Application — Louisiana, et al., Applicants v. American Rivers, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2022
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No. ______
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;
STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF TEXAS;
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,
APPLICANTS,
v.
AMERICAN RIVERS; MICHAEL S. REGAN; and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS.
APPENDIX TO APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
VOLUME IV OF IV
On Application For Stay, Or, In The Alternative, On Petition For A Writ Of
Certiorari To The U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
To the Honorable Elena Kagan
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
and Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower
951 East Byrd Street
Richmond, VA 23219
(804) 788-8262
(804) 788-8218 (fax)
gsibley@huntonak.com
DEIDRE G. DUNCAN
ERICA N. PETERSON
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
SEAN T.H. DUTTON
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
(312) 759-1939 (fax)
misha.tseytlin@troutman.com
TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
1001 Haxall Point,
15th Floor
Richmond, VA 23219
Attorneys for Applicants
[Additional counsel on following page.]
CLARE ELLIS
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
50 California Street
Suite 1700
San Francisco, CA 94111
Attorneys for Applicants American
Petroleum Institute and Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,
SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,
DEPUTY SOLICITOR
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6739
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov
stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov
CHARLES SENSIBA
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
401 9th Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004-2146
ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
Three Embarcadero Center
Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94111-4057
Attorneys for Applicant National
Hydropower Association
Attorneys for Applicant State of
Louisiana
JAMES KASTE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
109 State Capitol
Cheyenne, WY 82002
Additional Counsel:
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General of Montana
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General of Arkansas
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of Mississippi
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of West Virginia
ERIC SCHMITT
Attorney General of Missouri
Attorneys for Applicants
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume I
Order Regarding Motion to Relate, ECF No. 23, In re Clean Water
Act Rulemaking, No.3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 08, 2020) ................. App. 1
Motion to Intervene by the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, ECF No. 27, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-JSC (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 28, 2020) ....................................................................................................... App. 2
Order Relating to Case No.20-04869, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 02, 2020)
............................................................................................................................. App. 95
Declaration of Robin Rorick for the American Petroleum Institute In
Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support of Defendants,
ECF No.56-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA;
3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ................................................. App. 96
Declaration of Joan Dreskin for the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America In Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support
of Defendants, ECF No. 56-2, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. September 04,
2020) .................................................................................................................. App. 105
Order Granting Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 62, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2020)................................................................................................... App. 115
First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020) .................. App. 116
Joint Case Management Statement, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water
Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA;
3:20-cv-06137 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020) ........................................................... App. 148
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 96, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 30, 2020) .................................................................................................... App. 165
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 98, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-06137-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 02, 2020) ................................................................................................... App. 197
Order Regarding Proposed Timeline For Administrative Record Completion,
ECF No. 116, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020) .................................................................................. App. 224
Order Regarding Joint Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance, ECF
No. 132, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021) ................................................................................. App. 225
EPA’S Motion for Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 143, In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
July 01, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 226
Volume II
Plaintiff’s Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 145, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 244
Plaintiff States’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 146, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 267
Declaration of Eileen Sobeck in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion
for Remand, ECF No. 146-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021).......................................... App. 299
American Rivers’ Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 147, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 424
EPA’s Reply In Support Of Motion For Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 153, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 450
Intervenor Defendants’ Reply In Support Of Motion To Strike, ECF No. 155,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
August 19, 2021) ............................................................................................... App. 473
- ii -
Volume III
Intervenor Defendants’ Supplemental Brief On Allied-Signal Factors,
ECF No. 172, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2021) ..................................................................................... App. 478
August 2, 2021, Letter Comments From American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers, et al., Regarding Section 401 Rule, ECF No. 172-1,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 04, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 497
Declaration Of David M.S. Dewhirst, ECF No. 172-2, In re Clean Water
Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 04, 2021) ............. App. 549
Order Regarding Motion to Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 173,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 21, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 552
Final Judgment, ECF No. 176, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2021) ......................................... App. 570
Intervenor Defendants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 179,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 17, 2021) ................................................................................................... App. 571
Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 191, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 07, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 612
Intervenor National Hydropower Association’s Notice of Motion &
Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ........................................ App. 626
American Petroleum Institute and Interstate Natural Gas of America’s
Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) .................. App. 638
Order Granting Intervention, ECF No. 113, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. October 09, 2020) .............. App. 666
- iii -
Volume IV
Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants’ and Intervenors-Appellants’
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 20, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. December 15, 2021)............................... App. 667
Federal Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Intervenor Defendants/
Appellants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 26, In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 11, 2022) ............... App. 757
Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Appellate
Jurisdiction, ECF No. 33, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 19, 2022) ....................................................... App. 783
Order Denying Stay, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. February 24, 2022) ...................................................... App. 799
- iv -
Case: 21-16958, 12/15/2021, ID: 12317167, DktEntry: 20, Page 1 of 90
No. 21-16958
In the United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: CLEAN WATER ACT RULEMAKING
AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS
UNITED; COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER; SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE
PAIUTE TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE
WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF
COLORADO; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE
OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE OF MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF MAINE; and
STATE OF ILLINOIS,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,
v.
ANDREW R. WHEELER and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
DEFENDANTS,
and
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,
INTERVENORS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
AND
STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;
STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; and STATE OF
TEXAS,
INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS.
On Appeals from the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California
Case Nos. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA, -04869-WHA, -06137-WHA
The Honorable William H. Alsup, Judge
INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS’ AND
INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY PENDING
APPEAL
[Counsel Listed On Following Pages]
- App. 667 -
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No. 21-16958
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower
951 East Byrd Street
Richmond, VA 23219
(804) 788-8262
(804) 788-8218 (fax)
gsibley@huntonak.com
dduncan@huntonak.com
MISHA TSEYTLIN
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON
SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe Street,
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
(312) 759-1939 (fax)
misha.tseytlin@troutman.com
DIERDRE G. DUNCAN
ERICA N. PETERSON
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 955-1932
epeterson@huntonak.com
CHARLES SENSIBA
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON
SANDERS LLP
401 9th Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004-2146
(202) 274-2850
(202) 274-2994 (fax)
charles.sensiba@troutman.com
CLARE ELLIS
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
50 California Street
Suite 1700
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 975-3708
(415) 975-3701 (fax)
cellis@huntonak.com
Attorneys for IntervenorDefendants-Appellants
American Petroleum Institute
and Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America
- App. 668 -
ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON
SANDERS LLP
Three Embarcadero Center
Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94111-4057
(415) 477-5700
(415) 477-5710 (fax)
elizabeth.andrews@troutman
.com
Attorneys for Intervenor
Defendant-Appellant National
Hydropower Association
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No. 21-16958
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,
SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,
DEPUTY SOLICITOR
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6739
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov
stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov
JAMES KASTE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
OFFICE
109 State Capitol
Cheyenne, WY 82002
(307) 777-7895 (phone)
(307) 777-3542 (fax)
james.kaste@wyo.gov
Attorneys for Intervenor
Defendant-Appellant State of
Louisiana
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General of Arkansas
Additional Counsel:
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of
Mississippi
ERIC SCHMITT
Attorney General of Missouri
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General of Montana
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of
Virginia
- App. 669 -
West
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), American
Petroleum Institute states that it has no parent corporation and no
publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.
Dated: December 15, 2021
/s/ George P. Sibley, III
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America states that it has no parent
corporation and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.
Dated: December 15, 2021
/s/ George P. Sibley, III
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), National
Hydropower Association states that it has no parent corporation and no
publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.
Dated: December 15, 2021
/s/ Misha Tseytlin
MISHA TSEYTLIN
- App. 670 -
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 2
A. Clean Water Act ............................................................................ 2
B. Certain States Abused Their Section 401 Certification
Authority ....................................................................................... 3
C. EPA Adopts The Section 401 Certification Rule ......................... 4
D. This Lawsuit And The Order Vacating The Rule ....................... 6
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 8
I. This Court Should Stay The District Court’s Vacatur Decision
Pending Appeal ................................................................................. 8
A. Intervenors Are Likely—Indeed, Certain—To Succeed On
The Merits Of Their Appeal ......................................................... 9
1. The APA Requires A Complete Administrative Record
And Full Briefing On The Merits Before A Reviewing
Court May Set Aside Agency Action ....................................... 9
2. The District Court’s Application Of The Allied-Signal
Factors Was Erroneous .......................................................... 14
B. Intervenors Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent A Stay,
While Neither Plaintiffs Nor the Public Will Suffer Harm
If This Court Grants A Stay ....................................................... 19
II. This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction .......................................... 25
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 28
- App. 671 -
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
OTHER CASES
Al Otro Lado v. Wolf
952 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2020) .................................................................. 8
Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC
643 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .......................................................... 4, 17
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ...................................................... passim
Alsea Valley All. v. Dep’t of Commerce
358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) .................................................. 26, 27, 28
Am. Ironworks v. N. Am. Constr.
248 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................ 26
Beveridge v. City of Spokane
No. 20-35848, 2021 WL 3082003 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021) ................. 26
Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. U.S. EPA
688 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 16
Califano v. Yamasaki
442 U.S. 682 (1979) .............................................................................. 25
Carlson v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n
938 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 15, 17
City of Milwaukee v. Ill. & Mich.
451 U.S. 304 (1981) ................................................................................ 3
Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .............................................................. 20
Crow Indian Tribe v. United States
965 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2020) .......................................................... 26, 28
- ii - App. 672 -
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Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham
640 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011) ............................................................ 22
Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.
525 U.S. 255 (1999) .............................................................................. 10
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden
993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2021) ................................................................ 17
Gill v. Whitford
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) .......................................................................... 25
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell
424 U.S. 366 (1976) .............................................................................. 21
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. All. Bond Fund
527 U.S. 308 (1999) .............................................................................. 13
Harmon v. Thornburgh
878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) .............................................................. 17
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC
913 F.3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .............................................................. 4
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe
794 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 22
Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States
476 F. Supp. 3d 1323 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2020) ....................................... 19
Lair v. Bullock
697 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 8
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages
423 U.S. 276 (1976) .............................................................................. 20
Montes v. United States
37 F.3d 1347 (9th Cir. 1994) .................................................... 25, 26, 27
N. Mariana Islands v. United States
686 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2009) .......................................................... 20
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N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
No. 4:19-cv-44, Dkt. 131-1:¶14 (D. Mont. Apr. 27, 2020) ................... 22
N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC
884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018) ............................................................. 4, 17
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’cns Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.
545 U.S. 967 (2005) .............................................................................. 16
Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Salazar
660 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2009) .......................................................... 12
Pac. Rivers Council v. Shepard
No. 03:11-CV-00442-HU, 2011 WL 7562961 (D. Or. Sept.
29, 2011) ............................................................................................... 12
Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.
446 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006) .......................................................... 26, 27
Phillip Morris USA Inc. v Scott
561 U.S. 1301 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers) ................................... 22
Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv.
615 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010) ........................................................ 27, 28
Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S. EPA
806 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................... 10, 13, 14
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology
511 U.S. 700 (1994) .......................................................................... 7, 16
Regan v. Time, Inc.
468 U.S. 641 (1984) .............................................................................. 17
Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC
588 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ............................................................ 12
Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc.
402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ................................................ 10
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Skagit Cty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Shalala
80 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................ 27, 28
Texas v. EEOC
933 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2019) ................................................................ 20
Texas v. U.S. EPA
829 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 23
Transp. Div. of the Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, &
Transp. Workers v. Fed. R.R. Admin.
988 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) .............................................................. 20
Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C. v. U.S. FDA
16 F.4th 1130 (5th Cir. 2021) .............................................................. 23
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson
No. 21-463, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2021 WL 5855551 (Dec. 10,
2021) ..................................................................................................... 14
FEDERAL STATUTES
5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c), 551(5) ................................................................... 20
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) ............................................................................... passim
28 U.S.C. § 1291........................................................................................ 25
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) ..................................................................................... 3
Clean Water Act ............................................................................... passim
Administrative Procedure Act ......................................................... passim
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (Oct. 16, 1972) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. § 1341) ............................................................................... 3
Judiciary Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73) ............................................................... 13
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, 84
Stat. 91, 108 (Apr. 3, 1970) .................................................................... 3
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OTHER AUTHORITIES
40 C.F.R. § 121.1 ......................................................................................... 5
40 C.F.R. § 121.2 ......................................................................................... 5
40 C.F.R. § 121.3 ......................................................................................... 5
40 C.F.R. § 121.4 ......................................................................................... 5
40 C.F.R. §§ 121.5-9 .................................................................................... 6
40 C.F.R. § 121.7 ......................................................................................... 6
40 C.F.R. §§ 121.8–9 ................................................................................... 6
40 C.F.R. §§ 121.11–121.16 ................................................................ 16, 17
40 C.F.R. §§ 121.11–16 ............................................................................... 6
44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,856 (June 7, 1979) ............................................. 18
85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020) ........................................................... 4
85 Fed. Reg. at 42,237 ................................................................................ 5
85 Fed. Reg. 42,256..................................................................................... 6
86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021) ............................................................ 7
EO 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021) ........................................... 7
Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review, White House
(Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheetlistofagency-actions-for-review/ ............................................................. 7
Joint EPA Army Memorandum on 401 Implementation (Aug.
19, 2021), available at https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020rule-implementati on-material ............................................................ 24
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INTRODUCTION
This stay application asks this Court to stop remarkable judicial
overreach.
In June 2021, EPA formally announced its intent to
reconsider the 2020 Clean Water Act (“CWA”) Section 401 Certification
Rule (the “Rule”), a landmark rule promulgated by the prior
Administration. EPA then filed a motion for remand without vacatur
because the pending rulemaking could address many of Plaintiffs’
arguments against the Rule. The district court agreed to remand the
Rule, but took the extraordinary step of vacating the Rule in its entirety,
even though the court had not found the Rule unlawful or even received
a single merits brief. But the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) only
empowers courts to “set aside” agency actions after finding them
unlawful, and that has not occurred here. This Court should immediately
stay that ruling pending appeal.
Intervenors will prevail on the merits for multiple reasons. The
district court lacked authority to vacate the Rule without first
determining it was legally deficient, and, in any event, its reasoning for
vacatur fails on its own terms. Considerations of irreparable harms and
the equities also call out for a stay. Absent a stay, Intervenors will suffer
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irreparable harm from losing their rights to be protected by the Rule
absent agency repeal through notice-and-comment rulemaking or a
court’s finding the Rule violates the APA. And there’s more: other States
will infringe the Intervenor States’ sovereignty by burdening their
commercial interests, and Intervenors will be forced to pay unrecoverable
costs as they attempt to comply with the whipsawing regulatory
framework for certification requests. In contrast, a stay will not impose
any meaningful harm on Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs can litigate the Rule’s
legality on the merits, following the APA’s processes.1
BACKGROUND
A.
Clean Water Act
In 1970, Congress required that “[a]ny applicant for a Federal
license or permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any
discharge into the navigable waters . . . shall provide the licensing or
permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge
originates or will originate.” Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
Pursuant to Circuit Rule 27-1(2), Intervenors state that Plaintiffs
and EPA oppose any stay of the district court’s vacatur order. Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(2), Intervenors state that they
sought a stay in the district court, which the court denied. A33–A46.
1
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Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, 108 (Apr. 3, 1970). Then, in 1972, Congress
enacted the CWA, a “total restructuring” and “complete rewriting” of the
nation’s water-pollution-control laws, City of Milwaukee v. Ill. & Mich.,
451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981), narrowing the certification requirement from
proof that any “activity . . . will not violate applicable water quality
standards,” 84 Stat. at 108 (emphases added), to whether a “discharge
will comply with” the CWA.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (Oct. 16, 1972)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1341) (emphases added). Congress also created a
prominent role for States and Tribes in implementing this new program.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
In particular, federal agencies cannot permit
activities that may result in a discharge into waters of the United States
unless any State or authorized Tribe where the discharge would originate
certifies that the discharge complies with applicable water quality
requirements or waives the requirement. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
B.
Certain States Abused Their Section 401 Certification
Authority
Despite the statutory change in 1972, EPA failed to revise its 1971
regulations governing the certification process.
As a result, EPA’s
regulations were incongruent with the new statutory language.
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Some States exploited this regulatory ambiguity to indefinitely
extend the time for acting on a certification request or to deny permits
based on non-water quality concerns, effectively vetoing projects. For
example, the State of Washington denied certification based on purported
concerns about the interstate rail system and the ability to accommodate
additional vessels in ports, despite expressly concluding the project
would not result in significant adverse effects on water quality, aquatic
life, or designated uses. See ECF No.172-1. Similar examples of State
and Tribal overreach abound in the administrative record. See ECF
No.56-2:¶¶13–14.
Indeed, courts repeatedly recognized that States’
gamesmanship was violating the CWA. See, e.g., Hoopa Valley Tribe v.
FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 2019); N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 2018); Alcoa Power
Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
C.
EPA Adopts The Section 401 Certification Rule
Pointing to these abuses, a coalition of states led by Louisiana
petitioned for an update to the 1971 regulations to conform them to the
1972 CWA amendments, and to provide clarity and transparency. 85
Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020). EPA’s response was in accord: “The
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Agency’s longstanding failure to update its regulations created the
confusion and regulatory uncertainty that were ultimately the cause of
th[e] controversial section 401 certification actions” that underlay
Louisiana’s petition. Id. at 42,227.
The Rule fixes these problems. It begins by defining fourteen key
terms, 40 C.F.R. § 121.1; see also 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,237, and it reaffirms
EPA’s longstanding interpretation of when CWA Section 401 requires a
water quality certification. 40 C.F.R. § 121.2; 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,237. It
also sets out the permissible scope of certification, as developed through
the rulemaking process. 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. The Rule ensures meaningful
coordination between project proponents and State and Tribal certifying
authorities before the certification process even begins, 40 C.F.R. § 121.4,
and it provides uniform procedures for establishing the time period for
States and Tribes to act on a certification request, clear rules for when
that period begins and ends, and a procedure for communicating to all
parties when the period begins and ends, 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.5-9.
Furthermore, the Rule requires any action on a certification request—a
grant, grant with conditions, or denial of certification—to be in writing
and contain certain information that explains the State’s or Tribe’s
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action, or else certification is waived. 40 C.F.R. § 121.7; 85 Fed. Reg.
42,256. The Rule also describes the effect of certain actions and explains
how waiver of the certification requirement can occur proactively or by
operation of law. 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.8–9. Finally, it provides a procedure
for neighboring jurisdictions to participate in the certification process
and describes how certification conditions should be enforced. 40 C.F.R.
§§ 121.11–16.
D.
This Lawsuit And The Order Vacating The Rule
Plaintiffs are three groups who filed complaints in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California: a group of environmental
organizations (collectively “Plaintiff Groups”), twenty States and the
District of Columbia (collectively “Plaintiff States”), and conservation
associations and Indian Tribes (collectively “Plaintiff Tribes”).
ECF
Nos.75, 96, 98. Undersigned intervened to defend the Rule. ECF Nos.23,
27, 41, 62; Docket No.3:20-cv-04869-WHA, ECF Nos.75, 84, 113.
In January 2021, President Biden directed agencies to “take action
to address the promulgation of Federal regulations and other actions
during the last 4 years that conflict with” his Administration’s objectives,
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EO 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021), including the Rule.2
Thereafter, EPA announced its intent to reconsider the Rule, 86 Fed. Reg.
29,541 (June 2, 2021), and moved for remand without vacatur, ECF
No.143:2, 13. Plaintiffs then argued for remand with vacatur in their
oppositions, while failing to discuss meaningfully most aspects of the
Rule. ECF Nos.145–47.
On October 21, 2021, the district court vacated and remanded the
Rule to EPA, A15–A32, and entered final judgment, ECF No.176. The
court concluded nothing in the APA “expressly preclude[d]” its issuing
the equitable remedy of vacatur “without a decision on the merits[.]” It
then applied the two-step test for “considering vacatur of agency actions
found to be erroneous,” announced in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A22, A26–A31.
Regarding the Rule’s purported deficiencies—although EPA did “not
admit fault”—the court concluded the Rule was “antithetical” to PUD No.
1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700
(1994), and “harbor[ed] significant doubts” about the Rule, A27–A28.
Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review, White House
(Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-listofagency-actions-for-review/.
2
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Turning to the consequences of vacatur, the court reasoned that because
the Rule “has only been in effect for thirteen months,” and “has been
under attack since before day one,” there was no justifiable reliance on
the Rule. Id. at 15. Intervenors moved the district court for a stay
pending appeal, ECF No.179, which the district court denied on
December 7, A33–A46.
ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Stay The District Court’s Vacatur
Decision Pending Appeal
In deciding whether to grant a stay, a court must consider
“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203
(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). This
Court uses a “sliding scale” approach, balancing the elements “so that a
stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of
another.” Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir. 2020).
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Applying these factors, the vacatur order is an extraordinary overreach
that this Court should stay immediately.
A.
Intervenors Are Likely—Indeed, Certain—To Succeed
On The Merits Of Their Appeal
Intervenors will succeed on the merits of their appeal for two
independent reasons: (1) the district court had no authority to vacate the
rule without receiving full merits briefing and deciding the rule’s legality
on the merits; and (2) the district court misapplied the Allied-Signal
analysis, even if it were applicable in this procedural posture.
1.
The APA Requires A Complete Administrative
Record And Full Briefing On The Merits Before A
Reviewing Court May Set Aside Agency Action
a. With the APA, Congress provided federal district courts with
jurisdiction to review agencies’ final actions, but only authorized courts
to set aside such actions when they are “found” to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law,” “without observance of procedure required by law,” or “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Congress further provided that in “making
[those] determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those
parts of it cited by a party.” Id.
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The APA does not permit courts to vacate a rule without first
concluding that it is unlawful. See id.; see also Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at
150–51 (applying test only after determining the agency acted without
“reasoned decision-making”); Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S.
EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015) (“not supported by substantial
evidence”). The plain import of that explicit requirement, under the
expressio unius canon, is that Congress did not intend for courts to set
aside agency action absent such a finding. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures
Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Indeed, because
the APA waives sovereign immunity, the expressio unius canon applies
with particular force, Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255,
261 (1999) (citation omitted), thereby limiting a court’s vacatur authority
to instances where agency action is unlawful, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
Ignoring these explicit limitations affords plaintiffs complete relief
without ever proving their case, while also circumventing the APA’s
notice-and-comment requirements for repeal of a rule. It invites litigants
to seek process-free elimination of agency rules whenever the Presidency
changes parties. Advocacy groups aligned with the policy agenda of the
new administration urge pre-adjudication vacatur with the hope that a
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single federal judge will find authority in “equity” to give them
instantaneous relief without the burdens of administrative due process.
As happened here, a new Administration can achieve its aims of
eliminating the rule from the books by expressing “significant doubt” or
“deep concern” about the challenged rule and throwing up spurious
jurisdictional roadblocks to appellate review of patently unlawful
district-court action.3 The APA cannot tolerate such abuse and evasion.
b. The district court’s decision to vacate the Rule here thus violates
the plain text of the APA. The vacatur order does not find the Rule
unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), instead only asserting
“significant doubt . . . that EPA correctly promulgated the rule.” In so
holding, the Order relies largely on EPA’s decision to reconsider the Rule.
A27–A29. Yet EPA never conceded that the Rule is unlawful or that it
would rescind the entire Rule on remand, merely stating that it “will
undertake a new rulemaking effort to propose revisions due to
substantial concerns with the existing Rule.” ECF No.143:2; see id. at 7,
3
See ECF No.185:4–7.
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8; ECF No.155:2–3. Indeed, because EPA is presently in the middle of a
rulemaking process, ECF Nos.153:3, 155:3, it could not concede the Rule’s
legality or commit to rescinding the entire Rule without violating the
APA. See Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir.
2009); ECF No.155:2–3. In any event, a concession would be legally
insufficient to justify vacatur of the Rule because Intervenors are parties
to the litigation and defend fully every aspect of it.
Because the district court never “determin[ed]” the Rule was
“unlawful,” whether on “the whole record” or otherwise, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2),
it had no authority to vacate. Doing so improperly provided Plaintiffs
complete relief—repeal of their disfavored rule—without ever having to
prove their case or go through notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Nat’l
Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 2009);
Pac. Rivers Council v. Shepard, No. 03:11-CV-00442-HU, 2011 WL
7562961, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2011) (“the court would have no legal
basis to vacate and remand [the rule] without determining the merits”).
c. The district court’s justifications for its actions do not withstand
scrutiny. The district court inferred that this Court’s endorsement of
remand without vacatur in cases where agency action was found
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erroneous meant that remand with vacatur is appropriate in cases where
the action has not been found erroneous. That makes no sense. A21. If
anything, cases endorsing post-adjudication remand without vacatur
undermine the district court’s logic here. Those cases reflect the respect
given to Executive Branch agencies, noting that courts will “leave an
invalid rule in place only when equity demands.” Pollinator, 806 F.3d at
532 (citation omitted). Vacating lawful rules disregards that respect.
The court then resorted to “equity”: “[B]ecause vacatur is an
equitable remedy, and because the APA does not expressly preclude the
exercise of equitable jurisdiction, the APA does not preclude the granting
of vacatur without a decision on the merits.” A22 (citation omitted). The
court never explained, beyond broad assertions of its equitable
jurisdiction, from whence its authority to vacate a rule derives if the Rule
was never determined to be unlawful. A21–A22, A37–A39. A district
court’s equitable discretion is limited to “the jurisdiction in equity
exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary
Act, 1789 (1 Stat. 73),” which “did not include the power to create
remedies previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.” Grupo Mexicano
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de Desarrollo, SA v. All. Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318, 332 (1999). The
Supreme Court reemphasized that limitation just last week, making
clear that it applies no matter the issue. Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, No. 21-463, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2021 WL 5855551, at *8 (Dec. 10,
2021). That the law in this circuit is “unsettled” as between a handful of
district courts is a strong indicia that no relevant equitable remedy is
part of historic practice. The district court’s vacatur was thus ultra vires.
2.
The District Court’s Application Of The AlliedSignal Factors Was Erroneous
Only after a finding that an agency determination is unlawful
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) does a court address the two-factor test under the
Allied-Signal decision for whether it should vacate a rule or permit a
lesser remedy while remand proceedings continue before the agency. See
Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150–51; Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532. Under
the first factor, the court asks how “serious[ ]” the agency’s errors are in
order to determine whether vacatur of the rule is necessary. AlliedSignal, 988 F.2d at 150. Second, a court must consider “the disruptive
consequences” of the vacatur.
Id. at 150–51.
Even assuming these
factors have any relevance without a finding of unlawfulness, the district
court erred in applying them here.
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Plaintiffs presented an insufficient record and argument as to the
first Allied-Signal factor. The Plaintiff States and Plaintiff Groups relied
almost entirely on their erroneous contention that EPA admitted the
Rule’s illegality in various statements. See ECF No.146:20–21; ECF
No.147:4–10. The Plaintiff Tribes, in turn, merely argued that EPA
“failed to provide sufficient justification for departing from a half century
of practice and policy related to the interpretation and implementation
of Section 401” without explanation for how the Rule would be more
protective of water quality. ECF No.145:12–13. When the Plaintiffs did
attempt to make a few substantive arguments, they failed to support the
broad remedy of full vacatur, merely raising discrete concerns with
individual sections of the Rule. ECF No.146:4–14, 20–21. Plaintiffs
addressed at most a fraction of the Rule’s provisions based on litigation
statements by the EPA (not the Rule itself), only alluded to “other
detrimental provisions” of the Rule, and offered no severability analysis
whatsoever.
ECF No.146:7, 20–21; see Carlson v. Postal Regulatory
Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Ignoring these problems, the district court focused on the Rule’s
scope-of-certification provision as “antithetical” to the Supreme Court’s
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decision in PUD No. 1, contending that EPA did not “reasonably
explain[ ] the change.” A27. While chastising EPA for “depart[ing] from
what the Supreme Court dubbed the most reasonable interpretation of
the statute,” id., the district court ignored that the Supreme Court held
only that EPA’s then-applicable construction of Section 401 was “a
reasonable interpretation” or “most reasonably read” that way. PUD No.
1, 511 U.S. at 712. That does not mean it was the only reasonable
interpretation, such that the agency could not adopt another reading as
part of its delegated authority, see Nat’l Cable & Telecomm’cns Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005). Simply put, EPA’s
change does not “compel[ ] the conclusion that the current rule is
unreasonable,” A27, and EPA’s more-recent interpretation of Section 401
is both reasonable and owed deference. The district court’s reliance on
post-enactment litigation statements by EPA to for its contrary
conclusion, A28, further underscores the court’s errors. See Cal. Cmtys.
Against Toxics v. U.S. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2012).
The district court’s complete vacatur of the entire Rule was also
without any coherent justification.
Plaintiffs did not even challenge
many portions of the Rule in the vacatur briefing, see, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
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§§ 121.11–121.16, and several portions of the Rule merely codify what
federal courts have held the CWA requires, see N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, 884 F.3d at 455; Alcoa Power Generating Inc., 643 F.3d at
972. There is ample reason to conclude EPA would have adopted those
other provisions, which are all severable from the scope-of-certification
rule, regardless of whether scope-of-certification was “foundation[al],”
A25, for other parts of the Rule, see Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,
652 (1984); Carlson, 938 F.3d at 351–52.
The district court relied on East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden,
993 F.3d 640, 681 (9th Cir. 2021), for the principle that courts “ordinarily
do not attempt, even with the assistance of agency counsel, to fashion a
valid regulation from the remnants of the old rule.” But that portion of
East Bay quoted Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
which made that point only after explaining that “[w]hen a court finds
that an agency regulation is invalid in substantial part, and that the
invalid portion cannot be severed from the rest of the rule, its typical
response is to vacate the rule and remand to the agency,” id. at 494
(footnote omitted; emphasis added). Thus, the district court’s failure to
conduct a severability analysis was error, inconsistent with Supreme
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Court precedent, and will generate a circuit split if affirmed. Indeed, the
upshot to the district court’s vacatur is that—in reliance on its own
divinations
based
on
EPA’s
post-action
statements—the
Court
apparently reinstated a rule EPA long-ago suggested was inconsistent
with the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act.
See NPDES;
Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,856 (June 7, 1979).
The district court also erred in its consideration of the second
Allied-Signal factor by ignoring the substantial and predictable
disruptions the immediate vacatur of a (not-unlawful) Rule has caused.
As further explained below, see infra pp.21–23, vacating the Rule causes
significant disruption to pending Section 401 reviews, allowing States to
use outdated rules to exert control over activities in other States and to
protect their own industries, see, e.g., ECF No.27-7:1–4, increasing the
cost of some interstate projects and fully defeating others, with attendant
harms to other States’ economies and ability to develop their natural
resources, see ECF Nos.56-1, 56-2, and upending the progress agencies
have made to improve and make transparent certification procedures.
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B.
Intervenors Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Absent A
Stay, While Neither Plaintiffs Nor the Public Will
Suffer Harm If This Court Grants A Stay
1. Intervenors have suffered and will continue to suffer grave,
irreparable harm in three ways, absent a stay.
First, vacatur deprived Intervenors of their statutory and dueprocess rights to have the protection of a Rule that they successfully
secured through notice-and-comment rulemaking, for the benefit of
themselves and their members, not repealed without the agency
following notice-and-comment rulemaking or a court holding that the
Rule is unlawful. Intervenors fought for the Rule and then intervened in
this case to defend it because of numerous abuses and delays that had
occurred under the prior regime over many decades. See supra pp.3–4.
Through the district court’s vacatur, Intervenors have now lost the Rule
and the protections that the Rule provides to their members.
Thus, even if vacatur produced no immediate sovereign or economic
harm (and it most certainly has, see infra pp.20–24), the deprivation of
Intervenors’ statutory rights under the APA, which will be irreparable
unless vacatur is stayed, is sufficient irreparable harm.
Invenergy
Renewables LLC v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1323, 1353 (Ct. Int’l
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Trade 2020); N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17
(D.D.C. 2009); see also Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 446–47 (5th Cir.
2019). The court’s decision circumvented “the most fundamental of the
APA’s procedural requirements,” Transp. Div. of the Int’l Ass’n of Sheet
Metal, Air, Rail, & Transp. Workers v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 988 F.3d 1170,
1180 (9th Cir. 2021)—providing public notice and comment before
repealing a rule, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c), 551(5); Consumer Energy Council
of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In other words, a
single district judge has rolled back EPA rules to the 1971 regulations
that do not reflect the 1972 amendments to the CWA, supra pp.2–3,
without notice and comment or finding of illegality.
Second, vacatur harms State Intervenors’ constitutional rights and
sovereign interests.
Such harms—leaving “individual States free to
burden commerce . . . among themselves”—were “[o]ne of the major
defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a compelling reason for the
calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.” Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976). Indeed, particular “dissatisfaction”
came from “the peculiar situation of some of the States, which having no
convenient ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their
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neighbors, [through] whose ports, their commerce was carr[i]ed on.” Id.
(quoting Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Fanand ed.
1966)). So now a State “may not use the threat of economic isolation” to
control its sister states. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 379 (1976). Certain States doing just that was one of the reasons
Intervenors petitioned for the Rule, see, e.g., ECF No.172-2:¶¶4–7; see
also ECF Nos.27-7, 56-1, 56-2, and such foundational constitutional
harms will assuredly return in light of vacatur.
Third, Intervenors will suffer irreparable economic harm if this
Court does not stay the district court’s vacatur. The whipsawing caused
by reinstatement of the prior rule will be substantially disruptive for both
regulators and regulated entities. ECF No.172-2:¶8; A13–A14. Vacatur
of the Rule casts substantial uncertainty and raises questions with no
clear answers, such as whether pending certification requests need to be
resubmitted, causing substantial delay in completing pending Section
401 reviews.
ECF No.172-3:¶11; ECF No.56-2:¶¶21, 23, 24.
For
example, while the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has now lifted its
“pause” on finalizing permit decisions in light of the district court’s
decision, the Corps has noted that it still needs to “identify an
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appropriate path” to comply with the new regulatory framework thrust
upon industry actors by a single district court’s vacatur in the thousands
of pending requests for certifications. ECF No.186-1:2; see N. Plains Res.
Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 4:19-cv-44, Dkt. 131-1:¶14 (D.
Mont. Apr. 27, 2020) (“the Corps receives 3,000 standard individual
permit applications annually”). This uncertainty and attendant risk of
delay can continue to deter large capital projects that benefit multiple
States economically and are necessary for the development of their
natural resources. Id. ¶¶ 7-9; A8–A9. It also imposes costs on states that
must devote resources addressing uncertainty from the regulated
community. A13–A14.
This uncertainty imposes irreparable economic harm. See Phillip
Morris USA Inc. v Scott, 561 U.S. 1301, 1304 (2010) (Scalia, J., in
chambers) (“If expenditures cannot be recouped, the resulting loss may
be irreparable.”); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th
Cir. 2015); Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C. v. Stidham, 640 F.3d 1140, 1157 (10th
Cir. 2011) (“[I]mposition of money damages that cannot later be
recovered for reasons such as sovereign immunity constitutes irreparable
injury.”).
Indeed, other Circuits have noted that “complying with a
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regulation later held invalid almost always produces the irreparable
harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” Texas v. U.S. EPA, 829 F.3d
405, 433 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); Wages & White Lion Invs.,
L.L.C. v. U.S. FDA, 16 F.4th 1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 2021). Intervenors’
members have numerous certification requests pending for projects that
involve billions of dollars in capital investment at the time of their
intervention in these actions, see, e.g., ECF No.56-2: ¶¶14, 22, 24, with
many more forthcoming, ECF No.172-3: ¶10.
The district court’s contention that Intervenors can simply
challenge any abuses to particular projects in future litigation rings
hollow. A44–A45. The regulations that the district court unilaterally
reimposed permitted many of these abuses. So while the district court
relied on a months-old settlement in a different certification lawsuit to
establish that federal-court challenges are available, see A43, the court
failed to acknowledge the unrecoverable costs of compliance with portions
of the newly reimposed regulations that the never-declared-unlawful
Rule protected against.
2. Granting a stay pending appeal will not substantially injure
Plaintiffs and would serve the public interest. As an initial matter,
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Plaintiffs have no equitable interest or entitlement to an unlawful
vacatur, see supra pp.9–18, so staying that decision would not impose any
legal harm. Moreover, Plaintiffs can seek redress for any prejudice they
claim they would suffer if the Rule were left in place and can participate
in the usual notice-and-comment procedures before EPA, to secure any
protections they want, as EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
have indicated their willingness to address concerns with the Rule raised
by the Plaintiffs on remand.4 The public interest also supports a stay.
The Rule fills a gaping regulatory void, setting basic rules for the Section
401 process, including a rule for defining when the clock starts on a
State’s reasonable time period to act on a certification request, and
clearly defining the scope of authority granted by Congress in Section
401. Each of these regulatory improvements aids the public interest, and
returning to the prior dysfunction fostered by EPA’s decades-long failure
to set basic rules for the Section 401 process would harm industry and
government actors.
Joint EPA Army Memorandum on 401 Implementation (Aug. 19,
2021), available at https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020-rule-implementati
on-materials.
4
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3. At minimum, this Court should stay the district court’s vacatur
order outside of the Ninth Circuit. Both Article III and principles of
equity generally limit a court’s ability to fashion relief to that “necessary
to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442
U.S. 682, 702 (1979); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929–30 (2018).
Applying those principles here, allowing the district court to vacate the
Rule nationwide sweeps far beyond relief to the Plaintiffs and this Court
should, at the least, limit the vast reach of the district court’s vacatur to
this Circuit.
II.
This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction
Notwithstanding arguments by EPA and Plaintiffs below, ECF
Nos.185:4–7, 186:4–6; see also A46, this Court has appellate jurisdiction
over this case. Circuit Courts maintain appellate jurisdiction “from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. This Court gives the finality requirement “a practical rather than
a technical construction,” looking to “what effect the court intended it to
have, rather than the label placed upon it,” Montes v. United States, 37
F.3d 1347, 1350 (9th Cir. 1994), so “finality” exists whenever a decision
“is a full adjudication of the issues” and “clearly evidences the judge’s
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intentions that it be the court’s final act in the matter,” Patel v. Del Taco,
Inc., 446 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2006). Entry of final judgment is
indicative that a district court intended its order to be final, Montes, 37
F.3d at 1350; Beveridge v. City of Spokane, No. 20-35848, 2021 WL
3082003, at *1 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021), and permits parties to appeal
from prior, even interlocutory orders, Am. Ironworks v. N. Am. Constr.,
248 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2001).
This Court considers orders remanding to an agency to be final if
“(1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal issue, (2) the
remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule
which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as a
practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable.”
Alsea Valley All. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.
2004). But this rule only applies to an appeal by private parties “whose
positions on the merits would be considered during the agency
proceedings on remand,” Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 965 F.3d
662, 675 (9th Cir. 2020), and this Court will still “exercise [its]
jurisdiction over a remand order” in absence of those three elements if “a
holding of nonappealability would effectively deprive the litigants of an
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opportunity to obtain review.”
omitted).
Alsea, 358 F.3d at 1184–85 (citation
Indeed, “Alsea did not announce a hard-and-fast rule
prohibiting a non-agency litigant from appealing a remand order,” Pit
River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010), and
this Court continues to give the finality determination in such instances
“a practical construction,” Skagit Cty. Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Shalala,
80 F.3d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1996).
Here, the district court’s vacatur order and final judgment provide
this Court with appellate jurisdiction under any practical consideration
of finality. The district court’s order remanding the Rule to EPA with
vacatur effectively ends the entire dispute. Indeed, Plaintiffs throughout
this litigation sought “an order vacating the Final Rule or those portions
determined to be unlawful,” ECF No.1:23, and the court’s order grants
that relief, A31.
See Patel, 446 F.3d at 1000.
The district court’s
subsequent final judgment, “ensur[ing] appealability,” clarifying that no
issues remained, and closing the case, ECF No.176:1, removed any doubt
about finality, Montes, 37 F.3d at 1350.
That the order involved a remand to EPA does nothing to change
this conclusion.
The core issue raised by Intervenors on appeal is
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whether the district court even had the authority or jurisdiction to vacate
the Rule without first determining its unlawfulness, see supra Part I.A,
an issue that will not “be considered during the agency proceedings on
remand,” Crow Indian Tribe, 965 F.3d at 675, as EPA considers the
merits of the Rule. Indeed, absent review now, Intervenors will not get
any resolution on this important question, providing this Court appellate
jurisdiction under “a practical construction” of the finality rule, Skagit
Cty., 80 F.3d at 384. Thus, regardless of whether the district court’s
vacatur order meets the Alsea criteria—not a “hard-and-fast rule” itself,
Pit River Tribe, 615 F.3d at 1075—this Court has appellate jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
This Court should stay the district court’s Order vacating the
Section 401 Rule pending appeal.
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Dated: December 15, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ George P. Sibley, III
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III*
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower
951 East Byrd Street
Richmond, VA 23219
(804) 788-8262
(804) 788-8218 (fax)
gsibley@huntonak.com
/s/ Misha Tseytlin
MISHA TSEYTLIN
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON
SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe Street,
Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
(312) 759-1939 (fax)
misha.tseytlin@troutman.com
DIERDRE G. DUNCAN
ERICA N. PETERSON
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
(202) 955-1932
dduncan@huntonak.com
epeterson@huntonak.com
CLARE ELLIS
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
50 California Street
Suite 1700
San Francisco, CA 94111
(415) 975-3708
(415) 975-3701 (fax)
cellis@huntonak.com
Attorneys for IntervenorDefendants-Appellants
American Petroleum Institute
and Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America
- 29 - App. 705 -
CHARLES SENSIBA
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON
SANDERS LLP
401 9th Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004-2146
(202) 274-2850
(202) 274-2994 (fax)
charles.sensiba@troutman.com
ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON
SANDERS LLP
Three Embarcadero Center
Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94111-4057
(415) 477-5700
(415) 477-5710 (fax)
elizabeth.andrews@troutman
.com
Attorneys for Intervenor
Defendant-Appellant National
Hydropower Association
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Additional Counsel:
/s/ Joseph S. St. John
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,
SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,
DEPUTY SOLICITOR
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6739
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov
stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General of Arkansas
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of
Mississippi
ERIC SCHMITT
Attorney General of Missouri
Attorneys for Intervenor
Defendant-Appellant State of
Louisiana
/s/ James Kaste
James Kaste
Deputy Attorney General
Wyoming Attorney General’s
Office
109 State Capitol
Cheyenne, WY 82002
(307) 777-7895 (phone)
(307) 777-3542 (fax)
james.kaste@wyo.gov
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General of Montana
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of West
Virginia
* Pursuant to Circuit Rule 25-5(e), I hereby attest that concurrence in
the filing of the document has been obtained from each of the other
Signatories. /s/ George P. Sibley, III
-2- App. 706 -
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Motion complies with the typevolume limitation of Ninth Circuit Rules 27-1 and 32-3 because it
contains 5,577 words. This Motion complies with the typeface and the
type style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface
using Word 14-point Century Schoolbook typeface.
Dated: December 15, 2021
/s/ George P. Sibley, III
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III
- App. 707 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on December 15, 2021. All
participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be
accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.
Dated: December 15, 2021
/s/ George P. Sibley, III
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III
- App. 708 -
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ADDENDUM
- App. 709 -
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Supplemental Declaration of Joan Dreskin ......................................... A1
Declaration of Robert Christopher Sadlier........................................... A11
Order on Motion for Remand Without Vacatur (ECF No.173) ........... A15
Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (ECF No.191) ......... A33
- App. 710 -
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In the United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: CLEAN WATER ACT RULEMAKING
AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS
UNITED; COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER; SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE
PAIUTE TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE
WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF
COLORADO; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE
OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE OF MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF MAINE; and
STATE OF ILLINOIS,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,
v.
ANDREW R. WHEELER and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
DEFENDANTS,
and
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,
INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
AND
STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;
STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; and STATE OF
TEXAS,
INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS.
On Appeals from the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California
Case Nos. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA, -04869-WHA, -06137-WHA
The Honorable William H. Alsup, Senior District Judge
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JOAN DRESKIN FOR
THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTAPPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
- App. 711 -
A1
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1.
My name is Joan Dreskin. I am Senior Vice President and General
Counsel of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA). My
business address is 20 F Street, NW, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20001.
2.
I offer this declaration in support of the Motion by Intervenor
Defendants to Stay Pending Appeal the district court’s order vacating the Section
401 Rule. Final Rule, CWA Section 401 Certification Rule, EPA, 85 Fed. Reg.
42,210 (July 13, 2020) (the “401 Rule”).
3.
INGAA is a non-profit trade association representing interstate natural
gas transmission pipelines (“interstate pipelines”) operating in the United States.
INGAA is comprised of 25 members, representing the vast majority of the
interstate natural gas pipeline companies in the U.S. INGAA members operate
approximately 200,000 miles of pipelines. The interstate pipeline network serves
as an indispensable link between natural gas producers and the American homes
and businesses that use the fuel for heating, cooking, generating electricity and
manufacturing a wide variety of U.S. goods, ranging from plastics to paint to
medicines and fertilizer.
4.
U.S. natural gas production is expected to increase to 130 billion
cubic feet per day by 2035, spurred by growing markets, if available supplies are
developed, and it is estimated that investment in new oil and gas infrastructure will
total $791 billion from 2018 through 2035, averaging $44 billion per year. Natural
- App. 712 -
1
A2
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gas also will serve as a backstop to help firm up variable renewables, like wind and
solar, which are expected to grow. This translates to the need for thousands of
miles of new and replacement pipe to meet market demand or to modernize
existing pipeline facilities.
5.
INGAA members construct and operate interstate natural gas
pipelines in response to demonstrated public need for the delivery of natural gas,
requiring infrastructure that typically spans multiple state boundaries. The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must issue a certificate of “public
convenience and necessity” based on this demonstrated need before INGAA
members may construct and operate these pipelines. As documented by statistics
compiled by FERC, INGAA members construct hundreds of miles of new and
expanded interstate pipelines each year.
6.
Due to the public need to transport natural gas long distances, projects
developed by INGAA members unavoidably cross wetlands and other waters of
the United States regulated by the Clean Water Act (CWA). Such crossings
require authorization from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) under CWA
Section 404. And for such crossings, CWA section 401 requires the project
applicant to provide the federal agency with the certification of the state that the
discharges in the state comply with applicable water quality standards. If the state
fails or refuses to act on the request for certification within a reasonable time not to
- App. 713 -
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A3
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exceed one year, the applicant’s duty to provide the certification is waived. The
federal agency (such as FERC or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)) is
precluded from authorizing the activity resulting in the discharge unless the
certification is provided or waived. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
7.
INGAA members rely on, and make regular use of both individual
and general permits, including Nationwide Permits (NWPs), Regional General
permits, and Programmatic General Permits, issued by the Corps under CWA
section 404, which authorize activities required for the construction, maintenance,
repair, and removal of oil and natural gas pipelines and associated facilities.
NWPs are general permits that allow for the timely authorization of activities that
have only minimal and temporary environmental effects, but that are essential to
the reliable, safe and affordable supply of energy to U.S. consumers. Regional
General Permits are issued for a specific geographic area by an individual Corps
district and have specific terms and conditions, all of which must be met for
project-specific actions to be verified. Programmatic General Permits are based on
an existing state, local, or other federal program and designed to eliminate
duplication of effort between Corps districts and State regulatory programs that
provide similar protection to aquatic resources. In some states, a State
Programmatic General Permit (SPGP) replaces some or all of the Corps NWPs,
which results in greater efficiency in the overall permitting process.
- App. 714 -
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A4
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8.
INGAA members use general permits, including NWPs, Regional
permits, and SPGPs, for both large and small pipeline projects located across the
country that will have minimal impacts on the environment. For example, INGAA
members use NWP 12 for large pipeline expansions, where applicable, and also for
smaller projects, such as pipeline replacement projects driven by highway
replacements, ingress and egress to project workspace, and valve replacements.
NWP 3 and NWP 12 are also used extensively for maintenance, inspection, and
repair activities to comply with pipeline integrity requirements mandated by the
Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) pursuant to the
Pipeline Safety Act. INGAA members often rely on NWP 3 and NWP 12
authorizations to inspect, maintain, and repair existing pipelines to ensure the
continued safety and reliability of the pipelines.
9.
Collectively, INGAA members use general permits thousands of
times annually for their construction, maintenance, and repair activities.
10.
INGAA’s members schedule and design their projects and
maintenance and repair activities to meet the terms and conditions of the NWPs,
including NWP 12. NWPs provide an efficient permitting mechanism that helps
streamline the review and approval process for pipeline projects without
precluding or compromising the consideration of any necessary project-specific
conditions. Construction and maintenance of natural gas pipelines typically occur
- App. 715 -
4
A5
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on tight schedules designed to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the
natural gas pipeline network and to meet the growing demands of natural gas
customers. Obtaining coverage under a NWP takes considerably less time than an
individual CWA section 404 permit, while still ensuring appropriate consideration
of all applicable avoidance, minimization and mitigation measures through
adherence to the applicable conditions listed therein.
11.
The conditions associated with the NWPs are designed to ensure that
authorized crossings have only minimal environmental effects. NWPs are subject
to 32 general conditions that protect a range of different environmental resources,
including spawning areas, migratory bird breeding areas, shellfish beds, water
supply intakes, wild and scenic rivers, endangered species, migratory birds, bald
and golden eagles, historic properties, and designated critical resource waters. In
each case, these conditions prohibit activities that would have more than minimal
impacts on these resources. Regional conditions further ensure that authorized
crossings have only minimal environmental effects on state- or region-specific
resources of concern, including special status wetlands, special status streams and
rivers, and streams known to harbor protected species.
12.
In reliance on the availability of NWP 3 and NWP 12, the majority of
INGAA members have plans to submit or have already submitted Pre-Construction
Notifications seeking Corps verification to construct interstate natural gas pipelines
- App. 716 -
5
A6
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and complete necessary repair, maintenance and modernization work using NWP 3
and/or NWP 12.
13.
The Corps re-issued certain NWPs in March 2021, and many States
have issued CWA Section 401 water quality certifications (or waived certification)
for those nationwide permits. These certifications or waivers were issued while the
401 Rule was still effective. In States that have issued certifications or have
waived, INGAA members are relying on NWPs to complete vital projects, and
plan to rely on NWPs in the immediate future.
14.
After the district court’s decision to vacate the 401 Rule, INGAA
members have reported that the Corps suspended permitting authorizations for
activities that rely on water quality certifications based on the 401 Rule,
specifically citing the district court’s decision. This included authorizations under
both individual permits and NWPs, including NWP 12.
15.
For example, on November 4, 2021, the Corps’ Sacramento District
posted the following message on its website: “Due to the decision of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California on October 21, 2021 to
remand EPA’s 2020 401 WQC rule with vacatur, the Corps of Engineers is not
finalizing permit decisions that rely on a 401 WQC or waiver under EPA’s 2020
rule at this time. The Corps is working to provide more refined guidance that
provides a way forward that allows us to finalize permit decisions.”
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6
A7
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16.
The Corps’ Buffalo District posted the same message on its website
on November 9, 2021.
17.
The Corps’ suspension was not limited to its Sacramento and Buffalo
Districts. Other Corps Districts, including Mobile, Vicksburg (MS), Tulsa,
Nashville, Seattle, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Huntington, Baltimore, and New
Orleans Districts verbally told members that they would not finalize any permit
decisions that rely on a certification or waiver under the 2020 401 Rule due to the
district court’s decision.
18.
Around November 19, 2021, Corps headquarters issued additional
verbal guidance to Corps District Engineers. Pursuant to that guidance, which has
not been published, District Engineers may issue NWP verifications as to NWPs
issued in March 2021 and for which States issued blanket certifications or waivers
pursuant to the 2020 401 Rule. But where a State has issued an individual
certification or waiver for projects that either intend to proceed under an NWP or
an individual permit, the State has the option to revisit its certification decision up
to the one year statutory deadline.
19.
As a result, critical projects nationwide that intended to proceed under
general or individual permits already have been delayed, imposing substantial
added costs to INGAA’s members. And the even though the Corps has lifted its
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7
A8
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permitting suspension, the re-opener for States creates the potential for conflicting
directives from other agencies.
20.
Of further concern to INGAA members are pipeline integrity projects
that were planned to commence within the next several months. These pipeline
integrity projects are necessary to reduce the likelihood of pipeline leaks and
ruptures by inspecting, repairing and/or replacing pipelines located in densely
populated areas, including pipelines near homes, schools, churches, and
businesses. In many cases, these actions follow inspection schedules mandated by
the PHMSA. INGAA’s members have created inspection and remediation
schedules based on the PHMSA requirements and company risk assessments. If
INGAA members cannot rely on NWPs or individual permits where Section 401
certificates have been issued, some of these safety improvements will not be
accomplished pursuant to the regulatory timeframes, or PHMSA will need to
extensively grant waivers, imposing an additional administrative burden on its
staff.
21.
Delays such as these will increase the risk of reliability issues, while
also failing to meet the needs of customers who have a need for natural gas that
may be unfulfilled in the interim.
- App. 719 -
8
A9
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I, Joan Dreskin, certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States
of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on December 14, 2021.
___________________________________
Joan Dreskin
Senior Vice President and General Counsel
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
20 F Street, NW
Suite 450
Washington, DC 20001
- App. 720 -
9
A10
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Nos. 21-16958, -16960, 16961
In the United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: CLEAN WATER ACT RULEMAKING
AMERICAN RIVERS; AMERICAN WHITEWATER; CALIFORNIA TROUT; IDAHO RIVERS UNITED;
COLUMBIA RIVERKEEPER; SIERRA CLUB; SUQUAMISH TRIBE; PYRAMID LAKE PAIUTE
TRIBE; ORUTSARARMIUT NATIVE COUNCIL; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW
YORK; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF RHODE ISLAND; STATE OF COLORADO; DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; STATE OF NEW
MEXICO; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF MINNESOTA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; STATE OF MICHIGAN; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
NEVADA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; STATE OF MAINE; and STATE OF ILLINOIS,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,
v.
ANDREW R. WHEELER and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
DEFENDANTS,
and
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,
and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,
INTERVENORS-DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
AND
STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;
STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; and STATE OF
TEXAS,
INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS.
On Appeals from the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California
Case Nos. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA, -04869-WHA, -06137-WHA
The Honorable William H. Alsup, Judge
DECLARATION OF ROBERT
CHRISTOPHER SADLIER
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I, Robert Christopher Sadlier, hereby declare as follows:
1.
I am the Deputy Director of the Water Quality Division for
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). I have been
employed by the TCEQ since 2011, and have served in this capacity
since 2021. As part of my duties, I am responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the Clean Water Act (CWA) in Texas related to
administration of the state's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permitting program and Section 401 water quality
certifications.
2.
Based on my position, I have personal knowledge and
experience to understand many of the steps the State must undertake
in response to the vacatur of the revised CWA 401 rule.
3.
The water quality of Texas is protected through the policy
of the State of Texas, which is to maintain the quality of water in
the state consistent with the public health and enjoyment, the
propagation and protection of terrestrial and aquatic life, and the
operation of existing industries, taking into consideration the
economic development of the state; to encourage and promote the
development and use of regional and areawide waste collection,
treatment, and disposal systems to serve the waste disposal needs
of the citizens of the state; and to require the use of all reasonable
methods to implement this policy. Texas Water Code § 26.003.
4.
According to the Texas Water Code, the TCEQ is "the agency
with primary responsibility for implementation of water quality
management functions, including enforcement actions, within the
state. Texas Water Code§ 26.0136. Additionally, all waters in Texas
receive protection of their water quality through the Texas Surface
Water Quality Standards in 30 Texas Administrative Code (TAC)
Chapter 307. Specifically, the TCEQ is responsible, in cooperation with
other state agencies, for maintaining water quality in Texas' lakes,
rivers, and streams so that the state's Surface Water Quality
Standards are complied with.
5.
For CWA § 402 permitting, Texas was delegated authority
for the Texas Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (TPDES) in
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1998. Texas had an existing program prior to delegation and we
continue to protect waters in the state through our state
regulations. TCEQ also develops Texas' Water Quality Standards
criteria, monitors and assesses Texas' water resources, manages the
Total Maximum Daily Load program for the State of Texas, and
incorporates federal requirements to ensure the State's permitting
program complies with the Clean Water Act.
6.
The TCEQ is responsible for conducting Clean Water Act
Section 401 certification reviews to ensure that Texas is involved in
decisions made by the federal government that affect the quality of
the water resources of the state. The TCEQ is the lead state agency
that administers the Section 401 certification program in Texas,
except for activities related to oil and gas exploration, development,
and production, which is the responsibility of the Railroad
Commission of Texas. The primary focus of TCEQ's 401 certification
program is reviewing U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Section
404 permit applications for the discharge of dredged or fill material
into waters of the United States, including wetlands. The purpose of
the certification reviews is to determine whether a proposed
discharge will comply with the Texas Surface Water Quality
Standards, which are found in 30 TAC Chapter 307. TCEQ state
certifications are governed by 30 TAC Chapter 279.
7.
Under the CWA's certification program, Texas must
review each discharge to a water and certify for all CWA permits
that the discharge will comply with the State's surface water quality
standards. 33 U.S.C. § 134l(a)(l).
8.
For example, Texas is like many of the states in that CWA
§ 404 Dredge and Fill permitting is conducted by the USACE. Anyone
seeking to discharge dredge or fill material into a water subject to
the Rule is required to obtain a permit under Section 404 of the CWA
from USACE. A prerequisite to a 404 permit is a Section 401 water
quality certification.
9.
As a result of the vacatur of the revised CWA 401 rule there
has been confusion in the regulated community in Texas. There has
been concern that 401 certifications provided under the 2020 rule are
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no longer valid. As a result, TCEQ is having to devote significant
resources addressing this issue for individual 401 certifications and
Nationwide Permits issued under the 2020 rule, including responding
to numerous inquiries from the regulated community.
10. TCEQ does have concerns that a third party will try to reopen a case under the revised CWA 401 rule.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is correct.
Executed on this 14th day of December 2021, at Austin, Texas.
_____________________________
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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In re
CLEAN WATER ACT
RULEMAKING.
This Document Relates to:
ALL ACTIONS.
No. C 20-04636 WHA
No. C 20-04869 WHA
No. C 20-06137 WHA
(Consolidated)
ORDER RE MOTION FOR
REMAND WITHOUT VACATUR
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16
17
INTRODUCTION
18
Plaintiff states, tribes, and non-profit conservation groups have challenged EPA’s Clean
19
Water Act certification rule, and now EPA moves to remand the proceedings without vacatur.
20
For the reasons stated, the rule is remanded to the agency with vacatur.
21
22
STATEMENT
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly known as the
23
Clean Water Act, is the primary federal statute regulating water pollution. Congress enacted
24
the Clean Water Act in 1972 — over then-President Nixon’s veto — but the roots of the Act
25
extend much farther back to 1899 and the Rivers and Harbors Act. That statute, often referred
26
to as the Refuse Act, primarily ensured free and open navigability of the waters of the United
27
States, but also prohibited the discharge of “refuse matter of any kind or description whatever
28
other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any
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navigable water of the United States,” and authorized the Secretary of the Army to permit such
2
discharges under certain conditions. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 407 et seq. In 1948, following an
3
increase an industrialization throughout the country, Congress passed the Federal Water
4
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). See generally Joel Gross & Kerri Stelcen, Clean Water Act
5
2–7 (2d ed. 2012).
6
In 1969, two events would help foster a new environmental awareness in the United
7
States and prompt the promulgation of amendments to the FWPCA: A catastrophic oil spill of
8
three million gallons of crude off the coast of Santa Barbara (creating a thirty-five-mile slick);
9
and a fire on the surface of the Cuyahoga River in northeast Ohio. A 1968 Kent State
10
University symposium on the state of the Cuyahoga River is worth briefly quoting:
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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12
13
14
15
16
The surface is covered with brown oily film observed upstream as
far as the Southerly Plant effluent. In addition, large quantities of
black heavy oil floating in slicks, sometimes several inches thick,
are observed frequently. Debris and trash are commonly caught up
in these slicks forming an unsightly floating mess. Anaerobic
action is common as the dissolved oxygen is seldom above a
fraction of a part per million. The discharge of cooling water
increases the temperature by 10 to 15° F. The velocity is
negligible, and sludge accumulates on the bottom. Animal life
does not exist.
17
The Cuyahoga River Watershed: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Kent State University
18
104 (George D. Cooke, ed., 1969); Gross & Stelcen, supra, at 7; Christine Mai-Duc, The 1969
19
Santa Barbara oil spill that changed oil and gas exploration forever, L.A. Times, May 20, 2015,
20
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-barbara-oil-spill-1969-20150520-
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htmlstory.html.
22
Three years after these events, Congress passed the Clean Water Act. Section 101 of the
23
act expressed Congress’ goal “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
24
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The congressional declaration in
25
Section 101(b) recited:
26
27
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It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and
water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the
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Section 101(d) charged EPA to administer the act while Section 101(e) explicitly enshrined
3
public participation into the statutory scheme:
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Northern District of California
exercise of his authority under this chapter.
Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement
of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program
established by the Administrator or any State under this chapter
shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the
Administrator and the States.
7
Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, a federal agency may not issue a permit or
8
license to an applicant that seeks to conduct any activity that may result in any discharge into
9
the navigable waters of the United States unless a state or authorized tribe where the discharge
10
would originate issues a water quality certification or waives the requirement. EPA is
11
responsible for the certification by non-authorized tribes or when a discharge would originate
12
from lands under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Importantly, “No [federal] license or permit
13
shall be granted if certification has been denied by the State, interstate agency, or the
14
Administrator, as the case may be.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341; see also Overview of CWA Section
15
401 Certification, epa.gov/cwa-401/overview-cwa-section-401-certification (last visited Oct.
16
21, 2021). Several major federal licensing and permitting schemes are subject to Section 401,
17
such as National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under Section 402,
18
permits for discharge of dredged or fill material into wetlands under Section 404, Federal
19
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) licenses for hydropower facilities and natural gas
20
pipelines, and Rivers and Harbors Act Section Nine and Section Ten permits.
21
While EPA has promulgated myriad rules to administer the Clean Water Act, iterations
22
of the administrative rule implementing Section 401 had remained, until recently, singular.
23
EPA originally promulgated 40 C.F.R. Part 121 to implement water quality certifications for
24
Section 21(b) of the FWPCA as it existed in 1971 — a year before the Clean Water Act
25
amendments to the FWPCA. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22,487 (Nov. 25, 1971), redesignated at 37 Fed.
26
Reg. 21,441 (Oct. 11, 1972), further redesignated at 44 Fed. Reg. 32,899 (June 7, 1979). EPA
27
would continue to use this rule for the Section 401 licensing scheme. In brief, 40 C.F.R. Part
28
121 as promulgated set out: (i) the minimum procedural content of a certification to facilitate
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EPA’s administrative processes; (ii) the procedures for determining the effects of a license
2
upon other, non-certifying states; (iii) the procedures the EPA Administrator employs to certify
3
an application for a project under exclusive federal jurisdiction; and (iv) the procedures for
4
EPA consultations on obtaining a license or permit. EPA employed this procedure for
5
certifications as-is for half a century.
*
United States District Court
Northern District of California
6
*
*
7
On April 10, 2019, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,868, entitled Promoting
8
Energy Infrastructure and Economic Growth. 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 10, 2019). The order
9
stated: “The United States is blessed with plentiful energy resources, including abundant
10
supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas,” and, the “Federal Government must promote efficient
11
permitting processes and reduce regulatory uncertainties that currently make energy
12
infrastructure projects expensive and that discourage new investment.” To that end, Executive
13
Order 13,868 asserted that “[o]utdated Federal guidance and regulations regarding section 401
14
of the Clean Water Act . . . are causing confusion and uncertainty and are hindering the
15
development of energy infrastructure,” and instructed EPA to review and issue new guidance
16
regarding Section 401. Id. at 15,496.
17
Pursuant to the executive order, EPA revised its general Section 401 guidance in June
18
2019. Two months later, EPA published an economic analysis of existing Section 401
19
processes. That same month, in a publication dated August 22, 2019, EPA proposed an
20
updated Section 401 certification rule with extensive revisions. After a very active public
21
comment phase, EPA published the final rule in the Federal Register on July 13, 2020. The
22
rule went into effect September 11, 2020. See Economic Analysis for the Proposed Clean
23
Water Act Section 401 Rulemaking, NEPIS 810R19001A (Aug. 2019); Clean Water Act
24
Section 401 Guidance for Federal Agencies, States and Authorized Tribes,
25
www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2019-06/documents/cwa_section_401_guidance.pdf (June 7,
26
2019); 84 Fed. Reg. 44,080 (Aug. 22, 2019); 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020).
27
28
The new certification rule makes a variety of substantive changes to EPA’s procedures
for implementing Section 401. To state just a few examples, the new rule: (i) narrows the
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scope of certification to ensuring that a discharge from a point source into a water of the
2
United States from a federally licensed or permitted activity will comply with “water quality
3
requirements” — another defined term narrowed to mean applicable provisions of Sections
4
301, 302, 303, 306, and 307 of the Clean Water Act; (ii) authorizes EPA to establish the
5
reasonable amount of time for a certifying authority to certify a request; and (iii) authorizes
6
EPA to determine whether a certifying authority’s denial has complied with the rule’s
7
procedural requirements, and to deem certifications waived if not. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 121.
8
Plaintiff states, tribes, and non-profit conservation groups, many of which had
9
strenuously objected to these and other changes to the certification rule, began suing, many the
10
same day EPA published the final rule. Three cases eventually arrived before the undersigned
11
by August 2020. The new certification rule became effective in September, and by October,
12
eight states and three industry groups intervened as defendants. Then, in November,
13
administrative momentum for the revised certification rule stalled after the election of
14
President Biden, who declared his administration’s policy:
15
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17
18
19
20
to listen to the science; to improve public health and protect our
environment; to ensure access to clean air and water; to limit
exposure to dangerous chemicals and pesticides; to hold polluters
accountable, including those who disproportionately harm
communities of color and low-income communities; to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions; to bolster resilience to the impacts of
climate change; to restore and expand our national treasures and
monuments; and to prioritize both environmental justice and the
creation of the well-paying union jobs necessary to deliver on these
goals.
21
Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate
22
Crisis, Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 20, 2021). The administration
23
specifically listed the certification rule as one agency action set to be reviewed, and EPA stated
24
its intent to promulgate a new certification rule in a notice published on June 6, 2021. The
25
earliest EPA will be able to promulgate a revised rule is Spring 2023 (Goodin Decl. ¶ 27). See
26
86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021); Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review,
27
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-list-of-agency-
28
actions-for-review (Jan. 20, 2021).
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EPA now moves to remand for further proceedings without vacatur. Due to plaintiffs’
2
oppositions that requested remand with vacatur, intervenor defendants filed a motion to strike,
3
which necessitated extra briefing on that matter. After oral argument held telephonically due
4
to the COVID-19 pandemic, intervenor defendants were invited to file further briefing on the
5
vacatur issue, which they did.
ANALYSIS
United States District Court
Northern District of California
6
7
1.
8
Ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are, per Chevron
9
and Brand X, delegations of authority to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable fashion. Under
10
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a district court reviews a challenged federal agency
11
action to determine whether it is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with
12
law. Per the familiar taxonomy established by SKF USA, an agency typically takes one of five
13
positions when its action is challenged in federal court: (i) it may defend the decision on
14
previously articulated grounds; (ii) it may seek to defend the decision on grounds not
15
previously articulated by the agency; (iii) it may seek remand to reconsider its decision because
16
of intervening events outside the agency’s control; (iv) it may seek remand even absent any
17
intervening events, without confessing error, to reconsider its previous position; and (v) it may
18
seek remand because it believes the original decision was incorrect on the merits and it wishes
19
to change the result. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1027–28 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
20
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980, 982 (2005);
21
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984); Cal. Cmtys.
22
Against Toxics v. EPA (CCAT), 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2012) (approving SKF USA
23
taxonomy); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS FOR REMAND AND VACATUR.
24
An agency thus need not defend a challenged action in a district court and may instead
25
voluntarily request the court to remand the action to the agency for further proceedings. Nor
26
does an agency even need to admit error to justify voluntary remand. “Generally, courts only
27
refuse voluntarily requested remand when the agency’s request is frivolous or made in bad
28
faith.” CCAT, 688 F.3d at 992.
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The deferential standard for reviewing an agency’s request for voluntary remand can
2
raise difficult issues when vacatur comes into play. When a district court rules that an agency
3
action is defective due to errors of fact, law, or policy, the APA explicitly instructs that the
4
court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside” the agency action. “This approach enables a
5
reviewing court to correct error but, critically, also avoids judicial encroachment on agency
6
discretion.” 33 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8381
7
(3d ed. 2021); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Nevertheless, our court of appeals has held that, when equity
8
demands, a flawed rule need not be vacated. See CCAT, 688 F.3d at 992. Oftentimes, an
9
agency may voluntarily request remand prior to a court’s adjudication of the merits of the
10
disputed action. The caselaw here is unsettled. Leaving an agency action in place while the
11
agency reconsiders may deny the petitioners the opportunity to vindicate their claims in federal
12
court and would leave them subject to a rule they have asserted is invalid. On the other hand,
13
vacatur “of an action may allow an agency to abandon a legislative rule without going through
14
the (extensive) trouble of developing a new one.” Wright & Miller, supra, at § 8383. Our
15
court of appeals has issued the broad guidance — albeit in opinions where the agency action
16
had been found erroneous — that remand without vacatur is appropriate only in limited
17
circumstances. CCAT, 688 F.3d at 994; Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520,
18
532 (9th Cir. 2015).
19
Contrasting policy implications have led to a split in authority regarding whether a court
20
may order vacatur without first reaching a determination on the merits of the agency’s action.
21
Compare Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241–42 (D. Colo.
22
2011) (Judge John L. Kane), with Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126,
23
135–36 (D.D.C. 2010) (Judge Emmet G. Sullivan). Our court of appeals has not had the
24
opportunity to address this question directly, but its holding that even a flawed rule need not be
25
vacated supports the corollary proposition that a flaw need not be conclusively established to
26
vacate a rule. Other district courts in our circuit have consistently acknowledged they have the
27
authority to vacate agency actions upon remand prior to a final determination of the action’s
28
legality. See, e.g., Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, ––– F. Supp. 3d –––, 2021 WL 3855977, at *4
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(D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021) (Judge Rosemary Márquez); All. for Wild Rockies v. Marten, 2018
2
WL 2943251, at *2–3 (D. Mont. June 12, 2018) (Judge Dana L. Christensen); N. Coast Rivers
3
All. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 2016 WL 8673038, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (Judge
4
Lawrence J. O’Neill).
United States District Court
Northern District of California
5
This order agrees with the foregoing opinions from district judges within our circuit that,
6
when an agency requests voluntary remand, a district court may vacate an agency’s action
7
without first making a determination on the merits. Vacatur is a form of discretionary,
8
equitable relief akin to an injunction. This order finds persuasive the reasoning in Center for
9
Native Ecosystems, which explains that “because vacatur is an equitable remedy, and because
10
the APA does not expressly preclude the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, the APA does not
11
preclude the granting of vacatur without a decision on the merits.” 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1241–
12
42; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1987); Coal. to
13
Protect Puget Sound Habitat v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 843 Fed. App’x 77, 80
14
(9th Cir. 2021).
15
Our court of appeals has applied the familiar Allied-Signal test when considering vacatur
16
of agency actions found to be erroneous, and this order finds the same factors applicable when
17
considering voluntary remand prior to a conclusive decision on the merits. Allied-Signal, Inc.
18
v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–151 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under Allied-Signal,
19
the “decision whether to vacate depends on [1] the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and
20
thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive
21
consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” Ibid.; see also CCAT, 688
22
F.3d at 992 (adopting Allied-Signal). Allied-Signal can properly guide a vacatur analysis prior
23
to a merits determination similar to the review of a motion for a preliminary injunction. In
24
fact, the test in Allied-Signal explicitly arose from a preliminary injunction analysis. See Int’l
25
Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967
26
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
27
The first prong of Allied-Signal — sometimes abridged in decisions where the court had
28
made a merits determination — considers an agency action’s deficiencies in order to evaluate
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the “extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly.” Conclusive findings of agency error
2
are thus sufficient but not necessary for this factor to support vacatur. The first prong may be
3
measured in different ways, including: the extent the agency action contravenes the purposes of
4
the statute in question; whether the same rule could be adopted on remand; and whether the
5
action was the result of reasoned decisionmaking. Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532; Or. Nat. Desert
6
Ass’n v. Zinke, 250 F. Supp. 3d 773, 774 (D. Or. 2017) (Judge Michael Mosman) (citing
7
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314–15 (1982)); Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
8
Johnson, 541 F. Supp. 2d 165, 185 (D.D.C. 2008). Because a district court’s review of an
9
agency’s action begins and ends with the reasoning the agency relied on in making that
10
decision, the final rule and its preamble provide valuable material with which to evaluate
11
whether the agency employed reasoned decisionmaking. See CCAT, 688 F.3d at 993. As for
12
the second prong of Allied-Signal, our court of appeals has engaged in a broad analysis of the
13
potential consequences of vacatur. See id. at 994; Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532–33.
14
15
16
17
2.
EPA AND INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS TO VACATUR
AND ALLIED-SIGNAL.
Both EPA and intervenor defendants assert that this order cannot and should not consider
whether to vacate the certification rule. Their host of arguments fails to persuade.
18
First, intervenor defendants contend in a separate motion to strike that plaintiffs’
19
arguments for vacatur in their opposition briefing contravenes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
20
7(b), Civil Local Rule 7-1(a), and the undersigned’s standing order (Dkt. No. 148 at 2). An
21
August 2021 order ensured that the parties fully briefed this issue concurrently with EPA’s
22
motion for voluntary remand (Dkt. No. 151). Upon review, this order finds that plaintiffs
23
properly addressed the issue of vacatur. EPA has moved for remand without vacatur. Yet as
24
our court of appeals has explicitly stated, “We order remand without vacatur only in ‘limited
25
circumstances.’” Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532 (quoting CCAT, 688 F.3d at 994). EPA, in fact,
26
quoted CCAT in its opening brief, but neglected to address why the instant action is the
27
exception meriting remand without vacatur or why the default standard of vacatur stated in
28
CCAT should not apply here. EPA cannot avoid the default standard by strategically tailoring
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1
its briefing and requested relief, and intervenor defendants made a strategic choice not to
2
initially file any briefing on the subject. Intervenor defendants, regardless, were granted the
3
opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the vacatur issue and Allied-Signal (Intervenors
4
Br., Dkt. No. 172). So, they have had the last word. Plaintiffs will not be faulted for
5
addressing the issues that this order must address to render a decision. See also N. Coast
6
Rivers All., 2016 WL 8673038, at *7.
7
Second, EPA and intervenor defendants argue that Allied-Signal is not the proper
8
standard here because there has been no ruling on the merits of the certification rule (Reply Br.
9
6; Intervenors Br. 8–9). As explained, Allied-Signal does not require a merits decision (and, in
10
fact, is based on the standard for a preliminary injunction). Neither EPA nor intervenor
11
defendants, it should be noted, attempt to suggest a substitute for Allied-Signal for our
12
purposes. Intervenor defendants attempt to distinguish Pascua Yaqui Tribe — a recent
13
decision from our sister court that vacated upon remand another EPA rule related to the Clean
14
Water Act — on the ground that the district court had before it the parties’ fully-briefed
15
summary judgment motions (Intervenors Br. 9). But, the court’s opinion did not rule on the
16
parties’ summary judgment motions, which were dismissed without prejudice in the docket
17
entry for the remand order. Pascua Yaqui Tribe, No. C 20-00266, Dkt. No. 99, Aug. 30, 2021.
18
Pascua Yaqui Tribe, in fact, stated that it was not reaching the merits of the agency action:
19
“[I]n the Ninth Circuit, remand with vacatur may be appropriate even in the absence of a
20
merits adjudication. Accordingly, the Court will apply the ordinary test for whether remand
21
should include vacatur.” 2021 WL 3855977, at *4.
22
Third, intervenor defendants state that plaintiffs “fail to provide any severability analysis,
23
which would be mandatory if [p]laintiffs want this Court to vacate the entire Rule” (Intervenors
24
Br. 11, emphasis added). The decision intervenor defendants cite to support this statement,
25
Carlson v. Postal Reg. Comm’n, 938 F.3d 337, 351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2019), does not necessarily
26
mandate a severability analysis, and this order is not aware of any mandatory authority that
27
requires a severability analysis. Regardless, severance is not required here because, as
28
explained below, this order finds serious deficiencies in an aspect of the certification rule that,
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1
in EPA’s words, “is the foundation of the final rule and [] informs all other provisions of the
2
final rule.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,256.
3
4
scope of vacatur, citing California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2115 (2021) (see Reply Br. 2 n.
5
2). EPA does not elaborate how a decision regarding standing to challenge the minimum
6
essential coverage requirement of the Affordable Care Act has any bearing on our case here.
7
Citing general statements of law does not warrant additional briefing, nor did EPA raise this
8
request at our hearing after the intervenor defendants were permitted to provide supplemental
9
briefing on the Allied-Signal analysis. This order has considered the proper scope of vacatur.
10
In sum, should remand be justified, this order will duly apply Allied-Signal as described
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Fourth, in a footnote in its reply brief, EPA requests additional briefing regarding the
12
13
14
to determine whether vacatur is the appropriate remedy in this dispute.
3.
WHETHER REMAND OF THE CERTIFICATION RULE TO EPA IS
WARRANTED.
This order now considers whether to remand the certification rule back to EPA for further
15
proceedings. EPA says remand is appropriate because the request: (i) is made in good faith
16
and reflects substantial and legitimate concerns with the rule; (ii) supports judicial economy;
17
and (iii) would not cause undue prejudice to the parties (Br. 6–7).
18
Remand in this circuit, as EPA reminds us, is generally only refused when the agency’s
19
request is frivolous or made in bad faith. See CCAT, 688 F.3d at 992. The American Rivers
20
plaintiffs argue EPA’s request is frivolous because “the process EPA has laid out to address
21
[its] concerns does not demonstrate a genuine commitment to a changed rule that will address
22
all of those concerns” (American Rivers Opp. 16). This order notes some support for
23
American Rivers’ argument to deny EPA’s remand request as frivolous due to the fact that the
24
agency wholly omitted addressing vacatur until forced to by plaintiffs’ opposition briefing, but
25
will not deny remand on that basis alone. This order accordingly proceeds to consider the SKF
26
USA taxonomy of positions an agency may take on a challenge to its action.
27
28
EPA asserts that its remand request here falls into the fourth category of actions under
SKF USA — remand to reconsider a decision without confessing error (Br. 8). In this
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situation, an agency “might argue, for example, that it wished to consider further the governing
2
statute, or the procedures that were followed. It might simply state that it had doubts about the
3
correctness of its decision.” For an action with this type of posture, SKF USA advised that a
4
district court has discretion not to remand, but “if the agency’s concern is substantial and
5
legitimate, a remand is usually appropriate.” SKF USA, 254 F.3d at 1029.
6
7
formulation of the certification rule (Br. 2–5). Plaintiffs have not presented evidence or
8
argument sufficient to justify departing from the default rule permitting remand. The
9
certification rule will be remanded to EPA for further proceedings.
10
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
EPA, as explained below, has certainly expressed substantial concerns with the current
12
13
14
4.
WHETHER VACATUR OF THE CERTIFICATION RULE UPON
REMAND IS WARRANTED.
This order now considers whether the Allied-Signal test supports vacatur upon remand of
the certification rule. Each factor is considered in turn.
A.
THE CERTIFICATION RULE’S DEFICIENCIES.
15
The first Allied-Signal factor considers the seriousness of the rule’s deficiencies, thus
16
evaluating the extent of doubt whether the agency correctly promulgated the rule. See Allied-
17
Signal, 988 F.2d at 150–51. At the hearing, plaintiff states asserted that the most glaring
18
deficiency in the current certification rule is a newly-inserted subsection defining the scope of
19
certification, which they say impinges upon the Clean Water Act’s principles of cooperative
20
federalism. See 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. We start our Allied-Signal analysis with these revisions.
21
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, the Supreme
22
Court affirmed that Section 401(d) confers on states the power to “consider all state actions
23
related to water quality in imposing conditions on [S]ection 401 certificates.” 511 U.S. 700,
24
710 (1994). The majority recognized that Section 401(a) contemplates state certification that a
25
“discharge” will comply with certain provisions of the Clean Water Act while subsection (d)
26
“expands the State’s authority to impose conditions on the certification of a project” because it
27
“refers to the compliance of the applicant, not the discharge.” Id. at 711. PUD No. 1
28
concluded that Section 401(d) “is most reasonably read as authorizing additional conditions
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and limitations on the activity as a whole once the threshold condition, the existence of a
2
discharge, is satisfied.” Id. at 712.
United States District Court
Northern District of California
3
The revised scope of certification that EPA promulgated takes an antithetical position to
4
PUD No. 1 without reasonably explaining the change. The rule’s scope of certification is
5
“limited to assuring that a discharge from a Federally licensed or permitted activity will
6
comply with water quality requirements,” which the rule limits to Sections 301, 302, 303, 306,
7
and 307 of the Clean Water Act. 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. EPA may, of course, take up different
8
interpretations of Section 401, but a revised rule with unexplained inconsistencies suggests it is
9
an unreasonable interpretation that is not entitled to deference under Chevron. See Encino
10
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016); Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 892
11
F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir. 2018). EPA does not adequately explain in the preamble how it could
12
so radically depart from what the Supreme Court dubbed the most reasonable interpretation of
13
the statute. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. The certification rule’s preamble tries to address the
14
sharp departure from PUD No. 1 but falls back to claiming that the case was wrongly decided,
15
and eventually sides with Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 42,231.
16
EPA now undermines that argument itself by declaring its intent to “restore the balance of
17
state, Tribal, and federal authorities consistent with the cooperative federalism principles
18
central to CWA section 401” (Goodin Decl. ¶ 11, emphasis added). The agency’s recognition
19
of its inconsistent interpretation of the scope of the certification compels the conclusion that
20
the current rule is unreasonable. Accordingly, this order harbors significant doubts that EPA
21
correctly promulgated the certification rule due to the apparent arbitrary and capricious
22
changes to the rule’s scope. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013); PUD No.
23
1, 511 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Not a single sentence, phrase, or word in the
24
Clean Water Act purports to place any constraint on a State’s power to regulate the quality of
25
its own waters more stringently than federal law might require.”).
26
Moreover, EPA’s acknowledgment it intends to “restore” the principles of cooperative
27
federalism indicates that the current scope of the certification rule is inconsistent with and
28
contravenes the design and structure of the Clean Water Act, and thus does not warrant
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1
deference. As noted in the Clean Water Act’s congressional declaration of goals and policy:
2
“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
3
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development
4
and use . . . of land and water resources.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b); Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 573
5
U.S. 302, 321 (2014). The rule’s inconsistency with the purpose of the statute it interprets also
6
supports vacatur.
7
Next, while EPA does not admit fault, it does signal it will not or could not adopt the
8
same rule upon remand. The scope of certification is not the only problematic aspect of the
9
rule. EPA’s opening brief lists eleven aspects of the certification rule about which it has
10
“substantial concerns.” That list takes up two-and-a-half pages of its twelve-page brief, and
11
includes:
•
“the certification action process steps, including whether there is any
utility in requiring specific components and information for
certifications with conditions and denials; whether it is appropriate for
federal agencies to review certifying authority actions for consistency
with procedural requirements or any other purpose”
•
“enforcement of CWA Section 401, including the roles of federal
agencies and certifying authorities in enforcing certification
conditions”
•
“modifications and ‘reopeners,’ including whether the statutory
language in CWA Section 401 supports modification of certifications
or ‘reopeners,’”
•
21
“application of the Certification Rule, including impacts of the Rule
on processing certification requests, impacts of the Rule on
certification decisions, and whether any major projects are anticipated
in the next few years that could benefit from or be encumbered by the
Certification Rule’s procedural requirements”
22
(Br. 3–5). These are not narrow issues. They address nearly every substantive change
23
introduced in the current rule. Even without admitting error, the scope of potential revisions
24
EPA is considering supports vacatur of the current rule because the agency has demonstrated
25
that it will not or could not adopt the same rule upon remand.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
26
In sum, in light of the lack of reasoned decisionmaking and apparent errors in the rule’s
27
scope of certification, the indications that the rule contravenes the structure and purpose of the
28
Clean Water Act, and that EPA itself has signaled it could not or will not adopt the same rule
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upon remand, significant doubt exists that EPA correctly promulgated the rule. The first
2
Allied-Signal factor supports vacatur of the certification rule.
3
THE DISRUPTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF VACATUR.
4
The second Allied-Signal factor considers the disruptive consequences of vacatur.
5
Intervenor defendants argue that “[r]einstating the prior rule would result in substantial
6
disruption from general whipsawing of both regulators and regulated entities” and raise several
7
hypothetical procedural issues (Intervenors Br. 16, 18). The rule has only been in effect for
8
thirteen months. This is insufficient time for institutional reliance to build up around the
9
current rule, which has been under attack since before day one. This order finds vacatur will
10
not intrude on any justifiable reliance.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
B.
Moreover, the whipsawing intervenor defendants would ascribe to vacatur clearly arose
12
from EPA’s promulgation of a revised certification rule that dramatically broke with fifty years
13
of precedent, and subsequent complete course reversal by the agency less than nine months
14
later. EPA asserted in a June 2021 notice that it will not reinstate wholesale the previous
15
certification rule from 1971 (Goodin Decl. ¶ 13). However, EPA’s statements here that it will
16
“restore” the principles of cooperative federalism and that it plans to address nearly every
17
substantive change the current certification rule introduced suggest vacatur will prove less
18
disruptive than leaving the current rule in place until Spring 2023.
19
Our court of appeals has measured the disruptive consequences of vacating an EPA rule
20
by measuring the extent to which a faulty rule could result in possible environmental harm. To
21
that end, our court of appeals has chosen not to vacate an EPA rule when setting aside listing
22
of a snail species as endangered would have risked potential extinction of that species, and
23
when vacating could have, in part, led to air pollution that would undermine the goals of the
24
Clean Air Act. On the other hand, our court of appeals did vacate an EPA action that could
25
have affected sensitive bee populations. See Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532–33 (bees); CCAT, 688
26
F.3d at 994 (air); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1995)
27
(snails).
28
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1
Plaintiffs have established that significant environmental harms will likely transpire
2
should remand occur without vacatur. This order finds particularly persuasive the State of
3
Washington’s example concerning three hydropower dams on the Skagit River. These dams
4
will each require Section 401 certifications prior to EPA’s promulgation of a replacement for
5
the current certification rule. As noted in the State of Washington’s brief, “because FERC
6
licenses for dams will last between 30–50 years, the lack of adequate water quality conditions
7
attached to these licenses will have adverse impacts for a generation” (States Opp. 7). As
8
Loree’ Randall, Washington’s Section 401 Policy Lead, explains, the new certification rule
9
curtails restrictions certifying authorities can impose on dams to limit increases in water
10
temperature. The threatened Chinook salmon that reside in the Skagit River are vulnerable to
11
these changes in water temperature, which puts at risk a primary food source for the
12
endangered Southern Resident Orca population in Puget Sound, of which there are currently
13
only seventy-three, the lowest number in over four decades (Randall Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10–11).
14
Intervenor defendants argue that overreach by certifying authorities under the old rule led
15
to negative economic effects, pointing to several energy projects that failed or had additional
16
restrictions placed upon them (Intervenors Br. 4). This order duly considers the economic
17
effects of vacatur — and temporary reinstatement of the previous rule — but notes that our
18
court of appeals has focused more on environmental consequences when considering whether
19
to vacate EPA rules, and the Clean Water Act has the express goal “to restore and maintain the
20
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
21
Progress towards this goal carries inherent economic effects. This order finds the disruptive
22
environmental effects should remand occur without vacatur described by plaintiffs outweighs
23
the disruptive economic consequences of vacatur described by intervenor defendants. The
24
economic harms intervenor defendants proffer also do not outweigh the significant doubts that
25
EPA correctly promulgated the current certification rule. See Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532;
26
CCAT, 688 F.3d at 994; Zinke, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 775; Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v.
27
Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1242–43 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
28
(Judge Nathanael M. Cousins). This order finds the second Allied-Signal factor supports
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vacatur because the disruptions caused by vacatur and the imposition of an interim rule do not
2
outweigh the deficiencies of the current rule.
3
Finally, EPA and intervenor defendants have cited several cases that also reviewed the
4
certification rule (Reply Br. 2). This order considers the analysis in each of these opinions, to
5
the extent they seriously and substantively examined remand and vacatur, but ultimately finds
6
Pascua Yaqui Tribe, an opinion on another EPA rule with the most thorough analysis, to be the
7
most persuasive. 2021 WL 3855977. In that opinion, Judge Rosemary Márquez of our circuit
8
vacated EPA’s rule that narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States” upon remand
9
to the agency. In two of the decisions EPA cited here, Judge Richard Seeborg of our district
10
filed short orders remanding to EPA challenges to the rule at issue in Pascua Yaqui Tribe,
11
finding the issue of vacatur moot (Dkt. No. 161). See California v. Regan, No. C 20-03005
12
RS, Dkt. No. 271 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021); WaterKeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, No. C 18-03521
13
RS, Dkt. No. 125 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021). In dicta, both brief orders stated the court would
14
have been disinclined to impose vacatur. Both orders, however, based that conclusion on a
15
previous order that denied a motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground that plaintiffs
16
were unlikely to succeed on the merits proving the rule was legally erroneous. See California
17
v. Regan, No. C 20-03005 RS, Dkt. No. 171 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2020). These orders,
18
accordingly, premised their disinclination to impose vacatur on an issue evaluated by the first
19
Allied-Signal prong, which here supports vacatur.
20
In sum, the Allied-Signal factors support vacatur of the certification rule upon remand to
21
EPA, which will result in a temporary return to the rule previously in force until Spring 2023,
22
when EPA finalizes a new certification rule. See Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th
23
Cir. 2005).
CONCLUSION
24
25
26
As explained, the motion for remand is GRANTED. Upon remand the current certification
rule, 40 C.F.R. Part 121, is VACATED.
27
28
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Intervenor defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. No. 148) is DENIED. Being unnecessary for
2
the resolution of this motion, EPA’s request for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 157) is DENIED AS
3
MOOT.
4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
6
Dated: October 21, 2021.
7
8
WILLIAM ALSUP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
7
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9
10
In re
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
CLEAN WATER ACT
RULEMAKING.
12
13
This Document Relates to:
14
ALL ACTIONS.
No. C 20-04636 WHA
No. C 20-04869 WHA
No. C 20-06137 WHA
(Consolidated)
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
STAY PENDING APPEAL
15
16
17
INTRODUCTION
18
Intervenor defendants move for a stay of the order vacating and remanding EPA’s Clean
19
Water Act Section 401 certification rule pending appeal. Intervenors’ arguments on the merits
20
and irreparable harm provide lukewarm support for a stay. On the other side, a stay would
21
substantially injure plaintiffs and does not align with the public interest. The motion is
22
DENIED.
23
STATEMENT
24
The previous order at issue here describes our facts (Dkt. No. 173). In brief, Congress
25
enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly referred to
26
as the Clean Water Act, with the express goal “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
27
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Relevant here, under
28
Section 401 of the act, a federal agency may not issue a permit or license to an applicant that
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seeks to conduct any activity that may result in any discharge into the navigable waters of the
2
United States unless the state where the discharge would originate issues a water quality
3
certification or waives the requirement. Authorized tribes and EPA can also act as certifying
4
entities. Notably: “No license or permit shall be granted if certification has been denied by the
5
State, interstate agency, or the Administrator [of the EPA], as the case may be.” 33 U.S.C. §
6
1341(a)(1). Section 401 certifications are required for certain permits issued by, for example,
7
the Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
United States District Court
Northern District of California
8
EPA employed 40 C.F.R. Part 121 to administer Section 401 certifications, which the
9
agency had promulgated a year prior to the Clean Water Act to regulate water quality
10
certifications pursuant to Section 21(b) of the FWPCA. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22,487 (Nov. 25,
11
1971), redesignated at 37 Fed. Reg. 21,441 (Oct. 11, 1972), redesignated at 44 Fed. Reg.
12
32,899 (June 7, 1979). EPA utilized this regulation unchanged for half a century. This order
13
will refer to this certification rule as the 1971 rule.
14
On September 11, 2020, EPA revised 40 C.F.R. Part 121 in accordance with President
15
Trump’s Executive Order 13,868, which asserted that the “Federal Government must promote
16
efficient permitting processes and reduce regulatory uncertainties that currently make energy
17
infrastructure projects expensive and that discourage new investment.” 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495
18
(Apr. 15, 2019); see also 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020). The revised Section 401
19
certification rule — which this order will refer to as the 2020 rule — parted ways with the
20
1971 rule in dramatic fashion. This led to challenges to the rule by our plaintiff states, tribes,
21
and non-profit conservation groups. Those actions eventually consolidated before the
22
undersigned.
23
In October 2020, eight states and three industry groups intervened as defendants. But the
24
election of President Biden in November shifted the course of this litigation. On January 20,
25
2021, Executive Order 13,990 revoked Executive Order 13,868. The Biden administration also
26
specifically listed the 2020 rule as one agency action it planned to review. Five months later,
27
on June 2, 2021, EPA noticed its intent to revise the 2020 rule. EPA expects to finalize the
28
new certification rule by Spring 2023. 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 25, 2021); 86 Fed. Reg. 29,541
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(June 2, 2021); Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review,
2
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-list-of-
3
agency-actions-for-review/ (Jan. 20, 2021).
4
Less than a month after EPA announced it would revise the 2020 rule, the agency, in this
5
action, moved for remand of the rule without vacatur (Dkt. No. 143). Plaintiffs, opposing the
6
motion, argued that the 2020 rule should be vacated upon remand to the agency. Intervenors,
7
who had chosen not to file any briefing on EPA’s motion up to that point, filed a reply brief
8
arguing for remand without vacatur and separately moved to strike plaintiffs’ vacatur
9
arguments (Dkt. Nos. 148, 155). After a hearing on the motions, intervenors were offered the
10
opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the vacatur issue, which they did (Dkt. No. 172).
11
An October 2021 order vacated and remanded the 2020 rule (Vacatur Order, Dkt. No.
12
173). EPA has stated it will not appeal the vacatur order. Intervenors, however, now move for
13
a stay of the vacatur order pending their own appeal. To expedite the hearing on this motion,
14
defendants waived their reply briefing. This order follows oral argument held telephonically
15
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
ANALYSIS
16
17
18
Under the traditional test for a stay pending appeal, a district court considers four factors:
20
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay
will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
21
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009); see also Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999,
22
1006–07 (9th Cir. 2020).
19
23
Our court of appeals has instructed that we weigh these factors using a flexible, sliding-
24
scale approach, under which “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing
25
of another.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). The first two
26
factors are the most critical. The mere possibility of success or irreparable injury are
27
insufficient. A movant must show “at a minimum, that she has a substantial case for relief on
28
the merits.” Id. at 964, 967–68. Irreparable harm carries a higher standard: a movant must
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demonstrate irreparable harm is probable, not merely possible. We consider the final two
2
factors — which tend to merge when the government is an opposing party — once a movant
3
satisfies the first two. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435; United States v. Mitchell, 971 F.3d 993, 996 (9th
4
Cir. 2020). If a petition raises at least a serious question going to the merits, the other factors
5
can be satisfied by a showing that the balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor.
6
Leiva-Perez, 640 F.3d at 970.
7
This order will proceed through the stay factors in a moment, but offers this overview.
8
On the one hand, allowing the 1971 rule to remain in effect will give certifying entities greater
9
latitude to prescribe more conditions. This would harm those who wish to be free of further
10
requirements, such as our intervenor defendants. On the other hand, should we allow the 2020
11
rule to remain in effect, those certifying entities that wish to impose more conditions on
12
Section 401 certifications will lose the opportunity to do so. This would result in harm to
13
them. We face a crossroads where one side or the other will suffer some harm, no matter what.
14
But harm is one thing, irreparable harm another. Certifying entities that dislike more
15
conditions can simply choose not to impose additional conditions. And, a party saddled with
16
unwanted conditions can sue in district court if presented with a flawed certification process.
17
These considerations mitigate some potential harms. Ultimately, when it comes to mitigating
18
harm, prudence favors maintaining the course EPA has charted the past fifty years under the
19
1971 rule, the devil we know, rather than the devil we don’t.
20
With these overarching points in mind, this order considers each factor in turn.
21
1.
22
We start with whether intervenors can make a “strong showing” of success on the merits.
SUCCESS ON THE MERITS.
23
In light of the irreparable harm considerations previewed above, this order notes intervenors
24
need to make a commensurably stronger showing for the first factor. Intervenors assert they
25
are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal of the vacatur order based on two issues: (1)
26
whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires a complete administrative record
27
and full briefing on the merits before a reviewing court may set aside an agency action; and (2)
28
whether the vacatur order correctly applied the Allied-Signal test (Br. 9–18). This order
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questions whether intervenors have made a sufficient showing to justify a stay based on either
2
issue.
3
VACATUR PRIOR TO FULL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS.
4
Intervenors argue nothing in the APA “authorizes a court to set aside federal agency
5
action without making the predicate finding that the action was unlawful, and that decision
6
must be based on a review of the agency’s record” (Br. 10). Further, intervenors argue that the
7
vacatur order “relied chiefly on the reasoning in Center for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795
8
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241–42 (D. Colo. 2011),” which they assert is flawed in several ways (Br.
9
11–13).
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
A.
To start, intervenors’ statutory argument picks and chooses parts of the vacatur order to
11
criticize, garbling the order’s reasoning in the process. The vacatur order began with the
12
APA’s mandate that a district court “shall . . . set aside” unlawful agency actions (Vacatur
13
Order 7, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). Despite this directive, our court of appeals has repeatedly
14
held that, when equity demands, a flawed rule need not be vacated. See Pollinator
15
Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2015); Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA
16
(CCAT), 688 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2012). Relying on these opinions, the order explained that our
17
court of appeals’ “holding that even a flawed rule need not be vacated supports the corollary
18
proposition that a flaw need not be conclusively established to vacate a rule” (Vacatur Order
19
7). In other words, because federal courts have the equitable power to refrain from vacating an
20
unlawful rule despite the express requirement a court set it aside in the APA, federal courts a
21
priori retain the equitable power to vacate rules prior to a conclusive finding on the merits in
22
procedural postures such as motions for voluntary remand. Nowhere in their briefing do
23
intervenors grapple with these cases or this analysis. Moreover, as plaintiffs note: “Singular
24
equitable relief is commonplace in APA cases.” East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993
25
F.3d 640, 681 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).
26
Intervenors proceed to state general principles of law that could support their position.
27
They assert that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity “must be strictly construed,” and
28
recite the semantic canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Br. 10, citing Dep’t of the Army
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v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)). But how do these broad legal concepts apply to
2
the analysis in the vacatur order, or undermine CCAT and Pollinator? Intervenors do not say.
3
See also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982) (stating the broad tenet that
4
“a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied”).
5
Intervenors go on to assert the vacatur order did not acknowledge cases like Carpenters
6
Industry Council v. Salazar, 734 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2010) — which held the APA
7
precludes vacatur absent a conclusive judicial finding — or the policy concern that pre-merits
8
vacatur would permit an agency to repeal a rule without public notice and comment (Br. 11).
9
But the vacatur order expressly cited Carpenters Industry Council and the relevant section of
10
the Wright & Miller treatise regarding the conflicting policy implications of vacatur (Vacatur
11
Order 7). The order did not build its consideration of vacatur out of whole cloth. It cited
12
precedent from our court of appeals recognizing analogous equitable powers as well as
13
decisions by district court judges in our circuit supporting the vacatur order’s position (Vacatur
14
Order 7–8). Nor did the order ignore the policy concern that intervenors discuss. Rather, it
15
found more pertinent the competing concern that, “[l]eaving an agency action in place while
16
the agency reconsiders may deny the petitioners the opportunity to vindicate their claims in
17
federal court and would leave them subject to a rule they have asserted is invalid” (ibid).
18
19
Intervenors then attempt to distinguish Native Ecosystems, which held district courts may
vacate agency actions prior to a merits determination.
20
First, intervenors distinguish Native Ecosystems on the ground that, unlike here, the
21
agency had confessed error (Br. 11). This factual difference makes the reasoning in Native
22
Ecosystems regarding per-merits vacatur no less applicable. Moreover, this argument simply
23
puts a different spin on intervenors’ contention there must be some sort of conclusive statement
24
regarding unlawfulness in order to set aside an agency action. The vacatur order examined and
25
rejected that theory. Moreover, as explained below, step one of the Allied-Signal test does not
26
require any definitive statement on the merits. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.
27
Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
28
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Second, intervenors contend the law review article relied upon by Native Ecosystems
2
addressed remand without vacatur, not pre-merits vacatur (Br. 11–12, citing Ronald M. Levin,
3
“Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53
4
Duke L.J. 291 (2003)). Professor Levin’s article did indeed focus on remand without vacatur,
5
but the equitable principles it considered are readily applicable to the issues here, as Native
6
Ecosystems notes. See Native Ecosystems, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 n. 8. Professor Levin’s
7
article, in fact, began with a discussion of our court of appeals’ decision Idaho Farm Bureau
8
Federation v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392 (9th Cir. 1995), which both CCAT and Pollinator
9
expressly rely upon. Levin, supra, at 294.
10
Third, intervenors fault Native Ecosystems for not addressing “whether pre-adjudication
11
vacatur has any analog in the precedent of the English High Court of Chancery” (Br. 12, citing
12
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 318, 332 (1999)).
13
The argument goes no further than stating Grupo Mexicano’s holding. Intervenors provide no
14
analysis. Nor do they connect the dots back to the vacatur order. Intervenors do not
15
sufficiently raise this argument for this order to evaluate its merit.
16
Fourth, intervenors argue that Native Ecosystems “did not confront the settled principle
17
that equity cannot be invoked to evade limits imposed by law” (Br. 12, citing Porter v. Warner
18
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1946)). Once again, intervenors’ point is lost given it
19
fails to consider the vacatur order’s analysis of CCAT or the order’s citation to other
20
corroborating caselaw.
21
As explained, intervenors assert many arguments regarding pre-merits vacatur. The
22
vacatur order itself recognized that the law on this issue is unsettled and that difficult questions
23
arise when vacatur comes into play in an agency’s motion for voluntary remand (Vacatur
24
Order 7). But intervenors neither substantively address the reasoning in the vacatur order, nor
25
proffer new arguments beyond those considered and rejected in the order. Even EPA, which
26
does not fully endorse the vacatur order’s analysis, concludes that intervenors do not “fully
27
grapple” with the complexities here (EPA Opp. 4 n. 3). This order doubts whether intervenors
28
have made a sufficiently strong showing of their likelihood of success on appeal of this issue.
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2
B.
THE ALLIED-SIGNAL ANALYSIS.
The vacatur order applied the familiar Allied-Signal test when considering EPA’s remand
3
motion (Vacatur Order 8). Under Allied-Signal, the “decision whether to vacate depends on
4
[1] the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency
5
chose correctly) and [2] the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be
6
changed.” Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150–51 (quotation omitted). Intervenors argue the
7
vacatur order erroneously applied Allied-Signal. We start with Allied-Signal step one.
8
First, intervenors recapitulate their primary equitable-powers argument, saying that
9
review of the first Allied-Signal factor “can only logically occur after a court has concluded
10
that a legal error has occurred” (Br. 13). But, as the vacatur order noted, in full context, the
11
first factor considers “the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly.” This analysis
12
can be performed without a conclusive decision on the merits. Remember, Allied-Signal arose
13
from a traditional preliminary injunction analysis (Vacatur Order 8–9). Intervenors do not
14
address this reasoning.
15
Second, intervenors contend the vacatur order’s failure to conduct a severability analysis
16
constituted error. The vacatur order deemed severance unnecessary because it found “serious
17
deficiencies in an aspect of the certification rule that, in EPA’s words, ‘is the foundation of the
18
final rule and [] informs all other provisions of the final rule’” (Vacatur Order 10–11, citing 85
19
Fed. Reg. at 42,256). Intervenors assert here that severance should have occurred because
20
“[s]everal of the procedural portions of the rule merely codif[ied] what federal courts have held
21
the Clean Water Act requires,” and that just because the “scope of certification provision may
22
have been a ‘foundation’ for other parts of the rule does not mean those parts are not
23
severable” (Br. 17). Intervenors demand a provision-by-provision review to salvage
24
procedural portions of the rule that remained in force anyway. As our court of appeals
25
reminds, “we ordinarily do not attempt, even with the assistance of agency counsel, to fashion
26
a valid regulation from the remnants of the old rule.” East Bay Sanctuary, 993 F.3d at 681
27
(quotation omitted).
28
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Third, intervenors assert the vacatur order’s analysis of PUD No. 1 was erroneous (Br.
2
15–16, citing PUD No. 1of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994)).
3
The arguments intervenors proffer here are substantially similar to those considered by the
4
order. As explained in the order, EPA can change its interpretation of Section 401 and revise
5
the certification rule accordingly. But, for the 2020 rule, the agency embraced an
6
interpretation of the scope of Section 401 antithetical to the 1971 rule — which was consistent
7
with what PUD No. 1 deemed the most reasonable interpretation of the statute. It matters that
8
EPA did not merely assert a different interpretation but a contrary interpretation. As noted,
9
unexplained inconsistencies in an agency’s revisions to a rule indicate the new interpretation is
10
unreasonable and not entitled to Chevron deference (Vacatur Order 12–13). EPA failed to
11
sufficiently justify the inconsistent revisions in the 2020 rule. Without more, intervenors’
12
argument here remains unconvincing.
13
Fourth, intervenors argue the vacatur order erred by considering EPA’s declaration in
14
support of its remand motion (see Br. 16, citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196
15
(1947)). EPA’s declaration asserted that the agency harbored substantial doubts regarding
16
nearly every aspect of the 2020 rule and that it would “restore” principles of cooperative
17
federalism in its new rulemaking (Dkt. No. 143-1). The vacatur order does not run afoul of
18
Chenery by noting EPA’s opinion of the grounds upon which it based the 2020 rule. The order
19
properly focused on the final rule and its preamble (Vacatur Order 13–14). Upon a motion for
20
voluntary remand, moreover, evaluations of remand and vacatur do not occur in isolation from
21
one another. See, e.g., Safer Chemicals, Healthy Families v. EPA, 791 Fed. App’x 653, 656
22
(9th Cir. 2019); Pollinator, 806 F.3d at 532–33; CCAT, 688 F.3d at 993–94.
23
Turning to step two of Allied-Signal, intervenors contend the vacatur order failed to
24
consider the level of disruption returning to the 1971 rule would cause. As explained in our
25
framing discussion above and in the proceeding irreparable harm analysis, this speculative
26
argument does not convince. Intervenors also insist the vacatur order erred when it concluded
27
that insufficient time had elapsed since promulgation of the 2020 rule to justify any
28
institutional reliance on it (Br. 18). Intervenors’ reference to implementation documents for
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the 2020 rule do not demonstrate reliance. Intervenors also cite FERC’s rulemaking that
2
aligned its one-year deadline for certifications with the 2020 rule (Br. 18). But, as plaintiffs
3
point out, FERC explicitly disavowed the notion that it premised its rulemaking on the 2020
4
rule. See 86 Fed. Reg. 16,298, 16,299 n. 9 (Mar. 29, 2021). The 2020 rule was in effect for
5
thirteen months — and under attack since before day one — too brief and unsettled a time for
6
justifiable reliance to build up.
7
This order doubts whether intervenors have made a sufficiently strong showing on their
8
likelihood of success on the merits of their appeal of the vacatur order’s Allied-Signal analysis.
9
In sum, intervenors have not made particularly strong showings of their likelihood of
10
success on the merits. It bears emphasizing here th
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
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