Application — Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al., Applicants v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 20, 2021

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No.: _____________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC.,

ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS

OF ALABAMA, INC., INDEPENDENT ELECTRICAL

CONTRACTORS, INC., and

INDEPENDENT ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS – FWCC, INC.

Applicants,

v.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

__________

EMERGENCY APPLICATION OF ABC AND IEC

FOR IMMEDIATE STAY OF AGENCY ACTION

PENDING DISPOSITION OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

__________

To the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States

and Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit

__________

J. Larry Stine

Counsel of Record

WIMBERLY, LAWSON, STECKEL,

SCHNEIDER & STINE, P.C.

3400 Peachtree Road N.E.

Suite 400

Atlanta, Georgia 30326

(404) 365-0900

jls@wimlaw.com

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6, Applicants (“ABC and IEC”) state that no

individual Applicant has any parent corporation and that no publicly

held company owns any portion of any Applicant. Applicants further

state as follows:

Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. is a national

association of construction companies primarily in the commercial and

industrial sectors and represents over 21,000 companies nationwide.

Associated Builders and Contractors of Alabama, Inc. is a

chapter of ABC representing the interests of hundreds of member

construction contractors and related firms from all over Alabama, who

perform work in that state and throughout the country. Its membership

represents most specialties within the construction industry and is

comprised primarily of firms that perform work in the industrial and

commercial sectors.

Industrial Electrical Contractor, Inc. is a national association

of employers who provide electrical construction services.

i

Independent Electrical Contractor – FWCC, Inc. is the local

chapter of IEC in Florida and is an association of employers who provide

electrical contractors services found throughout the State of Florida.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

STATEMENT ............................................................................................. i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... v

TO THE HONORABLE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH, ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT: .................... 1

OPINION BELOW .................................................................................... 4

JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ 5

STATUTORY PROVISIONS..................................................................... 5

STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR GRANTING THE EMERGENCY

STAY .......................................................................................................... 6

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 8

I.

THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT FOUR

JUSTICES WOULD VOTE TO GRANT REVIEW, AND A

FAIR PROSPECT THAT A MAJORITY WOULD DECLARE

THE ETS UNLAWFUL. ......................................................... 9

A.

There is a Reasonable Probability that Four Justices Would

Vote to Grant Review in Order to Resolve the Evident

Conflict in the Circuits on an Issue of Extraordinary

Importance. ............................................................................. 9

B.

There is a fair prospect that a majority of this Court would

declare the ETS unlawful. .................................................... 10

1.

The Scope of OSHA’s Authority. ...................................... 10

a. 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) of the OSH Act does not Grant

Authority to OSHA to Require Vaccination. .............. 10

b. The ETS has no Force or Effect and Cannot be

Ratified Because the Person who Issued the ETS had

iii

no Authority to do so. ................................................. 14

2.

Major Questions Doctrine................................................. 14

3.

OSHA’s Basis for the ETS. ............................................... 15

a. The Authority Claimed by OSHA to Mandate

Vaccinations Exceeds the Authority Granted to OSHA

by 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(3).............................................. 16

b. Emergency and Grave Danger: The ETS Does not

Show an Emergency or Address a “Grave Danger” for

a Lower Risk Industry Like Construction. ................ 17

c. Necessity: OSHA Failed to Sufficiently Explain its

Dramatic Change of Position. .................................... 20

4.

Constitutional Challenges. ............................................... 23

a. Commerce Clause: The Tenth Amendment, which

Encompasses the Police Powers Reserved to the States,

Limits OSHA’s Authority to Mandate Vaccinations. 23

b. Non-Delegation Doctrine: The Authority Claimed by

OSHA in this Case Represents an Unlawful

Delegation of Legislative Power. ............................... 24

II.

ABSENT A STAY, THE OSHA ETS WILL CAUSE

IRREPARABLE HARM IN THE CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRY............................................................................ 25

A.

III.

Enforcement of the OSHA ETS will Cause Construction

Companies to Lose Irreplaceable Employees to Businesses

that do not Require COVID Vaccinations or Testing. .......... 26

THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS A STAY. ........ 32

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................................................. 34

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Page(s)

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,

141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) ................................................................ passim

Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray,

483 U.S. 1306 (1987) ......................................................................... 31

Asbestos Info. Association/N. Am. v. OSHA,

727 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1984) ....................................................... 19, 20

Bond v. United States,

572 U.S. 844, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) ................................................. 23

BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,

2021 WL 5279381, at *7 (5th Cir. 2021) ....................................... passim

Chamber of Com. v. EPA,

577 U.S. 1127 (2016) ..................................................................... 8, 29

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ....................................................................... 13

Dry Color Mfrs' Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor,

486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973) ................................................................. 19

Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro,

579 U.S. 211, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) ........................................... 20, 21

FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc.

556 U.S. 502, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009) ................................................... 20

Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) ............................................................. 19

Gibbons v. Ogden,

22 U.S. 1 (1824) ................................................................................. 23

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,

513 U.S. 561, 115 S. Ct. 1061, 131 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1995) ...................... 13

v

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U.S. 183 (2010) (per curiam) ........................................................ 9

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n,

432 U.S. 333 (1977) ............................................................................. 8

In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union,

830 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ............................................................ 18

In re: MCP No. 165, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. Rule on

COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing, (6th Cir., Dec. 17, 2021) ..... 8, 10, 32

Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API,

448 U.S. 607 (1980) ........................................................................... 15

Ledbetter v. Baldwin,

479 U.S. 1309 (1986) ......................................................................... 31

MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co.,

512 U.S. 218, 114 S. Ct. 2223, 129 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1994) .................. 13

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182267, 2020 WL 5847503

(N.D. Cal. 2020) ................................................................................. 28

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) ............................................ 23-24

Nken v. Holder,

556 U.S. 418 (2009) ............................................................................. 9

Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Auchter,

702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .......................................................... 18

Sehie v. City of Aurora,

432 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2005) ............................................................. 30

State of Georgia v. Biden, 21-cv-163, slip op.

at 14 (S.D. GA. Dec. 7. 2021) ....................................................... 28, 32

State of Georgia v. President,

No. 21-14269-F (11th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021) ........................................ 10, 32

vi

SW Gen. Inc. v. NLRB,

796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .............................................................. 14

Taylor Diving & Salvage Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,

537 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1976) ............................................................. 18

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,

510 U.S. 200 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) ...................................... 30

Tiger Lily, LLC v. United States HUD

5 F.4th 666 (6th Cir. 2021) .................................................................... 13

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014) ....................................................................... 2, 15

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952) ....................................................... 25

Zucht v. King,

260 U.S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24 (1922) ........................................................ 23

Federal Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 705 ............................................................................ 3, 5, 8, 14

5 U.S.C. § 3348 ...................................................................................... 14

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .................................................................................. 5, 8

28 U.S.C. § 1651 ...................................................................................... 5

28 U.S.C. § 2101 ...................................................................................... 8

29 U.S.C. § 655 .............................................................................. passim

29 U.S.C. § 669 .......................................................................... 10, 11, 13

29 U.S.C. § 1926 .................................................................................... 17

State Statutes

820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 235/1 (similar) ....................................................... 30

Cal. Lab. Code § 222.5 (similar) ............................................................ 30

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 336.220 ........................................................................ 30

Va. Code § 40.1-28 (similar) .................................................................. 30

vii

Rules

29 C.F.R. § 785.43 ................................................................................. 30

29 C.F.R. § 1910.501................................................................................ 24

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 ............................................................................ 12

29 C.F.R. § 1915 ...................................................................................... 26

29 C.F.R. § 1918 ...................................................................................... 26

29 C.F.R. § 1926 ...................................................................................... 26

29 C.F.R. § 1928 ...................................................................................... 26

F.R.A.P. 23.2 ........................................................................................ 3, 5

F.R.A.P. 25 ............................................................................................. 36

F.R.A.P. 25(a)(3) .................................................................................... 36

F.R.A.P. 29.6 ............................................................................................. i

Other

54 Fed. Reg. 23,042 ............................................................................... 12

86 Fed. Reg. 32,376 (June 21, 2021) ....................................................... 6

86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) ................................................ passim

Pub. L. No. 102-170, tit. I, § 100(b)

105 Stat. 1107, 1113-1114 (1991)............................................................ 12

viii

TO THE HONORABLE BRETT M. KAVANAUGH,

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT:

Applicants are trade associations (“ABC and IEC”) representing

tens of thousands of construction contractors throughout the United

States representing most specialties within the construction industry.

Many of Applicants’ members are directly and irreparably harmed by the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) “COVID-19

Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard.” 86 Fed. Reg.

61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) (the “ETS”). They respectfully request an

immediate stay of the ETS.

At issue is whether OSHA has statutory authority under the ETS

section of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) create a vaccine-and-testing

regime for all businesses with 100 or more employees, without prior

notice and public comment, thereby reaching over 25% of the entire

population, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,475. Absent an emergency stay, the unlawful

ETS will impose massive and irreparable burdens on the construction

industry, effective immediately.

The Fifth Circuit in BST Holdings, LLC v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604 (5th

Cir. 2021) found that the Petitioners had met the requirements for a stay

1

and issued a stay. After consolidation in the Sixth Circuit, multiple

petitioners in the Sixth Circuit filed motions for an initial en banc review,

which were denied in an 8 to 8 vote. In the dissent, 8 judges found that

the Petitioners had a substantial likelihood of success, and that OSHA

had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm if the stay was lifted.

Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit on December 17, 2021, vacated the Fifth

Circuit’s stay of the OSHA ETS. A conflict in the circuits therefore exists

on an issue of extraordinary importance, impacting 80 million workers

and a substantial portion of the business community. All of this calls for

immediate action by this Court to preserve the status quo by again

staying the OSHA ETS pending further review on the merits.

The Sixth Circuit failed to acknowledge that there is no language

in the OSH Act authorizing OSHA to require vaccinations. Instead, as

further discussed below, the Act grants a limited immunization authority

exclusively to HHS, an entirely different agency. Under such

circumstances, the major-questions doctrine prohibits OSHA from

“discover[ing] in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a

significant portion of the American economy.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v.

EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). In addition, OSHA has failed to

2

demonstrate that the ETS is necessary to address a “grave danger” to the

many different industries, which the blunderbuss new standard purports

to regulate in this unprecedented manner. The construction industry is

entitled to separate consideration, as evidenced by OSHA’s own

longstanding regulations, particularly because most construction

workers have been recognized by OSHA itself to be at much lower risk of

infection in the workplace. At the same time, because construction

industry employees are well known to be more transient than in other

industries, construction businesses are at a very high risk of losing

workers who have made abundantly clear that they will relocate to

employers with below 100 employees who will not be covered by the

standard. OSHA gave no consideration to the impact of its ETS on

construction and a variety of other industries, already facing a severe

labor shortage, who will suffer irreparable harm from enforcement of the

ETS.

A likelihood of success and irreparable harm are all that 5 U.S.C.

§ 705 requires for a stay pending review, but the equities also favor a

stay. Under the Court’s Rule 23.2, this Court is the only remaining option

for a stay, and unless this Court immediately stays the effective date

3

of the ETS, OSHA’s unlawful action will begin to inflict significant and

irreparable harm to the economy as the country struggles through the

holiday season and beyond.

Restoring the pre-ETS status quo does not require this Court to

question the efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines. But the reality is that tens

of millions of Americans remain unpersuaded.. The goal of getting more

Americans vaccinated does not allow the Executive Branch to use

regulatory fiat compelling regulated businesses to achieve a drastic

social, economic, and political change via the limited “emergency” power

that Congress authorized. Ala. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2490.

This Court should therefore immediately stay OSHA’s unlawful action,

pending disposition of ABC’s petition for review, along with those of other

similarly affected organizations.

OPINION BELOW

OSHA published its ETS at 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 on Nov. 5, 2021

(Appendix 1). The Fifth Circuit’s November 6 order granting a stay

pending further review is unpublished but can be found at 2021 WL

5166656. The Fifth Circuit’s November 12, 2021, opinion and order

4

granting a stay of the effective date of the ETS can be found at 17 F.4th

604 and is attached as Appendix 2.

The Sixth Circuit’s 8-8 decision on Dec. 15 denying initial hearing

en banc is attached as Appendix 3. The Sixth Circuit’s December 17,

2021, opinion and order dissolving the Fifth Circuit’s stay is attached as

Appendix 4.

This Court is the only remaining option for a stay, pursuant to Rule

23.2, in light of the Sixth Circuit’s panel decision and that court’s en banc

refusal to keep the Fifth Circuit’s stay in place.

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1). The Court has authority to grant the Applicants relief under

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 705, and the All Writs Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

All relevant statutory provisions are attached to this Application as

Appendix 5.

5

STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

EMERGENCY STAY

The OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1), allows OSHA to establish an

emergency temporary standard if, and only if, “employees are exposed to

grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be

toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards,” and “such emergency

standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.”

In January 2020, the President directed OSHA to review COVID19 and issue an ETS. On June 21, 2021, OSHA issued an ETS limited to

the healthcare industry and healthcare employees and no other

industries, and it did not deem it necessary to require vaccines or testing.

86 Fed. Reg. 32,376. On September 9, 2021, in what the President’s chief

of staff declared to be a “workaround” of the lack of statutory authority1

the President directed OSHA to issue an emergency temporary standard

requiring all employers with “100 or more employees to ensure their

workforce is fully vaccinated or require any workers who remain

BST Holding, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 612 n.13 (5th Cir. Nov. 12,

2021) (“On September 9, 2021, White House Chief of Staff Ron Klain

retweeted MSNBC anchor Stephanie Ruhle’s tweet that stated, “OSHA

doing this vaxx mandate as an emergency workplace safety rule is the

ultimate work-around for the Federal govt to require vaccinations.”).

1

6

unvaccinated to produce a negative test result on at least a weekly basis

before coming to work.” The White House, Vaccinating the Unvaccinated,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/covidplan/ (last visited December 14, 2021).

On November 5, 2021, OSHA published the emergency temporary

standard at issue. 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,402. Among many requirements,

this ETS requires most employers with 100 or more employees to

determine the vaccination status of their employees thirty days from the

issuance date and sixty days from that date to require unvaccinated

employees to either get fully vaccinated or submit to weekly COVID-19

testing. Id. Many workers in the construction industry, a significant

percentage of whom are unvaccinated, have indicated to their employers

in no uncertain terms that they will quit or be terminated rather than be

vaccinated or constantly tested at considerable expense. Because of the

uniquely transient, project-by-project nature of the construction

workforce, employees of companies covered by the OSHA ETS 100worker threshold can easily relocate to smaller companies, thereby

exacerbating the labor shortage and dislocations occurring throughout

the industry.

7

On November 12, 2021, the Fifth Circuit stayed the effective date

of the ETS, granting relief to all petitioners with pending stay motions.

BST Holdings, LLC, 17 F.4th at 619 & n.23.

Following briefing and without oral argument, on December 17,

2021, the Sixth Circuit vacated the Fifth Circuit’s stay of the ETS and

denied all other consolidated petitioners’ pending motions to stay. In re:

MCP No. 165, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. Rule on COVID-19

Vaccination and Testing, (6th Cir., Dec. 17, 2021) (hereinafter In re: MCP

No. 165, Slip Op.).

ARGUMENT

Under 5 U.S.C. § 705, this Court “may issue all necessary and

appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 2101; Chamber of Com. v. EPA, 577 U.S. 1127

(2016) (granting pre-judgment application to stay federal agency action

in order to forestall immediate, burdensome compliance causing

irreparable harm if not enjoined). The Applicants are trade associations

who have standing to represent the interests of thousands of their

construction industry members around the country, pursuant to Hunt v.

Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

8

The following stay factors are all present here: “(1) a reasonable

probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently

meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of the

Court w[ould] vote to reverse [a] judgment below [by enjoining OSHA’s

ETS]; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the

denial of a stay.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per

curiam); See also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (“[B]alanc[ing]

the equities and weigh[ing] the relative harms to the applicant and to the

respondent.”).

I.

THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT FOUR

JUSTICES WOULD VOTE TO GRANT REVIEW, AND A

FAIR PROSPECT THAT A MAJORITY WOULD DECLARE

THE ETS UNLAWFUL.

A.

There is a Reasonable Probability that Four Justices

Would Vote to Grant Review in Order to Resolve the

Evident Conflict in the Circuits on an Issue of

Extraordinary Importance.

As discussed above, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits reached opposite

conclusions on staying the OSHA ETS, and specifically the following

issues: the scope of OSHA’s authority, the major questions doctrine,

OSHA’s statutory basis for the ETS (including whether the factors of

emergency, grave danger, and necessity existed), the Commerce Clause

(including the police powers reserved to the States), the nondelegation

9

doctrine, irreparable harm, and the balancing of the equities. The

importance of this conflict is extraordinary in that immediate

enforcement of the OSHA ETS will have a huge impact on the entire

nation’s economy and the rule of law.

An additional conflict is presented by the Eleventh Circuit’s recent

order in State of Georgia v. President, No. 21-14269-F (11th Cir. Dec. 17,

2021), which found with respect to the federal contractor mandate, that

the federal government cannot establish that it will suffer irreparable

injury absent a stay.

B.

There is a fair prospect that a majority of this Court

would declare the ETS unlawful.

1.

The Scope of OSHA’s Authority.

a.

29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) of the OSH Act does not

Grant Authority to OSHA to Require

Vaccination.

The Sixth Circuit majority misunderstood Section 669(a)(5). The

Sixth

Circuit

concluded

that,

because

669(a)(5)

referenced

“immunization,” OSHA must have authority to require immunization

somewhere in the OSH Act. Yet, the Sixth Circuit failed to properly

identify where such authority exists. In re: MCP No. 165, Slip Op.at 11).

Section 669, however, assigns the responsibilities at issue here, i.e.,

10

vaccinations, solely to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

(now Secretary of Health and Human Services), not to OSHA.

Specifically, Section 669(a)(5) states:

The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, in order to

comply with his responsibilities under paragraph (2), and in

order to develop needed information regarding potentially

toxic substances or harmful physical agents, may prescribe

regulations requiring employers to measure, record, and

make reports on the exposure of employees to substances or

physical agents which the Secretary of Health, Education,

and Welfare reasonably believes may endanger the health or

safety of employees. The Secretary of Health, Education, and

Welfare also is authorized to establish such programs of

medical examinations and tests as may be necessary for

determining the incidence of occupational illnesses and the

susceptibility of employees to such illnesses. Nothing in this

or any other provision of this Act shall be deemed to

authorize

or

require

medical

examination,

immunization, or treatment for those who object thereto

on religious grounds, except where such is necessary for

the protection of the health or safety of others. Upon the

request of any employer who is required to measure and

record exposure of employees to substances or physical agents

as provided under this subsection, the Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare shall furnish full financial or other

assistance to such employer for the purpose of defraying any

additional expense incurred by him in carrying out the

measuring and recording as provided in this subsection.

29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(5) (emphasis added). Section 669(a)(5) is not a grant

of authority to OSHA but is a limitation on any authority granted by the

OSH Act to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and/or OSHA.

11

Neither the Sixth Circuit nor OSHA has cited any other provision of the

OSH Act that grants OSHA authority to require vaccinations or any

other medical treatment.

OSHA cannot justify the ETS by relying on bloodborne pathogen

legislation. OSHA asserts that legislation adopting OSHA’s bloodborne

pathogen standard “illustrates Congress’s understanding that OSHA has

authority to issue standards addressing workplace exposure to viruses.”

Doc. 69, pp 16-17. The legislation, however, merely adopted OSHA’s

proposed bloodborne pathogen standard if OSHA did not act by a date

certain. Pub. L. No. 102-170, tit. I, § 100(b), 105 Stat. 1107, 1113-1114

(1991). Notably, the bloodborne pathogen standard, as adopted by

Congress, did not mandate vaccinations; instead, the standard required

employers to bear the cost of any vaccine, to make the vaccine available,

and to provide information to the employees about the benefits of the

vaccine.2 The standard as adopted by OSHA did not change these

“OSHA believes a hepatitis B vaccination program where employers

bear the cost of the vaccine, make the vaccine available to employees at

a reasonable time and place, and provide information about the benefits

of the vaccine is the most appropriate way to assure that a large

percentage of eligible employees are vaccinated. The Agency seeks

comment on whether this voluntary approach is the correct approach.”

54 Fed. Reg. at 23,045.

2

12

requirements. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(f)(1), (g)(2)(vii)(I). Neither the

Sixth Circuit nor OSHA can cite any legislation that authorizes OSHA to

mandate, as opposed to make available, vaccinations.

OSHA certainly cannot use the very limited authority set forth in

Section 669(a)(5) as the basis for the broad authority to mandate vaccines

as set forth in the ETS. As the Supreme Court held in Dep’t of Homeland

Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1925 (2020). “Because

we must interpret the statutes “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory

scheme,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569, 115 S. Ct. 1061, 131

L. Ed. 2d 1 (1995), these grants of authority must be read alongside the

express limits contained within the statute.”

In determining what authority Congress statutorily delegated to an

agency, the courts look “not only [to] the ultimate purposes Congress has

selected, but [to] the means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed,

for the pursuit of those purposes.” Tiger Lily, LLC v. United States HUD,

5 F.4th 666 at 670-71 (6th Cir. 2021), citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.

AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4, 114 S. Ct. 2223, 129 L. Ed. 2d 182

(1994). Thus, this Court must hold OSHA to the text of Section

§ 669(a)(5), which, at best, vests HHS only when it is engaged in

13

measuring

and

recording

with

limited

authority

regarding

immunizations. Nowhere in the text of that statute, or anywhere else in

the OSH Act, is there any authority for what OSHA purports to do in the

ETS.

b.

The ETS has no Force or Effect and Cannot

be Ratified Because the Person who Issued

the ETS had no Authority to do so.

The ETS was issued on November 5, 2021, by James Frederick, who

purported to be the “Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor.” 86 Fed. Reg.

at 61,551. In reality, there was no “Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor”

on November 5, 2021, because two days before the ETS’s issuance the

confirmed Assistant Secretary of Labor, Douglas L. Parker, was sworn

in.3 Accordingly, Frederick had no authority to issue this rule. See SW

Gen. Inc., 796 F.3d at 81–83; 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d) and 3345(a). Because

Frederick had no authority to issue the ETS, the ETS has no force or

effect and cannot be ratified. Id..

2.

Major Questions Doctrine.

For the reasons fully explained in the Fifth Circuit’s BST decision

imposing the stay, and in the dissenting opinion in the Sixth Circuit’s

OSHA, Special Edition Meet OSHA’s New Leader (Nov. 3, 2021)

https://www.osha.gov/quicktakes/11032021.

3

14

decision lifting the stay, this Court has repeatedly declared that federal

agencies such as OSHA cannot claim the right to exercise “unprecedented

power over American industry” in the absence of “a clear mandate”

expressed by Congress in a statute. . . See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573

U.S. at 324; Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 141

S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021). Specifically with regard to OSHA, this Court

has held that Congress has “narrowly circumscribed [OSHA’s] power to

issue temporary emergency standards” and has “repeatedly expressed its

concern about allowing the Secretary to have too much power over

American industry.” Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607,

651 (1980). Congress has enacted no clear mandate for OSHA to take the

currently challenged action, which is unprecedented in its scope and the

burdens it is imposing on the business community. The Sixth Circuit

improperly glossed over the foregoing holdings of this Court in lifting the

stay which the Fifth Circuit had correctly imposed. For this reason alone,

this emergency appeal to reinstate the stay should be granted.

3.

OSHA’s Basis for the ETS.

15

a.

The Authority Claimed by OSHA to Mandate

Vaccinations Exceeds the Authority Granted

to OSHA by 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(3).

Aside from the authority erroneously claimed to have under Section

669(a)(5) to mandate vaccines, OSHA claims to have inherent standard

setting authority under Section 655(b) to mandate vaccinations, which is

a medical procedure, but again Congress did not grant OSHA such

authority.

Section 655(b) does not grant OSHA authority to compel

vaccinations or any other medical treatments. Instead, Section 655(b)(7)

limits OSHA’s rulemaking authority as follows in pertinent part:

(7) In addition, where appropriate, any such standard shall

prescribe the type and frequency of medical

examinations or other tests which shall be made

available, by the employer or at his cost, to employees

exposed to such hazards in order to most effectively

determine whether the health of such employees is

adversely affected by such exposure.

29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (emphasis added). Section 655(b)(7) allows OSHA

to require that certain information about the hazard be given to

employees and that certain medical examinations and other tests be

made available to employees, but Section 655(b)(7) does not grant OSHA

authority to mandate vaccinations or any other medical treatments.

16

Section 655(b)(7) allows OSHA only to prescribe the medical

examinations and other tests that employers should make available to

employees.

Thus,

although

OSHA

can

prescribe

the

medical

examinations and tests which shall be made available to employees by

employers, OSHA does not have statutory authority to compel employees,

or to require employers to compel employees, to submit to such medical

examinations and other tests.

b.

Emergency and Grave Danger: The ETS Does

not Show an Emergency or Address a “Grave

Danger” for a Lower Risk Industry Like

Construction.

The ETS also exceeds OSHA’s authority because the Secretary

cannot adequately show that “employees are exposed to grave danger

from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or

physically harmful or from new hazards.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1) nor that

an emergency exists. This is particularly true in the construction

industry, where most employees perform their work outside or in socially

distant situations while wearing personal protective equipment already

specified by extensive OSHA regulations tailored to the industry. See 29

U.S.C. § 1926; 86 Fed Reg 61412-13 (11/5/2021): “There is no

comprehensive source of nationwide workplace infection data….” So,

17

OSHA relied on anecdotal, unverified state and local reports of workplace

exposures to COVID. A remarkable number of these unvetted “studies”

showed no correlation between COVID and construction work.

In deciding whether to exercise the “extraordinary power” to issue

an ETS, OSHA must determine whether “employees are exposed to grave

danger” in the workplace, and whether an emergency standard including

mandatory vaccination or weekly testing is “necessary” to protect them

from such workplace danger. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c); In re Int’l Chem. Workers

Union, 830 F.2d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Such a determination is

necessarily based upon “‘considerations of policy as well as empirically

verifiable facts.’” Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp., 702 F.2d at 1156

(quoting Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 655 n.62, 65

L. Ed. 2d 1010, 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980)).

Here, OSHA is really attempting to use the ETS as an interim relief

measure—exactly the reason courts have said OSHA may not implement

an ETS. “[T]he ETS statute is not to be used merely as an interim relief

measure but treated as an extraordinary power to be used only in ‘limited

situations’ in which a grave danger exists, and then, to be ‘delicately

exercised.’” Id. (citing Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter,

18

702 F.2d 1150, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); See also Taylor Diving & Salvage

Co., 537 F.2d at 820-21; Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n, 489 F.2d at 129; Dry

Color Mfrs’ Ass’n, 486 F.2d at 104 n.9. “[T]he plain wording of the statute

limits [the court] to assessing the . . . grave danger that the ETS may

alleviate, during the six-month period that is the life of the standard.”

Asbestos Info. Association/N. Am. v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415, 422 (5th Cir.

1984). “The Agency cannot use its ETS powers as a stop-gap measure.

This would allow it to displace its clear obligations to promulgate rules

after public notice and opportunity for comment in any case, not just in

those in which an ETS is necessary to avert grave danger.” Asbestos, 727

F.2d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 1984). Of course, OSHA did issue an ETS related

to COVID 19 on June 21, 2021, and the six-month period of that ETS

expires on December 21, 2021. OSHA is attempting to extend the sixmonth period on COVID-19 by issuing a new ETS, which is not

authorized by the Act.

Furthermore, COVID-19 cannot be said to be a “grave danger” at

every industry or in every job site in the nation with more than 100

employees. The consequences of COVID-19 depend significantly on the

19

age and the health of the person infected by the virus. 4 Older people and

those with weakened immune systems tend to be the most susceptible

and at risk of death if they contract COVID-19. 5 Younger adults who

perform most construction work, and those who are not immunecompromised are less likely to die or be hospitalized from COVID-19. Id.

Therefore, it is the condition of the individual and their working

conditions that determine whether COVID-19 is a “grave danger”—not

the number of workers at the individual’s company.

c.

Necessity: OSHA Failed to Sufficiently

Explain its Dramatic Change of Position.

When an agency changes its existing position, it must “display

awareness that it is changing position” and “show that there are good

reasons for the new policy.” Encino Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, 579

U.S. 211, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124-25 (2016) (quoting FCC v. Fox TV

Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515, 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009)). “In such cases

it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy

CDC, COVID-19 Risks and Vaccine Information for Older Adults

(Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/aging/covid19/covid19-olderadults.html.

4

5

Id.

20

change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts

and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”

Fox Television Stations, supra, at 515-516, 129 S. Ct. 1800. It follows that

an “[u]nexplained inconsistency” in agency policy is “a reason for holding

an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency

practice.” Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. 211, 136 S. Ct. at 2125-26. An

arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort is itself unlawful and

receives no Chevron deference. Id.

The government has indulged in just such arbitrary and capricious

policy flip-flops here. President Biden was opposed to mandatory

vaccinations until he was for them. On January 21, 2021, President

Biden instructed OSHA to prepare an Emergency Temporary Standard

(ETS) to protect worker health and safety from COVID 19. On June 21,

2021, six months later, OSHA issued an ETS to protect healthcare

workers with certain safety measures; however, OSHA did not find a

grave danger to the employees in other industries. Furthermore, OSHA

did not mandate vaccines or weekly testing even for healthcare workers

that had the greatest exposure to COVID-19. On September 9, 2021,

President Biden announced that his “patience was wearing thin” and

21

directed all federal agencies to require vaccines. On November 5, 2021,

OSHA issued a second ETS, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402, directed to all industries

for employers of 100 or more employees to require COVID vaccines or

mandatory weekly testing.

When the government undertakes a dramatic change of course,

from opposition to vaccine mandates to their imposition, Encino suggests

that some sort of explanation is in order. Yet no reasoned explanation

has been offered. See BST Holdings, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33698, at *14

& n.11. In its Motion, OSHA merely asserts that the Delta variant

created a new danger after June 21, 2021, (Doc. 69, p. 14). That

explanation fails because WHO designated the Delta variant as a variant

of concern on May 10, 2021, and the Delta variant already accounted for

a significant percentage of sequenced virus samples in the U.S. as of June

21, 2021. 6 In addition, we are now dealing with the Omicron variant of

COVID, which the “CDC expects that anyone with Omicron infection can

spread the virus to others, even if they are vaccinated or don’t have

symptoms.”7 This certainly impacts the effectiveness of the vaccines.

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/10/health/delta-variant-indiaexplained-coronavirus-intl-cmd/index.html

7 Omicron Variant: What You Need to Know;

6

22

4.

Constitutional Challenges.

a.

Commerce Clause: The Tenth Amendment,

which Encompasses the Police Powers

Reserved to the States, Limits OSHA’s

Authority to Mandate Vaccinations.

Nowhere in the CONSTITUTION is the federal government given

authority to dictate that people must be vaccinated or must submit to any

other medical treatment. 8 It has long been the States’ power to legislate

health—including vaccination. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824)

(noting “health laws of every description” belong to the states); BST

Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 2021 WL

5279381, at *7 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43

S. Ct. 24 (1922) (noting that precedent had long “settled that it is within

the police power of a state to provide for compulsory vaccination.

Sometimes “the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional

problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent” for an agency’s action.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549, 132 S. Ct. 2566

www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/omicron-variant.html )last

visited December 19, 2021)

Although OSHA relies on the Commerce and Supremacy clauses, those

clauses neither explicitly nor implicitly grant the federal government any

authority over the medical treatment decisions made by the people.

8

23

(2012). With such a history of exclusive State power, this Court should

be certain that Congress intended for OSHA to require vaccinations for

millions of Americans. See Bond, 572 U.S. at 858, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (noting

“it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent

before finding that federal law overrides the usual constitutional balance

of federal and state powers” (internal quotations omitted)).

Despite the plain language of the Tenth Amendment and the

Supreme Court’s continued recognition of the States’ power in matters of

public health, including COVID-19, the ETS claims “to preempt

inconsistent state and local requirements relating to these issues,

including requirements that ban or limit employers’ authority to require

vaccination, face covering, or testing, regardless of the number of

employees.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,551, § 1910.501(a) (Nov. 5, 2021). Yet, how

can federal preemption apply to matters of public health that are within

the police powers reserved to the States? It cannot.

b.

Non-Delegation Doctrine: The Authority

Claimed by OSHA in this Case Represents an

Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power.

As discussed above, The Supreme Court “expect[s] Congress to

speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast

24

economic and political significance.” Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v.

Department of Health and Human Services, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021).

“[O]ur system does not permit agencies to act unlawfully even in pursuit

of desirable ends.” Id. at 2490, citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 582, 585-586, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952) (concluding that

even the Government’s belief that its action “was necessary to avert a

national catastrophe” could not overcome a lack of congressional

authorization). If the major-policy doctrine is violated, then in effect

Congress has unlawfully delegated legislative authority. If the OSH Act

allows the Secretary to impose a COVID-19 vaccine mandate on tens of

millions of Americans – through the “workaround” of forcing the entire

business community to act as the chief enforcers of such a policy, then

the Act allows almost anything. This Court has held the Act must not be

interpreted so broadly, and the CONSTITUTION is violated if that principle

is not sustained here.

II.

ABSENT A STAY, THE OSHA ETS WILL CAUSE

IRREPARABLE HARM IN THE CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRY.

A stay of the OSHA ETS is necessary because in the absence of a

stay, the ETS will have immediate adverse and irreparable impacts on

25

the construction industry. The ETS forces construction businesses to

come into compliance with massively burdensome obligations even as

they confront workplace shortages, supply chain disruptions, and yearend customer demands. Among these obligations are developing a

mandatory vaccination policy or testing and face-covering policy,

determining the vaccination status of their employees, and informing

employees about the ETS,9 vaccine efficacy and the criminal penalties

associated with providing false information and documentation. 86 Fed.

Reg. at 61,552, 61,554. The ETS will directly cause ABC’s members to

suffer myriad irreparable injuries: enormous nonrecoverable compliance

costs, loss of employees, lost profits, lost sales to competitors who are not

subject to the ETS, and loss of goodwill and reputation control.

A.

Enforcement of the OSHA ETS will Cause

Construction Companies to Lose Irreplaceable

Employees to Businesses that do not Require COVID

Vaccinations or Testing.

Although OSHA claims that employers with more than 100

employees “will have sufficient administrative systems in place to comply

Emergency Temporary Standard – COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing;

Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) (to

be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1918, 1926, and 1928) (hereafter

“ETS”).

9

26

quickly with the ETS[,]” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,403, the agency’s confidence

is unsupported by any data in the construction industry. Even if

employers and their employees can comply with the paperwork and

testing acquisition requirements of the reinstated ETS, ABC’s and IEC’s

member employers are reporting that significant percentages of their

skilled employees will quit or accept termination if the ETS is enforced.

Indeed, studies show that between 38-50% of unvaccinated employees

say they would rather quit than submit to vaccination mandates. 86 Fed.

Reg. at 61,475. These employees are irreplaceable. The construction

industry workforce is inherently transient and mobile, and employees

can and will easily take their services to smaller contractors who are not

as yet covered by the ETS.

This is not mere speculation: ABC’s and IEC’s members, many of

whom are small businesses under SBA guidelines even if they employ

100 or more employees, have been told in no uncertain terms that

significant numbers of their unvaccinated employees will leave if the

mandate is enforced. As one of many examples, the Executive Vice

President of Cajun Industries Holding, LLC, a member of ABC, stated in

a sworn declaration made part of the record in another federal court

27

proceeding that “many of its unvaccinated workers (over half its total

workforce) will quit if they are required to be vaccinated.” State of

Georgia v. Biden, 21-cv-163, slip op. at 14 (S.D. GA. Dec. 7. 2021). And

once this skilled employee exodus starts, it will be difficult, if not

impossible, for ABC’s members to replace them. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs.

v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182267, 2020

WL 5847503 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (ruling that skilled and unskilled workers

are not “fungible.”)

Moreover, the employers likely to be adversely affected employ

highly skilled trade- and crafts-persons, such as licensed plumbers,

electricians, ironworkers, and welders, for whom replacements simply

are not readily available; indeed, it is projected that the construction

industry already confronts a shortage of 430,000 craft workers in 2021.10

The Construction Industry Needs to Hire an Additional 430,000 Craft

Professionals in 2021, March 23, 2021, ABC News Release. See also

https://www.housingwire.com/articles/construction-worker-shortagehas-reached-crisis-levels/. (The construction industry needs more than

61,000 new hires every month, if we are to keep up with both industry

growth and the loss of workers either through retirement or simply

leaving the sector for good,” said Home Builders Institute CEO Ed

Brady. “From 2022 through 2024, this total represents a need for an

additional 2.2 million new hires for construction. That’s a staggering

number.”).

10

28

OSHA has acknowledged the risk that workers will quit rather than

accept a vaccination or testing requirement but claims that the “data

suggests that the number of employees who actually leave . . . is much

lower.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 61,475. OSHA speculates that only 1-3% of total

employees will quit because of the mandate. Id. But OSHA’s 1-3%

estimate relies on a single article that summarizes data from health care

workers—in Vermont. Id. at n.42. In short, OSHA’s estimate is not based

in reality.

B.

The ETS Imposes Nonrecoverable Compliance Costs on

Businesses.

ABC and IEC‘s members that have 100 or more employees

immediately face the “irreparable harm” of significant nonrecoverable

compliance costs if they are required to comply with the OSHA ETS. Ala.

Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2489; see, e.g., Chamber of Com. v.

EPA, 577 U.S. at 1127 (granting stay to prevent nonrecoverable

compliance costs).

The direct costs of ETS compliance are significant. OSHA itself

predicts that compliance will cost employers nearly $3 billion. 86 Fed.

Reg. at 61,493. Indirect costs, such as “testing-related costs [that] are not

included in the [ETS’s] main [cost] analysis,” are equally substantial. 86

29

Fed. Reg. at 61,484. Most states require employers “to pay the cost of a

medical examination” that is necessary “as a condition of employment.”

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 336.220; see Cal. Lab. Code § 222.5 (similar); 820 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 235/1 (similar); Va. Code § 40.1-28 (similar). Although

employers in some other states could theoretically require employees to

pay for their own testing, that prospect is unlikely in this historically

tight labor market. And no matter who pays for the test itself, employers

in every state must pay for “[t]ime spent by an employee in waiting for

and receiving medical attention on the premises or at the direction of the

employer during the employee’s normal working hours.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 785.43 (emphasis added); See Sehie v. City of Aurora, 432 F.3d 749, 751

(7th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s ruling that “time . . . spent

attending and traveling to and from [employer-mandated] counseling

sessions” was compensable under federal wage-and-hour laws, even

though travel and sessions occurred outside of employee’s “normal fortyhour work week”).

If the ETS is ultimately invalidated (and ABC and IEC believe that

it will be invalidated), ABC and IEC’s members will never be able to

recover their compliance costs. Because federal agencies generally

30

possess sovereign immunity from monetary damages claims, “a

regulation later held invalid almost always produces the irreparable

harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510

U.S. at 220-21 (Scalia, J., concurring). Sovereign immunity and other de

facto barriers to monetary recovery against the government have long

been sufficient to convert monetary costs into irreparable harm. See, e.g.,

Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1306, 1309 (1987) (Blackmun,

J., in chambers) (paying an unconstitutional state tax is irreparable harm

because “there is a substantial risk [that the Applicants] will not be able

to obtain a refund if the tax ultimately is declared unconstitutional”);

Ledbetter v. Baldwin, 479 U.S. 1309 (1986) (Powell, J., in chambers)

(nonrecoverable administrative costs of complying with an unlawful

court order to restructure state regulations is irreparable harm).

Consequently, this lack of a “guarantee of eventual recovery” makes

compliance costs here irreparable. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at

2489.

Accordingly, preserving the status quo by reinstating the stay of the

OSHA ETS pending review on the merits is vital to allowing the

construction industry to continue its fragile recovery from the pandemic.

31

III. THE BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES FAVORS A STAY.

Staying the enforcement of the OSHA ETS is in the public interest.

“From economic uncertainty to workplace strife, the mere specter of the

Mandate has contributed to untold economic upheaval in recent months.”

BST Holdings, 2021 WL 5279381, at *8. “The public interest is also

served by maintaining our constitutional structure and . . . the liberty of

individuals to make intensely personal decisions according to their own

convictions.” Id.

The government would suffer little, if any, harm from maintaining

the “status quo” through the litigation of this case. Georgia v. Biden, No.

21-14269-F (11th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).

Enforcing an unlawful rule is not in the public interest, even in the

context of a public health emergency. “Because OSHA’s authority extends

only to regulating the workplace, the equities embedded in the stay

factors do not extend to the costs to society of having unvaccinated

Americans. They extend only to the risks to workers and companies.” In

re: MCP No. 165, En Banc Order at 30 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting). In any

event, there is no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency

action. As the Supreme Court said in Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, “[i]t is

32

indisputable that the public has a strong interest in combating the spread

of the COVID–19[;]” however, “our system does not permit agencies to act

unlawfully even in pursuit of desirable ends.” 141 S. Ct. at 2490.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, ABC and IEC respectfully request an

immediate stay of the effective date of OSHA’s “COVID-19 Vaccination

and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard,” 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov.

5, 2021).

In the alternative, this Court may treat this application as both a

motion to stay and a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment; stay

the ETS pending resolution of Applicants’ petition for review; and set the

case for expedited plenary review.

Respectfully Submitted this 20th day of December 2021.

/s/ J. Larry Stine

J. Larry Stine

Counsel of Record

WIMBERLY LAWSON STECKEL

SCHNEIDER & STINE, PC

3400 Peachtree Road, N.E.

Suite 400 – Lenox Road

Atlanta, GA 30326-1107

404-365-0900 – Phone

404-261-3707 – Fax

jls@wimlaw.com

33

No.: _____________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

ASSOCIATED BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC., ET AL.,

Applicants,

v.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,

Respondents.

__________

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

__________

As required by Supreme Court Rule 29.5(b), I hereby certify that a

copy of the “Emergency Application of ABC and IEC for Immediate Stay

of Agency Action Pending Disposition of Petition for Review” of the

Occupational

Safety

and

Health

Administration’s

“COVID-19

Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard,” 86 Fed. Reg.

61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021), was served via electronic service on all parties

required and was served on the following via electronic service and

overnight mail:

Elizabeth Prelogar

Solicitor General of the United States

Room 5616

Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW

34

Washington, DC 20530-0001

Edmund C. Baird

Associate Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health

U.S. Department of Labor

Office of the Solicitor,

Suite S4004

200 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20210

Seema Nanda

Solicitor of Labor

U.S. Department of Labor

Office of the Solicitor,

Suite S4004

200 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20210

DATED: December 20, 2021

/s/ J. Larry Stine

J. Larry Stine

Counsel of Record

35

Appendix 1

APP. 1

61402

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration

29 CFR Parts 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918,

1926, and 1928

[Docket No. OSHA–2021–0007]

RIN 1218–AD42

COVID–19 Vaccination and Testing;

Emergency Temporary Standard

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA), Department of

Labor.

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for

comments.

SUMMARY: The Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA) is

issuing an emergency temporary

standard (ETS) to protect unvaccinated

employees of large employers (100 or

more employees) from the risk of

contracting COVID–19 by strongly

encouraging vaccination. Covered

employers must develop, implement,

and enforce a mandatory COVID–19

vaccination policy, with an exception

for employers that instead adopt a

policy requiring employees to either get

vaccinated or elect to undergo regular

COVID–19 testing and wear a face

covering at work in lieu of vaccination.

DATES: The rule is effective November 5,

2021. The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the rule is

approved by the Director of the Federal

Register as of November 5, 2021.

Compliance dates: Compliance dates

for specific provisions are in 29 CFR

1910.501(m).

Comments: Written comments,

including comments on any aspect of

this ETS and whether this ETS should

become a final rule, must be submitted

by December 6, 2021 in Docket No.

OSHA–2021–0007. Comments on the

information collection determination

described in Additional Requirements

(Section V.K. of this preamble) (OMB

review under the Paperwork Reduction

Act of 1995) may be submitted by

January 4, 2022 in Docket No. OSHA–

2021–0008.

ADDRESSES: In accordance with 28

U.S.C. 2112(a), the Agency designates

Edmund C. Baird, the Associate

Solicitor for Occupational Safety and

Health, Office of the Solicitor, U.S.

Department of Labor, to receive

petitions for review of the ETS. Service

can be accomplished by email to zzSOLCovid19-ETS@dol.gov.

Written comments. You may submit

comments and attachments, identified

by Docket No. OSHA–2021–0007,

electronically at www.regulations.gov,

which is the Federal e-Rulemaking

Portal. Follow the online instructions

for making electronic submissions.

Instructions: All submissions must

include the agency’s name and the

docket number for this rulemaking

(Docket No. OSHA–2021–0007). All

comments, including any personal

information you provide, are placed in

the public docket without change and

may be made available online at

www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA

cautions commenters about submitting

information they do not want made

available to the public, or submitting

materials that contain personal

information (either about themselves or

others), such as Social Security

Numbers and birthdates.

Docket: To read or download

comments or other material in the

docket, go to Docket No. OSHA–2021–

0007 at www.regulations.gov. All

comments and submissions are listed in

the www.regulations.gov index;

however, some information (e.g.,

copyrighted material) is not publicly

available to read or download through

that website. All comments and

submissions, including copyrighted

material, are available for inspection

through the OSHA Docket Office.

Documents submitted to the docket by

OSHA or stakeholders are assigned

document identification numbers

(Document ID) for easy identification

and retrieval. The full Document ID is

the docket number plus a unique fourdigit code. OSHA is identifying

supporting information in this ETS by

author name and publication year, when

appropriate. This information can be

used to search for a supporting

document in the docket at http://

www.regulations.gov. Contact the OSHA

Docket Office at 202–693–2350 (TTY

number: 877–889–5627) for assistance

in locating docket submissions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

General information and press

inquiries: Contact Frank Meilinger,

OSHA Office of Communications, U.S.

Department of Labor; telephone (202)

693–1999; email OSHAComms@dol.gov.

For technical inquiries: Contact

Andrew Levinson, OSHA Directorate of

Standards and Guidance, U.S.

Department of Labor; telephone (202)

693–1950; email ETS@dol.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The

preamble to the ETS on COVID–19

vaccination and testing follows this

outline:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary and Request for

Comment

A. Executive Summary

B. Request for Comment

II. Pertinent Legal Authority

III. Rationale for the ETS

A. Grave Danger

B. Need for the ETS

IV. Feasibility

A. Technological Feasibility

B. Economic Analysis

V. Additional Requirements

VI. Summary and Explanation

A. Purpose

B. Scope and Application

C. Definitions

D. Employer Policy on Vaccination

E. Determination of Employee Vaccination

Status

F. Employer Support for Employee

Vaccination

G. COVID–19 Testing for Employees Who

Are Not Fully Vaccinated

H. Employee Notification to Employer of a

Positive COVID–19 Test and Removal

I. Face Coverings

J. Information Provided to Employees

K. Reporting COVID–19 Fatalities and

Hospitalizations to OSHA

L. Availability of Records

M. Dates

N. Severability

O. Incorporation by Reference

VII. Authority and Signature

I. Executive Summary and Request for

Comment

A. Executive Summary

This ETS is based on the requirements

of the Occupational Safety and Health

Act (OSH Act or Act) and legal

precedent arising under the Act. Under

section 6(c)(1) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.

655(c)(1), OSHA shall issue an ETS if

the agency determines that employees

are subject to grave danger from

exposure to substances or agents

determined to be toxic or physically

harmful or from new hazards, and an

ETS is necessary to protect employees

from such danger. These legal

requirements are more fully discussed

in Pertinent Legal Authority (Section II.

of this preamble). This ETS does not

apply to workplaces subject to E.O.

14042 on Requiring Coronavirus Disease

2019 Vaccination for Federal

Contractors. In addition, OSHA will

treat federal agencies’ compliance with

E.O. 14043, and the Safer Federal

Workforce Task Force guidance issued

under section 4(e) of Executive Order

13991 and section 2 of Executive Order

14043, as sufficient to meet their

obligations under the OSH Act and E.O.

12196.

COVID–19 has killed over 725,000

people in the United States in less than

two years, and infected millions more

(CDC, October 18, 2021—Cumulative

US Deaths). The pandemic continues to

affect workers and workplaces. While

COVID–19 vaccines authorized or

APP. 2

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

approved by the U.S. Food and Drug

Administration (FDA) effectively protect

vaccinated individuals against severe

illness and death from COVID–19,

unvaccinated individuals remain at

much higher risk of severe health

outcomes from COVID–19. Further,

unvaccinated workers are much more

likely to contract and transmit COVID–

19 in the workplace than vaccinated

workers. OSHA has determined that

many employees in the U.S. who are not

fully vaccinated against COVID–19 face

grave danger from exposure to SARS–

CoV–2 in the workplace. This finding of

grave danger is based on the severe

health consequences associated with

exposure to the virus along with

evidence demonstrating the

transmissibility of the virus in the

workplace and the prevalence of

infections in employee populations, as

discussed in Grave Danger (Section

III.A. of this preamble).

OSHA has also determined that an

ETS is necessary to protect

unvaccinated workers from the risk of

contracting COVID–19 at work, as

discussed in Need for the ETS (Section

III.B. of this preamble). At the present

time, workers are becoming seriously ill

and dying as a result of occupational

exposures to COVID–19, when a simple

measure, vaccination, can largely

prevent those deaths and illnesses. The

ETS protects these workers through the

most effective and efficient control

available—vaccination—and further

protects workers who remain

unvaccinated through required regular

testing, use of face coverings, and

removal of all infected employees from

the workplace. OSHA also concludes,

based on its enforcement experience

during the pandemic to date, that

continued reliance on existing standards

and regulations, the General Duty

Clause of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C.

654(a)(1), and workplace guidance, in

lieu of an ETS, is not adequate to protect

unvaccinated employees from the grave

danger of being infected by, and

suffering death or serious health

consequences from, COVID–19.

OSHA will continue to monitor trends

in COVID–19 infections and death as

more of the workforce and the general

population become fully vaccinated

against COVID–19 and the pandemic

continues to evolve. Where OSHA finds

a grave danger from the virus no longer

exists for the covered workforce (or

some portion thereof), or new

information indicates a change in

measures necessary to address the grave

danger, OSHA will update this ETS, as

appropriate.

This ETS applies to employers with a

total of 100 or more employees at any

time the standard is in effect. In light of

the unique occupational safety and

health dangers presented by COVID–19,

and against the backdrop of the

uncertain economic environment of a

pandemic, OSHA is proceeding in a

stepwise fashion in addressing the

emergency this rule covers. OSHA is

confident that employers with 100 or

more employees have the administrative

capacity to implement the standard’s

requirements promptly, but is less

confident that smaller employers can do

so without undue disruption. OSHA

needs additional time to assess the

capacity of smaller employers, and is

seeking comment to help the agency

make that determination. Nonetheless,

the agency is acting to protect workers

now in adopting a standard that will

reach two-thirds of all private-sector

workers in the nation, including those

working in the largest facilities, where

the most deadly outbreaks of COVID–19

can occur.

The agency has also evaluated the

feasibility of this ETS and has

determined that the requirements of the

ETS are both economically and

technologically feasible, as outlined in

Feasibility (Section IV. of this

preamble). The specific requirements of

the ETS are outlined and described in

Summary and Explanation (Section VI.

of this preamble).

B. Request for Comment

Although this ETS takes effect

immediately, it also serves as a proposal

under Section 6(b) of the OSH Act (29

U.S.C. 655(b)) for a final standard.

Accordingly, OSHA seeks comment on

all aspects of this ETS and whether it

should be adopted as a final standard.

OSHA encourages commenters to

explain why they prefer or disfavor

particular policy choices, and include

any relevant studies, experiences,

anecdotes or other information that may

help support the comment. In

particular, OSHA seeks comments on

the following topics:

1. Employers with fewer than 100

employees. As noted above and fully

discussed in the Summary and

Explanation for Scope and Application

(Section VI.B. of this preamble), OSHA

has implemented a 100-employee

threshold for the requirements of this

standard to focus the ETS on companies

that OSHA is confident will have

sufficient administrative systems in

place to comply quickly with the ETS.

The agency is moving in a stepwise

fashion on the short timeline

necessitated by the danger presented by

COVID–19 while soliciting stakeholder

comment and additional information to

determine whether to adjust the scope

61403

of the ETS to address smaller employers

in the future. OSHA seeks information

about the ability of employers with

fewer than 100 employees to implement

COVID–19 vaccination and/or testing

programs. Have you instituted

vaccination mandates (with or without

alternatives), or requirements for regular

COVID–19 testing or face covering use?

What have been the benefits of your

approach? What challenges have you

had or could you foresee in

implementing such programs? Is there

anything specific to your industry, or

the size of your business, that poses

particular obstacles in implementing the

requirements in this standard? How

much time would it take, what types of

costs would you incur, and how much

would it cost for you to implement such

requirements?

2. Significant Risk. If OSHA were to

finalize a rule based on this ETS, it

would be a standard adopted under 6(b)

of the OSH Act, which requires a

finding of significant risk from exposure

to COVID–19. As discussed more fully

in Pertinent Legal Authority (Section II.

of this preamble), this is a lower

showing of risk than grave danger, the

finding required to issue a 6(c)

emergency temporary standard. How

should the scope of the rule change to

address the significant risk posed by

COVID–19 in the workplace? Should

portions of the rule, such as face

coverings, apply to fully vaccinated

persons?

3. Prior COVID–19 infections. OSHA

determined that workers who have been

infected with COVID–19 but have not

been fully vaccinated still face a grave

danger from workplace exposure to

SARS–CoV–2. This is an area of ongoing

scientific inquiry. Given scientific

uncertainty and limitations in testing for

infection and immunity, OSHA is

concerned that it would be infeasible for

employers to operationalize a standard

that would permit or require an

exception from vaccination or testing

and face covering based on prior

infection with COVID–19. Is there

additional scientific information on this

topic that OSHA should consider as it

determines whether to proceed with a

permanent rule?

In particular, what scientific criteria

can be used to determine whether a

given employee is sufficiently protected

against reinfection? Are there any

temporal limits associated with this

criteria to account for potential

reductions in immunity over time? Do

you require employees to provide

verification of infection with COVID–

19? If so, what kinds of verification do

you accept (i.e., PCR testing, antigen

testing, etc.)? What challenges have you

APP. 3

61404

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

experienced, if any, in operationalizing

such an exception?

4. Experience with COVID–19

vaccination policies. Should OSHA

impose a strict vaccination mandate

(i.e., all employers required to

implement mandatory vaccination

policies as defined in this ETS) with no

alternative compliance option? OSHA

seeks information on COVID–19

vaccination policies that employers

have implemented to protect workers. If

you have implemented a COVID–19

vaccination policy:

(a) When did you implement it, and

what does your policy require? Was

vaccination mandatory or voluntary

under the policy? Do you offer

vaccinations on site? What costs

associated with vaccination did you

cover under the policy? What

percentage of your workforce was

vaccinated as a result? Do you offer paid

leave for receiving a vaccination? If

vaccination is mandatory, have

employees been resistant and if so what

steps were required to enforce the

policy?

(b) How did you verify that employees

were vaccinated? Are there other

reliable means of vaccination

verification not addressed by the ETS

that should be included? Did you allow

attestation where the employee could

not find other proof, and if so, have you

experienced any difficulties with this

approach? Have you experienced any

issues with falsified records of

vaccination, and if so, how did you deal

with them?

(c) Have you experienced a decrease

in infection rates or outbreaks after

implementing this policy?

(d) If you have received any requests

for reasonable accommodation from

vaccination, what strategies did you

implement to address the

accommodation and ensure worker

safety (e.g., telework, working in

isolation, regular testing and the use of

face coverings)?

5. COVID–19 testing and removal.

OSHA seeks information on COVID–19

testing and removal practices

implemented to protect workers.

(a) Do you have a testing and removal

policy in your workplace and, if so,

what does it require? How often do you

require testing and what types of testing

do you use (e.g., at-home tests, tests

performed at laboratories, tests

performed at your worksites)? What

costs have you incurred as part of your

testing and removal policies? Do you

have difficulty in finding adequate

availability of tests? How often? Have

you experienced any issues with

falsified test results, and if so, how did

you deal with them? Have you

experienced other difficulties in

implementing a testing and removal

scheme, including the length of time to

obtain COVID–19 test results? Do you

offer paid leave for testing?

(b) How often have you detected and

removed COVID–19 positive employees

from the workplace under this policy?

Do you provide paid leave and job

protection to employees you remove for

this reason?

(c) Should OSHA require testing more

often than on a weekly basis?

6. Face coverings. As discussed in the

Summary and Explanation for Face

Coverings (Section VI.I. of this

preamble), ASTM released a

specification standard on February 15,

2021, to establish a national standard

baseline for barrier face coverings

(ASTM F3502–21). Should OSHA

require the use of face coverings

meeting the ASTM F3502–21 standard

instead of the face coverings specified

by the ETS? If so, should OSHA also

require that such face coverings meet

the NIOSH Workplace Performance or

Workplace Performance Plus criteria

(see CDC, September 23, 2021)? Are

there particular workplace settings in

which face coverings meeting one

standard should be favored over

another? Are there alternative criteria

OSHA should consider for face

coverings instead of the F3502–21

standard or NIOSH Workplace

Performance or Workplace Performance

Plus criteria? Is there sufficient capacity

to supply face coverings meeting

F3502–01 and/or NIOSH Workplace

Performance or Workplace Performance

Plus criteria to all employees covered by

the ETS? What costs have you incurred

as part of supplying employees with

face coverings meeting the appropriate

criteria?

7. Other controls. This ETS requires

employees to either be fully vaccinated

against COVID–19 or be tested weekly

and wear face coverings, based on the

type of policy their employer adopts. It

stops short of requiring the full suite of

workplace controls against SARS–CoV–

2 transmission recommended by OSHA

and the CDC, including distancing,

barriers, ventilation, and sanitation. As

OSHA explained in Need for the ETS

(Section III.B. of this preamble), OSHA

has determined that it needs more

information before imposing these

requirements on the entire scope of

industries and employers covered by the

standard. OSHA is interested in hearing

from employers about their experience

in implementing a full suite of

workplace controls against COVID–19.

What measures have you taken to

protect employees against COVID–19 in

your workplace? Are there controls that

you attempted to employ but found

ineffective or infeasible? What are they?

Why did you conclude that they were

they ineffective or infeasible; for

example, are there particular aspects of

your workplace or industry that make

certain controls infeasible? Do you

require both fully vaccinated and

unvaccinated employees to comply with

these controls? Have you experienced a

reduction in infection rates or outbreaks

since implementing these controls?

8. Educational materials. Have you

implemented any policies or provided

any information that has been helpful in

encouraging an employee to be

vaccinated?

9. Feasibility and health impacts. Do

you have any experience or data that

would inform OSHA’s estimates in its

economic feasibility analysis or any of

the assumptions or estimates used in

OSHA’s identification of the number of

hospitalizations prevented and lives

saved from its health impacts analysis

(see OSHA, October 2021c)?

References

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(CDC). (2021, October 18). COVID Data

Tracker. https://covid.cdc.gov/coviddata-tracker/. (CDC, October 18, 2021)

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(CDC). (2021, September 23). Types of

Masks and Respirators. https://

www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/

prevent-getting-sick/types-of-masks.html.

(CDC, September 23, 2021)

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA). (2021c,

October). Health Impacts of the COVID–

19 Vaccination and Testing ETS. (OSHA,

October 2021c)

II. Pertinent Legal Authority

The purpose of the Occupational

Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH

Act), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., is ‘‘to assure

so far as possible every working man

and woman in the Nation safe and

healthful working conditions and to

preserve our human resources.’’ 29

U.S.C. 651(b). To this end, Congress

authorized the Secretary of Labor

(Secretary) to promulgate and enforce

occupational safety and health

standards under sections 6(b) and (c) of

the OSH Act.1 29 U.S.C. 655(b). These

provisions provide bases for issuing

occupational safety and health

standards under the Act. Once OSHA

has established as a threshold matter

that a health standard is necessary

under section 6(b) or (c)—i.e., to reduce

1 The Secretary has delegated most of his duties

under the OSH Act to the Assistant Secretary of

Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.

Secretary’s Order 08–2020, 85 FR 58393 (Sept. 18,

2020). This section uses the terms Secretary and

OSHA interchangeably.

APP. 4

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

a significant risk of material health

impairment, or a grave danger to

employee health—the Act gives the

Secretary ‘‘almost unlimited discretion

to devise means to achieve the

congressionally mandated goal’’ of

protecting employee health, subject to

the constraints of feasibility. See United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647

F.2d 1189, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A

standard’s individual requirements need

only be ‘‘reasonably related’’ to the

purpose of ensuring a safe and healthful

working environment. Id. at 1237, 1241;

see also Forging Indus. Ass’n v. Sec’y of

Labor, 773 F.2d 1436, 1447 (4th Cir.

1985). OSHA’s authority to regulate

employers is hedged by constitutional

considerations and, pursuant to section

4(b)(1) of the OSH Act, the regulations

and enforcement policies of other

federal agencies. See, e.g., Chao v.

Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U.S. 235,

241 (2002).

The OSH Act in section 6(c)(1) states

that the Secretary ‘‘shall’’ issue an

emergency temporary standard (ETS)

upon a finding that the ETS is necessary

to address a grave danger to workers.

See 29 U.S.C. 655(c). In particular, the

Secretary shall provide, without regard

to the requirements of chapter 5, title 5,

United States Code, for an emergency

temporary standard to take immediate

effect upon publication in the Federal

Register if the Secretary makes two

determinations: That employees are

exposed to grave danger from exposure

to substances or agents determined to be

toxic or physically harmful or from new

hazards, and that such emergency

standard is necessary to protect

employees from such danger. 29 U.S.C.

655(c)(1). A separate section of the OSH

Act, section 8(c), authorizes the

Secretary to prescribe regulations

requiring employers to make, keep, and

preserve records that are necessary or

appropriate for the enforcement of the

Act. 29 U.S.C. 657(c)(1). Section 8(c)

also provides that the Secretary shall

require employers to keep records of,

and report, work-related deaths and

illnesses. 29 U.S.C. 657(c)(2).

The ETS provision, section 6(c)(1),

exempts the Secretary from procedural

requirements contained in the OSH Act

and the Administrative Procedure Act,

including those for public notice,

comments, and a rulemaking hearing.

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(3); 5 U.S.C.

552, 553.

The Secretary must issue an ETS in

situations where employees are exposed

to a ‘‘grave danger’’ and immediate

action is necessary to protect those

employees from such danger. 29 U.S.C.

655(c)(1); Pub. Citizen Health Research

Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1156

(D.C. Cir. 1983). The determination of

what exact level of risk constitutes a

‘‘grave danger’’ is a ‘‘policy

consideration that belongs, in the first

instance, to the Agency.’’ Asbestos Info.

Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 425 (accepting

OSHA’s determination that eighty lives

at risk over six months was a grave

danger); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO v.

Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655

n.62 (1980). However, a ‘‘grave danger’’

represents a risk greater than the

‘‘significant risk’’ that OSHA must show

in order to promulgate a permanent

standard under section 6(b) of the OSH

Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(b). Int’l Union,

United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr.

Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.

Donovan, 590 F. Supp. 747, 755–56

(D.D.C. 1984), adopted, 756 F.2d 162

(D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Indus. Union

Dep’t, AFL–CIO, 448 U.S. at 640 n.45

(noting the distinction between the

standard for risk findings in permanent

standards and ETSs).

In determining the type of health

effects that may constitute a ‘‘grave

danger’’ under the OSH Act, the Fifth

Circuit emphasized ‘‘the danger of

incurable, permanent, or fatal

consequences to workers, as opposed to

easily curable and fleeting effects on

their health.’’ Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n,

Inc. v. U. S. Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d

120, 132 (5th Cir. 1974). Although the

findings of grave danger and necessity

must be based on evidence of ‘‘actual,

prevailing industrial conditions,’’ see

Int’l Union, 590 F. Supp. at 751, when

OSHA determines that exposure to a

particular hazard would pose a grave

danger to workers, OSHA can assume an

exposure to a grave danger wherever

that hazard is present in a workplace.

Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of

Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 102 n.3 (3d Cir.

1973).

In demonstrating whether OSHA had

shown that an ETS is necessary, the

Fifth Circuit considered whether OSHA

had another available means of

addressing the risk that would not

require an ETS. Asbestos Info. Ass’n,

727 F.2d at 426 (holding that necessity

had not been proven where OSHA could

have increased enforcement of alreadyexisting standards to address the grave

risk to workers from asbestos exposure).

Additionally, a standard must be both

economically and technologically

feasible in order to be ‘‘reasonably

necessary and appropriate’’ under

section 3(8) and, by inference,

‘‘necessary’’ under section 6(c)(1)(B) of

the Act. Cf. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc.

v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 n.31

(1981) (noting ‘‘any standard that was

not economically or technologically

feasible would a fortiori not be

61405

‘reasonably necessary or appropriate’ ’’

as required by the OSH Act’s definition

of ‘‘occupational safety and health

standard’’ in section 3(8)); see also

Florida Peach Growers, 489 F.2d at 130

(recognizing that the promulgation of

any standard, including an ETS, must

account for its economic effect).

However, given that section 6(c) is

aimed at enabling OSHA to protect

workers in emergency situations, the

agency is not required to make a

feasibility showing with the same rigor

as in ordinary section 6(b) rulemaking.

Asbestos Info. Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 424

n.18.

On judicial review of an ETS, OSHA

is entitled to great deference on the

determinations of grave danger and

necessity required under section 6(c)(1).

See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research

Grp., 702 F.2d at 1156; Asbestos Info.

Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 422 (judicial review

of these legislative determinations

requires deference to the agency); cf.

Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d

823, 831 (7th Cir. 1993) (‘‘the duty of a

reviewing court of generalist judges is

merely to patrol the boundary of

reasonableness’’). These determinations

are ‘‘essentially legislative and rooted in

inferences from complex scientific and

factual data.’’ Pub. Citizen Health

Research Grp., 702 F.2d at 1156. The

agency is not required to support its

conclusions ‘‘with anything

approaching scientific certainty,’’ Indus.

Union Dep’t, AFL–CIO, 448 U.S. at 656,

and has the ‘‘prerogative to choose

between conflicting evidence.’’ Asbestos

Info. Ass’n, 727 F.2d at 425.

The determinations of the Secretary in

issuing standards under section 6 of the

OSH Act, including ETSs, must be

affirmed if supported by ‘‘substantial

evidence in the record considered as a

whole.’’ 29 U.S.C. 655(f). The Supreme

Court described substantial evidence as

‘‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.’’ Am. Textile

Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 522–23 (quoting

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340

U.S. 474, 477 (1951)). The Court also

noted that ‘‘the possibility of drawing

two inconsistent conclusions from the

evidence does not prevent an

administrative agency’s finding from

being supported by substantial

evidence.’’ Id. at 523 (quoting Consolo

v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). The

Fifth Circuit, recognizing the size and

complexity of the rulemaking record

before it in the case of OSHA’s ETS for

organophosphorus pesticides, stated

that a court’s function in reviewing an

ETS to determine whether it meets the

substantial evidence standard is

‘‘basically [to] determine whether the

APP. 5

61406

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

Secretary carried out his essentially

legislative task in a manner reasonable

under the state of the record before

him.’’ Fla Peach Growers Ass’n, 489

F.2d at 129.

Although Congress waived the

ordinary rulemaking procedures in the

interest of ‘‘permitting rapid action to

meet emergencies,’’ section 6(e) of the

OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 655(e), requires

OSHA to include a statement of reasons

for its action when it issues any

standard. Dry Color Mfrs., 486 F.2d at

105–06 (finding OSHA’s statement of

reasons inadequate). By requiring the

agency to articulate its reasons for

issuing an ETS, the requirement acts as

‘‘an essential safeguard to emergency

temporary standard-setting.’’ Id. at 106.

However, the Third Circuit noted that it

did not require justification of ‘‘every

substance, type of use or production

technique,’’ but rather a ‘‘general

explanation’’ of why the standard is

necessary. Id. at 107.

ETSs are, by design, temporary in

nature. Under section 6(c)(3), an ETS

serves as a proposal for a permanent

standard in accordance with section 6(b)

of the OSH Act (permanent standards),

and the Act calls for the permanent

standard to be finalized within six

months after publication of the ETS. 29

U.S.C. 655(c)(3); see Fla. Peach Growers

Ass’n, 489 F.2d at 124. The ETS is

effective ‘‘until superseded by a

standard promulgated in accordance

with’’ section 6(c)(3). 29 U.S.C.

655(c)(2).

Section 6(c)(1) states that the

Secretary ‘‘shall’’ provide for an ETS

when OSHA makes the prerequisite

findings of grave danger and necessity.

See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp.,

702 F.2d at 1156 (noting the mandatory

language of section 6(c)). OSHA is

entitled to great deference in its

determinations, and it must also

account for ‘‘the fact that ‘the interests

at stake are not merely economic

interests in a license or a rate structure,

but personal interests in life and

health.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Wellford v.

Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C.

Cir. 1971)).

When OSHA issues a standard

pursuant to section 6—whether

permanent or an ETS—section 18 of the

OSH Act provides that OSHA’s standard

preempts any state occupational safety

or health standard ‘‘relating to [the

same] occupational safety or health

issue’’ as the Federal standard. 29 U.S.C.

667(b); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid

Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 97

(1992). A state can avoid preemption

only if it submits, and receives Federal

approval for, a state plan for the

development and enforcement of

standards pursuant to section 18 of the

Act, which must be ‘‘at least as

effective’’ as the Federal standards. 29

U.S.C. 667; Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry,

125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997).

However, the OSH Act does not

preempt state laws of ‘‘general

applicability’’ that regulate workers and

non-workers alike, so long as they do

not conflict with an OSHA standard.

Gade, 505 U.S. at 107.

As discussed in detail elsewhere in

this preamble, OSHA has determined

that a grave danger exists necessitating

a new ETS (see Grave Danger and Need

for the ETS, Sections III.A. and III.B. of

this preamble), and that compliance

with this ETS is feasible for covered

employers (see Feasibility, Section IV. of

this preamble). OSHA has also provided

a more detailed explanation of each

provision of this ETS in Summary and

Explanation (Section VI. of this

preamble). In addition, OSHA wishes to

provide here some general guidance on

its legal authority to regulate COVID–19

hazards, and for particular provisions of

this ETS.

As a threshold matter, OSHA’s

authority to regulate workplace

exposure to biological hazards like

SARS–CoV–2 is well-established.

Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act uses

similar language to section 6(c)(1)(A):

The former sets forth requirements for

promulgating permanent standards

addressing ‘‘toxic materials or harmful

physical agents,’’ and the latter

authorizes OSHA to promulgate an ETS

addressing ‘‘substances or agents

determined to be toxic or physically

harmful’’ (as well as ‘‘new hazards’’).

OSHA has consistently identified

biological hazards similar to SARS–

CoV–2, as well as SARS–CoV–2 itself, to

be ‘‘toxic materials or harmful physical

agents’’ under the Act. Indeed, in its

exposure and medical records access

regulation, OSHA has defined ‘‘toxic

materials or harmful physical agents’’ to

include ‘‘any . . . biological agent

(bacteria, virus, fungus, etc.)’’ for which

there is evidence that it poses a chronic

or acute health hazard. 29 CFR

1910.1020(c)(13). And in addition to

previously regulating exposure to

SARS–CoV–2 as a new and physically

harmful agent in the Healthcare ETS

(see, e.g., 86 FR at 32381), OSHA has

also previously regulated biological

hazards like SARS–CoV–2 as health

hazards under section 6(b)(5), for

example in the Bloodborne Pathogens

(BBP) standard, 29 CFR 1910.1030,

which addresses workplace exposure to

HIV and Hepatitis B. The BBP standard

was upheld (except as to application in

certain limited industries) in American

Dental Association, which observed that

‘‘the infectious character’’ of the

regulated bloodborne diseases might

warrant ‘‘more regulation than would be

necessary in the case of a

noncommunicable disease.’’ 984 F.2d at

826. In addition, in the preamble to the

respiratory protection standard, 29 CFR

1910.134, which was also promulgated

under section 6(b)(5), ‘‘OSHA

emphasize[d] that [the] respiratory

protection standard does apply to

biological hazards.’’ Respiratory

Protection, 63 FR 1152–01, 1180 (Jan. 8,

1998) (citing Mahone Grain Corp., 10

BNA OSHC 1275 (No. 77–3041, 1981)).

In addition to being a physically

harmful agent covered by section

6(c)(1)(A), SARS–CoV–2 is also, without

question, a ‘‘new hazard’’ covered by

this provision, as discussed in more

detail in Grave Danger (Section III.A. of

this preamble). SARS–CoV–2 was not

known to exist until January 2020, and

since then more than 725,000 people

have died from COVID–19 in the U.S.

alone (CDC, October 18, 2021—

Cumulative US Deaths).

Turning to specific provisions of this

standard, the vaccination requirements

in this ETS are also well within the

bounds of OSHA’s authority.

Vaccination can be a critical tool in the

pursuit of health and safety goals,

particularly in response to an infectious

and highly communicable disease. See,

e.g., Jacobson v. Commonwealth of

Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27–28 (1905)

(recognizing use of smallpox vaccine as

a reasonable measure to protect public

health and safety); Klaassen v. Trustees

of Ind. Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir.

2021) (citing Jacobson and noting that

vaccination may be an appropriate

safety measure against SARS–CoV–2 as

‘‘[v]accination protects not only the

vaccinated persons but also those who

come in contact with them’’). And the

OSH Act itself explicitly acknowledges

that such treatments might be necessary,

in some circumstances. 29 U.S.C.

669(a)(5) (providing in the Act’s

provisions on research and related

activities conducted by the Secretary of

Health and Human Services to aid

OSHA in its formulation of health and

safety standards that ‘‘[n]othing in this

or any other provision of this Act shall

be deemed to authorize or require

medical examination, immunization, or

treatment for those who object thereto

on religious grounds, except where such

is necessary for the protection of the

health or safety of others.’’ (emphasis

added)). In recognition of the health and

safety benefits provided by vaccination,

OSHA has previously exercised its

authority to promulgate vaccine-related

requirements in the COVID–19

Healthcare ETS (29 CFR 1910.502(m))

APP. 6

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

and the BBP standard (29 CFR

1910.1030(f)). The BBP standard

illustrates congressional understanding

that the statutory delegation of authority

to OSHA to issue standards includes

authority for vaccine provisions, where

appropriate. See Public Law 102–170,

Title I, Section 100, 105 Stat. 1107

(1991) (directing OSHA to complete the

BBP rulemaking by a date certain, and

providing that if OSHA did not do so,

the proposed rule, which included a

vaccine provision, would become the

final standard).

Additionally, OSHA’s authority to

require employers to bear the costs of

particular provisions of a standard is

solidly grounded in the OSH Act. The

Act reflects Congress’s determination

that the costs of compliance with the

Act and OSHA standards are part of the

cost of doing business and OSHA may

foreclose employers from shifting those

costs to employees. See Am. Textile

Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 514; Phelps

Dodge Corp. v. OSHRC, 725 F.2d 1237,

1239–40 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Sec’y

of Labor v. Beverly Healthcare-Hillview,

541 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2008). Consistent

with this authority, OSHA has largely

required employers to bear the costs of

the provisions of this ETS, including the

typical costs associated with

vaccination. The allocation of

vaccination costs to employers in this

ETS is similar to OSHA’s treatment of

vaccine-related costs in the COVID–19

Healthcare ETS and the BBP standards.

See 29 CFR 1910.502(m), (p); 29 CFR

1910.1030(f)(1)(ii)(A).

The OSH Act provides OSHA with

discretion, however, to decide whether

to impose certain costs—such as those

related to medical examinations or other

tests—on employers ‘‘[w]here [it

determines that such costs are]

appropriate.’’ 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(7). OSHA

has determined that for purposes of this

ETS, it would not be ‘‘appropriate’’ to

impose on employers any costs

associated with COVID–19 testing for

employees who choose not to be

vaccinated. For most of the agency’s

existing standards containing medical

testing and removal provisions, OSHA

has found it necessary to impose the

costs of such provisions on employers

in order to remove barriers to employee

participation in medical examinations

that are critical to effectuating the

standards’ safety and health protections.

See United Steelworkers of Am., 647

F.2d at 1229–31, 1237–38. However, as

explained in greater detail elsewhere in

this preamble (see Need for the ETS,

Section III.B. of this preamble), the

ETS’s safety and health protections are

best effectuated by employee

vaccination, not testing. Accordingly,

OSHA only requires employers to bear

the costs of employee compliance with

the preferred, and more protective,

vaccination provision, but not costs

associated with testing. The agency does

not believe it appropriate to impose the

costs of testing on an employer where

an employee has made an individual

choice to pursue a less protective

option. For the same reasons, OSHA has

also determined that it is not

appropriate to require employers to pay

for face coverings for employees who

choose not to be vaccinated.2

Finally, the Act and its legislative

history ‘‘both demonstrate

unmistakably’’ OSHA’s authority to

require employers to temporarily

remove workers from the workplace to

prevent exposure to a health hazard.

United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d at

1230. And again, this is an authority

OSHA has repeatedly exercised in prior

standards, including in: COVID–19

Healthcare ETS (29 CFR 1910.502); Lead

(29 CFR 1910.1025); Cadmium (29 CFR

1910.1027); Benzene (29 CFR

1910.1028); Formaldehyde (29 CFR

1910.1048); Methylenedianiline (29 CFR

1910.1050); Methylene Chloride (29

CFR 1910.1052); and Beryllium (29 CFR

1910.1024). It is equally appropriate to

impose that obligation here.

For all of these reasons, as well as

those explained more fully in other

areas of this preamble, OSHA has the

authority—and obligation—to

promulgate this ETS.

References

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

(CDC). (2021, October 18). COVID Data

Tracker. https://covid.cdc.gov/coviddata-tracker/. (CDC, October 18, 2021)

III. Rationale for the ETS

A. Grave Danger

I. Introduction

Section 6(c)(1) of the OSH Act

requires the Secretary to issue an ETS in

situations where employees are exposed

to a ‘‘grave danger’’ and immediate

action is necessary to protect those

employees from such danger (29 U.S.C.

655(c)(1)). Consistent with its legal

duties, OSHA is issuing this ETS to

address the grave danger posed by

occupational exposure to SARS–CoV–2,

2 OSHA notes that while the ETS does not impose

these testing or face covering costs on employers,

in some circumstances employers may be required

to pay for the costs related to testing and/or face

coverings by other laws, regulations, or collectively

negotiated agreements. OSHA has no authority

under the OSH Act to determine whether such

obligations under other laws, regulations, or

agreements might exist.

61407

the virus that causes COVID–19.3 OSHA

has determined that occupational

exposure to SARS–CoV–2, including the

Delta variant (B.1.617.2 and AY

lineages), presents a grave danger to

unvaccinated workers in the U.S., with

several exceptions explained below.4

This finding of grave danger is based on

the science of how the virus spreads, the

transmissibility of the disease in

workplaces, and the serious adverse

health effects, including death, that can

be suffered by those who are diagnosed

with COVID–19. The protections of this

ETS—which will apply, with some

limitations, to a broad range of

workplace settings where exposure to

SARS–CoV–2 may occur—are designed

to protect employees from infection

with SARS–CoV–2 and from the dire,

sometimes fatal, consequences of such

infection.

The fact that COVID–19 is not a

uniquely work-related hazard does not

change the determination that it is a

grave danger to which employees are

exposed, nor does it excuse employers

from their duty to protect employees

from the occupational transmission of

SARS–CoV–2. The OSH Act is intended

to ‘‘assure so far as possible every

working man and woman in the Nation

safe and healthful working conditions’’

(29 U.S.C. 651(b)), and there is nothing

in the Act to suggest that its protections

do not extend to hazards which might

occur outside of the workplace as well

as within. Indeed, COVID–19 is not the

first hazard that OSHA has regulated

that occurs both inside and outside the

workplace. For example, the hazard of

noise is not unique to the workplace,

but the Fourth Circuit has upheld

OSHA’s Occupational Noise Exposure

standard (29 CFR 1910.95) (Forging

Industry Ass’n v. Sec’ of Labor, 773 F.2d

1437, 1444 (4th Cir. 1985)). Diseases

caused by bloodborne pathogens,

including HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B, are

also not unique to the workplace, but

the Seventh Circuit upheld the majority

of OSHA’s Bloodborne Pathogens

standard (29 CFR 1910.1030) (Am.

Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823

(7th Cir. 1993)). OSHA’s Sanitation

3 OSHA is defining the grave danger as workplace

exposure to SARS–CoV–2, the virus that causes the

development of COVID–19. COVID–19 is the

disease that can occur in people exposed to SARSCoV–2, and that leads to the health effects

described in this section. This distinction applies

despite OSHA’s use of the terms SARS–CoV–2 and

COVID–19 interchangeably in some parts of this

preamble.

4 OSHA refers to the grave danger from

occupational exposure to SARS–CoV–2 throughout

this document. Those references are intended to

encompass exposure to SARS–CoV–2 and all

variants of SARS–CoV–2, including the Delta

variant.

APP. 7

61408

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

standard, 29 CFR 1910.141, which

requires measures such as cleaning,

waste disposal, potable water, toilets,

and washing facilities, addresses

hazards that exist everywhere—both

within and outside of workplaces.

Moreover, employees have more

freedom to control their environment

outside of work, and to make decisions

about their behavior and their contact

with others to better minimize their risk

of exposure. However, during the

workday, while under the control of

their employer, workers may have little

ability to limit contact with coworkers,

clients, members of the public, patients,

and others, any one of whom could

represent a source of exposure to SARS–

CoV–2. OSHA has a mandate to protect

employees from hazards they are

exposed to at work, even if they may be

exposed to similar hazards outside of

work.

As described above in Pertinent Legal

Authority (Section II. of this preamble),

‘‘grave danger’’ indicates a risk that is

more than ‘‘significant’’ (Int’l Union,

United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr.

Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.

Donovan, 590 F. Supp. 747, 755–56

(D.D.C. 1984); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–

CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.

607, 640 n.45, 655 (1980) (stating that a

rate of 1 worker in 1,000 workers

suffering a given health effect

constitutes a ‘‘significant’’ risk)). ‘‘Grave

danger,’’ according to one court, refers

to ‘‘the danger of incurable, permanent,

or fatal consequences to workers, as

opposed to easily curable and fleeting

effects on their health’’ (Fla. Peach

Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 132 (5th Cir.

1974)). Fleeting effects were described

as nausea, excessive salivation,

perspiration, or blurred vision and were

considered so minor that they often

went unreported; these effects are in

stark contrast with the adverse health

effects of COVID–19 infections, which

are formally referenced as ranging from

‘‘mild’’ to ‘‘critical,’’ 5 but which can

involve significant illness, hospital

stays, ICU care, death, and long-term

health complications for survivors.

Beyond this, however, ‘‘the

determination of what constitutes a risk

worthy of Agency action is a policy

consideration that belongs, in the first

instance, to the Agency’’ (Asbestos Info.

Ass’n/N. Am. v. OSHA, 727 F.2d 415,

425 (5th Cir. 1984)).

In the context of ordinary 6(b)

rulemaking, the Supreme Court has said

5 See the definitions for the different levels of

severity of COVID–19 illness in the National

Institutes of Health’s COVID–19 treatment

guidelines (NIH, October 12, 2021).

that the OSH Act is not a ‘‘mathematical

straitjacket,’’ nor does it require the

agency to support its findings ‘‘with

anything approaching scientific

certainty,’’ particularly when operating

on the ‘‘frontiers of scientific

knowledge’’ (Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL–

CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.

607, 655–56 (1980)). Courts reviewing

OSHA’s determination of grave danger

do so with ‘‘great deference’’ (Pub.

Citizen Health Research Grp. v.

Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1156 (D.C. Cir.

1983)). In one case, the Fifth Circuit, in

reviewing an OSHA ETS for asbestos,

declined to question the agency’s

finding that 80 worker lives at risk

nationwide over six months constituted

a grave danger (Asbestos Info. Ass’n/N.

Am., 727 F.2d at 424). OSHA estimates

that this ETS would save over 6,500

worker lives and prevent over 250,000

hospitalizations over the course of the

next six months (OSHA, October 2021c).

Here, the mortality and morbidity risk to

employees from COVID–19 is so dire

that the grave danger from exposures to

SARS–CoV–2 is clear.

SARS–CoV–2 is both a physically

harmful agent and a new hazard (see 29

U.S.C. 655(c)(1)(A)). The majority of

OSHA’s previous ETSs addressed toxic

substances that had been familiar to the

agency for many years prior to issuance

of the ETS. OSHA’s Healthcare ETS,

issued in response to COVID–19 earlier

this year, is one notable exception. In

most cases, OSHA’s ETSs were issued in

response to new information about

substances that had been used in

workplaces for decades (e.g., Vinyl

Chloride (39 FR 12342 (April 5, 1974));

Benzene (42 FR 22516 (May 3, 1977));

1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane (42 FR

45536 (Sept. 9, 1977))). In some cases,

the hazards of the toxic substance were

already so well established that OSHA

promulgated an ETS simply to update

an existing standard (e.g., Vinyl cyanide

(43 FR 2586 (Jan. 17, 1978))). The

COVID–19 Healthcare ETS, which was

issued in June 2021, was the sole

instance in which OSHA issued an ETS

to address a grave danger from a

substance that had only recently come

into existence. Although that action by

the agency was challenged, the case has

not gone to briefing (see United Food &

Commercial Workers Int’l Union, AFL–

CIO, CLC and AFL–CIO v. OSHA, Dep’t

of Labor, D.C. Circuit No. 21–1143).

Thus, no court has had occasion to

examine OSHA’s authority under

section (6)(c) of the OSH Act (29 U.S.C.

655(c)) to address a grave danger from

a ‘‘new hazard.’’ Yet by any measure,

SARS–CoV–2 is a new hazard. Unlike

any of the hazards addressed in

previous ETSs, there were no

documented cases of SARS–CoV–2

infections in the United States until

January 2020. Since then, more than

725,000 people have died in the U.S.

alone (CDC, October 18, 2021—

Cumulative US Deaths). The pandemic

continues to affect workers and

workplaces, with workplace exposures

leading to further exposures among

workers’ families and communities.

Clearly, SARS–CoV–2 is both a

physically harmful agent and a new

hazard that presents a grave danger to

workers in the U.S.

Published on June 21, 2021, OSHA’s

Healthcare ETS (86 FR 32376) was

written in response to the grave danger

posed to healthcare workers in the

United States who faced a heightened

risk of infection from COVID–19. In the

healthcare ETS, OSHA described its

finding of grave danger for healthcare

and healthcare support service workers

(see 86 FR 32381–32412). OSHA now

finds that all unvaccinated workers,

with some exceptions, face a grave

danger from the SARS–CoV–2 virus.6

II. Nature of the Disease

The health effects of symptomatic

COVID–19 illness can range from mild

disease consisting of fever or chills,

cough, and shortness of breath to severe

disease. Severe cases can involve

respiratory failure, blood clots, longterm cardiovascular and neurological

effects, and organ damage, which can

lead to hospitalization, ICU admission,

and death (see 86 FR 32383–32388;

NINDS, September 2, 2021). Even in the

short time since the Healthcare ETS’s

publication in June 2021, the risk posed

by COVID–19 has changed

meaningfully. Since OSHA considered

the impact of COVID–19 when

promulgating the Healthcare ETS, over

135,000 additional Americans have died

from COVID–19, and over 933,000 have

been hospitalized, (CDC, October 18,

2021—Cumulative US Deaths; CDC,

May 28, 2021; CDC, October 18, 2021—

Weekly Review). In August 2021,

COVID–19 was the third leading cause

of death in the United States, trailing

only heart disease and cancer (Ortaliza

et al., August 27, 2021). By September

20, 2021, COVID–19 had killed as many

Americans as the 1918–1919 flu

pandemic (Johnson, September 20,

2021).

While the Healthcare ETS addresses

the risk of illness and death from

6 When OSHA refers to ‘‘unvaccinated’’

individuals in its grave danger finding, it means all

individuals who are not fully vaccinated against

COVID–19, i.e., those who are completely

unvaccinated and those who are partially

vaccinated.

APP. 8

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

COVID–19 as the SARS–CoV–2 virus

continues to change over time, it does

not specifically address the increases in

infectiousness and transmission, and

the potentially more severe health

effects, related to the Delta variant. The

rapid rise to predominance of the Delta

variant in the U.S. occurred shortly after

the ETS was published. At this time, the

widespread prevalence of the Delta

variant and its increased

transmissibility have resulted in

increased risk of exposure and disease

relative to the previously-dominant

strains of the SARS–CoV–2 virus.

Adding to the information covered in

the Healthcare ETS, the following

sections provide a brief review of

SARS–CoV–2 and describe the

characteristics of the Delta variant that

are different from previous versions of

SARS–CoV–2 and have changed the

risks posed by COVID–19. The agency

specifically references the material

presented in the Healthcare ETS, which

is still relevant to this analysis, to

support OSHA’s finding of grave danger.

Taken together, the information

available to OSHA demonstrates that

SARS–CoV–2 poses a grave danger to

unvaccinated workers across all

industry sectors.

a. Variants of SARS–CoV–2

Viral mutations have been a serious

concern of scientists, public health

experts, and policymakers from the

beginning of the COVID–19 pandemic.

Viral mutations can affect how a virus

interacts with a cell—altering the virus’s

transmissibility, infection severity, and

sensitivity to vaccines. The U.S.

government’s SARS–CoV–2 Interagency

Group has a variant classification

scheme that defines four classes of

SARS–CoV–2 variants: Variants Being

Monitored (VBM), Variants of Interest

(VOI), Variants of Concern (VOC), and

Variants of High Consequence (VOHC).

These variant designations are based on

their ‘‘proportions at the national and

regional levels and the potential or

known impact of the constellation of

mutations on the effectiveness of

medical countermeasures, severity of

disease, and ability to spread from

person to person’’ (CDC, October 4,

2021), with VOIs considered less serious

than VOCs and VOCs considered less

serious than VOHCs. As of early October

2021, the CDC was monitoring 10

VBMs—Alpha (B.1.1.7, Q.1–Q.8), Beta

(B.1.351, B.1.351.2, B.1.351.3), Gamma

(P.1, P.1.1, P.1.2), Epsilon (B.1.427 and

B.1.429), Eta (B.1.525), Iota (B.1.526),

Kappa (B.1.617.1), B.1.617.3, Mu

(B.1.621, B.1.621.1), and Zeta (P.2)—and

one VOC—Delta (B.1.617.2 and AY.1

sublineages)—in the U.S. (CDC, October

4, 2021). CDC defines a VOC as ‘‘[a]

variant for which there is evidence of an

increase in transmissibility, more severe

disease (e.g., increased hospitalizations

or deaths), significant reduction in

neutralization by antibodies generated

during previous infection or

vaccination, reduced effectiveness of

treatments or vaccines, or diagnostic

detection failures’’ (CDC, October 4,

2021).

While the proportions of SARS–CoV–

2 variants in the United States have

shifted over time (CDC, May 24, 2021c;

CDC, October 18, 2021—Variant

Proportions, July through October 2021),

the primary variant that drove COVID–

19 transmission in the late Winter and

Spring of 2021 was the Alpha variant.

The CDC noted that Alpha is associated

with an increase in transmission, as

well as potentially increased incidences

of hospitalization and death, compared

to the predominant variants before its

emergence (CDC, October 4, 2021;

Pascall et al., August 24, 2021; Julin et

al., September 22, 2021). As Alpha

transmission subsided in the United

States during the late Spring and early

Summer of 2021, Delta emerged and

quickly became the predominant variant

in the U.S. by July 3, 2021 (CDC,

October 18, 2021—Variant Proportions,

July through October 2021). Delta now

accounts for more than 99% of

circulating virus nationwide (CDC,

October 18, 2021—Variant Proportions,

July through October 2021).

FDA authorized and approved

COVID–19 vaccines currently work well

against all of these variants; however,

there are differences in various variants’

ability to spread and the likelihood of

infection to cause severe illness. Data on

the Beta and Gamma variants do not

indicate that infections from these

variants caused more severe illness or

death than other VOCs. Data on the

Alpha variant does indicate its ability to

cause more severe illness and death in

infected individuals. And some data on

the Delta variant suggests that the Delta

variant may cause more severe illness

than previous variants, including Alpha,

in unvaccinated individuals (CDC,

October 4, 2021).

The emergence of the Delta variant,

along with other VOCs, has resulted in

a more deadly pandemic (Fisman and

Tuite, July 12, 2021). While the Delta

variant is the most transmissible SARS–

CoV–2 variant to date, the possibility

remains for the rise of future VOCs, and

even more dangerous VOHCs, as the

virus continues to spread and mutate.

Inadequate vaccination rates and the

abundance of transmission create an

environment that can foster the

development of new variants that could

61409

be similarly, or even more, disruptive

(Liu and Rocklov, August, 4, 2021). In

this context, it is critical that OSHA

address the grave danger from COVID–

19 that unvaccinated workers are

currently facing by requiring

vaccination and the other measures

included in this rule, in order to

significantly slow the transmission of

COVID–19 in workers and workplaces

and mitigate the rise of future variants.

b. Transmission

SARS–CoV–2 is a highly

transmissible virus, regardless of

variant. Since the first case was detected

in the U.S., there have been close to 45

million reported cases of COVID–19,

affecting every state and territory, with

thousands more infected each day (CDC,

October 18, 2021—Cumulative US

Cases), and some indication that these

numbers continue to underestimate the

full burden of disease (CDC, July 27,

2021). According to the CDC, the

primary way the SARS–CoV–2 virus

spreads from an infected person to

others is through the respiratory

droplets that are produced when an

infected person coughs, sneezes, sings,

talks, or breathes (CDC, May 7, 2021).

Infection could then occur when

another person breathes in the virus.

Most commonly this occurs when

people are in close contact with one

another in indoor spaces (within

approximately six feet for at least fifteen

minutes) (CDC, August 13, 2021).

Additionally, airborne transmission may

occur in indoor spaces without adequate

ventilation where small respiratory

particles are able to remain suspended

in the air and accumulate (CDC, May 7,

2021; Fennelly, July 24, 2020). While

scientists’ understanding of the Delta

variant’s virology is evolving and

remains at the frontier of science,

current data shows that the routes of

transmission remain the same for all

currently-identified SARS–CoV–2

variants. In addition, all variants can be

transmitted by people who are presymptomatic (i.e., people who are

infected but do not yet feel sick) or

asymptomatic (i.e., people who are

infected but never feel any symptoms of

COVID–19), as well as those who are

symptomatic. Pre-symptomatic and

asymptomatic transmission continue to

pose serious challenges to containing

the spread of COVID–19. For more

extensive information on transmission

routes, as well as pre-symptomatic and

asymptomatic transmission, see the

preamble to the Healthcare ETS (86 FR

APP. 9

61410

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

32392–32396), which is hereby

included in the record of this ETS.7

The Delta variant is transmitted from

infectious individuals via the same

routes as previous variants, but is much

more transmissible. Specifically, Delta

differs from previous dominant variants

of SARS–CoV–2 in terms of the

amplification of viral particles expelled

from infected individuals. Testing of

Delta-infected individuals indicates that

their viral loads are—on average—

approximately 1,000x greater than those

of the SARS–CoV–2 variants from the

first COVID–19 wave in early 2020. This

finding suggests much faster replication

of viral particles during early infection

with the Delta variant, resulting in

greater infectiousness (contagiousness)

when compared to earlier versions of

SARS–CoV–2 (Li et al., July 12, 2021).

The transmissibility of viruses is

measured in part by the average number

of subsequently-infected people (or

secondary cases) that are expected to

occur from each existing case (often

referred to as R0). Several comparisons

of the transmissibility of the initial

SARS–CoV–2 variants to the Delta

variant have shown that Delta is

approximately twice as transmissible

(contagious) as previous versions of

SARS–CoV–2 (CDC, August 26, 2021;

Riou and Althaus, January 30, 2020; Li

et al., July 12, 2021; Liu and Rocklov,

August, 4, 2021), likely the result of

higher initial viral loads during the presymptomatic phase (Li et al., July 12,

2021). In addition, as described further

below, data on Delta shows that both

unvaccinated and vaccinated

individuals are more likely to transmit

Delta than previous variants (Liu and

Rocklov, August, 4, 2021; Eyre et al.,

September 29, 2021), making it

especially dangerous to those who

remain unvaccinated.

c. Health Effects

COVID–19 infections can lead to

death. As reported in the Healthcare

ETS, by May 24, 2021, there had been

587,432 deaths and 32,947,548 million

infections in the U.S. alone (CDC, May

24, 2021a; CDC, May 24, 2021b). At that

point in the pandemic, 1.8 out of every

1,000 people in the U.S. had died from

COVID–19 (CDC, May 24, 2021a). Since

then, reported cases have increased to

44,857,861 and the number of deaths

has increased to 723,205 (CDC, October

18, 2021– Cumulative US Cases;

Cumulative US Deaths). By September

2021, an astounding 1 in 500 Americans

had died from COVID–19 (Keating,

7 This adoption includes the citations in the

referenced section of the Healthcare ETS, which are

also included in the docket for this ETS.

September 15, 2021). Updated mortality

data 8 currently indicate that people of

working age (18–64 years old) now have

a 1 in 202 chance of dying when they

contract the disease, with the risk much

higher (1 in 72) for those aged 50–64

(CDC, October 18, 2021—Demographic

Trends, Cases by Age Group; CDC,

October 18, 2021—Demographic Trends,

Deaths by Age Group). For a more indepth description of the health effects

resulting from SARS–CoV–2 infection,

see the preamble to the Healthcare ETS

(86 FR 32383–32392), which is hereby

included in the record of this ETS.9

Apart from fatal cases, COVID–19 can

cause serious illness, including longlasting effects on health. Many patients

who become ill with COVID–19 require

hospitalization. Indeed, updated CDC

hospitalization and mortality data

indicate that working age Americans

(18–64 years old) now have a 1 in 14

chance of hospitalization when infected

with COVID–19 (CDC, October 18,

2021—Demographic Trends, Cases by

Age; Total Hospitalizations, by Age).

Those who are hospitalized frequently

need supplemental oxygen and

treatment for the disease’s most

common complications, which include

pneumonia, respiratory failure, acute

respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS),

acute kidney injury, sepsis, myocardial

injury, arrhythmias, and blood clots.

One study, which included 35,502

inpatients nationwide, determined that

the median length of hospital stay was

6 days, unless the cases required ICU

treatment. For those cases, ICU stays

were on median 5 days in addition to

the time spent hospitalized outside of

the ICU (Rosenthal et al., December 10,

2020). Another study that assessed

hospital length of stay for COVID–19

patients in England estimated that a

non-ICU hospital stay averaged between

8 and 9 days, but those estimates ranged

from approximately 12 to 18 days when

patients were admitted to the ICU

(Vekaria et al., July 22, 2021). Moreover,

given that SARS–CoV–2 is still a novel

virus, the severity of long-term health

effects—such as ‘‘post-COVID

conditions’’—are not yet fully

understood.

Many members of the workforce are at

increased risk of death and severe

disease from COVID–19 because of their

age or pre-existing health conditions.

8 Risk of death is based on averages from reported

CDC data. Risks of hospitalization and death are

much higher in unvaccinated individuals, as

discussed further in Grave Danger, Section III.A.IV.

Vaccines Effectively Reduce Severe Health

Outcomes from and Transmission of SARS–CoV–2.

9 This adoption includes the citations in the

referenced section of the Healthcare ETS, which are

also included in the docket for this ETS.

The comorbidities that further

exacerbate COVID–19 infections are

common among adults of working age in

the U.S. For instance, 46.1% of

individuals with cancer are in the 20–

64 year old age range (NCI, April 29,

2015), and over 40% of working age

adults are obese (Hales et al., February

2020). Disease severity is also likely

exacerbated by long-standing healthcare

inequities experienced by members of

many racial and economic

demographics (CDC, April 19, 2021).

Recent data suggests that Delta variant

infections may result in even more

severe illness and a higher frequency of

death than previous COVID–19 variants

due to Delta’s increased transmissibility,

virulence, and immune escape (Fisman

and Tuite, July 12, 2021). Symptomatic

Delta variant infections do occur in fully

vaccinated people (Mlcochova et al.,

June 22, 2021; Musser et al., July 22,

2021); however, as reported by the CDC

(CDC, August 26, 2021), the vast

majority of the continuing instances of

severe and fatal COVID–19 infections

are occurring in unvaccinated persons

(discussed further in Grave Danger,

Section III.A.IV. Vaccines Effectively

Reduce Severe Outcomes from and

Transmission of SARS–CoV–2). An

assessment of Delta-related hospital

admissions in Scotland found that

hospitalizations were approximately

doubled in patients with the Delta

variant when compared to the Alpha

variant (Sheikh et al., June 4, 2021). A

similar study conducted using a

retrospective cohort in Ontario, Canada

compared the virulence of novel SARS–

CoV–2 variants and found that the

incidences of hospitalization, ICU

admission, and death were more

pronounced with the Delta variant than

any other SARS–CoV–2 variant (Fisman

and Tuite, July 12, 2021). A large

national cohort study that included all

Alpha and Delta SARS–CoV–2 patients

in England between March 29 and May

23, 2021 found a ‘‘higher hospital

admission or emergency care attendance

risk for patients with COVID–19

infected with the Delta variant

compared with the Alpha variant,’’

suggesting that Delta outbreaks—

especially amongst unvaccinated

populations—may lead to more severe

health consequences and an equivalent

or greater burden on healthcare services

than the Alpha variant (Twohig et al.,

August 27, 2021). However, one more

recent study examining data from

several U.S. states demonstrated a

significant increase in hospitalization

from the pre-Delta to the Delta period,

which may be related to increased

transmissibility of Delta rather than

APP. 10

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

more severe health outcomes (Taylor et

al., October 22, 2021).

III. Impact on the Workplace

SARS–CoV–2 is readily transmissible

in workplaces because they are areas

where multiple people come into

contact with one another, often for

extended periods of time. When

employees report to their workplace,

they may regularly come into contact

with co-workers, the public, delivery

people, patients, and any other people

who enter the workplace. Workplace

factors that exacerbate the risk of

transmission of SARS–CoV–2 include

working in indoor settings, working in

poorly-ventilated areas, and spending

hours in close proximity with others.

Full-time employees typically spend 8

hours or more at work each shift, more

time than they spend anywhere else but

where they live. Employees work in

proximity to others in workplaces that

were not originally designed to keep

people six feet away from other people

and that may make it difficult for

employees to perform work tasks while

maintaining a six-foot distance from

others. Even in the cases where workers

can do most of their work from, for

example, a private office within a

workplace, they share common areas

like hallways, restrooms, lunch rooms

and meeting rooms. Furthermore, many

work areas are poorly ventilated (Allen

and Ibrahim, May 25, 2021; Lewis,

March 30, 2021). An additional factor

that exacerbates the risk of transmission

of SARS–CoV–2 is interacting with or

caring for people with suspected or

confirmed COVID–19; this was a

primary driver of OSHA’s determination

of grave danger for healthcare workers

in the Healthcare ETS (see 86 FR 32381–

32383). In recent weeks, the majority of

states in the U.S. have experienced what

CDC defines as ‘‘high or substantial

community transmission,’’ indicating

that there is a clear risk of the virus

being introduced into and circulating in

workplaces (CDC, October 18, 2021—

Community Transmission Rates).

Although COVID–19 is not

exclusively an occupational disease, it

is evident from research accrued since

the beginning of the pandemic that

SARS–CoV–2 transmission can and

does occur in workplaces, affecting

employees and their lives, health, and

livelihoods. This continues to be true

for the Delta variant, with its increased

transmissibility and potentially more

severe health effects. This section

describes some of the clusters,

outbreaks, and other occurrences of

workplace COVID–19 cases that

government agencies, researchers, and

journalists have described, and the

widespread effects of SARS–CoV–2 in

industry sectors across the national

economy. While the focus is on more

recent data reflecting the impact of the

Delta variant, evidence of workplace

transmission that occurred prior to the

emergence of the Delta variant is also

presented.

The workplace-based clusters

described below provide evidence that

workplaces in a wide range of industries

have been affected by COVID–19, that

many employees face exposure to

infected people in their workspaces, and

that SARS–CoV–2 transmission is

occurring in the workplace, including

during the recent period where the Delta

variant has predominated. Although the

presence of a cluster on its own does not

necessarily establish that the cluster is

work-related (i.e., a result of

transmission at the worksite), many

state investigation reports and

published studies provide evidence that

transmission is work related by

documenting that infections at a

workplace occurred within 14-days (the

incubation period for the virus) of each

other and ruling out the possibility that

transmission occurred outside the

workplace. In addition, the information

below demonstrates that exposures to

SARS–CoV–2 happen regularly in a

wide variety of different types of

workplaces.

The basis for OSHA’s grave danger

finding is that employees can be

exposed to the virus in almost any work

setting; that exposure to SARS–CoV–2

can lead to infection (CDC, September

21, 2021); and that infection in turn can

cause death or serious impairment of

health, especially in those who are

unvaccinated (see Section III.A.IV.

Vaccines Effectively Reduce Severe

Health Outcomes from and

Transmission of SARS–CoV–2). The

information described in this section

supports OSHA’s finding that

employees who work in spaces shared

by others are at risk of exposure to

SARS–CoV–2. The degree of risk from

droplet-based transmission may vary

based on the duration of close proximity

to a person infected with SARS–CoV–2,

including the Delta variant, but the

simple and brief act of sneezing,

coughing, talking, or even breathing can

significantly increase the risk of

transmission if controls are not in place.

SARS–CoV–2, including the Delta

variant, might also be spread through

airborne particles under certain

conditions, particularly in enclosed

settings with inadequate ventilation,

which are common characteristics of

some workplaces.

The peer-reviewed scientific journal

articles, government reports, and news

61411

articles described below establish the

widespread prevalence of COVID–19

among employees, beginning with a

description of the recent impact from

the Delta variant. OSHA’s findings are

based primarily on the evidence from

peer-reviewed scientific journal articles

and government reports. However, peer

review for scientific journal articles and

the assembly of information for

government reports and other official

sources of information take time, and

therefore those sources do not always

reflect the most up-to-date information

(Chan et al., December 14, 2010). In

addition, while state and local health

departments can report workplace

outbreaks to CDC, the agency does not

provide summary statistics by

workplace so that those outbreaks can

be tracked on a national level. In the

context of the COVID–19 pandemic,

given the recent impacts due to the

Delta variant and the emergence of new

information on a daily basis, it is critical

for OSHA to rely on the most up-to-date

information available. Therefore, OSHA

has occasionally supplemented peerreviewed data and government reports

with additional information on

occupational outbreaks contained in

other sources of media (e.g.,

newspapers, digital media, and

information submitted to or obtained by

private organizations).10 The reported

information from other sources can

provide further evidence of the impact

of an emerging and changing disease,

especially for industries that are not

well represented in the peer-reviewed

scientific literature. Together, these

sources of information represent the

best available evidence of the impact on

employees of the pandemic thus far.

The information described herein

illustrates a significant number of

infections among employees in a variety

of industries, with virtually every state

continuing to experience what CDC

defines as high or substantial

community transmission related to the

recent surge of the Delta variant. The

industries and types of workplaces

described are not the only ones in

which a grave danger exists. The science

of transmission does not vary by

industry or by type of workplace. OSHA

therefore expects transmission to occur

in diverse workplaces all across the

country (see Dry Color Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc.

v. Dep’t of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 102 n.3

(3d Cir. 1973) (holding that when OSHA

determines a substance poses a grave

10 OSHA did not make findings based solely on

non-peer-reviewed sources such as news articles,

but the agency found that those sources can

sometimes provide useful information when

considered with more robust sources.

APP. 11

61412

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

danger to workers, OSHA can assume an

exposure to a grave danger exists

wherever that substance is present in a

workplace)). In addition, the severity of

COVID–19 does not depend on where

an employee is infected; an employee

exposed to SARS–CoV–2 might die

whether exposed while working at a

meat packing facility, a retail

establishment, or an office (see Grave

Danger, Section III.A.V.b. Employees

Who Work Exclusively Outside, below,

for a discussion of the risk of exposure

in outdoor workplaces).

a. General Impact on Workers

Data on SARS–CoV–2 infections,

illnesses, and deaths among employees

in general industry, agriculture,

construction, and maritime support

OSHA’s finding that COVID–19 poses a

grave danger to employees in these

sectors across the U.S. economy. This

section summarizes studies and reports

of COVID–19 illness and fatalities in a

wide range of workplaces across those

industry sectors. Not all workplace

settings are discussed; nor is the data

available to do so. However, the

characteristics of the various affected

workplaces—such as indoor work

settings; contact with coworkers, clients,

or members of the public; and sharing

space with others for prolonged periods

of time—indicate that exposures to

SARS–CoV–2 are occurring in a wide

variety of work settings across all

industries. Therefore, most employees

who work in the presence of other

people (e.g., co-workers, customers,

visitors) need to be protected.

While there is no comprehensive

source of nationwide workplace

infection data, reports from states and

communities on outbreaks related to

workplaces provide key, up-to-date data

that illustrate the likelihood of

employee exposure to SARS–CoV–2 at

workplaces throughout the U.S. OSHA

identified a number of recent reports

from various regions of the country that

together demonstrate the impact that

SARS–CoV–2 can have on a variety of

workplaces, including in service

industries (e.g., restaurants, grocery and

other retail stores, fitness centers,

hospitality, casinos, salons), corrections,

warehousing, childcare, schools, offices,

homeless shelters, transportation, mail/

shipping/delivery services, cleaning

services, emergency services/response,

waste management, construction,

agriculture, food packaging/processing,

and healthcare. Deaths are reported in

many studies performed prior to the

emergence of the Delta variant but,

because the Delta outbreak is so recent

and deaths can occur weeks after

infection, the number of deaths from

recent infections might be

underestimated. Some of the reports

include cumulative data representing

various phases of the pandemic,

beginning prior to the availability of

vaccines and continuing through the

recent surge of the Delta variant. In

addition, some studies report

investigations of recent outbreaks,

which provide insight on the impact of

the Delta variant as well as impacts

associated with the current vaccination

status of workers.

The Washington State Department of

Health (WSDH) reports outbreaks

occurring in non-healthcare workplaces

(WSDH, September 8, 2021). In nonhealthcare workplaces, outbreaks are

defined as two or more laboratory

confirmed cases of COVID–19, with at

least two cases reporting symptom onset

within 14 days of each other, and

plausible epidemiological evidence of

transmission in a shared location other

than a household. As of September 4,

2021, WSDH reported 5,247 outbreaks

in approximately 40 different types of

non-healthcare work settings. During

the week of August 29 through

September 4, 2021, WSDH identified

137 separate workplace outbreaks. The

types of non-medical workplace settings

that represented more than 5% of the

total outbreaks during that week

included food service/restaurants,

childcare, schools, retail, grocery, and

shelter/homeless services. Other types

of non-healthcare settings where

outbreaks occurred recently included

non-food and food manufacturing,

construction, professional services/

office based, agriculture/produce

packing, transportation/shipping

delivery, government agencies/facilities,

leisure hospitality/recreation,

corrections, utilities, warehousing,

facility/domestic cleaning services,

youth sports/activities, camps, and

public safety. Over the course of the

pandemic, outbreaks have also been

observed at bars/nightclubs, hotels, and

fishing/commercial seafood vessels.

The Oregon Health Authority (OHA)

publishes a weekly report detailing

outbreaks directly related to work

settings. OHA epidemiologists consider

cases to be part of a workplace outbreak

when clusters form with respect to

space and time, within a plausible

incubation period for the virus, and

their investigation does not uncover an

alternative source for the outbreak. For

privacy reasons, OHA only reports

outbreaks with 5 or more cases in

workplaces with 30 or more people.

OHA reported a total of 26,013 cases

and 135 deaths related to workplace

outbreaks as of September 1, 2021. As

of September 1, 2021, OHA was

investigating more than 124 active

workplace outbreaks (OHA, September

1, 2021). Those outbreaks occurred in a

wide variety of industries including

correctional facilities, emergency

services, waste management, schools

and child care, retail and grocery stores,

restaurants, warehousing, agriculture,

food processing/packaging,

construction, healthcare, mail and

delivery services, office locations,

utilities, transportation, and others.

Tennessee Department of Health was

investigating 557 active COVID–19

clusters as of September 8, 2021 (TDH,

September 8, 2021). Clusters are defined

as two or more laboratory confirmed

COVID–19 cases linked to the same

location or event that is not a household

exposure. The clusters occurred in 13

types of settings, 10 of which were

workplace settings. Outbreaks at

workplaces represented more than half

of the total active outbreaks in the state

at that time. Settings comprising more

than 5% of total clusters included

assisted care living facilities, nursing

homes, and correctional facilities. Other

types of workplaces where outbreaks

occurred included bars, construction,

farms, homeless shelters, and industrial

settings.

The North Carolina Department of

Health and Human Services reports

cumulative numbers of clusters, cases,

and deaths for workers in poultry

processing facilities (beginning in April

of 2020) and other types of workplaces

(beginning in May of 2020) (NCDHHS,

August 30, 2021). Clusters are defined

as a minimum of 5 cases with illness

onset or initial positive results within a

14-day period and plausible

epidemiological linkage between the

cases. Plausible epidemiological linkage

means that multiple cases were in the

same general setting during the same

time period (e.g., same shift, same

physical area) and that a more likely

source of exposure is not identified (e.g.,

household contact or close contact to a

confirmed case in another setting).

During that time period of April/May

2020 through August 30, 2021,

workplaces 11 were associated with

nearly 80% of the 1,969 clusters and

27,097 cases observed and nearly 40%

of the 167 deaths related to the clusters.

Cumulative numbers of clusterassociated deaths were highest in meat

and poultry processing (25 of 5,351

cases), followed by healthcare (10 of

1,036 cases), government services and

manufacturing (5 of 1,048 cases and 5 of

11 NCDHHS identifies a ‘‘workplace’’ category in

their report (e.g., agriculture, construction), but

OSHA includes other settings where employees

would be present (e.g., retail, restaurants, childcare,

healthcare).

APP. 12

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

1,856 cases, respectively), and

restaurants and childcare (3 of 421 cases

and 3 of 1,943 cases, respectively).

Recently, in July of 2021, the number of

cases associated with workplace clusters

began increasing in several different

types of work settings, including meat

processing, manufacturing, retail,

restaurants, childcare, schools, and

higher education.

Colorado Department of Public Health

& Environment/Colorado State

Emergency Operations Center (CDPHE/

CSEOC, September 8, 2021) reported

5,584 resolved workplace-related

outbreaks involving 40,156 employee

cases and 79 employee deaths since

May of 2020. The agency’s current

investigations, as of September 8, 2021

included 291 active outbreaks (not

defined), with 2,865 staff cases

(assumed to be cases in employees). The

majority of active outbreaks were

reported in childcare, schools,

healthcare, and corrections. Active

outbreaks were also reported in

construction, retail, homeless shelters,

casinos, restaurants, hotels, offices, law

enforcement, manufacturing, delivery

services, and warehouses. Other types of

work settings that were affected in

resolved outbreaks included

warehouses, bars, government locations,

waste management, utilities, salons,

emergency services, meat processing/

packaging, and postal services. From

June 21, 2021 (the date the healthcare

ETS was published) through September

8, 2021, 1,469 staff cases associated with

outbreaks were reported, for an average

of approximately 19 cases per day.

Similar reporting is available from

Louisiana’s Department of Health (LDH,

August 24, 2021), with 1,347 outbreaks

and 9,130 cases reported as of August

24, 2021. LDH defines an outbreak as 2

or more cases among unrelated

individuals who visited a site within a

14-day period. More than three quarters

of outbreaks through that date were

associated with workplaces. Workplace

settings in Louisiana that experienced

more than 5% of outbreaks included

day care facilities, bars, restaurants,

retail settings, industrial settings, and

office spaces. Other types of workplace

settings or industries where outbreaks

occurred included casinos, gyms/fitness

centers, banks, automotive services,

construction, and ships/boats.

In addition to the state data above,

some published studies and government

reports provide information on recent

workplaces outbreaks. For example, 47

people, including 3 of 11 staff members,

23 gymnasts, and 21 household

contacts, contracted COVID–19 from an

outbreak linked to an Oklahoma

gymnastics facility during April 15

through May 3, 2021 (Dougherty et al.,

July 16, 2021). All 21 of the virus

samples sequenced were determined to

be the Delta variant. The majority of the

infected individuals (85%) were

unvaccinated. Infections were reported

in 16 adults aged 20 years or older; two

adults were hospitalized and one

required intensive care.

The state of Hawaii defines clusters as

three or more confirmed or probable

cases linked to a site or event within 14

days, with no outside exposure of cases

to each other (Hawaii State, August 19,

2021). The state reported a COVID–19

cluster in July associated with a concert

at a bar that affected 16 people,

including employees, band members,

and concert attendees; infections also

spread to 7 household members. Band

members had performed while sick.

Four of the initial 16 people and none

of the household members who tested

positive for COVID–19 were fully

vaccinated. The concert cluster was

linked to clusters at another workplace

and another concert. The report lists

additional clusters investigated in the

two weeks prior to the report; those

clusters were observed in workplace

locations such as correctional facilities,

bars and nightclubs, restaurants,

construction/industrial sites, travel/

lodging/tourism, schools, food

suppliers, and gyms.

Additional evidence that employees

are at risk of exposure to SARS–CoV–2

in the workplace is available from

published, peer-reviewed studies that

were conducted before the Delta variant

emerged. Those studies demonstrate

that employees have been at risk of

infection, illness, and death throughout

the COVID–19 pandemic. Because the

Delta variant is more transmissible and

likely causes more severe disease than

previous variants, there is even greater

potential for unvaccinated employees to

become seriously ill or die as a result of

exposure to the Delta variant.

Contreras et al. (July, 2021) examined

workplace outbreaks (excluding

healthcare settings, homelessness

services, and emergency medical

services) in Los Angeles county from

March 19 through September 30, 2020.

Workplace outbreaks were defined as 5

or more suspected or laboratory

confirmed COVID–19 cases (prior to

May 29) or 3 or more laboratory

confirmed cases (after May 29)

occurring within 14 days. Nearly 60% of

the 698 identified outbreaks occurred in

three sectors—manufacturing (184,

26.4%), retail trade (137, 19.6%), and

transportation and warehousing (73,

10.5%). Also notable were the 71

outbreaks in the accommodation and

food services industry, which

61413

represented 10.2% of the outbreaks. The

study authors concluded that outbreaks

were larger and lasted longer at facilities

with more onsite staff.

Outbreaks in Wisconsin from March 4

through November 16, 2020 were also

examined (Pray et al., January 29, 2021).

Non-household outbreaks were defined

as two or more confirmed COVID–19

cases that occurred within 14 days in

persons who attended the same facility

or event and did not share a household.

During the period from March 4 through

November 16, 2020, the largest

percentages of cases were associated

with outbreaks in long-term care

facilities (26.8% of cases), correctional

facilities (14.9% of cases), and colleges

or universities (15% of cases). Also

notable were the substantial number of

cases associated with outbreaks in food

production or manufacturing facilities

(including meat processing and

warehousing; 14.5% of cases) and

schools and childcare facilities (10.6%

of cases).

Bui et al. (August 17, 2020) analyzed

data from the Utah Department of

Health’s COVID–19 case surveillance

system, which included data on

workplace outbreaks. Outbreaks were

defined as two or more laboratory

confirmed cases occurring within a 14

day period among coworkers in a

common workplace (e.g., same facility).

During the time period between March

6 and June 5, 2020, 277 COVID–19

outbreaks were reported, of which 210

(76%) occurred in workplaces. The 210

workplace outbreaks occurred in 15 of

20 industry sectors, and the industry

sectors of manufacturing (43 outbreaks,

20%), construction (32 outbreaks, 15%),

and wholesale trade (29 outbreaks, 14%)

together represented nearly half of

workplace outbreaks. Other sectors that

represented more than 10% of total

outbreaks were retail trade (28

outbreaks, 13%) and accommodation

and food services (25 outbreaks, 12%).

Incidence rates of COVID–19 over the

period of March 6 through June 5, 2020

were 339/100,000 workers in

manufacturing, 122/100,000 workers in

construction, 377/100,000 workers in

wholesale trade, 68/100,000 workers for

retail trade, and 78/100,000 workers for

accommodation and food services. For

COVID–19 cases associated with

workplace outbreaks in which

hospitalization and severity status were

known (1,382 and 1,155, respectively),

the number in all sectors who were

admitted to the hospital was 85 (6%)

and the number with severe outcomes

(intensive care unit admission,

mechanical ventilation, or death) was 40

(3%).

APP. 13

61414

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

The impact of SARS–CoV–2

exposures on employee infection,

illness, and death has also been

demonstrated in studies focusing on

specific types of industries, such as

those where employees have frequent

contact with each other and the public

(e.g., grocery stores, bars, fitness

facilities, schools, and law enforcement/

corrections). For example, a study by

Lan et al. (September 26, 2020)

demonstrates the risk of infection in

service industries. The cross-sectional

study examined the risks of SARS–CoV–

2 exposure and infection for employees

in a Boston, Massachusetts-area retail

grocery store market. The study tested

104 grocery store employees, of whom

20% (21 employees) were positive for

COVID–19; 76% of confirmed cases did

not have symptoms. After adjusting for

gender, smoking, age, and the

prevalence of COVID–19 in the

employees’ residential communities,

employees who had direct customer

exposure (e.g., cashiers, sales associates,

cart attendants) were 5.1 times more

likely to have a positive test for COVID–

19 than employees without direct faceto-face customer exposure (e.g.,

stockers, backroom, receiving and

maintenance). The infection rate of 20%

among all employees was significantly

higher than the rate in the surrounding

community.

In February of 2021, an event at an

Illinois bar that accommodates

approximately 100 people resulted in a

COVID–19 outbreak that affected 46

people, including 3 (10%) staff

members, 26 (90%) patrons, and 17

secondary cases (Sami et al., April 9,

2021). People at the event included an

asymptomatic person diagnosed with

COVID–19 on the previous day and 4

symptomatic people who were later

diagnosed with COVID–19. The

outbreak resulted in a school closure

and the hospitalization of a resident at

a long-term care facility.

In Minnesota, 47 COVID–19 outbreaks

were detected at fitness facilities from

August through November of 2020

(Suhs et al., July 23, 2021). One

outbreak at a fitness facility during

October through November of 2020

resulted in 23 COVID–19 cases

including 5 (22%) employees and 18

(78%) members. A genetic analysis of

specimens from 3 employees and 10

members identified 2 distinct genetic

subclusters, indicating two distinct

chains of transmission among members

and employees.

School-related outbreaks were

examined from December 1, 2020

through January 22, 2021 in eight public

elementary schools of a Georgia school

district (Gold et al., February 26, 2021).

A COVID–19 case was determined to be

school-related if (1) symptom onset or a

positive test was consistent with the

incubation period of the virus following

contact with an index case or a schoolassociated case, (2) close contact

occurred with the index case or schoolassociated case while that person was

infected, and (3) no known contact

occurred with an infected community or

household contact in the two weeks

prior to a positive test for COVID–19.

The investigators identified nine

clusters of three or more

epidemiologically linked COVID–19

cases that involved 13 educators and 32

students in six of the eight elementary

schools. Approximately half of the

school-associated cases involved two

clusters that began with probable

transmission between educators,

followed by educator to student

transmission. Eighteen of 69 household

members tested received positive

results.

A number of studies demonstrate the

impact of COVID–19 in law enforcement

and related fields such as corrections.

For example, a study examining

COVID–19 antibodies in employees

from public service agencies in the New

York City area from May through July of

2020, found that 22.5% of participants

had COVID–19 antibodies (Sami et al.,

March, 2021). The percentage of

correctional officers found to have

COVID–19 antibodies (39.2%) was the

highest observed among all the

occupations. The percentages of police

dispatchers, traffic officers, security

guards, and dispatchers found to have

COVID–19 antibodies (29.8 to 37.3%)

were among the highest levels observed

in all the occupations. The study

authors noted that those jobs involve

frequent or close contact with the public

or are done in places where employees

work in close proximity to their

coworkers.

Wallace et al. (May 15, 2020)

evaluated data on COVID–19 cases and

deaths among correctional facility

employees and inmates from January 21

to April 21, 2020. Data were reported to

CDC by 37 (69%) of 54 state and

territorial health department

jurisdictions. Of these 37 jurisdictions,

32 (86%) reported at least one COVID–

19 case from a correctional facility. Of

the 420 facilities with a case, 221 (53%)

reported cases only among staff

members. In total, 4,893 COVID–19

cases among incarcerated or detained

persons and 2,778 cases among staff

members were reported (total tested not

provided). Among staff member cases,

79 hospitalizations (3%) and 15 deaths

(1%) were reported. The study authors

noted that ‘‘correctional and detention

facilities face challenges in controlling

the spread of infectious diseases

because of crowded, shared

environments and potential

introductions by staff members and new

intakes.’’

Ward et al. (June 2021) analyzed

COVID–19 prevalence among prisoners

and staff in 45 states from March 31,

2020 through November 4, 2020. During

that time period, COVID–19 cases in

staff were 3 to 5 times higher compared

to the U.S. population. Average daily

increases in cases were 42 per 100,000

prison employees, 61 per 100,000

prisoners, and 13 per 100,000 U.S.

residents. On November 4, 2020,

COVID–19 prevalence for prison staff

was 9,316 cases per 100,000 employees,

which was 3.2 times greater than

prevalence in the U.S. population (2,900

cases per 100,000).

Kirbiyik et al. (November 6, 2020)

analyzed movement through a networkinformed approach to identify likely

high points of transmission within the

Cook County Jail in Chicago, IL. At that

facility, over 900 COVID–19 cases were

reported across 10 housing divisions in

13 buildings from March 1–April 30,

2020. Staff members were required to

report symptoms of COVID–19

(probable cases) or receipt of a positive

test result (confirmed cases). A total of

2,041 staff members (77% of staff) were

included in the network analysis

because information was available about

their shift and division assignments,

and 198 (9.7%) of those staff members

had COVID–19 during the two-month

study period. Connections between staff

members who had COVID–19 were

higher than expected, suggesting likely

transmission among staff members.

Fewer connections than expected were

observed among detained persons with

SARS–CoV–2 infections, suggesting the

effectiveness of medical isolation at

reducing transmission.

The Officer Down Memorial Page,

which tracks police officer fatalities

determined to be occupationally related,

reported that the majority of officer

deaths for 2021 (157 of 269) were

related to COVID–19 (ODMP, September

14, 2021). For the 269 officers who died,

causes of death were not reported for

each month, but the highest numbers of

monthly deaths, 52 in January and 65 in

August (compared to 16 to 34 deaths on

other reported months), were consistent

with the winter surge of COVID–19 and,

more recently, the surge caused by the

Delta variant.

The risk of COVID–19 has also been

examined in industries where

employees have little contact with the

public, such as construction, and food

processing, and where most exposure to

APP. 14

Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 212 / Friday, November 5, 2021 / Rules and Regulations

SARS–CoV–2 likely comes from other

workers. Pasco et al. (October 29, 2020)

examined the association between

construction work during the COVID–19

pandemic and community transmission

and construction worker hospitalization

rates in Austin, Texas from March 13 to

August 20, 2020. A ‘‘Stay Home-Work

Safe’’ order enacted on March 24, 2020,

limited construction to only critical

infrastructure and excluded commercial

and residential work. One week later,

the Texas governor lifted the restriction

for essential workers and allowed all

types of construction work to resume,

while keeping the order in place for

other workers. The authors found that

resuming construction during the

shelter-in-place order led to an increase

in community transmission, an increase

in hospitalizations among community

members, and an increase in

hospitalizations of construction

workers. By mid-July, Austin Public

Health identified at least 42 clusters (not

defined) of COVID–19 cases in the

construction industry; 515 individuals

were hospitalized for COVID–19

illnesses acquired as part of these

clusters, and 77 of those reported

working in construction. The study

found that construction workers had a

nearly 5-fold increased risk of

hospitalization in central Texas

compared with workers in other

occupations. The authors’ model

predicted that allowing unrestricted

construction work would be associated

with an increase in COVID–19

hospitalization rates from 0.38 per 1,000

residents to 1.5 per 1,000 residents

overall, and from 0.22 per 1,000

construction workers to 9.3 per 1,000

construction workers for the

construction industry specifically. The

authors concluded that stringent

workplace safety measures could

significantly mitigate risks related to

COVID–19 in the industry.

The meat packing and processing

industries and related agricultural and

food processing sectors have also been

impacted by COVID–19. Waltenburg et

al. (January, 2021) reported COVID–19

cases in employees from meat and

poultry processing facilities in 31 states

from March 1 through May 31, 2020. As

reported in Table 2 of that report, 28,364

employees in those facilities were

confirmed to have COVID–19 by

laboratory testing and 132 died. Among

the 20 states that reported total numbers

of employees, 11.4% of the workers

were diagnosed with COVID–19 (with a

range of 3.1 to 27.7% of workers in

individual states). For states that

reported at least one COVID–19-related

death, the percentages of employees

who died in each state ranged from 0.1

to 2.4% of those with COVID–19. The

authors found a high burden of disease

in persons employed at these facilities

who were racial or ethnic minorities.

Higher incidence in these populations

might be due to the likelihood of these

employees working in areas in the plant

where transmission risk is higher.

Steinberg et al. (August 7, 2020)

reported that attack rates (i.e., the

number of individuals who are infected

in comparison to the total number at

risk) among production employees in

the Cut (30.2%), Conversion (30.1%),

and Harvest (29.4%) departments of a

meat processing plant (where spacing

between employees is less than 6 feet)

were double that of salaried employees

(14.8%) whose workstations had been

modified to increase physical distancing

from others.

Waltenburg et al. (January, 2021) also

evaluated COVID–19 incidence in food

manufacturing and agricultural settings

(e.g., manufacturing or farming

involving fruits, vegetables, dairy, baked

goods, eggs, prepared foods), as reported

in 30 states from March through May

2020. In food manufacturing and

farming of fruits, vegetables, dairy, and

other items, 742 workplaces were

affected, including 8,978 infections and

55 fatalities. For states that reported

total numbers of employees, the

proportion of employees who developed

COVID–19 in each state ranged from 2.0

to 43.5%. For states that reported at

least one death, the percentages of

deaths among cases ranged from 0.1 to

3.8%.

Porter et al. (April 30, 2021) reported

that 13 COVID–19 outbreaks occurred at

Alaska seafood processing facilities and

vessels (both of which were described as

high density workplaces) during the

Summer and early Fall of 2020. The 13

outbreaks involved 539 COVID–19

cases, with 2–168 cases per outbreak.

Attack rates in facilities and offshore

vessels ranged from less than 5% to

75%. Outbreaks were also reported in

entry quarantine groups. Because of

these outbreaks, it was determined that

vaccination of these essential workers is

important and requirements for COVID–

19 prevention were updated to include

smaller quarantine groups, serial testing,

and testing before transfers from one

facility or vessel to another.

Finally, two published studies

analyzed death records to determine

how mortality rates among individuals

in various types of workplaces had

changed during the pandemic. Chen et

al. (June 4, 2021) analyzed records of

deaths occurring on or after January 1,

2016 in California and found that

mortality rates in working aged adults

61415

(18–65 years) increased 22% during the

COVID–19 pandemic period of March

through November 2020 compared to

pre-pandemic periods. Relative to prepandemic periods, the groups of

employees experiencing the highest,

statistically significant increases in

relative excess mortality were those in

food/agriculture (39% increase),

transportation/logistics (31% increase),

facilities (23% increase), and

manufacturing (24% increase). Other

groups that also experienced excess,

statistically significant mortality

compared to pre-pandemic periods were

health or emergency workers (17%

increase), retail workers (21% increase),

and government and community

workers (17% increase). The study

authors concluded that certain

occupational sectors were impacted

disproportionally by mortality during

the pandemic and that essential work

conducted in-person is a likely avenue

of infection transmission.

Hawkins et al. (January 10, 2021)

examined death certificates of

individuals who died in Massachusetts

between March 1 and July 31, 2020. An

age-adjusted mortality rate of 16

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Application — Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., et al., Applicants v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, et al. | Frix