Application — Louisiana, et al., Applicants v. American Rivers, et al.

Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2022

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Text

No. ______

In the Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;

STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF TEXAS;

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF

AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,

APPLICANTS,

v.

AMERICAN RIVERS; MICHAEL S. REGAN; and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ET AL.

RESPONDENTS.

APPENDIX TO APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

VOLUME III OF IV

On Application For Stay, Or, In The Alternative, On Petition For A Writ Of

Certiorari To The U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

To the Honorable Elena Kagan

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

and Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit

GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

Riverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 788-8262

(804) 788-8218 (fax)

gsibley@huntonak.com

DEIDRE G. DUNCAN

ERICA N. PETERSON

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

MISHA TSEYTLIN

Counsel of Record

SEAN T.H. DUTTON

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606

(608) 999-1240

(312) 759-1939 (fax)

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

1001 Haxall Point,

15th Floor

Richmond, VA 23219

Attorneys for Applicants

[Additional counsel on following page.]

CLARE ELLIS

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

50 California Street

Suite 1700

San Francisco, CA 94111

Attorneys for Applicants American

Petroleum Institute and Interstate

Natural Gas Association of America

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,

SOLICITOR GENERAL

JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,

DEPUTY SOLICITOR

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70804

(225) 326-6739

murrille@ag.louisiana.gov

stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov

CHARLES SENSIBA

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

401 9th Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004-2146

ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS

TROUTMAN PEPPER

HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

Three Embarcadero Center

Suite 800

San Francisco, CA 94111-4057

Attorneys for Applicant National

Hydropower Association

Attorneys for Applicant State of

Louisiana

JAMES KASTE

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE

109 State Capitol

Cheyenne, WY 82002

Additional Counsel:

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General of Montana

LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Attorney General of Arkansas

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General of Texas

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of Mississippi

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West Virginia

ERIC SCHMITT

Attorney General of Missouri

Attorneys for Applicants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Volume I

Order Regarding Motion to Relate, ECF No. 23, In re Clean Water

Act Rulemaking, No.3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 08, 2020) ................. App. 1

Motion to Intervene by the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,

Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, ECF No. 27, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-JSC (N.D. Cal.

Aug. 28, 2020) ....................................................................................................... App. 2

Order Relating to Case No.20-04869, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 02, 2020)

............................................................................................................................. App. 95

Declaration of Robin Rorick for the American Petroleum Institute In

Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support of Defendants,

ECF No.56-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA;

3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ................................................. App. 96

Declaration of Joan Dreskin for the Interstate Natural Gas Association

of America In Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support

of Defendants, ECF No. 56-2, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. September 04,

2020) .................................................................................................................. App. 105

Order Granting Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 62, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 17, 2020)................................................................................................... App. 115

First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020) .................. App. 116

Joint Case Management Statement, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water

Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA;

3:20-cv-06137 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020) ........................................................... App. 148

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 96, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 30, 2020) .................................................................................................... App. 165

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 98, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-06137-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 02, 2020) ................................................................................................... App. 197

Order Regarding Proposed Timeline For Administrative Record Completion,

ECF No. 116, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020) .................................................................................. App. 224

Order Regarding Joint Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance, ECF

No. 132, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021) ................................................................................. App. 225

EPA’S Motion for Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 143, In re Clean

Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

July 01, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 226

Volume II

Plaintiff’s Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 145, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 244

Plaintiff States’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 146, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 267

Declaration of Eileen Sobeck in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion

for Remand, ECF No. 146-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021).......................................... App. 299

American Rivers’ Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 147, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 424

EPA’s Reply In Support Of Motion For Remand Without Vacatur,

ECF No. 153, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 450

Intervenor Defendants’ Reply In Support Of Motion To Strike, ECF No. 155,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

August 19, 2021) ............................................................................................... App. 473

- ii -

Volume III

Intervenor Defendants’ Supplemental Brief On Allied-Signal Factors,

ECF No. 172, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2021) ..................................................................................... App. 478

August 2, 2021, Letter Comments From American Fuel & Petrochemical

Manufacturers, et al., Regarding Section 401 Rule, ECF No. 172-1,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 04, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 497

Declaration Of David M.S. Dewhirst, ECF No. 172-2, In re Clean Water

Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 04, 2021) ............. App. 549

Order Regarding Motion to Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 173,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Oct. 21, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 552

Final Judgment, ECF No. 176, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2021) ......................................... App. 570

Intervenor Defendants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 179,

In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 17, 2021) ................................................................................................... App. 571

Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 191, In re

Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.

Dec. 07, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 612

Intervenor National Hydropower Association’s Notice of Motion &

Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ........................................ App. 626

American Petroleum Institute and Interstate Natural Gas of America’s

Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support Thereof, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) .................. App. 638

Order Granting Intervention, ECF No. 113, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. October 09, 2020) .............. App. 666

- iii -

Volume IV

Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants’ and Intervenors-Appellants’

Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 20, In re Clean Water Act

Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. December 15, 2021)............................... App. 667

Federal Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Intervenor Defendants/

Appellants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 26, In re Clean

Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 11, 2022) ............... App. 757

Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Appellate

Jurisdiction, ECF No. 33, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 19, 2022) ....................................................... App. 783

Order Denying Stay, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,

No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. February 24, 2022) ...................................................... App. 799

- iv -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 1 of 19

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Misha Tseytlin (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

misha.tseytlin@troutman.com

Sean T.H. Dutton (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

sean.dutton@troutman.com

227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900

Chicago, IL 60606-5085

Telephone:

312.759.1920

Facsimile:

312.759.1939

T H R E E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , S U I T E 800

11

Andrea W. Wortzel (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

andrea.wortzel@troutman.com

1001 Haxall Point, 15th Floor

Richmond, VA 23219

Telephone:

804.697.1406

Facsimile:

804.697.1339

Additional Counsel listed in signature

blocks

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

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Charles Sensiba (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

charles.sensiba@troutman.com

401 9th Street N.W., Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20004

Telephone:

202.274.2850

Facsimile:

202.274.2994

Attorneys for

for Intervenor Defendant

National Hydropower Association

10

S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A L I F O R N I A 94 111-4057

T ROUTMAN P

EPPER H

AM ILTON SANDERS

S AN DERS LLP

LLP

TROUTMAN

PEPPER

HAMILTON

9

TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON

SANDERS LLP

Elizabeth Holt Andrews (SBN 263206)

elizabeth.andrews@troutman.com

Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 800

San Francisco, California 94111-4057

Telephone:

415.477.5700

Facsimile:

415.477.5710

In re: Clean Water Act Rulemaking

Lead Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Related Case Nos.

3:20-CV-04869-WHA

3

:20-CV-04869-WHA

3:20-CV-06137-WHA

3

:20-CV-06137-WHA

16

17

INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS'

DEFENDANTS’

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ALLIEDSIGNAL FACTORS

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19

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21

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25

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27

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- App. 478 -

Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 2 of 19

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T ROUTMAN P

EPPER H

AM ILTON SANDERS

S AN DERS LLP

LLP

TROUTMAN

PEPPER

HAMILTON

1

INTRODUCTION

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The Plaintiffs want this Court to strike down EPA’s

EPA's 2020 Clean Water Act Section 401

3

Certification Rule. But to get that extraordinary relief, they must prove that EPA acted arbitrarily,

4

capriciously, or contrary to law when promulgating the Rule. EPA, for its part, wants to revisit the

5

policy decisions reflected in the Certification Rule. But to change the Rule at all, EPA must go

6

through notice and comment rulemaking. The fact that Plaintiffs and EPA want these things at the

7

same time does not relax their respective burdens before this Court.

8

Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions have not met the exacting burden for vacating the

9

Certification Rule. EPA has not confessed error or admitted that any aspect of the Rule is legally

10

deficient, and the Intervenor Defendants continue to defend every aspect of the Rule in any event.

11

The Court has not received full merits briefing and has made no adjudication of error. If the Allied-

12

Signal test is applicable at all in this scenario—and it is not—Plaintiffs must show at the very first

13

step of that test that there is some legal deficiency serious enough to justify the disruptive

14

consequences of vacatur. The abbreviated discussion of the merits in Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs’ responses to EPA’s

EPA's

15

motion to remand without vacatur presents only a limited engagement with some of the many

16

features of the Certification Rule and relies on the incorrect premise that EPA has conceded the

17

Rule is unlawful. It falls well short of the predicate necessary to justify vacating agency action.

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Plaintiffs have not fully briefed any aspect of the Rule, let alone all of the Rule's

Rule’s many complicated,

19

detailed provisions and how Plaintiffs believe a severability analysis should apply here.

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The disruption that vacatur of the Rule would wreak on many states and the regulated

21

community is profound. EPA promulgated the Certification Rule to fill a regulatory void that has

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existed for nearly 50 years. The absence of clarity about basic features of the section 401

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certification process spawned a series of abuses that distorted the cooperative-federalism

24

framework on which the Clean Water Act depends. Vacating the Rule would invite the return of

25

those abuses and cast substantial uncertainty over dozens of pending certification requests and the

26

processes states have implemented in the wake of the Certification Rule. That uncertainty will lead

27

inexorably to regulatory chaos, which will trigger needless litigation.

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- App. 479 -

-2Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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TROUTMAN

PEPPER

HAMILTON

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 3 of 19

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The states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia,

2

and Wyoming (collectively the "State

“State Defendants"),

Defendants”), American Petroleum Institute ("API"),

(“API”),

3

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America ("INGAA"),

(“INGAA”), and National Hydropower Association

4

("NHA")

(“NHA”) (collectively "Intervenor

“Intervenor Defendants")

Defendants”) intervened in this case because they have

5

substantial interests that would be impaired should the Rule be vacated. Vacating the Rule without

6

holding Plaintiffs to their well-established burden as challengers to agency action would violate

7

Intervenor-Defendants’

Intervenor-Defendants' basic right as a party in civil litigation—the right to be heard on the merits

8

of the dispute and put Plaintiffs to their proof. Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs’ request for vacatur should be denied.

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BACKGROUND

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A.

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Since 1970, "[a]ny

“[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity . . .

12

which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters . . . shall provide the licensing or

13

originate.”

permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates or will originate."

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Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, 108 (Apr. 3, 1970). In 1972,

15

(“CWA”), a "total

“total restructuring"

restructuring” and "complete

“complete rewriting”

Congress enacted the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),

rewriting"

16

of

of the nation’s

nation's water pollution control laws, including the provision requiring certification. City of

17

Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (quoting legislative history); see also Federal Water

18

Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (Oct. 16, 1972)

19

U.S.C.

(codified at 33 U.

S.C. § 1341). Of particular relevance here, Congress narrowed the certification

20

“activity [that] will be conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable

requirement from "activity

21

standards,” 84. Stat. at 108 (emphases added), to a certification only "that

“that any such

water quality standards,"

22

provisions of

of sections 301, 302, 306, and 307 of

of this

discharge will comply with the applicable provisions

23

Act,” 86 Stat. at 877 (emphases added). Congress also created a prominent role for states and tribes

Act,"

24

in implementing the new regulatory program. See 33 U.S.C. 1251(b).

Clean Water Act

25

The CWA uses a "cooperative

“cooperative federalism"

federalism” approach to achieve its aims. It carves out

26

complementary roles for federal agencies, on the one hand, and states and tribes, on the other.

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CWA Section 401 gives each state and tribe an important but limited say in the licensing of federal

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- App. 480 -

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Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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AM ILTON SANDERS

S AN DERS LLP

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TROUTMAN

PEPPER

HAMILTON

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 4 of 19

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projects that could affect water quality. Specifically, federal agencies cannot license activities that

2

may result in a discharge into waters of the United States until the state or authorized tribe where

3

the discharge would originate certifies that the discharge will comply with applicable water quality

4

requirements or waives the Section 401 requirement, either affirmatively or through inaction. 33

5

U.S.C. § 1341. Section 401 authority is powerful—when triggered, state certification or waiver is

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an essential requirement for the federally-licensed activity to proceed. But to preserve the CWA's

CWA’s

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federal-state balance, that authority is also limited—Section 401 only authorizes states to address

8

water quality, and only within reasonable time limits that can never exceed one year.

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B.

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Despite the statutory change in 1972, EPA failed to revise its prior regulations, promulgated

11

in 1971, that governed the certification process, which is known as a 401 Certification. As a result,

12

for nearly fifty years, EPA’s

EPA's regulations were incongruent with the new statutory language. Cf.

13

NPDES; Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,856 (June 7, 1979) (indicating need for

14

updated certification rules). Certain states began using the incongruity and ambiguities in EPA’s

EPA's

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prior regulations effectively to veto projects based on non-water quality considerations, such as

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preferences regarding energy policy, which infringes on the federal government’s

government's exclusive

17

authority.

Certain States Abused Their Section 401 Certification Authority

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A particularly egregious example is Washington State’s

State's treatment of the Millennium Bulk

19

Terminals —

– Longview LLC project. In the course of a five-year review of the project, the State

20

compiled an Environmental Impact Statement that expressly concluded that the terminal would not

21

result in significant adverse effects on water quality, aquatic life, or designated uses; and that any

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potential water quality impacts could be fully mitigated. Ex. 1, Joint Fuel & Petroleum Industry

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Comments To Clean Water Act Section 401 Rule. And yet, the State denied the certification

24

request based on concerns about capacity of the interstate rail system, the impact of trains operating

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anywhere in that system, and impacts on the overall capacity of the Federal Columbia River

26

Navigation Channel to accommodate additional vessels at state ports. Id.

27

Other examples abound in the administrative record. In December 2017, Virginia approved

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a water quality certification for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, a $5.1 billion pipeline project that

- App. 481 -

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Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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AM ILTON SANDERS

S AN DERS LLP

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TROUTMAN

PEPPER

HAMILTON

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 5 of 19

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would transport gas produced in the Marcellus Shale region to the Mid-Atlantic region of the United

2

States. Dreskin Decl. ¶

¶ 13 (Dkt. 56-2). Virginia then included conditions regulating activities in

3

upland areas that may indirectly affect state waters beyond the scope of federal CWA jurisdiction

4

and the project's

project’s direct discharges to navigable waters. Id. According to Virginia, "all

“all proposed

5

upland activities associated with the construction, operation, maintenance, and repair of the

6

pipeline, any components thereof or appurtenances thereto, and related access roads and rights-of-

7

way,” are subject to the stringent conditions of the certification. Id. Another example took place

way,"

8

in August 2020, when North Carolina denied water quality certification for Mountain Valley

9

Pipeline Southgate, one of INGAA's

INGAA’s members, for reasons outside of water quality. Id. ¶

¶ 14. The

10

State determined that the purpose of the project was "unachievable"

“unachievable” due to the "uncertainty"

“uncertainty” of

11

completing a different pipeline project even though FERC had determined that the public

12

convenience and necessity required approval of the $468 million, 75-mile natural gas pipeline

13

project. Id.

14

States have also unlawfully exploited the regulatory ambiguity to extend the amount of time

15

they have to act on a certification request, which can effectively kill a project. One example is the

16

Constitution Pipeline, a $683 million, 124-mile natural gas pipeline designed to connect natural gas

17

production in Pennsylvania to demand in northeastern markets. Dkt. 84-1 ¶

¶ 12. The New York

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State Department of Environmental Conservation ("NYSDEC")

(“NYSDEC”) requested additional information

19

and deemed the request complete in December 2014. Id. In April 2015, NYSDEC requested that

20

the API member withdraw and resubmit its request in order to restart the statutory period of time

21

that NYSDEC had to act on the request. Id. In April 2016, nearly three years after the project's

project’s

22

initial request for certification, NYSDEC denied water quality certification. Following litigation

23

over NYSDEC's

NYSDEC’s determination, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")

(“FERC”) determined in

24

August 2019 that NYSDEC had waived the Section 401 certification requirement.

25

Nevertheless, after years of delay, the project's

project’s sponsor halted investment in the pipeline and

26

cancelled the project in February 2020. Id.

Id.

27

The Millennium Pipeline Company faced a similar roadblock when it submitted a

28

certification request to NYSDEC for the Millennium Valley Lateral project, a 7.8-mile pipeline

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Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 6 of 19

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connecting a natural gas mainline to a new natural gas-fueled combined cycle electric generation

2

facility in New York. Id. ¶

¶ 13. Nearly two years after the project's

project’s initial request for certification,

3

NYSDEC denied certification on the grounds that FERC's

FERC’s environmental review of the project

4

lacked an adequate analysis of the potential downstream greenhouse gas emissions, not water

5

quality concerns. Id. In September 2017, FERC concluded that NYSDEC's

NYSDEC’s twenty-one-month

6

delay constituted waiver of the certification requirement, and the Second Circuit agreed. See N.Y.

7

State Dep't

Dep’t of

of Env

Env’t't Conservation v. Fed. Energy Regal.

Regul. Comm’n,

Comm'n, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018).

8

A number of courts have recognized that allowing states to delay the start of the period of

9

review violates the CWA's

CWA’s plain text. The Second Circuit concluded that the CWA creates a

10

“bright-line rule"

rule” that the "receipt"

“receipt” of a Section 401 request is the beginning of the state's

state’s one-year

"bright-line

11

period for review. Id. at 455. As the D.C. Circuit explained, "the

“the purpose of the waiver provision

12

is to prevent a State from indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding by failing to issue a

13

timely water quality certification under Section 401."

401.” Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643

14

F.3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The D.C. Circuit thereafter invalidated the process of withdrawing

15

and refiling the same Section 401 request in order to restart the review period. Hoopa Valley

Valley Tribe

16

v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

17

C.

18

An update to the 1971 regulations was necessary to conform the regulations to the 1972

19

CWA amendments and to provide necessary clarity and transparency that would also remedy the

20

“[t]he Agency's

Agency’s

abuses described above. 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020). EPA explained that "[t]he

21

longstanding failure to update its regulations created the confusion and regulatory uncertainty that

22

were ultimately the cause of those controversial section 401 certification actions and the resulting

23

litigation." 85 Fed. Reg. 42227. In particular, EPA cited the D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit

litigation.”

24

decisions discussed above as recognizing that allowing states to extend their review beyond one

25

year is contrary to the CWA. Id.

EPA Adopts The Section 401 Certification Rule

26

The Rule fixes these problems. The Rule begins by defining fourteen key terms, most of

27

which are not defined in the Clean Water Act. 40 C.F.R. § 121.1; see also 85 Fed. Reg. at 42237

28

- App. 483 -

-6Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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(describing the need for definitional clarity achieved through EPA’s

EPA's rulemaking process). The Rule

2

then reaffirms EPA’s

EPA's longstanding interpretation of when a water quality certification is required

3

under Clean Water Act section 401. 40 C.F.R. § 121.2; 85 Fed. Reg. 42237 ("Section

(“Section 121.2 of the

4

final rule is consistent with the Agency's

Agency’s longstanding interpretation and is not intended to alter the

5

scope of applicability established in the CWA.").

CWA.”). The Rule sets out the scope of certification, as

6

developed through the rulemaking process. 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. The Rule provides a procedure to

7

ensure meaningful coordination occurs between project proponents and state and tribal certifying

8

authorities before the certification process even begins. 40 C.F.R. § 121.4 (Pre-filing meeting

9

request). The Rule lays out a uniform procedure for establishing the reasonable period of time for

10

states and tribes to act on a certification request, clear rules for when that period of time begins and

11

ends, and a procedure for communicating to all parties when the period of time begins and ends.

12

40 C.F.R. §§ 121.5-9.

121.5–9. The Rule requires an action on a certification request, whether it is a grant,

13

grant with conditions, or a denial of certification, to be in writing and to contain certain information

14

that explains the state or tribe's

tribe’s action. 40 C.F.R. § 121.7; 85 Fed. Reg. 42256 (explaining that such

15

requirements are intended to promote the development of comprehensive administrative records

16

for certification actions and to increase transparency). The Rule describes the effect of certain

17

actions and explains how waiver of the certification requirement can occur proactively or by

18

operation of law. 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.8-9.

121.8–9. The Rule also provides a procedure for neighboring

19

jurisdictions to participate in the certification process, as required by the Clean Water Act, 40

20

C.F.R. §§ 121.12; describes how certification conditions are to be enforced, 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.11;

21

and describes EPA’s

121.13–16.

EPA's role as a certifying authority and advisor, 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.13-16.

22

23

D.

Plaintiffs Bring This Lawsuit, EPA Moves To Remand Without Vacatur, And

Then Plaintiffs Ask This Court To Vacate The Rule.

24

Plaintiffs are three groups who filed complaints in this Court: Idaho Rivers United,

25

American Rivers, California Trout, and American Whitewater (collectively "Plaintiff

“Plaintiff American

26

Rivers”), Dkt. 75; twenty states and the District of Columbia (collectively "Plaintiff

“Plaintiff States”),

Rivers"),

States"), Dkt.

27

96; and Columbia Riverkeeper, Sierra Club, Suquamish Tribe, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe,

28

- App. 484 -

-7Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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Orutsaramiut Native Council (collectively "Plaintiff

“Plaintiff Tribes”),

Tribes"), Dkt. 98. Intervenor Defendants

2

moved to intervene to defend the Rule, Dkt. 27, and this Court granted their motions, Dkt. 62.

3

On January 20, 2021, President Biden directed "all

“all executive departments and agencies . . .

4

to immediately review and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, take action to address

5

the promulgation of Federal regulations and other actions during the last 4 years that conflict with"

with”

6

the new Administration's

Administration’s objectives. EO 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 25, 2021). In a press

7

statement the same day, the Administration identified the Certification Rule as among those that

8

would be reviewed under President Biden's

Biden’s Executive Order.1

Order.1

9

On June 2, 2021, EPA pointed to the Executive Order and announced it intended to

10

reconsider and revise the Certification Rule. Notice of

of Intention to Reconsider and Revise the Clean

11

Water

Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 29541 (June 2, 2021). EPA then moved for

12

remand without vacatur in this case, Dkt. 143 at 2, among others. Although EPA noted "substantial

“substantial

13

concerns” with some portions of the Rule, EPA made clear that it was not confessing error. Id. at

concerns"

14

13. Without filing a motion of their own, Plaintiffs argued for vacatur in their oppositions, while

15

failing to meaningfully discuss most aspects of the Rule. See generally Dkts. 145-47.

145–47.

16

ARGUMENT

17

I.

19

Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Vacatur Because They Have Utterly Failed To Show

That They Satisfy The First Allied-Signal

Allied-Signal Factor

A.

Plaintiffs Failed To Establish The Necessary Legal Predicate For Application

Of The First Allied-Signal Factor, Rendering Such Relief Unavailable

20

Plaintiffs failed to establish the predicate for vacatur and thus the application of the first

21

Allied-Signal factor—that the rule is, in fact, unlawful—and thus their request for vacatur should

22

be denied on that basis alone. The first Allied-Signal factor asks how "serious[

“serious[ ]"

]” the agency's

agency’s

23

errors are. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,

150–51 (D.C. Cir.

Comm 'n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51

24

1993). This assessment of error can only logically occur after a court has concluded that a legal

25

error has occurred. See id. (applying the two-factor test after determining that the agency acted

18

26

27

28

11 Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review, White House (Jan. 20, 2021),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-listofagency-actions-for-review/.

- App. 485 -

-8Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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without "reasoned

“reasoned decision-making");

decision-making”); Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532

2

(9th Cir. 2015) (same). And there is good reason for that well-established approach. Vacating a

3

rule prior to adjudicating the merits affords plaintiffs complete relief without ever proving the

4

merits of their case, while also circumventing the Administrative Procedure Act's

Act’s ("APA")

(“APA”) notice-

5

and-comment requirements for repeal of a rule. See Nat'l

Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass

Ass’n

'n v. Salazar,

6

660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[G]ranting

(“[G]ranting vacatur here would allow the Federal defendants

7

to do what they cannot do under the APA, repeal a rule without public notice and comment, without

8

judicial consideration of the merits.");

merits.”); accord Maine v. Wheeler,

Wheeler, No. 1:14-cv-00264-JDL, 2018

9

WL 6304402, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2018); California v. Regan, No. 20-cv-03005-RS, 2021 WL

10

4221583, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021) ("there

(“there has been no evaluation of the merits—or

11

concession by defendants—that would support a finding that the rule should be vacated").

vacated”). And

12

unlike the cases that Plaintiffs cite to advocate that vacatur before full adjudication on the merits is

13

permissible, see Dkts. 146 at 19, 147 at 2-3,

2–3, here there remains a live controversy between the

14

parties regarding the legality of the Rule because Intervenor Defendants would vigorously defend

15

every aspect of the Rule from legal challenge.

16

To the extent that it ever would be appropriate for a court to vacate a rule that a party in the

17

case is defending on the merits without issuing a decision on the rule’s

rule's legality—and to be clear, it

18

would never be permissible—that type of relief could only be ordered after full merits briefing. To

19

illustrate, the district court in Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, __ F. Supp.

20

3d __,, 2021 WL 3855977 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021), vacated a rule without making a merits

21

determination on the rule's

rule’s legality,

legality,22 but at least in that case the plaintiffs submitted a full 61-page

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

2

The Pascua Yacqui Tribe court observed that two Ninth Circuit cases indicate that "in

“in the Ninth

adjudication.”

Circuit, remand with vacatur may be appropriate even in the absence of a merits adjudication."

Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 2021 WL 3855977 at *4 (citing Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d

989 (9th Cir. 2012); Safer Chemicals, Healthy Fams. v. EPA, 791 F. App'x

App’x 653 (9th Cir. 2019)).

But both of those Ninth Circuit cases involved different circumstances than those presented here.

In California Communities Against Toxics, no party defended EPA’s

EPA's reasons for adopting the rule

as legally permissible, with EPA seeking to salvage the rule based on new reasoning not found in

the administrative record, 688 F.3d at 993, which it cannot do, see id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,

318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)). Similarly, in Safer Chemicals, EPA asked for remand with vacatur, thus

App’x at 656.

conceding the rule was unlawful, and no party opposed such relief. 791 F. App'x

- App. 486 -

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Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 10 of 19

1

merits brief, see No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, Dkt. 48, and intervenor-defendants submitted a

2

response in support of the rule, see id. Dkt. 77. The court considered all of these fully briefed and

3

developed merits arguments and only then concluded that there were serious errors on the first

4

Allied-Signal factor, finding

“fundamental, substantive flaws."

flaws.” Pasqua Yaqui Tribe, 2021 WL

fmding "fundamental,

5

3855977, at *5. Here, on the other hand, as discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs have not fully

6

briefed any aspect of their legal challenges to the Rule, let alone all of the Rule's

Rule’s many complicated,

7

detailed provisions and how they would approach the issue of severability.

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B.

9

The Limited Discussion of the Merits That Plaintiffs Submitted Is Insufficient

For This Court To Hold That Any Aspect Of The Rule Is Unlawful Under

The First Allied-Skenal

Allied-Signal Factor, Let Alone That The Entire Rule Is Unlawful

10

Plaintiffs have failed to present to this Court anything resembling a developed argument as

11

to why any aspect of the Rule fails on the first Allied-Signal factor, which provides an independently

12

sufficient basis for denying their request. In particular, the State Plaintiffs do not develop any

13

argument that any aspect of the Rule is unlawful, instead claiming that EPA, as a general matter,

14

Rule’s illegality in various statements. See Dkt. 146 at 20-21.

20–21. The Tribes Plaintiffs,

admitted the Rule's

15

in turn, also fail to develop any argument that the Rule is unlawful, merely listing three general

16

considerations—“(1) the agency failed to provide sufficient justification for departing from a half

considerations—"(1)

17

century of practice and policy related to the interpretation and implementation of Section 401; (2)

18

it based its decision to do so on an [Executive Order] aimed at promoting fossil fuel infrastructure,

19

not clean water; and (3) EPA did not present any explanation for how the [ ] Rule would be more

20

States' claim that EPA

protective of water quality,”

quality," Dkt. 145 at 12—and then parroting the Plaintiff States’

21

12–13. American Rivers Plaintiffs do make a few

somehow admitted these errors, Dkt. 145, at 12-13.

22

4–10, while pointing to the same

brief arguments on a couple of aspects of the Rule, Dkt. 147 at 4-10,

23

10, but such perfunctory analysis is nowhere near

claimed concession by EPA, see Dkt. 147 at 9,

9,10,

24

Rule’s legality.

developed enough for this Court to make any judgment as to the Rule's

25

Rule’s

As a threshold matter, all of these Plaintiffs are simply wrong that EPA conceded the Rule's

26

illegality, and any such concession would be legally insufficient in any event, given that Intervenor

27

Defendants are parties in this case and defend fully every aspect of the Rule.

EPA has

28

- App. 487 -

-10Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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unequivocally denied that it made any concession. See generally Sept. 30,2021

30, 2021 Hr'g.

Hr’g. Instead,

2

EPA merely stated that it "will

“will undertake a new rulemaking effort to propose revisions due to

3

substantial concerns with the existing Rule."

Rule.” Dkt. 143 at 2, see id. at 7, 8; see Dkt. 155 at 2-3.

2–3. EPA

4

could not in fact concede anything as to the Rule's

Rule’s legality without violating the APA. EPA is

5

currently in the middle of its rulemaking process, Dkt. 153 at 2; see Dkt. 155 at 3, during which

6

process the agency must keep an open mind on all issues, including as to whether to retain the entire

7

Rule, Rural Cellular Ass

Ass’n

1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Dkt. 155 at 2-3.

2–3.

'n v. F.C.C., 588 F.3d 1095,1101

8

Plaintiffs also failed to satisfy the first Allied-Signal factor because the few merits

9

arguments that they briefly mention are mismatched entirely with the full vacatur remedy that they

10

seek. The Rule is complex and multifaceted, with many operative provisions that cover numerous

11

topics. See supra pp. 6–7.

6-7. Plaintiffs assert that the errors in the Rule are significant, but their

12

arguments only touch on a few discrete sections, which Plaintiffs discuss out of context, Dkt. 146

13

at 20-21,

20–21, or only offer passing speculative harms, rather than cite to actual alleged legal errors in

14

the Rule, Dkt. 146 at 4-14.

4–14. At most, Plaintiffs address a fraction of the Rule's

Rule’s provisions, cherry-

15

picking from EPA’s

EPA's statements in its briefing rather than the Rule itself, see Dkt. 146 at 20-21,

20–21, and

16

vaguely alluding to "other

“other detrimental provisions"

provisions” without any elaboration, see, e.g., Dkt 146 at 7.

17

Plaintiffs also fail to provide any severability analysis, which would be mandatory if Plaintiffs want

18

this Court to vacate the entire Rule. See Carlson v. Postal Regul. Comm’n,

337, 351–52

Comm'n, 938 F.3d 337,351-52

19

(D.C. Cir. 2019). For example, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that EPA "would

“would [not] have

20

adopted” the various aspects of the Section 401 Rule if some other aspects were declared invalid.

adopted"

21

Id. Courts, after all, must ordinarily "limit

“limit the solution to the problem"

problem” that the plaintiff has

22

demonstrated. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Wheeler,

68, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting

Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68,82

23

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of

of N

N. New England, 546 U.S. 320,328-29

320, 328–29 (2006)).

24

25

26

27

28

The same conclusion follows if this Court looks at the specific, brief arguments that the

various Plaintiffs groups included in their vacatur requests.

The State Plaintiffs make no substantive argument with regard to the legality of any aspect

of the Rule. See generally Dkt. 146.

The Tribes Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs’ one-paragraph merits "argument"

“argument” is conclusory and without merit.

- App. 488 -

-11Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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See Dkt. 145 at 11-12.

11–12. The Tribes Plaintiffs make broad claims about the Rule's

Rule’s "serious

“serious legal

2

errors,” namely that the Rule "runs

“runs afoul"

afoul” of the CWA's

CWA’s text, purpose, and "cooperative

“cooperative federalist

errors,"

3

framework”

Rule’s purported

framework" without developing these claims beyond a brief description of the Rule's

4

effect. Dkt. 145 at 11-12.

11–12. Such an undeveloped argument fails. Cal. Pac. Bank v. Fed. Deposit

5

Ins. Corp., 885 F.3d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Inadequately

(“Inadequately briefed and perfunctory arguments

6

are [ ] waived.");

waived.”); Wells

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d 898, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

7

Notably, EPA addressed concerns related to these issues in the Rule's

Rule’s preamble. See 85 Fed. Reg.

8

42226 (responding to public comments that the "rule

“rule is inconsistent with the concept of cooperative

9

federalism”),

42228–29 (responding to public comments about the Rule's

Rule’s adherence to the

federalism"), id. at 42228-29

10

statutory text and outlining the scope of EPA authority to clarify the statute), see also 42215 (listing

11

the changes made to the proposed Rule after consideration of public comments). The Tribes

12

Plaintiffs do not even attempt to explain what aspect of EPA’s

EPA's discussion was legally incorrect with

13

any sufficient clarity to allow Defendant Intervenors to address that argument, or for this Court to

14

evaluate whether that argument carries the day under the first Allied-Signal factor.

15

16

The American Rivers Plaintiffs, in turn, offer various critiques of the Section 401 Rule that

are too conclusory and meritless to prevail under the first Allied-Signal factor.

17

These Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs’ attack on the Rule's

Rule’s scope of certification is insufficiently developed for

18

this Court to evaluate this aspect of the Rule's

Rule’s legality and, in any event, is wrong. See Dkt. 147 at

19

5–7.

Rule’s scope of certification "is

“is inconsistent with the Clean Water Act"

Act”

5-7. They argue that the Rule's

20

and that the definitions of "discharge"

“discharge” and "water

“water quality requirements”

“bear little resemblance to

requirements" "bear

21

how the Clean Water Act defines those terms."

terms.” Dkt. 147 at 5–7.

5-7. But the Clean Water Act does not

22

provide "a

“a single, clear, and unambiguous definition of the appropriate scope of section 401"

401” and

23

Section 401 does not define the terms "discharge"

“discharge” or "water

“water quality requirements,”

requirements," eliminating any

24

possible direct inconsistencies. 85 Fed. Reg. 42250. Moreover, the Rule's

Rule’s scope of certification

25

and related definitions were drafted to "reasonably

“reasonably resolve any ambiguity"

ambiguity” in the statute, after

26

taking into consideration "the

“the text and structure of the Act, as well as the history of modifications

27

between the 1970 version and the 1972 amendments."

amendments.” Id. The Rule was developed after

28

consideration of all public comments, including "varying

“varying interpretations"

interpretations” described in the

- App. 489 -

-12Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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preamble. Id. at 42256. The final definition of "water

“water quality requirements"

requirements” "strikes

“strikes a balance

2

among various competing considerations while remaining loyal to the text of the CWA"

CWA” and with

3

an intent to "provide

“provide additional clarity and regulatory certainty for certifying authorities, project

4

proponents, and federal licensing and permitting agencies."

agencies.” Id. EPA fully and correctly engaged

5

with the text and history of the Act with regard to the Section 401 certification process. See 85

6

Fed. Reg. 42229-30

42229–30 (describing the scope of certification under the Rule in the context of the

7

CWA’s text and history), id. at 42230-36

42230–36 (engaging in a plain text analysis of the statute and

CWA's

8

showing how the definitional clarifications in the Rule are supported by the ordinary meaning of

9

the text); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.2-121.11

121.2–121.11 (laying out the uniform set of certification

10

procedures). These Plaintiffs do not explain what aspect of EPA’s

EPA's discussion or legal conclusions

11

were legally insufficient. Their arguments fail to offer any concrete reasoning, and, therefore, are

12

not sufficiently developed. See Cal. Pac. Bank, 885 F.3d at 570; Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 911.

13

The American Rivers Plaintiffs claim that the Rule is unlawful because it limits states and

14

tribes to considering potential impacts of only the "discharge"

“discharge” from a proposed project, rather than

15

“the activity as a whole,"

whole,” pointing to PUD No. 1 of

of Jefferson County v. Washington

of

"the

Washington Department of

16

Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994); see Dkt. 147 at 5–7.

5-7. As EPA explained in the Rule preamble, in

17

1972 Congress replaced the word "activity"

“activity” in section 401(a) with the word "discharge"

“discharge” to reflect

18

the "total

“total restructuring"

restructuring” and "complete

“complete rewriting"

rewriting” of the statutory framework to regulate discharges

19

under the Clean Water Act. 85 Fed. Reg. 42251. "The

“The final rule gives due weight to Congress'

Congress’

20

intentional choice to change the language in section 401(a) to ensure that ‘discharges’

'discharges' from

21

federally licensed or permitted activities, rather than the activity as a whole, comply with

22

appropriate water quality requirements."

requirements.” Id. EPA concluded in the Rule preamble that the text of

23

section 401 is not unambiguous and that "the

“the variation in public comments received”

received" demonstrates

24

that "section

“section 401 is susceptible to a multitude of interpretations."

interpretations.” Id. Further, as described in the

25

Rule’s preamble, the Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 analyzed section 401 and EPA’s

EPA's prior

Rule's

26

regulations and concluded, based on its interpretation, that certification conditions and limitations

27

could be based on the activity as a whole, not just the discharge. 85 Fed. Reg. 42251. The American

28

Rivers Plaintiffs appear to believe that the Supreme Court's

Court’s decision was based on a plain language

- App. 490 -

-13Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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analysis of the Clean Water Act, such that EPA would have no authority to interpret this language.

2

But "[n]owhere

“[n]owhere in the opinion does the Court conclude that section 401 is unambiguous. In fact,

3

the Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 offered its own interpretation of the ambiguous language in

4

section 401 when it ‘reasonably

'reasonably read’

read' the scope of section 401 to allow conditions and limitations

5

on the activity as a whole."

whole.” Id. EPA also noted that the Court "found

“found the EPA's

EPA’s regulations to be

6

consistent with the Court's

Court’s own reasonable reading of the language in sections 401(a) and (d)."

(d).” Id.

7

These Plaintiffs assert that PUD No. 1 is "binding,"

“binding,” Dkt. 147 at 5, but fail to acknowledge that EPA

8

analyzed applicable law and concluded that the scope of certification established in 40 C.F.R. §

9

121.3 "is

“is not foreclosed by the holding in PUD No. 1"

1” because the Court's

Court’s conclusion "did

“did not

10

follow from the unambiguous terms of the statute,"

statute,” and thus the agency could use its delegated

11

rulemaking authority to adopt a different approach, 85 Fed. Reg. 42251.

12

The American Rivers Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs’ limited argument that the Rule limits or circumscribes

13

states’ abilities to implement their certification programs is meritless. The American Rivers

states'

14

Plaintiffs offer no support for their sweeping assertion that the Rule "impermissibly

“impermissibly intrudes on the

15

states’ and tribes'

tribes’ ability to effectively manage their 401 certification programs and meaningfully

states'

16

review federally licensed projects."

projects.” Dkt. 147 at 7-9.

7–9. As such, this perfunctory argument is also

17

waived. See Cal. Pac. Bank, 885 F.3d at 570; Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 911. In any event, Plaintiff

18

American Rivers'

Rivers’ discontent with the procedures set out in the Certification Rule is just that—

19

subjective discontent. But nothing suggests that these procedures are illegal. The Certification

20

Rule simply establishes predictable and consistent procedures for certification processes, regardless

21

of what state or tribe is issuing certification. EPA explained in the Rule preamble, "[a]s

“[a]s the Agency

22

charged with administering the CWA, as well as a certifying authority in certain instances, the EPA

23

is responsible for developing a common regulatory framework for certifying authorities to follow

24

when completing section 401 certifications."

certifications.” 85 Fed. Reg. 42211 (footnote omitted). Throughout

25

the Rule preamble, EPA provides legal rationale and support for each of the procedures that the

26

American Rivers Plaintiffs complain are illegal, but the Plaintiffs do not acknowledge let alone

27

rebut EPA’s

42240–43 (explaining the basis for a

EPA's analysis or conclusions. See, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg, 42240-43

28

pre-filing meeting request and responding to public comments concerning same); 42243-49

42243–49

- App. 491 -

-14Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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TROUTMAN

PEPPER

HAMILTON

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1

(explaining the rationale for establishing a specific set of information to be included in a

2

certification request; the statutory basis for starting the reasonable period of time "upon

“upon receipt"

receipt” of

3

a certification request; and responding to public comments concerning same); 42258-63

42258–63

4

(explaining the timeline for certification actions; concluding that federal permit and licensing

5

agencies "should

“should continue to [establish the reasonable period of time] as they have done for the

6

past several decades";

decades”; explaining the factors that must be considered when establishing the

7

reasonable period of time; providing federal agencies maximum flexibility in establishing the

8

reasonable period of time by declining to adopt a default reasonable period of time of six months;

9

explaining procedures for requesting an extension of the established reasonable period of time;

10

explaining that the Clean Water Act does not contain any provisions for tolling the reasonable

11

period of time for any reason; providing legal citations to applicable case law; responding to public

12

comments concerning same).

13

II.

Vacating The Rule Would Cause Significant Disruption To Pending Section 401

Reviews

14

The Certification Rule fills a gaping regulatory void. It sets basic rules for the section 401

15

16

17

18

19

20

process, including a common rule for defining when the clock starts on a state's

state’s reasonable period

of time to act on a certification request and procedures for establishing how much time is

reasonable. And critically, it more clearly defines the scope of authority granted by Congress in

section 401, so that section 401 cannot be used by states to make policy decisions squarely reserved

to the federal government and thereby impair the interests of other states. Vacating the rule would

eliminate these salutary improvements and return to the dysfunction fostered by EPA’s

EPA's decades-

21

long failure to set basic rules for the section 401 process.

22

Most problematic is the interstate conflict that a return to the old regime is sure to foster.

23

24

Before the Certification Rule, some states—including some Plaintiff States—used the prior

outdated rules to exert control over activities in other states and to protect their own industries.

industries.33

25

26

27

28

“[o]ne of the

33 The abuses under the prior rule raise issues of constitutional magnitude. Indeed, "[o]ne

major defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a compelling reason for the calling of the

Constitutional Convention of 1787, was the fact that the Articles essentially left the individual

States free to burden commerce both among themselves and with foreign countries very much as

pleased.” Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,

“source of

they pleased."

Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976). A particular "source

- App. 492 -

-15Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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HAMILTON

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1

See, e.g., Lighthouse Resources Letter (Dkt. 27-7 at 1-4).

1–4). Even when states did not outright deny

2

section 401 certifications, they imposed uncertainty, never-ending demands for information,

3

interminable delays, and conditions unrelated to the discharges actually regulated by the CWA.

4

The result was to greatly increase the cost of some interstate projects and fully defeat others, with

5

attendant harms to other states'

states’ economies and ability to develop their natural resources. See Rorick

6

Decl (Dkt. 56-1); Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2). Curbing such abuses is a core benefit of the Rule.

7

There is no reason to think the abuses won't

won’t return if the Certification Rule is vacated.4

vacated.4

8

More practically, the Rule would upend the substantial progress made by states and federal

9

agencies to improve the section 401 process in the wake of the Certification Rule. Reinstating the

10

prior rule would result in substantial disruption from general whipsawing of both regulators and

11

regulated entities. Ex. 2, Declaration of David M.S. Dewhirst ¶

¶ 8. Such uncertainty and the

12

attendant risk of delay deters large capital projects that benefit the Intervenor Defendant States

13

economically and, indeed, which are necessary for the development of their natural resources. Id.

14

¶¶ 7-9. And that is without even considering the likely return of the outright abuses the Certification

'Irlf

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of some of the States, which having no convenient ports

for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, [through] whose ports, their

on.” Id. (quoting Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Fan-and

Farrand

commerce was carryed on."

“By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on

ed. 1966)). "By

interstate commerce without congressional approval, [the Commerce Clause] strikes at one of the

chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that

commerce.” Comptroller of

of Treasury of

of Md. v. Wynne,

burdened interstate commerce."

Wynne, 575 U.S. 542 (2015)

(citations omitted); see also Tenn. Wine

Wine and Spirits Retailers Assoc. v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449,

(“[W]e have long held that this Clause also prohibits state laws that unduly restrict

2459 (2019) ("[W]e

interstate commerce[.]”);

commerce[.]"); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949) (holding

denial of license for new milk facility to be unconstitutional protectionism). Accordingly, a State

“may not use the threat of economic isolation"

isolation” to control its sister states. Great Atl. &

certainly "may

Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976).

23

The Intervenor Defendant States asserted as affirmative defenses that Plaintiffs had "neither

“neither

factual nor legal support for injunctive or equitable relief,"

relief,” "[a]ny

“[a]ny claim for injunctive or equitable

Plaintiffs’ unclean hands,”

“Plaintiffs’ theories would render the Clean Water

relief is barred by Plaintiffs'

hands," and "Plaintiffs'

part.” Answer (Dkt. 82) at 20. Intervenor Defendant States have

Act unconstitutional in whole or part."

not had the opportunity to take discovery on these defenses, but the existing record supports

widespread unclean hands by Plaintiffs, such that any claim to equitable relief is barred. See, e.g.,

Lighthouse Resources Letter (Dkt. 27-7); Rorick Decl. (Dkt. 56-1) I¶¶ 11-15; Dreskin Decl. (Dkt.

56-2) I¶¶ 8-14.

4

4

24

25

26

27

28

- App. 493 -

-16Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

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1

Rule was intended to address. At the federal level, multiple federal agencies have applied the new

2

rule to pending actions. Since 2020, EPA has issued a number of implementation documents,

3

including recommended best practices and template certifications that can be used by states and

4

tribes in different circumstances.

5

completed its own notice-and-comment rulemaking in March 2021 to set a uniform one-year

6

deadline for states to complete certification actions on FERC authorizations and to explain how

7

that time-period would be calculated. Waiver of the Water Quality Certification Requirements of

8

Section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 16298 (Mar. 29, 2021).

EPA, 2020 Rule Implementation Materials. 55 And FERC

9

Vacating the Rule would cast doubt on these independent regulatory actions, and the

10

businesses and municipalities that need section 401 certifications for critical infrastructure projects

11

would shoulder the burden of that disruption. See Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) 'Irlf

¶¶ 21, 23. These new

12

rules and procedures are now being applied to thousands of pending requests for section 401

13

certifications. See Moyer Decl. ¶

¶ 14, N

N. Plains Resource Council v. U.S. Army Corps of

of Eng'rs,

Eng’rs,

14

No. 4:19-cv-44 (D. Mont. Apr. 27, 2020), Dkt. 131-1 (explaining that "[o]n

“[o]n average, the Corps

15

receives 3,000 standard individual permit applications annually.").

annually.”). INGAA members alone have

16

numerous certification requests pending for projects that involve billions of dollars in capital

17

investment. See, e.g., Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) 'Irlf

¶¶ 14, 22, 24. NHA members have 30 federal

18

license applications that require section 401 certifications and expect another 54 projects will be

19

required to submit licensing applications between now and October 1, 2022. Ex. 3, Declaration of

20

Dennis Cakert ¶

¶ 10. And that's

that’s just a thin sliver of the potential harm to the regulated community.

community

21

Section 401 certificates are required for all manner of infrastructure projects requiring federal

22

licenses, the vast majority of which are not connected to natural gas, petroleum projects, or

23

hydropower.

24

Vacating the Rule

Rule—especially

especially without any actual finding that any particular portion of it is

25

deficient—casts substantial uncertainty over all of those pending authorizations and raises a host

26

of questions that lack any clear answer:

27

28

5

Available at https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020-rule-implementation-materials.

'Available

- App. 494 -

-17Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 18 of 19

1

•

What regulations would apply?

2

•

What effect would the rule have on section 401 rulemakings by other agencies?

3

•

Would pending certification requests need to be resubmitted?

4

•

Would states be free engage in the same scope and timing abuses that plagued the

old regime?

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5

6

Open questions such as these will cause substantial delay in completing pending section

7

401 reviews. Ex. 3, Cakert Decl. at ¶

¶ 11; Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) In

¶¶ 21, 23, 24. Those delays

8

will impose substantial costs on the regulated community and delay critical reliability and

9

maintenance projects. Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) ¶¶21, 23. And the swirl of uncertainty is sure to

10

invite future litigation.

11

The prejudice to Intervenor Defendants of vacating the Rule is real and cannot be mitigated.

12

In contrast, Plaintiffs each have the ability to seek redress for the prejudice they claim to suffer

13

through further administrative or judicial process. Administratively, EPA and the U.S. Army Corps

14

of Engineers have both indicated their willingness to address concerns raised by Plaintiffs within

15

the context of the existing rule.

rule.66 Judicially, each Plaintiff here can challenge any particular

16

application of the Rule that causes the harms they claim they will suffer. See Pls.'

Pls.’ Opp'n

Opp’n to EPA’s

EPA's

17

Motion to Remand Without Vacatur at 9–11

9-11 (Dkt. 145).

18

CONCLUSION

19

If the Court is not persuaded by EPA’s

EPA's arguments that remand without vacatur is appropriate

20

here, the solution is to deny the EPA’s

EPA's remand motion and proceed to merits briefing. Vacating

21

the Rule without affording Intervenor Defendants the opportunity to defend the rule on the merits,

22

as Plaintiffs request, violates the most fundamental right of a party in civil litigation—the right to

23

be heard on the merits of the dispute.

24

25

26

27

Joint EPA Army Memorandum on 401 Implementation (Aug. 19, 2021), available at

https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020-rule-implementation-materials.

6

6

28

- App. 495 -

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Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 19 of 19

1

Respectfully submitted,

2

3

4

Dated: October 4, 2021

By: /s/ Elizabeth Holt Andrews

Elizabeth Holt Andrews*

pro hac vice)

Misha Tseytlin (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

Charles Sensiba (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

Andrea W. Wortzel (admitted pro

Sean T.H. Dutton (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

5

6

7

8

for Intervenor Defendant

Attorneys for

National Hydropower Association

9

T H R E E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , S U I T E 800

10

S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A L I F O R N I A 94 111-4057

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LLP

TROUTMAN

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TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP

JEFF LANDRY

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA

11

12

By: /s/ Joseph S. St. John

Elizabeth B. Murrill, Solicitor General

(admitted pro

pro hac vice)

Joseph S. St. John, Deputy Solicitor

General (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

Ryan M. Seidemann, Assistant Attorney

General (admitted pro

pro hac vice)

13

14

15

16

Attorneys for

for State Intervenor Defendants

States of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,

Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia,

and Wyoming

17

18

19

HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP

20

III

By: /s/ George P. Sibley, III

Clare Ellis

George P. Sibley, III

(admitted pro

pro hac vice)

pro hac vice)

Deidre G. Duncan (admitted pro

21

22

23

for Intervenor Defendants

Attorneys for

American Petroleum Institute and

Interstate Natural Gas Association of

America

24

25

26

27

* Pursuant to Civil L.R. 5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that concurrence in the filing of the document

/s/ Elizabeth Holt Andrews

has been obtained from each of the other Signatories. /s/

28

- App. 496 -

-19Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA

Intervenor Defendants'

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 1 of 52

EXHIBIT 1

- App. 497 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 2 of 52

r

AFPM

r

American

Fuel & Petrochemical

Manufacturers

American

Petroleum

Institute

AMERICAN

EXPLORATION

PRODUCTION

COUNCIL

iNIOEFENDENT PETROLEUM

ASSOCIATION OF APIERICA

August 2, 2021

Via Regulations..Erov

Regulations.gov

Water Docket

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

EPA West, Room 3334

1301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20004

Re:

Comments from American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Petroleum

Institute, the American Exploration and Production Council, and the Independent

Petroleum Association of America in response to the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency’s request for comment on reconsidering and revising the Clean Water Act Section

Agency's

401 Certification Rule

(EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0302)

86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021)

To whom it may concern:

This letter provides comments from the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers

(“AFPM”), the American Petroleum Institute ("APT),

(“API”), the American Exploration and Production

("AFPM"),

(“AXPC”), and the Independent Petroleum Association of America ("IPAA")

(“IPAA”)

Council ("AXPC"),

“the Associations")

Associations”) in response to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's

Agency’s

(collectively, "the

(“EPA’s” or "the

“the Agency's")

Agency’s”) request for comment on reconsidering and revising the Agency's

Agency’s

("EPA's"

2020 Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule'

Rule1 ("401

(“401 Certification Rule").2

Rule”).2 As explained

in more detail below, the 401 Certification Rule provided long-overdue clarification on the role of

(“CWA” or "the

“the

states and other certifying authorities under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"

Act”).

Act").

The clarifications furnished in the 401 Certification Rule were also necessary to address some

states’ misuse of Section 401 certification procedures in pursuit of policy goals wholly distinct

states'

from considerations of potential water quality impacts. Indeed, the 401 Certification Rule was

also necessary to incorporate a growing body of case law interpreting Section 401 of the Act

Congress’s intent to preserve for states a highly circumscribed role in evaluating a

consistent with Congress's

project’s potential impacts on certain enumerated CWA provisions.

proposed project's

The Associations therefore recommend EPA refrain from altogether setting aside the 401

Certification Rule. If EPA intends to promulgate revisions to portions of the 401 Certification

1

1 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020).

2

2 86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021).

- App. 498 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 3 of 52

Rule, we urge the Agency to do so in a way that adheres to congressional intent, conforms to

relevant current and pending court decisions, and restrains misuse of Section 401 certification

procedures. Indeed, as EPA considers revisions to the 401 Certification Rule, we are optimistic

that the Agency will recognize that Congress did not intend CWA Section 401 to allow a single

state to wield disproportionate power over projects of national importance, and to further recognize

that the imposition of reasonable limits on the disproportionate use of Section 401 certification

authority is consistent with the principles of cooperative federalism.

To that end, and the interest of constructively engaging with EPA in this reconsideration process,

the Associations provide the following comments. Because of the length of this letter, we have

included a table of contents below.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I.

SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................4

4

II.

THE ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR INTERESTS ...........................................................66

III.

GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETING CWA SECTION 401 ............................................7

7

a. Consideration of the context for, and role of, CWA Section 401 certifications ............8

8

1. Natural Gas Act of 1938 ....................................................................................8

8

2. National Environmental Policy Act .................................................................10

10

3. Other federal statutes with impact reviews and opportunities for stakeholder

11

engagement ......................................................................................................11

4. EPA must implement CWA Section 401 in accordance with Congress's

Congress’s intent

to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction through statutes like the NGA and in the

context of more comprehensive environmental review processes Congress

established through NEPA and other statutes ..................................................13

13

b. Reasonable limits on the Section 401 certification process are consistent with principles

of cooperative federalism.............................................................................................15

15

c. The legislative history of the CWA illustrates the reasonable limits Congress intended

for the Section 401 certification process ......................................................................17

17

2

- App. 499 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 4 of 52

d. Any revisions to the 401 Certification Rule must include provisions sufficient to

Congress’s statutorily prescribed time limits ...........................21

21

meaningfully enforce Congress's

CWA’s Section 401 deadlines requires a clear and objective

1. Enforcing the CWA's

starting point for review ...................................................................................23

23

2. EPA must prohibit states from artificially extending timeframes by stopping

and restarting the certification process ............................................................25

25

e. Section 401 certification is required only when a federally licensed or permitted activity

has the potential to result in a discharge from a point source to navigable waters ......27

27

f. The scope of certifying authorities'

authorities’ Section 401 review and conditioning authority is

not unbounded, and must be interpreted in accordance with the text, structure, and

history of the Act .........................................................................................................30

30

1. "Applicant"

“Applicant” ............................................................................................................31

31

2. "Any

32

“Any other appropriate requirement of State law”

law" ................................................32

IV.

35

RESPONSES TO EPA’S

EPA'S QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION .......................................35

1. Pre-filing meeting requests ................................................................................................35

35

2. Certification request ...........................................................................................................36

36

37

3. Reasonable period of time .................................................................................................37

39

4. Scope of certification .........................................................................................................39

5. Certification actions and federal agency review ................................................................42

42

44

6. Enforcement .......................................................................................................................44

7. Modification.......................................................................................................................45

45

8. Neighboring jurisdictions

jurisdictions...................................................................................................46

46

48

9. Data and other information ................................................................................................48

10. Implementation Coordination ............................................................................................49

49

V.

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................50

50

3

- App. 500 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 5 of 52

I.

SUMMARY

The Associations urge EPA to refrain from substantially revising the 401 Certification Rule.3

Rule.3 The

final rule provided a long-overdue and increasingly necessary clarification of the role of states and

other certifying authorities under Section 401 of the Act.

Section 401 certification proceedings be efficient, reasonably predictable, and appropriately

focused on potential water quality impacts. Our members are on the forefront of a transformational

era of increased domestic oil and natural gas production that has greatly enhanced U.S. energy

security and lowered consumer costs. The growth of domestic oil and natural gas production and

our ability to responsibly develop these resources in new areas of the country have created the

need for more infrastructure to safely bring these resources to refineries and processing facilities,

and ultimately, consumers. While there has been a great deal of discussion about an energy

transition away from fossil fuels, experts agree acknowledge that modern society will continue to

depend on oil and natural gas for several decades. As these products are needed in the world, it

America’s energy infrastructure. Prudent investment for the

makes sense to expand and update America's

safe and environmentally responsible movement of these critically important resources is

important for affordability and environmental protection. To those opposed to any oil or natural

America’s energy infrastructure needs are viewed as convenient

gas development, permitting of America's

opportunities to deploy regulatory and litigation strategies designed to delay needed projects and

sever resources from markets. This is counter-productive since the products are needed worldwide

and such opposition only increases costs and environmental risks, risks good-paying jobs, and

endangers energy security.

The need for an efficient and appropriately regulated certification process extends well beyond our

industry. President Biden recently announced his support for a Bipartisan Infrastructure

“transformational and historic investments

Framework that the White House anticipates will fund "transformational

in clean transportation infrastructure, clean water infrastructure, universal broadband

infrastructure, clean power infrastructure, remediation of legacy pollution, and resilience to the

changing climate.”

climate."'4 Many of these types of projects require federal licensing or permitting actions

that will trigger Section 401 certification proceedings.

The Associations therefore urge EPA to continue to interpret Section 401 in a manner that

reasonably limits the ability of single state to wield disproportionate power over interstate projects

of national importance. The efficient permitting of essential infrastructure projects requires the

collaboration of state and federal authorities and the consideration of state and national interests.

In enacting Section 401, Congress preserved an important role for states in evaluating the water

quality impacts of federal infrastructure projects, but it did not prescribe that role without limit or

to the detriment of federal licensing or permitting authorities.

3

3 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020).

4

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/24/fact-sheet-president-biden4

See

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/24/fact-sheet-president-biden-

announces-support-for-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-framework/.

announce

s-support-for-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-framework/.

4

- App. 501 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 6 of 52

More specifically, Section 401 preserves for states the highly circumscribed role of evaluating a

project’s potential impacts on certain enumerated CWA provisions. CWA Section 401

proposed project's

does not empower a state to deny a certification request based on generalized objections about

hydrocarbon development, or concerns about the continued role of fossil fuels in product

manufacturing and power generation. Nor does CWA Section 401 allow states to deny or

condition certification based on potential environmental impacts of the proposed project other than

potential point source discharges to waters of the United States that can result in possible violations

standards.5

of water quality standards.5

The text, structure, and history of Section 401 reflect Congress's

Congress’s recognition that certain projects

of national importance could not be subjected to the parochial interests of a single state. And yet,

(“D.C.

as acknowledged by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C.

Circuit”), "it

“it is now commonplace for states to use Section 401 to hold federal licensing hostage."6

hostage.”6

Circuit"),

“to hold federal licensing hostage,"7

hostage,”7 or basing state certification decisions on

Using Section 401 "to

policy considerations that cannot realistically be construed as credible concerns over water quality

impacts is impermissible under the CWA and conflicts with several other statutes through which

Congress tasked federal agencies with decision-making authority.

The Associations therefore urge EPA to ensure that the Agency's

Agency’s regulations adhere to Congress's

Congress’s

readily discernable intent that Section 401 be implemented to provide states certification authority

that is limited in time and scope. We believe that the Agency must, at a minimum, retain those

provisions of the 401 Certification Rule necessary to curb the well documented tactics a handful

of states have utilized to artificially extend their review deadlines and improperly expand the scope

EPA’s regulations implementing Section 401 can

of their certification and conditioning authority. EPA's

and should be appropriately tailored to curtail the known avenues for state misuse of Section 401,

while preserving the important but highly circumscribed role Congress intended.

In Section III, the Associations provide interpretive guidelines that we believe can be useful to

EPA as it reconsiders the 401 Certification Rule. These guidelines interpret Section 401 utilizing

the text and structure of the CWA, extensive analysis of case law, and a detailed legislative history

of the Act and its key amendments.

Section III also describes the natural gas pipeline permitting process to illustrate the

comprehensive review and approval process within which Section 401 certification is but one part.

Natural gas permitting is only one example of the types of federal actions that can trigger Section

401 certifications, but it is a good example because it helps provide context necessary to understand

why Congress limited the scope and duration of the Section 401 certification process. Section III

also explains why reasonable limits on Section 401 certification processes comport with principles

5

5 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3).

6

(“Hoopa Valley”),

6 Hoopa Valley

Valley Tribe v. FERC ("Hoopa

Valley"), 913 F. 3d. 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

7

7 Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d. at 1104.

5

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 7 of 52

of cooperative federalism and are necessary to ensure that one state cannot inappropriately wield

its Section 401 authority to the detriment of other states or the nation as a whole.

In Section IV, the Associations respond to each of the Agency's

Agency’s enumerated "questions

“questions for

consideration.” Each of our responses are grounded in a fundamental recognition that Congress,

consideration."

through Section 401, expressly assigned an important project review role for states and tribes, but

it did so in the context of multiple statutes unambiguously preserving exclusive federal jurisdiction

over certain projects and multiple other statutes subjecting those projects to environmental reviews

beyond the limited scope of Section 401.

EPA's

The Associations hope that these interpretive guidelines and responses will inform EPA’s

reconsideration of the 401 Certification Rule and any future interpretation of CWA Section 401.

II.

THE ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR INTERESTS

AFPM is a national trade association representing most U.S. refining and petrochemical

manufacturing capacity. AFPM members strengthen economic and national security while

supporting more than 3 million jobs nationwide. AFPM's

AFPM’s member companies produce the

gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel that drive the modern economy, as well as the chemical building

blocks that are used to make the millions of products that make modern life possible. To produce

these essential goods, AFPM members depend on all modes of transportation to move their

products to and from refineries and petrochemical facilities and have made significant

infrastructure investments to support and improve the safety and efficiency of the transportation

system. AFPM member companies depend upon an uninterrupted, affordable supply of crude oil

and natural gas as feedstocks for the transportation fuels and petrochemicals they manufacture.

Pipelines are the primary mode for transporting crude oil and natural gas to refiners and

petrochemical facilities and refined products from those same facilities to distribution terminals

serving consumer markets. Pipelines provide a safe, reliable, efficient, and cost-effective way to

move bulk liquids, particularly over long distances. AFPM member companies own, operate, and

rely on pipeline infrastructure as part of their daily operations. AFPM member companies also are

leaders in human safety and environmental responsibility. AFPM supports robust analyses of

infrastructure projects to ensure that environmental impacts are appropriately considered.

API is a nationwide, non-profit trade association that represents all facets of the natural gas and

oil industry, which supports 10.3 million U.S. jobs and nearly 8 percent of the U.S. economy.

API's

API’s more than 600 member companies include large integrated companies, as well as

exploration and production, refining, marketing, pipeline and marine businesses, and service and

supply firms. API was formed in 1919 as a standards-setting organization, and API has developed

more than 700 standards to enhance operational and environmental safety, efficiency, and

sustainability. API and its members are committed to the safe transportation of natural gas, crude

oil and petroleum products, and support sound science and risk-based regulations, legislation, and

industry practices that have demonstrated safety benefits. API members engage in exploration,

6

- App. 503 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 8 of 52

production, and construction projects that routinely involve both state and federal water permitting

and are, and will continue to be, affected by CWA Section 401.

The AXPC is a national trade association representing 29 of America's

America’s largest and most active

AXPC’s

independent natural gas and crude oil exploration and production companies. The AXPC's

“independent” in that their operations are limited to the exploration for and

members are "independent"

production of natural gas and crude oil. Moreover, its members operate autonomously, unlike

their fully integrated counterparts which operate in different segments of the energy industry, such

as refining and marketing. The AXPC's

AXPC’s members are leaders in developing and applying the

innovative and advanced technologies necessary to explore for and produce the natural gas and

crude oil that allows our nation to add reasonably priced domestic energy reserves in

environmentally responsible ways.

The IPAA represents the thousands of independent oil and natural gas explorers and producers, as

well as the service and supply industries that support their efforts, that will most directly be

impacted by federal regulatory policies. Independent producers develop about 91 percent of

American oil and natural gas wells, produce about 83 percent of American oil, and produce more

than 90 percent of American natural gas and natural gas liquids. The IPAA is dedicated to ensuring

a strong, viable American oil and natural gas industry, recognizing that an adequate and secure

supply of energy is essential to the national economy.

III.

GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETING CWA SECTION 401

The Associations'

Associations’ responses to the Agency's

Agency’s enumerated "questions

“questions for consideration"

consideration” follow in

Section IV

W below. But the Associations believe it is important to furnish the analytical framework

and interpretive guidelines that inform our construction of Section 401 and our specific

recommendations for EPA’s

EPA's reconsideration of the 401 Certification Rule. We believe this

Associations’ responses to the

background provides necessary context and support for the Associations'

Agency’s specific inquiries. And more broadly, we hope these interpretative guidelines will be

Agency's

useful to EPA as it reconsiders the 401 Certification Rule.

The Associations'

Associations’ members have a substantial interest in ensuring that the CWA Section 401

certification process preserves the important role of states in protecting water quality, while at the

same time providing appropriate limits where states use their certification authority to achieve

policy goals or outcomes unrelated to water quality. Therefore, the Associations provide

interpretive guidelines that EPA should use to reasonably interpret important provisions of CWA

Section 401. These interpretive guidelines follow from the text and structure of the Act, relevant

case law, and - where necessary to ascertain congressional intent - the legislative history of the

Act and its key amendments.

The Association's

Association’s framework was also informed by the way Congress structured the Act to

promote cooperative federalism. Finally, our framework examines the Section 401 certification

process in the context of other federal statutes that assign the federal government exclusive

7

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 9 of 52

jurisdiction over certain projects and/or provide alternate mechanisms for state review of federally

permitted projects.

a.

Consideration of the context for, and role of, CWA Section 401 certifications

“[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any

Under Section 401 of the CWA, "[a]ny

waters” must seek "a

“a certification

activity . . . which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters"

from the State in which the discharge originates . . . that any such discharge will comply with the

provisions” of the CWA.8

CWA.8 Section 401 further provides that "[n]o

“[n]o license or permit

applicable provisions"

“fails or refuses to act

shall be granted if certification has been denied by the State,”

State," but, if a state "fails

on a request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year)

waived.”9

after receipt of such request, the certification requirements of this subsection shall be waived."9

The statute is clear on its face; however, when state certification authority under CWA Section

401 is read in the context of the exclusive jurisdiction preserved for the federal government in

issuing certain permits and licenses, the narrow role of states under the CWA Section 401 program

becomes even more apparent.

The Natural Gas Act of 1938 ("NGA")

(“NGA”) is an example of a statute that preserves exclusive

Associations’ members.

jurisdiction for the federal government, and it is relevant to many of the Associations'

The NGA illustrates that state Section 401 review is a component in a much larger, and more

complex, interstate approval process that is inherently federal in nature.

1.

NGA

Companies seeking to build interstate natural gas pipelines must first obtain federal approval. The

process.10 Congress passed the NGA to ensure

NGA provides the statutory framework for this process.1°

patch-work state-by-state regulatory regimes would not impede interstate commerce. Specifically,

“a natural gas company must obtain from the Federal Energy

under Section 7(c) of the NGA, "a

(“FERC”) a ‘certificate

necessity’ before it

Regulatory Commission ("FERC")

'certificate of public convenience and necessity'

constructs, extends, acquires, or operates any facility for the transportation or sale of natural gas

in interstate commerce."11

commerce.”11 In assessing "public

“public convenience and necessity,"

necessity,” FERC considers "all

“all

12

13

factors bearing on the public interest,”

impacts. "FERC

“FERC will

interest,"12 including potential environmental impacts.13

8

8 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

9

9 Id. (emphasis added).

10 15 U.S.C. § 717.

11

ii Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.(“Schneidewind”),

Co. ("Schneidewind"), 485 U.S. 293, 302 (1988); See also 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A).

12

of Consumers’

12 See Office of

Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

13

967–68 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

13 See e.g., Midcoast Interstate Transmission, Inc. v. FERC, 198 F.3d 960, 967-68

10

8

- App. 505 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 10 of 52

grant the certificate only if it finds the company able and willing to undertake the project in

scheme.”14

compliance with the rules and regulations of the federal regulatory scheme."14

FERC’s authority under the NGA is exclusive: "Congress

“Congress occupied the field of matters relating to

FERC's

commerce.”15 "FERC's

“FERC’s exclusive

wholesale sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce."15

purview” includes regulating "facilities

“facilities [that] are a critical part of the transportation of natural gas

purview"

and sale for resale in interstate commerce."16

commerce.”16 In this "exclusively

“exclusively federal domain,"

domain,” states may not

17

regulate.

regulate.'?

Pipeline routing is the definitive example of an issue committed to FERC's

FERC’s exclusive authority.18

authority.18

pipeline’s route—including which states it

Nor could it be otherwise. Determining an interstate pipeline's

will cross, where it will do so, and how far it will travel within their borders—is a task that must

nation’s public interest in mind, not by local

be completed by a centralized body with the entire nation's

“agencies with only local constituencies."19

constituencies.”19 Otherwise, each state could say, "not

“not in my

"agencies

backyard,” thereby depriving other states and the nation of the pipeline's

pipeline’s benefits and undermining

backyard,"

NGA’s purpose of "ensur[ing]

“ensur[ing] that natural gas consumers have access to an adequate supply

the NGA's

20

of natural gas at ‘just

'just and reasonable rates.’”

rates.'"2°

Thus, the NGA vests FERC with exclusive authority over all salient aspects of the natural gas

nation’s collective interest in promoting the safe

pipeline permitting process to facilitate the nation's

movement of natural gas in interstate commerce. And while the NGA is necessarily limited to

natural gas pipeline permitting, we believe it demonstrates why EPA must implement CWA

Section 401 to prevent a single state from using its Section 401 certification authority to

commandeer the exclusive jurisdiction that Congress provided to the federal government for

projects of national importance.

14

14 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 302.

15

15 Schneidewind 485 U.S. at 305.

16

16 Schneidewind, at 485 U.S. 308.

17

17 Schneidewind, at 485 U.S. 305; See, e.g., N. Natural Gas Co. v.

819–20, 822-24

822–24

Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 819-20,

(8th Cir. 2004) (NGA preempted state-law environmental provisions); E. End Prop. Co. No. 1, LLC v. Kessel, 851

N.Y.S.2d 565, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); No Tanks Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,

Comm'n, 697 A.2d 1313, 1315 (Me. 1997).

18

(“the NGA gives

18 See Wash.

Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Prince George’s

George's Cty. Council, 711 F.3d 412, 423 (4th Cir. 2013) ("the

facilities”); See also, e.g., Guardian Pipeline, LLC v. 529.42 Acres of

of

FERC jurisdiction over the siting of natural gas facilities");

“FERC has approved the route ...

… [a]ny objections to the

Land, 210 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (where "FERC

preempted”); Skyview Acres Co-op.,

condemnation of public land for the construction of a natural gas pipeline [are] preempted");

(State’s "authority

“authority [was] preempted …

Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,

Comm'n, 558 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (State's

... to

pipeline”); No Tanks, 697 A.2d at 1315 ("[State]

(“[State]

the extent that it purported to approve the route of an interstate gas pipeline");

review of safety and environmental issues surrounding the siting of the [natural gas] tank would be an attempt to

FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction").

jurisdiction”).

regulate matters within FERC's

19

19

Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 1316.

20

422–23.

20 Wash.

Wash. Gas, 711 F.3d at 422-23.

9

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 11 of 52

The NGA also illustrates the important but highly circumscribed role of Section 401 reviews in

light of the far more comprehensive federal environmental review process. Indeed, FERC has

project’s potential environmental impacts, which includes

primary authority to consider a pipeline project's

considering routes that could reduce environmental impacts.

“the lead agency . . . for the purposes of complying with"

with” the National

Under the NGA, FERC is "the

Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").21

(“NEPA”).21 Thus, "FERC

“FERC undertakes its own environmental analysis

of” NEPA, "which

“which . . . FERC considers in reaching its ultimate

pursuant to the requirements of

determination.”22 Like the authority to issue certificates of public convenience and

routing determination."22

necessity, the authority to conduct this broader environmental analysis and to make routing

FERC’s purview, except as to the narrow

decisions based on that analysis is exclusively within FERC's

401.23

question of water-quality compliance under Section 401.23

2.

NEPA

environment,"

“major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,”

For any "major

“a detailed statement,"

statement,” known as an Environmental

NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare "a

Impact Statement ("EIS"),

(“EIS”), on "(i)

“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse

environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, [and] (iii)

action.”24

alternatives to the proposed action."24

Preparing an EIS has three basic stages. First, the agency must "determin[e]

“determin[e] the scope of issues to

addressed,” with the input of (among many others) "affected

“affected Federal, State, and local

be addressed,"

agencies.”25 Second, the agency prepares a draft EIS, which must "disclose

“disclose and discuss …

agencies."25

... all

major points of view on the environmental impacts of the alternatives including the proposed

action.”26 The agency must then obtain comments from any other federal agency with relevant

action."26

“[a]ppropriate State and local agencies,"

agencies,” and the public.27

public.27 Finally, the

jurisdiction or expertise, "[a]ppropriate

“respond[s] to comments,"

comments,” "discuss[es]

“discuss[es] …

agency must prepare a final EIS that "respond[s]

... any responsible

view,” and "indicate[s]

“indicate[s] the agency's

agency’s response to the issues raised."28

raised.”28

opposing view,"

21

21 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1).

22

22 Skyview Acres, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 975.

23

23 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(3); The NGA also preserves States’

States' authority under the Coastal Zone Management Act and the

717b(d)(1)–(2), which are not at issue here.

Clean Air Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(1)—(2),

24

24 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) Agencies typically begin by preparing an Environmental Assessment, or EA, which must

“provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether"

whether” the project will have a "significant

“significant impact.”

"provide

impact." 40

EA’s thorough assessment helps ensure NEPA

C.F.R. § 1508.9(a). If so, an EIS must be prepared. If not, the EA's

compliance. See id.

25

25 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1).

26

26

Id. § 1502.9(a).

27

Id. § 1503.1(a).

27 Id

28

Id. § 1502.9(b).

28 Id

10

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 12 of 52

These "'action-forcing'

“‘action-forcing’ procedures"

procedures” serve to ensure "that

“that agencies take a ‘hard

'hard look’

look' at

29

consequences.” Affected parties - including states - can challenge the adequacy

environmental consequences."29

agency’s NEPA review and its consideration of an EIS by seeking judicial review of the final

of an agency's

determination.30 The courts carefully review an agency's

agency’s NEPA compliance to ensure that

agency determination.30

“duty . . . to consider environmental factors not be shunted aside in the bureaucratic shuffle."31

shuffle.”31

its "duty

“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results,"

results,” however: "If

“If the adverse environmental effects

"NEPA

of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by

32

NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.”

costs."32

FERC’s regulations require preparation of an EIS for "[m]ajor

“[m]ajor

For natural gas pipeline permitting, FERC's

pipeline construction projects . . . using rights-of-way in which there is no existing natural gas

pipeline.”33 A FERC EIS must comply with the NEPA regulations and also summarize the

pipeline."33

project's

project’s "significant

“significant environmental impacts”;

“alternative . . . that would have a less severe

impacts"; any "alternative

impact,” which includes alternative routes; any potential "mitigation

“mitigation measures"

measures” and

environmental impact,"

data.34

impacts that cannot be mitigated; and studies that might provide useful data.34

FERC’s "public

“public convenience and necessity"

necessity” analysis carefully accounts for these environmental

FERC's

impacts, alternatives, and potential mitigation measures. Based on this comprehensive process,

FERC may deny approval, or it may require the adoption of alternatives or mitigation measures.35

measures.35

FERC's

FERC’s "environmental

“environmental assessment . . . is not subject to modification"

modification” by state agencies; instead,

they can submit comments to FERC or intervene in the FERC proceedings to offer their input and

review.36 And with good reason: "Allowing

“Allowing all the sites and all

then, if necessary, seek judicial review.36

the specifics to be regulated by agencies with only local constituencies would delay or prevent

construction that has won approval after federal consideration of environmental factors and

needs.”37

interstate needs."37

3.

Other federal statutes with impact reviews and opportunities for stakeholder

engagement

Importantly, while the NEPA review process provides meaningful opportunities for states and

other stakeholders to engage with federal agencies on the potential impacts of a proposed federal

action, the NEPA review process is far from the only avenue for state and local engagement.

29

29 Robertson v. Methow Valley

Valley Citizens Council (“Robertson”),

("Robertson"), 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).

30

345–46.

30 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 345-46.

31

Ass’n

of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976).

31

Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass

'n of

32

32 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.

33

33 18 C.F.R. § 380.6(a)(3).

34

34 18 C.F.R. § 380.7.

35

35 See e.g., Midcoast Interstate, 198 F.3d at 966, 968.

36

36 Skyview Acres, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 975; See also 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a).

37

37 No Tanks, 697 A.2d at 1316.

11

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 13 of 52

Numerous other statutes provide mechanisms for state and stakeholder engagement on a wide

variety of potential impacts from proposed federal projects:

•

Endangered Species Act ("ESA")38

(“ESA”)38 - Section 7 of the ESA requires that federal agencies

consult with the ESA administering services to ensure that any projects authorized, funded,

or carried out by them are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any

endangered species or threatened species, or result in the destruction or adverse

modification of critical habitat of such species.

•

(“NHPA”)39 - Section 106 of the NHPA and

National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA")39

implementing regulations require federal agencies, before issuing a license (permit), to

adopt measures when feasible to mitigate potential adverse effects of the licensed activity

and properties listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places. The

Act's requirements are to be implemented in cooperation with state historic preservation

officers.

•

(“CZMA”)40 —

– Under CZMA Section 307, applicants for

Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA")4°

federal licenses or permits must obtain from potentially impacted coastal states certification

states’ coastal zone management plan.

that the proposed project complies with the states'

•

Essential Fish Habitat Provisions ("EFH")

(“EFH”) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act —

– The EFH

provisions promote the protection of essential fish habitat in the review of projects

conducted under federal permits, licenses, or other authorities that affect or have the

potential to affect such habitat. EFH requires that federal agencies consult with the

National Marine Fisheries Service for any permits which may adversely affect essential

fish habitat identified under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.

These are just a few of the statutory provisions through which states and other stakeholders can

engage with agencies like FERC, raise concerns about potential impacts from proposed federally

alternatives.41 They are an important

licensed or permitted projects, and request consideration of alternatives.41

part of the cooperative federalism approach through which Congress apportioned jurisdiction

between the federal government and the states. These statutory provisions, and others like them,

demonstrate that states have multiple opportunities outside of Section 401 to provide input on

proposed federal projects. They also provide context for the narrow but important jurisdiction

conferred to states by Section 401. In light of all these other meaningful engagement and review

38

38

16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.

"39 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.

40

40

16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.

41

41 Indeed, these are just a few of the examples of statutory provisions through which federal projects are reviewed and

state feedback is solicited and considered. For a large pipeline project that would traverse federal, state, and tribal

lands, the statutory authorities under which the project is reviewed are far more numerous.

12

- App. 509 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 14 of 52

opportunities, one recognizes that the statutory requirement for states to focus their Section 401

reviews on water quality furthers, rather than undermines, cooperative federalism.

states’ authority to

Further, the statutory provisions cited above do not represent the full extent of states'

address environmental impacts from the operation of federally licensed or permitted projects.

States can and often do regulate the operation of federally licensed or permitted projects pursuant

to authority delegated under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),42the

(“CAA”),42the CWA,43

CWA,43 as well as other statutes.

Section 401 does not constrain states'

states’ authority under these statutes to issue and enforce

environmental permits on the operation of federally licensed or permitted projects. Section 401

states’ roles in reviewing the potential impacts from certain projects that require federal

only limits states'

licenses or permits.

4.

EPA must implement CWA Section 401 in accordance with Congress's

Congress’s

intent to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction through statutes like the NGA

and in the context of more comprehensive environmental review processes

Congress established through NEPA and other statutes

In this subsection, the Associations discuss Section 401 for natural gas pipeline pennitting.44

permitting.44 By

examining Section 401 in the context of other statutes, like the NGA and NEPA, one appreciates

that Section 401 certification is but one part of a larger federal process.

As noted above, the NGA vests FERC with exclusive authority over all salient aspects of the

natural gas pipeline permitting process, which facilitates the safe movement of natural gas in

“public convenience and

interstate commerce. The rigorous process by which FERC analyzes the "public

necessity” of a natural gas pipeline requires an extensive and meticulous review of potential

necessity"

environmental impacts, including consideration of potential impacts to water quality, drinking

water resources, and aquatic species. It is from this comprehensive analytical framework that

FERC’s exclusive authority in this

CWA Section 401 carves out a carefully cabined exception to FERC's

area by permitting states to certify whether potential discharges from a federally licensed project

will comply with water-quality standards.45

standards.45

Embedded within the text of CWA Section 401 are meaningful limits on the requirements to obtain

a certification. Most significantly, applicants are only required to obtain certification from states

point source discharge to “navigable

waters,” defined in the

where a project could result in a point

"navigable waters,"

42

42 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(d); 7412.

43

43 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b); 1344(g).

44

NGA’s federal approval process for natural

" While the Associations herein discuss Section 401 in the context of the NGA's

gas pipelines, it is important to note that Section 401 certifications are important to a number of other types of essential

energy projects. All types of energy projects can require individual, regional, or nationwide general Section 404

permits that are also subject to state review under Section 401.

45

45 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).

13

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 15 of 52

“waters of the United States”

(“WOTUS.”)46 Section 401 is not implicated for nonpoint

statute as "waters

States" ("WOTUS.")46

discharges or other diffuse releases to groundwater. Nor is Section 401 implicated when the

discharge enters purely state, rather than federal waterbodies. Thus, states can only deny a

certification request based on potential point source discharges to WOTUS that can result in

possible violations of water quality standards.

With few exceptions, courts have correctly construed this limited delegation as "[r]elinquish[ing]

“[r]elinquish[ing]

only one element of the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction granted [to FERC] ….

.... It authorizes states

assurance’ that the

to determine and certify only the narrow question whether there is ‘reasonable

'reasonable assurance'

construction and operation of a proposed project ‘will

'will not violate applicable water quality

standards.’”47 "Congress

“Congress did not empower the States to reconsider matters unrelated to their water

standards.'"47

48

Such second-guessing

quality standards, which [FERC] has within its exclusive jurisdiction ….”

...."48

“countermand the carefully worded authority of section 401(a)(1)"

401(a)(1)” and "usurp

“usurp the authority

would "countermand

49

FERC.”

that Congress reserved for FERC."49

States exercising authority under CWA Section 401 must do so in a way that is reasonable and

explained.50 When deciding whether or not to issue a certification, a state must

adequately explained.50

“the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including ‘a

examine "the

'a

made.’”51 Therefore, when a state

rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'"51

“to hold federal licensing hostage,"52

hostage,”52 or otherwise base its

endeavors to use Section 401 "to

certification decision on policy considerations that cannot realistically be construed as credible

concerns over water quality impacts, that determination is impermissible under the CWA and

several other statutes through which Congress tasked federal agencies with decision-making

authority.

The forgoing discussion focuses on natural gas pipeline permitting under the NGA to illustrate the

comprehensive statutory framework within which the Section 401 certification process is

conducted. However, it is by no means the only federal permitting or licensing program to trigger

Section 401 certification processes. Nor is natural gas pipeline permitting the only licensing or

licensing process to be misused by some states as a lever to pursue policy objectives unrelated to

water quality. In fact, Section 404 permitting is perhaps the most common trigger for Section 401

permitting, and it impacts each segment of the energy industry and a wide variety of other

industries as well. Therefore, as the agency tasked with implementing the CWA, EPA must ensure

46

(9th Cir. 1998); See also Oregon Natural Desert

46 See Oregon Natural Desert Assoc. v. Dombeck, 151 F. 3d. 945 (9th

th

(9 Cir. 2006).); 33 U.S.0

U.S.C § 1362(7).

Assoc. v. US

US Forest Service, 550 F.3d 778 (9th

47

47 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. DEC, 624 N.E.2d 146, 149 (N.Y. 1993).

48

48 Power Auth. v. Williams,

Williams, 60 N.Y.2d 315, 325 (N.Y. 1983).

49

49 Niagara Mohawk, 624 N.E.2d at 150.

50

Dep’t. of

5° National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation v. New York State Dep't.

of Envtl. Conservation, 761 F. Appx. 68, 72 (2d

Cir. Feb 5, 2019).

51

(4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v.

Appalachian Voices

Voices v. State Water

Water Control Bd., No. 18-1079, (4th

United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).

52

(“Hoopa Valley”),

62 Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC ("Hoopa

Valley"), 913 F. 3d 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

14

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that its regulations facilitate functional and efficient Section 401 certification processes. This

401’s

means that any potential revisions to the 401 Certification Rule must perpetuate Section 401's

important but highly circumscribed role for states, while prohibiting states from arrogating

authority Congress exclusively entrusted to the federal government.

b.

Reasonable limits on the Section 401 certification process are consistent with

principles of cooperative federalism

Grounded on principles of cooperative federalism, the CWA establishes states as the primary

permitting and enforcement authorities under Sections 402, 404, and a number of other provisions

of the Act:

It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary

responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to

plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and

enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in

the exercise of his authority under this Act. It is the policy of Congress that the

States manage the construction grant program under this Act and implement the

permit programs under sections 402 and 404 of this Act. It is further the policy of

the Congress to support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction, and

elimination of pollution, and to provide federal technical services and financial aid

to State and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection with the

pollution.53

prevention, reduction, and elimination or pollution.53

Thus, in recognition of the states'

states’ sovereignty and the fact that states are best situated to regulate

their own resources, the CWA required EPA to coordinate its water resource protection efforts

states.54 Nonetheless, while the Associations oppose federal intrusion in those areas

with the states.'

where Congress preserved state primacy, we also recognize those circumstances where Congress

deemed it necessary to rest primary decision-making authority with federal agencies and/or more

closely circumscribe the otherwise broad authority of states.

In CWA Section 401, Congress prescriptively delineated a more narrow and focused role for states,

so that the jurisdiction that the Act provides to states could not overwhelm or subsume the federal

government’s ability to issue licenses and permits for projects of national importance. Of particular

government's

Associations’ members, these projects of national importance include pipeline

relevance to the Associations'

“Notices to Proceed"

Proceed” from FERC and dredge-and-fill activities in WOTUS that

projects requiring "Notices

require CWA Section 404 permits from the Army Corps. But Congress also designated federal

agencies as the approval authorities for Section 402 industrial and municipal point source

discharge permits issued by EPA, Army Corps permits issued under Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers

(“RHA”), U.S. Coast Guard permits for bridges and causeways under Section 9

and Harbors Act ("RHA"),

53

53 33 U.S.C. § 101(b).

54

54 33 U.S.C. § 101(g); 33 U.S.C. § 102(a).

15

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 17 of 52

of the RHA, hydroelectric projects requiring FERC licenses, and nuclear power plants licensed by

(“NRC”).

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC").

Congress certainly understood that projects authorized pursuant to these statutes would have

localized impacts, but it viewed it as inappropriate to allow these projects to be principally steered

by parochial interests. Congress uniquely provided these boundaries in Section 401 because,

unlike other provisions of the Act, like Sections 402 and 404, that direct federal agencies to cede

authority to states when certain conditions of delegation are satisfied, Congress recognized that for

certain federal projects, federal agencies must share their authority with, rather than cede their

authority to, the states.

Congress’s intent to reasonably limit the scope and duration of state Section 401 certifications is

Congress's

consistent with cooperative federalism. States that have misused Section 401 certification

authority can wield a disproportionate level of decision-making authority over a wide variety of

essential interstate projects or other projects of national importance such as transportation

infrastructure, nuclear and hydroelectric power generation facilities, energy distribution

infrastructure, and projects requiring dredge-and-fill permits under Section 404. Misapplying

Section 401 to allow any state unilateral veto authority over these projects has adverse impacts,

not only on project proponents and federal licensing and permitting authorities, but other states

with interests in the project.

This was certainly the case with Washington State’s

–

State's denial of the Millennium Bulk Terminals —

55

Longview LLC project.55

project. The project proponents intended the terminal to receive rail cars of coal

mined principally in Montana and Wyoming so that the coal could be exported to overseas markets.

Washington State employed various regulatory strategies to extend their certification review over

five years before denying the certification request based on grounds having nothing to do with

water quality.56

quality.56 Having minimal financial interest in facilitating the export of a product that was

not produced in the state and policy objections to coal-fired power generation, Washington State

used its Section 401 certification authority to deny Montana and Wyoming access to foreign

markets. Thus, the exercise of expansive authority under Section 401 by one state harms, rather

states’ rights.

than serves, other states'

Similar dynamics underlie many instances of state misuse of Section 401 certification authority in

pipeline projects. States along the proposed route of a pipeline that would not supply their state

have occasionally used their Section 401 certification authority to block projects desperately

needed by other states. This acutely harmed New England consumers who pay significantly more

'55 WDEC, In the Matter of Denying Section 401 Water Quality Certification to Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview,

LLC, Order # 15417 (Sept. 26, 2017); See also Montana v. Washington,

Washington, No 22o152, (motion by Montana and

Wyoming for leave to file the bills of complaint denied June 28, 20921. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito indicated

they would grant the motion).

56

56 See Section IV.4.

16

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 18 of 52

for their electricity than the U.S. average in part because pipeline project delays have inhibited

access to natural gas supplies from the Marcellus Shale.

The principles of cooperative federalism are also well served by preventing states from evading

Section 401 statutory deadlines for review. "Congress

‘‘Congress intended Section 401 to curb a state's

state’s

57

‘dalliance

delay.’’’

`dalliance or unreasonable delay.'

" 57

In the permitting context, extensive delays in the 401

certification process can cause projects that are important to other states to be cancelled altogether.

In sum, principles of cooperative federalism simply do not provide states unbounded authority to

subjugate the interests of one state to the parochial whims of another. Cooperative federalism

under Section 401 requires a balanced approach that conforms to the balance Congress itself struck

when enacting Section 401. As such, if the Agency revises the 401 Certification Rule, the

Associations urge EPA preserve the important role of states under Section 401, but prevent states

from misusing the certification process to unlawfully elevate their own interests over the interests

of other states or the nation as a whole.

c.

The legislative history of the CWA illustrates the reasonable limits Congress

intended for the Section 401 certification process

CWA’s predecessor statutes, Federal Water Pollution Control Act

While Congress amended the CWA's

58

Congress’s transformation of the

of 1948 (“FWPCA”),

("FWPCA"),58

no statutory revision was more central to Congress's

today’s CWA than the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA ("1972

(“1972 Amendments").59

Amendments”).59

FWPCA to today's

Indeed, as Congress noted at the time, the 1972 Amendments represented a "total

“total restructuring”

restructuring"

60

“complete rewriting"

rewriting” of the existing statutory framework.60

framework. The transformative nature of the

and "complete

1972 Amendments is critical to interpreting Section 401 for many reasons, including the need to

Amendments61

distinguish court decisions that were based on EPA regulations predating the 1972 Amendments61

from those court decisions that more directly interpreted Section 401 of the Act as it appears today.

Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the regulatory framework for the FWPCA, as amended by the

Water Quality Act of 1965,62

1965,62 was based exclusively on ambient water quality standards that

Congress anticipated would be used to develop standards for discharge to the receiving waters.

While the predecessor Act regulated only water quality (largely as defined by states) and could

only be used to regulate the discharging sources of impairment if water quality standards were not

met,63 practical application of the framework demonstrated its ineffectiveness; between 1948

being met,63

57

1104–05 (emphasis in original).

57 Hoopa Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104-05

58

58 Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).

59

59 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).

60

of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (quoting legislative history of 1972 amendments).

60 City of

61

1 of

Jefferson Cty. v. Washington

Dep’t of

of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712 (1994).

61 PUD No. 1

ofJefferson

Washington Dep't

62

62 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).

63

63 See NDRC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, a discharger needed no permit to deposit pollutants

into a water that had "room

“room to spare"

spare” in achieving its water quality standards.

17

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 19 of 52

Act’s enforcement framework "resulted

“resulted in only one prosecution."64

prosecution.”64 This informed

and 1972, the Act's

Congress’s 1972 effort to amend the Act, and was the impetus for Congress's

Congress’s enactment of Section

Congress's

“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402,

301, which states, "Except

unlawful.”65

and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."65

“pollutant” quite broadly to mean "dredged

“dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator

Congress then defined "pollutant"

residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,

radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,

water.”66 However, Congress much more

municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water."66

“discharge of a pollutant"

pollutant” to include "any

“any addition of any pollutant to

narrowly defined the "discharge

source,” such as a pipe, ditch, or other "discernible,

“discernible, confined and

navigable waters from any point source,"

67

discrete conveyance.”

conveyance."67

Therefore, the newly enacted Section 301 made it unlawful for the first time to discharge pollutants

into WOTUS from a point source unless the discharge complied with the CWA, including

obtaining authorizations pursuant to the Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System ("NPDES")

(“NPDES”) permit program or the Section 404 dredge-and-fill permit program.68

“[t]he primary

Because of the 1972 Amendments, the NPDES permitting program now constitutes "[t]he

means for enforcing these limitations and standards"

standards” from point sources.'

sources.69 Point source dischargers

“place limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that can

must now obtain NPDES permits that "place

released”70 into WOTUS through point sources, and "defines,

“defines, and facilitates compliance with,

be released"7°

[CWA].”71

and enforcement of …

... a discharger’s

discharger's obligations under the [CWA]."71

The 1972 Amendments similarly resulted in the first ever regulation of the discharge of dredged

or fill material into WOTUS, including certain wetlands. Section 404 now requires putative

dischargers to obtain a permit before any dredged or fill material may be discharged into WOTUS

from activities such as fill for water resource development, infrastructure development, and mining

projects.

In addition to fundamentally shifting the Act from its purely "harm-based"

“harm-based” regulatory approach to

its focus on point source discharges of pollutants to WOTUS, the 1972 Amendments also

preserved a role for states and tribes. These amendments first authorized states to assume program

64

of the Clean Water

64 See David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of

Water Act, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 304 (2009).

65

65 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).

66

66 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).

67

67 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14).

68

68 33 U.S.C. § 1342, 1344.

69

69 Arkansas et al. v. Oklahoma et al., 503 U.S. at 101 (1992).

70

S. Fla. Water

of Indians, 541 U.S. at 102 (2004).

70 5.

Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of

71

71 EPA v. California ex rel. State Water

Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 205 (1976).

18

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 20 of 52

borders.72 States also became

authority for issuing Section 402 and 404 permits within their borders.72

borders,73 developing

responsible for developing water quality standards for WOTUS within their borders,73

(“TMDLs”) for waters that are not meeting established water quality

total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs")

74

standards while at the same time retaining authority to protect and manage waters that are not

standards74

75

considered WOTUS.

WOTUS.75

Most relevant here, however, the 1972 Amendments updated a preexisting state certification

requirement (Section 21(b)) to create Section 401. As with Section 401, Congress developed

enacted Section

21(b) to

to "recognize[]

“recognize[ ] the

the responsibility

responsibility of

of Federal

Federal agencies

agencies to

to protect

protect water

water

enacted

Section 21(b)

76

waterways.” As Congress noted at the time, "[i]n

“[i]n

quality whenever their activities affect public waterways."76

the past, these [Federal] licenses and permits have been granted without any assurance that the

77

[water quality] standards will be met or even considered.”

considered."77

FWPCA’s water qualityBecause the state certification requirement in Section 21(b) under the FWPCA's

based framework existed before Congress enacted the 1972 Amendments to focus on point source

“such activity will be conducted

discharges to WOTUS, Section 21(b) required states to certify that "such

standards.”78

in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards."78

The 1972 Amendments'

Amendments’ changes to Section 21(b) were therefore intended to maintain consistency

with the 1972 Amendments'

Amendments’ broader focus on, and definition of, point

point source discharges to

WOTUS.

WOTUS. In other words, because the predecessor Act regulated only water quality and could only

be used to regulate the pollution-contributing sources of impairment if water quality standards

were not being met, Congress drafted Section 21(b), and EPA promulgated its 1971 regulations

21(b)79 to focus on thosefederal

federal activities that could adversely impact ambient

pursuant to Section 21(b)79

water quality standards. Once the 1972 Amendments fundamentally transformed the Act to

provide authority to directly address discharges of pollutants rather than indirectly address

pollutant discharges based on their impacts on water quality, Congress made a corresponding

change to Section 21(b) so that it reflected the new prohibition and permitting regime for

discharges.

“that such activity .

As such, the Section 21(b)(1) requirement that the certifying authority certify "that

standards,”80 was modified to state that the authority must certify

. . will not violate water quality standards,"8°

“that any such discharge shall comply with the applicable provisions of sections 301, 302, 303,

"that

72

72 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), 1344(g).

73

73 33 U.S.C. § 1313, 1315.

74

74 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).

75

75 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), 1251(g), 1370, 1377(a).

76

76 S. Rep. No. 91-351, at 3 (1969).

77

77 S. Rep. No. 91-351, at 3 (1969).

78

78 Public Law 91-224, 21(b)(1), 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (emphasis added).

79

79 See NDRC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, a discharger needed no permit to deposit pollutants

into a water that had "room

“room to spare"

spare” in achieving its water quality standards.

80

Public Law

Law 91-224

91-224 §§ 21(b)(1)

21(b)(1) (emphasis

(emphasis added).

added).

80 Public

19

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 21 of 52

81

306, and 307 . . .”

."81 The 1972 Amendments also added an entirely new Section 4(d) which

authorizes the imposition of certification conditions:

to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with any

applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under section 301 or 302 of

this Act, standard of performance under section 306 of this Act, or prohibition,

effluent standard, or pretreatment standard under section 307 of this Act, and with

any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such certification . . . 82

Thus, the 1972 Amendments maintained Section 21(b)'s

21(b)’s focus on water quality impacts but

‘‘to assure consistency with the bill's

bill’s changed emphasis

adapted those certification requirements "to

from water quality standards to effluent limitations based on the elimination of any discharge of

pollutants.’’83 As explained by then-Senator Muskie, the sponsor of the legislation that would

pollutants."83

become Section 401:

No polluter will be able to hide behind a Federal license or permit as an excuse for

a violation of water quality standard[s]. No polluter will be able to make major

investments in facilities under a Federal license or permit without providing

assurance that the facility will comply with water quality standards. No State water

pollution control agency will be confronted with a fait accompli by an industry that

84

has built a plant without consideration of water quality requirements.

requirements."

The Senate Report that accompanied the 1972 Amendments likewise explained that Section 401:

makes clear that any water quality requirements established under State law, more

stringent than those requirements under this Act, also shall through certification

become conditions on any Federal license or permit. The purpose of the

certification mechanism provided in this law is to assure that Federal licensing or

85

permitting agencies cannot override State water quality requirements.

requirements.85

As the foregoing makes clear, Congress intended Section 401 certifications and conditions to focus

exclusively on water quality. Nothing in the legislative history of Section 401 reflects any intent

to consider non-water quality considerations or conditions.

Notwithstanding the transformative nature of the 1972 Amendments, EPA did not update its 1971

regulations (implementing Section 21(b)), until promulgation of the 401 Certification Rule in

81

81

33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (emphasis added).

82

82 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).

83

83 S. Rep. No. 92–414,

92-414, at 69 (1971).

84

84 116 Cong. Reg. 8,984 (Mar. 24, 1970) (discussing section 21(b) of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970)

(emphasis added).

85

85 S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 69 (1971) (emphasis added).

20

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 22 of 52

Agency’s regulations remained out-of-step with

2020. Thus, for nearly five decades, the Agency's

Congress’s most consequential changes to the CWA—the prohibition on point source discharges

Congress's

“[e]xcept as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and

to WOTUS "[e]xcept

Act.”86 The persistence of EPA's

EPA’s outdated 1971 implementing regulations is relevant

404 of th[e] Act."86

Agency’s current reconsideration of the 401 Certification Rule because a significant portion

to the Agency's

of the jurisprudence on Section 401, including the 1994 Supreme Court decision in PUD No. 1 of

of

87

of Ecology,'

Ecology, is based on courts deferring to EPA

Jefferson County v. Washington

Washington Department of

regulations that predate the 1972 Amendments.

The Associations also urge EPA to recognize that FWPCA Section 21(b) was enacted prior to the

statutory requirement that the federal government consider the potential environmental impacts of

its actions. It provided states authority to examine the water quality impacts of federal actions in

the absence of any federal obligation to examine their own obligations. Section 401, on the other

hand, is informed by the 1969 passage of NEPA, which requires the federal government to consider

the potential environmental consequences—water quality-related or otherwise—of its actions.

While NEPA does not subsume the Section 401 water quality certification process, it does place

Section 401 in a statutory context distinct from that which existed in 1971. The state water quality

certification process is not the sole means by which potential environmental impacts of federal

actions are identified, scrutinized, mitigated, or avoided. The 1972 Amendments followed the

passage of NEPA by a mere two years. Congress understood the important role NEPA would play

in examining the impacts of federal actions, including those subject to state certifications under

Section 401. Congress continued to view state water quality certifications as important, but it

NEPA’s processes in scope, scale, or duration. Section

clearly did not intend them to duplicate NEPA's

401 was intended to be, and should remain, a focused inquiry on very specific types of discharges

and a very narrow set of potential impacts.

d.

Any revisions to the 401 Certification Rule must include provisions sufficient

to meaningfully enforce Congress’s

Congress's statutorily prescribed time limits

As EPA considers revisions to the 401 Certification Rule, we urge the Agency to recognize that

the deadlines Congress imposed in Section 401 are explicit, unambiguous, and binding. The

express text of Section 401 plainly states that a certifying authority waives its certification

“fails or refuses to act on a

authority over a federal license or permit if the certifying authority "fails

request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after

88

“[T]he purpose of the waiver provision is to prevent a State from

receipt of such request.”

request." 88

"[T]he

indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding by failing to issue a timely water quality

401.”89 Given the clarity of the CWA with respect to the one-year

certification under Section 401."89

86

86 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).

87

(“PUD No. 1").

1”).

87 511 U.S. 700, 712 ("PUD

88

88 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).

89

89 Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

21

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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 23 of 52

deadline and the lack of ambiguity about the intended purpose of this language, the text of the

CWA leaves EPA no room to interpret Section 401 as allowing certifying authorities any amount

year.90

of time in excess of one year.9°

“while a full year is the absolute maximum, it does

Additionally, as explained by the D.C. Circuit, "while

year.”91 Determining the "reasonable

“reasonable

not preclude a finding of waiver prior to the passage of a full year."91

period of time"

time” within that one-year period has for several decades fallen within the purview of

agencies.92 Relatedly, from the time EPA first promulgated

the federal licensing and permitting agencies.'

its implementing regulations in 1971, federal licensing and permitting agencies have been tasked

occurs.93 Thus, although EPA may have some discretion in

with determining when waiver occurs.93

“reasonable period of

describing the factors that an agency should consider when determining the "reasonable

time” and the occurrence of a waiver, the longstanding nature of this aspect of EPA’s

time"

EPA's regulations

change.94

will require the Agency to provide a robust and reasoned explanation of the need for the change.94

CWA,95 EPA must ensure that its

Finally, as the agency charged with implementing the CWA,95

implementing regulations include meaningfully and reasonably preclude certification tactics that

401’s congressionally mandated

are plainly intended to evade, rather than comply with, Section 401's

deadlines. To that end, EPA’s

EPA's 401 Certification Rule examined the various ways in which a small

minority of states have circumvented or attempted to circumvent certification deadlines. While

the Agency is not precluded from varying the measures needed to ensure that certifications are

completed within a reasonable period of time (not to exceed one year), the Agency cannot ignore

those known tactics certain that states have employed to evade deadlines. As the implementation

agency for the CWA, EPA must ensure that its regulations reasonably ensure statutory compliance,

90

Congress’s establishment of one-year

9° Consistent with our comments in Section III.f., the Associations believe that Congress's

as the outermost limit for Section 401 certifications reveals that Congress understood and expected Section 401

reviews to be narrowly focused on discharges from the federal project, rather than broader or more tangentially related

impacts.

91

91 Hoopa Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104.

92

92 See Army Corps regulations at 33 CFR § 325.1(b)(ii) (51 Fed. Reg. 41,236) (Nov. 13, 1986)); See also FERC Rules

at 18 §5.23(b)(1) (68 Fed. Reg. 61,743)(Oct. 30, 2003)); See also Constitution Pipeline Company, LLC, 164 FERC P

(‘‘[T]o the extent that Congress left it to federal licensing and permitting agencies,

61029, 2018 WL 3498274 (2018) ("[T]o

here the Commission, to determine the reasonable period of time for action by a state certifying agency, bounded on

the outside at one year, we have concluded that a period up to one year is reasonable.’’).

reasonable.").

93

93 See Millennium Pipeline Company, L.L.C., 860 F.3d at 700–01

700-01 (acknowledging that a project proponent can ask the

federal agency to determine whether a waiver has occurred).

94

94 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).

95

(‘‘Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, the Administrator of the

95 See 33 U.S.C. 1251(d) ("Except

chapter.’’); Id. at 1361(a); Mayo Found. for

for Medical Educ.

Environmental Protection Agency . . . shall administer this chapter.");

and Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 45 (2011); Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104; Ala. Rivers Alliance v. FERC, 325

296–97 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Cal. Trout v. FERC, 313 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002); Am. Rivers, Inc. v.

F.3d 290, 296-97

FERC, 129 F. 3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997).

22

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rather than leaving loopholes. Accordingly, EPA must, at a minimum, preclude those deadline

circumvention tactics that courts have held to be improper.

1.

Enforcing the CWA's

CWA’s Section 401 deadlines requires a clear and objective

starting point for review

EPA’s

EPA's regulations must reflect that the review period for a certification request begins when the

project proponent submits the certification request to the certifying authority. This interpretation

is required by the Act and, given examples where states have sought to toll the start date of their

review long after their receipt of certification requests, this proposed interpretation is practically

necessary.

Section 401 plainly states that:

may be, fails or refuses

[i]f the State, interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case maybe,

for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall

to act on a request for

not exceed one year) after receipt of such request, the certification requirements of

application.96

this subsection shall be waived with respect to such Federal application.96

The plain meaning of this language is that the Act provides the timeframe for a certifying

authority’s review and instructs that the receipt of the request for certification begins the review

authority's

97

“bright-line rule”

period. The statutory text therefore created a "bright-line

rule"97

for identifying the start of the

Act’s review deadlines would be rendered meaningless.

review period, without which the Act's

“receipt” is clear and widely understood through its common usage, the

Although the term "receipt"

Associations nonetheless believe that EPA must implement and enforce a regulatory definition of

“receipt” to prevent certain states from strategically sidestepping straight-forward interpretations

"receipt"

limits. At a minimum,

of the term to extend their review period beyond statutorily mandated time limits

EPA, as the agency charged with implementing the CWA, must implement Section 401 of the Act

“receipt” documented in the following

to prohibit the impermissible constructions of the term "receipt"

examples.

For instance, the State of New York received a certification request for the Northern Access

Pipeline on March 2, 2016. New York denied the certification application on April 7, 2017 and

argued that its denial was timely because: (1) the certification review did not begin until the state

“complete;” and (2) that the state asked and received consent from the

deemed the application "complete;"

project proponent to change the date on which the application was deemed received so that New

96

96 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added).

97

N.Y.

Dep’t't of

of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 2018).

97 N.

Y. State Dep

23

- App. 520 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 25 of 52

York’s April 7, 2017 decision would appear to conform to the Section 401 time limits

limits.98

York's

98

York’s arguments, FERC concluded that the state waived its Section 401

Notwithstanding New York's

deadlines,99 and in two sequential decisions, the

obligation for failure to act within the prescribed deadlines,99

(“Second Circuit")

Circuit”) agreed.10°

agreed.100

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second

In the first case, the Second Circuit held that Section 401 prohibited New York from determining

that the certification application was not "received"

“received” until the state deemed it complete.101

complete.101 The

“bright-line rule regarding the beginning of the review,"

review,”

court reasoned that Section 401 provided a "bright-line

York’s approach would impermissibly "allow

“allow a state agency not only to dictate when

and that New York's

102

the review process can begin but also to delay it indefinitely.”

indefinitely.99102

The Second Circuit then remanded FERC's

FERC’s conditional approval back to the Commission to allow

FERC to supplement its reasoning for the conditional approval. After FERC reaffirmed and further

Commission’s waiver determination.

explained its approval, New York once again challenged the Commission's

“bright-line rule”

state’s

Once again, the Second Circuit held that Section 401 provides a "bright-line

rule" that a state's

103

action on a request for certification shall not exceed one year from receipt of such a request.

request.103

York’s agreement with the project proponent to stipulate that the application

And regarding New York's

“however modest and

was received 36 days after it was actually received, the court held that "however

reasonable that extension may have been, allowing the state to dictate the beginning of review by

standard’”104

agreement would ‘blur

'blur th[e] bright-line rule into a subjective standard'"104

In another example, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP")

(“NJDEP”) recently

deemed as incomplete a certification request for a project proposed by PennEast Pipeline

Company, LLC because the project proponent had not provided NJDEP with surveys of the entire

pipeline route, including segments that had no rational relationship with potential water quality

impacts.105 Because this data request was irrelevant to the state's

state’s review of the proposed project's

project’s

impacts.105

potential water quality impacts in New Jersey, it can only be construed as a tactic for delay. Indeed,

Court’s June 29, 2021 decision in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey suggests that

the Supreme Court's

98

Dep’t of

of Envtl. Conservation v. Nat's

Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-161898 See N.Y. State Dep't

Dep’t of

of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir.

ag (2d Cir. March 23, 2021); See also N.Y. State Dep't

2018).

99

Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 164 FERC 61,084 at PP 35,42 (2018).

99 See Nat's

100

Dep’t of

Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-16181°°

See N.Y. State Dep't

ofEnvtl. Conservation v. Nat's

Dep’t of

of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, (2d Cir. 2018).

ag (2d Cir. March 23, 2021); See also N.Y. State Dep't

101

N.Y.

Dep’t of

'1' N

Y. State Dep't

of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d at 455.

102

N.Y.

Dep’t of

102

N

Y. State Dep't

of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d at 455-456.

103

Dep’t of

Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-1618-ag

l'NN.Y.

Y. State Dep't

of Envtl. Conservation v. Nat's

at p. 17 (2d Cir. March 23, 2021).

104

N.Y.

Dep’t of

Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-1618-ag

1°4

N

Y. State Dep't

of Envtl. Conservation v. Nat's

N.Y.

Dep’t of

of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d at 455).

at p. 17 (quoting N.

Y. State Dep't

105

Kop’Kash, Assistant Comm'r,

Comm’r, N.J. Dep't

Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Re: Freshwater Wetlands Individual

105

Letter from Virginia Kop'Kash,

Permit Application, DLUR File #0000-17-0007.2 FWW170001,

24

- App. 521 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 26 of 52

state’s efforts to expand its Section 401 review time were part of a larger effort to frustrate and

the state's

forestall construction of the pipeline.1°6

pipeline.106

While the CWA clearly directs how the Section 401 review deadlines should be applied, these

Agency’s regulations must prohibit the arbitrary and strategic

decision leave no doubt that the Agency's

tolling of Section 401 review periods.

2.

EPA must prohibit states from artificially extending timeframes by stopping

and restarting the certification process

The CWA does not allow certifying authorities to stop and restart their review to artificially extend

Section 401's

401’s statutorily prescribed deadlines. And as the agency charged with implementing

Section 401 of the Act, EPA’s

EPA's regulations must incorporate enforceable procedures that prohibit

401’s statutory deadlines. Here again, the need for these restrictions

this manner of evading Section 401's

“withdrawal

is made evident by the actions of a handful of states that have increasingly relied on a "withdrawal

resubmittal” tactic to circumvent statutory deadlines. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit's

Circuit’s recent

and resubmittal"

107

decision in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC ("Hoopa

(“Hoopa Valley”)

Valley")107

demonstrates the need for EPA to

enforce regulations to compel compliance with the express Section 401 deadlines.

In Hoopa Valley,

Valley, the D.C. Circuit considered whether California and Oregon could lawfully rely

“withdrawal-and-resubmission scheme"

scheme” to avoid the Section 401 deadline for certifying the

on a "withdrawal-and-resubmission

Project.108 The project proponent had originally

relicensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.108

states’ demand,

submitted its certification requests to the states in 2006, and pursuant to the states'

decade.109

withdrew and resubmitted the same certification requests annually for more than a decade.1°9

“more than a decade later, the states still ha[d] not

When the D.C. Circuit drafted its decision "more

110

decisions.”

rendered certification decisions."11°

The court went bemoaned that:

it is now commonplace for states to use Section 401 to hold federal licensing

hostage. At the time of briefing, twenty-seven of the forty-three licensing

applications before FERC were awaiting a state's water quality certification, and

four of those had been pending for more than a decade.111

decade.111

While the problem identified by the D.C. Circuit was pervasive, its resolution was remarkably

“[d]etermining the effectiveness of such a withdrawalstraight-forward. According to the court, "[d]etermining

401’s text is clear."112

clear.”112

and-resubmission scheme is an undemanding inquiry because Section 401's

106

594 U.S. __ (Slip. Op. at 4) (June 29, 2021).

106

107

1"

913 F. 3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

108

1°8

Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1103.

109

1°9

Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104.

110

ii° Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104 (emphasis in original).

111

iii Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104 (emphasis in original).

112

112 Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1103.

25

- App. 522 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 27 of 52

act’ or ‘refusal

act,’ the states'

states’ efforts

While the statute does not define ‘failure

'failure to act'

'refusal to act,'

. . . constitute such failure and refusal within the plain meaning of these phrases.

Section 401 requires state action within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed

one year. California and Oregon's deliberate and contractual idleness defies this

requirement. By shelving water quality certifications, the states usurp FERC's

control over whether and when a federal license will issue. Thus, if allowed, the

withdrawal-and-resubmission scheme could be used to indefinitely delay federal

licensing proceedings and undermine FERC's jurisdiction to regulate such

matters.113

matters.113

The court explained that "Congress

“Congress intended Section 401 to curb a state's

state’s ‘dalliance

'dalliance or

unreasonable delay.’

delay.' This Court has repeatedly recognized that the waiver provision was created

999114

114

‘to

proceeding.’”

Therefore, the

`to prevent a State from indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding.

“conclude[d] that California and Oregon have waived their Section 401 authority with regard

court "conclude[d]

Project.”115

to the Project."115

(“Fourth Circuit")

Circuit”) rejected a FERC

Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth

determination that North Carolina waived its Section 401 authority because the state took longer

proponent’s initial certification application and two subsequent

than one year to review a project proponent's

withdrawn.116 The court held

applications that were resubmitted after the initial application was withdrawn.116

that FERC did not have a sufficient basis to conclude that North Carolina had colluded with the

project proponent on the withdrawal and resubmittal of the certification applications to artificially

extend the time. Instead, the court found that the decision to withdraw and resubmit the initial and

subsequent applications was made by the project proponent alone and without the direction of, or

state.117

coordination with, the state."'

The Fourth Circuit's

Circuit’s reasoning appears to conflict with holdings in the D.C. Circuit118

Circuit118 and the

Second Circuit,119

Circuit,119 it is also not a particularly sweeping decision because the court made a factspecific determination that the record did not support FERC's

FERC’s determination that the project

proponent’s withdrawal and resubmittal of the certification application was coordinated with the

proponent's

state.120 Simply put, the 401 Certification Rule does not prohibit project proponents from

state.12°

withdrawing and resubmitting certification applications. The final rule only prohibits states and

other certifying authorities from requesting applications be withdrawn and resubmitted in order to

113

113 Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105.

114

114 Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105-6 (internal citations omitted).

115

115 Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105.

116

Dep’t of

of Envtl Quality v. FERC, 2021 WL 2763265 (41h

(4th Cir. July 2, 2021).

116 North Carolina Dep't

117

Dep’t of

of Envtl Quality v. FERC, 2021 WL 2763265.

117 North Carolina Dep't

118

118 See Hoopa Valley,

Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105.

119

Dep’t of

of Envtl. Conservation v. See Nat's

Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19119 See N.Y. State Dep't

1618-ag (2d Cir. March 23, 2021); See also N.Y. State Dep't

Dep’t of

of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d

Cir. 2018).

120

Dep’t of

of Envtl Quality v. FERC, 2021 WL 2763265.

12/3 North Carolina Dep't

26

- App. 523 -

Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 28 of 52

extend the Section 401 review time limit.

limit Thus, although it remains an outlier to the larger body

Circuit’s decision is not altogether inconsistent with the

of Section 401 jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit's

401 Certification Rule. Therefore, EPA’s

EPA's regulations must continue to stipulate that a certifying

authority is not authorized to request the project proponent to withdraw a certification request or

to take any other action to modify or restart the established reasonable period of time.

e.

Section 401 certification is required only when a federally licensed or

permitted activity has the potential to result in a discharge from a point source

to navigable waters

The 401 Certification Rule must continue to clarify that Section 401 certification procedures are

triggered by Section 401(a)(1) only when a federally licensed or permitted activity has the potential

from a point

point source into a WOTUS.

to result in a discharge from

WOTUS. This restrained application of Section

401 is commanded by the text and structure of the CWA, consistent with the applicable case law,

Agency’s longstanding interpretations.

and in harmony with the Agency's

As explained in Section III.c. above, the same 1972 Amendments through which Section 401 was

Act’s regulatory focus away from ambient standards and toward a

enacted also shifted the Act's

prohibition and permitting framework for "the

“the discharge of any pollutant by any person . . ."

.”121

122

The 1972 Amendments defined the phrase "discharge

“discharge of any pollutant"'

pollutant” as "any

“any addition of any

123

from any point

point source."123

source.”

pollutant to navigable watersfrom

“navigable waters"

waters” as "the

“the waters of the United States

Congress then also further defined "navigable

124

[“WOTUS”], including the territorial seas."124

seas.”

["WOTUS"],

While the precise contours of this definition are

the subject of a great deal of debate, Congress clearly intended the definition of WOTUS, and

“navigable waters,"

waters,” to refer to a subset of surface waterbodies within the United States.

therefore "navigable

The Associations submitted comments in strong support of the Agency's

Agency’s most recent proposal to

125

WOTUS, and we support the Navigable Waters Protection Rule that EPA and the Army

define WOTUS,125

126

Act’s defmition

definition of "navigable

“navigable waters"

waters” as WOTUS and the

Corps ultimately finalized.

finalized.126

The Act's

interpretation

Agency’s

of

“WOTUS”

act

as

a

limit

on

the

types

of

projects

subject to Section 401

Agency's

"WOTUS"

certification procedures just as these definitions limit the scope of activities subject to the Section

402 NPDES program or the Section 404 dredge-and-fill program. Like

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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