Application — Louisiana, et al., Applicants v. American Rivers, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 21, 2022
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No. ______
In the Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;
STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF TEXAS;
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICA, and NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION,
APPLICANTS,
v.
AMERICAN RIVERS; MICHAEL S. REGAN; and U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS.
APPENDIX TO APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
VOLUME III OF IV
On Application For Stay, Or, In The Alternative, On Petition For A Writ Of
Certiorari To The U.S. Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit
To the Honorable Elena Kagan
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
and Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit
GEORGE P. SIBLEY, III
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower
951 East Byrd Street
Richmond, VA 23219
(804) 788-8262
(804) 788-8218 (fax)
gsibley@huntonak.com
DEIDRE G. DUNCAN
ERICA N. PETERSON
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
2200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20037
MISHA TSEYTLIN
Counsel of Record
SEAN T.H. DUTTON
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606
(608) 999-1240
(312) 759-1939 (fax)
misha.tseytlin@troutman.com
TIMOTHY L. MCHUGH
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
1001 Haxall Point,
15th Floor
Richmond, VA 23219
Attorneys for Applicants
[Additional counsel on following page.]
CLARE ELLIS
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
50 California Street
Suite 1700
San Francisco, CA 94111
Attorneys for Applicants American
Petroleum Institute and Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL,
SOLICITOR GENERAL
JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN,
DEPUTY SOLICITOR
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6739
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov
stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov
CHARLES SENSIBA
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
401 9th Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004-2146
ELIZABETH HOLT ANDREWS
TROUTMAN PEPPER
HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
Three Embarcadero Center
Suite 800
San Francisco, CA 94111-4057
Attorneys for Applicant National
Hydropower Association
Attorneys for Applicant State of
Louisiana
JAMES KASTE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
109 State Capitol
Cheyenne, WY 82002
Additional Counsel:
AUSTIN KNUDSEN
Attorney General of Montana
LESLIE RUTLEDGE
Attorney General of Arkansas
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
LYNN FITCH
Attorney General of Mississippi
PATRICK MORRISEY
Attorney General of West Virginia
ERIC SCHMITT
Attorney General of Missouri
Attorneys for Applicants
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Volume I
Order Regarding Motion to Relate, ECF No. 23, In re Clean Water
Act Rulemaking, No.3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Aug. 08, 2020) ................. App. 1
Motion to Intervene by the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, ECF No. 27, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-JSC (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 28, 2020) ....................................................................................................... App. 2
Order Relating to Case No.20-04869, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-4636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 02, 2020)
............................................................................................................................. App. 95
Declaration of Robin Rorick for the American Petroleum Institute In
Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support of Defendants,
ECF No.56-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA;
3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ................................................. App. 96
Declaration of Joan Dreskin for the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America In Support of the Coalition’s Motion to Intervene in Support
of Defendants, ECF No. 56-2, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. September 04,
2020) .................................................................................................................. App. 105
Order Granting Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 62, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2020)................................................................................................... App. 115
First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020) .................. App. 116
Joint Case Management Statement, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water
Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA; 3:20-cv-04869-WHA;
3:20-cv-06137 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2020) ........................................................... App. 148
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 96, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 30, 2020) .................................................................................................... App. 165
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 98, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-06137-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 02, 2020) ................................................................................................... App. 197
Order Regarding Proposed Timeline For Administrative Record Completion,
ECF No. 116, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020) .................................................................................. App. 224
Order Regarding Joint Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance, ECF
No. 132, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021) ................................................................................. App. 225
EPA’S Motion for Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 143, In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
July 01, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 226
Volume II
Plaintiff’s Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 145, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 244
Plaintiff States’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 146, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 267
Declaration of Eileen Sobeck in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion
for Remand, ECF No. 146-1, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021).......................................... App. 299
American Rivers’ Opposition to EPA’s Motion for Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 147, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 424
EPA’s Reply In Support Of Motion For Remand Without Vacatur,
ECF No. 153, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) .................................................................................. App. 450
Intervenor Defendants’ Reply In Support Of Motion To Strike, ECF No. 155,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
August 19, 2021) ............................................................................................... App. 473
- ii -
Volume III
Intervenor Defendants’ Supplemental Brief On Allied-Signal Factors,
ECF No. 172, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2021) ..................................................................................... App. 478
August 2, 2021, Letter Comments From American Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers, et al., Regarding Section 401 Rule, ECF No. 172-1,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 04, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 497
Declaration Of David M.S. Dewhirst, ECF No. 172-2, In re Clean Water
Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 04, 2021) ............. App. 549
Order Regarding Motion to Remand Without Vacatur, ECF No. 173,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 21, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 552
Final Judgment, ECF No. 176, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2021) ......................................... App. 570
Intervenor Defendants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 179,
In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 17, 2021) ................................................................................................... App. 571
Order Denying Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 191, In re
Clean Water Act Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04636-WHA (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 07, 2021) .................................................................................................... App. 612
Intervenor National Hydropower Association’s Notice of Motion &
Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 75, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) ........................................ App. 626
American Petroleum Institute and Interstate Natural Gas of America’s
Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support Thereof, ECF No. 84, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 04, 2020) .................. App. 638
Order Granting Intervention, ECF No. 113, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 3:20-cv-04869-WHA (N.D. Cal. October 09, 2020) .............. App. 666
- iii -
Volume IV
Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants’ and Intervenors-Appellants’
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 20, In re Clean Water Act
Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. December 15, 2021)............................... App. 667
Federal Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Intervenor Defendants/
Appellants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF No. 26, In re Clean
Water Act Rulemaking, No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 11, 2022) ............... App. 757
Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Appellate
Jurisdiction, ECF No. 33, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. January 19, 2022) ....................................................... App. 783
Order Denying Stay, ECF No. 41, In re Clean Water Act Rulemaking,
No. 21-16958 (9th Cir. February 24, 2022) ...................................................... App. 799
- iv -
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Misha Tseytlin (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
misha.tseytlin@troutman.com
Sean T.H. Dutton (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
sean.dutton@troutman.com
227 W. Monroe Street, Suite 3900
Chicago, IL 60606-5085
Telephone:
312.759.1920
Facsimile:
312.759.1939
T H R E E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , S U I T E 800
11
Andrea W. Wortzel (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
andrea.wortzel@troutman.com
1001 Haxall Point, 15th Floor
Richmond, VA 23219
Telephone:
804.697.1406
Facsimile:
804.697.1339
Additional Counsel listed in signature
blocks
12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
13
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15
Charles Sensiba (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
charles.sensiba@troutman.com
401 9th Street N.W., Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone:
202.274.2850
Facsimile:
202.274.2994
Attorneys for
for Intervenor Defendant
National Hydropower Association
10
S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A L I F O R N I A 94 111-4057
T ROUTMAN P
EPPER H
AM ILTON SANDERS
S AN DERS LLP
LLP
TROUTMAN
PEPPER
HAMILTON
9
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON
SANDERS LLP
Elizabeth Holt Andrews (SBN 263206)
elizabeth.andrews@troutman.com
Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 800
San Francisco, California 94111-4057
Telephone:
415.477.5700
Facsimile:
415.477.5710
In re: Clean Water Act Rulemaking
Lead Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA
Related Case Nos.
3:20-CV-04869-WHA
3
:20-CV-04869-WHA
3:20-CV-06137-WHA
3
:20-CV-06137-WHA
16
17
INTERVENOR DEFENDANTS'
DEFENDANTS’
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ON ALLIEDSIGNAL FACTORS
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- App. 478 -
Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA
Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 2 of 19
T H R E E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , S U I T E 800
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T ROUTMAN P
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AM ILTON SANDERS
S AN DERS LLP
LLP
TROUTMAN
PEPPER
HAMILTON
1
INTRODUCTION
2
The Plaintiffs want this Court to strike down EPA’s
EPA's 2020 Clean Water Act Section 401
3
Certification Rule. But to get that extraordinary relief, they must prove that EPA acted arbitrarily,
4
capriciously, or contrary to law when promulgating the Rule. EPA, for its part, wants to revisit the
5
policy decisions reflected in the Certification Rule. But to change the Rule at all, EPA must go
6
through notice and comment rulemaking. The fact that Plaintiffs and EPA want these things at the
7
same time does not relax their respective burdens before this Court.
8
Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions have not met the exacting burden for vacating the
9
Certification Rule. EPA has not confessed error or admitted that any aspect of the Rule is legally
10
deficient, and the Intervenor Defendants continue to defend every aspect of the Rule in any event.
11
The Court has not received full merits briefing and has made no adjudication of error. If the Allied-
12
Signal test is applicable at all in this scenario—and it is not—Plaintiffs must show at the very first
13
step of that test that there is some legal deficiency serious enough to justify the disruptive
14
consequences of vacatur. The abbreviated discussion of the merits in Plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs’ responses to EPA’s
EPA's
15
motion to remand without vacatur presents only a limited engagement with some of the many
16
features of the Certification Rule and relies on the incorrect premise that EPA has conceded the
17
Rule is unlawful. It falls well short of the predicate necessary to justify vacating agency action.
18
Plaintiffs have not fully briefed any aspect of the Rule, let alone all of the Rule's
Rule’s many complicated,
19
detailed provisions and how Plaintiffs believe a severability analysis should apply here.
20
The disruption that vacatur of the Rule would wreak on many states and the regulated
21
community is profound. EPA promulgated the Certification Rule to fill a regulatory void that has
22
existed for nearly 50 years. The absence of clarity about basic features of the section 401
23
certification process spawned a series of abuses that distorted the cooperative-federalism
24
framework on which the Clean Water Act depends. Vacating the Rule would invite the return of
25
those abuses and cast substantial uncertainty over dozens of pending certification requests and the
26
processes states have implemented in the wake of the Certification Rule. That uncertainty will lead
27
inexorably to regulatory chaos, which will trigger needless litigation.
28
- App. 479 -
-2Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA
Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
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HAMILTON
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 3 of 19
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The states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia,
2
and Wyoming (collectively the "State
“State Defendants"),
Defendants”), American Petroleum Institute ("API"),
(“API”),
3
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America ("INGAA"),
(“INGAA”), and National Hydropower Association
4
("NHA")
(“NHA”) (collectively "Intervenor
“Intervenor Defendants")
Defendants”) intervened in this case because they have
5
substantial interests that would be impaired should the Rule be vacated. Vacating the Rule without
6
holding Plaintiffs to their well-established burden as challengers to agency action would violate
7
Intervenor-Defendants’
Intervenor-Defendants' basic right as a party in civil litigation—the right to be heard on the merits
8
of the dispute and put Plaintiffs to their proof. Plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs’ request for vacatur should be denied.
9
BACKGROUND
10
A.
11
Since 1970, "[a]ny
“[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity . . .
12
which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters . . . shall provide the licensing or
13
originate.”
permitting agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates or will originate."
14
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, 108 (Apr. 3, 1970). In 1972,
15
(“CWA”), a "total
“total restructuring"
restructuring” and "complete
“complete rewriting”
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),
rewriting"
16
of
of the nation’s
nation's water pollution control laws, including the provision requiring certification. City of
17
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (quoting legislative history); see also Federal Water
18
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (Oct. 16, 1972)
19
U.S.C.
(codified at 33 U.
S.C. § 1341). Of particular relevance here, Congress narrowed the certification
20
“activity [that] will be conducted in a manner which will not violate applicable
requirement from "activity
21
standards,” 84. Stat. at 108 (emphases added), to a certification only "that
“that any such
water quality standards,"
22
provisions of
of sections 301, 302, 306, and 307 of
of this
discharge will comply with the applicable provisions
23
Act,” 86 Stat. at 877 (emphases added). Congress also created a prominent role for states and tribes
Act,"
24
in implementing the new regulatory program. See 33 U.S.C. 1251(b).
Clean Water Act
25
The CWA uses a "cooperative
“cooperative federalism"
federalism” approach to achieve its aims. It carves out
26
complementary roles for federal agencies, on the one hand, and states and tribes, on the other.
27
CWA Section 401 gives each state and tribe an important but limited say in the licensing of federal
28
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Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
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HAMILTON
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projects that could affect water quality. Specifically, federal agencies cannot license activities that
2
may result in a discharge into waters of the United States until the state or authorized tribe where
3
the discharge would originate certifies that the discharge will comply with applicable water quality
4
requirements or waives the Section 401 requirement, either affirmatively or through inaction. 33
5
U.S.C. § 1341. Section 401 authority is powerful—when triggered, state certification or waiver is
6
an essential requirement for the federally-licensed activity to proceed. But to preserve the CWA's
CWA’s
7
federal-state balance, that authority is also limited—Section 401 only authorizes states to address
8
water quality, and only within reasonable time limits that can never exceed one year.
9
B.
10
Despite the statutory change in 1972, EPA failed to revise its prior regulations, promulgated
11
in 1971, that governed the certification process, which is known as a 401 Certification. As a result,
12
for nearly fifty years, EPA’s
EPA's regulations were incongruent with the new statutory language. Cf.
13
NPDES; Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,856 (June 7, 1979) (indicating need for
14
updated certification rules). Certain states began using the incongruity and ambiguities in EPA’s
EPA's
15
prior regulations effectively to veto projects based on non-water quality considerations, such as
16
preferences regarding energy policy, which infringes on the federal government’s
government's exclusive
17
authority.
Certain States Abused Their Section 401 Certification Authority
18
A particularly egregious example is Washington State’s
State's treatment of the Millennium Bulk
19
Terminals —
– Longview LLC project. In the course of a five-year review of the project, the State
20
compiled an Environmental Impact Statement that expressly concluded that the terminal would not
21
result in significant adverse effects on water quality, aquatic life, or designated uses; and that any
22
potential water quality impacts could be fully mitigated. Ex. 1, Joint Fuel & Petroleum Industry
23
Comments To Clean Water Act Section 401 Rule. And yet, the State denied the certification
24
request based on concerns about capacity of the interstate rail system, the impact of trains operating
25
anywhere in that system, and impacts on the overall capacity of the Federal Columbia River
26
Navigation Channel to accommodate additional vessels at state ports. Id.
27
Other examples abound in the administrative record. In December 2017, Virginia approved
28
a water quality certification for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, a $5.1 billion pipeline project that
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Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
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would transport gas produced in the Marcellus Shale region to the Mid-Atlantic region of the United
2
States. Dreskin Decl. ¶
¶ 13 (Dkt. 56-2). Virginia then included conditions regulating activities in
3
upland areas that may indirectly affect state waters beyond the scope of federal CWA jurisdiction
4
and the project's
project’s direct discharges to navigable waters. Id. According to Virginia, "all
“all proposed
5
upland activities associated with the construction, operation, maintenance, and repair of the
6
pipeline, any components thereof or appurtenances thereto, and related access roads and rights-of-
7
way,” are subject to the stringent conditions of the certification. Id. Another example took place
way,"
8
in August 2020, when North Carolina denied water quality certification for Mountain Valley
9
Pipeline Southgate, one of INGAA's
INGAA’s members, for reasons outside of water quality. Id. ¶
¶ 14. The
10
State determined that the purpose of the project was "unachievable"
“unachievable” due to the "uncertainty"
“uncertainty” of
11
completing a different pipeline project even though FERC had determined that the public
12
convenience and necessity required approval of the $468 million, 75-mile natural gas pipeline
13
project. Id.
14
States have also unlawfully exploited the regulatory ambiguity to extend the amount of time
15
they have to act on a certification request, which can effectively kill a project. One example is the
16
Constitution Pipeline, a $683 million, 124-mile natural gas pipeline designed to connect natural gas
17
production in Pennsylvania to demand in northeastern markets. Dkt. 84-1 ¶
¶ 12. The New York
18
State Department of Environmental Conservation ("NYSDEC")
(“NYSDEC”) requested additional information
19
and deemed the request complete in December 2014. Id. In April 2015, NYSDEC requested that
20
the API member withdraw and resubmit its request in order to restart the statutory period of time
21
that NYSDEC had to act on the request. Id. In April 2016, nearly three years after the project's
project’s
22
initial request for certification, NYSDEC denied water quality certification. Following litigation
23
over NYSDEC's
NYSDEC’s determination, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
(“FERC”) determined in
24
August 2019 that NYSDEC had waived the Section 401 certification requirement.
25
Nevertheless, after years of delay, the project's
project’s sponsor halted investment in the pipeline and
26
cancelled the project in February 2020. Id.
Id.
27
The Millennium Pipeline Company faced a similar roadblock when it submitted a
28
certification request to NYSDEC for the Millennium Valley Lateral project, a 7.8-mile pipeline
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Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
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connecting a natural gas mainline to a new natural gas-fueled combined cycle electric generation
2
facility in New York. Id. ¶
¶ 13. Nearly two years after the project's
project’s initial request for certification,
3
NYSDEC denied certification on the grounds that FERC's
FERC’s environmental review of the project
4
lacked an adequate analysis of the potential downstream greenhouse gas emissions, not water
5
quality concerns. Id. In September 2017, FERC concluded that NYSDEC's
NYSDEC’s twenty-one-month
6
delay constituted waiver of the certification requirement, and the Second Circuit agreed. See N.Y.
7
State Dep't
Dep’t of
of Env
Env’t't Conservation v. Fed. Energy Regal.
Regul. Comm’n,
Comm'n, 884 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018).
8
A number of courts have recognized that allowing states to delay the start of the period of
9
review violates the CWA's
CWA’s plain text. The Second Circuit concluded that the CWA creates a
10
“bright-line rule"
rule” that the "receipt"
“receipt” of a Section 401 request is the beginning of the state's
state’s one-year
"bright-line
11
period for review. Id. at 455. As the D.C. Circuit explained, "the
“the purpose of the waiver provision
12
is to prevent a State from indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding by failing to issue a
13
timely water quality certification under Section 401."
401.” Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643
14
F.3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The D.C. Circuit thereafter invalidated the process of withdrawing
15
and refiling the same Section 401 request in order to restart the review period. Hoopa Valley
Valley Tribe
16
v. FERC, 913 F.3d 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
17
C.
18
An update to the 1971 regulations was necessary to conform the regulations to the 1972
19
CWA amendments and to provide necessary clarity and transparency that would also remedy the
20
“[t]he Agency's
Agency’s
abuses described above. 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020). EPA explained that "[t]he
21
longstanding failure to update its regulations created the confusion and regulatory uncertainty that
22
were ultimately the cause of those controversial section 401 certification actions and the resulting
23
litigation." 85 Fed. Reg. 42227. In particular, EPA cited the D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit
litigation.”
24
decisions discussed above as recognizing that allowing states to extend their review beyond one
25
year is contrary to the CWA. Id.
EPA Adopts The Section 401 Certification Rule
26
The Rule fixes these problems. The Rule begins by defining fourteen key terms, most of
27
which are not defined in the Clean Water Act. 40 C.F.R. § 121.1; see also 85 Fed. Reg. at 42237
28
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(describing the need for definitional clarity achieved through EPA’s
EPA's rulemaking process). The Rule
2
then reaffirms EPA’s
EPA's longstanding interpretation of when a water quality certification is required
3
under Clean Water Act section 401. 40 C.F.R. § 121.2; 85 Fed. Reg. 42237 ("Section
(“Section 121.2 of the
4
final rule is consistent with the Agency's
Agency’s longstanding interpretation and is not intended to alter the
5
scope of applicability established in the CWA.").
CWA.”). The Rule sets out the scope of certification, as
6
developed through the rulemaking process. 40 C.F.R. § 121.3. The Rule provides a procedure to
7
ensure meaningful coordination occurs between project proponents and state and tribal certifying
8
authorities before the certification process even begins. 40 C.F.R. § 121.4 (Pre-filing meeting
9
request). The Rule lays out a uniform procedure for establishing the reasonable period of time for
10
states and tribes to act on a certification request, clear rules for when that period of time begins and
11
ends, and a procedure for communicating to all parties when the period of time begins and ends.
12
40 C.F.R. §§ 121.5-9.
121.5–9. The Rule requires an action on a certification request, whether it is a grant,
13
grant with conditions, or a denial of certification, to be in writing and to contain certain information
14
that explains the state or tribe's
tribe’s action. 40 C.F.R. § 121.7; 85 Fed. Reg. 42256 (explaining that such
15
requirements are intended to promote the development of comprehensive administrative records
16
for certification actions and to increase transparency). The Rule describes the effect of certain
17
actions and explains how waiver of the certification requirement can occur proactively or by
18
operation of law. 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.8-9.
121.8–9. The Rule also provides a procedure for neighboring
19
jurisdictions to participate in the certification process, as required by the Clean Water Act, 40
20
C.F.R. §§ 121.12; describes how certification conditions are to be enforced, 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.11;
21
and describes EPA’s
121.13–16.
EPA's role as a certifying authority and advisor, 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.13-16.
22
23
D.
Plaintiffs Bring This Lawsuit, EPA Moves To Remand Without Vacatur, And
Then Plaintiffs Ask This Court To Vacate The Rule.
24
Plaintiffs are three groups who filed complaints in this Court: Idaho Rivers United,
25
American Rivers, California Trout, and American Whitewater (collectively "Plaintiff
“Plaintiff American
26
Rivers”), Dkt. 75; twenty states and the District of Columbia (collectively "Plaintiff
“Plaintiff States”),
Rivers"),
States"), Dkt.
27
96; and Columbia Riverkeeper, Sierra Club, Suquamish Tribe, Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe,
28
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Intervenor Defendants'
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Orutsaramiut Native Council (collectively "Plaintiff
“Plaintiff Tribes”),
Tribes"), Dkt. 98. Intervenor Defendants
2
moved to intervene to defend the Rule, Dkt. 27, and this Court granted their motions, Dkt. 62.
3
On January 20, 2021, President Biden directed "all
“all executive departments and agencies . . .
4
to immediately review and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, take action to address
5
the promulgation of Federal regulations and other actions during the last 4 years that conflict with"
with”
6
the new Administration's
Administration’s objectives. EO 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 25, 2021). In a press
7
statement the same day, the Administration identified the Certification Rule as among those that
8
would be reviewed under President Biden's
Biden’s Executive Order.1
Order.1
9
On June 2, 2021, EPA pointed to the Executive Order and announced it intended to
10
reconsider and revise the Certification Rule. Notice of
of Intention to Reconsider and Revise the Clean
11
Water
Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 29541 (June 2, 2021). EPA then moved for
12
remand without vacatur in this case, Dkt. 143 at 2, among others. Although EPA noted "substantial
“substantial
13
concerns” with some portions of the Rule, EPA made clear that it was not confessing error. Id. at
concerns"
14
13. Without filing a motion of their own, Plaintiffs argued for vacatur in their oppositions, while
15
failing to meaningfully discuss most aspects of the Rule. See generally Dkts. 145-47.
145–47.
16
ARGUMENT
17
I.
19
Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Vacatur Because They Have Utterly Failed To Show
That They Satisfy The First Allied-Signal
Allied-Signal Factor
A.
Plaintiffs Failed To Establish The Necessary Legal Predicate For Application
Of The First Allied-Signal Factor, Rendering Such Relief Unavailable
20
Plaintiffs failed to establish the predicate for vacatur and thus the application of the first
21
Allied-Signal factor—that the rule is, in fact, unlawful—and thus their request for vacatur should
22
be denied on that basis alone. The first Allied-Signal factor asks how "serious[
“serious[ ]"
]” the agency's
agency’s
23
errors are. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,
150–51 (D.C. Cir.
Comm 'n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51
24
1993). This assessment of error can only logically occur after a court has concluded that a legal
25
error has occurred. See id. (applying the two-factor test after determining that the agency acted
18
26
27
28
11 Fact Sheet: List of Agency Actions for Review, White House (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-listofagency-actions-for-review/.
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without "reasoned
“reasoned decision-making");
decision-making”); Pollinator Stewardship Council v. EPA, 806 F.3d 520, 532
2
(9th Cir. 2015) (same). And there is good reason for that well-established approach. Vacating a
3
rule prior to adjudicating the merits affords plaintiffs complete relief without ever proving the
4
merits of their case, while also circumventing the Administrative Procedure Act's
Act’s ("APA")
(“APA”) notice-
5
and-comment requirements for repeal of a rule. See Nat'l
Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass
Ass’n
'n v. Salazar,
6
660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 2009) ("[G]ranting
(“[G]ranting vacatur here would allow the Federal defendants
7
to do what they cannot do under the APA, repeal a rule without public notice and comment, without
8
judicial consideration of the merits.");
merits.”); accord Maine v. Wheeler,
Wheeler, No. 1:14-cv-00264-JDL, 2018
9
WL 6304402, at *3 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2018); California v. Regan, No. 20-cv-03005-RS, 2021 WL
10
4221583, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2021) ("there
(“there has been no evaluation of the merits—or
11
concession by defendants—that would support a finding that the rule should be vacated").
vacated”). And
12
unlike the cases that Plaintiffs cite to advocate that vacatur before full adjudication on the merits is
13
permissible, see Dkts. 146 at 19, 147 at 2-3,
2–3, here there remains a live controversy between the
14
parties regarding the legality of the Rule because Intervenor Defendants would vigorously defend
15
every aspect of the Rule from legal challenge.
16
To the extent that it ever would be appropriate for a court to vacate a rule that a party in the
17
case is defending on the merits without issuing a decision on the rule’s
rule's legality—and to be clear, it
18
would never be permissible—that type of relief could only be ordered after full merits briefing. To
19
illustrate, the district court in Pascua Yaqui Tribe v. EPA, No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, __ F. Supp.
20
3d __,, 2021 WL 3855977 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021), vacated a rule without making a merits
21
determination on the rule's
rule’s legality,
legality,22 but at least in that case the plaintiffs submitted a full 61-page
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
2
The Pascua Yacqui Tribe court observed that two Ninth Circuit cases indicate that "in
“in the Ninth
adjudication.”
Circuit, remand with vacatur may be appropriate even in the absence of a merits adjudication."
Pascua Yaqui Tribe, 2021 WL 3855977 at *4 (citing Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d
989 (9th Cir. 2012); Safer Chemicals, Healthy Fams. v. EPA, 791 F. App'x
App’x 653 (9th Cir. 2019)).
But both of those Ninth Circuit cases involved different circumstances than those presented here.
In California Communities Against Toxics, no party defended EPA’s
EPA's reasons for adopting the rule
as legally permissible, with EPA seeking to salvage the rule based on new reasoning not found in
the administrative record, 688 F.3d at 993, which it cannot do, see id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)). Similarly, in Safer Chemicals, EPA asked for remand with vacatur, thus
App’x at 656.
conceding the rule was unlawful, and no party opposed such relief. 791 F. App'x
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merits brief, see No. CV-20-00266-TUC-RM, Dkt. 48, and intervenor-defendants submitted a
2
response in support of the rule, see id. Dkt. 77. The court considered all of these fully briefed and
3
developed merits arguments and only then concluded that there were serious errors on the first
4
Allied-Signal factor, finding
“fundamental, substantive flaws."
flaws.” Pasqua Yaqui Tribe, 2021 WL
fmding "fundamental,
5
3855977, at *5. Here, on the other hand, as discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs have not fully
6
briefed any aspect of their legal challenges to the Rule, let alone all of the Rule's
Rule’s many complicated,
7
detailed provisions and how they would approach the issue of severability.
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B.
9
The Limited Discussion of the Merits That Plaintiffs Submitted Is Insufficient
For This Court To Hold That Any Aspect Of The Rule Is Unlawful Under
The First Allied-Skenal
Allied-Signal Factor, Let Alone That The Entire Rule Is Unlawful
10
Plaintiffs have failed to present to this Court anything resembling a developed argument as
11
to why any aspect of the Rule fails on the first Allied-Signal factor, which provides an independently
12
sufficient basis for denying their request. In particular, the State Plaintiffs do not develop any
13
argument that any aspect of the Rule is unlawful, instead claiming that EPA, as a general matter,
14
Rule’s illegality in various statements. See Dkt. 146 at 20-21.
20–21. The Tribes Plaintiffs,
admitted the Rule's
15
in turn, also fail to develop any argument that the Rule is unlawful, merely listing three general
16
considerations—“(1) the agency failed to provide sufficient justification for departing from a half
considerations—"(1)
17
century of practice and policy related to the interpretation and implementation of Section 401; (2)
18
it based its decision to do so on an [Executive Order] aimed at promoting fossil fuel infrastructure,
19
not clean water; and (3) EPA did not present any explanation for how the [ ] Rule would be more
20
States' claim that EPA
protective of water quality,”
quality," Dkt. 145 at 12—and then parroting the Plaintiff States’
21
12–13. American Rivers Plaintiffs do make a few
somehow admitted these errors, Dkt. 145, at 12-13.
22
4–10, while pointing to the same
brief arguments on a couple of aspects of the Rule, Dkt. 147 at 4-10,
23
10, but such perfunctory analysis is nowhere near
claimed concession by EPA, see Dkt. 147 at 9,
9,10,
24
Rule’s legality.
developed enough for this Court to make any judgment as to the Rule's
25
Rule’s
As a threshold matter, all of these Plaintiffs are simply wrong that EPA conceded the Rule's
26
illegality, and any such concession would be legally insufficient in any event, given that Intervenor
27
Defendants are parties in this case and defend fully every aspect of the Rule.
EPA has
28
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unequivocally denied that it made any concession. See generally Sept. 30,2021
30, 2021 Hr'g.
Hr’g. Instead,
2
EPA merely stated that it "will
“will undertake a new rulemaking effort to propose revisions due to
3
substantial concerns with the existing Rule."
Rule.” Dkt. 143 at 2, see id. at 7, 8; see Dkt. 155 at 2-3.
2–3. EPA
4
could not in fact concede anything as to the Rule's
Rule’s legality without violating the APA. EPA is
5
currently in the middle of its rulemaking process, Dkt. 153 at 2; see Dkt. 155 at 3, during which
6
process the agency must keep an open mind on all issues, including as to whether to retain the entire
7
Rule, Rural Cellular Ass
Ass’n
1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Dkt. 155 at 2-3.
2–3.
'n v. F.C.C., 588 F.3d 1095,1101
8
Plaintiffs also failed to satisfy the first Allied-Signal factor because the few merits
9
arguments that they briefly mention are mismatched entirely with the full vacatur remedy that they
10
seek. The Rule is complex and multifaceted, with many operative provisions that cover numerous
11
topics. See supra pp. 6–7.
6-7. Plaintiffs assert that the errors in the Rule are significant, but their
12
arguments only touch on a few discrete sections, which Plaintiffs discuss out of context, Dkt. 146
13
at 20-21,
20–21, or only offer passing speculative harms, rather than cite to actual alleged legal errors in
14
the Rule, Dkt. 146 at 4-14.
4–14. At most, Plaintiffs address a fraction of the Rule's
Rule’s provisions, cherry-
15
picking from EPA’s
EPA's statements in its briefing rather than the Rule itself, see Dkt. 146 at 20-21,
20–21, and
16
vaguely alluding to "other
“other detrimental provisions"
provisions” without any elaboration, see, e.g., Dkt 146 at 7.
17
Plaintiffs also fail to provide any severability analysis, which would be mandatory if Plaintiffs want
18
this Court to vacate the entire Rule. See Carlson v. Postal Regul. Comm’n,
337, 351–52
Comm'n, 938 F.3d 337,351-52
19
(D.C. Cir. 2019). For example, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that EPA "would
“would [not] have
20
adopted” the various aspects of the Section 401 Rule if some other aspects were declared invalid.
adopted"
21
Id. Courts, after all, must ordinarily "limit
“limit the solution to the problem"
problem” that the plaintiff has
22
demonstrated. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Wheeler,
68, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting
Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68,82
23
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
of N
N. New England, 546 U.S. 320,328-29
320, 328–29 (2006)).
24
25
26
27
28
The same conclusion follows if this Court looks at the specific, brief arguments that the
various Plaintiffs groups included in their vacatur requests.
The State Plaintiffs make no substantive argument with regard to the legality of any aspect
of the Rule. See generally Dkt. 146.
The Tribes Plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs’ one-paragraph merits "argument"
“argument” is conclusory and without merit.
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See Dkt. 145 at 11-12.
11–12. The Tribes Plaintiffs make broad claims about the Rule's
Rule’s "serious
“serious legal
2
errors,” namely that the Rule "runs
“runs afoul"
afoul” of the CWA's
CWA’s text, purpose, and "cooperative
“cooperative federalist
errors,"
3
framework”
Rule’s purported
framework" without developing these claims beyond a brief description of the Rule's
4
effect. Dkt. 145 at 11-12.
11–12. Such an undeveloped argument fails. Cal. Pac. Bank v. Fed. Deposit
5
Ins. Corp., 885 F.3d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Inadequately
(“Inadequately briefed and perfunctory arguments
6
are [ ] waived.");
waived.”); Wells
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d 898, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
7
Notably, EPA addressed concerns related to these issues in the Rule's
Rule’s preamble. See 85 Fed. Reg.
8
42226 (responding to public comments that the "rule
“rule is inconsistent with the concept of cooperative
9
federalism”),
42228–29 (responding to public comments about the Rule's
Rule’s adherence to the
federalism"), id. at 42228-29
10
statutory text and outlining the scope of EPA authority to clarify the statute), see also 42215 (listing
11
the changes made to the proposed Rule after consideration of public comments). The Tribes
12
Plaintiffs do not even attempt to explain what aspect of EPA’s
EPA's discussion was legally incorrect with
13
any sufficient clarity to allow Defendant Intervenors to address that argument, or for this Court to
14
evaluate whether that argument carries the day under the first Allied-Signal factor.
15
16
The American Rivers Plaintiffs, in turn, offer various critiques of the Section 401 Rule that
are too conclusory and meritless to prevail under the first Allied-Signal factor.
17
These Plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs’ attack on the Rule's
Rule’s scope of certification is insufficiently developed for
18
this Court to evaluate this aspect of the Rule's
Rule’s legality and, in any event, is wrong. See Dkt. 147 at
19
5–7.
Rule’s scope of certification "is
“is inconsistent with the Clean Water Act"
Act”
5-7. They argue that the Rule's
20
and that the definitions of "discharge"
“discharge” and "water
“water quality requirements”
“bear little resemblance to
requirements" "bear
21
how the Clean Water Act defines those terms."
terms.” Dkt. 147 at 5–7.
5-7. But the Clean Water Act does not
22
provide "a
“a single, clear, and unambiguous definition of the appropriate scope of section 401"
401” and
23
Section 401 does not define the terms "discharge"
“discharge” or "water
“water quality requirements,”
requirements," eliminating any
24
possible direct inconsistencies. 85 Fed. Reg. 42250. Moreover, the Rule's
Rule’s scope of certification
25
and related definitions were drafted to "reasonably
“reasonably resolve any ambiguity"
ambiguity” in the statute, after
26
taking into consideration "the
“the text and structure of the Act, as well as the history of modifications
27
between the 1970 version and the 1972 amendments."
amendments.” Id. The Rule was developed after
28
consideration of all public comments, including "varying
“varying interpretations"
interpretations” described in the
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preamble. Id. at 42256. The final definition of "water
“water quality requirements"
requirements” "strikes
“strikes a balance
2
among various competing considerations while remaining loyal to the text of the CWA"
CWA” and with
3
an intent to "provide
“provide additional clarity and regulatory certainty for certifying authorities, project
4
proponents, and federal licensing and permitting agencies."
agencies.” Id. EPA fully and correctly engaged
5
with the text and history of the Act with regard to the Section 401 certification process. See 85
6
Fed. Reg. 42229-30
42229–30 (describing the scope of certification under the Rule in the context of the
7
CWA’s text and history), id. at 42230-36
42230–36 (engaging in a plain text analysis of the statute and
CWA's
8
showing how the definitional clarifications in the Rule are supported by the ordinary meaning of
9
the text); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 121.2-121.11
121.2–121.11 (laying out the uniform set of certification
10
procedures). These Plaintiffs do not explain what aspect of EPA’s
EPA's discussion or legal conclusions
11
were legally insufficient. Their arguments fail to offer any concrete reasoning, and, therefore, are
12
not sufficiently developed. See Cal. Pac. Bank, 885 F.3d at 570; Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
13
The American Rivers Plaintiffs claim that the Rule is unlawful because it limits states and
14
tribes to considering potential impacts of only the "discharge"
“discharge” from a proposed project, rather than
15
“the activity as a whole,"
whole,” pointing to PUD No. 1 of
of Jefferson County v. Washington
of
"the
Washington Department of
16
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994); see Dkt. 147 at 5–7.
5-7. As EPA explained in the Rule preamble, in
17
1972 Congress replaced the word "activity"
“activity” in section 401(a) with the word "discharge"
“discharge” to reflect
18
the "total
“total restructuring"
restructuring” and "complete
“complete rewriting"
rewriting” of the statutory framework to regulate discharges
19
under the Clean Water Act. 85 Fed. Reg. 42251. "The
“The final rule gives due weight to Congress'
Congress’
20
intentional choice to change the language in section 401(a) to ensure that ‘discharges’
'discharges' from
21
federally licensed or permitted activities, rather than the activity as a whole, comply with
22
appropriate water quality requirements."
requirements.” Id. EPA concluded in the Rule preamble that the text of
23
section 401 is not unambiguous and that "the
“the variation in public comments received”
received" demonstrates
24
that "section
“section 401 is susceptible to a multitude of interpretations."
interpretations.” Id. Further, as described in the
25
Rule’s preamble, the Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 analyzed section 401 and EPA’s
EPA's prior
Rule's
26
regulations and concluded, based on its interpretation, that certification conditions and limitations
27
could be based on the activity as a whole, not just the discharge. 85 Fed. Reg. 42251. The American
28
Rivers Plaintiffs appear to believe that the Supreme Court's
Court’s decision was based on a plain language
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analysis of the Clean Water Act, such that EPA would have no authority to interpret this language.
2
But "[n]owhere
“[n]owhere in the opinion does the Court conclude that section 401 is unambiguous. In fact,
3
the Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 offered its own interpretation of the ambiguous language in
4
section 401 when it ‘reasonably
'reasonably read’
read' the scope of section 401 to allow conditions and limitations
5
on the activity as a whole."
whole.” Id. EPA also noted that the Court "found
“found the EPA's
EPA’s regulations to be
6
consistent with the Court's
Court’s own reasonable reading of the language in sections 401(a) and (d)."
(d).” Id.
7
These Plaintiffs assert that PUD No. 1 is "binding,"
“binding,” Dkt. 147 at 5, but fail to acknowledge that EPA
8
analyzed applicable law and concluded that the scope of certification established in 40 C.F.R. §
9
121.3 "is
“is not foreclosed by the holding in PUD No. 1"
1” because the Court's
Court’s conclusion "did
“did not
10
follow from the unambiguous terms of the statute,"
statute,” and thus the agency could use its delegated
11
rulemaking authority to adopt a different approach, 85 Fed. Reg. 42251.
12
The American Rivers Plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs’ limited argument that the Rule limits or circumscribes
13
states’ abilities to implement their certification programs is meritless. The American Rivers
states'
14
Plaintiffs offer no support for their sweeping assertion that the Rule "impermissibly
“impermissibly intrudes on the
15
states’ and tribes'
tribes’ ability to effectively manage their 401 certification programs and meaningfully
states'
16
review federally licensed projects."
projects.” Dkt. 147 at 7-9.
7–9. As such, this perfunctory argument is also
17
waived. See Cal. Pac. Bank, 885 F.3d at 570; Renz, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 911. In any event, Plaintiff
18
American Rivers'
Rivers’ discontent with the procedures set out in the Certification Rule is just that—
19
subjective discontent. But nothing suggests that these procedures are illegal. The Certification
20
Rule simply establishes predictable and consistent procedures for certification processes, regardless
21
of what state or tribe is issuing certification. EPA explained in the Rule preamble, "[a]s
“[a]s the Agency
22
charged with administering the CWA, as well as a certifying authority in certain instances, the EPA
23
is responsible for developing a common regulatory framework for certifying authorities to follow
24
when completing section 401 certifications."
certifications.” 85 Fed. Reg. 42211 (footnote omitted). Throughout
25
the Rule preamble, EPA provides legal rationale and support for each of the procedures that the
26
American Rivers Plaintiffs complain are illegal, but the Plaintiffs do not acknowledge let alone
27
rebut EPA’s
42240–43 (explaining the basis for a
EPA's analysis or conclusions. See, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg, 42240-43
28
pre-filing meeting request and responding to public comments concerning same); 42243-49
42243–49
- App. 491 -
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Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
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1
(explaining the rationale for establishing a specific set of information to be included in a
2
certification request; the statutory basis for starting the reasonable period of time "upon
“upon receipt"
receipt” of
3
a certification request; and responding to public comments concerning same); 42258-63
42258–63
4
(explaining the timeline for certification actions; concluding that federal permit and licensing
5
agencies "should
“should continue to [establish the reasonable period of time] as they have done for the
6
past several decades";
decades”; explaining the factors that must be considered when establishing the
7
reasonable period of time; providing federal agencies maximum flexibility in establishing the
8
reasonable period of time by declining to adopt a default reasonable period of time of six months;
9
explaining procedures for requesting an extension of the established reasonable period of time;
10
explaining that the Clean Water Act does not contain any provisions for tolling the reasonable
11
period of time for any reason; providing legal citations to applicable case law; responding to public
12
comments concerning same).
13
II.
Vacating The Rule Would Cause Significant Disruption To Pending Section 401
Reviews
14
The Certification Rule fills a gaping regulatory void. It sets basic rules for the section 401
15
16
17
18
19
20
process, including a common rule for defining when the clock starts on a state's
state’s reasonable period
of time to act on a certification request and procedures for establishing how much time is
reasonable. And critically, it more clearly defines the scope of authority granted by Congress in
section 401, so that section 401 cannot be used by states to make policy decisions squarely reserved
to the federal government and thereby impair the interests of other states. Vacating the rule would
eliminate these salutary improvements and return to the dysfunction fostered by EPA’s
EPA's decades-
21
long failure to set basic rules for the section 401 process.
22
Most problematic is the interstate conflict that a return to the old regime is sure to foster.
23
24
Before the Certification Rule, some states—including some Plaintiff States—used the prior
outdated rules to exert control over activities in other states and to protect their own industries.
industries.33
25
26
27
28
“[o]ne of the
33 The abuses under the prior rule raise issues of constitutional magnitude. Indeed, "[o]ne
major defects of the Articles of Confederation, and a compelling reason for the calling of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, was the fact that the Articles essentially left the individual
States free to burden commerce both among themselves and with foreign countries very much as
pleased.” Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
“source of
they pleased."
Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976). A particular "source
- App. 492 -
-15Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA
Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
T H R E E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , S U I T E 800
S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A L I F O R N I A 94 111-4057
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LLP
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HAMILTON
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1
See, e.g., Lighthouse Resources Letter (Dkt. 27-7 at 1-4).
1–4). Even when states did not outright deny
2
section 401 certifications, they imposed uncertainty, never-ending demands for information,
3
interminable delays, and conditions unrelated to the discharges actually regulated by the CWA.
4
The result was to greatly increase the cost of some interstate projects and fully defeat others, with
5
attendant harms to other states'
states’ economies and ability to develop their natural resources. See Rorick
6
Decl (Dkt. 56-1); Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2). Curbing such abuses is a core benefit of the Rule.
7
There is no reason to think the abuses won't
won’t return if the Certification Rule is vacated.4
vacated.4
8
More practically, the Rule would upend the substantial progress made by states and federal
9
agencies to improve the section 401 process in the wake of the Certification Rule. Reinstating the
10
prior rule would result in substantial disruption from general whipsawing of both regulators and
11
regulated entities. Ex. 2, Declaration of David M.S. Dewhirst ¶
¶ 8. Such uncertainty and the
12
attendant risk of delay deters large capital projects that benefit the Intervenor Defendant States
13
economically and, indeed, which are necessary for the development of their natural resources. Id.
14
¶¶ 7-9. And that is without even considering the likely return of the outright abuses the Certification
'Irlf
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of some of the States, which having no convenient ports
for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, [through] whose ports, their
on.” Id. (quoting Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Fan-and
Farrand
commerce was carryed on."
“By prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens on
ed. 1966)). "By
interstate commerce without congressional approval, [the Commerce Clause] strikes at one of the
chief evils that led to the adoption of the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that
commerce.” Comptroller of
of Treasury of
of Md. v. Wynne,
burdened interstate commerce."
Wynne, 575 U.S. 542 (2015)
(citations omitted); see also Tenn. Wine
Wine and Spirits Retailers Assoc. v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449,
(“[W]e have long held that this Clause also prohibits state laws that unduly restrict
2459 (2019) ("[W]e
interstate commerce[.]”);
commerce[.]"); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949) (holding
denial of license for new milk facility to be unconstitutional protectionism). Accordingly, a State
“may not use the threat of economic isolation"
isolation” to control its sister states. Great Atl. &
certainly "may
Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976).
23
The Intervenor Defendant States asserted as affirmative defenses that Plaintiffs had "neither
“neither
factual nor legal support for injunctive or equitable relief,"
relief,” "[a]ny
“[a]ny claim for injunctive or equitable
Plaintiffs’ unclean hands,”
“Plaintiffs’ theories would render the Clean Water
relief is barred by Plaintiffs'
hands," and "Plaintiffs'
part.” Answer (Dkt. 82) at 20. Intervenor Defendant States have
Act unconstitutional in whole or part."
not had the opportunity to take discovery on these defenses, but the existing record supports
widespread unclean hands by Plaintiffs, such that any claim to equitable relief is barred. See, e.g.,
Lighthouse Resources Letter (Dkt. 27-7); Rorick Decl. (Dkt. 56-1) I¶¶ 11-15; Dreskin Decl. (Dkt.
56-2) I¶¶ 8-14.
4
4
24
25
26
27
28
- App. 493 -
-16Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA
Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
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HAMILTON
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1
Rule was intended to address. At the federal level, multiple federal agencies have applied the new
2
rule to pending actions. Since 2020, EPA has issued a number of implementation documents,
3
including recommended best practices and template certifications that can be used by states and
4
tribes in different circumstances.
5
completed its own notice-and-comment rulemaking in March 2021 to set a uniform one-year
6
deadline for states to complete certification actions on FERC authorizations and to explain how
7
that time-period would be calculated. Waiver of the Water Quality Certification Requirements of
8
Section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 16298 (Mar. 29, 2021).
EPA, 2020 Rule Implementation Materials. 55 And FERC
9
Vacating the Rule would cast doubt on these independent regulatory actions, and the
10
businesses and municipalities that need section 401 certifications for critical infrastructure projects
11
would shoulder the burden of that disruption. See Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) 'Irlf
¶¶ 21, 23. These new
12
rules and procedures are now being applied to thousands of pending requests for section 401
13
certifications. See Moyer Decl. ¶
¶ 14, N
N. Plains Resource Council v. U.S. Army Corps of
of Eng'rs,
Eng’rs,
14
No. 4:19-cv-44 (D. Mont. Apr. 27, 2020), Dkt. 131-1 (explaining that "[o]n
“[o]n average, the Corps
15
receives 3,000 standard individual permit applications annually.").
annually.”). INGAA members alone have
16
numerous certification requests pending for projects that involve billions of dollars in capital
17
investment. See, e.g., Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) 'Irlf
¶¶ 14, 22, 24. NHA members have 30 federal
18
license applications that require section 401 certifications and expect another 54 projects will be
19
required to submit licensing applications between now and October 1, 2022. Ex. 3, Declaration of
20
Dennis Cakert ¶
¶ 10. And that's
that’s just a thin sliver of the potential harm to the regulated community.
community
21
Section 401 certificates are required for all manner of infrastructure projects requiring federal
22
licenses, the vast majority of which are not connected to natural gas, petroleum projects, or
23
hydropower.
24
Vacating the Rule
Rule—especially
especially without any actual finding that any particular portion of it is
25
deficient—casts substantial uncertainty over all of those pending authorizations and raises a host
26
of questions that lack any clear answer:
27
28
5
Available at https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020-rule-implementation-materials.
'Available
- App. 494 -
-17Case No. 3:20-CV-04636-WHA
Intervenor Defendants'
Defendants’ Supplemental Brief on the Allied-Signal Factors
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 18 of 19
1
•
What regulations would apply?
2
•
What effect would the rule have on section 401 rulemakings by other agencies?
3
•
Would pending certification requests need to be resubmitted?
4
•
Would states be free engage in the same scope and timing abuses that plagued the
old regime?
T H R E E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , S U I T E 800
S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A L I F O R N I A 94 111-4057
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5
6
Open questions such as these will cause substantial delay in completing pending section
7
401 reviews. Ex. 3, Cakert Decl. at ¶
¶ 11; Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) In
¶¶ 21, 23, 24. Those delays
8
will impose substantial costs on the regulated community and delay critical reliability and
9
maintenance projects. Dreskin Decl. (Dkt. 56-2) ¶¶21, 23. And the swirl of uncertainty is sure to
10
invite future litigation.
11
The prejudice to Intervenor Defendants of vacating the Rule is real and cannot be mitigated.
12
In contrast, Plaintiffs each have the ability to seek redress for the prejudice they claim to suffer
13
through further administrative or judicial process. Administratively, EPA and the U.S. Army Corps
14
of Engineers have both indicated their willingness to address concerns raised by Plaintiffs within
15
the context of the existing rule.
rule.66 Judicially, each Plaintiff here can challenge any particular
16
application of the Rule that causes the harms they claim they will suffer. See Pls.'
Pls.’ Opp'n
Opp’n to EPA’s
EPA's
17
Motion to Remand Without Vacatur at 9–11
9-11 (Dkt. 145).
18
CONCLUSION
19
If the Court is not persuaded by EPA’s
EPA's arguments that remand without vacatur is appropriate
20
here, the solution is to deny the EPA’s
EPA's remand motion and proceed to merits briefing. Vacating
21
the Rule without affording Intervenor Defendants the opportunity to defend the rule on the merits,
22
as Plaintiffs request, violates the most fundamental right of a party in civil litigation—the right to
23
be heard on the merits of the dispute.
24
25
26
27
Joint EPA Army Memorandum on 401 Implementation (Aug. 19, 2021), available at
https://www.epa.gov/cwa-401/2020-rule-implementation-materials.
6
6
28
- App. 495 -
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172 Filed 10/04/21 Page 19 of 19
1
Respectfully submitted,
2
3
4
Dated: October 4, 2021
By: /s/ Elizabeth Holt Andrews
Elizabeth Holt Andrews*
pro hac vice)
Misha Tseytlin (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
Charles Sensiba (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
Andrea W. Wortzel (admitted pro
Sean T.H. Dutton (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
5
6
7
8
for Intervenor Defendant
Attorneys for
National Hydropower Association
9
T H R E E E M B A R C A D E R O C E N T E R , S U I T E 800
10
S A N F R A N C I S C O , C A L I F O R N I A 94 111-4057
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AM ILTON SANDERS
S AN DERS LLP
LLP
TROUTMAN
PEPPER
HAMILTON
TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP
JEFF LANDRY
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA
11
12
By: /s/ Joseph S. St. John
Elizabeth B. Murrill, Solicitor General
(admitted pro
pro hac vice)
Joseph S. St. John, Deputy Solicitor
General (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
Ryan M. Seidemann, Assistant Attorney
General (admitted pro
pro hac vice)
13
14
15
16
Attorneys for
for State Intervenor Defendants
States of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia,
and Wyoming
17
18
19
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
20
III
By: /s/ George P. Sibley, III
Clare Ellis
George P. Sibley, III
(admitted pro
pro hac vice)
pro hac vice)
Deidre G. Duncan (admitted pro
21
22
23
for Intervenor Defendants
Attorneys for
American Petroleum Institute and
Interstate Natural Gas Association of
America
24
25
26
27
* Pursuant to Civil L.R. 5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that concurrence in the filing of the document
/s/ Elizabeth Holt Andrews
has been obtained from each of the other Signatories. /s/
28
- App. 496 -
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Intervenor Defendants'
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EXHIBIT 1
- App. 497 -
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 2 of 52
r
AFPM
r
American
Fuel & Petrochemical
Manufacturers
American
Petroleum
Institute
AMERICAN
EXPLORATION
PRODUCTION
COUNCIL
iNIOEFENDENT PETROLEUM
ASSOCIATION OF APIERICA
August 2, 2021
Via Regulations..Erov
Regulations.gov
Water Docket
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPA West, Room 3334
1301 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
Re:
Comments from American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Petroleum
Institute, the American Exploration and Production Council, and the Independent
Petroleum Association of America in response to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s request for comment on reconsidering and revising the Clean Water Act Section
Agency's
401 Certification Rule
(EPA-HQ-OW-2021-0302)
86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021)
To whom it may concern:
This letter provides comments from the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers
(“AFPM”), the American Petroleum Institute ("APT),
(“API”), the American Exploration and Production
("AFPM"),
(“AXPC”), and the Independent Petroleum Association of America ("IPAA")
(“IPAA”)
Council ("AXPC"),
“the Associations")
Associations”) in response to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
Agency’s
(collectively, "the
(“EPA’s” or "the
“the Agency's")
Agency’s”) request for comment on reconsidering and revising the Agency's
Agency’s
("EPA's"
2020 Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule'
Rule1 ("401
(“401 Certification Rule").2
Rule”).2 As explained
in more detail below, the 401 Certification Rule provided long-overdue clarification on the role of
(“CWA” or "the
“the
states and other certifying authorities under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"
Act”).
Act").
The clarifications furnished in the 401 Certification Rule were also necessary to address some
states’ misuse of Section 401 certification procedures in pursuit of policy goals wholly distinct
states'
from considerations of potential water quality impacts. Indeed, the 401 Certification Rule was
also necessary to incorporate a growing body of case law interpreting Section 401 of the Act
Congress’s intent to preserve for states a highly circumscribed role in evaluating a
consistent with Congress's
project’s potential impacts on certain enumerated CWA provisions.
proposed project's
The Associations therefore recommend EPA refrain from altogether setting aside the 401
Certification Rule. If EPA intends to promulgate revisions to portions of the 401 Certification
1
1 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020).
2
2 86 Fed. Reg. 29,541 (June 2, 2021).
- App. 498 -
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 3 of 52
Rule, we urge the Agency to do so in a way that adheres to congressional intent, conforms to
relevant current and pending court decisions, and restrains misuse of Section 401 certification
procedures. Indeed, as EPA considers revisions to the 401 Certification Rule, we are optimistic
that the Agency will recognize that Congress did not intend CWA Section 401 to allow a single
state to wield disproportionate power over projects of national importance, and to further recognize
that the imposition of reasonable limits on the disproportionate use of Section 401 certification
authority is consistent with the principles of cooperative federalism.
To that end, and the interest of constructively engaging with EPA in this reconsideration process,
the Associations provide the following comments. Because of the length of this letter, we have
included a table of contents below.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.
SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................4
4
II.
THE ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR INTERESTS ...........................................................66
III.
GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETING CWA SECTION 401 ............................................7
7
a. Consideration of the context for, and role of, CWA Section 401 certifications ............8
8
1. Natural Gas Act of 1938 ....................................................................................8
8
2. National Environmental Policy Act .................................................................10
10
3. Other federal statutes with impact reviews and opportunities for stakeholder
11
engagement ......................................................................................................11
4. EPA must implement CWA Section 401 in accordance with Congress's
Congress’s intent
to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction through statutes like the NGA and in the
context of more comprehensive environmental review processes Congress
established through NEPA and other statutes ..................................................13
13
b. Reasonable limits on the Section 401 certification process are consistent with principles
of cooperative federalism.............................................................................................15
15
c. The legislative history of the CWA illustrates the reasonable limits Congress intended
for the Section 401 certification process ......................................................................17
17
2
- App. 499 -
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 4 of 52
d. Any revisions to the 401 Certification Rule must include provisions sufficient to
Congress’s statutorily prescribed time limits ...........................21
21
meaningfully enforce Congress's
CWA’s Section 401 deadlines requires a clear and objective
1. Enforcing the CWA's
starting point for review ...................................................................................23
23
2. EPA must prohibit states from artificially extending timeframes by stopping
and restarting the certification process ............................................................25
25
e. Section 401 certification is required only when a federally licensed or permitted activity
has the potential to result in a discharge from a point source to navigable waters ......27
27
f. The scope of certifying authorities'
authorities’ Section 401 review and conditioning authority is
not unbounded, and must be interpreted in accordance with the text, structure, and
history of the Act .........................................................................................................30
30
1. "Applicant"
“Applicant” ............................................................................................................31
31
2. "Any
32
“Any other appropriate requirement of State law”
law" ................................................32
IV.
35
RESPONSES TO EPA’S
EPA'S QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION .......................................35
1. Pre-filing meeting requests ................................................................................................35
35
2. Certification request ...........................................................................................................36
36
37
3. Reasonable period of time .................................................................................................37
39
4. Scope of certification .........................................................................................................39
5. Certification actions and federal agency review ................................................................42
42
44
6. Enforcement .......................................................................................................................44
7. Modification.......................................................................................................................45
45
8. Neighboring jurisdictions
jurisdictions...................................................................................................46
46
48
9. Data and other information ................................................................................................48
10. Implementation Coordination ............................................................................................49
49
V.
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................50
50
3
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 5 of 52
I.
SUMMARY
The Associations urge EPA to refrain from substantially revising the 401 Certification Rule.3
Rule.3 The
final rule provided a long-overdue and increasingly necessary clarification of the role of states and
other certifying authorities under Section 401 of the Act.
Section 401 certification proceedings be efficient, reasonably predictable, and appropriately
focused on potential water quality impacts. Our members are on the forefront of a transformational
era of increased domestic oil and natural gas production that has greatly enhanced U.S. energy
security and lowered consumer costs. The growth of domestic oil and natural gas production and
our ability to responsibly develop these resources in new areas of the country have created the
need for more infrastructure to safely bring these resources to refineries and processing facilities,
and ultimately, consumers. While there has been a great deal of discussion about an energy
transition away from fossil fuels, experts agree acknowledge that modern society will continue to
depend on oil and natural gas for several decades. As these products are needed in the world, it
America’s energy infrastructure. Prudent investment for the
makes sense to expand and update America's
safe and environmentally responsible movement of these critically important resources is
important for affordability and environmental protection. To those opposed to any oil or natural
America’s energy infrastructure needs are viewed as convenient
gas development, permitting of America's
opportunities to deploy regulatory and litigation strategies designed to delay needed projects and
sever resources from markets. This is counter-productive since the products are needed worldwide
and such opposition only increases costs and environmental risks, risks good-paying jobs, and
endangers energy security.
The need for an efficient and appropriately regulated certification process extends well beyond our
industry. President Biden recently announced his support for a Bipartisan Infrastructure
“transformational and historic investments
Framework that the White House anticipates will fund "transformational
in clean transportation infrastructure, clean water infrastructure, universal broadband
infrastructure, clean power infrastructure, remediation of legacy pollution, and resilience to the
changing climate.”
climate."'4 Many of these types of projects require federal licensing or permitting actions
that will trigger Section 401 certification proceedings.
The Associations therefore urge EPA to continue to interpret Section 401 in a manner that
reasonably limits the ability of single state to wield disproportionate power over interstate projects
of national importance. The efficient permitting of essential infrastructure projects requires the
collaboration of state and federal authorities and the consideration of state and national interests.
In enacting Section 401, Congress preserved an important role for states in evaluating the water
quality impacts of federal infrastructure projects, but it did not prescribe that role without limit or
to the detriment of federal licensing or permitting authorities.
3
3 85 Fed. Reg. 42,210 (July 13, 2020).
4
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/24/fact-sheet-president-biden4
See
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/24/fact-sheet-president-biden-
announces-support-for-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-framework/.
announce
s-support-for-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-framework/.
4
- App. 501 -
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More specifically, Section 401 preserves for states the highly circumscribed role of evaluating a
project’s potential impacts on certain enumerated CWA provisions. CWA Section 401
proposed project's
does not empower a state to deny a certification request based on generalized objections about
hydrocarbon development, or concerns about the continued role of fossil fuels in product
manufacturing and power generation. Nor does CWA Section 401 allow states to deny or
condition certification based on potential environmental impacts of the proposed project other than
potential point source discharges to waters of the United States that can result in possible violations
standards.5
of water quality standards.5
The text, structure, and history of Section 401 reflect Congress's
Congress’s recognition that certain projects
of national importance could not be subjected to the parochial interests of a single state. And yet,
(“D.C.
as acknowledged by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C.
Circuit”), "it
“it is now commonplace for states to use Section 401 to hold federal licensing hostage."6
hostage.”6
Circuit"),
“to hold federal licensing hostage,"7
hostage,”7 or basing state certification decisions on
Using Section 401 "to
policy considerations that cannot realistically be construed as credible concerns over water quality
impacts is impermissible under the CWA and conflicts with several other statutes through which
Congress tasked federal agencies with decision-making authority.
The Associations therefore urge EPA to ensure that the Agency's
Agency’s regulations adhere to Congress's
Congress’s
readily discernable intent that Section 401 be implemented to provide states certification authority
that is limited in time and scope. We believe that the Agency must, at a minimum, retain those
provisions of the 401 Certification Rule necessary to curb the well documented tactics a handful
of states have utilized to artificially extend their review deadlines and improperly expand the scope
EPA’s regulations implementing Section 401 can
of their certification and conditioning authority. EPA's
and should be appropriately tailored to curtail the known avenues for state misuse of Section 401,
while preserving the important but highly circumscribed role Congress intended.
In Section III, the Associations provide interpretive guidelines that we believe can be useful to
EPA as it reconsiders the 401 Certification Rule. These guidelines interpret Section 401 utilizing
the text and structure of the CWA, extensive analysis of case law, and a detailed legislative history
of the Act and its key amendments.
Section III also describes the natural gas pipeline permitting process to illustrate the
comprehensive review and approval process within which Section 401 certification is but one part.
Natural gas permitting is only one example of the types of federal actions that can trigger Section
401 certifications, but it is a good example because it helps provide context necessary to understand
why Congress limited the scope and duration of the Section 401 certification process. Section III
also explains why reasonable limits on Section 401 certification processes comport with principles
5
5 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3).
6
(“Hoopa Valley”),
6 Hoopa Valley
Valley Tribe v. FERC ("Hoopa
Valley"), 913 F. 3d. 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
7
7 Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d. at 1104.
5
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of cooperative federalism and are necessary to ensure that one state cannot inappropriately wield
its Section 401 authority to the detriment of other states or the nation as a whole.
In Section IV, the Associations respond to each of the Agency's
Agency’s enumerated "questions
“questions for
consideration.” Each of our responses are grounded in a fundamental recognition that Congress,
consideration."
through Section 401, expressly assigned an important project review role for states and tribes, but
it did so in the context of multiple statutes unambiguously preserving exclusive federal jurisdiction
over certain projects and multiple other statutes subjecting those projects to environmental reviews
beyond the limited scope of Section 401.
EPA's
The Associations hope that these interpretive guidelines and responses will inform EPA’s
reconsideration of the 401 Certification Rule and any future interpretation of CWA Section 401.
II.
THE ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR INTERESTS
AFPM is a national trade association representing most U.S. refining and petrochemical
manufacturing capacity. AFPM members strengthen economic and national security while
supporting more than 3 million jobs nationwide. AFPM's
AFPM’s member companies produce the
gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel that drive the modern economy, as well as the chemical building
blocks that are used to make the millions of products that make modern life possible. To produce
these essential goods, AFPM members depend on all modes of transportation to move their
products to and from refineries and petrochemical facilities and have made significant
infrastructure investments to support and improve the safety and efficiency of the transportation
system. AFPM member companies depend upon an uninterrupted, affordable supply of crude oil
and natural gas as feedstocks for the transportation fuels and petrochemicals they manufacture.
Pipelines are the primary mode for transporting crude oil and natural gas to refiners and
petrochemical facilities and refined products from those same facilities to distribution terminals
serving consumer markets. Pipelines provide a safe, reliable, efficient, and cost-effective way to
move bulk liquids, particularly over long distances. AFPM member companies own, operate, and
rely on pipeline infrastructure as part of their daily operations. AFPM member companies also are
leaders in human safety and environmental responsibility. AFPM supports robust analyses of
infrastructure projects to ensure that environmental impacts are appropriately considered.
API is a nationwide, non-profit trade association that represents all facets of the natural gas and
oil industry, which supports 10.3 million U.S. jobs and nearly 8 percent of the U.S. economy.
API's
API’s more than 600 member companies include large integrated companies, as well as
exploration and production, refining, marketing, pipeline and marine businesses, and service and
supply firms. API was formed in 1919 as a standards-setting organization, and API has developed
more than 700 standards to enhance operational and environmental safety, efficiency, and
sustainability. API and its members are committed to the safe transportation of natural gas, crude
oil and petroleum products, and support sound science and risk-based regulations, legislation, and
industry practices that have demonstrated safety benefits. API members engage in exploration,
6
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 8 of 52
production, and construction projects that routinely involve both state and federal water permitting
and are, and will continue to be, affected by CWA Section 401.
The AXPC is a national trade association representing 29 of America's
America’s largest and most active
AXPC’s
independent natural gas and crude oil exploration and production companies. The AXPC's
“independent” in that their operations are limited to the exploration for and
members are "independent"
production of natural gas and crude oil. Moreover, its members operate autonomously, unlike
their fully integrated counterparts which operate in different segments of the energy industry, such
as refining and marketing. The AXPC's
AXPC’s members are leaders in developing and applying the
innovative and advanced technologies necessary to explore for and produce the natural gas and
crude oil that allows our nation to add reasonably priced domestic energy reserves in
environmentally responsible ways.
The IPAA represents the thousands of independent oil and natural gas explorers and producers, as
well as the service and supply industries that support their efforts, that will most directly be
impacted by federal regulatory policies. Independent producers develop about 91 percent of
American oil and natural gas wells, produce about 83 percent of American oil, and produce more
than 90 percent of American natural gas and natural gas liquids. The IPAA is dedicated to ensuring
a strong, viable American oil and natural gas industry, recognizing that an adequate and secure
supply of energy is essential to the national economy.
III.
GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETING CWA SECTION 401
The Associations'
Associations’ responses to the Agency's
Agency’s enumerated "questions
“questions for consideration"
consideration” follow in
Section IV
W below. But the Associations believe it is important to furnish the analytical framework
and interpretive guidelines that inform our construction of Section 401 and our specific
recommendations for EPA’s
EPA's reconsideration of the 401 Certification Rule. We believe this
Associations’ responses to the
background provides necessary context and support for the Associations'
Agency’s specific inquiries. And more broadly, we hope these interpretative guidelines will be
Agency's
useful to EPA as it reconsiders the 401 Certification Rule.
The Associations'
Associations’ members have a substantial interest in ensuring that the CWA Section 401
certification process preserves the important role of states in protecting water quality, while at the
same time providing appropriate limits where states use their certification authority to achieve
policy goals or outcomes unrelated to water quality. Therefore, the Associations provide
interpretive guidelines that EPA should use to reasonably interpret important provisions of CWA
Section 401. These interpretive guidelines follow from the text and structure of the Act, relevant
case law, and - where necessary to ascertain congressional intent - the legislative history of the
Act and its key amendments.
The Association's
Association’s framework was also informed by the way Congress structured the Act to
promote cooperative federalism. Finally, our framework examines the Section 401 certification
process in the context of other federal statutes that assign the federal government exclusive
7
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jurisdiction over certain projects and/or provide alternate mechanisms for state review of federally
permitted projects.
a.
Consideration of the context for, and role of, CWA Section 401 certifications
“[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
Under Section 401 of the CWA, "[a]ny
waters” must seek "a
“a certification
activity . . . which may result in any discharge into the navigable waters"
from the State in which the discharge originates . . . that any such discharge will comply with the
provisions” of the CWA.8
CWA.8 Section 401 further provides that "[n]o
“[n]o license or permit
applicable provisions"
“fails or refuses to act
shall be granted if certification has been denied by the State,”
State," but, if a state "fails
on a request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year)
waived.”9
after receipt of such request, the certification requirements of this subsection shall be waived."9
The statute is clear on its face; however, when state certification authority under CWA Section
401 is read in the context of the exclusive jurisdiction preserved for the federal government in
issuing certain permits and licenses, the narrow role of states under the CWA Section 401 program
becomes even more apparent.
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 ("NGA")
(“NGA”) is an example of a statute that preserves exclusive
Associations’ members.
jurisdiction for the federal government, and it is relevant to many of the Associations'
The NGA illustrates that state Section 401 review is a component in a much larger, and more
complex, interstate approval process that is inherently federal in nature.
1.
NGA
Companies seeking to build interstate natural gas pipelines must first obtain federal approval. The
process.10 Congress passed the NGA to ensure
NGA provides the statutory framework for this process.1°
patch-work state-by-state regulatory regimes would not impede interstate commerce. Specifically,
“a natural gas company must obtain from the Federal Energy
under Section 7(c) of the NGA, "a
(“FERC”) a ‘certificate
necessity’ before it
Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
'certificate of public convenience and necessity'
constructs, extends, acquires, or operates any facility for the transportation or sale of natural gas
in interstate commerce."11
commerce.”11 In assessing "public
“public convenience and necessity,"
necessity,” FERC considers "all
“all
12
13
factors bearing on the public interest,”
impacts. "FERC
“FERC will
interest,"12 including potential environmental impacts.13
8
8 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
9
9 Id. (emphasis added).
10 15 U.S.C. § 717.
11
ii Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.(“Schneidewind”),
Co. ("Schneidewind"), 485 U.S. 293, 302 (1988); See also 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)(1)(A).
12
of Consumers’
12 See Office of
Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 655 F.2d 1132, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
13
967–68 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
13 See e.g., Midcoast Interstate Transmission, Inc. v. FERC, 198 F.3d 960, 967-68
10
8
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 10 of 52
grant the certificate only if it finds the company able and willing to undertake the project in
scheme.”14
compliance with the rules and regulations of the federal regulatory scheme."14
FERC’s authority under the NGA is exclusive: "Congress
“Congress occupied the field of matters relating to
FERC's
commerce.”15 "FERC's
“FERC’s exclusive
wholesale sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce."15
purview” includes regulating "facilities
“facilities [that] are a critical part of the transportation of natural gas
purview"
and sale for resale in interstate commerce."16
commerce.”16 In this "exclusively
“exclusively federal domain,"
domain,” states may not
17
regulate.
regulate.'?
Pipeline routing is the definitive example of an issue committed to FERC's
FERC’s exclusive authority.18
authority.18
pipeline’s route—including which states it
Nor could it be otherwise. Determining an interstate pipeline's
will cross, where it will do so, and how far it will travel within their borders—is a task that must
nation’s public interest in mind, not by local
be completed by a centralized body with the entire nation's
“agencies with only local constituencies."19
constituencies.”19 Otherwise, each state could say, "not
“not in my
"agencies
backyard,” thereby depriving other states and the nation of the pipeline's
pipeline’s benefits and undermining
backyard,"
NGA’s purpose of "ensur[ing]
“ensur[ing] that natural gas consumers have access to an adequate supply
the NGA's
20
of natural gas at ‘just
'just and reasonable rates.’”
rates.'"2°
Thus, the NGA vests FERC with exclusive authority over all salient aspects of the natural gas
nation’s collective interest in promoting the safe
pipeline permitting process to facilitate the nation's
movement of natural gas in interstate commerce. And while the NGA is necessarily limited to
natural gas pipeline permitting, we believe it demonstrates why EPA must implement CWA
Section 401 to prevent a single state from using its Section 401 certification authority to
commandeer the exclusive jurisdiction that Congress provided to the federal government for
projects of national importance.
14
14 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 302.
15
15 Schneidewind 485 U.S. at 305.
16
16 Schneidewind, at 485 U.S. 308.
17
17 Schneidewind, at 485 U.S. 305; See, e.g., N. Natural Gas Co. v.
819–20, 822-24
822–24
Iowa Utils. Bd., 377 F.3d 817, 819-20,
(8th Cir. 2004) (NGA preempted state-law environmental provisions); E. End Prop. Co. No. 1, LLC v. Kessel, 851
N.Y.S.2d 565, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); No Tanks Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
Comm'n, 697 A.2d 1313, 1315 (Me. 1997).
18
(“the NGA gives
18 See Wash.
Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Prince George’s
George's Cty. Council, 711 F.3d 412, 423 (4th Cir. 2013) ("the
facilities”); See also, e.g., Guardian Pipeline, LLC v. 529.42 Acres of
of
FERC jurisdiction over the siting of natural gas facilities");
“FERC has approved the route ...
… [a]ny objections to the
Land, 210 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (where "FERC
preempted”); Skyview Acres Co-op.,
condemnation of public land for the construction of a natural gas pipeline [are] preempted");
(State’s "authority
“authority [was] preempted …
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
Comm'n, 558 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (State's
... to
pipeline”); No Tanks, 697 A.2d at 1315 ("[State]
(“[State]
the extent that it purported to approve the route of an interstate gas pipeline");
review of safety and environmental issues surrounding the siting of the [natural gas] tank would be an attempt to
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction").
jurisdiction”).
regulate matters within FERC's
19
19
Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 1316.
20
422–23.
20 Wash.
Wash. Gas, 711 F.3d at 422-23.
9
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 11 of 52
The NGA also illustrates the important but highly circumscribed role of Section 401 reviews in
light of the far more comprehensive federal environmental review process. Indeed, FERC has
project’s potential environmental impacts, which includes
primary authority to consider a pipeline project's
considering routes that could reduce environmental impacts.
“the lead agency . . . for the purposes of complying with"
with” the National
Under the NGA, FERC is "the
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").21
(“NEPA”).21 Thus, "FERC
“FERC undertakes its own environmental analysis
of” NEPA, "which
“which . . . FERC considers in reaching its ultimate
pursuant to the requirements of
determination.”22 Like the authority to issue certificates of public convenience and
routing determination."22
necessity, the authority to conduct this broader environmental analysis and to make routing
FERC’s purview, except as to the narrow
decisions based on that analysis is exclusively within FERC's
401.23
question of water-quality compliance under Section 401.23
2.
NEPA
environment,"
“major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,”
For any "major
“a detailed statement,"
statement,” known as an Environmental
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare "a
Impact Statement ("EIS"),
(“EIS”), on "(i)
“(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, [and] (iii)
action.”24
alternatives to the proposed action."24
Preparing an EIS has three basic stages. First, the agency must "determin[e]
“determin[e] the scope of issues to
addressed,” with the input of (among many others) "affected
“affected Federal, State, and local
be addressed,"
agencies.”25 Second, the agency prepares a draft EIS, which must "disclose
“disclose and discuss …
agencies."25
... all
major points of view on the environmental impacts of the alternatives including the proposed
action.”26 The agency must then obtain comments from any other federal agency with relevant
action."26
“[a]ppropriate State and local agencies,"
agencies,” and the public.27
public.27 Finally, the
jurisdiction or expertise, "[a]ppropriate
“respond[s] to comments,"
comments,” "discuss[es]
“discuss[es] …
agency must prepare a final EIS that "respond[s]
... any responsible
view,” and "indicate[s]
“indicate[s] the agency's
agency’s response to the issues raised."28
raised.”28
opposing view,"
21
21 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1).
22
22 Skyview Acres, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
23
23 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(3); The NGA also preserves States’
States' authority under the Coastal Zone Management Act and the
717b(d)(1)–(2), which are not at issue here.
Clean Air Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d)(1)—(2),
24
24 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) Agencies typically begin by preparing an Environmental Assessment, or EA, which must
“provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether"
whether” the project will have a "significant
“significant impact.”
"provide
impact." 40
EA’s thorough assessment helps ensure NEPA
C.F.R. § 1508.9(a). If so, an EIS must be prepared. If not, the EA's
compliance. See id.
25
25 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1).
26
26
Id. § 1502.9(a).
27
Id. § 1503.1(a).
27 Id
28
Id. § 1502.9(b).
28 Id
10
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These "'action-forcing'
“‘action-forcing’ procedures"
procedures” serve to ensure "that
“that agencies take a ‘hard
'hard look’
look' at
29
consequences.” Affected parties - including states - can challenge the adequacy
environmental consequences."29
agency’s NEPA review and its consideration of an EIS by seeking judicial review of the final
of an agency's
determination.30 The courts carefully review an agency's
agency’s NEPA compliance to ensure that
agency determination.30
“duty . . . to consider environmental factors not be shunted aside in the bureaucratic shuffle."31
shuffle.”31
its "duty
“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results,"
results,” however: "If
“If the adverse environmental effects
"NEPA
of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by
32
NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.”
costs."32
FERC’s regulations require preparation of an EIS for "[m]ajor
“[m]ajor
For natural gas pipeline permitting, FERC's
pipeline construction projects . . . using rights-of-way in which there is no existing natural gas
pipeline.”33 A FERC EIS must comply with the NEPA regulations and also summarize the
pipeline."33
project's
project’s "significant
“significant environmental impacts”;
“alternative . . . that would have a less severe
impacts"; any "alternative
impact,” which includes alternative routes; any potential "mitigation
“mitigation measures"
measures” and
environmental impact,"
data.34
impacts that cannot be mitigated; and studies that might provide useful data.34
FERC’s "public
“public convenience and necessity"
necessity” analysis carefully accounts for these environmental
FERC's
impacts, alternatives, and potential mitigation measures. Based on this comprehensive process,
FERC may deny approval, or it may require the adoption of alternatives or mitigation measures.35
measures.35
FERC's
FERC’s "environmental
“environmental assessment . . . is not subject to modification"
modification” by state agencies; instead,
they can submit comments to FERC or intervene in the FERC proceedings to offer their input and
review.36 And with good reason: "Allowing
“Allowing all the sites and all
then, if necessary, seek judicial review.36
the specifics to be regulated by agencies with only local constituencies would delay or prevent
construction that has won approval after federal consideration of environmental factors and
needs.”37
interstate needs."37
3.
Other federal statutes with impact reviews and opportunities for stakeholder
engagement
Importantly, while the NEPA review process provides meaningful opportunities for states and
other stakeholders to engage with federal agencies on the potential impacts of a proposed federal
action, the NEPA review process is far from the only avenue for state and local engagement.
29
29 Robertson v. Methow Valley
Valley Citizens Council (“Robertson”),
("Robertson"), 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
30
345–46.
30 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 345-46.
31
Ass’n
of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976).
31
Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass
'n of
32
32 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350.
33
33 18 C.F.R. § 380.6(a)(3).
34
34 18 C.F.R. § 380.7.
35
35 See e.g., Midcoast Interstate, 198 F.3d at 966, 968.
36
36 Skyview Acres, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 975; See also 18 C.F.R. § 385.214(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 717r(a).
37
37 No Tanks, 697 A.2d at 1316.
11
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Numerous other statutes provide mechanisms for state and stakeholder engagement on a wide
variety of potential impacts from proposed federal projects:
•
Endangered Species Act ("ESA")38
(“ESA”)38 - Section 7 of the ESA requires that federal agencies
consult with the ESA administering services to ensure that any projects authorized, funded,
or carried out by them are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species, or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat of such species.
•
(“NHPA”)39 - Section 106 of the NHPA and
National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA")39
implementing regulations require federal agencies, before issuing a license (permit), to
adopt measures when feasible to mitigate potential adverse effects of the licensed activity
and properties listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places. The
Act's requirements are to be implemented in cooperation with state historic preservation
officers.
•
(“CZMA”)40 —
– Under CZMA Section 307, applicants for
Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA")4°
federal licenses or permits must obtain from potentially impacted coastal states certification
states’ coastal zone management plan.
that the proposed project complies with the states'
•
Essential Fish Habitat Provisions ("EFH")
(“EFH”) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act —
– The EFH
provisions promote the protection of essential fish habitat in the review of projects
conducted under federal permits, licenses, or other authorities that affect or have the
potential to affect such habitat. EFH requires that federal agencies consult with the
National Marine Fisheries Service for any permits which may adversely affect essential
fish habitat identified under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
These are just a few of the statutory provisions through which states and other stakeholders can
engage with agencies like FERC, raise concerns about potential impacts from proposed federally
alternatives.41 They are an important
licensed or permitted projects, and request consideration of alternatives.41
part of the cooperative federalism approach through which Congress apportioned jurisdiction
between the federal government and the states. These statutory provisions, and others like them,
demonstrate that states have multiple opportunities outside of Section 401 to provide input on
proposed federal projects. They also provide context for the narrow but important jurisdiction
conferred to states by Section 401. In light of all these other meaningful engagement and review
38
38
16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
"39 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.
40
40
16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.
41
41 Indeed, these are just a few of the examples of statutory provisions through which federal projects are reviewed and
state feedback is solicited and considered. For a large pipeline project that would traverse federal, state, and tribal
lands, the statutory authorities under which the project is reviewed are far more numerous.
12
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opportunities, one recognizes that the statutory requirement for states to focus their Section 401
reviews on water quality furthers, rather than undermines, cooperative federalism.
states’ authority to
Further, the statutory provisions cited above do not represent the full extent of states'
address environmental impacts from the operation of federally licensed or permitted projects.
States can and often do regulate the operation of federally licensed or permitted projects pursuant
to authority delegated under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),42the
(“CAA”),42the CWA,43
CWA,43 as well as other statutes.
Section 401 does not constrain states'
states’ authority under these statutes to issue and enforce
environmental permits on the operation of federally licensed or permitted projects. Section 401
states’ roles in reviewing the potential impacts from certain projects that require federal
only limits states'
licenses or permits.
4.
EPA must implement CWA Section 401 in accordance with Congress's
Congress’s
intent to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction through statutes like the NGA
and in the context of more comprehensive environmental review processes
Congress established through NEPA and other statutes
In this subsection, the Associations discuss Section 401 for natural gas pipeline pennitting.44
permitting.44 By
examining Section 401 in the context of other statutes, like the NGA and NEPA, one appreciates
that Section 401 certification is but one part of a larger federal process.
As noted above, the NGA vests FERC with exclusive authority over all salient aspects of the
natural gas pipeline permitting process, which facilitates the safe movement of natural gas in
“public convenience and
interstate commerce. The rigorous process by which FERC analyzes the "public
necessity” of a natural gas pipeline requires an extensive and meticulous review of potential
necessity"
environmental impacts, including consideration of potential impacts to water quality, drinking
water resources, and aquatic species. It is from this comprehensive analytical framework that
FERC’s exclusive authority in this
CWA Section 401 carves out a carefully cabined exception to FERC's
area by permitting states to certify whether potential discharges from a federally licensed project
will comply with water-quality standards.45
standards.45
Embedded within the text of CWA Section 401 are meaningful limits on the requirements to obtain
a certification. Most significantly, applicants are only required to obtain certification from states
point source discharge to “navigable
waters,” defined in the
where a project could result in a point
"navigable waters,"
42
42 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(d); 7412.
43
43 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b); 1344(g).
44
NGA’s federal approval process for natural
" While the Associations herein discuss Section 401 in the context of the NGA's
gas pipelines, it is important to note that Section 401 certifications are important to a number of other types of essential
energy projects. All types of energy projects can require individual, regional, or nationwide general Section 404
permits that are also subject to state review under Section 401.
45
45 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
13
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“waters of the United States”
(“WOTUS.”)46 Section 401 is not implicated for nonpoint
statute as "waters
States" ("WOTUS.")46
discharges or other diffuse releases to groundwater. Nor is Section 401 implicated when the
discharge enters purely state, rather than federal waterbodies. Thus, states can only deny a
certification request based on potential point source discharges to WOTUS that can result in
possible violations of water quality standards.
With few exceptions, courts have correctly construed this limited delegation as "[r]elinquish[ing]
“[r]elinquish[ing]
only one element of the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction granted [to FERC] ….
.... It authorizes states
assurance’ that the
to determine and certify only the narrow question whether there is ‘reasonable
'reasonable assurance'
construction and operation of a proposed project ‘will
'will not violate applicable water quality
standards.’”47 "Congress
“Congress did not empower the States to reconsider matters unrelated to their water
standards.'"47
48
Such second-guessing
quality standards, which [FERC] has within its exclusive jurisdiction ….”
...."48
“countermand the carefully worded authority of section 401(a)(1)"
401(a)(1)” and "usurp
“usurp the authority
would "countermand
49
FERC.”
that Congress reserved for FERC."49
States exercising authority under CWA Section 401 must do so in a way that is reasonable and
explained.50 When deciding whether or not to issue a certification, a state must
adequately explained.50
“the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including ‘a
examine "the
'a
made.’”51 Therefore, when a state
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'"51
“to hold federal licensing hostage,"52
hostage,”52 or otherwise base its
endeavors to use Section 401 "to
certification decision on policy considerations that cannot realistically be construed as credible
concerns over water quality impacts, that determination is impermissible under the CWA and
several other statutes through which Congress tasked federal agencies with decision-making
authority.
The forgoing discussion focuses on natural gas pipeline permitting under the NGA to illustrate the
comprehensive statutory framework within which the Section 401 certification process is
conducted. However, it is by no means the only federal permitting or licensing program to trigger
Section 401 certification processes. Nor is natural gas pipeline permitting the only licensing or
licensing process to be misused by some states as a lever to pursue policy objectives unrelated to
water quality. In fact, Section 404 permitting is perhaps the most common trigger for Section 401
permitting, and it impacts each segment of the energy industry and a wide variety of other
industries as well. Therefore, as the agency tasked with implementing the CWA, EPA must ensure
46
(9th Cir. 1998); See also Oregon Natural Desert
46 See Oregon Natural Desert Assoc. v. Dombeck, 151 F. 3d. 945 (9th
th
(9 Cir. 2006).); 33 U.S.0
U.S.C § 1362(7).
Assoc. v. US
US Forest Service, 550 F.3d 778 (9th
47
47 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. DEC, 624 N.E.2d 146, 149 (N.Y. 1993).
48
48 Power Auth. v. Williams,
Williams, 60 N.Y.2d 315, 325 (N.Y. 1983).
49
49 Niagara Mohawk, 624 N.E.2d at 150.
50
Dep’t. of
5° National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation v. New York State Dep't.
of Envtl. Conservation, 761 F. Appx. 68, 72 (2d
Cir. Feb 5, 2019).
51
(4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v.
Appalachian Voices
Voices v. State Water
Water Control Bd., No. 18-1079, (4th
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
52
(“Hoopa Valley”),
62 Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC ("Hoopa
Valley"), 913 F. 3d 1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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that its regulations facilitate functional and efficient Section 401 certification processes. This
401’s
means that any potential revisions to the 401 Certification Rule must perpetuate Section 401's
important but highly circumscribed role for states, while prohibiting states from arrogating
authority Congress exclusively entrusted to the federal government.
b.
Reasonable limits on the Section 401 certification process are consistent with
principles of cooperative federalism
Grounded on principles of cooperative federalism, the CWA establishes states as the primary
permitting and enforcement authorities under Sections 402, 404, and a number of other provisions
of the Act:
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to
plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in
the exercise of his authority under this Act. It is the policy of Congress that the
States manage the construction grant program under this Act and implement the
permit programs under sections 402 and 404 of this Act. It is further the policy of
the Congress to support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction, and
elimination of pollution, and to provide federal technical services and financial aid
to State and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection with the
pollution.53
prevention, reduction, and elimination or pollution.53
Thus, in recognition of the states'
states’ sovereignty and the fact that states are best situated to regulate
their own resources, the CWA required EPA to coordinate its water resource protection efforts
states.54 Nonetheless, while the Associations oppose federal intrusion in those areas
with the states.'
where Congress preserved state primacy, we also recognize those circumstances where Congress
deemed it necessary to rest primary decision-making authority with federal agencies and/or more
closely circumscribe the otherwise broad authority of states.
In CWA Section 401, Congress prescriptively delineated a more narrow and focused role for states,
so that the jurisdiction that the Act provides to states could not overwhelm or subsume the federal
government’s ability to issue licenses and permits for projects of national importance. Of particular
government's
Associations’ members, these projects of national importance include pipeline
relevance to the Associations'
“Notices to Proceed"
Proceed” from FERC and dredge-and-fill activities in WOTUS that
projects requiring "Notices
require CWA Section 404 permits from the Army Corps. But Congress also designated federal
agencies as the approval authorities for Section 402 industrial and municipal point source
discharge permits issued by EPA, Army Corps permits issued under Sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers
(“RHA”), U.S. Coast Guard permits for bridges and causeways under Section 9
and Harbors Act ("RHA"),
53
53 33 U.S.C. § 101(b).
54
54 33 U.S.C. § 101(g); 33 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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of the RHA, hydroelectric projects requiring FERC licenses, and nuclear power plants licensed by
(“NRC”).
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC").
Congress certainly understood that projects authorized pursuant to these statutes would have
localized impacts, but it viewed it as inappropriate to allow these projects to be principally steered
by parochial interests. Congress uniquely provided these boundaries in Section 401 because,
unlike other provisions of the Act, like Sections 402 and 404, that direct federal agencies to cede
authority to states when certain conditions of delegation are satisfied, Congress recognized that for
certain federal projects, federal agencies must share their authority with, rather than cede their
authority to, the states.
Congress’s intent to reasonably limit the scope and duration of state Section 401 certifications is
Congress's
consistent with cooperative federalism. States that have misused Section 401 certification
authority can wield a disproportionate level of decision-making authority over a wide variety of
essential interstate projects or other projects of national importance such as transportation
infrastructure, nuclear and hydroelectric power generation facilities, energy distribution
infrastructure, and projects requiring dredge-and-fill permits under Section 404. Misapplying
Section 401 to allow any state unilateral veto authority over these projects has adverse impacts,
not only on project proponents and federal licensing and permitting authorities, but other states
with interests in the project.
This was certainly the case with Washington State’s
–
State's denial of the Millennium Bulk Terminals —
55
Longview LLC project.55
project. The project proponents intended the terminal to receive rail cars of coal
mined principally in Montana and Wyoming so that the coal could be exported to overseas markets.
Washington State employed various regulatory strategies to extend their certification review over
five years before denying the certification request based on grounds having nothing to do with
water quality.56
quality.56 Having minimal financial interest in facilitating the export of a product that was
not produced in the state and policy objections to coal-fired power generation, Washington State
used its Section 401 certification authority to deny Montana and Wyoming access to foreign
markets. Thus, the exercise of expansive authority under Section 401 by one state harms, rather
states’ rights.
than serves, other states'
Similar dynamics underlie many instances of state misuse of Section 401 certification authority in
pipeline projects. States along the proposed route of a pipeline that would not supply their state
have occasionally used their Section 401 certification authority to block projects desperately
needed by other states. This acutely harmed New England consumers who pay significantly more
'55 WDEC, In the Matter of Denying Section 401 Water Quality Certification to Millennium Bulk Terminals-Longview,
LLC, Order # 15417 (Sept. 26, 2017); See also Montana v. Washington,
Washington, No 22o152, (motion by Montana and
Wyoming for leave to file the bills of complaint denied June 28, 20921. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito indicated
they would grant the motion).
56
56 See Section IV.4.
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for their electricity than the U.S. average in part because pipeline project delays have inhibited
access to natural gas supplies from the Marcellus Shale.
The principles of cooperative federalism are also well served by preventing states from evading
Section 401 statutory deadlines for review. "Congress
‘‘Congress intended Section 401 to curb a state's
state’s
57
‘dalliance
delay.’’’
`dalliance or unreasonable delay.'
" 57
In the permitting context, extensive delays in the 401
certification process can cause projects that are important to other states to be cancelled altogether.
In sum, principles of cooperative federalism simply do not provide states unbounded authority to
subjugate the interests of one state to the parochial whims of another. Cooperative federalism
under Section 401 requires a balanced approach that conforms to the balance Congress itself struck
when enacting Section 401. As such, if the Agency revises the 401 Certification Rule, the
Associations urge EPA preserve the important role of states under Section 401, but prevent states
from misusing the certification process to unlawfully elevate their own interests over the interests
of other states or the nation as a whole.
c.
The legislative history of the CWA illustrates the reasonable limits Congress
intended for the Section 401 certification process
CWA’s predecessor statutes, Federal Water Pollution Control Act
While Congress amended the CWA's
58
Congress’s transformation of the
of 1948 (“FWPCA”),
("FWPCA"),58
no statutory revision was more central to Congress's
today’s CWA than the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA ("1972
(“1972 Amendments").59
Amendments”).59
FWPCA to today's
Indeed, as Congress noted at the time, the 1972 Amendments represented a "total
“total restructuring”
restructuring"
60
“complete rewriting"
rewriting” of the existing statutory framework.60
framework. The transformative nature of the
and "complete
1972 Amendments is critical to interpreting Section 401 for many reasons, including the need to
Amendments61
distinguish court decisions that were based on EPA regulations predating the 1972 Amendments61
from those court decisions that more directly interpreted Section 401 of the Act as it appears today.
Prior to the 1972 Amendments, the regulatory framework for the FWPCA, as amended by the
Water Quality Act of 1965,62
1965,62 was based exclusively on ambient water quality standards that
Congress anticipated would be used to develop standards for discharge to the receiving waters.
While the predecessor Act regulated only water quality (largely as defined by states) and could
only be used to regulate the discharging sources of impairment if water quality standards were not
met,63 practical application of the framework demonstrated its ineffectiveness; between 1948
being met,63
57
1104–05 (emphasis in original).
57 Hoopa Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104-05
58
58 Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
59
59 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
60
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (quoting legislative history of 1972 amendments).
60 City of
61
1 of
Jefferson Cty. v. Washington
Dep’t of
of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712 (1994).
61 PUD No. 1
ofJefferson
Washington Dep't
62
62 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
63
63 See NDRC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, a discharger needed no permit to deposit pollutants
into a water that had "room
“room to spare"
spare” in achieving its water quality standards.
17
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 19 of 52
Act’s enforcement framework "resulted
“resulted in only one prosecution."64
prosecution.”64 This informed
and 1972, the Act's
Congress’s 1972 effort to amend the Act, and was the impetus for Congress's
Congress’s enactment of Section
Congress's
“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402,
301, which states, "Except
unlawful.”65
and 404 of this Act, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful."65
“pollutant” quite broadly to mean "dredged
“dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator
Congress then defined "pollutant"
residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,
water.”66 However, Congress much more
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water."66
“discharge of a pollutant"
pollutant” to include "any
“any addition of any pollutant to
narrowly defined the "discharge
source,” such as a pipe, ditch, or other "discernible,
“discernible, confined and
navigable waters from any point source,"
67
discrete conveyance.”
conveyance."67
Therefore, the newly enacted Section 301 made it unlawful for the first time to discharge pollutants
into WOTUS from a point source unless the discharge complied with the CWA, including
obtaining authorizations pursuant to the Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES")
(“NPDES”) permit program or the Section 404 dredge-and-fill permit program.68
“[t]he primary
Because of the 1972 Amendments, the NPDES permitting program now constitutes "[t]he
means for enforcing these limitations and standards"
standards” from point sources.'
sources.69 Point source dischargers
“place limits on the type and quantity of pollutants that can
must now obtain NPDES permits that "place
released”70 into WOTUS through point sources, and "defines,
“defines, and facilitates compliance with,
be released"7°
[CWA].”71
and enforcement of …
... a discharger’s
discharger's obligations under the [CWA]."71
The 1972 Amendments similarly resulted in the first ever regulation of the discharge of dredged
or fill material into WOTUS, including certain wetlands. Section 404 now requires putative
dischargers to obtain a permit before any dredged or fill material may be discharged into WOTUS
from activities such as fill for water resource development, infrastructure development, and mining
projects.
In addition to fundamentally shifting the Act from its purely "harm-based"
“harm-based” regulatory approach to
its focus on point source discharges of pollutants to WOTUS, the 1972 Amendments also
preserved a role for states and tribes. These amendments first authorized states to assume program
64
of the Clean Water
64 See David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of
Water Act, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267, 304 (2009).
65
65 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
66
66 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
67
67 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14).
68
68 33 U.S.C. § 1342, 1344.
69
69 Arkansas et al. v. Oklahoma et al., 503 U.S. at 101 (1992).
70
S. Fla. Water
of Indians, 541 U.S. at 102 (2004).
70 5.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
71
71 EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 205 (1976).
18
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borders.72 States also became
authority for issuing Section 402 and 404 permits within their borders.72
borders,73 developing
responsible for developing water quality standards for WOTUS within their borders,73
(“TMDLs”) for waters that are not meeting established water quality
total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs")
74
standards while at the same time retaining authority to protect and manage waters that are not
standards74
75
considered WOTUS.
WOTUS.75
Most relevant here, however, the 1972 Amendments updated a preexisting state certification
requirement (Section 21(b)) to create Section 401. As with Section 401, Congress developed
enacted Section
21(b) to
to "recognize[]
“recognize[ ] the
the responsibility
responsibility of
of Federal
Federal agencies
agencies to
to protect
protect water
water
enacted
Section 21(b)
76
waterways.” As Congress noted at the time, "[i]n
“[i]n
quality whenever their activities affect public waterways."76
the past, these [Federal] licenses and permits have been granted without any assurance that the
77
[water quality] standards will be met or even considered.”
considered."77
FWPCA’s water qualityBecause the state certification requirement in Section 21(b) under the FWPCA's
based framework existed before Congress enacted the 1972 Amendments to focus on point source
“such activity will be conducted
discharges to WOTUS, Section 21(b) required states to certify that "such
standards.”78
in a manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards."78
The 1972 Amendments'
Amendments’ changes to Section 21(b) were therefore intended to maintain consistency
with the 1972 Amendments'
Amendments’ broader focus on, and definition of, point
point source discharges to
WOTUS.
WOTUS. In other words, because the predecessor Act regulated only water quality and could only
be used to regulate the pollution-contributing sources of impairment if water quality standards
were not being met, Congress drafted Section 21(b), and EPA promulgated its 1971 regulations
21(b)79 to focus on thosefederal
federal activities that could adversely impact ambient
pursuant to Section 21(b)79
water quality standards. Once the 1972 Amendments fundamentally transformed the Act to
provide authority to directly address discharges of pollutants rather than indirectly address
pollutant discharges based on their impacts on water quality, Congress made a corresponding
change to Section 21(b) so that it reflected the new prohibition and permitting regime for
discharges.
“that such activity .
As such, the Section 21(b)(1) requirement that the certifying authority certify "that
standards,”80 was modified to state that the authority must certify
. . will not violate water quality standards,"8°
“that any such discharge shall comply with the applicable provisions of sections 301, 302, 303,
"that
72
72 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), 1344(g).
73
73 33 U.S.C. § 1313, 1315.
74
74 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
75
75 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), 1251(g), 1370, 1377(a).
76
76 S. Rep. No. 91-351, at 3 (1969).
77
77 S. Rep. No. 91-351, at 3 (1969).
78
78 Public Law 91-224, 21(b)(1), 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (emphasis added).
79
79 See NDRC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, a discharger needed no permit to deposit pollutants
into a water that had "room
“room to spare"
spare” in achieving its water quality standards.
80
Public Law
Law 91-224
91-224 §§ 21(b)(1)
21(b)(1) (emphasis
(emphasis added).
added).
80 Public
19
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81
306, and 307 . . .”
."81 The 1972 Amendments also added an entirely new Section 4(d) which
authorizes the imposition of certification conditions:
to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with any
applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under section 301 or 302 of
this Act, standard of performance under section 306 of this Act, or prohibition,
effluent standard, or pretreatment standard under section 307 of this Act, and with
any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such certification . . . 82
Thus, the 1972 Amendments maintained Section 21(b)'s
21(b)’s focus on water quality impacts but
‘‘to assure consistency with the bill's
bill’s changed emphasis
adapted those certification requirements "to
from water quality standards to effluent limitations based on the elimination of any discharge of
pollutants.’’83 As explained by then-Senator Muskie, the sponsor of the legislation that would
pollutants."83
become Section 401:
No polluter will be able to hide behind a Federal license or permit as an excuse for
a violation of water quality standard[s]. No polluter will be able to make major
investments in facilities under a Federal license or permit without providing
assurance that the facility will comply with water quality standards. No State water
pollution control agency will be confronted with a fait accompli by an industry that
84
has built a plant without consideration of water quality requirements.
requirements."
The Senate Report that accompanied the 1972 Amendments likewise explained that Section 401:
makes clear that any water quality requirements established under State law, more
stringent than those requirements under this Act, also shall through certification
become conditions on any Federal license or permit. The purpose of the
certification mechanism provided in this law is to assure that Federal licensing or
85
permitting agencies cannot override State water quality requirements.
requirements.85
As the foregoing makes clear, Congress intended Section 401 certifications and conditions to focus
exclusively on water quality. Nothing in the legislative history of Section 401 reflects any intent
to consider non-water quality considerations or conditions.
Notwithstanding the transformative nature of the 1972 Amendments, EPA did not update its 1971
regulations (implementing Section 21(b)), until promulgation of the 401 Certification Rule in
81
81
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (emphasis added).
82
82 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
83
83 S. Rep. No. 92–414,
92-414, at 69 (1971).
84
84 116 Cong. Reg. 8,984 (Mar. 24, 1970) (discussing section 21(b) of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970)
(emphasis added).
85
85 S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 69 (1971) (emphasis added).
20
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Agency’s regulations remained out-of-step with
2020. Thus, for nearly five decades, the Agency's
Congress’s most consequential changes to the CWA—the prohibition on point source discharges
Congress's
“[e]xcept as in compliance with this section and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and
to WOTUS "[e]xcept
Act.”86 The persistence of EPA's
EPA’s outdated 1971 implementing regulations is relevant
404 of th[e] Act."86
Agency’s current reconsideration of the 401 Certification Rule because a significant portion
to the Agency's
of the jurisprudence on Section 401, including the 1994 Supreme Court decision in PUD No. 1 of
of
87
of Ecology,'
Ecology, is based on courts deferring to EPA
Jefferson County v. Washington
Washington Department of
regulations that predate the 1972 Amendments.
The Associations also urge EPA to recognize that FWPCA Section 21(b) was enacted prior to the
statutory requirement that the federal government consider the potential environmental impacts of
its actions. It provided states authority to examine the water quality impacts of federal actions in
the absence of any federal obligation to examine their own obligations. Section 401, on the other
hand, is informed by the 1969 passage of NEPA, which requires the federal government to consider
the potential environmental consequences—water quality-related or otherwise—of its actions.
While NEPA does not subsume the Section 401 water quality certification process, it does place
Section 401 in a statutory context distinct from that which existed in 1971. The state water quality
certification process is not the sole means by which potential environmental impacts of federal
actions are identified, scrutinized, mitigated, or avoided. The 1972 Amendments followed the
passage of NEPA by a mere two years. Congress understood the important role NEPA would play
in examining the impacts of federal actions, including those subject to state certifications under
Section 401. Congress continued to view state water quality certifications as important, but it
NEPA’s processes in scope, scale, or duration. Section
clearly did not intend them to duplicate NEPA's
401 was intended to be, and should remain, a focused inquiry on very specific types of discharges
and a very narrow set of potential impacts.
d.
Any revisions to the 401 Certification Rule must include provisions sufficient
to meaningfully enforce Congress’s
Congress's statutorily prescribed time limits
As EPA considers revisions to the 401 Certification Rule, we urge the Agency to recognize that
the deadlines Congress imposed in Section 401 are explicit, unambiguous, and binding. The
express text of Section 401 plainly states that a certifying authority waives its certification
“fails or refuses to act on a
authority over a federal license or permit if the certifying authority "fails
request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after
88
“[T]he purpose of the waiver provision is to prevent a State from
receipt of such request.”
request." 88
"[T]he
indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding by failing to issue a timely water quality
401.”89 Given the clarity of the CWA with respect to the one-year
certification under Section 401."89
86
86 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
87
(“PUD No. 1").
1”).
87 511 U.S. 700, 712 ("PUD
88
88 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
89
89 Alcoa Power Generating Inc. v. FERC, 643 F.3d 963, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
21
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deadline and the lack of ambiguity about the intended purpose of this language, the text of the
CWA leaves EPA no room to interpret Section 401 as allowing certifying authorities any amount
year.90
of time in excess of one year.9°
“while a full year is the absolute maximum, it does
Additionally, as explained by the D.C. Circuit, "while
year.”91 Determining the "reasonable
“reasonable
not preclude a finding of waiver prior to the passage of a full year."91
period of time"
time” within that one-year period has for several decades fallen within the purview of
agencies.92 Relatedly, from the time EPA first promulgated
the federal licensing and permitting agencies.'
its implementing regulations in 1971, federal licensing and permitting agencies have been tasked
occurs.93 Thus, although EPA may have some discretion in
with determining when waiver occurs.93
“reasonable period of
describing the factors that an agency should consider when determining the "reasonable
time” and the occurrence of a waiver, the longstanding nature of this aspect of EPA’s
time"
EPA's regulations
change.94
will require the Agency to provide a robust and reasoned explanation of the need for the change.94
CWA,95 EPA must ensure that its
Finally, as the agency charged with implementing the CWA,95
implementing regulations include meaningfully and reasonably preclude certification tactics that
401’s congressionally mandated
are plainly intended to evade, rather than comply with, Section 401's
deadlines. To that end, EPA’s
EPA's 401 Certification Rule examined the various ways in which a small
minority of states have circumvented or attempted to circumvent certification deadlines. While
the Agency is not precluded from varying the measures needed to ensure that certifications are
completed within a reasonable period of time (not to exceed one year), the Agency cannot ignore
those known tactics certain that states have employed to evade deadlines. As the implementation
agency for the CWA, EPA must ensure that its regulations reasonably ensure statutory compliance,
90
Congress’s establishment of one-year
9° Consistent with our comments in Section III.f., the Associations believe that Congress's
as the outermost limit for Section 401 certifications reveals that Congress understood and expected Section 401
reviews to be narrowly focused on discharges from the federal project, rather than broader or more tangentially related
impacts.
91
91 Hoopa Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104.
92
92 See Army Corps regulations at 33 CFR § 325.1(b)(ii) (51 Fed. Reg. 41,236) (Nov. 13, 1986)); See also FERC Rules
at 18 §5.23(b)(1) (68 Fed. Reg. 61,743)(Oct. 30, 2003)); See also Constitution Pipeline Company, LLC, 164 FERC P
(‘‘[T]o the extent that Congress left it to federal licensing and permitting agencies,
61029, 2018 WL 3498274 (2018) ("[T]o
here the Commission, to determine the reasonable period of time for action by a state certifying agency, bounded on
the outside at one year, we have concluded that a period up to one year is reasonable.’’).
reasonable.").
93
93 See Millennium Pipeline Company, L.L.C., 860 F.3d at 700–01
700-01 (acknowledging that a project proponent can ask the
federal agency to determine whether a waiver has occurred).
94
94 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
95
(‘‘Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, the Administrator of the
95 See 33 U.S.C. 1251(d) ("Except
chapter.’’); Id. at 1361(a); Mayo Found. for
for Medical Educ.
Environmental Protection Agency . . . shall administer this chapter.");
and Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 45 (2011); Hoopa Valley, 913 F.3d at 1104; Ala. Rivers Alliance v. FERC, 325
296–97 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Cal. Trout v. FERC, 313 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002); Am. Rivers, Inc. v.
F.3d 290, 296-97
FERC, 129 F. 3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997).
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rather than leaving loopholes. Accordingly, EPA must, at a minimum, preclude those deadline
circumvention tactics that courts have held to be improper.
1.
Enforcing the CWA's
CWA’s Section 401 deadlines requires a clear and objective
starting point for review
EPA’s
EPA's regulations must reflect that the review period for a certification request begins when the
project proponent submits the certification request to the certifying authority. This interpretation
is required by the Act and, given examples where states have sought to toll the start date of their
review long after their receipt of certification requests, this proposed interpretation is practically
necessary.
Section 401 plainly states that:
may be, fails or refuses
[i]f the State, interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case maybe,
for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall
to act on a request for
not exceed one year) after receipt of such request, the certification requirements of
application.96
this subsection shall be waived with respect to such Federal application.96
The plain meaning of this language is that the Act provides the timeframe for a certifying
authority’s review and instructs that the receipt of the request for certification begins the review
authority's
97
“bright-line rule”
period. The statutory text therefore created a "bright-line
rule"97
for identifying the start of the
Act’s review deadlines would be rendered meaningless.
review period, without which the Act's
“receipt” is clear and widely understood through its common usage, the
Although the term "receipt"
Associations nonetheless believe that EPA must implement and enforce a regulatory definition of
“receipt” to prevent certain states from strategically sidestepping straight-forward interpretations
"receipt"
limits. At a minimum,
of the term to extend their review period beyond statutorily mandated time limits
EPA, as the agency charged with implementing the CWA, must implement Section 401 of the Act
“receipt” documented in the following
to prohibit the impermissible constructions of the term "receipt"
examples.
For instance, the State of New York received a certification request for the Northern Access
Pipeline on March 2, 2016. New York denied the certification application on April 7, 2017 and
argued that its denial was timely because: (1) the certification review did not begin until the state
“complete;” and (2) that the state asked and received consent from the
deemed the application "complete;"
project proponent to change the date on which the application was deemed received so that New
96
96 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added).
97
N.Y.
Dep’t't of
of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir. 2018).
97 N.
Y. State Dep
23
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 25 of 52
York’s April 7, 2017 decision would appear to conform to the Section 401 time limits
limits.98
York's
98
York’s arguments, FERC concluded that the state waived its Section 401
Notwithstanding New York's
deadlines,99 and in two sequential decisions, the
obligation for failure to act within the prescribed deadlines,99
(“Second Circuit")
Circuit”) agreed.10°
agreed.100
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second
In the first case, the Second Circuit held that Section 401 prohibited New York from determining
that the certification application was not "received"
“received” until the state deemed it complete.101
complete.101 The
“bright-line rule regarding the beginning of the review,"
review,”
court reasoned that Section 401 provided a "bright-line
York’s approach would impermissibly "allow
“allow a state agency not only to dictate when
and that New York's
102
the review process can begin but also to delay it indefinitely.”
indefinitely.99102
The Second Circuit then remanded FERC's
FERC’s conditional approval back to the Commission to allow
FERC to supplement its reasoning for the conditional approval. After FERC reaffirmed and further
Commission’s waiver determination.
explained its approval, New York once again challenged the Commission's
“bright-line rule”
state’s
Once again, the Second Circuit held that Section 401 provides a "bright-line
rule" that a state's
103
action on a request for certification shall not exceed one year from receipt of such a request.
request.103
York’s agreement with the project proponent to stipulate that the application
And regarding New York's
“however modest and
was received 36 days after it was actually received, the court held that "however
reasonable that extension may have been, allowing the state to dictate the beginning of review by
standard’”104
agreement would ‘blur
'blur th[e] bright-line rule into a subjective standard'"104
In another example, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP")
(“NJDEP”) recently
deemed as incomplete a certification request for a project proposed by PennEast Pipeline
Company, LLC because the project proponent had not provided NJDEP with surveys of the entire
pipeline route, including segments that had no rational relationship with potential water quality
impacts.105 Because this data request was irrelevant to the state's
state’s review of the proposed project's
project’s
impacts.105
potential water quality impacts in New Jersey, it can only be construed as a tactic for delay. Indeed,
Court’s June 29, 2021 decision in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey suggests that
the Supreme Court's
98
Dep’t of
of Envtl. Conservation v. Nat's
Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-161898 See N.Y. State Dep't
Dep’t of
of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d Cir.
ag (2d Cir. March 23, 2021); See also N.Y. State Dep't
2018).
99
Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 164 FERC 61,084 at PP 35,42 (2018).
99 See Nat's
100
Dep’t of
Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-16181°°
See N.Y. State Dep't
ofEnvtl. Conservation v. Nat's
Dep’t of
of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, (2d Cir. 2018).
ag (2d Cir. March 23, 2021); See also N.Y. State Dep't
101
N.Y.
Dep’t of
'1' N
Y. State Dep't
of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d at 455.
102
N.Y.
Dep’t of
102
N
Y. State Dep't
of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d at 455-456.
103
Dep’t of
Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-1618-ag
l'NN.Y.
Y. State Dep't
of Envtl. Conservation v. Nat's
at p. 17 (2d Cir. March 23, 2021).
104
N.Y.
Dep’t of
Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19-1618-ag
1°4
N
Y. State Dep't
of Envtl. Conservation v. Nat's
N.Y.
Dep’t of
of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d at 455).
at p. 17 (quoting N.
Y. State Dep't
105
Kop’Kash, Assistant Comm'r,
Comm’r, N.J. Dep't
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Re: Freshwater Wetlands Individual
105
Letter from Virginia Kop'Kash,
Permit Application, DLUR File #0000-17-0007.2 FWW170001,
24
- App. 521 -
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 26 of 52
state’s efforts to expand its Section 401 review time were part of a larger effort to frustrate and
the state's
forestall construction of the pipeline.1°6
pipeline.106
While the CWA clearly directs how the Section 401 review deadlines should be applied, these
Agency’s regulations must prohibit the arbitrary and strategic
decision leave no doubt that the Agency's
tolling of Section 401 review periods.
2.
EPA must prohibit states from artificially extending timeframes by stopping
and restarting the certification process
The CWA does not allow certifying authorities to stop and restart their review to artificially extend
Section 401's
401’s statutorily prescribed deadlines. And as the agency charged with implementing
Section 401 of the Act, EPA’s
EPA's regulations must incorporate enforceable procedures that prohibit
401’s statutory deadlines. Here again, the need for these restrictions
this manner of evading Section 401's
“withdrawal
is made evident by the actions of a handful of states that have increasingly relied on a "withdrawal
resubmittal” tactic to circumvent statutory deadlines. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit's
Circuit’s recent
and resubmittal"
107
decision in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC ("Hoopa
(“Hoopa Valley”)
Valley")107
demonstrates the need for EPA to
enforce regulations to compel compliance with the express Section 401 deadlines.
In Hoopa Valley,
Valley, the D.C. Circuit considered whether California and Oregon could lawfully rely
“withdrawal-and-resubmission scheme"
scheme” to avoid the Section 401 deadline for certifying the
on a "withdrawal-and-resubmission
Project.108 The project proponent had originally
relicensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.108
states’ demand,
submitted its certification requests to the states in 2006, and pursuant to the states'
decade.109
withdrew and resubmitted the same certification requests annually for more than a decade.1°9
“more than a decade later, the states still ha[d] not
When the D.C. Circuit drafted its decision "more
110
decisions.”
rendered certification decisions."11°
The court went bemoaned that:
it is now commonplace for states to use Section 401 to hold federal licensing
hostage. At the time of briefing, twenty-seven of the forty-three licensing
applications before FERC were awaiting a state's water quality certification, and
four of those had been pending for more than a decade.111
decade.111
While the problem identified by the D.C. Circuit was pervasive, its resolution was remarkably
“[d]etermining the effectiveness of such a withdrawalstraight-forward. According to the court, "[d]etermining
401’s text is clear."112
clear.”112
and-resubmission scheme is an undemanding inquiry because Section 401's
106
594 U.S. __ (Slip. Op. at 4) (June 29, 2021).
106
107
1"
913 F. 3d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
108
1°8
Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1103.
109
1°9
Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104.
110
ii° Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104 (emphasis in original).
111
iii Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1104 (emphasis in original).
112
112 Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1103.
25
- App. 522 -
Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 27 of 52
act’ or ‘refusal
act,’ the states'
states’ efforts
While the statute does not define ‘failure
'failure to act'
'refusal to act,'
. . . constitute such failure and refusal within the plain meaning of these phrases.
Section 401 requires state action within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed
one year. California and Oregon's deliberate and contractual idleness defies this
requirement. By shelving water quality certifications, the states usurp FERC's
control over whether and when a federal license will issue. Thus, if allowed, the
withdrawal-and-resubmission scheme could be used to indefinitely delay federal
licensing proceedings and undermine FERC's jurisdiction to regulate such
matters.113
matters.113
The court explained that "Congress
“Congress intended Section 401 to curb a state's
state’s ‘dalliance
'dalliance or
unreasonable delay.’
delay.' This Court has repeatedly recognized that the waiver provision was created
999114
114
‘to
proceeding.’”
Therefore, the
`to prevent a State from indefinitely delaying a federal licensing proceeding.
“conclude[d] that California and Oregon have waived their Section 401 authority with regard
court "conclude[d]
Project.”115
to the Project."115
(“Fourth Circuit")
Circuit”) rejected a FERC
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth
determination that North Carolina waived its Section 401 authority because the state took longer
proponent’s initial certification application and two subsequent
than one year to review a project proponent's
withdrawn.116 The court held
applications that were resubmitted after the initial application was withdrawn.116
that FERC did not have a sufficient basis to conclude that North Carolina had colluded with the
project proponent on the withdrawal and resubmittal of the certification applications to artificially
extend the time. Instead, the court found that the decision to withdraw and resubmit the initial and
subsequent applications was made by the project proponent alone and without the direction of, or
state.117
coordination with, the state."'
The Fourth Circuit's
Circuit’s reasoning appears to conflict with holdings in the D.C. Circuit118
Circuit118 and the
Second Circuit,119
Circuit,119 it is also not a particularly sweeping decision because the court made a factspecific determination that the record did not support FERC's
FERC’s determination that the project
proponent’s withdrawal and resubmittal of the certification application was coordinated with the
proponent's
state.120 Simply put, the 401 Certification Rule does not prohibit project proponents from
state.12°
withdrawing and resubmitting certification applications. The final rule only prohibits states and
other certifying authorities from requesting applications be withdrawn and resubmitted in order to
113
113 Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105.
114
114 Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105-6 (internal citations omitted).
115
115 Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105.
116
Dep’t of
of Envtl Quality v. FERC, 2021 WL 2763265 (41h
(4th Cir. July 2, 2021).
116 North Carolina Dep't
117
Dep’t of
of Envtl Quality v. FERC, 2021 WL 2763265.
117 North Carolina Dep't
118
118 See Hoopa Valley,
Valley, 913 F. 3d at 1105.
119
Dep’t of
of Envtl. Conservation v. See Nat's
Nat’s Fuel Gas Supply Corp., Slip Op. at No.s 19-1610-ag. 19119 See N.Y. State Dep't
1618-ag (2d Cir. March 23, 2021); See also N.Y. State Dep't
Dep’t of
of Envtl. Conservation v. FERC, 884 F.3d 450, 455 (2d
Cir. 2018).
120
Dep’t of
of Envtl Quality v. FERC, 2021 WL 2763265.
12/3 North Carolina Dep't
26
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Case 3:20-cv-04636-WHA Document 172-1 Filed 10/04/21 Page 28 of 52
extend the Section 401 review time limit.
limit Thus, although it remains an outlier to the larger body
Circuit’s decision is not altogether inconsistent with the
of Section 401 jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit's
401 Certification Rule. Therefore, EPA’s
EPA's regulations must continue to stipulate that a certifying
authority is not authorized to request the project proponent to withdraw a certification request or
to take any other action to modify or restart the established reasonable period of time.
e.
Section 401 certification is required only when a federally licensed or
permitted activity has the potential to result in a discharge from a point source
to navigable waters
The 401 Certification Rule must continue to clarify that Section 401 certification procedures are
triggered by Section 401(a)(1) only when a federally licensed or permitted activity has the potential
from a point
point source into a WOTUS.
to result in a discharge from
WOTUS. This restrained application of Section
401 is commanded by the text and structure of the CWA, consistent with the applicable case law,
Agency’s longstanding interpretations.
and in harmony with the Agency's
As explained in Section III.c. above, the same 1972 Amendments through which Section 401 was
Act’s regulatory focus away from ambient standards and toward a
enacted also shifted the Act's
prohibition and permitting framework for "the
“the discharge of any pollutant by any person . . ."
.”121
122
The 1972 Amendments defined the phrase "discharge
“discharge of any pollutant"'
pollutant” as "any
“any addition of any
123
from any point
point source."123
source.”
pollutant to navigable watersfrom
“navigable waters"
waters” as "the
“the waters of the United States
Congress then also further defined "navigable
124
[“WOTUS”], including the territorial seas."124
seas.”
["WOTUS"],
While the precise contours of this definition are
the subject of a great deal of debate, Congress clearly intended the definition of WOTUS, and
“navigable waters,"
waters,” to refer to a subset of surface waterbodies within the United States.
therefore "navigable
The Associations submitted comments in strong support of the Agency's
Agency’s most recent proposal to
125
WOTUS, and we support the Navigable Waters Protection Rule that EPA and the Army
define WOTUS,125
126
Act’s defmition
definition of "navigable
“navigable waters"
waters” as WOTUS and the
Corps ultimately finalized.
finalized.126
The Act's
interpretation
Agency’s
of
“WOTUS”
act
as
a
limit
on
the
types
of
projects
subject to Section 401
Agency's
"WOTUS"
certification procedures just as these definitions limit the scope of activities subject to the Section
402 NPDES program or the Section 404 dredge-and-fill program. Like
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