merely stating that it “will

undertake a new rulemaking effort to propose revisions due to

substantial concerns with the existing Rule.” ECF No.143:2; see id. at 7,

3

See ECF No.185:4–7.

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8; ECF No.155:2–3. Indeed, because EPA is presently in the middle of a

rulemaking process, ECF Nos.153:3, 155:3, it could not concede the Rule’s

legality or commit to rescinding the entire Rule without violating the

APA. See Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir.

2009); ECF No.155:2–3. In any event, a concession would be legally

insufficient to justify vacatur of the Rule because Intervenors are parties

to the litigation and defend fully every aspect of it.

Because the district court never “determin[ed]” the Rule was

“unlawful,” whether on “the whole record” or otherwise, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2),

it had no authority to vacate. Doing so improperly provided Plaintiffs

complete relief—repeal of their disfavored rule—without ever having to

prove their case or go through notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Nat’l

Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 2009);

Pac. Rivers Council v. Shepard, No. 03:11-CV-00442-HU, 2011 WL

7562961, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2011) (“the court would have no legal

basis to vacate and remand [the rule] without determining the merits”).

c. The district court’s justifications for its actions do not withstand

scrutiny. The district court inferred that this Court’s endorsement of

remand without vacatur in cases where agency action was found

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erroneous meant that remand with vacatur is appropriate in cases where

the action has not been found erroneous. That makes no sense. A21. If

anything, cases endorsing post-adjudication remand without vacatur

undermine the district court’s logic here. Those cases reflect the respect

given to Executive Branch agencies, noting that courts will “leave an

invalid rule in place only when equity demands.” Pollinator, 806 F.3d at

532 (citation omitted). Vacating lawful rules disregards that respect.

The court then resorted to “equity”: “[B]ecause vacatur is an

equitable remedy, and because the APA does not expressly preclude the

exercise of equitable jurisdiction, the APA does not preclude the granting

of vacatur without a decision on the merits.” A22 (citation omitted). The

court never explained, beyond broad assertions of its equitable

jurisdiction, from whence its authority to vacate a rule derives if the Rule

was never determined to be unlawful. A21–A22, A37–A39. A district

court’s equitable discretion is limited to “the jurisdiction in equity

exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the

adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary

Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73),” which “did not include the power to create

remedies previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.” Grupo Mexicano

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de Desarrollo, SA v. All. Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318, 332 (1999). The

Supreme Court reemphasized that limitation just last week, making

clear that it applies no matter the issue. Whole Woman’s Health v.

Jackson, No. 21-463, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2021 WL 5855551, at *8 (Dec. 10,

2021). That the law in this circuit is “unsettled” as between a handful of

district courts is a strong indicia that no relevant equitable remedy is

part of historic practice. The district court’s vacatur was thus ultra vires.

2.

The District Court’s Application Of The AlliedSignal Factors Was Erroneous

Only after a finding that an agency determination is unlawful

under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) does a court address the two-factor test under the

Allied-Signal decision for whether it should vacate a rule or permit a

lesser remedy while remand proceedings continue before the agency. See

Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150–51; Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532. Under

the first factor, the court asks how “serious[ ]” the agency’s errors are in

order to determine whether vacatur of the rule is necessary. AlliedSignal, 988 F.2d at 150. Second, a court must consider “the disruptive

consequences” of the vacatur.

Id. at 150–51.

Even assuming these

factors have any relevance without a finding of unlawfulness, the district

court erred in applying them here.

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Plaintiffs presented an insufficient record and argument as to the

first Allied-Signal factor. The Plaintiff States and Plaintiff Groups relied

almost entirely on their erroneous contention that EPA admitted the

Rule’s illegality in various statements. See ECF No.146:20–21; ECF

No.147:4–10. The Plaintiff Tribes, in turn, merely argued that EPA

“failed to provide sufficient justification for departing from a half century

of practice and policy related to the interpretation and implementation

of Section 401” without explanation for how the Rule would be more

protective of water quality. ECF No.145:12–13. When the Plaintiffs did

attempt to make a few substantive arguments, they failed to support the

broad remedy of full vacatur, merely raising discrete concerns with

individual sections of the Rule. ECF No.146:4–14, 20–21. Plaintiffs

addressed at most a fraction of the Rule’s provisions based on litigation

statements by the EPA (not the Rule itself), only alluded to “other

detrimental provisions” of the Rule, and offered no severability analysis

whatsoever.

ECF No.146:7, 20–21; see Carlson v. Postal Regulatory

Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Ignoring these problems, the district court focused on the Rule’s

scope-of-certification provision as “antithetical” to the Supreme Court’s

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decision in PUD No. 1, contending that EPA did not “reasonably

explain[ ] the change.” A27. While chastising EPA for “depart[ing] from

what the Supreme Court dubbed the most reasonable interpretation of

the statute,” id., the district court ignored that the Supreme Court held

only that EPA’s then-applicable construction of Section 401 was “a

reasonable interpretation” or “most reasonably read” that way. PUD No.

1, 511 U.S. at 712. That does not mean it was the only reasonable

interpretation, such that the agency could not adopt another reading as

part of its delegated authority, see Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’cns Ass’n v.

Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005). Simply put, EPA’s

change does not “compel[ ] the conclusion that the current rule is

unreasonable,” A27, and EPA’s more-recent interpretation of Section 401

is both reasonable and owed deference. The district court’s reliance on

post-enactment litigation statements by EPA to for its contrary

conclusion, A28, further underscores the court’s errors. See Cal. Cmtys.

Against Toxics v. U.S. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2012).

The district court’s complete vacatur of the entire Rule was also

without any coherent justification.

Plaintiffs did not even challenge

many portions of the Rule in the vacatur briefing, see, e.g., 40 C.F.R.

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§§ 121.11–121.16, and several portions of the Rule merely codify what

federal courts have held the CWA requires, see N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl.

Conservation, 884 F.3d at 455; Alcoa Power Generating Inc., 643 F.3d at

972. There is ample reason to conclude EPA would have adopted those

other provisions, which are all severable from the scope-of-certification

rule, regardless of whether scope-of-certification was “foundation[al],”

A25, for other parts of the Rule, see Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,

652 (1984); Carlson, 938 F.3d at 351–52.

The district court relied on East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden,

993 F.3d 640, 681 (9th Cir. 2021), for the principle that courts “ordinarily

do not attempt, even with the assistance of agency counsel, to fashion a

valid regulation from the remnants of the old rule.” But that portion of

East Bay quoted Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989),

which made that point only after explaining that “[w]hen a court finds

that an agency regulation is invalid in substantial part, and that the

invalid portion cannot be severed from the rest of the rule, its typical

response is to vacate the rule and remand to the agency,” id. at 494

(footnote omitted; emphasis added). Thus, the district court’s failure to

conduct a severability analysis was error, inconsistent with Supreme

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Court precedent, and will generate a circuit split if affirmed. Indeed, the

upshot to the district court’s vacatur is that—in reliance on its own

divinations

based

on

EPA’s

post-action

statements—the

Court

apparently reinstated a rule EPA long-ago suggested was inconsistent

with the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act.

See NPDES;

Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,856 (June 7, 1979).

The district court also erred in its consideration of the second

Allied-Signal factor by ignoring the substantial and predictable

disruptions the immediate vacatur of a (not-unlawful) Rule has caused.

As further explained below, see infra pp.21–23, vacating the Rule causes

significant disruption to pending Section 401 reviews, allowing States to

use outdated rules to exert control over activities in other States and to

protect their own industries, see, e.g., ECF No.27-7:1–4, increasing the

cost of some interstate projects and fully defeating others, with attendant

harms to other States’ economies and ability to develop their natural

resources, see ECF Nos.56-1, 56-2, and upending the progress agencies

have made to improve and make transparent certification procedures.

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B.

Intervenors Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent A

Stay, While Neither Plaintiffs Nor the Public Will

Suffer Harm If This Court Grants A Stay

1. Intervenors have suffered and will continue to suffer grave,

irreparable harm in three ways, absent a stay.

First, vacatur deprived Intervenors of their statutory and dueprocess rights to have the protection of a Rule that they successfully

secured through notice-and-comment rulemaking, for the benefit of

themselves and their members, not repealed without the agency

following notice-and-comment rulemaking or a court holding that the

Rule is unlawful. Intervenors fought for the Rule and then intervened in

this case to defend it because of numerous abuses and delays that had

occurred under the prior regime over many decades. See supra pp.3–4.

Through the district court’s vacatur, Intervenors have now lost the Rule

and the protections that the Rule provides to their members.

Thus, even if vacatur produced no immediate sovereign or economic

harm (and it most certainly has, see infra pp.20–24), the deprivation of

Intervenors’ statutory rights under the APA, which will be irreparable

unless vacatur is stayed, is sufficient irreparable harm.

Invenergy

Renewables LLC v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1353 (Ct. Int’l

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Trade 2020); N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17

(D.D.C. 2009); see also Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir.

2019). The court’s decision circumvented “the most fundamental of the

APA’s procedural requirements,” Transp. Div. of the Int’l Ass’n of Sheet

Metal, Air, Rail, & Transp. Workers v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 988 F.3d 1170,

1180 (9th Cir. 2021)—providing public notice and comment before

repealing a rule, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c), 551(5); Consumer Energy Council

of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In other words, a

single district judge has rolled back EPA rules to the 1971 regulations

that do not reflect the 1972 amendments to the CWA, supra pp.2–3,

without notice and comment or finding of illegality.

Second, vacatur harms State Intervenors’ constitutional rights and

sovereign interests.

Such harms—leaving “individual States free to

burden commerce . . . among themselves”—were “[o]ne of the major

defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a compelling reason for the

calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.” Michelin Tire Corp. v.

Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976). Indeed, particular “dissatisfaction”

came from “the peculiar situation of some of the States, which having no

convenient ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their

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neighbors, [through] whose ports, their commerce was carr[i]ed on.” Id.

(quoting Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Fanand ed.

1966)). So now a State “may not use the threat of economic isolation” to

control its sister states. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.

366, 379 (1976). Certain States doing just that was one of the reasons

Intervenors petitioned for the Rule, see, e.g., ECF No.172-2:¶¶4–7; see

also ECF Nos.27-7, 56-1, 56-2, and such foundational constitutional

harms will assuredly return in light of vacatur.

Third, Intervenors will suffer irreparable economic harm if this

Court does not stay the district court’s vacatur. The whipsawing caused

by reinstatement of the prior rule will be substantially disruptive for both

regulators and regulated entities. ECF No.172-2:¶8; A13–A14. Vacatur

of the Rule casts substantial uncertainty and raises questions with no

clear answers, such as whether pending certification requests need to be

resubmitted, causing substantial delay in completing pending Section

401 reviews.

ECF No.172-3:¶11; ECF No.56-2:¶¶21, 23, 24.

For

example, while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has now lifted its

“pause” on finalizing permit decisions in light of the district court’s

decision, the Corps has noted that it still needs to “identify an

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appropriate path” to comply with the new regulatory framework thrust

upon industry actors by a single district court’s vacatur in the thousands

of pending requests for certifications. ECF No.186-1:2; see N. Plains Res.

Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 4:19-cv-44, Dkt. 131-1:¶14 (D.

Mont. Apr. 27, 2020) (“the Corps receives 3,000 standard individual

permit applications annually”). This uncertainty and attendant risk of

delay can continue to deter large capital projects that benefit multiple

States economically and are necessary for the development of their

natural resources. Id. ¶¶ 7-9; A8–A9. It also imposes costs on states that

must devote resources addressing uncertainty from the regulated

community. A13–A14.

This uncertainty imposes irreparable economic harm. See Phillip

Morris USA Inc. v Scott, 561 U.S. 1301, 1304 (2010) (Scalia, J., in

chambers) (“If expenditures cannot be recouped, the resulting loss may

be irreparable.”); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th

Cir. 2015); Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1157 (10th

Cir. 2011) (“[I]mposition of money damages that cannot later be

recovered for reasons such as sovereign immunity constitutes irreparable

injury.”).

Indeed, other Circuits have noted that “complying with a

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regulation later held invalid almost always produces the irreparable

harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” Texas v. U.S. EPA, 829 F.3d

405, 433 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); Wages & White Lion Invs.,

L.L.C. v. U.S. FDA, 16 F.4th 1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 2021). Intervenors’

members have numerous certification requests pending for projects that

involve billions of dollars in capital investment at the time of their

intervention in these actions, see, e.g., ECF No.56-2: ¶¶14, 22, 24, with

many more forthcoming, ECF No.172-3: ¶10.

The district court’s contention that Intervenors can simply

challenge any abuses to particular projects in future litigation rings

hollow. A44–A45. The regulations that the district court unilaterally

reimposed permitted many of these abuses. So while the district court

relied on a months-old settlement in a different certification lawsuit to

establish that federal-court challenges are available, see A43, the court

failed to acknowledge the unrecoverable costs of compliance with portions

of the newly reimposed regulations that the never-declared-unlawful

Rule protected against.

2. Granting a stay pending appeal will not substantially injure

Plaintiffs and would serve the public interest. As an initial matter,

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Plaintiffs have no equitable interest or entitlement to an unlawful

vacatur, see supra pp.9–18, so staying that decision would not impose any

legal harm. Moreover, Plaintiffs can seek redress for any prejudice they

claim they would suffer if the Rule were left in place and can participate

in the usual notice-and-comment procedures before EPA, to secure any

protections they want, as EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

have indicated their willingness to address concerns with the Rule raised

by the Plaintiffs on remand.4 The public interest also supports a stay.

The Rule fills a gaping regulatory void, setting basic rules for the Section

401 process, including a rule for defining when the clock starts on a

State’s reasonable time period to act on a certification request, and

clearly defining the scope of authority granted by Congress in Section

401. Each of these regulatory improvements aids the public interest, and

returning to the prior dysfunction fostered by EPA’s decades-long failure

to set basic rules for the Section 401 process would harm industry and

government actors.

Joint EPA Army Memorandum on 401 Implementation (Aug. 19,

2021), available at https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020-rule-implementati

on-materials.

4

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3. At minimum, this Court should stay the district court’s vacatur

order outside of the Ninth Circuit. Both Article III and principles of

equity generally limit a court’s ability to fashion relief to that “necessary

to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442

U.S. 682, 702 (1979); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929–30 (2018).

Applying those principles here, allowing the district court to vacate the

Rule nationwide sweeps far beyond relief to the Plaintiffs and this Court

should, at the least, limit the vast reach of the district court’s vacatur to

this Circuit.

II.

This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction

Notwithstanding arguments by EPA and Plaintiffs below, ECF

Nos.185:4–7, 186:4–6; see also A46, this Court has appellate jurisdiction

over this case. Circuit Courts maintain appellate jurisdiction “from all

final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. This Court gives the finality requirement “a practical rather than

a technical construction,” looking to “what effect the court intended it to

have, rather than the label placed upon it,” Montes v. United States, 37

F.3d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1994), so “finality” exists whenever a decision

“is a full adjudication of the issues” and “clearly evidences the judge’s

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intentions that it be the court’s final act in the matter,” Patel v. Del Taco,

Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006). Entry of final judgment is

indicative that a district court intended its order to be final, Montes, 37

F.3d at 1350; Beveridge v. City of Spokane, No. 20-35848, 2021 WL

3082003, at *1 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021), and permits parties to appeal

from prior, even interlocutory orders, Am. Ironworks v. N. Am. Constr.,

248 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2001).

This Court considers orders remanding to an agency to be final if

“(1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal issue, (2) the

remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule

which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as a

practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable.”

Alsea Valley All. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.

2004). But this rule only applies to an appeal by private parties “whose

positions on the merits would be considered during the agency

proceedings on remand,” Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 965 F.3d

662, 675 (9th Cir. 2020), and this Court will still “exercise [its]

jurisdiction over a remand order” in absence of those three elements if “a

holding of nonappealability would effectively deprive the litigants of an

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opportunity to obtain review.”

omitted).

Alsea, 358 F.3d at 1184–85 (citation

Indeed, “Alsea did not announce a hard-and-fast rule

prohibiting a non-agency litigant from appealing a remand order,” Pit

River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010), and

this Court continues to give the finality determination in such instances

“a practical construction,” Skagit Cty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Shalala,

80 F.3d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, the district court’s vacatur order and final judgment provide

this Court with appellate jurisdiction under any practical consideration

of finality. The district court’s order remanding the Rule to EPA with

vacatur effectively ends the entire dispute. Indeed, Plaintiffs throughout

this litigation sought “an order vacating the Final Rule or those portions

determined to be unlawful,” ECF No.1:23, and the court’s order grants

that relief, A31.

See Patel, 446 F.3d at 1000.

The district court’s

subsequent final judgment, “ensur[ing] appealability,” clarifying that no

issues remained, and closing the case, ECF No.176:1, removed any doubt

about finality, Montes, 37 F.3d at 1350.

That the order involved a remand to EPA does nothing to change

this conclusion.

The core issue raised by Intervenors on appeal is

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whether the district court even had the authority or jurisdiction to vacate

the Rule without first determining its unlawfulness, see supra Part I.A,

an issue that will not “be considered during the agency proceedings on

remand,” Crow Indian Tribe, 965 F.3d at 675, as EPA considers the

merits of the Rule. Indeed, absent review now, Intervenors will not get

any resolution on this important question, providing this Court appellate

jurisdiction under “a practical construction” of the finality rule, Skagit

Cty., 80 F.3d at 384. Thus, regardless of whether the district court’s

vacatur order meets the Alsea criteria—not a “hard-and-fast rule” itself,

Pit River Tribe, 615 F.3d at 1075—this Court has appellate jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

This Court should stay the district court’s Order vacating the

Section 401 Rule pending appeal.

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Dated: December 15, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ George P. Sibley, III

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III*

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

Riverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 788-8262

(804) 788-8218 (fax)

gsibley@huntonak.com

/s/ Misha Tseytlin

MISHA TSEYTLIN

TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON

SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe Street,

Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

(312) 759-1939 (fax)

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

DIERDRE G. DUNCAN

ERICA N. PETERSON

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 955-1932

dduncan@huntonak.com

epeterson@huntonak.com

CLARE ELLIS

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

50 California Street

Suite 1700

San Francisco, CA 94111

(415) 975-3708

(415) 975-3701 (fax)

cellis@huntonak.com

Attorneys for IntervenorDefendants-Appellants

American Petroleum Institute

and Interstate Natural Gas

Association of America

- 29 - App. 705 -

CHARLES SENSIBA

TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON

SANDERS LLP

401 9th Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004-2146

(202) 274-2850

(202) 274-2994 (fax)

charles.sensiba@troutman.com

ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS

TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON

SANDERS LLP

Three Embarcadero Center

Suite 800

San Francisco, CA 94111-4057

(415) 477-5700

(415) 477-5710 (fax)

elizabeth.andrews@troutman

.com

Attorneys for Intervenor

Defendant-Appellant National

Hydropower Association

Case: 21-16958, 12/15/2021, ID: 12317167, DktEntry: 20, Page 40 of 90

Additional Counsel:

/s/ Joseph S. St. John

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,

SOLICITOR GENERAL

JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,

DEPUTY SOLICITOR

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70804

(225) 326-6739

murrille@ag.louisiana.gov

stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov

LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Attorney General of Arkansas

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of

Mississippi

ERIC SCHMITT

Attorney General of Missouri

Attorneys for Intervenor

Defendant-Appellant State of

Louisiana

/s/ James Kaste

James Kaste

Deputy Attorney General

Wyoming Attorney General’s

Office

109 State Capitol

Cheyenne, WY 82002

(307) 777-7895 (phone)

(307) 777-3542 (fax)

james.kaste@wyo.gov

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General of Montana

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West

Virginia

* Pursuant to Circuit Rule 25-5(e), I hereby attest that concurrence in

the filing of the document has been obtained from each of the other

Signatories. /s/ George P. Sibley, III

-2- App. 706 -

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the foregoing Motion complies with the typevolume limitation of Ninth Circuit Rules 27-1 and 32-3 because it

contains 5,577 words. This Motion complies with the typeface and the

type style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27

because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface

using Word 14-point Century Schoolbook typeface.

Dated: December 15, 2021

/s/ George P. Sibley, III

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III

- App. 707 -

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the

Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on December 15, 2021. All

participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be

accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

Dated: December 15, 2021

/s/ George P. Sibley, III

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III

- App. 708 -

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ADDENDUM

- App. 709 -

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Supplemental Declaration of Joan Dreskin ......................................... A1

Declaration of Robert Christopher Sadlier........................................... A11

Order on Motion for Remand Without Vacatur (ECF No.173) ........... A15

Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (ECF No.191) ......... A33

- App. 710 -

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In the United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE: CLEAN WATER ACT RULEMAKING

AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS

UNITED; COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER; SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE

PAIUTE TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE

WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;

STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF

COLORADO; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; COMMONWEALTH OF

VIRGINIA; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE

OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE OF MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH OF

MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF MAINE; and

STATE OF ILLINOIS,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

v.

ANDREW R. WHEELER and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

DEFENDANTS,

and

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,

INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

AND

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;

STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; and STATE OF

TEXAS,

INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS.

On Appeals from the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of California

Case Nos. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA, -04869-WHA, -06137-WHA

The Honorable William H. Alsup, Senior District Judge

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JOAN DRESKIN FOR

THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTAPPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

- App. 711 -

A1

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1.

My name is Joan Dreskin. I am Senior Vice President and General

Counsel of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA). My

business address is 20 F Street, NW, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20001.

2.

I offer this declaration in support of the Motion by Intervenor

Defendants to Stay Pending Appeal the district court’s order vacating the Section

401 Rule. Final Rule, CWA Section 401 Certification Rule, EPA, 85 Fed. Reg.

42,210 (July 13, 2020) (the “401 Rule”).

3.

INGAA is a non-profit trade association representing interstate natural

gas transmission pipelines (“interstate pipelines”) operating in the United States.

INGAA is comprised of 25 members, representing the vast majority of the

interstate natural gas pipeline companies in the U.S. INGAA members operate

approximately 200,000 miles of pipelines. The interstate pipeline network serves

as an indispensable link between natural gas producers and the American homes

and businesses that use the fuel for heating, cooking, generating electricity and

manufacturing a wide variety of U.S. goods, ranging from plastics to paint to

medicines and fertilizer.

4.

U.S. natural gas production is expected to increase to 130 billion

cubic feet per day by 2035, spurred by growing markets, if available supplies are

developed, and it is estimated that investment in new oil and gas infrastructure will

total $791 billion from 2018 through 2035, averaging $44 billion per year. Natural

- App. 712 -

1

A2

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gas also will serve as a backstop to help firm up variable renewables, like wind and

solar, which are expected to grow. This translates to the need for thousands of

miles of new and replacement pipe to meet market demand or to modernize

existing pipeline facilities.

5.

INGAA members construct and operate interstate natural gas

pipelines in response to demonstrated public need for the delivery of natural gas,

requiring infrastructure that typically spans multiple state boundaries. The Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must issue a certificate of “public

convenience and necessity” based on this demonstrated need before INGAA

members may construct and operate these pipelines. As documented by statistics

compiled by FERC, INGAA members construct hundreds of miles of new and

expanded interstate pipelines each year.

6.

Due to the public need to transport natural gas long distances, projects

developed by INGAA members unavoidably cross wetlands and other waters of

the United States regulated by the Clean Water Act (CWA). Such crossings

require authorization from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) under CWA

Section 404. And for such crossings, CWA section 401 requires the project

applicant to provide the federal agency with the certification of the state that the

discharges in the state comply with applicable water quality standards. If the state

fails or refuses to act on the request for certification within a reasonable time not to

- App. 713 -

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A3

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exceed one year, the applicant’s duty to provide the certification is waived. The

federal agency (such as FERC or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)) is

precluded from authorizing the activity resulting in the discharge unless the

certification is provided or waived. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.

7.

INGAA members rely on, and make regular use of both individual

and general permits, including Nationwide Permits (NWPs), Regional General

permits, and Programmatic General Permits, issued by the Corps under CWA

section 404, which authorize activities required for the construction, maintenance,

repair, and removal of oil and natural gas pipelines and associated facilities.

NWPs are general permits that allow for the timely authorization of activities that

have only minimal and temporary environmental effects, but that are essential to

the reliable, safe and affordable supply of energy to U.S. consumers. Regional

General Permits are issued for a specific geographic area by an individual Corps

district and have specific terms and conditions, all of which must be met for

project-specific actions to be verified. Programmatic General Permits are based on

an existing state, local, or other federal program and designed to eliminate

duplication of effort between Corps districts and State regulatory programs that

provide similar protection to aquatic resources. In some states, a State

Programmatic General Permit (SPGP) replaces some or all of the Corps NWPs,

which results in greater efficiency in the overall permitting process.

- App. 714 -

3

A4

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8.

INGAA members use general permits, including NWPs, Regional

permits, and SPGPs, for both large and small pipeline projects located across the

country that will have minimal impacts on the environment. For example, INGAA

members use NWP 12 for large pipeline expansions, where applicable, and also for

smaller projects, such as pipeline replacement projects driven by highway

replacements, ingress and egress to project workspace, and valve replacements.

NWP 3 and NWP 12 are also used extensively for maintenance, inspection, and

repair activities to comply with pipeline integrity requirements mandated by the

Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to the

Pipeline Safety Act. INGAA members often rely on NWP 3 and NWP 12

authorizations to inspect, maintain, and repair existing pipelines to ensure the

continued safety and reliability of the pipelines.

9.

Collectively, INGAA members use general permits thousands of

times annually for their construction, maintenance, and repair activities.

10.

INGAA’s members schedule and design their projects and

maintenance and repair activities to meet the terms and conditions of the NWPs,

including NWP 12. NWPs provide an efficient permitting mechanism that helps

streamline the review and approval process for pipeline projects without

precluding or compromising the consideration of any necessary project-specific

conditions. Construction and maintenance of natural gas pipelines typically occur

- App. 715 -

4

A5

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on tight schedules designed to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the

natural gas pipeline network and to meet the growing demands of natural gas

customers. Obtaining coverage under a NWP takes considerably less time than an

individual CWA section 404 permit, while still ensuring appropriate consideration

of all applicable avoidance, minimization and mitigation measures through

adherence to the applicable conditions listed therein.

11.

The conditions associated with the NWPs are designed to ensure that

authorized crossings have only minimal environmental effects. NWPs are subject

to 32 general conditions that protect a range of different environmental resources,

including spawning areas, migratory bird breeding areas, shellfish beds, water

supply intakes, wild and scenic rivers, endangered species, migratory birds, bald

and golden eagles, historic properties, and designated critical resource waters. In

each case, these conditions prohibit activities that would have more than minimal

impacts on these resources. Regional conditions further ensure that authorized

crossings have only minimal environmental effects on state- or region-specific

resources of concern, including special status wetlands, special status streams and

rivers, and streams known to harbor protected species.

12.

In reliance on the availability of NWP 3 and NWP 12, the majority of

INGAA members have plans to submit or have already submitted Pre-Construction

Notifications seeking Corps verification to construct interstate natural gas pipelines

- App. 716 -

5

A6

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and complete necessary repair, maintenance and modernization work using NWP 3

and/or NWP 12.

13.

The Corps re-issued certain NWPs in March 2021, and many States

have issued CWA Section 401 water quality certifications (or waived certification)

for those nationwide permits. These certifications or waivers were issued while the

401 Rule was still effective. In States that have issued certifications or have

waived, INGAA members are relying on NWPs to complete vital projects, and

plan to rely on NWPs in the immediate future.

14.

After the district court’s decision to vacate the 401 Rule, INGAA

members have reported that the Corps suspended permitting authorizations for

activities that rely on water quality certifications based on the 401 Rule,

specifically citing the district court’s decision. This included authorizations under

both individual permits and NWPs, including NWP 12.

15.

For example, on November 4, 2021, the Corps’ Sacramento District

posted the following message on its website: “Due to the decision of the United

States District Court for the Northern District of California on October 21, 2021 to

remand EPA’s 2020 401 WQC rule with vacatur, the Corps of Engineers is not

finalizing permit decisions that rely on a 401 WQC or waiver under EPA’s 2020

rule at this time. The Corps is working to provide more refined guidance that

provides a way forward that allows us to finalize permit decisions.”

- App. 717 -

6

A7

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16.

The Corps’ Buffalo District posted the same message on its website

on November 9, 2021.

17.

The Corps’ suspension was not limited to its Sacramento and Buffalo

Districts. Other Corps Districts, including Mobile, Vicksburg (MS), Tulsa,

Nashville, Seattle, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Huntington, Baltimore, and New

Orleans Districts verbally told members that they would not finalize any permit

decisions that rely on a certification or waiver under the 2020 401 Rule due to the

district court’s decision.

18.

Around November 19, 2021, Corps headquarters issued additional

verbal guidance to Corps District Engineers. Pursuant to that guidance, which has

not been published, District Engineers may issue NWP verifications as to NWPs

issued in March 2021 and for which States issued blanket certifications or waivers

pursuant to the 2020 401 Rule. But where a State has issued an individual

certification or waiver for projects that either intend to proceed under an NWP or

an individual permit, the State has the option to revisit its certification decision up

to the one year statutory deadline.

19.

As a result, critical projects nationwide that intended to proceed under

general or individual permits already have been delayed, imposing substantial

added costs to INGAA’s members. And the even though the Corps has lifted its

- App. 718 -

7

A8

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permitting suspension, the re-opener for States creates the potential for conflicting

directives from other agencies.

20.

Of further concern to INGAA members are pipeline integrity projects

that were planned to commence within the next several months. These pipeline

integrity projects are necessary to reduce the likelihood of pipeline leaks and

ruptures by inspecting, repairing and/or replacing pipelines located in densely

populated areas, including pipelines near homes, schools, churches, and

businesses. In many cases, these actions follow inspection schedules mandated by

the PHMSA. INGAA’s members have created inspection and remediation

schedules based on the PHMSA requirements and company risk assessments. If

INGAA members cannot rely on NWPs or individual permits where Section 401

certificates have been issued, some of these safety improvements will not be

accomplished pursuant to the regulatory timeframes, or PHMSA will need to

extensively grant waivers, imposing an additional administrative burden on its

staff.

21.

Delays such as these will increase the risk of reliability issues, while

also failing to meet the needs of customers who have a need for natural gas that

may be unfulfilled in the interim.

- App. 719 -

8

A9

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I, Joan Dreskin, certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States

of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on December 14, 2021.

___________________________________

Joan Dreskin

Senior Vice President and General Counsel

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America

20 F Street, NW

Suite 450

Washington, DC 20001

- App. 720 -

9

A10

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Nos. 21-16958, -16960, 16961

In the United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE: CLEAN WATER ACT RULEMAKING

AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS UNITED;

COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER; SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE PAIUTE

TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE WATER

RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW

YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF COLORADO; DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; STATE OF NEW

MEXICO; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF

WASHINGTON; STATE OF MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF

NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF MAINE; and STATE OF ILLINOIS,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,

v.

ANDREW R. WHEELER and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

DEFENDANTS,

and

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,

and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,

INTERVENORS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

AND

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;

STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; and STATE OF

TEXAS,

INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS.

On Appeals from the U.S. District Court

for the Northern District of California

Case Nos. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA, -04869-WHA, -06137-WHA

The Honorable William H. Alsup, Judge

DECLARATION OF ROBERT

CHRISTOPHER SADLIER

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I, Robert Christopher Sadlier, hereby declare as follows:

1.

I am the Deputy Director of the Water Quality Division for

the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). I have been

employed by the TCEQ since 2011, and have served in this capacity

since 2021. As part of my duties, I am responsible for overseeing the

implementation of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in Texas related to

administration of the state's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System permitting program and Section 401 water quality

certifications.

2.

Based on my position, I have personal knowledge and

experience to understand many of the steps the State must undertake

in response to the vacatur of the revised CWA 401 rule.

3.

The water quality of Texas is protected through the policy

of the State of Texas, which is to maintain the quality of water in

the state consistent with the public health and enjoyment, the

propagation and protection of terrestrial and aquatic life, and the

operation of existing industries, taking into consideration the

economic development of the state; to encourage and promote the

development and use of regional and areawide waste collection,

treatment, and disposal systems to serve the waste disposal needs

of the citizens of the state; and to require the use of all reasonable

methods to implement this policy. Texas Water Code § 26.003.

4.

According to the Texas Water Code, the TCEQ is "the agency

with primary responsibility for implementation of water quality

management functions, including enforcement actions, within the

state. Texas Water Code§ 26.0136. Additionally, all waters in Texas

receive protection of their water quality through the Texas Surface

Water Quality Standards in 30 Texas Administrative Code (TAC)

Chapter 307. Specifically, the TCEQ is responsible, in cooperation with

other state agencies, for maintaining water quality in Texas' lakes,

rivers, and streams so that the state's Surface Water Quality

Standards are complied with.

5.

For CWA § 402 permitting, Texas was delegated authority

for the Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (TPDES) in

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1998. Texas had an existing program prior to delegation and we

continue to protect waters in the state through our state

regulations. TCEQ also develops Texas' Water Quality Standards

criteria, monitors and assesses Texas' water resources, manages the

Total Maximum Daily Load program for the State of Texas, and

incorporates federal requirements to ensure the State's permitting

program complies with the Clean Water Act.

6.

The TCEQ is responsible for conducting Clean Water Act

Section 401 certification reviews to ensure that Texas is involved in

decisions made by the federal government that affect the quality of

the water resources of the state. The TCEQ is the lead state agency

that administers the Section 401 certification program in Texas,

except for activities related to oil and gas exploration, development,

and production, which is the responsibility of the Railroad

Commission of Texas. The primary focus of TCEQ's 401 certification

program is reviewing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Section

404 permit applications for the discharge of dredged or fill material

into waters of the United States, including wetlands. The purpose of

the certification reviews is to determine whether a proposed

discharge will comply with the Texas Surface Water Quality

Standards, which are found in 30 TAC Chapter 307. TCEQ state

certifications are governed by 30 TAC Chapter 279.

7.

Under the CWA's certification program, Texas must

review each discharge to a water and certify for all CWA permits

that the discharge will comply with the State's surface water quality

standards. 33 U.S.C. § 134l(a)(l).

8.

For example, Texas is like many of the states in that CWA

§ 404 Dredge and Fill permitting is conducted by the USACE. Anyone

seeking to discharge dredge or fill material into a water subject to

the Rule is required to obtain a permit under Section 404 of the CWA

from USACE. A prerequisite to a 404 permit is a Section 401 water

quality certification.

9.

As a result of the vacatur of the revised CWA 401 rule there

has been confusion in the regulated community in Texas. There has

been concern that 401 certifications provided under the 2020 rule are

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no longer valid. As a result, TCEQ is having to devote significant

resources addressing this issue for individual 401 certifications and

Nationwide Permits issued under the 2020 rule, including responding

to numerous inquiries from the regulated community.

10. TCEQ does have concerns that a third party will try to reopen a case under the revised CWA 401 rule.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is correct.

Executed on this 14th day of December 2021, at Austin, Texas.

_____________________________

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

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In re

CLEAN WATER ACT

RULEMAKING.

This Document Relates to:

ALL ACTIONS.

No. C 20-04636 WHA

No. C 20-04869 WHA

No. C 20-06137 WHA

(Consolidated)

ORDER RE MOTION FOR

REMAND WITHOUT VACATUR

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff states, tribes, and non-profit conservation groups have challenged EPA’s Clean

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Water Act certification rule, and now EPA moves to remand the proceedings without vacatur.

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For the reasons stated, the rule is remanded to the agency with vacatur.

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STATEMENT

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly known as the

23

Clean Water Act, is the primary federal statute regulating water pollution. Congress enacted

24

the Clean Water Act in 1972 — over then-President Nixon’s veto — but the roots of the Act

25

extend much farther back to 1899 and the Rivers and Harbors Act. That statute, often referred

26

to as the Refuse Act, primarily ensured free and open navigability of the waters of the United

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States, but also prohibited the discharge of “refuse matter of any kind or description whatever

28

other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any

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navigable water of the United States,” and authorized the Secretary of the Army to permit such

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discharges under certain conditions. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 407 et seq. In 1948, following an

3

increase an industrialization throughout the country, Congress passed the Federal Water

4

Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). See generally Joel Gross & Kerri Stelcen, Clean Water Act

5

2–7 (2d ed. 2012).

6

In 1969, two events would help foster a new environmental awareness in the United

7

States and prompt the promulgation of amendments to the FWPCA: A catastrophic oil spill of

8

three million gallons of crude off the coast of Santa Barbara (creating a thirty-five-mile slick);

9

and a fire on the surface of the Cuyahoga River in northeast Ohio. A 1968 Kent State

10

University symposium on the state of the Cuyahoga River is worth briefly quoting:

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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The surface is covered with brown oily film observed upstream as

far as the Southerly Plant effluent. In addition, large quantities of

black heavy oil floating in slicks, sometimes several inches thick,

are observed frequently. Debris and trash are commonly caught up

in these slicks forming an unsightly floating mess. Anaerobic

action is common as the dissolved oxygen is seldom above a

fraction of a part per million. The discharge of cooling water

increases the temperature by 10 to 15° F. The velocity is

negligible, and sludge accumulates on the bottom. Animal life

does not exist.

17

The Cuyahoga River Watershed: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Kent State University

18

104 (George D. Cooke, ed., 1969); Gross & Stelcen, supra, at 7; Christine Mai-Duc, The 1969

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Santa Barbara oil spill that changed oil and gas exploration forever, L.A. Times, May 20, 2015,

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https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-barbara-oil-spill-1969-20150520-

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htmlstory.html.

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Three years after these events, Congress passed the Clean Water Act. Section 101 of the

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act expressed Congress’ goal “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological

24

integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The congressional declaration in

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Section 101(b) recited:

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It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect

the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce,

and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use

(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and

water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the

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Section 101(d) charged EPA to administer the act while Section 101(e) explicitly enshrined

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public participation into the statutory scheme:

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Northern District of California

exercise of his authority under this chapter.

Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement

of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program

established by the Administrator or any State under this chapter

shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the

Administrator and the States.

7

Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, a federal agency may not issue a permit or

8

license to an applicant that seeks to conduct any activity that may result in any discharge into

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the navigable waters of the United States unless a state or authorized tribe where the discharge

10

would originate issues a water quality certification or waives the requirement. EPA is

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responsible for the certification by non-authorized tribes or when a discharge would originate

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from lands under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Importantly, “No [federal] license or permit

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shall be granted if certification has been denied by the State, interstate agency, or the

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Administrator, as the case may be.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341; see also Overview of CWA Section

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401 Certification, epa.gov/cwa-401/overview-cwa-section-401-certification (last visited Oct.

16

21, 2021). Several major federal licensing and permitting schemes are subject to Section 401,

17

such as National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under Section 402,

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permits for discharge of dredged or fill material into wetlands under Section 404, Federal

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Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) licenses for hydropower facilities and natural gas

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pipelines, and Rivers and Harbors Act Section Nine and Section Ten permits.

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While EPA has promulgated myriad rules to administer the Clean Water Act, iterations

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of the administrative rule implementing Section 401 had remained, until recently, singular.

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EPA originally promulgated 40 C.F.R. Part 121 to implement water quality certifications for

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Section 21(b) of the FWPCA as it existed in 1971 — a year before the Clean Water Act

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amendments to the FWPCA. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22,487 (Nov. 25, 1971), redesignated at 37 Fed.

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Reg. 21,441 (Oct. 11, 1972), further redesignated at 44 Fed. Reg. 32,899 (June 7, 1979). EPA

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would continue to use this rule for the Section 401 licensing scheme. In brief, 40 C.F.R. Part

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121 as promulgated set out: (i) the minimum procedural content of a certification to facilitate

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EPA’s administrative processes; (ii) the procedures for determining the effects of a license

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upon other, non-certifying states; (iii) the procedures the EPA Administrator employs to certify

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an application for a project under exclusive federal jurisdiction; and (iv) the procedures for

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EPA consultations on obtaining a license or permit. EPA employed this procedure for

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certifications as-is for half a century.

*

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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*

*

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On April 10, 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,868, entitled Promoting

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Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth. 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 10, 2019). The order

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stated: “The United States is blessed with plentiful energy resources, including abundant

10

supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas,” and, the “Federal Government must promote efficient

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permitting processes and reduce regulatory uncertainties that currently make energy

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infrastructure projects expensive and that discourage new investment.” To that end, Executive

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Order 13,868 asserted that “[o]utdated Federal guidance and regulations regarding section 401

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of the Clean Water Act . . . are causing confusion and uncertainty and are hindering the

15

development of energy infrastructure,” and instructed EPA to review and issue new guidance

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regarding Section 401. Id. at 15,496.

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Pursuant to the executive order, EPA revised its general Section 401 guidance in June

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2019. Two months later, EPA published an economic analysis of existing Section 401

19

processes. That same month, in a publication dated August 22, 2019, EPA proposed an

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updated Section 401 certification rule with extensive revisions. After a very active public

21

comment phase, EPA published the final rule in the Federal Register on July 13, 2020. The

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rule went into effect September 11, 2020. See Economic Analysis for the Proposed Clean

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Water Act Section 401 Rulemaking, NEPIS 810R19001A (Aug. 2019); Clean Water Act

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Section 401 Guidance for Federal Agencies, States and Authorized Tribes,

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www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2019-06/documents/cwa_section_401_guidance.pdf (June 7,

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2019); 84 Fed. Reg. 44,080 (Aug. 22, 2019); 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020).

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The new certification rule makes a variety of substantive changes to EPA’s procedures

for implementing Section 401. To state just a few examples, the new rule: (i) narrows the

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scope of certification to ensuring that a discharge from a point source into a water of the

2

United States from a federally licensed or permitted activity will comply with “water quality

3

requirements” — another defined term narrowed to mean applicable provisions of Sections

4

301, 302, 303, 306, and 307 of the Clean Water Act; (ii) authorizes EPA to establish the

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reasonable amount of time for a certifying authority to certify a request; and (iii) authorizes

6

EPA to determine whether a certifying authority’s denial has complied with the rule’s

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procedural requirements, and to deem certifications waived if not. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 121.

8

Plaintiff states, tribes, and non-profit conservation groups, many of which had

9

strenuously objected to these and other changes to the certification rule, began suing, many the

10

same day EPA published the final rule. Three cases eventually arrived before the undersigned

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by August 2020. The new certification rule became effective in September, and by October,

12

eight states and three industry groups intervened as defendants. Then, in November,

13

administrative momentum for the revised certification rule stalled after the election of

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President Biden, who declared his administration’s policy:

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to listen to the science; to improve public health and protect our

environment; to ensure access to clean air and water; to limit

exposure to dangerous chemicals and pesticides; to hold polluters

accountable, including those who disproportionately harm

communities of color and low-income communities; to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions; to bolster resilience to the impacts of

climate change; to restore and expand our national treasures and

monuments; and to prioritize both environmental justice and the

creation of the well-paying union jobs necessary to deliver on these

goals.

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Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate

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Crisis, Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 20, 2021). The administration

23

specifically listed the certification rule as one agency action set to be reviewed, and EPA stated

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its intent to promulgate a new certification rule in a notice published on June 6, 2021. The

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earliest EPA will be able to promulgate a revised rule is Spring 2023 (Goodin Decl. ¶ 27). See

26

86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021); Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review,

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www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-list-of-agency-

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actions-for-review (Jan. 20, 2021).

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EPA now moves to remand for further proceedings without vacatur. Due to plaintiffs’

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oppositions that requested remand with vacatur, intervenor defendants filed a motion to strike,

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which necessitated extra briefing on that matter. After oral argument held telephonically due

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to the COVID-19 pandemic, intervenor defendants were invited to file further briefing on the

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vacatur issue, which they did.

ANALYSIS

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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1.

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Ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are, per Chevron

9

and Brand X, delegations of authority to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion. Under

10

the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a district court reviews a challenged federal agency

11

action to determine whether it is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with

12

law. Per the familiar taxonomy established by SKF USA, an agency typically takes one of five

13

positions when its action is challenged in federal court: (i) it may defend the decision on

14

previously articulated grounds; (ii) it may seek to defend the decision on grounds not

15

previously articulated by the agency; (iii) it may seek remand to reconsider its decision because

16

of intervening events outside the agency’s control; (iv) it may seek remand even absent any

17

intervening events, without confessing error, to reconsider its previous position; and (v) it may

18

seek remand because it believes the original decision was incorrect on the merits and it wishes

19

to change the result. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1027–28 (Fed. Cir. 2001);

20

Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980, 982 (2005);

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Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); Cal. Cmtys.

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Against Toxics v. EPA (CCAT), 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012) (approving SKF USA

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taxonomy); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS FOR REMAND AND VACATUR.

24

An agency thus need not defend a challenged action in a district court and may instead

25

voluntarily request the court to remand the action to the agency for further proceedings. Nor

26

does an agency even need to admit error to justify voluntary remand. “Generally, courts only

27

refuse voluntarily requested remand when the agency’s request is frivolous or made in bad

28

faith.” CCAT, 688 F.3d at 992.

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The deferential standard for reviewing an agency’s request for voluntary remand can

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raise difficult issues when vacatur comes into play. When a district court rules that an agency

3

action is defective due to errors of fact, law, or policy, the APA explicitly instructs that the

4

court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside” the agency action. “This approach enables a

5

reviewing court to correct error but, critically, also avoids judicial encroachment on agency

6

discretion.” 33 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8381

7

(3d ed. 2021); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Nevertheless, our court of appeals has held that, when equity

8

demands, a flawed rule need not be vacated. See CCAT, 688 F.3d at 992. Oftentimes, an

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agency may voluntarily request remand prior to a court’s adjudication of the merits of the

10

disputed action. The caselaw here is unsettled. Leaving an agency action in place while the

11

agency reconsiders may deny the petitioners the opportunity to vindicate their claims in federal

12

court and would leave them subject to a rule they have asserted is invalid. On the other hand,

13

vacatur “of an action may allow an agency to abandon a legislative rule without going through

14

the (extensive) trouble of developing a new one.” Wright & Miller, supra, at § 8383. Our

15

court of appeals has issued the broad guidance — albeit in opinions where the agency action

16

had been found erroneous — that remand without vacatur is appropriate only in limited

17

circumstances. CCAT, 688 F.3d at 994; Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520,

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532 (9th Cir. 2015).

19

Contrasting policy implications have led to a split in authority regarding whether a court

20

may order vacatur without first reaching a determination on the merits of the agency’s action.

21

Compare Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241–42 (D. Colo.

22

2011) (Judge John L. Kane), with Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126,

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135–36 (D.D.C. 2010) (Judge Emmet G. Sullivan). Our court of appeals has not had the

24

opportunity to address this question directly, but its holding that even a flawed rule need not be

25

vacated supports the corollary proposition that a flaw need not be conclusively established to

26

vacate a rule. Other district courts in our circuit have consistently acknowledged they have the

27

authority to vacate agency actions upon remand prior to a final determination of the action’s

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legality. See, e.g., Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, ––– F. Supp. 3d –––, 2021 WL 3855977, at *4

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(D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021) (Judge Rosemary Márquez); All. for Wild Rockies v. Marten, 2018

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WL 2943251, at *2–3 (D. Mont. June 12, 2018) (Judge Dana L. Christensen); N. Coast Rivers

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All. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 2016 WL 8673038, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (Judge

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Lawrence J. O’Neill).

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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This order agrees with the foregoing opinions from district judges within our circuit that,

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when an agency requests voluntary remand, a district court may vacate an agency’s action

7

without first making a determination on the merits. Vacatur is a form of discretionary,

8

equitable relief akin to an injunction. This order finds persuasive the reasoning in Center for

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Native Ecosystems, which explains that “because vacatur is an equitable remedy, and because

10

the APA does not expressly preclude the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, the APA does not

11

preclude the granting of vacatur without a decision on the merits.” 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1241–

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42; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1987); Coal. to

13

Protect Puget Sound Habitat v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 843 Fed. App’x 77, 80

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(9th Cir. 2021).

15

Our court of appeals has applied the familiar Allied-Signal test when considering vacatur

16

of agency actions found to be erroneous, and this order finds the same factors applicable when

17

considering voluntary remand prior to a conclusive decision on the merits. Allied-Signal, Inc.

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v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–151 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under Allied-Signal,

19

the “decision whether to vacate depends on [1] the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and

20

thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive

21

consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” Ibid.; see also CCAT, 688

22

F.3d at 992 (adopting Allied-Signal). Allied-Signal can properly guide a vacatur analysis prior

23

to a merits determination similar to the review of a motion for a preliminary injunction. In

24

fact, the test in Allied-Signal explicitly arose from a preliminary injunction analysis. See Int’l

25

Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967

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(D.C. Cir. 1990).

27

The first prong of Allied-Signal — sometimes abridged in decisions where the court had

28

made a merits determination — considers an agency action’s deficiencies in order to evaluate

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the “extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly.” Conclusive findings of agency error

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are thus sufficient but not necessary for this factor to support vacatur. The first prong may be

3

measured in different ways, including: the extent the agency action contravenes the purposes of

4

the statute in question; whether the same rule could be adopted on remand; and whether the

5

action was the result of reasoned decisionmaking. Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532; Or. Nat. Desert

6

Ass’n v. Zinke, 250 F. Supp. 3d 773, 774 (D. Or. 2017) (Judge Michael Mosman) (citing

7

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314–15 (1982)); Am. Petroleum Inst. v.

8

Johnson, 541 F. Supp. 2d 165, 185 (D.D.C. 2008). Because a district court’s review of an

9

agency’s action begins and ends with the reasoning the agency relied on in making that

10

decision, the final rule and its preamble provide valuable material with which to evaluate

11

whether the agency employed reasoned decisionmaking. See CCAT, 688 F.3d at 993. As for

12

the second prong of Allied-Signal, our court of appeals has engaged in a broad analysis of the

13

potential consequences of vacatur. See id. at 994; Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532–33.

14

15

16

17

2.

EPA AND INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO VACATUR

AND ALLIED-SIGNAL.

Both EPA and intervenor defendants assert that this order cannot and should not consider

whether to vacate the certification rule. Their host of arguments fails to persuade.

18

First, intervenor defendants contend in a separate motion to strike that plaintiffs’

19

arguments for vacatur in their opposition briefing contravenes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

20

7(b), Civil Local Rule 7-1(a), and the undersigned’s standing order (Dkt. No. 148 at 2). An

21

August 2021 order ensured that the parties fully briefed this issue concurrently with EPA’s

22

motion for voluntary remand (Dkt. No. 151). Upon review, this order finds that plaintiffs

23

properly addressed the issue of vacatur. EPA has moved for remand without vacatur. Yet as

24

our court of appeals has explicitly stated, “We order remand without vacatur only in ‘limited

25

circumstances.’” Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532 (quoting CCAT, 688 F.3d at 994). EPA, in fact,

26

quoted CCAT in its opening brief, but neglected to address why the instant action is the

27

exception meriting remand without vacatur or why the default standard of vacatur stated in

28

CCAT should not apply here. EPA cannot avoid the default standard by strategically tailoring

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its briefing and requested relief, and intervenor defendants made a strategic choice not to

2

initially file any briefing on the subject. Intervenor defendants, regardless, were granted the

3

opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the vacatur issue and Allied-Signal (Intervenors

4

Br., Dkt. No. 172). So, they have had the last word. Plaintiffs will not be faulted for

5

addressing the issues that this order must address to render a decision. See also N. Coast

6

Rivers All., 2016 WL 8673038, at *7.

7

Second, EPA and intervenor defendants argue that Allied-Signal is not the proper

8

standard here because there has been no ruling on the merits of the certification rule (Reply Br.

9

6; Intervenors Br. 8–9). As explained, Allied-Signal does not require a merits decision (and, in

10

fact, is based on the standard for a preliminary injunction). Neither EPA nor intervenor

11

defendants, it should be noted, attempt to suggest a substitute for Allied-Signal for our

12

purposes. Intervenor defendants attempt to distinguish Pascua Yaqui Tribe — a recent

13

decision from our sister court that vacated upon remand another EPA rule related to the Clean

14

Water Act — on the ground that the district court had before it the parties’ fully-briefed

15

summary judgment motions (Intervenors Br. 9). But, the court’s opinion did not rule on the

16

parties’ summary judgment motions, which were dismissed without prejudice in the docket

17

entry for the remand order. Pascua Yaqui Tribe, No. C 20-00266, Dkt. No. 99, Aug. 30, 2021.

18

Pascua Yaqui Tribe, in fact, stated that it was not reaching the merits of the agency action:

19

“[I]n the Ninth Circuit, remand with vacatur may be appropriate even in the absence of a

20

merits adjudication. Accordingly, the Court will apply the ordinary test for whether remand

21

should include vacatur.” 2021 WL 3855977, at *4.

22

Third, intervenor defendants state that plaintiffs “fail to provide any severability analysis,

23

which would be mandatory if [p]laintiffs want this Court to vacate the entire Rule” (Intervenors

24

Br. 11, emphasis added). The decision intervenor defendants cite to support this statement,

25

Carlson v. Postal Reg. Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2019), does not necessarily

26

mandate a severability analysis, and this order is not aware of any mandatory authority that

27

requires a severability analysis. Regardless, severance is not required here because, as

28

explained below, this order finds serious deficiencies in an aspect of the certification rule that,

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in EPA’s words, “is the foundation of the final rule and [] informs all other provisions of the

2

final rule.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,256.

3

4

scope of vacatur, citing California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2115 (2021) (see Reply Br. 2 n.

5

2). EPA does not elaborate how a decision regarding standing to challenge the minimum

6

essential coverage requirement of the Affordable Care Act has any bearing on our case here.

7

Citing general statements of law does not warrant additional briefing, nor did EPA raise this

8

request at our hearing after the intervenor defendants were permitted to provide supplemental

9

briefing on the Allied-Signal analysis. This order has considered the proper scope of vacatur.

10

In sum, should remand be justified, this order will duly apply Allied-Signal as described

11

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Fourth, in a footnote in its reply brief, EPA requests additional briefing regarding the

12

13

14

to determine whether vacatur is the appropriate remedy in this dispute.

3.

WHETHER REMAND OF THE CERTIFICATION RULE TO EPA IS

WARRANTED.

This order now considers whether to remand the certification rule back to EPA for further

15

proceedings. EPA says remand is appropriate because the request: (i) is made in good faith

16

and reflects substantial and legitimate concerns with the rule; (ii) supports judicial economy;

17

and (iii) would not cause undue prejudice to the parties (Br. 6–7).

18

Remand in this circuit, as EPA reminds us, is generally only refused when the agency’s

19

request is frivolous or made in bad faith. See CCAT, 688 F.3d at 992. The American Rivers

20

plaintiffs argue EPA’s request is frivolous because “the process EPA has laid out to address

21

[its] concerns does not demonstrate a genuine commitment to a changed rule that will address

22

all of those concerns” (American Rivers Opp. 16). This order notes some support for

23

American Rivers’ argument to deny EPA’s remand request as frivolous due to the fact that the

24

agency wholly omitted addressing vacatur until forced to by plaintiffs’ opposition briefing, but

25

will not deny remand on that basis alone. This order accordingly proceeds to consider the SKF

26

USA taxonomy of positions an agency may take on a challenge to its action.

27

28

EPA asserts that its remand request here falls into the fourth category of actions under

SKF USA — remand to reconsider a decision without confessing error (Br. 8). In this

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situation, an agency “might argue, for example, that it wished to consider further the governing

2

statute, or the procedures that were followed. It might simply state that it had doubts about the

3

correctness of its decision.” For an action with this type of posture, SKF USA advised that a

4

district court has discretion not to remand, but “if the agency’s concern is substantial and

5

legitimate, a remand is usually appropriate.” SKF USA, 254 F.3d at 1029.

6

7

formulation of the certification rule (Br. 2–5). Plaintiffs have not presented evidence or

8

argument sufficient to justify departing from the default rule permitting remand. The

9

certification rule will be remanded to EPA for further proceedings.

10

11

United States District Court

Northern District of California

EPA, as explained below, has certainly expressed substantial concerns with the current

12

13

14

4.

WHETHER VACATUR OF THE CERTIFICATION RULE UPON

REMAND IS WARRANTED.

This order now considers whether the Allied-Signal test supports vacatur upon remand of

the certification rule. Each factor is considered in turn.

A.

THE CERTIFICATION RULE’S DEFICIENCIES.

15

The first Allied-Signal factor considers the seriousness of the rule’s deficiencies, thus

16

evaluating the extent of doubt whether the agency correctly promulgated the rule. See Allied-

17

Signal, 988 F.2d at 150–51. At the hearing, plaintiff states asserted that the most glaring

18

deficiency in the current certification rule is a newly-inserted subsection defining the scope of

19

certification, which they say impinges upon the Clean Water Act’s principles of cooperative

20

federalism. See 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. We start our Allied-Signal analysis with these revisions.

21

In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, the Supreme

22

Court affirmed that Section 401(d) confers on states the power to “consider all state actions

23

related to water quality in imposing conditions on [S]ection 401 certificates.” 511 U.S. 700,

24

710 (1994). The majority recognized that Section 401(a) contemplates state certification that a

25

“discharge” will comply with certain provisions of the Clean Water Act while subsection (d)

26

“expands the State’s authority to impose conditions on the certification of a project” because it

27

“refers to the compliance of the applicant, not the discharge.” Id. at 711. PUD No. 1

28

concluded that Section 401(d) “is most reasonably read as authorizing additional conditions

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and limitations on the activity as a whole once the threshold condition, the existence of a

2

discharge, is satisfied.” Id. at 712.

United States District Court

Northern District of California

3

The revised scope of certification that EPA promulgated takes an antithetical position to

4

PUD No. 1 without reasonably explaining the change. The rule’s scope of certification is

5

“limited to assuring that a discharge from a Federally licensed or permitted activity will

6

comply with water quality requirements,” which the rule limits to Sections 301, 302, 303, 306,

7

and 307 of the Clean Water Act. 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. EPA may, of course, take up different

8

interpretations of Section 401, but a revised rule with unexplained inconsistencies suggests it is

9

an unreasonable interpretation that is not entitled to deference under Chevron. See Encino

10

Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016); Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 892

11

F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2018). EPA does not adequately explain in the preamble how it could

12

so radically depart from what the Supreme Court dubbed the most reasonable interpretation of

13

the statute. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. The certification rule’s preamble tries to address the

14

sharp departure from PUD No. 1 but falls back to claiming that the case was wrongly decided,

15

and eventually sides with Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,231.

16

EPA now undermines that argument itself by declaring its intent to “restore the balance of

17

state, Tribal, and federal authorities consistent with the cooperative federalism principles

18

central to CWA section 401” (Goodin Decl. ¶ 11, emphasis added). The agency’s recognition

19

of its inconsistent interpretation of the scope of the certification compels the conclusion that

20

the current rule is unreasonable. Accordingly, this order harbors significant doubts that EPA

21

correctly promulgated the certification rule due to the apparent arbitrary and capricious

22

changes to the rule’s scope. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013); PUD No.

23

1, 511 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Not a single sentence, phrase, or word in the

24

Clean Water Act purports to place any constraint on a State’s power to regulate the quality of

25

its own waters more stringently than federal law might require.”).

26

Moreover, EPA’s acknowledgment it intends to “restore” the principles of cooperative

27

federalism indicates that the current scope of the certification rule is inconsistent with and

28

contravenes the design and structure of the Clean Water Act, and thus does not warrant

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deference. As noted in the Clean Water Act’s congressional declaration of goals and policy:

2

“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities

3

and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development

4

and use . . . of land and water resources.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b); Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573

5

U.S. 302, 321 (2014). The rule’s inconsistency with the purpose of the statute it interprets also

6

supports vacatur.

7

Next, while EPA does not admit fault, it does signal it will not or could not adopt the

8

same rule upon remand. The scope of certification is not the only problematic aspect of the

9

rule. EPA’s opening brief lists eleven aspects of the certification rule about which it has

10

“substantial concerns.” That list takes up two-and-a-half pages of its twelve-page brief, and

11

includes:

•

“the certification action process steps, including whether there is any

utility in requiring specific components and information for

certifications with conditions and denials; whether it is appropriate for

federal agencies to review certifying authority actions for consistency

with procedural requirements or any other purpose”

•

“enforcement of CWA Section 401, including the roles of federal

agencies and certifying authorities in enforcing certification

conditions”

•

“modifications and ‘reopeners,’ including whether the statutory

language in CWA Section 401 supports modification of certifications

or ‘reopeners,’”

•

21

“application of the Certification Rule, including impacts of the Rule

on processing certification requests, impacts of the Rule on

certification decisions, and whether any major projects are anticipated

in the next few years that could benefit from or be encumbered by the

Certification Rule’s procedural requirements”

22

(Br. 3–5). These are not narrow issues. They address nearly every substantive change

23

introduced in the current rule. Even without admitting error, the scope of potential revisions

24

EPA is considering supports vacatur of the current rule because the agency has demonstrated

25

that it will not or could not adopt the same rule upon remand.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

26

In sum, in light of the lack of reasoned decisionmaking and apparent errors in the rule’s

27

scope of certification, the indications that the rule contravenes the structure and purpose of the

28

Clean Water Act, and that EPA itself has signaled it could not or will not adopt the same rule

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upon remand, significant doubt exists that EPA correctly promulgated the rule. The first

2

Allied-Signal factor supports vacatur of the certification rule.

3

THE DISRUPTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF VACATUR.

4

The second Allied-Signal factor considers the disruptive consequences of vacatur.

5

Intervenor defendants argue that “[r]einstating the prior rule would result in substantial

6

disruption from general whipsawing of both regulators and regulated entities” and raise several

7

hypothetical procedural issues (Intervenors Br. 16, 18). The rule has only been in effect for

8

thirteen months. This is insufficient time for institutional reliance to build up around the

9

current rule, which has been under attack since before day one. This order finds vacatur will

10

not intrude on any justifiable reliance.

11

United States District Court

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B.

Moreover, the whipsawing intervenor defendants would ascribe to vacatur clearly arose

12

from EPA’s promulgation of a revised certification rule that dramatically broke with fifty years

13

of precedent, and subsequent complete course reversal by the agency less than nine months

14

later. EPA asserted in a June 2021 notice that it will not reinstate wholesale the previous

15

certification rule from 1971 (Goodin Decl. ¶ 13). However, EPA’s statements here that it will

16

“restore” the principles of cooperative federalism and that it plans to address nearly every

17

substantive change the current certification rule introduced suggest vacatur will prove less

18

disruptive than leaving the current rule in place until Spring 2023.

19

Our court of appeals has measured the disruptive consequences of vacating an EPA rule

20

by measuring the extent to which a faulty rule could result in possible environmental harm. To

21

that end, our court of appeals has chosen not to vacate an EPA rule when setting aside listing

22

of a snail species as endangered would have risked potential extinction of that species, and

23

when vacating could have, in part, led to air pollution that would undermine the goals of the

24

Clean Air Act. On the other hand, our court of appeals did vacate an EPA action that could

25

have affected sensitive bee populations. See Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532–33 (bees); CCAT, 688

26

F.3d at 994 (air); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1995)

27

(snails).

28

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Plaintiffs have established that significant environmental harms will likely transpire

2

should remand occur without vacatur. This order finds particularly persuasive the State of

3

Washington’s example concerning three hydropower dams on the Skagit River. These dams

4

will each require Section 401 certifications prior to EPA’s promulgation of a replacement for

5

the current certification rule. As noted in the State of Washington’s brief, “because FERC

6

licenses for dams will last between 30–50 years, the lack of adequate water quality conditions

7

attached to these licenses will have adverse impacts for a generation” (States Opp. 7). As

8

Loree’ Randall, Washington’s Section 401 Policy Lead, explains, the new certification rule

9

curtails restrictions certifying authorities can impose on dams to limit increases in water

10

temperature. The threatened Chinook salmon that reside in the Skagit River are vulnerable to

11

these changes in water temperature, which puts at risk a primary food source for the

12

endangered Southern Resident Orca population in Puget Sound, of which there are currently

13

only seventy-three, the lowest number in over four decades (Randall Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10–11).

14

Intervenor defendants argue that overreach by certifying authorities under the old rule led

15

to negative economic effects, pointing to several energy projects that failed or had additional

16

restrictions placed upon them (Intervenors Br. 4). This order duly considers the economic

17

effects of vacatur — and temporary reinstatement of the previous rule — but notes that our

18

court of appeals has focused more on environmental consequences when considering whether

19

to vacate EPA rules, and the Clean Water Act has the express goal “to restore and maintain the

20

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

21

Progress towards this goal carries inherent economic effects. This order finds the disruptive

22

environmental effects should remand occur without vacatur described by plaintiffs outweighs

23

the disruptive economic consequences of vacatur described by intervenor defendants. The

24

economic harms intervenor defendants proffer also do not outweigh the significant doubts that

25

EPA correctly promulgated the current certification rule. See Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532;

26

CCAT, 688 F.3d at 994; Zinke, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 775; Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v.

27

Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1242–43 (N.D. Cal. 2015)

28

(Judge Nathanael M. Cousins). This order finds the second Allied-Signal factor supports

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vacatur because the disruptions caused by vacatur and the imposition of an interim rule do not

2

outweigh the deficiencies of the current rule.

3

Finally, EPA and intervenor defendants have cited several cases that also reviewed the

4

certification rule (Reply Br. 2). This order considers the analysis in each of these opinions, to

5

the extent they seriously and substantively examined remand and vacatur, but ultimately finds

6

Pascua Yaqui Tribe, an opinion on another EPA rule with the most thorough analysis, to be the

7

most persuasive. 2021 WL 3855977. In that opinion, Judge Rosemary Márquez of our circuit

8

vacated EPA’s rule that narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” upon remand

9

to the agency. In two of the decisions EPA cited here, Judge Richard Seeborg of our district

10

filed short orders remanding to EPA challenges to the rule at issue in Pascua Yaqui Tribe,

11

finding the issue of vacatur moot (Dkt. No. 161). See California v. Regan, No. C 20-03005

12

RS, Dkt. No. 271 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021); WaterKeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, No. C 18-03521

13

RS, Dkt. No. 125 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021). In dicta, both brief orders stated the court would

14

have been disinclined to impose vacatur. Both orders, however, based that conclusion on a

15

previous order that denied a motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiffs

16

were unlikely to succeed on the merits proving the rule was legally erroneous. See California

17

v. Regan, No. C 20-03005 RS, Dkt. No. 171 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2020). These orders,

18

accordingly, premised their disinclination to impose vacatur on an issue evaluated by the first

19

Allied-Signal prong, which here supports vacatur.

20

In sum, the Allied-Signal factors support vacatur of the certification rule upon remand to

21

EPA, which will result in a temporary return to the rule previously in force until Spring 2023,

22

when EPA finalizes a new certification rule. See Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th

23

Cir. 2005).

CONCLUSION

24

25

26

As explained, the motion for remand is GRANTED. Upon remand the current certification

rule, 40 C.F.R. Part 121, is VACATED.

27

28

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Intervenor defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. No. 148) is DENIED. Being unnecessary for

2

the resolution of this motion, EPA’s request for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 157) is DENIED AS

3

MOOT.

4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5

6

Dated: October 21, 2021.

7

8

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9

10

United States District Court

Northern District of California

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6

7

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

8

9

10

In re

United States District Court

Northern District of California

11

CLEAN WATER ACT

RULEMAKING.

12

13

This Document Relates to:

14

ALL ACTIONS.

No. C 20-04636 WHA

No. C 20-04869 WHA

No. C 20-06137 WHA

(Consolidated)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

STAY PENDING APPEAL

15

16

17

INTRODUCTION

18

Intervenor defendants move for a stay of the order vacating and remanding EPA’s Clean

19

Water Act Section 401 certification rule pending appeal. Intervenors’ arguments on the merits

20

and irreparable harm provide lukewarm support for a stay. On the other side, a stay would

21

substantially injure plaintiffs and does not align with the public interest. The motion is

22

DENIED.

23

STATEMENT

24

The previous order at issue here describes our facts (Dkt. No. 173). In brief, Congress

25

enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly referred to

26

as the Clean Water Act, with the express goal “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,

27

and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Relevant here, under

28

Section 401 of the act, a federal agency may not issue a permit or license to an applicant that

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seeks to conduct any activity that may result in any discharge into the navigable waters of the

2

United States unless the state where the discharge would originate issues a water quality

3

certification or waives the requirement. Authorized tribes and EPA can also act as certifying

4

entities. Notably: “No license or permit shall be granted if certification has been denied by the

5

State, interstate agency, or the Administrator [of the EPA], as the case may be.” 33 U.S.C. §

6

1341(a)(1). Section 401 certifications are required for certain permits issued by, for example,

7

the Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

United States District Court

Northern District of California

8

EPA employed 40 C.F.R. Part 121 to administer Section 401 certifications, which the

9

agency had promulgated a year prior to the Clean Water Act to regulate water quality

10

certifications pursuant to Section 21(b) of the FWPCA. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22,487 (Nov. 25,

11

1971), redesignated at 37 Fed. Reg. 21,441 (Oct. 11, 1972), redesignated at 44 Fed. Reg.

12

32,899 (June 7, 1979). EPA utilized this regulation unchanged for half a century. This order

13

will refer to this certification rule as the 1971 rule.

14

On September 11, 2020, EPA revised 40 C.F.R. Part 121 in accordance with President

15

Trump’s Executive Order 13,868, which asserted that the “Federal Government must promote

16

efficient permitting processes and reduce regulatory uncertainties that currently make energy

17

infrastructure projects expensive and that discourage new investment.” 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495

18

(Apr. 15, 2019); see also 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020). The revised Section 401

19

certification rule — which this order will refer to as the 2020 rule — parted ways with the

20

1971 rule in dramatic fashion. This led to challenges to the rule by our plaintiff states, tribes,

21

and non-profit conservation groups. Those actions eventually consolidated before the

22

undersigned.

23

In October 2020, eight states and three industry groups intervened as defendants. But the

24

election of President Biden in November shifted the course of this litigation. On January 20,

25

2021, Executive Order 13,990 revoked Executive Order 13,868. The Biden administration also

26

specifically listed the 2020 rule as one agency action it planned to review. Five months later,

27

on June 2, 2021, EPA noticed its intent to revise the 2020 rule. EPA expects to finalize the

28

new certification rule by Spring 2023. 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 25, 2021); 86 Fed. Reg. 29,541

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(June 2, 2021); Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review,

2

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-list-of-

3

agency-actions-for-review/ (Jan. 20, 2021).

4

Less than a month after EPA announced it would revise the 2020 rule, the agency, in this

5

action, moved for remand of the rule without vacatur (Dkt. No. 143). Plaintiffs, opposing the

6

motion, argued that the 2020 rule should be vacated upon remand to the agency. Intervenors,

7

who had chosen not to file any briefing on EPA’s motion up to that point, filed a reply brief

8

arguing for remand without vacatur and separately moved to strike plaintiffs’ vacatur

9

arguments (Dkt. Nos. 148, 155). After a hearing on the motions, intervenors were offered the

10

opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the vacatur issue, which they did (Dkt. No. 172).

11

An October 2021 order vacated and remanded the 2020 rule (Vacatur Order, Dkt. No.

12

173). EPA has stated it will not appeal the vacatur order. Intervenors, however, now move for

13

a stay of the vacatur order pending their own appeal. To expedite the hearing on this motion,

14

defendants waived their reply briefing. This order follows oral argument held telephonically

15

due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

ANALYSIS

16

17

18

Under the traditional test for a stay pending appeal, a district court considers four factors:

20

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay

will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

21

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009); see also Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999,

22

1006–07 (9th Cir. 2020).

19

23

Our court of appeals has instructed that we weigh these factors using a flexible, sliding-

24

scale approach, under which “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing

25

of another.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). The first two

26

factors are the most critical. The mere possibility of success or irreparable injury are

27

insufficient. A movant must show “at a minimum, that she has a substantial case for relief on

28

the merits.” Id. at 964, 967–68. Irreparable harm carries a higher standard: a movant must

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demonstrate irreparable harm is probable, not merely possible. We consider the final two

2

factors — which tend to merge when the government is an opposing party — once a movant

3

satisfies the first two. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435; United States v. Mitchell, 971 F.3d 993, 996 (9th

4

Cir. 2020). If a petition raises at least a serious question going to the merits, the other factors

5

can be satisfied by a showing that the balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor.

6

Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 970.

7

This order will proceed through the stay factors in a moment, but offers this overview.

8

On the one hand, allowing the 1971 rule to remain in effect will give certifying entities greater

9

latitude to prescribe more conditions. This would harm those who wish to be free of further

10

requirements, such as our intervenor defendants. On the other hand, should we allow the 2020

11

rule to remain in effect, those certifying entities that wish to impose more conditions on

12

Section 401 certifications will lose the opportunity to do so. This would result in harm to

13

them. We face a crossroads where one side or the other will suffer some harm, no matter what.

14

But harm is one thing, irreparable harm another. Certifying entities that dislike more

15

conditions can simply choose not to impose additional conditions. And, a party saddled with

16

unwanted conditions can sue in district court if presented with a flawed certification process.

17

These considerations mitigate some potential harms. Ultimately, when it comes to mitigating

18

harm, prudence favors maintaining the course EPA has charted the past fifty years under the

19

1971 rule, the devil we know, rather than the devil we don’t.

20

With these overarching points in mind, this order considers each factor in turn.

21

1.

22

We start with whether intervenors can make a “strong showing” of success on the merits.

SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.

23

In light of the irreparable harm considerations previewed above, this order notes intervenors

24

need to make a commensurably stronger showing for the first factor. Intervenors assert they

25

are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal of the vacatur order based on two issues: (1)

26

whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires a complete administrative record

27

and full briefing on the merits before a reviewing court may set aside an agency action; and (2)

28

whether the vacatur order correctly applied the Allied-Signal test (Br. 9–18). This order

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questions whether intervenors have made a sufficient showing to justify a stay based on either

2

issue.

3

VACATUR PRIOR TO FULL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS.

4

Intervenors argue nothing in the APA “authorizes a court to set aside federal agency

5

action without making the predicate finding that the action was unlawful, and that decision

6

must be based on a review of the agency’s record” (Br. 10). Further, intervenors argue that the

7

vacatur order “relied chiefly on the reasoning in Center for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795

8

F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241–42 (D. Colo. 2011),” which they assert is flawed in several ways (Br.

9

11–13).

10

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A.

To start, intervenors’ statutory argument picks and chooses parts of the vacatur order to

11

criticize, garbling the order’s reasoning in the process. The vacatur order began with the

12

APA’s mandate that a district court “shall . . . set aside” unlawful agency actions (Vacatur

13

Order 7, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). Despite this directive, our court of appeals has repeatedly

14

held that, when equity demands, a flawed rule need not be vacated. See Pollinator

15

Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2015); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA

16

(CCAT), 688 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2012). Relying on these opinions, the order explained that our

17

court of appeals’ “holding that even a flawed rule need not be vacated supports the corollary

18

proposition that a flaw need not be conclusively established to vacate a rule” (Vacatur Order

19

7). In other words, because federal courts have the equitable power to refrain from vacating an

20

unlawful rule despite the express requirement a court set it aside in the APA, federal courts a

21

priori retain the equitable power to vacate rules prior to a conclusive finding on the merits in

22

procedural postures such as motions for voluntary remand. Nowhere in their briefing do

23

intervenors grapple with these cases or this analysis. Moreover, as plaintiffs note: “Singular

24

equitable relief is commonplace in APA cases.” East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993

25

F.3d 640, 681 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).

26

Intervenors proceed to state general principles of law that could support their position.

27

They assert that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity “must be strictly construed,” and

28

recite the semantic canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Br. 10, citing Dep’t of the Army

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v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)). But how do these broad legal concepts apply to

2

the analysis in the vacatur order, or undermine CCAT and Pollinator? Intervenors do not say.

3

See also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982) (stating the broad tenet that

4

“a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied”).

5

Intervenors go on to assert the vacatur order did not acknowledge cases like Carpenters

6

Industry Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2010) — which held the APA

7

precludes vacatur absent a conclusive judicial finding — or the policy concern that pre-merits

8

vacatur would permit an agency to repeal a rule without public notice and comment (Br. 11).

9

But the vacatur order expressly cited Carpenters Industry Council and the relevant section of

10

the Wright & Miller treatise regarding the conflicting policy implications of vacatur (Vacatur

11

Order 7). The order did not build its consideration of vacatur out of whole cloth. It cited

12

precedent from our court of appeals recognizing analogous equitable powers as well as

13

decisions by district court judges in our circuit supporting the vacatur order’s position (Vacatur

14

Order 7–8). Nor did the order ignore the policy concern that intervenors discuss. Rather, it

15

found more pertinent the competing concern that, “[l]eaving an agency action in place while

16

the agency reconsiders may deny the petitioners the opportunity to vindicate their claims in

17

federal court and would leave them subject to a rule they have asserted is invalid” (ibid).

18

19

Intervenors then attempt to distinguish Native Ecosystems, which held district courts may

vacate agency actions prior to a merits determination.

20

First, intervenors distinguish Native Ecosystems on the ground that, unlike here, the

21

agency had confessed error (Br. 11). This factual difference makes the reasoning in Native

22

Ecosystems regarding per-merits vacatur no less applicable. Moreover, this argument simply

23

puts a different spin on intervenors’ contention there must be some sort of conclusive statement

24

regarding unlawfulness in order to set aside an agency action. The vacatur order examined and

25

rejected that theory. Moreover, as explained below, step one of the Allied-Signal test does not

26

require any definitive statement on the merits. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.

27

Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

28

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Second, intervenors contend the law review article relied upon by Native Ecosystems

2

addressed remand without vacatur, not pre-merits vacatur (Br. 11–12, citing Ronald M. Levin,

3

“Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53

4

Duke L.J. 291 (2003)). Professor Levin’s article did indeed focus on remand without vacatur,

5

but the equitable principles it considered are readily applicable to the issues here, as Native

6

Ecosystems notes. See Native Ecosystems, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 n. 8. Professor Levin’s

7

article, in fact, began with a discussion of our court of appeals’ decision Idaho Farm Bureau

8

Federation v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995), which both CCAT and Pollinator

9

expressly rely upon. Levin, supra, at 294.

10

Third, intervenors fault Native Ecosystems for not addressing “whether pre-adjudication

11

vacatur has any analog in the precedent of the English High Court of Chancery” (Br. 12, citing

12

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318, 332 (1999)).

13

The argument goes no further than stating Grupo Mexicano’s holding. Intervenors provide no

14

analysis. Nor do they connect the dots back to the vacatur order. Intervenors do not

15

sufficiently raise this argument for this order to evaluate its merit.

16

Fourth, intervenors argue that Native Ecosystems “did not confront the settled principle

17

that equity cannot be invoked to evade limits imposed by law” (Br. 12, citing Porter v. Warner

18

Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1946)). Once again, intervenors’ point is lost given it

19

fails to consider the vacatur order’s analysis of CCAT or the order’s citation to other

20

corroborating caselaw.

21

As explained, intervenors assert many arguments regarding pre-merits vacatur. The

22

vacatur order itself recognized that the law on this issue is unsettled and that difficult questions

23

arise when vacatur comes into play in an agency’s motion for voluntary remand (Vacatur

24

Order 7). But intervenors neither substantively address the reasoning in the vacatur order, nor

25

proffer new arguments beyond those considered and rejected in the order. Even EPA, which

26

does not fully endorse the vacatur order’s analysis, concludes that intervenors do not “fully

27

grapple” with the complexities here (EPA Opp. 4 n. 3). This order doubts whether intervenors

28

have made a sufficiently strong showing of their likelihood of success on appeal of this issue.

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B.

THE ALLIED-SIGNAL ANALYSIS.

The vacatur order applied the familiar Allied-Signal test when considering EPA’s remand

3

motion (Vacatur Order 8). Under Allied-Signal, the “decision whether to vacate depends on

4

[1] the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency

5

chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be

6

changed.” Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150–51 (quotation omitted). Intervenors argue the

7

vacatur order erroneously applied Allied-Signal. We start with Allied-Signal step one.

8

First, intervenors recapitulate their primary equitable-powers argument, saying that

9

review of the first Allied-Signal factor “can only logically occur after a court has concluded

10

that a legal error has occurred” (Br. 13). But, as the vacatur order noted, in full context, the

11

first factor considers “the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly.” This analysis

12

can be performed without a conclusive decision on the merits. Remember, Allied-Signal arose

13

from a traditional preliminary injunction analysis (Vacatur Order 8–9). Intervenors do not

14

address this reasoning.

15

Second, intervenors contend the vacatur order’s failure to conduct a severability analysis

16

constituted error. The vacatur order deemed severance unnecessary because it found “serious

17

deficiencies in an aspect of the certification rule that, in EPA’s words, ‘is the foundation of the

18

final rule and [] informs all other provisions of the final rule’” (Vacatur Order 10–11, citing 85

19

Fed. Reg. at 42,256). Intervenors assert here that severance should have occurred because

20

“[s]everal of the procedural portions of the rule merely codif[ied] what federal courts have held

21

the Clean Water Act requires,” and that just because the “scope of certification provision may

22

have been a ‘foundation’ for other parts of the rule does not mean those parts are not

23

severable” (Br. 17). Intervenors demand a provision-by-provision review to salvage

24

procedural portions of the rule that remained in force anyway. As our court of appeals

25

reminds, “we ordinarily do not attempt, even with the assistance of agency counsel, to fashion

26

a valid regulation from the remnants of the old rule.” East Bay Sanctuary, 993 F.3d at 681

27

(quotation omitted).

28

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Third, intervenors assert the vacatur order’s analysis of PUD No. 1 was erroneous (Br.

2

15–16, citing PUD No. 1of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994)).

3

The arguments intervenors proffer here are substantially similar to those considered by the

4

order. As explained in the order, EPA can change its interpretation of Section 401 and revise

5

the certification rule accordingly. But, for the 2020 rule, the agency embraced an

6

interpretation of the scope of Section 401 antithetical to the 1971 rule — which was consistent

7

with what PUD No. 1 deemed the most reasonable interpretation of the statute. It matters that

8

EPA did not merely assert a different interpretation but a contrary interpretation. As noted,

9

unexplained inconsistencies in an agency’s revisions to a rule indicate the new interpretation is

10

unreasonable and not entitled to Chevron deference (Vacatur Order 12–13). EPA failed to

11

sufficiently justify the inconsistent revisions in the 2020 rule. Without more, intervenors’

12

argument here remains unconvincing.

13

Fourth, intervenors argue the vacatur order erred by considering EPA’s declaration in

14

support of its remand motion (see Br. 16, citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196

15

(1947)). EPA’s declaration asserted that the agency harbored substantial doubts regarding

16

nearly every aspect of the 2020 rule and that it would “restore” principles of cooperative

17

federalism in its new rulemaking (Dkt. No. 143-1). The vacatur order does not run afoul of

18

Chenery by noting EPA’s opinion of the grounds upon which it based the 2020 rule. The order

19

properly focused on the final rule and its preamble (Vacatur Order 13–14). Upon a motion for

20

voluntary remand, moreover, evaluations of remand and vacatur do not occur in isolation from

21

one another. See, e.g., Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. EPA, 791 Fed. App’x 653, 656

22

(9th Cir. 2019); Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532–33; CCAT, 688 F.3d at 993–94.

23

Turning to step two of Allied-Signal, intervenors contend the vacatur order failed to

24

consider the level of disruption returning to the 1971 rule would cause. As explained in our

25

framing discussion above and in the proceeding irreparable harm analysis, this speculative

26

argument does not convince. Intervenors also insist the vacatur order erred when it concluded

27

that insufficient time had elapsed since promulgation of the 2020 rule to justify any

28

institutional reliance on it (Br. 18). Intervenors’ reference to implementation documents for

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the 2020 rule do not demonstrate reliance. Intervenors also cite FERC’s rulemaking that

2

aligned its one-year deadline for certifications with the 2020 rule (Br. 18). But, as plaintiffs

3

point out, FERC explicitly disavowed the notion that it premised its rulemaking on the 2020

4

rule. See 86 Fed. Reg. 16,298, 16,299 n. 9 (Mar. 29, 2021). The 2020 rule was in effect for

5

thirteen months — and under attack since before day one — too brief and unsettled a time for

6

justifiable reliance to build up.

7

This order doubts whether intervenors have made a sufficiently strong showing on their

8

likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal of the vacatur order’s Allied-Signal analysis.

9

In sum, intervenors have not made particularly strong showings of their likelihood of

10

success on the merits. It bears emphasizing here th

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