Application — Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al., Applicants v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, et al.
Supreme Court briefDec 20, 2021
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No.: _____________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC.,
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS
OF ALABAMA, INC., INDEPENDENT ELECTRICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC., and
INDEPENDENT ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS – FWCC, INC.
Applicants,
v.
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.
__________
EMERGENCY APPLICATION OF ABC AND IEC
FOR IMMEDIATE STAY OF AGENCY ACTION
PENDING DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR REVIEW
__________
To the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
and Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit
__________
J. Larry Stine
Counsel of Record
WIMBERLY, LAWSON, STECKEL,
SCHNEIDER & STINE, P.C.
3400 Peachtree Road N.E.
Suite 400
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
(404) 365-0900
jls@wimlaw.com
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Applicants (“ABC and IEC”) state that no
individual Applicant has any parent corporation and that no publicly
held company owns any portion of any Applicant. Applicants further
state as follows:
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. is a national
association of construction companies primarily in the commercial and
industrial sectors and represents over 21,000 companies nationwide.
Associated Builders and Contractors of Alabama, Inc. is a
chapter of ABC representing the interests of hundreds of member
construction contractors and related firms from all over Alabama, who
perform work in that state and throughout the country. Its membership
represents most specialties within the construction industry and is
comprised primarily of firms that perform work in the industrial and
commercial sectors.
Industrial Electrical Contractor, Inc. is a national association
of employers who provide electrical construction services.
i
Independent Electrical Contractor – FWCC, Inc. is the local
chapter of IEC in Florida and is an association of employers who provide
electrical contractors services found throughout the State of Florida.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
STATEMENT ............................................................................................. i
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... v
TO THE HONORABLE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT: .................... 1
OPINION BELOW .................................................................................... 4
JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ 5
STATUTORY PROVISIONS..................................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR GRANTING THE EMERGENCY
STAY .......................................................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 8
I.
THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT FOUR
JUSTICES WOULD VOTE TO GRANT REVIEW, AND A
FAIR PROSPECT THAT A MAJORITY WOULD DECLARE
THE ETS UNLAWFUL. ......................................................... 9
A.
There is a Reasonable Probability that Four Justices Would
Vote to Grant Review in Order to Resolve the Evident
Conflict in the Circuits on an Issue of Extraordinary
Importance. ............................................................................. 9
B.
There is a fair prospect that a majority of this Court would
declare the ETS unlawful. .................................................... 10
1.
The Scope of OSHA’s Authority. ...................................... 10
a. 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) of the OSH Act does not Grant
Authority to OSHA to Require Vaccination. .............. 10
b. The ETS has no Force or Effect and Cannot be
Ratified Because the Person who Issued the ETS had
iii
no Authority to do so. ................................................. 14
2.
Major Questions Doctrine................................................. 14
3.
OSHA’s Basis for the ETS. ............................................... 15
a. The Authority Claimed by OSHA to Mandate
Vaccinations Exceeds the Authority Granted to OSHA
by 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(3).............................................. 16
b. Emergency and Grave Danger: The ETS Does not
Show an Emergency or Address a “Grave Danger” for
a Lower Risk Industry Like Construction. ................ 17
c. Necessity: OSHA Failed to Sufficiently Explain its
Dramatic Change of Position. .................................... 20
4.
Constitutional Challenges. ............................................... 23
a. Commerce Clause: The Tenth Amendment, which
Encompasses the Police Powers Reserved to the States,
Limits OSHA’s Authority to Mandate Vaccinations. 23
b. Non-Delegation Doctrine: The Authority Claimed by
OSHA in this Case Represents an Unlawful
Delegation of Legislative Power. ............................... 24
II.
ABSENT A STAY, THE OSHA ETS WILL CAUSE
IRREPARABLE HARM IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY............................................................................ 25
A.
III.
Enforcement of the OSHA ETS will Cause Construction
Companies to Lose Irreplaceable Employees to Businesses
that do not Require COVID Vaccinations or Testing. .......... 26
THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS A STAY. ........ 32
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 33
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................................................. 34
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Page(s)
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ................................................................ passim
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray,
483 U.S. 1306 (1987) ......................................................................... 31
Asbestos Info. Association/N. Am. v. OSHA,
727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984) ....................................................... 19, 20
Bond v. United States,
572 U.S. 844, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) ................................................. 23
BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
2021 WL 5279381, at *7 (5th Cir. 2021) ....................................... passim
Chamber of Com. v. EPA,
577 U.S. 1127 (2016) ..................................................................... 8, 29
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ....................................................................... 13
Dry Color Mfrs' Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor,
486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973) ................................................................. 19
Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro,
579 U.S. 211, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) ........................................... 20, 21
FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc.
556 U.S. 502, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009) ................................................... 20
Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) ............................................................. 19
Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 (1824) ................................................................................. 23
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561, 115 S. Ct. 1061, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1995) ...................... 13
v
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
558 U.S. 183 (2010) (per curiam) ........................................................ 9
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977) ............................................................................. 8
In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union,
830 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ............................................................ 18
In re: MCP No. 165, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. Rule on
COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing, (6th Cir., Dec. 17, 2021) ..... 8, 10, 32
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API,
448 U.S. 607 (1980) ........................................................................... 15
Ledbetter v. Baldwin,
479 U.S. 1309 (1986) ......................................................................... 31
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co.,
512 U.S. 218, 114 S. Ct. 2223, 129 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1994) .................. 13
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182267, 2020 WL 5847503
(N.D. Cal. 2020) ................................................................................. 28
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) ............................................ 23-24
Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418 (2009) ............................................................................. 9
Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Auchter,
702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .......................................................... 18
Sehie v. City of Aurora,
432 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2005) ............................................................. 30
State of Georgia v. Biden, 21-cv-163, slip op.
at 14 (S.D. GA. Dec. 7. 2021) ....................................................... 28, 32
State of Georgia v. President,
No. 21-14269-F (11th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021) ........................................ 10, 32
vi
SW Gen. Inc. v. NLRB,
796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 14
Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
537 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1976) ............................................................. 18
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,
510 U.S. 200 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ...................................... 30
Tiger Lily, LLC v. United States HUD
5 F.4th 666 (6th Cir. 2021) .................................................................... 13
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,
573 U.S. 302 (2014) ....................................................................... 2, 15
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952) ....................................................... 25
Zucht v. King,
260 U.S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24 (1922) ........................................................ 23
Federal Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 705 ............................................................................ 3, 5, 8, 14
5 U.S.C. § 3348 ...................................................................................... 14
28 U.S.C. § 1254 .................................................................................. 5, 8
28 U.S.C. § 1651 ...................................................................................... 5
28 U.S.C. § 2101 ...................................................................................... 8
29 U.S.C. § 655 .............................................................................. passim
29 U.S.C. § 669 .......................................................................... 10, 11, 13
29 U.S.C. § 1926 .................................................................................... 17
State Statutes
820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 235/1 (similar) ....................................................... 30
Cal. Lab. Code § 222.5 (similar) ............................................................ 30
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 336.220 ........................................................................ 30
Va. Code § 40.1-28 (similar) .................................................................. 30
vii
Rules
29 C.F.R. § 785.43 ................................................................................. 30
29 C.F.R. § 1910.501................................................................................ 24
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 ............................................................................ 12
29 C.F.R. § 1915 ...................................................................................... 26
29 C.F.R. § 1918 ...................................................................................... 26
29 C.F.R. § 1926 ...................................................................................... 26
29 C.F.R. § 1928 ...................................................................................... 26
F.R.A.P. 23.2 ........................................................................................ 3, 5
F.R.A.P. 25 ............................................................................................. 36
F.R.A.P. 25(a)(3) .................................................................................... 36
F.R.A.P. 29.6 ............................................................................................. i
Other
54 Fed. Reg. 23,042 ............................................................................... 12
86 Fed. Reg. 32,376 (June 21, 2021) ....................................................... 6
86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) ................................................ passim
Pub. L. No. 102-170, tit. I, § 100(b)
105 Stat. 1107, 1113-1114 (1991)............................................................ 12
viii
TO THE HONORABLE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT:
Applicants are trade associations (“ABC and IEC”) representing
tens of thousands of construction contractors throughout the United
States representing most specialties within the construction industry.
Many of Applicants’ members are directly and irreparably harmed by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) “COVID-19
Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard.” 86 Fed. Reg.
61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) (the “ETS”). They respectfully request an
immediate stay of the ETS.
At issue is whether OSHA has statutory authority under the ETS
section of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) create a vaccine-and-testing
regime for all businesses with 100 or more employees, without prior
notice and public comment, thereby reaching over 25% of the entire
population, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,475. Absent an emergency stay, the unlawful
ETS will impose massive and irreparable burdens on the construction
industry, effective immediately.
The Fifth Circuit in BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604 (5th
Cir. 2021) found that the Petitioners had met the requirements for a stay
1
and issued a stay. After consolidation in the Sixth Circuit, multiple
petitioners in the Sixth Circuit filed motions for an initial en banc review,
which were denied in an 8 to 8 vote. In the dissent, 8 judges found that
the Petitioners had a substantial likelihood of success, and that OSHA
had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm if the stay was lifted.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit on December 17, 2021, vacated the Fifth
Circuit’s stay of the OSHA ETS. A conflict in the circuits therefore exists
on an issue of extraordinary importance, impacting 80 million workers
and a substantial portion of the business community. All of this calls for
immediate action by this Court to preserve the status quo by again
staying the OSHA ETS pending further review on the merits.
The Sixth Circuit failed to acknowledge that there is no language
in the OSH Act authorizing OSHA to require vaccinations. Instead, as
further discussed below, the Act grants a limited immunization authority
exclusively to HHS, an entirely different agency. Under such
circumstances, the major-questions doctrine prohibits OSHA from
“discover[ing] in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a
significant portion of the American economy.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v.
EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). In addition, OSHA has failed to
2
demonstrate that the ETS is necessary to address a “grave danger” to the
many different industries, which the blunderbuss new standard purports
to regulate in this unprecedented manner. The construction industry is
entitled to separate consideration, as evidenced by OSHA’s own
longstanding regulations, particularly because most construction
workers have been recognized by OSHA itself to be at much lower risk of
infection in the workplace. At the same time, because construction
industry employees are well known to be more transient than in other
industries, construction businesses are at a very high risk of losing
workers who have made abundantly clear that they will relocate to
employers with below 100 employees who will not be covered by the
standard. OSHA gave no consideration to the impact of its ETS on
construction and a variety of other industries, already facing a severe
labor shortage, who will suffer irreparable harm from enforcement of the
ETS.
A likelihood of success and irreparable harm are all that 5 U.S.C.
§ 705 requires for a stay pending review, but the equities also favor a
stay. Under the Court’s Rule 23.2, this Court is the only remaining option
for a stay, and unless this Court immediately stays the effective date
3
of the ETS, OSHA’s unlawful action will begin to inflict significant and
irreparable harm to the economy as the country struggles through the
holiday season and beyond.
Restoring the pre-ETS status quo does not require this Court to
question the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines. But the reality is that tens
of millions of Americans remain unpersuaded.. The goal of getting more
Americans vaccinated does not allow the Executive Branch to use
regulatory fiat compelling regulated businesses to achieve a drastic
social, economic, and political change via the limited “emergency” power
that Congress authorized. Ala. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2490.
This Court should therefore immediately stay OSHA’s unlawful action,
pending disposition of ABC’s petition for review, along with those of other
similarly affected organizations.
OPINION BELOW
OSHA published its ETS at 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 on Nov. 5, 2021
(Appendix 1). The Fifth Circuit’s November 6 order granting a stay
pending further review is unpublished but can be found at 2021 WL
5166656. The Fifth Circuit’s November 12, 2021, opinion and order
4
granting a stay of the effective date of the ETS can be found at 17 F.4th
604 and is attached as Appendix 2.
The Sixth Circuit’s 8-8 decision on Dec. 15 denying initial hearing
en banc is attached as Appendix 3. The Sixth Circuit’s December 17,
2021, opinion and order dissolving the Fifth Circuit’s stay is attached as
Appendix 4.
This Court is the only remaining option for a stay, pursuant to Rule
23.2, in light of the Sixth Circuit’s panel decision and that court’s en banc
refusal to keep the Fifth Circuit’s stay in place.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1). The Court has authority to grant the Applicants relief under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 705, and the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory provisions are attached to this Application as
Appendix 5.
5
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
EMERGENCY STAY
The OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1), allows OSHA to establish an
emergency temporary standard if, and only if, “employees are exposed to
grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be
toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards,” and “such emergency
standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.”
In January 2020, the President directed OSHA to review COVID19 and issue an ETS. On June 21, 2021, OSHA issued an ETS limited to
the healthcare industry and healthcare employees and no other
industries, and it did not deem it necessary to require vaccines or testing.
86 Fed. Reg. 32,376. On September 9, 2021, in what the President’s chief
of staff declared to be a “workaround” of the lack of statutory authority1
the President directed OSHA to issue an emergency temporary standard
requiring all employers with “100 or more employees to ensure their
workforce is fully vaccinated or require any workers who remain
BST Holding, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 612 n.13 (5th Cir. Nov. 12,
2021) (“On September 9, 2021, White House Chief of Staff Ron Klain
retweeted MSNBC anchor Stephanie Ruhle’s tweet that stated, “OSHA
doing this vaxx mandate as an emergency workplace safety rule is the
ultimate work-around for the Federal govt to require vaccinations.”).
1
6
unvaccinated to produce a negative test result on at least a weekly basis
before coming to work.” The White House, Vaccinating the Unvaccinated,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/covidplan/ (last visited December 14, 2021).
On November 5, 2021, OSHA published the emergency temporary
standard at issue. 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,402. Among many requirements,
this ETS requires most employers with 100 or more employees to
determine the vaccination status of their employees thirty days from the
issuance date and sixty days from that date to require unvaccinated
employees to either get fully vaccinated or submit to weekly COVID-19
testing. Id. Many workers in the construction industry, a significant
percentage of whom are unvaccinated, have indicated to their employers
in no uncertain terms that they will quit or be terminated rather than be
vaccinated or constantly tested at considerable expense. Because of the
uniquely transient, project-by-project nature of the construction
workforce, employees of companies covered by the OSHA ETS 100worker threshold can easily relocate to smaller companies, thereby
exacerbating the labor shortage and dislocations occurring throughout
the industry.
7
On November 12, 2021, the Fifth Circuit stayed the effective date
of the ETS, granting relief to all petitioners with pending stay motions.
BST Holdings, LLC, 17 F.4th at 619 & n.23.
Following briefing and without oral argument, on December 17,
2021, the Sixth Circuit vacated the Fifth Circuit’s stay of the ETS and
denied all other consolidated petitioners’ pending motions to stay. In re:
MCP No. 165, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. Rule on COVID-19
Vaccination and Testing, (6th Cir., Dec. 17, 2021) (hereinafter In re: MCP
No. 165, Slip Op.).
ARGUMENT
Under 5 U.S.C. § 705, this Court “may issue all necessary and
appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action.”
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 2101; Chamber of Com. v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1127
(2016) (granting pre-judgment application to stay federal agency action
in order to forestall immediate, burdensome compliance causing
irreparable harm if not enjoined). The Applicants are trade associations
who have standing to represent the interests of thousands of their
construction industry members around the country, pursuant to Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
8
The following stay factors are all present here: “(1) a reasonable
probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently
meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the
Court w[ould] vote to reverse [a] judgment below [by enjoining OSHA’s
ETS]; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the
denial of a stay.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per
curiam); See also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (“[B]alanc[ing]
the equities and weigh[ing] the relative harms to the applicant and to the
respondent.”).
I.
THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT FOUR
JUSTICES WOULD VOTE TO GRANT REVIEW, AND A
FAIR PROSPECT THAT A MAJORITY WOULD DECLARE
THE ETS UNLAWFUL.
A.
There is a Reasonable Probability that Four Justices
Would Vote to Grant Review in Order to Resolve the
Evident Conflict in the Circuits on an Issue of
Extraordinary Importance.
As discussed above, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits reached opposite
conclusions on staying the OSHA ETS, and specifically the following
issues: the scope of OSHA’s authority, the major questions doctrine,
OSHA’s statutory basis for the ETS (including whether the factors of
emergency, grave danger, and necessity existed), the Commerce Clause
(including the police powers reserved to the States), the nondelegation
9
doctrine, irreparable harm, and the balancing of the equities. The
importance of this conflict is extraordinary in that immediate
enforcement of the OSHA ETS will have a huge impact on the entire
nation’s economy and the rule of law.
An additional conflict is presented by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent
order in State of Georgia v. President, No. 21-14269-F (11th Cir. Dec. 17,
2021), which found with respect to the federal contractor mandate, that
the federal government cannot establish that it will suffer irreparable
injury absent a stay.
B.
There is a fair prospect that a majority of this Court
would declare the ETS unlawful.
1.
The Scope of OSHA’s Authority.
a.
29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) of the OSH Act does not
Grant Authority to OSHA to Require
Vaccination.
The Sixth Circuit majority misunderstood Section 669(a)(5). The
Sixth
Circuit
concluded
that,
because
669(a)(5)
referenced
“immunization,” OSHA must have authority to require immunization
somewhere in the OSH Act. Yet, the Sixth Circuit failed to properly
identify where such authority exists. In re: MCP No. 165, Slip Op.at 11).
Section 669, however, assigns the responsibilities at issue here, i.e.,
10
vaccinations, solely to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(now Secretary of Health and Human Services), not to OSHA.
Specifically, Section 669(a)(5) states:
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in order to
comply with his responsibilities under paragraph (2), and in
order to develop needed information regarding potentially
toxic substances or harmful physical agents, may prescribe
regulations requiring employers to measure, record, and
make reports on the exposure of employees to substances or
physical agents which the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare reasonably believes may endanger the health or
safety of employees. The Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare also is authorized to establish such programs of
medical examinations and tests as may be necessary for
determining the incidence of occupational illnesses and the
susceptibility of employees to such illnesses. Nothing in this
or any other provision of this Act shall be deemed to
authorize
or
require
medical
examination,
immunization, or treatment for those who object thereto
on religious grounds, except where such is necessary for
the protection of the health or safety of others. Upon the
request of any employer who is required to measure and
record exposure of employees to substances or physical agents
as provided under this subsection, the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare shall furnish full financial or other
assistance to such employer for the purpose of defraying any
additional expense incurred by him in carrying out the
measuring and recording as provided in this subsection.
29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) (emphasis added). Section 669(a)(5) is not a grant
of authority to OSHA but is a limitation on any authority granted by the
OSH Act to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and/or OSHA.
11
Neither the Sixth Circuit nor OSHA has cited any other provision of the
OSH Act that grants OSHA authority to require vaccinations or any
other medical treatment.
OSHA cannot justify the ETS by relying on bloodborne pathogen
legislation. OSHA asserts that legislation adopting OSHA’s bloodborne
pathogen standard “illustrates Congress’s understanding that OSHA has
authority to issue standards addressing workplace exposure to viruses.”
Doc. 69, pp 16-17. The legislation, however, merely adopted OSHA’s
proposed bloodborne pathogen standard if OSHA did not act by a date
certain. Pub. L. No. 102-170, tit. I, § 100(b), 105 Stat. 1107, 1113-1114
(1991). Notably, the bloodborne pathogen standard, as adopted by
Congress, did not mandate vaccinations; instead, the standard required
employers to bear the cost of any vaccine, to make the vaccine available,
and to provide information to the employees about the benefits of the
vaccine.2 The standard as adopted by OSHA did not change these
“OSHA believes a hepatitis B vaccination program where employers
bear the cost of the vaccine, make the vaccine available to employees at
a reasonable time and place, and provide information about the benefits
of the vaccine is the most appropriate way to assure that a large
percentage of eligible employees are vaccinated. The Agency seeks
comment on whether this voluntary approach is the correct approach.”
54 Fed. Reg. at 23,045.
2
12
requirements. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(f)(1), (g)(2)(vii)(I). Neither the
Sixth Circuit nor OSHA can cite any legislation that authorizes OSHA to
mandate, as opposed to make available, vaccinations.
OSHA certainly cannot use the very limited authority set forth in
Section 669(a)(5) as the basis for the broad authority to mandate vaccines
as set forth in the ETS. As the Supreme Court held in Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1925 (2020). “Because
we must interpret the statutes “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory
scheme,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569, 115 S. Ct. 1061, 131
L. Ed. 2d 1 (1995), these grants of authority must be read alongside the
express limits contained within the statute.”
In determining what authority Congress statutorily delegated to an
agency, the courts look “not only [to] the ultimate purposes Congress has
selected, but [to] the means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed,
for the pursuit of those purposes.” Tiger Lily, LLC v. United States HUD,
5 F.4th 666 at 670-71 (6th Cir. 2021), citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4, 114 S. Ct. 2223, 129 L. Ed. 2d 182
(1994). Thus, this Court must hold OSHA to the text of Section
§ 669(a)(5), which, at best, vests HHS only when it is engaged in
13
measuring
and
recording
with
limited
authority
regarding
immunizations. Nowhere in the text of that statute, or anywhere else in
the OSH Act, is there any authority for what OSHA purports to do in the
ETS.
b.
The ETS has no Force or Effect and Cannot
be Ratified Because the Person who Issued
the ETS had no Authority to do so.
The ETS was issued on November 5, 2021, by James Frederick, who
purported to be the “Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor.” 86 Fed. Reg.
at 61,551. In reality, there was no “Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor”
on November 5, 2021, because two days before the ETS’s issuance the
confirmed Assistant Secretary of Labor, Douglas L. Parker, was sworn
in.3 Accordingly, Frederick had no authority to issue this rule. See SW
Gen. Inc., 796 F.3d at 81–83; 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d) and 3345(a). Because
Frederick had no authority to issue the ETS, the ETS has no force or
effect and cannot be ratified. Id..
2.
Major Questions Doctrine.
For the reasons fully explained in the Fifth Circuit’s BST decision
imposing the stay, and in the dissenting opinion in the Sixth Circuit’s
OSHA, Special Edition Meet OSHA’s New Leader (Nov. 3, 2021)
https://www.osha.gov/quicktakes/11032021.
3
14
decision lifting the stay, this Court has repeatedly declared that federal
agencies such as OSHA cannot claim the right to exercise “unprecedented
power over American industry” in the absence of “a clear mandate”
expressed by Congress in a statute. . . See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573
U.S. at 324; Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 141
S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021). Specifically with regard to OSHA, this Court
has held that Congress has “narrowly circumscribed [OSHA’s] power to
issue temporary emergency standards” and has “repeatedly expressed its
concern about allowing the Secretary to have too much power over
American industry.” Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607,
651 (1980). Congress has enacted no clear mandate for OSHA to take the
currently challenged action, which is unprecedented in its scope and the
burdens it is imposing on the business community. The Sixth Circuit
improperly glossed over the foregoing holdings of this Court in lifting the
stay which the Fifth Circuit had correctly imposed. For this reason alone,
this emergency appeal to reinstate the stay should be granted.
3.
OSHA’s Basis for the ETS.
15
a.
The Authority Claimed by OSHA to Mandate
Vaccinations Exceeds the Authority Granted
to OSHA by 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(3).
Aside from the authority erroneously claimed to have under Section
669(a)(5) to mandate vaccines, OSHA claims to have inherent standard
setting authority under Section 655(b) to mandate vaccinations, which is
a medical procedure, but again Congress did not grant OSHA such
authority.
Section 655(b) does not grant OSHA authority to compel
vaccinations or any other medical treatments. Instead, Section 655(b)(7)
limits OSHA’s rulemaking authority as follows in pertinent part:
(7) In addition, where appropriate, any such standard shall
prescribe the type and frequency of medical
examinations or other tests which shall be made
available, by the employer or at his cost, to employees
exposed to such hazards in order to most effectively
determine whether the health of such employees is
adversely affected by such exposure.
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (emphasis added). Section 655(b)(7) allows OSHA
to require that certain information about the hazard be given to
employees and that certain medical examinations and other tests be
made available to employees, but Section 655(b)(7) does not grant OSHA
authority to mandate vaccinations or any other medical treatments.
16
Section 655(b)(7) allows OSHA only to prescribe the medical
examinations and other tests that employers should make available to
employees.
Thus,
although
OSHA
can
prescribe
the
medical
examinations and tests which shall be made available to employees by
employers, OSHA does not have statutory authority to compel employees,
or to require employers to compel employees, to submit to such medical
examinations and other tests.
b.
Emergency and Grave Danger: The ETS Does
not Show an Emergency or Address a “Grave
Danger” for a Lower Risk Industry Like
Construction.
The ETS also exceeds OSHA’s authority because the Secretary
cannot adequately show that “employees are exposed to grave danger
from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or
physically harmful or from new hazards.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1) nor that
an emergency exists. This is particularly true in the construction
industry, where most employees perform their work outside or in socially
distant situations while wearing personal protective equipment already
specified by extensive OSHA regulations tailored to the industry. See 29
U.S.C. § 1926; 86 Fed Reg 61412-13 (11/5/2021): “There is no
comprehensive source of nationwide workplace infection data….” So,
17
OSHA relied on anecdotal, unverified state and local reports of workplace
exposures to COVID. A remarkable number of these unvetted “studies”
showed no correlation between COVID and construction work.
In deciding whether to exercise the “extraordinary power” to issue
an ETS, OSHA must determine whether “employees are exposed to grave
danger” in the workplace, and whether an emergency standard including
mandatory vaccination or weekly testing is “necessary” to protect them
from such workplace danger. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c); In re Int’l Chem. Workers
Union, 830 F.2d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Such a determination is
necessarily based upon “‘considerations of policy as well as empirically
verifiable facts.’” Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp., 702 F.2d at 1156
(quoting Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 655 n.62, 65
L. Ed. 2d 1010, 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980)).
Here, OSHA is really attempting to use the ETS as an interim relief
measure—exactly the reason courts have said OSHA may not implement
an ETS. “[T]he ETS statute is not to be used merely as an interim relief
measure but treated as an extraordinary power to be used only in ‘limited
situations’ in which a grave danger exists, and then, to be ‘delicately
exercised.’” Id. (citing Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter,
18
702 F.2d 1150, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); See also Taylor Diving & Salvage
Co., 537 F.2d at 820-21; Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n, 489 F.2d at 129; Dry
Color Mfrs’ Ass’n, 486 F.2d at 104 n.9. “[T]he plain wording of the statute
limits [the court] to assessing the . . . grave danger that the ETS may
alleviate, during the six-month period that is the life of the standard.”
Asbestos Info. Association/N. Am. v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 422 (5th Cir.
1984). “The Agency cannot use its ETS powers as a stop-gap measure.
This would allow it to displace its clear obligations to promulgate rules
after public notice and opportunity for comment in any case, not just in
those in which an ETS is necessary to avert grave danger.” Asbestos, 727
F.2d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 1984). Of course, OSHA did issue an ETS related
to COVID 19 on June 21, 2021, and the six-month period of that ETS
expires on December 21, 2021. OSHA is attempting to extend the sixmonth period on COVID-19 by issuing a new ETS, which is not
authorized by the Act.
Furthermore, COVID-19 cannot be said to be a “grave danger” at
every industry or in every job site in the nation with more than 100
employees. The consequences of COVID-19 depend significantly on the
19
age and the health of the person infected by the virus. 4 Older people and
those with weakened immune systems tend to be the most susceptible
and at risk of death if they contract COVID-19. 5 Younger adults who
perform most construction work, and those who are not immunecompromised are less likely to die or be hospitalized from COVID-19. Id.
Therefore, it is the condition of the individual and their working
conditions that determine whether COVID-19 is a “grave danger”—not
the number of workers at the individual’s company.
c.
Necessity: OSHA Failed to Sufficiently
Explain its Dramatic Change of Position.
When an agency changes its existing position, it must “display
awareness that it is changing position” and “show that there are good
reasons for the new policy.” Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 579
U.S. 211, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124-25 (2016) (quoting FCC v. Fox TV
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)). “In such cases
it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy
CDC, COVID-19 Risks and Vaccine Information for Older Adults
(Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/aging/covid19/covid19-olderadults.html.
4
5
Id.
20
change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts
and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”
Fox Television Stations, supra, at 515-516, 129 S. Ct. 1800. It follows that
an “[u]nexplained inconsistency” in agency policy is “a reason for holding
an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency
practice.” Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. 211, 136 S. Ct. at 2125-26. An
arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort is itself unlawful and
receives no Chevron deference. Id.
The government has indulged in just such arbitrary and capricious
policy flip-flops here. President Biden was opposed to mandatory
vaccinations until he was for them. On January 21, 2021, President
Biden instructed OSHA to prepare an Emergency Temporary Standard
(ETS) to protect worker health and safety from COVID 19. On June 21,
2021, six months later, OSHA issued an ETS to protect healthcare
workers with certain safety measures; however, OSHA did not find a
grave danger to the employees in other industries. Furthermore, OSHA
did not mandate vaccines or weekly testing even for healthcare workers
that had the greatest exposure to COVID-19. On September 9, 2021,
President Biden announced that his “patience was wearing thin” and
21
directed all federal agencies to require vaccines. On November 5, 2021,
OSHA issued a second ETS, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402, directed to all industries
for employers of 100 or more employees to require COVID vaccines or
mandatory weekly testing.
When the government undertakes a dramatic change of course,
from opposition to vaccine mandates to their imposition, Encino suggests
that some sort of explanation is in order. Yet no reasoned explanation
has been offered. See BST Holdings, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33698, at *14
& n.11. In its Motion, OSHA merely asserts that the Delta variant
created a new danger after June 21, 2021, (Doc. 69, p. 14). That
explanation fails because WHO designated the Delta variant as a variant
of concern on May 10, 2021, and the Delta variant already accounted for
a significant percentage of sequenced virus samples in the U.S. as of June
21, 2021. 6 In addition, we are now dealing with the Omicron variant of
COVID, which the “CDC expects that anyone with Omicron infection can
spread the virus to others, even if they are vaccinated or don’t have
symptoms.”7 This certainly impacts the effectiveness of the vaccines.
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/10/health/delta-variant-indiaexplained-coronavirus-intl-cmd/index.html
7 Omicron Variant: What You Need to Know;
6
22
4.
Constitutional Challenges.
a.
Commerce Clause: The Tenth Amendment,
which Encompasses the Police Powers
Reserved to the States, Limits OSHA’s
Authority to Mandate Vaccinations.
Nowhere in the CONSTITUTION is the federal government given
authority to dictate that people must be vaccinated or must submit to any
other medical treatment. 8 It has long been the States’ power to legislate
health—including vaccination. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824)
(noting “health laws of every description” belong to the states); BST
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 2021 WL
5279381, at *7 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43
S. Ct. 24 (1922) (noting that precedent had long “settled that it is within
the police power of a state to provide for compulsory vaccination.
Sometimes “the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional
problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent” for an agency’s action.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549, 132 S. Ct. 2566
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/omicron-variant.html )last
visited December 19, 2021)
Although OSHA relies on the Commerce and Supremacy clauses, those
clauses neither explicitly nor implicitly grant the federal government any
authority over the medical treatment decisions made by the people.
8
23
(2012). With such a history of exclusive State power, this Court should
be certain that Congress intended for OSHA to require vaccinations for
millions of Americans. See Bond, 572 U.S. at 858, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (noting
“it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent
before finding that federal law overrides the usual constitutional balance
of federal and state powers” (internal quotations omitted)).
Despite the plain language of the Tenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court’s continued recognition of the States’ power in matters of
public health, including COVID-19, the ETS claims “to preempt
inconsistent state and local requirements relating to these issues,
including requirements that ban or limit employers’ authority to require
vaccination, face covering, or testing, regardless of the number of
employees.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,551, § 1910.501(a) (Nov. 5, 2021). Yet, how
can federal preemption apply to matters of public health that are within
the police powers reserved to the States? It cannot.
b.
Non-Delegation Doctrine: The Authority
Claimed by OSHA in this Case Represents an
Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power.
As discussed above, The Supreme Court “expect[s] Congress to
speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast
24
economic and political significance.” Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v.
Department of Health and Human Services, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021).
“[O]ur system does not permit agencies to act unlawfully even in pursuit
of desirable ends.” Id. at 2490, citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 582, 585-586, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952) (concluding that
even the Government’s belief that its action “was necessary to avert a
national catastrophe” could not overcome a lack of congressional
authorization). If the major-policy doctrine is violated, then in effect
Congress has unlawfully delegated legislative authority. If the OSH Act
allows the Secretary to impose a COVID-19 vaccine mandate on tens of
millions of Americans – through the “workaround” of forcing the entire
business community to act as the chief enforcers of such a policy, then
the Act allows almost anything. This Court has held the Act must not be
interpreted so broadly, and the CONSTITUTION is violated if that principle
is not sustained here.
II.
ABSENT A STAY, THE OSHA ETS WILL CAUSE
IRREPARABLE HARM IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY.
A stay of the OSHA ETS is necessary because in the absence of a
stay, the ETS will have immediate adverse and irreparable impacts on
25
the construction industry. The ETS forces construction businesses to
come into compliance with massively burdensome obligations even as
they confront workplace shortages, supply chain disruptions, and yearend customer demands. Among these obligations are developing a
mandatory vaccination policy or testing and face-covering policy,
determining the vaccination status of their employees, and informing
employees about the ETS,9 vaccine efficacy and the criminal penalties
associated with providing false information and documentation. 86 Fed.
Reg. at 61,552, 61,554. The ETS will directly cause ABC’s members to
suffer myriad irreparable injuries: enormous nonrecoverable compliance
costs, loss of employees, lost profits, lost sales to competitors who are not
subject to the ETS, and loss of goodwill and reputation control.
A.
Enforcement of the OSHA ETS will Cause
Construction Companies to Lose Irreplaceable
Employees to Businesses that do not Require COVID
Vaccinations or Testing.
Although OSHA claims that employers with more than 100
employees “will have sufficient administrative systems in place to comply
Emergency Temporary Standard – COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing;
Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1918, 1926, and 1928) (hereafter
“ETS”).
9
26
quickly with the ETS[,]” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,403, the agency’s confidence
is unsupported by any data in the construction industry. Even if
employers and their employees can comply with the paperwork and
testing acquisition requirements of the reinstated ETS, ABC’s and IEC’s
member employers are reporting that significant percentages of their
skilled employees will quit or accept termination if the ETS is enforced.
Indeed, studies show that between 38-50% of unvaccinated employees
say they would rather quit than submit to vaccination mandates. 86 Fed.
Reg. at 61,475. These employees are irreplaceable. The construction
industry workforce is inherently transient and mobile, and employees
can and will easily take their services to smaller contractors who are not
as yet covered by the ETS.
This is not mere speculation: ABC’s and IEC’s members, many of
whom are small businesses under SBA guidelines even if they employ
100 or more employees, have been told in no uncertain terms that
significant numbers of their unvaccinated employees will leave if the
mandate is enforced. As one of many examples, the Executive Vice
President of Cajun Industries Holding, LLC, a member of ABC, stated in
a sworn declaration made part of the record in another federal court
27
proceeding that “many of its unvaccinated workers (over half its total
workforce) will quit if they are required to be vaccinated.” State of
Georgia v. Biden, 21-cv-163, slip op. at 14 (S.D. GA. Dec. 7. 2021). And
once this skilled employee exodus starts, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for ABC’s members to replace them. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.
v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182267, 2020
WL 5847503 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (ruling that skilled and unskilled workers
are not “fungible.”)
Moreover, the employers likely to be adversely affected employ
highly skilled trade- and crafts-persons, such as licensed plumbers,
electricians, ironworkers, and welders, for whom replacements simply
are not readily available; indeed, it is projected that the construction
industry already confronts a shortage of 430,000 craft workers in 2021.10
The Construction Industry Needs to Hire an Additional 430,000 Craft
Professionals in 2021, March 23, 2021, ABC News Release. See also
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/construction-worker-shortagehas-reached-crisis-levels/. (The construction industry needs more than
61,000 new hires every month, if we are to keep up with both industry
growth and the loss of workers either through retirement or simply
leaving the sector for good,” said Home Builders Institute CEO Ed
Brady. “From 2022 through 2024, this total represents a need for an
additional 2.2 million new hires for construction. That’s a staggering
number.”).
10
28
OSHA has acknowledged the risk that workers will quit rather than
accept a vaccination or testing requirement but claims that the “data
suggests that the number of employees who actually leave . . . is much
lower.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,475. OSHA speculates that only 1-3% of total
employees will quit because of the mandate. Id. But OSHA’s 1-3%
estimate relies on a single article that summarizes data from health care
workers—in Vermont. Id. at n.42. In short, OSHA’s estimate is not based
in reality.
B.
The ETS Imposes Nonrecoverable Compliance Costs on
Businesses.
ABC and IEC‘s members that have 100 or more employees
immediately face the “irreparable harm” of significant nonrecoverable
compliance costs if they are required to comply with the OSHA ETS. Ala.
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489; see, e.g., Chamber of Com. v.
EPA, 577 U.S. at 1127 (granting stay to prevent nonrecoverable
compliance costs).
The direct costs of ETS compliance are significant. OSHA itself
predicts that compliance will cost employers nearly $3 billion. 86 Fed.
Reg. at 61,493. Indirect costs, such as “testing-related costs [that] are not
included in the [ETS’s] main [cost] analysis,” are equally substantial. 86
29
Fed. Reg. at 61,484. Most states require employers “to pay the cost of a
medical examination” that is necessary “as a condition of employment.”
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 336.220; see Cal. Lab. Code § 222.5 (similar); 820 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 235/1 (similar); Va. Code § 40.1-28 (similar). Although
employers in some other states could theoretically require employees to
pay for their own testing, that prospect is unlikely in this historically
tight labor market. And no matter who pays for the test itself, employers
in every state must pay for “[t]ime spent by an employee in waiting for
and receiving medical attention on the premises or at the direction of the
employer during the employee’s normal working hours.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 785.43 (emphasis added); See Sehie v. City of Aurora, 432 F.3d 749, 751
(7th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s ruling that “time . . . spent
attending and traveling to and from [employer-mandated] counseling
sessions” was compensable under federal wage-and-hour laws, even
though travel and sessions occurred outside of employee’s “normal fortyhour work week”).
If the ETS is ultimately invalidated (and ABC and IEC believe that
it will be invalidated), ABC and IEC’s members will never be able to
recover their compliance costs. Because federal agencies generally
30
possess sovereign immunity from monetary damages claims, “a
regulation later held invalid almost always produces the irreparable
harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510
U.S. at 220-21 (Scalia, J., concurring). Sovereign immunity and other de
facto barriers to monetary recovery against the government have long
been sufficient to convert monetary costs into irreparable harm. See, e.g.,
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1306, 1309 (1987) (Blackmun,
J., in chambers) (paying an unconstitutional state tax is irreparable harm
because “there is a substantial risk [that the Applicants] will not be able
to obtain a refund if the tax ultimately is declared unconstitutional”);
Ledbetter v. Baldwin, 479 U.S. 1309 (1986) (Powell, J., in chambers)
(nonrecoverable administrative costs of complying with an unlawful
court order to restructure state regulations is irreparable harm).
Consequently, this lack of a “guarantee of eventual recovery” makes
compliance costs here irreparable. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at
2489.
Accordingly, preserving the status quo by reinstating the stay of the
OSHA ETS pending review on the merits is vital to allowing the
construction industry to continue its fragile recovery from the pandemic.
31
III. THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS A STAY.
Staying the enforcement of the OSHA ETS is in the public interest.
“From economic uncertainty to workplace strife, the mere specter of the
Mandate has contributed to untold economic upheaval in recent months.”
BST Holdings, 2021 WL 5279381, at *8. “The public interest is also
served by maintaining our constitutional structure and . . . the liberty of
individuals to make intensely personal decisions according to their own
convictions.” Id.
The government would suffer little, if any, harm from maintaining
the “status quo” through the litigation of this case. Georgia v. Biden, No.
21-14269-F (11th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).
Enforcing an unlawful rule is not in the public interest, even in the
context of a public health emergency. “Because OSHA’s authority extends
only to regulating the workplace, the equities embedded in the stay
factors do not extend to the costs to society of having unvaccinated
Americans. They extend only to the risks to workers and companies.” In
re: MCP No. 165, En Banc Order at 30 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting). In any
event, there is no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency
action. As the Supreme Court said in Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, “[i]t is
32
indisputable that the public has a strong interest in combating the spread
of the COVID–19[;]” however, “our system does not permit agencies to act
unlawfully even in pursuit of desirable ends.” 141 S. Ct. at 2490.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ABC and IEC respectfully request an
immediate stay of the effective date of OSHA’s “COVID-19 Vaccination
and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard,” 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov.
5, 2021).
In the alternative, this Court may treat this application as both a
motion to stay and a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment; stay
the ETS pending resolution of Applicants’ petition for review; and set the
case for expedited plenary review.
Respectfully Submitted this 20th day of December 2021.
/s/ J. Larry Stine
J. Larry Stine
Counsel of Record
WIMBERLY LAWSON STECKEL
SCHNEIDER & STINE, PC
3400 Peachtree Road, N.E.
Suite 400 – Lenox Road
Atlanta, GA 30326-1107
404-365-0900 – Phone
404-261-3707 – Fax
jls@wimlaw.com
33
No.: _____________
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________
ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC., ET AL.,
Applicants,
v.
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, AND
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Respondents.
__________
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
__________
As required by Supreme Court Rule 29.5(b), I hereby certify that a
copy of the “Emergency Application of ABC and IEC for Immediate Stay
of Agency Action Pending Disposition of Petition for Review” of the
Occupational
Safety
and
Health
Administration’s
“COVID-19
Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard,” 86 Fed. Reg.
61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021), was served via electronic service on all parties
required and was served on the following via electronic service and
overnight mail:
Elizabeth Prelogar
Solicitor General of the United States
Room 5616
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
34
Washington, DC 20530-0001
Edmund C. Baird
Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health
U.S. Department of Labor
Office of the Solicitor,
Suite S4004
200 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20210
Seema Nanda
Solicitor of Labor
U.S. Department of Labor
Office of the Solicitor,
Suite S4004
200 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20210
DATED: December 20, 2021
/s/ J. Larry Stine
J. Larry Stine
Counsel of Record
35
Appendix 1
APP. 1
61402
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
29 CFR Parts 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918,
1926, and 1928
[Docket No. OSHA–2021–0007]
RIN 1218–AD42
COVID–19 Vaccination and Testing;
Emergency Temporary Standard
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), Department of
Labor.
ACTION: Interim final rule; request for
comments.
SUMMARY: The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) is
issuing an emergency temporary
standard (ETS) to protect unvaccinated
employees of large employers (100 or
more employees) from the risk of
contracting COVID–19 by strongly
encouraging vaccination. Covered
employers must develop, implement,
and enforce a mandatory COVID–19
vaccination policy, with an exception
for employers that instead adopt a
policy requiring employees to either get
vaccinated or elect to undergo regular
COVID–19 testing and wear a face
covering at work in lieu of vaccination.
DATES: The rule is effective November 5,
2021. The incorporation by reference of
certain publications listed in the rule is
approved by the Director of the Federal
Register as of November 5, 2021.
Compliance dates: Compliance dates
for specific provisions are in 29 CFR
1910.501(m).
Comments: Written comments,
including comments on any aspect of
this ETS and whether this ETS should
become a final rule, must be submitted
by December 6, 2021 in Docket No.
OSHA–2021–0007. Comments on the
information collection determination
described in Additional Requirements
(Section V.K. of this preamble) (OMB
review under the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995) may be submitted by
January 4, 2022 in Docket No. OSHA–
2021–0008.
ADDRESSES: In accordance with 28
U.S.C. 2112(a), the Agency designates
Edmund C. Baird, the Associate
Solicitor for Occupational Safety and
Health, Office of the Solicitor, U.S.
Department of Labor, to receive
petitions for review of the ETS. Service
can be accomplished by email to zzSOLCovid19-ETS@dol.gov.
Written comments. You may submit
comments and attachments, identified
by Docket No. OSHA–2021–0007,
electronically at www.regulations.gov,
which is the Federal e-Rulemaking
Portal. Follow the online instructions
for making electronic submissions.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency’s name and the
docket number for this rulemaking
(Docket No. OSHA–2021–0007). All
comments, including any personal
information you provide, are placed in
the public docket without change and
may be made available online at
www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA
cautions commenters about submitting
information they do not want made
available to the public, or submitting
materials that contain personal
information (either about themselves or
others), such as Social Security
Numbers and birthdates.
Docket: To read or download
comments or other material in the
docket, go to Docket No. OSHA–2021–
0007 at www.regulations.gov. All
comments and submissions are listed in
the www.regulations.gov index;
however, some information (e.g.,
copyrighted material) is not publicly
available to read or download through
that website. All comments and
submissions, including copyrighted
material, are available for inspection
through the OSHA Docket Office.
Documents submitted to the docket by
OSHA or stakeholders are assigned
document identification numbers
(Document ID) for easy identification
and retrieval. The full Document ID is
the docket number plus a unique fourdigit code. OSHA is identifying
supporting information in this ETS by
author name and publication year, when
appropriate. This information can be
used to search for a supporting
document in the docket at http://
www.regulations.gov. Contact the OSHA
Docket Office at 202–693–2350 (TTY
number: 877–889–5627) for assistance
in locating docket submissions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
General information and press
inquiries: Contact Frank Meilinger,
OSHA Office of Communications, U.S.
Department of Labor; telephone (202)
693–1999; email OSHAComms@dol.gov.
For technical inquiries: Contact
Andrew Levinson, OSHA Directorate of
Standards and Guidance, U.S.
Department of Labor; telephone (202)
693–1950; email ETS@dol.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
preamble to the ETS on COVID–19
vaccination and testing follows this
outline:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary and Request for
Comment
A. Executive Summary
B. Request for Comment
II. Pertinent Legal Authority
III. Rationale for the ETS
A. Grave Danger
B. Need for the ETS
IV. Feasibility
A. Technological Feasibility
B. Economic Analysis
V. Additional Requirements
VI. Summary and Explanation
A. Purpose
B. Scope and Application
C. Definitions
D. Employer Policy on Vaccination
E. Determination of Employee Vaccination
Status
F. Employer Support for Employee
Vaccination
G. COVID–19 Testing for Employees Who
Are Not Fully Vaccinated
H. Employee Notification to Employer of a
Positive COVID–19 Test and Removal
I. Face Coverings
J. Information Provided to Employees
K. Reporting COVID–19 Fatalities and
Hospitalizations to OSHA
L. Availability of Records
M. Dates
N. Severability
O. Incorporation by Reference
VII. Authority and Signature
I. Executive Summary and Request for
Comment
A. Executive Summary
This ETS is based on the requirements
of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSH Act or Act) and legal
precedent arising under the Act. Under
section 6(c)(1) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.
655(c)(1), OSHA shall issue an ETS if
the agency determines that employees
are subject to grave danger from
exposure to substances or agents
determined to be toxic or physically
harmful or from new hazards, and an
ETS is necessary to protect employees
from such danger. These legal
requirements are more fully discussed
in Pertinent Legal Authority (Section II.
of this preamble). This ETS does not
apply to workplaces subject to E.O.
14042 on Requiring Coronavirus Disease
2019 Vaccination for Federal
Contractors. In addition, OSHA will
treat federal agencies’ compliance with
E.O. 14043, and the Safer Federal
Workforce Task Force guidance issued
under section 4(e) of Executive Order
13991 and section 2 of Executive Order
14043, as sufficient to meet their
obligations under the OSH Act and E.O.
12196.
COVID–19 has killed over 725,000
people in the United States in less than
two years, and infected millions more
(CDC, October 18, 2021—Cumulative
US Deaths). The pandemic continues to
affect workers and workplaces. While
COVID–19 vaccines authorized or
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approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) effectively protect
vaccinated individuals against severe
illness and death from COVID–19,
unvaccinated individuals remain at
much higher risk of severe health
outcomes from COVID–19. Further,
unvaccinated workers are much more
likely to contract and transmit COVID–
19 in the workplace than vaccinated
workers. OSHA has determined that
many employees in the U.S. who are not
fully vaccinated against COVID–19 face
grave danger from exposure to SARS–
CoV–2 in the workplace. This finding of
grave danger is based on the severe
health consequences associated with
exposure to the virus along with
evidence demonstrating the
transmissibility of the virus in the
workplace and the prevalence of
infections in employee populations, as
discussed in Grave Danger (Section
III.A. of this preamble).
OSHA has also determined that an
ETS is necessary to protect
unvaccinated workers from the risk of
contracting COVID–19 at work, as
discussed in Need for the ETS (Section
III.B. of this preamble). At the present
time, workers are becoming seriously ill
and dying as a result of occupational
exposures to COVID–19, when a simple
measure, vaccination, can largely
prevent those deaths and illnesses. The
ETS protects these workers through the
most effective and efficient control
available—vaccination—and further
protects workers who remain
unvaccinated through required regular
testing, use of face coverings, and
removal of all infected employees from
the workplace. OSHA also concludes,
based on its enforcement experience
during the pandemic to date, that
continued reliance on existing standards
and regulations, the General Duty
Clause of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.
654(a)(1), and workplace guidance, in
lieu of an ETS, is not adequate to protect
unvaccinated employees from the grave
danger of being infected by, and
suffering death or serious health
consequences from, COVID–19.
OSHA will continue to monitor trends
in COVID–19 infections and death as
more of the workforce and the general
population become fully vaccinated
against COVID–19 and the pandemic
continues to evolve. Where OSHA finds
a grave danger from the virus no longer
exists for the covered workforce (or
some portion thereof), or new
information indicates a change in
measures necessary to address the grave
danger, OSHA will update this ETS, as
appropriate.
This ETS applies to employers with a
total of 100 or more employees at any
time the standard is in effect. In light of
the unique occupational safety and
health dangers presented by COVID–19,
and against the backdrop of the
uncertain economic environment of a
pandemic, OSHA is proceeding in a
stepwise fashion in addressing the
emergency this rule covers. OSHA is
confident that employers with 100 or
more employees have the administrative
capacity to implement the standard’s
requirements promptly, but is less
confident that smaller employers can do
so without undue disruption. OSHA
needs additional time to assess the
capacity of smaller employers, and is
seeking comment to help the agency
make that determination. Nonetheless,
the agency is acting to protect workers
now in adopting a standard that will
reach two-thirds of all private-sector
workers in the nation, including those
working in the largest facilities, where
the most deadly outbreaks of COVID–19
can occur.
The agency has also evaluated the
feasibility of this ETS and has
determined that the requirements of the
ETS are both economically and
technologically feasible, as outlined in
Feasibility (Section IV. of this
preamble). The specific requirements of
the ETS are outlined and described in
Summary and Explanation (Section VI.
of this preamble).
B. Request for Comment
Although this ETS takes effect
immediately, it also serves as a proposal
under Section 6(b) of the OSH Act (29
U.S.C. 655(b)) for a final standard.
Accordingly, OSHA seeks comment on
all aspects of this ETS and whether it
should be adopted as a final standard.
OSHA encourages commenters to
explain why they prefer or disfavor
particular policy choices, and include
any relevant studies, experiences,
anecdotes or other information that may
help support the comment. In
particular, OSHA seeks comments on
the following topics:
1. Employers with fewer than 100
employees. As noted above and fully
discussed in the Summary and
Explanation for Scope and Application
(Section VI.B. of this preamble), OSHA
has implemented a 100-employee
threshold for the requirements of this
standard to focus the ETS on companies
that OSHA is confident will have
sufficient administrative systems in
place to comply quickly with the ETS.
The agency is moving in a stepwise
fashion on the short timeline
necessitated by the danger presented by
COVID–19 while soliciting stakeholder
comment and additional information to
determine whether to adjust the scope
61403
of the ETS to address smaller employers
in the future. OSHA seeks information
about the ability of employers with
fewer than 100 employees to implement
COVID–19 vaccination and/or testing
programs. Have you instituted
vaccination mandates (with or without
alternatives), or requirements for regular
COVID–19 testing or face covering use?
What have been the benefits of your
approach? What challenges have you
had or could you foresee in
implementing such programs? Is there
anything specific to your industry, or
the size of your business, that poses
particular obstacles in implementing the
requirements in this standard? How
much time would it take, what types of
costs would you incur, and how much
would it cost for you to implement such
requirements?
2. Significant Risk. If OSHA were to
finalize a rule based on this ETS, it
would be a standard adopted under 6(b)
of the OSH Act, which requires a
finding of significant risk from exposure
to COVID–19. As discussed more fully
in Pertinent Legal Authority (Section II.
of this preamble), this is a lower
showing of risk than grave danger, the
finding required to issue a 6(c)
emergency temporary standard. How
should the scope of the rule change to
address the significant risk posed by
COVID–19 in the workplace? Should
portions of the rule, such as face
coverings, apply to fully vaccinated
persons?
3. Prior COVID–19 infections. OSHA
determined that workers who have been
infected with COVID–19 but have not
been fully vaccinated still face a grave
danger from workplace exposure to
SARS–CoV–2. This is an area of ongoing
scientific inquiry. Given scientific
uncertainty and limitations in testing for
infection and immunity, OSHA is
concerned that it would be infeasible for
employers to operationalize a standard
that would permit or require an
exception from vaccination or testing
and face covering based on prior
infection with COVID–19. Is there
additional scientific information on this
topic that OSHA should consider as it
determines whether to proceed with a
permanent rule?
In particular, what scientific criteria
can be used to determine whether a
given employee is sufficiently protected
against reinfection? Are there any
temporal limits associated with this
criteria to account for potential
reductions in immunity over time? Do
you require employees to provide
verification of infection with COVID–
19? If so, what kinds of verification do
you accept (i.e., PCR testing, antigen
testing, etc.)? What challenges have you
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experienced, if any, in operationalizing
such an exception?
4. Experience with COVID–19
vaccination policies. Should OSHA
impose a strict vaccination mandate
(i.e., all employers required to
implement mandatory vaccination
policies as defined in this ETS) with no
alternative compliance option? OSHA
seeks information on COVID–19
vaccination policies that employers
have implemented to protect workers. If
you have implemented a COVID–19
vaccination policy:
(a) When did you implement it, and
what does your policy require? Was
vaccination mandatory or voluntary
under the policy? Do you offer
vaccinations on site? What costs
associated with vaccination did you
cover under the policy? What
percentage of your workforce was
vaccinated as a result? Do you offer paid
leave for receiving a vaccination? If
vaccination is mandatory, have
employees been resistant and if so what
steps were required to enforce the
policy?
(b) How did you verify that employees
were vaccinated? Are there other
reliable means of vaccination
verification not addressed by the ETS
that should be included? Did you allow
attestation where the employee could
not find other proof, and if so, have you
experienced any difficulties with this
approach? Have you experienced any
issues with falsified records of
vaccination, and if so, how did you deal
with them?
(c) Have you experienced a decrease
in infection rates or outbreaks after
implementing this policy?
(d) If you have received any requests
for reasonable accommodation from
vaccination, what strategies did you
implement to address the
accommodation and ensure worker
safety (e.g., telework, working in
isolation, regular testing and the use of
face coverings)?
5. COVID–19 testing and removal.
OSHA seeks information on COVID–19
testing and removal practices
implemented to protect workers.
(a) Do you have a testing and removal
policy in your workplace and, if so,
what does it require? How often do you
require testing and what types of testing
do you use (e.g., at-home tests, tests
performed at laboratories, tests
performed at your worksites)? What
costs have you incurred as part of your
testing and removal policies? Do you
have difficulty in finding adequate
availability of tests? How often? Have
you experienced any issues with
falsified test results, and if so, how did
you deal with them? Have you
experienced other difficulties in
implementing a testing and removal
scheme, including the length of time to
obtain COVID–19 test results? Do you
offer paid leave for testing?
(b) How often have you detected and
removed COVID–19 positive employees
from the workplace under this policy?
Do you provide paid leave and job
protection to employees you remove for
this reason?
(c) Should OSHA require testing more
often than on a weekly basis?
6. Face coverings. As discussed in the
Summary and Explanation for Face
Coverings (Section VI.I. of this
preamble), ASTM released a
specification standard on February 15,
2021, to establish a national standard
baseline for barrier face coverings
(ASTM F3502–21). Should OSHA
require the use of face coverings
meeting the ASTM F3502–21 standard
instead of the face coverings specified
by the ETS? If so, should OSHA also
require that such face coverings meet
the NIOSH Workplace Performance or
Workplace Performance Plus criteria
(see CDC, September 23, 2021)? Are
there particular workplace settings in
which face coverings meeting one
standard should be favored over
another? Are there alternative criteria
OSHA should consider for face
coverings instead of the F3502–21
standard or NIOSH Workplace
Performance or Workplace Performance
Plus criteria? Is there sufficient capacity
to supply face coverings meeting
F3502–01 and/or NIOSH Workplace
Performance or Workplace Performance
Plus criteria to all employees covered by
the ETS? What costs have you incurred
as part of supplying employees with
face coverings meeting the appropriate
criteria?
7. Other controls. This ETS requires
employees to either be fully vaccinated
against COVID–19 or be tested weekly
and wear face coverings, based on the
type of policy their employer adopts. It
stops short of requiring the full suite of
workplace controls against SARS–CoV–
2 transmission recommended by OSHA
and the CDC, including distancing,
barriers, ventilation, and sanitation. As
OSHA explained in Need for the ETS
(Section III.B. of this preamble), OSHA
has determined that it needs more
information before imposing these
requirements on the entire scope of
industries and employers covered by the
standard. OSHA is interested in hearing
from employers about their experience
in implementing a full suite of
workplace controls against COVID–19.
What measures have you taken to
protect employees against COVID–19 in
your workplace? Are there controls that
you attempted to employ but found
ineffective or infeasible? What are they?
Why did you conclude that they were
they ineffective or infeasible; for
example, are there particular aspects of
your workplace or industry that make
certain controls infeasible? Do you
require both fully vaccinated and
unvaccinated employees to comply with
these controls? Have you experienced a
reduction in infection rates or outbreaks
since implementing these controls?
8. Educational materials. Have you
implemented any policies or provided
any information that has been helpful in
encouraging an employee to be
vaccinated?
9. Feasibility and health impacts. Do
you have any experience or data that
would inform OSHA’s estimates in its
economic feasibility analysis or any of
the assumptions or estimates used in
OSHA’s identification of the number of
hospitalizations prevented and lives
saved from its health impacts analysis
(see OSHA, October 2021c)?
References
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). (2021, October 18). COVID Data
Tracker. https://covid.cdc.gov/coviddata-tracker/. (CDC, October 18, 2021)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). (2021, September 23). Types of
Masks and Respirators. https://
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/
prevent-getting-sick/types-of-masks.html.
(CDC, September 23, 2021)
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA). (2021c,
October). Health Impacts of the COVID–
19 Vaccination and Testing ETS. (OSHA,
October 2021c)
II. Pertinent Legal Authority
The purpose of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH
Act), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., is ‘‘to assure
so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to
preserve our human resources.’’ 29
U.S.C. 651(b). To this end, Congress
authorized the Secretary of Labor
(Secretary) to promulgate and enforce
occupational safety and health
standards under sections 6(b) and (c) of
the OSH Act.1 29 U.S.C. 655(b). These
provisions provide bases for issuing
occupational safety and health
standards under the Act. Once OSHA
has established as a threshold matter
that a health standard is necessary
under section 6(b) or (c)—i.e., to reduce
1 The Secretary has delegated most of his duties
under the OSH Act to the Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
Secretary’s Order 08–2020, 85 FR 58393 (Sept. 18,
2020). This section uses the terms Secretary and
OSHA interchangeably.
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a significant risk of material health
impairment, or a grave danger to
employee health—the Act gives the
Secretary ‘‘almost unlimited discretion
to devise means to achieve the
congressionally mandated goal’’ of
protecting employee health, subject to
the constraints of feasibility. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647
F.2d 1189, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A
standard’s individual requirements need
only be ‘‘reasonably related’’ to the
purpose of ensuring a safe and healthful
working environment. Id. at 1237, 1241;
see also Forging Indus. Ass’n v. Sec’y of
Labor, 773 F.2d 1436, 1447 (4th Cir.
1985). OSHA’s authority to regulate
employers is hedged by constitutional
considerations and, pursuant to section
4(b)(1) of the OSH Act, the regulations
and enforcement policies of other
federal agencies. See, e.g., Chao v.
Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235,
241 (2002).
The OSH Act in section 6(c)(1) states
that the Secretary ‘‘shall’’ issue an
emergency temporary standard (ETS)
upon a finding that the ETS is necessary
to address a grave danger to workers.
See 29 U.S.C. 655(c). In particular, the
Secretary shall provide, without regard
to the requirements of chapter 5, title 5,
United States Code, for an emergency
temporary standard to take immediate
effect upon publication in the Federal
Register if the Secretary makes two
determinations: That employees are
exposed to grave danger from exposure
to substances or agents determined to be
toxic or physically harmful or from new
hazards, and that such emergency
standard is necessary to protect
employees from such danger. 29 U.S.C.
655(c)(1). A separate section of the OSH
Act, section 8(c), authorizes the
Secretary to prescribe regulations
requiring employers to make, keep, and
preserve records that are necessary or
appropriate for the enforcement of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. 657(c)(1). Section 8(c)
also provides that the Secretary shall
require employers to keep records of,
and report, work-related deaths and
illnesses. 29 U.S.C. 657(c)(2).
The ETS provision, section 6(c)(1),
exempts the Secretary from procedural
requirements contained in the OSH Act
and the Administrative Procedure Act,
including those for public notice,
comments, and a rulemaking hearing.
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(3); 5 U.S.C.
552, 553.
The Secretary must issue an ETS in
situations where employees are exposed
to a ‘‘grave danger’’ and immediate
action is necessary to protect those
employees from such danger. 29 U.S.C.
655(c)(1); Pub. Citizen Health Research
Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1156
(D.C. Cir. 1983). The determination of
what exact level of risk constitutes a
‘‘grave danger’’ is a ‘‘policy
consideration that belongs, in the first
instance, to the Agency.’’ Asbestos Info.
Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 425 (accepting
OSHA’s determination that eighty lives
at risk over six months was a grave
danger); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v.
Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655
n.62 (1980). However, a ‘‘grave danger’’
represents a risk greater than the
‘‘significant risk’’ that OSHA must show
in order to promulgate a permanent
standard under section 6(b) of the OSH
Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(b). Int’l Union,
United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr.
Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Donovan, 590 F. Supp. 747, 755–56
(D.D.C. 1984), adopted, 756 F.2d 162
(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Indus. Union
Dep’t, AFL–CIO, 448 U.S. at 640 n.45
(noting the distinction between the
standard for risk findings in permanent
standards and ETSs).
In determining the type of health
effects that may constitute a ‘‘grave
danger’’ under the OSH Act, the Fifth
Circuit emphasized ‘‘the danger of
incurable, permanent, or fatal
consequences to workers, as opposed to
easily curable and fleeting effects on
their health.’’ Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n,
Inc. v. U. S. Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d
120, 132 (5th Cir. 1974). Although the
findings of grave danger and necessity
must be based on evidence of ‘‘actual,
prevailing industrial conditions,’’ see
Int’l Union, 590 F. Supp. at 751, when
OSHA determines that exposure to a
particular hazard would pose a grave
danger to workers, OSHA can assume an
exposure to a grave danger wherever
that hazard is present in a workplace.
Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 102 n.3 (3d Cir.
1973).
In demonstrating whether OSHA had
shown that an ETS is necessary, the
Fifth Circuit considered whether OSHA
had another available means of
addressing the risk that would not
require an ETS. Asbestos Info. Ass’n,
727 F.2d at 426 (holding that necessity
had not been proven where OSHA could
have increased enforcement of alreadyexisting standards to address the grave
risk to workers from asbestos exposure).
Additionally, a standard must be both
economically and technologically
feasible in order to be ‘‘reasonably
necessary and appropriate’’ under
section 3(8) and, by inference,
‘‘necessary’’ under section 6(c)(1)(B) of
the Act. Cf. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc.
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 n.31
(1981) (noting ‘‘any standard that was
not economically or technologically
feasible would a fortiori not be
61405
‘reasonably necessary or appropriate’ ’’
as required by the OSH Act’s definition
of ‘‘occupational safety and health
standard’’ in section 3(8)); see also
Florida Peach Growers, 489 F.2d at 130
(recognizing that the promulgation of
any standard, including an ETS, must
account for its economic effect).
However, given that section 6(c) is
aimed at enabling OSHA to protect
workers in emergency situations, the
agency is not required to make a
feasibility showing with the same rigor
as in ordinary section 6(b) rulemaking.
Asbestos Info. Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 424
n.18.
On judicial review of an ETS, OSHA
is entitled to great deference on the
determinations of grave danger and
necessity required under section 6(c)(1).
See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research
Grp., 702 F.2d at 1156; Asbestos Info.
Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 422 (judicial review
of these legislative determinations
requires deference to the agency); cf.
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d
823, 831 (7th Cir. 1993) (‘‘the duty of a
reviewing court of generalist judges is
merely to patrol the boundary of
reasonableness’’). These determinations
are ‘‘essentially legislative and rooted in
inferences from complex scientific and
factual data.’’ Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp., 702 F.2d at 1156. The
agency is not required to support its
conclusions ‘‘with anything
approaching scientific certainty,’’ Indus.
Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO, 448 U.S. at 656,
and has the ‘‘prerogative to choose
between conflicting evidence.’’ Asbestos
Info. Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 425.
The determinations of the Secretary in
issuing standards under section 6 of the
OSH Act, including ETSs, must be
affirmed if supported by ‘‘substantial
evidence in the record considered as a
whole.’’ 29 U.S.C. 655(f). The Supreme
Court described substantial evidence as
‘‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’’ Am. Textile
Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 522–23 (quoting
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 477 (1951)). The Court also
noted that ‘‘the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s finding from
being supported by substantial
evidence.’’ Id. at 523 (quoting Consolo
v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). The
Fifth Circuit, recognizing the size and
complexity of the rulemaking record
before it in the case of OSHA’s ETS for
organophosphorus pesticides, stated
that a court’s function in reviewing an
ETS to determine whether it meets the
substantial evidence standard is
‘‘basically [to] determine whether the
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Secretary carried out his essentially
legislative task in a manner reasonable
under the state of the record before
him.’’ Fla Peach Growers Ass’n, 489
F.2d at 129.
Although Congress waived the
ordinary rulemaking procedures in the
interest of ‘‘permitting rapid action to
meet emergencies,’’ section 6(e) of the
OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(e), requires
OSHA to include a statement of reasons
for its action when it issues any
standard. Dry Color Mfrs., 486 F.2d at
105–06 (finding OSHA’s statement of
reasons inadequate). By requiring the
agency to articulate its reasons for
issuing an ETS, the requirement acts as
‘‘an essential safeguard to emergency
temporary standard-setting.’’ Id. at 106.
However, the Third Circuit noted that it
did not require justification of ‘‘every
substance, type of use or production
technique,’’ but rather a ‘‘general
explanation’’ of why the standard is
necessary. Id. at 107.
ETSs are, by design, temporary in
nature. Under section 6(c)(3), an ETS
serves as a proposal for a permanent
standard in accordance with section 6(b)
of the OSH Act (permanent standards),
and the Act calls for the permanent
standard to be finalized within six
months after publication of the ETS. 29
U.S.C. 655(c)(3); see Fla. Peach Growers
Ass’n, 489 F.2d at 124. The ETS is
effective ‘‘until superseded by a
standard promulgated in accordance
with’’ section 6(c)(3). 29 U.S.C.
655(c)(2).
Section 6(c)(1) states that the
Secretary ‘‘shall’’ provide for an ETS
when OSHA makes the prerequisite
findings of grave danger and necessity.
See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp.,
702 F.2d at 1156 (noting the mandatory
language of section 6(c)). OSHA is
entitled to great deference in its
determinations, and it must also
account for ‘‘the fact that ‘the interests
at stake are not merely economic
interests in a license or a rate structure,
but personal interests in life and
health.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Wellford v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
When OSHA issues a standard
pursuant to section 6—whether
permanent or an ETS—section 18 of the
OSH Act provides that OSHA’s standard
preempts any state occupational safety
or health standard ‘‘relating to [the
same] occupational safety or health
issue’’ as the Federal standard. 29 U.S.C.
667(b); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 97
(1992). A state can avoid preemption
only if it submits, and receives Federal
approval for, a state plan for the
development and enforcement of
standards pursuant to section 18 of the
Act, which must be ‘‘at least as
effective’’ as the Federal standards. 29
U.S.C. 667; Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry,
125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997).
However, the OSH Act does not
preempt state laws of ‘‘general
applicability’’ that regulate workers and
non-workers alike, so long as they do
not conflict with an OSHA standard.
Gade, 505 U.S. at 107.
As discussed in detail elsewhere in
this preamble, OSHA has determined
that a grave danger exists necessitating
a new ETS (see Grave Danger and Need
for the ETS, Sections III.A. and III.B. of
this preamble), and that compliance
with this ETS is feasible for covered
employers (see Feasibility, Section IV. of
this preamble). OSHA has also provided
a more detailed explanation of each
provision of this ETS in Summary and
Explanation (Section VI. of this
preamble). In addition, OSHA wishes to
provide here some general guidance on
its legal authority to regulate COVID–19
hazards, and for particular provisions of
this ETS.
As a threshold matter, OSHA’s
authority to regulate workplace
exposure to biological hazards like
SARS–CoV–2 is well-established.
Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act uses
similar language to section 6(c)(1)(A):
The former sets forth requirements for
promulgating permanent standards
addressing ‘‘toxic materials or harmful
physical agents,’’ and the latter
authorizes OSHA to promulgate an ETS
addressing ‘‘substances or agents
determined to be toxic or physically
harmful’’ (as well as ‘‘new hazards’’).
OSHA has consistently identified
biological hazards similar to SARS–
CoV–2, as well as SARS–CoV–2 itself, to
be ‘‘toxic materials or harmful physical
agents’’ under the Act. Indeed, in its
exposure and medical records access
regulation, OSHA has defined ‘‘toxic
materials or harmful physical agents’’ to
include ‘‘any . . . biological agent
(bacteria, virus, fungus, etc.)’’ for which
there is evidence that it poses a chronic
or acute health hazard. 29 CFR
1910.1020(c)(13). And in addition to
previously regulating exposure to
SARS–CoV–2 as a new and physically
harmful agent in the Healthcare ETS
(see, e.g., 86 FR at 32381), OSHA has
also previously regulated biological
hazards like SARS–CoV–2 as health
hazards under section 6(b)(5), for
example in the Bloodborne Pathogens
(BBP) standard, 29 CFR 1910.1030,
which addresses workplace exposure to
HIV and Hepatitis B. The BBP standard
was upheld (except as to application in
certain limited industries) in American
Dental Association, which observed that
‘‘the infectious character’’ of the
regulated bloodborne diseases might
warrant ‘‘more regulation than would be
necessary in the case of a
noncommunicable disease.’’ 984 F.2d at
826. In addition, in the preamble to the
respiratory protection standard, 29 CFR
1910.134, which was also promulgated
under section 6(b)(5), ‘‘OSHA
emphasize[d] that [the] respiratory
protection standard does apply to
biological hazards.’’ Respiratory
Protection, 63 FR 1152–01, 1180 (Jan. 8,
1998) (citing Mahone Grain Corp., 10
BNA OSHC 1275 (No. 77–3041, 1981)).
In addition to being a physically
harmful agent covered by section
6(c)(1)(A), SARS–CoV–2 is also, without
question, a ‘‘new hazard’’ covered by
this provision, as discussed in more
detail in Grave Danger (Section III.A. of
this preamble). SARS–CoV–2 was not
known to exist until January 2020, and
since then more than 725,000 people
have died from COVID–19 in the U.S.
alone (CDC, October 18, 2021—
Cumulative US Deaths).
Turning to specific provisions of this
standard, the vaccination requirements
in this ETS are also well within the
bounds of OSHA’s authority.
Vaccination can be a critical tool in the
pursuit of health and safety goals,
particularly in response to an infectious
and highly communicable disease. See,
e.g., Jacobson v. Commonwealth of
Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27–28 (1905)
(recognizing use of smallpox vaccine as
a reasonable measure to protect public
health and safety); Klaassen v. Trustees
of Ind. Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir.
2021) (citing Jacobson and noting that
vaccination may be an appropriate
safety measure against SARS–CoV–2 as
‘‘[v]accination protects not only the
vaccinated persons but also those who
come in contact with them’’). And the
OSH Act itself explicitly acknowledges
that such treatments might be necessary,
in some circumstances. 29 U.S.C.
669(a)(5) (providing in the Act’s
provisions on research and related
activities conducted by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to aid
OSHA in its formulation of health and
safety standards that ‘‘[n]othing in this
or any other provision of this Act shall
be deemed to authorize or require
medical examination, immunization, or
treatment for those who object thereto
on religious grounds, except where such
is necessary for the protection of the
health or safety of others.’’ (emphasis
added)). In recognition of the health and
safety benefits provided by vaccination,
OSHA has previously exercised its
authority to promulgate vaccine-related
requirements in the COVID–19
Healthcare ETS (29 CFR 1910.502(m))
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and the BBP standard (29 CFR
1910.1030(f)). The BBP standard
illustrates congressional understanding
that the statutory delegation of authority
to OSHA to issue standards includes
authority for vaccine provisions, where
appropriate. See Public Law 102–170,
Title I, Section 100, 105 Stat. 1107
(1991) (directing OSHA to complete the
BBP rulemaking by a date certain, and
providing that if OSHA did not do so,
the proposed rule, which included a
vaccine provision, would become the
final standard).
Additionally, OSHA’s authority to
require employers to bear the costs of
particular provisions of a standard is
solidly grounded in the OSH Act. The
Act reflects Congress’s determination
that the costs of compliance with the
Act and OSHA standards are part of the
cost of doing business and OSHA may
foreclose employers from shifting those
costs to employees. See Am. Textile
Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 514; Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. OSHRC, 725 F.2d 1237,
1239–40 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Sec’y
of Labor v. Beverly Healthcare-Hillview,
541 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2008). Consistent
with this authority, OSHA has largely
required employers to bear the costs of
the provisions of this ETS, including the
typical costs associated with
vaccination. The allocation of
vaccination costs to employers in this
ETS is similar to OSHA’s treatment of
vaccine-related costs in the COVID–19
Healthcare ETS and the BBP standards.
See 29 CFR 1910.502(m), (p); 29 CFR
1910.1030(f)(1)(ii)(A).
The OSH Act provides OSHA with
discretion, however, to decide whether
to impose certain costs—such as those
related to medical examinations or other
tests—on employers ‘‘[w]here [it
determines that such costs are]
appropriate.’’ 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(7). OSHA
has determined that for purposes of this
ETS, it would not be ‘‘appropriate’’ to
impose on employers any costs
associated with COVID–19 testing for
employees who choose not to be
vaccinated. For most of the agency’s
existing standards containing medical
testing and removal provisions, OSHA
has found it necessary to impose the
costs of such provisions on employers
in order to remove barriers to employee
participation in medical examinations
that are critical to effectuating the
standards’ safety and health protections.
See United Steelworkers of Am., 647
F.2d at 1229–31, 1237–38. However, as
explained in greater detail elsewhere in
this preamble (see Need for the ETS,
Section III.B. of this preamble), the
ETS’s safety and health protections are
best effectuated by employee
vaccination, not testing. Accordingly,
OSHA only requires employers to bear
the costs of employee compliance with
the preferred, and more protective,
vaccination provision, but not costs
associated with testing. The agency does
not believe it appropriate to impose the
costs of testing on an employer where
an employee has made an individual
choice to pursue a less protective
option. For the same reasons, OSHA has
also determined that it is not
appropriate to require employers to pay
for face coverings for employees who
choose not to be vaccinated.2
Finally, the Act and its legislative
history ‘‘both demonstrate
unmistakably’’ OSHA’s authority to
require employers to temporarily
remove workers from the workplace to
prevent exposure to a health hazard.
United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at
1230. And again, this is an authority
OSHA has repeatedly exercised in prior
standards, including in: COVID–19
Healthcare ETS (29 CFR 1910.502); Lead
(29 CFR 1910.1025); Cadmium (29 CFR
1910.1027); Benzene (29 CFR
1910.1028); Formaldehyde (29 CFR
1910.1048); Methylenedianiline (29 CFR
1910.1050); Methylene Chloride (29
CFR 1910.1052); and Beryllium (29 CFR
1910.1024). It is equally appropriate to
impose that obligation here.
For all of these reasons, as well as
those explained more fully in other
areas of this preamble, OSHA has the
authority—and obligation—to
promulgate this ETS.
References
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC). (2021, October 18). COVID Data
Tracker. https://covid.cdc.gov/coviddata-tracker/. (CDC, October 18, 2021)
III. Rationale for the ETS
A. Grave Danger
I. Introduction
Section 6(c)(1) of the OSH Act
requires the Secretary to issue an ETS in
situations where employees are exposed
to a ‘‘grave danger’’ and immediate
action is necessary to protect those
employees from such danger (29 U.S.C.
655(c)(1)). Consistent with its legal
duties, OSHA is issuing this ETS to
address the grave danger posed by
occupational exposure to SARS–CoV–2,
2 OSHA notes that while the ETS does not impose
these testing or face covering costs on employers,
in some circumstances employers may be required
to pay for the costs related to testing and/or face
coverings by other laws, regulations, or collectively
negotiated agreements. OSHA has no authority
under the OSH Act to determine whether such
obligations under other laws, regulations, or
agreements might exist.
61407
the virus that causes COVID–19.3 OSHA
has determined that occupational
exposure to SARS–CoV–2, including the
Delta variant (B.1.617.2 and AY
lineages), presents a grave danger to
unvaccinated workers in the U.S., with
several exceptions explained below.4
This finding of grave danger is based on
the science of how the virus spreads, the
transmissibility of the disease in
workplaces, and the serious adverse
health effects, including death, that can
be suffered by those who are diagnosed
with COVID–19. The protections of this
ETS—which will apply, with some
limitations, to a broad range of
workplace settings where exposure to
SARS–CoV–2 may occur—are designed
to protect employees from infection
with SARS–CoV–2 and from the dire,
sometimes fatal, consequences of such
infection.
The fact that COVID–19 is not a
uniquely work-related hazard does not
change the determination that it is a
grave danger to which employees are
exposed, nor does it excuse employers
from their duty to protect employees
from the occupational transmission of
SARS–CoV–2. The OSH Act is intended
to ‘‘assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation
safe and healthful working conditions’’
(29 U.S.C. 651(b)), and there is nothing
in the Act to suggest that its protections
do not extend to hazards which might
occur outside of the workplace as well
as within. Indeed, COVID–19 is not the
first hazard that OSHA has regulated
that occurs both inside and outside the
workplace. For example, the hazard of
noise is not unique to the workplace,
but the Fourth Circuit has upheld
OSHA’s Occupational Noise Exposure
standard (29 CFR 1910.95) (Forging
Industry Ass’n v. Sec’ of Labor, 773 F.2d
1437, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985)). Diseases
caused by bloodborne pathogens,
including HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B, are
also not unique to the workplace, but
the Seventh Circuit upheld the majority
of OSHA’s Bloodborne Pathogens
standard (29 CFR 1910.1030) (Am.
Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823
(7th Cir. 1993)). OSHA’s Sanitation
3 OSHA is defining the grave danger as workplace
exposure to SARS–CoV–2, the virus that causes the
development of COVID–19. COVID–19 is the
disease that can occur in people exposed to SARSCoV–2, and that leads to the health effects
described in this section. This distinction applies
despite OSHA’s use of the terms SARS–CoV–2 and
COVID–19 interchangeably in some parts of this
preamble.
4 OSHA refers to the grave danger from
occupational exposure to SARS–CoV–2 throughout
this document. Those references are intended to
encompass exposure to SARS–CoV–2 and all
variants of SARS–CoV–2, including the Delta
variant.
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standard, 29 CFR 1910.141, which
requires measures such as cleaning,
waste disposal, potable water, toilets,
and washing facilities, addresses
hazards that exist everywhere—both
within and outside of workplaces.
Moreover, employees have more
freedom to control their environment
outside of work, and to make decisions
about their behavior and their contact
with others to better minimize their risk
of exposure. However, during the
workday, while under the control of
their employer, workers may have little
ability to limit contact with coworkers,
clients, members of the public, patients,
and others, any one of whom could
represent a source of exposure to SARS–
CoV–2. OSHA has a mandate to protect
employees from hazards they are
exposed to at work, even if they may be
exposed to similar hazards outside of
work.
As described above in Pertinent Legal
Authority (Section II. of this preamble),
‘‘grave danger’’ indicates a risk that is
more than ‘‘significant’’ (Int’l Union,
United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr.
Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Donovan, 590 F. Supp. 747, 755–56
(D.D.C. 1984); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–
CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 640 n.45, 655 (1980) (stating that a
rate of 1 worker in 1,000 workers
suffering a given health effect
constitutes a ‘‘significant’’ risk)). ‘‘Grave
danger,’’ according to one court, refers
to ‘‘the danger of incurable, permanent,
or fatal consequences to workers, as
opposed to easily curable and fleeting
effects on their health’’ (Fla. Peach
Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 132 (5th Cir.
1974)). Fleeting effects were described
as nausea, excessive salivation,
perspiration, or blurred vision and were
considered so minor that they often
went unreported; these effects are in
stark contrast with the adverse health
effects of COVID–19 infections, which
are formally referenced as ranging from
‘‘mild’’ to ‘‘critical,’’ 5 but which can
involve significant illness, hospital
stays, ICU care, death, and long-term
health complications for survivors.
Beyond this, however, ‘‘the
determination of what constitutes a risk
worthy of Agency action is a policy
consideration that belongs, in the first
instance, to the Agency’’ (Asbestos Info.
Ass’n/N. Am. v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415,
425 (5th Cir. 1984)).
In the context of ordinary 6(b)
rulemaking, the Supreme Court has said
5 See the definitions for the different levels of
severity of COVID–19 illness in the National
Institutes of Health’s COVID–19 treatment
guidelines (NIH, October 12, 2021).
that the OSH Act is not a ‘‘mathematical
straitjacket,’’ nor does it require the
agency to support its findings ‘‘with
anything approaching scientific
certainty,’’ particularly when operating
on the ‘‘frontiers of scientific
knowledge’’ (Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–
CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 655–56 (1980)). Courts reviewing
OSHA’s determination of grave danger
do so with ‘‘great deference’’ (Pub.
Citizen Health Research Grp. v.
Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1156 (D.C. Cir.
1983)). In one case, the Fifth Circuit, in
reviewing an OSHA ETS for asbestos,
declined to question the agency’s
finding that 80 worker lives at risk
nationwide over six months constituted
a grave danger (Asbestos Info. Ass’n/N.
Am., 727 F.2d at 424). OSHA estimates
that this ETS would save over 6,500
worker lives and prevent over 250,000
hospitalizations over the course of the
next six months (OSHA, October 2021c).
Here, the mortality and morbidity risk to
employees from COVID–19 is so dire
that the grave danger from exposures to
SARS–CoV–2 is clear.
SARS–CoV–2 is both a physically
harmful agent and a new hazard (see 29
U.S.C. 655(c)(1)(A)). The majority of
OSHA’s previous ETSs addressed toxic
substances that had been familiar to the
agency for many years prior to issuance
of the ETS. OSHA’s Healthcare ETS,
issued in response to COVID–19 earlier
this year, is one notable exception. In
most cases, OSHA’s ETSs were issued in
response to new information about
substances that had been used in
workplaces for decades (e.g., Vinyl
Chloride (39 FR 12342 (April 5, 1974));
Benzene (42 FR 22516 (May 3, 1977));
1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane (42 FR
45536 (Sept. 9, 1977))). In some cases,
the hazards of the toxic substance were
already so well established that OSHA
promulgated an ETS simply to update
an existing standard (e.g., Vinyl cyanide
(43 FR 2586 (Jan. 17, 1978))). The
COVID–19 Healthcare ETS, which was
issued in June 2021, was the sole
instance in which OSHA issued an ETS
to address a grave danger from a
substance that had only recently come
into existence. Although that action by
the agency was challenged, the case has
not gone to briefing (see United Food &
Commercial Workers Int’l Union, AFL–
CIO, CLC and AFL–CIO v. OSHA, Dep’t
of Labor, D.C. Circuit No. 21–1143).
Thus, no court has had occasion to
examine OSHA’s authority under
section (6)(c) of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C.
655(c)) to address a grave danger from
a ‘‘new hazard.’’ Yet by any measure,
SARS–CoV–2 is a new hazard. Unlike
any of the hazards addressed in
previous ETSs, there were no
documented cases of SARS–CoV–2
infections in the United States until
January 2020. Since then, more than
725,000 people have died in the U.S.
alone (CDC, October 18, 2021—
Cumulative US Deaths). The pandemic
continues to affect workers and
workplaces, with workplace exposures
leading to further exposures among
workers’ families and communities.
Clearly, SARS–CoV–2 is both a
physically harmful agent and a new
hazard that presents a grave danger to
workers in the U.S.
Published on June 21, 2021, OSHA’s
Healthcare ETS (86 FR 32376) was
written in response to the grave danger
posed to healthcare workers in the
United States who faced a heightened
risk of infection from COVID–19. In the
healthcare ETS, OSHA described its
finding of grave danger for healthcare
and healthcare support service workers
(see 86 FR 32381–32412). OSHA now
finds that all unvaccinated workers,
with some exceptions, face a grave
danger from the SARS–CoV–2 virus.6
II. Nature of the Disease
The health effects of symptomatic
COVID–19 illness can range from mild
disease consisting of fever or chills,
cough, and shortness of breath to severe
disease. Severe cases can involve
respiratory failure, blood clots, longterm cardiovascular and neurological
effects, and organ damage, which can
lead to hospitalization, ICU admission,
and death (see 86 FR 32383–32388;
NINDS, September 2, 2021). Even in the
short time since the Healthcare ETS’s
publication in June 2021, the risk posed
by COVID–19 has changed
meaningfully. Since OSHA considered
the impact of COVID–19 when
promulgating the Healthcare ETS, over
135,000 additional Americans have died
from COVID–19, and over 933,000 have
been hospitalized, (CDC, October 18,
2021—Cumulative US Deaths; CDC,
May 28, 2021; CDC, October 18, 2021—
Weekly Review). In August 2021,
COVID–19 was the third leading cause
of death in the United States, trailing
only heart disease and cancer (Ortaliza
et al., August 27, 2021). By September
20, 2021, COVID–19 had killed as many
Americans as the 1918–1919 flu
pandemic (Johnson, September 20,
2021).
While the Healthcare ETS addresses
the risk of illness and death from
6 When OSHA refers to ‘‘unvaccinated’’
individuals in its grave danger finding, it means all
individuals who are not fully vaccinated against
COVID–19, i.e., those who are completely
unvaccinated and those who are partially
vaccinated.
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COVID–19 as the SARS–CoV–2 virus
continues to change over time, it does
not specifically address the increases in
infectiousness and transmission, and
the potentially more severe health
effects, related to the Delta variant. The
rapid rise to predominance of the Delta
variant in the U.S. occurred shortly after
the ETS was published. At this time, the
widespread prevalence of the Delta
variant and its increased
transmissibility have resulted in
increased risk of exposure and disease
relative to the previously-dominant
strains of the SARS–CoV–2 virus.
Adding to the information covered in
the Healthcare ETS, the following
sections provide a brief review of
SARS–CoV–2 and describe the
characteristics of the Delta variant that
are different from previous versions of
SARS–CoV–2 and have changed the
risks posed by COVID–19. The agency
specifically references the material
presented in the Healthcare ETS, which
is still relevant to this analysis, to
support OSHA’s finding of grave danger.
Taken together, the information
available to OSHA demonstrates that
SARS–CoV–2 poses a grave danger to
unvaccinated workers across all
industry sectors.
a. Variants of SARS–CoV–2
Viral mutations have been a serious
concern of scientists, public health
experts, and policymakers from the
beginning of the COVID–19 pandemic.
Viral mutations can affect how a virus
interacts with a cell—altering the virus’s
transmissibility, infection severity, and
sensitivity to vaccines. The U.S.
government’s SARS–CoV–2 Interagency
Group has a variant classification
scheme that defines four classes of
SARS–CoV–2 variants: Variants Being
Monitored (VBM), Variants of Interest
(VOI), Variants of Concern (VOC), and
Variants of High Consequence (VOHC).
These variant designations are based on
their ‘‘proportions at the national and
regional levels and the potential or
known impact of the constellation of
mutations on the effectiveness of
medical countermeasures, severity of
disease, and ability to spread from
person to person’’ (CDC, October 4,
2021), with VOIs considered less serious
than VOCs and VOCs considered less
serious than VOHCs. As of early October
2021, the CDC was monitoring 10
VBMs—Alpha (B.1.1.7, Q.1–Q.8), Beta
(B.1.351, B.1.351.2, B.1.351.3), Gamma
(P.1, P.1.1, P.1.2), Epsilon (B.1.427 and
B.1.429), Eta (B.1.525), Iota (B.1.526),
Kappa (B.1.617.1), B.1.617.3, Mu
(B.1.621, B.1.621.1), and Zeta (P.2)—and
one VOC—Delta (B.1.617.2 and AY.1
sublineages)—in the U.S. (CDC, October
4, 2021). CDC defines a VOC as ‘‘[a]
variant for which there is evidence of an
increase in transmissibility, more severe
disease (e.g., increased hospitalizations
or deaths), significant reduction in
neutralization by antibodies generated
during previous infection or
vaccination, reduced effectiveness of
treatments or vaccines, or diagnostic
detection failures’’ (CDC, October 4,
2021).
While the proportions of SARS–CoV–
2 variants in the United States have
shifted over time (CDC, May 24, 2021c;
CDC, October 18, 2021—Variant
Proportions, July through October 2021),
the primary variant that drove COVID–
19 transmission in the late Winter and
Spring of 2021 was the Alpha variant.
The CDC noted that Alpha is associated
with an increase in transmission, as
well as potentially increased incidences
of hospitalization and death, compared
to the predominant variants before its
emergence (CDC, October 4, 2021;
Pascall et al., August 24, 2021; Julin et
al., September 22, 2021). As Alpha
transmission subsided in the United
States during the late Spring and early
Summer of 2021, Delta emerged and
quickly became the predominant variant
in the U.S. by July 3, 2021 (CDC,
October 18, 2021—Variant Proportions,
July through October 2021). Delta now
accounts for more than 99% of
circulating virus nationwide (CDC,
October 18, 2021—Variant Proportions,
July through October 2021).
FDA authorized and approved
COVID–19 vaccines currently work well
against all of these variants; however,
there are differences in various variants’
ability to spread and the likelihood of
infection to cause severe illness. Data on
the Beta and Gamma variants do not
indicate that infections from these
variants caused more severe illness or
death than other VOCs. Data on the
Alpha variant does indicate its ability to
cause more severe illness and death in
infected individuals. And some data on
the Delta variant suggests that the Delta
variant may cause more severe illness
than previous variants, including Alpha,
in unvaccinated individuals (CDC,
October 4, 2021).
The emergence of the Delta variant,
along with other VOCs, has resulted in
a more deadly pandemic (Fisman and
Tuite, July 12, 2021). While the Delta
variant is the most transmissible SARS–
CoV–2 variant to date, the possibility
remains for the rise of future VOCs, and
even more dangerous VOHCs, as the
virus continues to spread and mutate.
Inadequate vaccination rates and the
abundance of transmission create an
environment that can foster the
development of new variants that could
61409
be similarly, or even more, disruptive
(Liu and Rocklov, August, 4, 2021). In
this context, it is critical that OSHA
address the grave danger from COVID–
19 that unvaccinated workers are
currently facing by requiring
vaccination and the other measures
included in this rule, in order to
significantly slow the transmission of
COVID–19 in workers and workplaces
and mitigate the rise of future variants.
b. Transmission
SARS–CoV–2 is a highly
transmissible virus, regardless of
variant. Since the first case was detected
in the U.S., there have been close to 45
million reported cases of COVID–19,
affecting every state and territory, with
thousands more infected each day (CDC,
October 18, 2021—Cumulative US
Cases), and some indication that these
numbers continue to underestimate the
full burden of disease (CDC, July 27,
2021). According to the CDC, the
primary way the SARS–CoV–2 virus
spreads from an infected person to
others is through the respiratory
droplets that are produced when an
infected person coughs, sneezes, sings,
talks, or breathes (CDC, May 7, 2021).
Infection could then occur when
another person breathes in the virus.
Most commonly this occurs when
people are in close contact with one
another in indoor spaces (within
approximately six feet for at least fifteen
minutes) (CDC, August 13, 2021).
Additionally, airborne transmission may
occur in indoor spaces without adequate
ventilation where small respiratory
particles are able to remain suspended
in the air and accumulate (CDC, May 7,
2021; Fennelly, July 24, 2020). While
scientists’ understanding of the Delta
variant’s virology is evolving and
remains at the frontier of science,
current data shows that the routes of
transmission remain the same for all
currently-identified SARS–CoV–2
variants. In addition, all variants can be
transmitted by people who are presymptomatic (i.e., people who are
infected but do not yet feel sick) or
asymptomatic (i.e., people who are
infected but never feel any symptoms of
COVID–19), as well as those who are
symptomatic. Pre-symptomatic and
asymptomatic transmission continue to
pose serious challenges to containing
the spread of COVID–19. For more
extensive information on transmission
routes, as well as pre-symptomatic and
asymptomatic transmission, see the
preamble to the Healthcare ETS (86 FR
APP. 9
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32392–32396), which is hereby
included in the record of this ETS.7
The Delta variant is transmitted from
infectious individuals via the same
routes as previous variants, but is much
more transmissible. Specifically, Delta
differs from previous dominant variants
of SARS–CoV–2 in terms of the
amplification of viral particles expelled
from infected individuals. Testing of
Delta-infected individuals indicates that
their viral loads are—on average—
approximately 1,000x greater than those
of the SARS–CoV–2 variants from the
first COVID–19 wave in early 2020. This
finding suggests much faster replication
of viral particles during early infection
with the Delta variant, resulting in
greater infectiousness (contagiousness)
when compared to earlier versions of
SARS–CoV–2 (Li et al., July 12, 2021).
The transmissibility of viruses is
measured in part by the average number
of subsequently-infected people (or
secondary cases) that are expected to
occur from each existing case (often
referred to as R0). Several comparisons
of the transmissibility of the initial
SARS–CoV–2 variants to the Delta
variant have shown that Delta is
approximately twice as transmissible
(contagious) as previous versions of
SARS–CoV–2 (CDC, August 26, 2021;
Riou and Althaus, January 30, 2020; Li
et al., July 12, 2021; Liu and Rocklov,
August, 4, 2021), likely the result of
higher initial viral loads during the presymptomatic phase (Li et al., July 12,
2021). In addition, as described further
below, data on Delta shows that both
unvaccinated and vaccinated
individuals are more likely to transmit
Delta than previous variants (Liu and
Rocklov, August, 4, 2021; Eyre et al.,
September 29, 2021), making it
especially dangerous to those who
remain unvaccinated.
c. Health Effects
COVID–19 infections can lead to
death. As reported in the Healthcare
ETS, by May 24, 2021, there had been
587,432 deaths and 32,947,548 million
infections in the U.S. alone (CDC, May
24, 2021a; CDC, May 24, 2021b). At that
point in the pandemic, 1.8 out of every
1,000 people in the U.S. had died from
COVID–19 (CDC, May 24, 2021a). Since
then, reported cases have increased to
44,857,861 and the number of deaths
has increased to 723,205 (CDC, October
18, 2021– Cumulative US Cases;
Cumulative US Deaths). By September
2021, an astounding 1 in 500 Americans
had died from COVID–19 (Keating,
7 This adoption includes the citations in the
referenced section of the Healthcare ETS, which are
also included in the docket for this ETS.
September 15, 2021). Updated mortality
data 8 currently indicate that people of
working age (18–64 years old) now have
a 1 in 202 chance of dying when they
contract the disease, with the risk much
higher (1 in 72) for those aged 50–64
(CDC, October 18, 2021—Demographic
Trends, Cases by Age Group; CDC,
October 18, 2021—Demographic Trends,
Deaths by Age Group). For a more indepth description of the health effects
resulting from SARS–CoV–2 infection,
see the preamble to the Healthcare ETS
(86 FR 32383–32392), which is hereby
included in the record of this ETS.9
Apart from fatal cases, COVID–19 can
cause serious illness, including longlasting effects on health. Many patients
who become ill with COVID–19 require
hospitalization. Indeed, updated CDC
hospitalization and mortality data
indicate that working age Americans
(18–64 years old) now have a 1 in 14
chance of hospitalization when infected
with COVID–19 (CDC, October 18,
2021—Demographic Trends, Cases by
Age; Total Hospitalizations, by Age).
Those who are hospitalized frequently
need supplemental oxygen and
treatment for the disease’s most
common complications, which include
pneumonia, respiratory failure, acute
respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS),
acute kidney injury, sepsis, myocardial
injury, arrhythmias, and blood clots.
One study, which included 35,502
inpatients nationwide, determined that
the median length of hospital stay was
6 days, unless the cases required ICU
treatment. For those cases, ICU stays
were on median 5 days in addition to
the time spent hospitalized outside of
the ICU (Rosenthal et al., December 10,
2020). Another study that assessed
hospital length of stay for COVID–19
patients in England estimated that a
non-ICU hospital stay averaged between
8 and 9 days, but those estimates ranged
from approximately 12 to 18 days when
patients were admitted to the ICU
(Vekaria et al., July 22, 2021). Moreover,
given that SARS–CoV–2 is still a novel
virus, the severity of long-term health
effects—such as ‘‘post-COVID
conditions’’—are not yet fully
understood.
Many members of the workforce are at
increased risk of death and severe
disease from COVID–19 because of their
age or pre-existing health conditions.
8 Risk of death is based on averages from reported
CDC data. Risks of hospitalization and death are
much higher in unvaccinated individuals, as
discussed further in Grave Danger, Section III.A.IV.
Vaccines Effectively Reduce Severe Health
Outcomes from and Transmission of SARS–CoV–2.
9 This adoption includes the citations in the
referenced section of the Healthcare ETS, which are
also included in the docket for this ETS.
The comorbidities that further
exacerbate COVID–19 infections are
common among adults of working age in
the U.S. For instance, 46.1% of
individuals with cancer are in the 20–
64 year old age range (NCI, April 29,
2015), and over 40% of working age
adults are obese (Hales et al., February
2020). Disease severity is also likely
exacerbated by long-standing healthcare
inequities experienced by members of
many racial and economic
demographics (CDC, April 19, 2021).
Recent data suggests that Delta variant
infections may result in even more
severe illness and a higher frequency of
death than previous COVID–19 variants
due to Delta’s increased transmissibility,
virulence, and immune escape (Fisman
and Tuite, July 12, 2021). Symptomatic
Delta variant infections do occur in fully
vaccinated people (Mlcochova et al.,
June 22, 2021; Musser et al., July 22,
2021); however, as reported by the CDC
(CDC, August 26, 2021), the vast
majority of the continuing instances of
severe and fatal COVID–19 infections
are occurring in unvaccinated persons
(discussed further in Grave Danger,
Section III.A.IV. Vaccines Effectively
Reduce Severe Outcomes from and
Transmission of SARS–CoV–2). An
assessment of Delta-related hospital
admissions in Scotland found that
hospitalizations were approximately
doubled in patients with the Delta
variant when compared to the Alpha
variant (Sheikh et al., June 4, 2021). A
similar study conducted using a
retrospective cohort in Ontario, Canada
compared the virulence of novel SARS–
CoV–2 variants and found that the
incidences of hospitalization, ICU
admission, and death were more
pronounced with the Delta variant than
any other SARS–CoV–2 variant (Fisman
and Tuite, July 12, 2021). A large
national cohort study that included all
Alpha and Delta SARS–CoV–2 patients
in England between March 29 and May
23, 2021 found a ‘‘higher hospital
admission or emergency care attendance
risk for patients with COVID–19
infected with the Delta variant
compared with the Alpha variant,’’
suggesting that Delta outbreaks—
especially amongst unvaccinated
populations—may lead to more severe
health consequences and an equivalent
or greater burden on healthcare services
than the Alpha variant (Twohig et al.,
August 27, 2021). However, one more
recent study examining data from
several U.S. states demonstrated a
significant increase in hospitalization
from the pre-Delta to the Delta period,
which may be related to increased
transmissibility of Delta rather than
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more severe health outcomes (Taylor et
al., October 22, 2021).
III. Impact on the Workplace
SARS–CoV–2 is readily transmissible
in workplaces because they are areas
where multiple people come into
contact with one another, often for
extended periods of time. When
employees report to their workplace,
they may regularly come into contact
with co-workers, the public, delivery
people, patients, and any other people
who enter the workplace. Workplace
factors that exacerbate the risk of
transmission of SARS–CoV–2 include
working in indoor settings, working in
poorly-ventilated areas, and spending
hours in close proximity with others.
Full-time employees typically spend 8
hours or more at work each shift, more
time than they spend anywhere else but
where they live. Employees work in
proximity to others in workplaces that
were not originally designed to keep
people six feet away from other people
and that may make it difficult for
employees to perform work tasks while
maintaining a six-foot distance from
others. Even in the cases where workers
can do most of their work from, for
example, a private office within a
workplace, they share common areas
like hallways, restrooms, lunch rooms
and meeting rooms. Furthermore, many
work areas are poorly ventilated (Allen
and Ibrahim, May 25, 2021; Lewis,
March 30, 2021). An additional factor
that exacerbates the risk of transmission
of SARS–CoV–2 is interacting with or
caring for people with suspected or
confirmed COVID–19; this was a
primary driver of OSHA’s determination
of grave danger for healthcare workers
in the Healthcare ETS (see 86 FR 32381–
32383). In recent weeks, the majority of
states in the U.S. have experienced what
CDC defines as ‘‘high or substantial
community transmission,’’ indicating
that there is a clear risk of the virus
being introduced into and circulating in
workplaces (CDC, October 18, 2021—
Community Transmission Rates).
Although COVID–19 is not
exclusively an occupational disease, it
is evident from research accrued since
the beginning of the pandemic that
SARS–CoV–2 transmission can and
does occur in workplaces, affecting
employees and their lives, health, and
livelihoods. This continues to be true
for the Delta variant, with its increased
transmissibility and potentially more
severe health effects. This section
describes some of the clusters,
outbreaks, and other occurrences of
workplace COVID–19 cases that
government agencies, researchers, and
journalists have described, and the
widespread effects of SARS–CoV–2 in
industry sectors across the national
economy. While the focus is on more
recent data reflecting the impact of the
Delta variant, evidence of workplace
transmission that occurred prior to the
emergence of the Delta variant is also
presented.
The workplace-based clusters
described below provide evidence that
workplaces in a wide range of industries
have been affected by COVID–19, that
many employees face exposure to
infected people in their workspaces, and
that SARS–CoV–2 transmission is
occurring in the workplace, including
during the recent period where the Delta
variant has predominated. Although the
presence of a cluster on its own does not
necessarily establish that the cluster is
work-related (i.e., a result of
transmission at the worksite), many
state investigation reports and
published studies provide evidence that
transmission is work related by
documenting that infections at a
workplace occurred within 14-days (the
incubation period for the virus) of each
other and ruling out the possibility that
transmission occurred outside the
workplace. In addition, the information
below demonstrates that exposures to
SARS–CoV–2 happen regularly in a
wide variety of different types of
workplaces.
The basis for OSHA’s grave danger
finding is that employees can be
exposed to the virus in almost any work
setting; that exposure to SARS–CoV–2
can lead to infection (CDC, September
21, 2021); and that infection in turn can
cause death or serious impairment of
health, especially in those who are
unvaccinated (see Section III.A.IV.
Vaccines Effectively Reduce Severe
Health Outcomes from and
Transmission of SARS–CoV–2). The
information described in this section
supports OSHA’s finding that
employees who work in spaces shared
by others are at risk of exposure to
SARS–CoV–2. The degree of risk from
droplet-based transmission may vary
based on the duration of close proximity
to a person infected with SARS–CoV–2,
including the Delta variant, but the
simple and brief act of sneezing,
coughing, talking, or even breathing can
significantly increase the risk of
transmission if controls are not in place.
SARS–CoV–2, including the Delta
variant, might also be spread through
airborne particles under certain
conditions, particularly in enclosed
settings with inadequate ventilation,
which are common characteristics of
some workplaces.
The peer-reviewed scientific journal
articles, government reports, and news
61411
articles described below establish the
widespread prevalence of COVID–19
among employees, beginning with a
description of the recent impact from
the Delta variant. OSHA’s findings are
based primarily on the evidence from
peer-reviewed scientific journal articles
and government reports. However, peer
review for scientific journal articles and
the assembly of information for
government reports and other official
sources of information take time, and
therefore those sources do not always
reflect the most up-to-date information
(Chan et al., December 14, 2010). In
addition, while state and local health
departments can report workplace
outbreaks to CDC, the agency does not
provide summary statistics by
workplace so that those outbreaks can
be tracked on a national level. In the
context of the COVID–19 pandemic,
given the recent impacts due to the
Delta variant and the emergence of new
information on a daily basis, it is critical
for OSHA to rely on the most up-to-date
information available. Therefore, OSHA
has occasionally supplemented peerreviewed data and government reports
with additional information on
occupational outbreaks contained in
other sources of media (e.g.,
newspapers, digital media, and
information submitted to or obtained by
private organizations).10 The reported
information from other sources can
provide further evidence of the impact
of an emerging and changing disease,
especially for industries that are not
well represented in the peer-reviewed
scientific literature. Together, these
sources of information represent the
best available evidence of the impact on
employees of the pandemic thus far.
The information described herein
illustrates a significant number of
infections among employees in a variety
of industries, with virtually every state
continuing to experience what CDC
defines as high or substantial
community transmission related to the
recent surge of the Delta variant. The
industries and types of workplaces
described are not the only ones in
which a grave danger exists. The science
of transmission does not vary by
industry or by type of workplace. OSHA
therefore expects transmission to occur
in diverse workplaces all across the
country (see Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc.
v. Dep’t of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 102 n.3
(3d Cir. 1973) (holding that when OSHA
determines a substance poses a grave
10 OSHA did not make findings based solely on
non-peer-reviewed sources such as news articles,
but the agency found that those sources can
sometimes provide useful information when
considered with more robust sources.
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danger to workers, OSHA can assume an
exposure to a grave danger exists
wherever that substance is present in a
workplace)). In addition, the severity of
COVID–19 does not depend on where
an employee is infected; an employee
exposed to SARS–CoV–2 might die
whether exposed while working at a
meat packing facility, a retail
establishment, or an office (see Grave
Danger, Section III.A.V.b. Employees
Who Work Exclusively Outside, below,
for a discussion of the risk of exposure
in outdoor workplaces).
a. General Impact on Workers
Data on SARS–CoV–2 infections,
illnesses, and deaths among employees
in general industry, agriculture,
construction, and maritime support
OSHA’s finding that COVID–19 poses a
grave danger to employees in these
sectors across the U.S. economy. This
section summarizes studies and reports
of COVID–19 illness and fatalities in a
wide range of workplaces across those
industry sectors. Not all workplace
settings are discussed; nor is the data
available to do so. However, the
characteristics of the various affected
workplaces—such as indoor work
settings; contact with coworkers, clients,
or members of the public; and sharing
space with others for prolonged periods
of time—indicate that exposures to
SARS–CoV–2 are occurring in a wide
variety of work settings across all
industries. Therefore, most employees
who work in the presence of other
people (e.g., co-workers, customers,
visitors) need to be protected.
While there is no comprehensive
source of nationwide workplace
infection data, reports from states and
communities on outbreaks related to
workplaces provide key, up-to-date data
that illustrate the likelihood of
employee exposure to SARS–CoV–2 at
workplaces throughout the U.S. OSHA
identified a number of recent reports
from various regions of the country that
together demonstrate the impact that
SARS–CoV–2 can have on a variety of
workplaces, including in service
industries (e.g., restaurants, grocery and
other retail stores, fitness centers,
hospitality, casinos, salons), corrections,
warehousing, childcare, schools, offices,
homeless shelters, transportation, mail/
shipping/delivery services, cleaning
services, emergency services/response,
waste management, construction,
agriculture, food packaging/processing,
and healthcare. Deaths are reported in
many studies performed prior to the
emergence of the Delta variant but,
because the Delta outbreak is so recent
and deaths can occur weeks after
infection, the number of deaths from
recent infections might be
underestimated. Some of the reports
include cumulative data representing
various phases of the pandemic,
beginning prior to the availability of
vaccines and continuing through the
recent surge of the Delta variant. In
addition, some studies report
investigations of recent outbreaks,
which provide insight on the impact of
the Delta variant as well as impacts
associated with the current vaccination
status of workers.
The Washington State Department of
Health (WSDH) reports outbreaks
occurring in non-healthcare workplaces
(WSDH, September 8, 2021). In nonhealthcare workplaces, outbreaks are
defined as two or more laboratory
confirmed cases of COVID–19, with at
least two cases reporting symptom onset
within 14 days of each other, and
plausible epidemiological evidence of
transmission in a shared location other
than a household. As of September 4,
2021, WSDH reported 5,247 outbreaks
in approximately 40 different types of
non-healthcare work settings. During
the week of August 29 through
September 4, 2021, WSDH identified
137 separate workplace outbreaks. The
types of non-medical workplace settings
that represented more than 5% of the
total outbreaks during that week
included food service/restaurants,
childcare, schools, retail, grocery, and
shelter/homeless services. Other types
of non-healthcare settings where
outbreaks occurred recently included
non-food and food manufacturing,
construction, professional services/
office based, agriculture/produce
packing, transportation/shipping
delivery, government agencies/facilities,
leisure hospitality/recreation,
corrections, utilities, warehousing,
facility/domestic cleaning services,
youth sports/activities, camps, and
public safety. Over the course of the
pandemic, outbreaks have also been
observed at bars/nightclubs, hotels, and
fishing/commercial seafood vessels.
The Oregon Health Authority (OHA)
publishes a weekly report detailing
outbreaks directly related to work
settings. OHA epidemiologists consider
cases to be part of a workplace outbreak
when clusters form with respect to
space and time, within a plausible
incubation period for the virus, and
their investigation does not uncover an
alternative source for the outbreak. For
privacy reasons, OHA only reports
outbreaks with 5 or more cases in
workplaces with 30 or more people.
OHA reported a total of 26,013 cases
and 135 deaths related to workplace
outbreaks as of September 1, 2021. As
of September 1, 2021, OHA was
investigating more than 124 active
workplace outbreaks (OHA, September
1, 2021). Those outbreaks occurred in a
wide variety of industries including
correctional facilities, emergency
services, waste management, schools
and child care, retail and grocery stores,
restaurants, warehousing, agriculture,
food processing/packaging,
construction, healthcare, mail and
delivery services, office locations,
utilities, transportation, and others.
Tennessee Department of Health was
investigating 557 active COVID–19
clusters as of September 8, 2021 (TDH,
September 8, 2021). Clusters are defined
as two or more laboratory confirmed
COVID–19 cases linked to the same
location or event that is not a household
exposure. The clusters occurred in 13
types of settings, 10 of which were
workplace settings. Outbreaks at
workplaces represented more than half
of the total active outbreaks in the state
at that time. Settings comprising more
than 5% of total clusters included
assisted care living facilities, nursing
homes, and correctional facilities. Other
types of workplaces where outbreaks
occurred included bars, construction,
farms, homeless shelters, and industrial
settings.
The North Carolina Department of
Health and Human Services reports
cumulative numbers of clusters, cases,
and deaths for workers in poultry
processing facilities (beginning in April
of 2020) and other types of workplaces
(beginning in May of 2020) (NCDHHS,
August 30, 2021). Clusters are defined
as a minimum of 5 cases with illness
onset or initial positive results within a
14-day period and plausible
epidemiological linkage between the
cases. Plausible epidemiological linkage
means that multiple cases were in the
same general setting during the same
time period (e.g., same shift, same
physical area) and that a more likely
source of exposure is not identified (e.g.,
household contact or close contact to a
confirmed case in another setting).
During that time period of April/May
2020 through August 30, 2021,
workplaces 11 were associated with
nearly 80% of the 1,969 clusters and
27,097 cases observed and nearly 40%
of the 167 deaths related to the clusters.
Cumulative numbers of clusterassociated deaths were highest in meat
and poultry processing (25 of 5,351
cases), followed by healthcare (10 of
1,036 cases), government services and
manufacturing (5 of 1,048 cases and 5 of
11 NCDHHS identifies a ‘‘workplace’’ category in
their report (e.g., agriculture, construction), but
OSHA includes other settings where employees
would be present (e.g., retail, restaurants, childcare,
healthcare).
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1,856 cases, respectively), and
restaurants and childcare (3 of 421 cases
and 3 of 1,943 cases, respectively).
Recently, in July of 2021, the number of
cases associated with workplace clusters
began increasing in several different
types of work settings, including meat
processing, manufacturing, retail,
restaurants, childcare, schools, and
higher education.
Colorado Department of Public Health
& Environment/Colorado State
Emergency Operations Center (CDPHE/
CSEOC, September 8, 2021) reported
5,584 resolved workplace-related
outbreaks involving 40,156 employee
cases and 79 employee deaths since
May of 2020. The agency’s current
investigations, as of September 8, 2021
included 291 active outbreaks (not
defined), with 2,865 staff cases
(assumed to be cases in employees). The
majority of active outbreaks were
reported in childcare, schools,
healthcare, and corrections. Active
outbreaks were also reported in
construction, retail, homeless shelters,
casinos, restaurants, hotels, offices, law
enforcement, manufacturing, delivery
services, and warehouses. Other types of
work settings that were affected in
resolved outbreaks included
warehouses, bars, government locations,
waste management, utilities, salons,
emergency services, meat processing/
packaging, and postal services. From
June 21, 2021 (the date the healthcare
ETS was published) through September
8, 2021, 1,469 staff cases associated with
outbreaks were reported, for an average
of approximately 19 cases per day.
Similar reporting is available from
Louisiana’s Department of Health (LDH,
August 24, 2021), with 1,347 outbreaks
and 9,130 cases reported as of August
24, 2021. LDH defines an outbreak as 2
or more cases among unrelated
individuals who visited a site within a
14-day period. More than three quarters
of outbreaks through that date were
associated with workplaces. Workplace
settings in Louisiana that experienced
more than 5% of outbreaks included
day care facilities, bars, restaurants,
retail settings, industrial settings, and
office spaces. Other types of workplace
settings or industries where outbreaks
occurred included casinos, gyms/fitness
centers, banks, automotive services,
construction, and ships/boats.
In addition to the state data above,
some published studies and government
reports provide information on recent
workplaces outbreaks. For example, 47
people, including 3 of 11 staff members,
23 gymnasts, and 21 household
contacts, contracted COVID–19 from an
outbreak linked to an Oklahoma
gymnastics facility during April 15
through May 3, 2021 (Dougherty et al.,
July 16, 2021). All 21 of the virus
samples sequenced were determined to
be the Delta variant. The majority of the
infected individuals (85%) were
unvaccinated. Infections were reported
in 16 adults aged 20 years or older; two
adults were hospitalized and one
required intensive care.
The state of Hawaii defines clusters as
three or more confirmed or probable
cases linked to a site or event within 14
days, with no outside exposure of cases
to each other (Hawaii State, August 19,
2021). The state reported a COVID–19
cluster in July associated with a concert
at a bar that affected 16 people,
including employees, band members,
and concert attendees; infections also
spread to 7 household members. Band
members had performed while sick.
Four of the initial 16 people and none
of the household members who tested
positive for COVID–19 were fully
vaccinated. The concert cluster was
linked to clusters at another workplace
and another concert. The report lists
additional clusters investigated in the
two weeks prior to the report; those
clusters were observed in workplace
locations such as correctional facilities,
bars and nightclubs, restaurants,
construction/industrial sites, travel/
lodging/tourism, schools, food
suppliers, and gyms.
Additional evidence that employees
are at risk of exposure to SARS–CoV–2
in the workplace is available from
published, peer-reviewed studies that
were conducted before the Delta variant
emerged. Those studies demonstrate
that employees have been at risk of
infection, illness, and death throughout
the COVID–19 pandemic. Because the
Delta variant is more transmissible and
likely causes more severe disease than
previous variants, there is even greater
potential for unvaccinated employees to
become seriously ill or die as a result of
exposure to the Delta variant.
Contreras et al. (July, 2021) examined
workplace outbreaks (excluding
healthcare settings, homelessness
services, and emergency medical
services) in Los Angeles county from
March 19 through September 30, 2020.
Workplace outbreaks were defined as 5
or more suspected or laboratory
confirmed COVID–19 cases (prior to
May 29) or 3 or more laboratory
confirmed cases (after May 29)
occurring within 14 days. Nearly 60% of
the 698 identified outbreaks occurred in
three sectors—manufacturing (184,
26.4%), retail trade (137, 19.6%), and
transportation and warehousing (73,
10.5%). Also notable were the 71
outbreaks in the accommodation and
food services industry, which
61413
represented 10.2% of the outbreaks. The
study authors concluded that outbreaks
were larger and lasted longer at facilities
with more onsite staff.
Outbreaks in Wisconsin from March 4
through November 16, 2020 were also
examined (Pray et al., January 29, 2021).
Non-household outbreaks were defined
as two or more confirmed COVID–19
cases that occurred within 14 days in
persons who attended the same facility
or event and did not share a household.
During the period from March 4 through
November 16, 2020, the largest
percentages of cases were associated
with outbreaks in long-term care
facilities (26.8% of cases), correctional
facilities (14.9% of cases), and colleges
or universities (15% of cases). Also
notable were the substantial number of
cases associated with outbreaks in food
production or manufacturing facilities
(including meat processing and
warehousing; 14.5% of cases) and
schools and childcare facilities (10.6%
of cases).
Bui et al. (August 17, 2020) analyzed
data from the Utah Department of
Health’s COVID–19 case surveillance
system, which included data on
workplace outbreaks. Outbreaks were
defined as two or more laboratory
confirmed cases occurring within a 14
day period among coworkers in a
common workplace (e.g., same facility).
During the time period between March
6 and June 5, 2020, 277 COVID–19
outbreaks were reported, of which 210
(76%) occurred in workplaces. The 210
workplace outbreaks occurred in 15 of
20 industry sectors, and the industry
sectors of manufacturing (43 outbreaks,
20%), construction (32 outbreaks, 15%),
and wholesale trade (29 outbreaks, 14%)
together represented nearly half of
workplace outbreaks. Other sectors that
represented more than 10% of total
outbreaks were retail trade (28
outbreaks, 13%) and accommodation
and food services (25 outbreaks, 12%).
Incidence rates of COVID–19 over the
period of March 6 through June 5, 2020
were 339/100,000 workers in
manufacturing, 122/100,000 workers in
construction, 377/100,000 workers in
wholesale trade, 68/100,000 workers for
retail trade, and 78/100,000 workers for
accommodation and food services. For
COVID–19 cases associated with
workplace outbreaks in which
hospitalization and severity status were
known (1,382 and 1,155, respectively),
the number in all sectors who were
admitted to the hospital was 85 (6%)
and the number with severe outcomes
(intensive care unit admission,
mechanical ventilation, or death) was 40
(3%).
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The impact of SARS–CoV–2
exposures on employee infection,
illness, and death has also been
demonstrated in studies focusing on
specific types of industries, such as
those where employees have frequent
contact with each other and the public
(e.g., grocery stores, bars, fitness
facilities, schools, and law enforcement/
corrections). For example, a study by
Lan et al. (September 26, 2020)
demonstrates the risk of infection in
service industries. The cross-sectional
study examined the risks of SARS–CoV–
2 exposure and infection for employees
in a Boston, Massachusetts-area retail
grocery store market. The study tested
104 grocery store employees, of whom
20% (21 employees) were positive for
COVID–19; 76% of confirmed cases did
not have symptoms. After adjusting for
gender, smoking, age, and the
prevalence of COVID–19 in the
employees’ residential communities,
employees who had direct customer
exposure (e.g., cashiers, sales associates,
cart attendants) were 5.1 times more
likely to have a positive test for COVID–
19 than employees without direct faceto-face customer exposure (e.g.,
stockers, backroom, receiving and
maintenance). The infection rate of 20%
among all employees was significantly
higher than the rate in the surrounding
community.
In February of 2021, an event at an
Illinois bar that accommodates
approximately 100 people resulted in a
COVID–19 outbreak that affected 46
people, including 3 (10%) staff
members, 26 (90%) patrons, and 17
secondary cases (Sami et al., April 9,
2021). People at the event included an
asymptomatic person diagnosed with
COVID–19 on the previous day and 4
symptomatic people who were later
diagnosed with COVID–19. The
outbreak resulted in a school closure
and the hospitalization of a resident at
a long-term care facility.
In Minnesota, 47 COVID–19 outbreaks
were detected at fitness facilities from
August through November of 2020
(Suhs et al., July 23, 2021). One
outbreak at a fitness facility during
October through November of 2020
resulted in 23 COVID–19 cases
including 5 (22%) employees and 18
(78%) members. A genetic analysis of
specimens from 3 employees and 10
members identified 2 distinct genetic
subclusters, indicating two distinct
chains of transmission among members
and employees.
School-related outbreaks were
examined from December 1, 2020
through January 22, 2021 in eight public
elementary schools of a Georgia school
district (Gold et al., February 26, 2021).
A COVID–19 case was determined to be
school-related if (1) symptom onset or a
positive test was consistent with the
incubation period of the virus following
contact with an index case or a schoolassociated case, (2) close contact
occurred with the index case or schoolassociated case while that person was
infected, and (3) no known contact
occurred with an infected community or
household contact in the two weeks
prior to a positive test for COVID–19.
The investigators identified nine
clusters of three or more
epidemiologically linked COVID–19
cases that involved 13 educators and 32
students in six of the eight elementary
schools. Approximately half of the
school-associated cases involved two
clusters that began with probable
transmission between educators,
followed by educator to student
transmission. Eighteen of 69 household
members tested received positive
results.
A number of studies demonstrate the
impact of COVID–19 in law enforcement
and related fields such as corrections.
For example, a study examining
COVID–19 antibodies in employees
from public service agencies in the New
York City area from May through July of
2020, found that 22.5% of participants
had COVID–19 antibodies (Sami et al.,
March, 2021). The percentage of
correctional officers found to have
COVID–19 antibodies (39.2%) was the
highest observed among all the
occupations. The percentages of police
dispatchers, traffic officers, security
guards, and dispatchers found to have
COVID–19 antibodies (29.8 to 37.3%)
were among the highest levels observed
in all the occupations. The study
authors noted that those jobs involve
frequent or close contact with the public
or are done in places where employees
work in close proximity to their
coworkers.
Wallace et al. (May 15, 2020)
evaluated data on COVID–19 cases and
deaths among correctional facility
employees and inmates from January 21
to April 21, 2020. Data were reported to
CDC by 37 (69%) of 54 state and
territorial health department
jurisdictions. Of these 37 jurisdictions,
32 (86%) reported at least one COVID–
19 case from a correctional facility. Of
the 420 facilities with a case, 221 (53%)
reported cases only among staff
members. In total, 4,893 COVID–19
cases among incarcerated or detained
persons and 2,778 cases among staff
members were reported (total tested not
provided). Among staff member cases,
79 hospitalizations (3%) and 15 deaths
(1%) were reported. The study authors
noted that ‘‘correctional and detention
facilities face challenges in controlling
the spread of infectious diseases
because of crowded, shared
environments and potential
introductions by staff members and new
intakes.’’
Ward et al. (June 2021) analyzed
COVID–19 prevalence among prisoners
and staff in 45 states from March 31,
2020 through November 4, 2020. During
that time period, COVID–19 cases in
staff were 3 to 5 times higher compared
to the U.S. population. Average daily
increases in cases were 42 per 100,000
prison employees, 61 per 100,000
prisoners, and 13 per 100,000 U.S.
residents. On November 4, 2020,
COVID–19 prevalence for prison staff
was 9,316 cases per 100,000 employees,
which was 3.2 times greater than
prevalence in the U.S. population (2,900
cases per 100,000).
Kirbiyik et al. (November 6, 2020)
analyzed movement through a networkinformed approach to identify likely
high points of transmission within the
Cook County Jail in Chicago, IL. At that
facility, over 900 COVID–19 cases were
reported across 10 housing divisions in
13 buildings from March 1–April 30,
2020. Staff members were required to
report symptoms of COVID–19
(probable cases) or receipt of a positive
test result (confirmed cases). A total of
2,041 staff members (77% of staff) were
included in the network analysis
because information was available about
their shift and division assignments,
and 198 (9.7%) of those staff members
had COVID–19 during the two-month
study period. Connections between staff
members who had COVID–19 were
higher than expected, suggesting likely
transmission among staff members.
Fewer connections than expected were
observed among detained persons with
SARS–CoV–2 infections, suggesting the
effectiveness of medical isolation at
reducing transmission.
The Officer Down Memorial Page,
which tracks police officer fatalities
determined to be occupationally related,
reported that the majority of officer
deaths for 2021 (157 of 269) were
related to COVID–19 (ODMP, September
14, 2021). For the 269 officers who died,
causes of death were not reported for
each month, but the highest numbers of
monthly deaths, 52 in January and 65 in
August (compared to 16 to 34 deaths on
other reported months), were consistent
with the winter surge of COVID–19 and,
more recently, the surge caused by the
Delta variant.
The risk of COVID–19 has also been
examined in industries where
employees have little contact with the
public, such as construction, and food
processing, and where most exposure to
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
SARS–CoV–2 likely comes from other
workers. Pasco et al. (October 29, 2020)
examined the association between
construction work during the COVID–19
pandemic and community transmission
and construction worker hospitalization
rates in Austin, Texas from March 13 to
August 20, 2020. A ‘‘Stay Home-Work
Safe’’ order enacted on March 24, 2020,
limited construction to only critical
infrastructure and excluded commercial
and residential work. One week later,
the Texas governor lifted the restriction
for essential workers and allowed all
types of construction work to resume,
while keeping the order in place for
other workers. The authors found that
resuming construction during the
shelter-in-place order led to an increase
in community transmission, an increase
in hospitalizations among community
members, and an increase in
hospitalizations of construction
workers. By mid-July, Austin Public
Health identified at least 42 clusters (not
defined) of COVID–19 cases in the
construction industry; 515 individuals
were hospitalized for COVID–19
illnesses acquired as part of these
clusters, and 77 of those reported
working in construction. The study
found that construction workers had a
nearly 5-fold increased risk of
hospitalization in central Texas
compared with workers in other
occupations. The authors’ model
predicted that allowing unrestricted
construction work would be associated
with an increase in COVID–19
hospitalization rates from 0.38 per 1,000
residents to 1.5 per 1,000 residents
overall, and from 0.22 per 1,000
construction workers to 9.3 per 1,000
construction workers for the
construction industry specifically. The
authors concluded that stringent
workplace safety measures could
significantly mitigate risks related to
COVID–19 in the industry.
The meat packing and processing
industries and related agricultural and
food processing sectors have also been
impacted by COVID–19. Waltenburg et
al. (January, 2021) reported COVID–19
cases in employees from meat and
poultry processing facilities in 31 states
from March 1 through May 31, 2020. As
reported in Table 2 of that report, 28,364
employees in those facilities were
confirmed to have COVID–19 by
laboratory testing and 132 died. Among
the 20 states that reported total numbers
of employees, 11.4% of the workers
were diagnosed with COVID–19 (with a
range of 3.1 to 27.7% of workers in
individual states). For states that
reported at least one COVID–19-related
death, the percentages of employees
who died in each state ranged from 0.1
to 2.4% of those with COVID–19. The
authors found a high burden of disease
in persons employed at these facilities
who were racial or ethnic minorities.
Higher incidence in these populations
might be due to the likelihood of these
employees working in areas in the plant
where transmission risk is higher.
Steinberg et al. (August 7, 2020)
reported that attack rates (i.e., the
number of individuals who are infected
in comparison to the total number at
risk) among production employees in
the Cut (30.2%), Conversion (30.1%),
and Harvest (29.4%) departments of a
meat processing plant (where spacing
between employees is less than 6 feet)
were double that of salaried employees
(14.8%) whose workstations had been
modified to increase physical distancing
from others.
Waltenburg et al. (January, 2021) also
evaluated COVID–19 incidence in food
manufacturing and agricultural settings
(e.g., manufacturing or farming
involving fruits, vegetables, dairy, baked
goods, eggs, prepared foods), as reported
in 30 states from March through May
2020. In food manufacturing and
farming of fruits, vegetables, dairy, and
other items, 742 workplaces were
affected, including 8,978 infections and
55 fatalities. For states that reported
total numbers of employees, the
proportion of employees who developed
COVID–19 in each state ranged from 2.0
to 43.5%. For states that reported at
least one death, the percentages of
deaths among cases ranged from 0.1 to
3.8%.
Porter et al. (April 30, 2021) reported
that 13 COVID–19 outbreaks occurred at
Alaska seafood processing facilities and
vessels (both of which were described as
high density workplaces) during the
Summer and early Fall of 2020. The 13
outbreaks involved 539 COVID–19
cases, with 2–168 cases per outbreak.
Attack rates in facilities and offshore
vessels ranged from less than 5% to
75%. Outbreaks were also reported in
entry quarantine groups. Because of
these outbreaks, it was determined that
vaccination of these essential workers is
important and requirements for COVID–
19 prevention were updated to include
smaller quarantine groups, serial testing,
and testing before transfers from one
facility or vessel to another.
Finally, two published studies
analyzed death records to determine
how mortality rates among individuals
in various types of workplaces had
changed during the pandemic. Chen et
al. (June 4, 2021) analyzed records of
deaths occurring on or after January 1,
2016 in California and found that
mortality rates in working aged adults
61415
(18–65 years) increased 22% during the
COVID–19 pandemic period of March
through November 2020 compared to
pre-pandemic periods. Relative to prepandemic periods, the groups of
employees experiencing the highest,
statistically significant increases in
relative excess mortality were those in
food/agriculture (39% increase),
transportation/logistics (31% increase),
facilities (23% increase), and
manufacturing (24% increase). Other
groups that also experienced excess,
statistically significant mortality
compared to pre-pandemic periods were
health or emergency workers (17%
increase), retail workers (21% increase),
and government and community
workers (17% increase). The study
authors concluded that certain
occupational sectors were impacted
disproportionally by mortality during
the pandemic and that essential work
conducted in-person is a likely avenue
of infection transmission.
Hawkins et al. (January 10, 2021)
examined death certificates of
individuals who died in Massachusetts
between March 1 and July 31, 2020. An
age-adjusted mortality rate of 16
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