Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Thomas H. Buffington, Petitioner v. Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Supreme Court briefJan 3, 2022

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No. 21-____

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

THOMAS H. BUFFINGTON,

Petitioner,

V.

DENIS MCDONOUGH,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Roman Martinez

Gregory B. in den Berken

Brent T. Murphy

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2200

Richard A. Samp

Counsel of Record

Kara Rollins

Mark Chenoweth

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES

ALLIANCE

1225 19th Street, NW

Suite 450

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 869-5210

rich.samp@ncla.legal

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

This Court has repeatedly held that when

assessing whether to defer to an agency’s

interpretation of a statute under Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. courts

must apply all “traditional tools of statutory

construction” at Step One of the analysis. 467 U.S.

837, 843 n.9 (1984). Here, the Federal Circuit refused

to apply the pro-veteran canon of construction—an

interpretive tool that this Court has regularly invoked

for nearly 80 years—when assessing petitioner’s

statutory right to resume disability benefits after

finishing a period of active duty. The Federal Circuit

then deferred to the Department of Veterans Affairs’

implausible construction of the relevant statutes,

thereby depriving petitioner of nearly three years of

disability benefits to which he was legally entitled.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Chevron doctrine permits courts

to defer to VA’s construction of a statute designed to

benefit veterans, without first considering the proveteran canon of construction.

2. Whether Chevron should be overruled.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner Thomas H. Buffington was the

appellant in both the U.S. Court of Appeals for

Veterans Claims (the “Veterans Court”) and the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Secretary of Veterans Affairs Robert L. Wilkie was

the appellee in the Veterans Court and, initially, in

the Federal Circuit. He was replaced in the Federal

Circuit by his successor, Respondent Secretary of

Veterans Affairs Denis McDonough. McDonough is

being sued in his official capacity only.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Buffington v. Wilkie, No. 17-4382 (Vet. App.).

Judgment entered December 11, 2019.

Buffington v. McDonough, No. 20-1479 (Fed. Cir.).

Judgment entered August 6, 2021.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented ................................................... i

Parties to the Proceeding ........................................... ii

Related Proceedings .................................................. iii

Table of Authorities .................................................. vi

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari..................................1

Opinions and Orders Below ........................................1

Jurisdiction..................................................................1

Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Involved ..........1

Introduction .................................................................2

Statement of the Case .................................................5

Reasons for Granting the Writ .................................11

I.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO

APPLY THE PRO-VETERAN CANON AT

CHEVRON STEP ONE WARRANTS REVIEW ...........11

A.

The Federal Circuit’s Decision

Conflicts with Chevron and Its

Progeny......................................................11

B.

This Court’s Intervention Is Needed

to Vindicate the Pro-Veteran Canon

and

Prevent

Unwarranted

Deference to VA ........................................18

C.

This Case Offers an Ideal Vehicle for

Resolving the Question Presented ...........24

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

II.

THE

COURT

SHOULD

RECONSIDER

CHEVRON ............................................................25

A.

Chevron Was Wrongly Decided ................25

B.

Stare Decisis Does Not Support

Retaining Chevron ....................................29

Conclusion .................................................................35

APPENDIX

Appendix A—Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

(Aug. 6, 2020) ............................................... App.1a

Appendix B—Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims

(July 12, 2019)............................................ App.31a

Appendix C—Opinion of the Board of

Veterans’ Appeals (July 20, 2017) ............. App.58a

Appendix D—Letter from Department of

Veterans Affairs to Thomas H.

Buffington informing him of start date

for disability benefits (Aug. 20, 2009) ....... App.70a

Appendix E—Relevant Statutes and

Regulations ................................................ App.75a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Arangure v. Whitaker,

911 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2018)..........................15, 17

Auer v. Robbins,

519 U.S. 452 (1997) ................................................2

Baldwin v. United States,

140 S. Ct. 690 (2020)............................................30

Barnhart v. Walton,

535 U.S. 212 (2002) ..............................................33

BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos,

139 S. Ct. 893 (2019)............................................34

Boone v. Lightner,

319 U.S. 561 (1943) ..............................................13

Brown v. Gardner,

513 U.S. 115 (1994) .............................. 3, 13, 15, 22

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) ...................................... passim

Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) ........................................30, 34

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

City of Arlington v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ..............................................33

Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,

447 U.S. 191 (1980) ..............................................14

DeBeaord v. Principi,

18 Vet. App. 357 (2004) .......................................22

Disabled American Veterans v. Gober,

234 F.3d 682 (Fed. Cir. 2000), overruled

on other grounds by National

Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc.

v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 981 F.3d

1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ...........................................20

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,

556 U.S. 208 (2009) ..............................................33

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,

138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).......................... 2, 12, 15, 34

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair

Corp.,

328 U.S. 275 (1946) ..............................................13

General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.

Cline,

540 U.S. 581 (2004) ..............................................12

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Gray v. McDonald,

27 Vet. App. 313 (2015) .......................................23

Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Firearms & Explosives,

140 S. Ct. 789 (2020)......................................31, 33

Guerra v. Shinseki,

642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................20

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,

834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016)................ 25, 27, 30

Haas v. Peake,

544 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................20

Heino v. Shinseki,

683 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................19

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,

562 U.S. 428 (2011) .................................. 13, 14, 15

Hohn v. United States,

524 U.S. 236 (1998) ..............................................35

Hudgens v. McDonald,

823 F.3d 630 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..............................19

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421 (1987) ..............................................12

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

INS v. St. Cyr,

533 U.S. 289 (2001) ..............................................15

Johnson v. McDonald,

762 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................23

King v. Burwell,

576 U.S. 473 (2015) ..............................................32

King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital,

502 U.S. 215 (1991) ........................................13, 14

Kisor v. McDonough,

995 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................21

Kisor v. McDonough,

995 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............ 4, 17, 19, 21

Kisor v. Shulkin,

880 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................18

Kisor v. Wilkie,

139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).................................. passim

Knick v. Township of Scott,

139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)..........................................29

Maine Medical Center v. Burwell,

841 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2016) ..................................15

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ...............................25

Martin v. Social Security Administration,

903 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2018)............................33

Mathis v. Shulkin,

137 S. Ct. 1994 (2017)..........................................23

In re MCP No. 165,

__ F.4th __, 2021 WL 5989357 (6th Cir.

Dec. 17, 2021) .......................................................33

Michigan v. EPA,

576 U.S. 743 (2015) ........................................25, 28

National Association of Home Builders v.

Defenders of Wildlife,

551 U.S. 644 (2007) ..............................................15

National Cable & Telecommunications

Association v. Brand X Internet Services,

545 U.S. 967 (2005) ..............................................30

National Credit Union Administration v.

First National Bank & Trust Co.,

522 U.S. 479 (1998) ..............................................15

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

National Organization of Veterans’

Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans

Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ...............19

Nielson v. Shinseki,

607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..............................20

Oregon Restaurant & Lodging Association

v. Perez, 843 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 2016) .................17

Pacheco v. Gibson,

27 Vet. App. 21 (2014) .........................................22

Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808 (1991) ........................................29, 30

Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018)....................................25, 34

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,

575 U.S. 92 (2015) ................................................25

Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

632 F.3d 1345 (Fed Cir. 2011) .............................23

Procopio v. Wilkie,

913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .................. 3, 20, 22

Ray v. Wilkie,

31 Vet. App. 58 (2019) .........................................23

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,

138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018)................................ 2, 12, 34

Sears v. Principi,

349 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................20

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook

County v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ...........................15

Terry v. Principi,

340 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................20

Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas,

918 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019)................................15

Turner v. Shulkin,

29 Vet. App. 207 (2018) .......................................23

United States v. Harris,

907 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2018), vacated on

reh’g en banc, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir.

2019) .....................................................................26

United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,

LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012) ....................................16

United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218 (2001) ..............................................33

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

United States v. Oregon,

366 U.S. 643 (1961) ..............................................14

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................26

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)......................................................1

38 U.S.C. § 1110 ..........................................................5

38 U.S.C. § 1131 ..........................................................5

38 U.S.C. § 5304(c) ......................................................5

38 C.F.R. § 3.654 .........................................................6

38 C.F.R. § 3.654(b) .....................................................6

OTHER AUTHORITIES

26 Fed. Reg. 1561 (Feb. 24, 1961)...............................6

27 Fed. Reg. 11,886 (Dec. 1, 1962)..............................6

Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons

in the Review of Administrative

Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 65 (2008) ................15

Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial

Deference to Executive Interpretation,

128 Yale L.J. 908 (2017) ......................................26

xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

David Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s

Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct.

Rev. 201 (2001) ....................................................27

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of

Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin.

L. Rev. 363 (1986) ................................................27

Fed. Resp’ts Opp’n Br., Bais Yaakov of

Spring Valley v. FCC, No. 17-351 (U.S.

Jan. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 1182931 .......................27

Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory

Interpretation from the Inside—An

Empirical Study of Congressional

Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:

Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013) ......................27

Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (2016) .............................25, 26

Kisor v. McDonough, No. 21-465

(U.S. filed Sept. 24, 2021) ....................................21

Kristin Hickman & Aaron Nielson,

Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 Duke

L.J. 931 (2021) .....................................................30

Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, Jr.,

Administrative Law Treatise (6th ed.

updated Nov. 1, 2021) ....................................26, 34

xv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory

Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118

(2016) .................................................. 25, 27, 28, 32

Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132

Harv. L. Rev. 1520 (2019) ....................................33

Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Combination of

Chevron and Political Polarity Has

Awful Effects, 70 Duke L.J. Online 91

(2021) ....................................................................31

James D. Ridgway, Toward a Less

Adversarial Relationship Between

Chevron and Gardner, 9 U. Mass. L.

Rev. 388 (2014) ........................................ 14, 20, 22

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law (2012) ...........................................................14

Cass Sunstein, There Are Two “Major

Questions” Doctrines, 73 Admin. L. Rev.

475 (2021) .............................................................32

Tr. of Oral Arg., Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882

(U.S. Jan. 15, 2020) .......................................16, 26

Tr. of Oral Arg., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra,

No. 20-1114 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2021) ........................32

xvi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

U.S. Government Accountability Office,

GAO-21-348, VA Disability Benefits:

Veterans Benefits Administration Could

Enhance Management of Claims

Processor Training (June 2021),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21348.pdf ..................................................................18

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully seeks a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The opinion of the Federal Circuit is reported at 7

F.4th 1361 and is reproduced at App.1a-30a. The

opinion of the Veterans Court is reported at 31 Vet.

App. 293 and is reproduced at App.31a-57a. The

opinion of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals is

unreported and is reproduced at App.58a-69a. The

letter from the Department of Veterans Affairs

informing petitioner of the start date for his disability

benefits is reproduced at App.70a-74a.

JURISDICTION

The Federal Circuit issued its judgment on August

6, 2021. On October 22, 2021, Chief Justice John

Roberts extended the time to file a petition for a writ

of certiorari until December 6, 2021, and on

November 27, 2021, further extended the time until

January 3, 2022. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The relevant statutory and regulatory provisions

are set out in the appendix to this petition. App.75a78a.

2

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, this Court has repeatedly placed

limits on when courts must defer to federal agencies

when construing statutes and regulations under

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Among the most

important such limits has been a rigorous

enforcement of the comprehensive Step One inquiry

into whether the relevant statute or regulation is

truly ambiguous and thus eligible for deference. As

this Court originally made clear in footnote 9 of

Chevron, courts must apply all “traditional tools of

statutory construction” in conducting the ambiguity

analysis at Step One. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. The Court

has repeatedly reaffirmed that principle ever since.

See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie (“Kisor I”), 139 S. Ct. 2400,

2415 (2019); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612,

1630 (2018); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348,

1358 (2018).

In this case, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit

flouted this Court’s direction and refused to apply an

important and long-standing rule of construction—

the pro-veteran canon—before finding a veterans

disability statute ambiguous at Step One. Proceeding

to Step Two, the court then deferred to the antiveteran interpretation offered by the Department of

Veterans Affairs (VA). As a result, it upheld VA’s

decision to deny petitioner Thomas Buffington nearly

three years of disability benefits that VA had

previously determined he was entitled to receive.

Under VA’s interpretation, Buffington could not

receive those benefits because he had waited too long

to ask for them to be reinstated after completing a

short period of Air Force active duty.

VA’s

3

interpretation essentially invented a one-year

forfeiture rule governing requests for reinstatement

of benefits, without any basis in the statutory text.

The Federal Circuit’s ruling is wrong—and should

be overturned by this Court—for two reasons.

First, the Federal Circuit violated Chevron’s

footnote 9 by refusing to apply the pro-veteran canon,

a “traditional tool[] of statutory construction”

regularly used to interpret laws pertaining to

veterans. See 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. That canon—

under which “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in

the veteran’s favor,” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115,

118 (1994)—has been applied by this Court for nearly

80 years. It is indisputably part of the “legal toolkit”

for interpreting statutes affecting veterans. Kisor I,

139 S. Ct. at 2415. Accordingly, as Judge O’Malley

rightly explained in her dissent below, the canon must

“be employed before resorting to Chevron deference,”

at Step One of the analysis. App.28a. Here, the proveteran canon establishes that Buffington is entitled

to the full disability benefits he earned, and not

merely the one year of retroactive benefits allowed by

VA.

The Federal Circuit’s refusal to apply the proveteran canon was not surprising. For over a decade,

judges on that court have expressed widely divergent

views on how the pro-veteran canon intersects with

deference doctrines, and in recent years it has

repeatedly refused to apply the canon at Step One. In

2018, the court granted en banc review to consider

whether and how the pro-veteran canon applies in

Chevron cases, but then decided the case on other

grounds. See Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371, 1374,

1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc). And last spring,

members of that court wrote 5 different opinions

4

dividing on the issue—with none commanding a

majority, and with a total of nine judges urging this

Court to provide further guidance on the issue. See

Kisor v. McDonough (“Kisor III”), 995 F.3d 1347, 1358

(Fed. Cir. 2021) (Prost, C.J., concurring in denial of

rehearing en banc); id. at 1376 (O’Malley, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

This Court should now provide that guidance. The

Federal Circuit’s persistent refusal to apply the proveteran canon at Step One defies this Court’s

precedent and condones a massive (and unwarranted)

expansion of VA power. It does so, moreover, in a way

that contravenes the intent of Congress and harms

our Nation’s veterans. The Court should grant review

to reaffirm the limits on Chevron deference and

protect veterans from an agency prone to issuing

unlawful regulations against veterans’ interests.

Second, the Federal Circuit’s ruling spotlights the

fundamental ways in which Chevron itself is contrary

to law.

The Federal Circuit faced competing

interpretations of the veterans’ disability benefits law

at issue, one offered by Buffington, the other by VA.

But instead of deciding for itself which interpretation

was correct, the court invoked Chevron and rubberstamped VA’s construction. Such abdication of the

independent Judiciary’s responsibility to say what

the law is cannot be reconciled with the constitutional

separation of powers, with basic principles of due

process of law, or with the Administrative Procedure

Act. Chevron was wrongly decided.

Stare decisis does not support retaining Chevron

in the face of these problems. After 37 years,

experience has shown that Chevron’s deference

regime is wrong, unworkable in practice, leads to

arbitrary and subjective decisions, and affirmatively

5

undermines the stable development of law. Instead of

tinkering at the margins, this Court should now

reconsider—and overrule—Chevron.

This case provides an ideal vehicle for considering

these questions. Buffington served our Nation with

distinction in the Air Force for over nine years and

became disabled in the course of that service. He is

now being denied benefits based on VA’s arbitrary

decision to create a one-year forfeiture rule with no

grounding in the statutory text. This Court should

either cabin Chevron’s scope by enforcing footnote 9

or overrule Chevron altogether. Either way, the

Federal Circuit’s anti-veteran decision should not

stand.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Throughout our Nation’s history, Congress has

provided generous benefits for those who serve our

country in uniform. Federal law instructs that “the

United States will pay” veterans compensation “[f]or

disability resulting from personal injury suffered or

disease contracted in line of duty” during wartime, 38

U.S.C. § 1110, or peacetime, id. § 1131. At the same

time, Congress has determined that veterans should

not receive disability compensation “for any period for

which [they] receive[] active service pay.”

Id.

§ 5304(c). Thus, if a veteran retires from military

service and is awarded disability benefits but is later

recalled to active duty, he may not simultaneously

receive both active-duty pay and disability pay for the

same period of time.

Section 5304(c) places no restriction on a veteran’s

right to resume disability compensation when such

active duty concludes. And indeed, shortly after that

statute was enacted in 1958, the Veterans

6

Administration (VA’s predecessor) issued a regulation

interpreting that law as requiring that disability

payments “be resumed the day following release from

active duty if otherwise in order.” 26 Fed. Reg. 1561,

1599 (Feb. 24, 1961) (establishing 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.654(b)).

In 1962, however, the Veterans Administration

amended that regulation to create a brand-new

forfeiture rule restricting veterans’ ability to resume

their disability benefits following active service.

Specifically, the Veterans Administration determined

that any request by a veteran to resume benefits

would take effect “the day following release from

active duty”—but only “if [a] claim for

recommencement of payments is received within 1

year from the date of such release.” 27 Fed. Reg.

11,886, 11,890 (Dec. 1, 1962) (revising 38 C.F.R.

§ 3.654 and adding subsection (b)(2)). If such a claim

was not received within a year of the veteran’s release

from active duty, “payments will be resumed effective

1 year prior to the date of receipt of a new claim.” Id.

(emphasis added).

The Veterans Administration thus created a

forfeiture rule under which veterans would lose

disability benefits they have earned if they waited

more than one year before submitting a claim to

resume benefits. The rulemaking did not indicate any

source of statutory authority for creating this rule.

The modified version of Section 3.654 remains in

effect today.

2. Buffington served on active duty in the U.S. Air

Force from September 1992 to May 2000. App.3a.

After being honorably discharged, Buffington sought

disability compensation for tinnitus in July 2000. Id.

VA concluded that Buffington’s tinnitus was service

7

connected, rated his disability at 10%, and began

paying him disability compensation effective May 31,

2000. Id. VA has never disputed that, from 2002

onward, Buffington continued to suffer from his

service-connected disability and that the proper

disability rating is 10%.

In July 2003, Buffington was recalled to active

duty in the Air National Guard. Id. Buffington

informed VA of his activation. Id. Applying 38 U.S.C.

§ 5304(c), VA discontinued paying Buffington

disability compensation effective July 20, 2003, the

day before his active service began. App.3a.

Buffington served on active duty from July 2003 to

June 2004, and then again from November 2004 to

July 2005. Id. VA did not reinstate his disability

benefits between those periods of active duty; nor did

VA do so when the second period concluded. In

January 2009, Buffington formally requested that VA

reinstate his disability benefits, including by paying

the benefits he had earned in the periods of time

(between June 2004 and November 2004, and after

July 2005) when he had not received active-duty pay.

See App.33a.

On August 20, 2009, VA agreed to reinstate

Buffington’s benefits “at the same 10 percent service

connected disability rating [he] w[as] awarded prior

to [his] return to active duty.” But VA refused to

award him the benefits due for the full periods in

which he had not received active-duty pay. Instead,

VA informed him that his reinstatement would only

be retroactive to February 1, 2008. App.70a-74a. VA

explained:

We received your request for the

reinstatement of your VA Compensation

8

benefit more than one year after your

release from active duty. By law we are

only permitted to make payments

retroactive to one year prior to the date

we received your request.

App.72a.

3.

Buffington appealed, and the Board of

Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. App.58a-69a. The Board

explained that under Section 3.654(b)(2), “VA cannot

resume compensation payments more than one year

prior to the date of the claim.” App.65a

4. Buffington appealed to the Veterans Court,

arguing that Section 3.654(b)(2) is invalid because it

conflicts with 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 5304(c).

Specifically, Buffington noted that Section 1110(a)

creates a mandatory duty that VA “will pay” disability

benefits once service connection is established, and

Section 5304(c) is “clear” that VA may withhold or

suspend a veteran’s disability benefits only “‘for any

period for which such [veteran] receives active service

pay.’” App.35a. Buffington argued that Section

3.654(b)(2) conflicts with these statutory provisions

because it lets VA withhold a veteran’s disability

benefits for periods during which the veteran is not

receiving active-service pay. Id.

A divided panel affirmed. App.31a-57a. The

majority concluded that the relevant statutes are

silent on the effective date for recommencement of

disability benefits that were discontinued due to reentry into active service. App.42a-43a. The majority

then granted Chevron deference to Section

3.654(b)(2), concluding that the regulation was a

permissible interpretation of a statutory “gap.”

App.42a-48a.

9

Judge Greenberg dissented. He argued that the

regulation “creates an unnecessary and inappropriate

impediment to a veteran receiving benefits he has

already established entitlement to.” App.57a. He

also criticized the majority’s resort to Chevron, calling

it “nothing more than a rubber stamping of the

Government’s attempt to misuse its [regulatory]

authority.” App.56a. Judge Greenberg explained

that he would “stop this business of making up

excuses for judges to abdicate their job of interpreting

the law, and simply allow the court of appeals to

afford a ‘claimant’ its best independent judgment of

the law’s meaning.’” Id. (quoting Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at

2426 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)).

5. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed,

also based on Chevron deference. App.1a-30a.

At Step One, Buffington again argued that 38

U.S.C. §§ 11101 and 5304(c) unambiguously establish

that a veteran who has been recalled to active duty

may be deprived of disability benefits that he has

previously been granted only during “any period for

which such [veteran] receives active service pay.” He

also argued that the pro-veteran canon of

interpretation applies at Step One and precluded

deference to VA at Step Two.

The Federal Circuit disagreed. It held that

Section 5304(c) does not resolve the question because

it does not explicitly say that the period during which

the veteran receives active-service pay is the only

1

The Federal Circuit noted that Buffington’s claim is

actually governed by Section 1131, not Section 1110, because he

served during peacetime—but also that “any differences

[between those provisions] are immaterial for purposes of this

appeal.” App.7a-8a n.3.

10

period during which payments are barred. App.7a.

The majority concluded that “the statutory scheme is

silent regarding the effective date for recommencing

benefits when a disabled veteran leaves active

service.” App.9a. Because of that silence, the court

refused to apply the pro-veteran canon at Step One,

and instead proceeded to consider whether VA’s

interpretation was reasonable at Step Two. App.9a

n.5 (“Because we hold the statutory scheme is silent,

we need not resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the

pro-veteran canon.”). At Step Two, the majority

upheld Section 3.654(b)(2) as a permissible gap-filling

regulation. App.9a-11a.

Judge O’Malley dissented. App.12a-30a. She

concluded that the statutory scheme, particularly 38

U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5110(a), and 5304(c), unambiguously

provides that a disabled veteran who returns to active

service “remains entitled to the benefits for which he

originally qualified,” except for the precise period

during which he receives active-service pay. App.16a17a. Alternatively, she would have applied the proveteran canon at Step One and thereby resolved any

statutory ambiguity in Buffington’s favor. App.26a28a. Judge O’Malley explained that “a correct

Chevron step one analysis … must take into account

all other traditional canons of construction along the

way, including the pro-veteran canon of construction.”

App.26a (citing Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2414); see also

App.28a (explaining that the pro-veteran canon is “an

interpretive tool in the court’s statutory construction

toolbox that is to be employed before resorting to

Chevron deference”).

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO APPLY THE

PRO-VETERAN CANON AT CHEVRON STEP ONE

WARRANTS REVIEW

The Federal Circuit rejected Buffington’s claim for

benefits because it refused to apply the pro-veteran

canon at Step One of the Chevron inquiry when

determining whether VA’s interpretation was eligible

for deference.

That refusal defies this Court’s

repeated instruction—in Chevron’s footnote 9 and

ever since—that the Step One analysis must consider

all “traditional tools of statutory construction.” 467

U.S. at 843 n.9. The Federal Circuit has been

confused and divided over the pro-veteran canon’s

interplay with deference for years. And that issue is

enormously important to the proper interpretation of

veterans-related statutes. This Court should grant

review to resolve the confusion, clarify that the

comprehensive Step One inquiry includes the proveteran canon, and curb VA’s expansive assertion of

interpretive authority.

A.

The Federal Circuit’s Decision Conflicts

with Chevron and Its Progeny

1.

Chevron’s “principle of deference to

administrative interpretations” is rooted in a judicial

assumption that when a “statute is silent or

ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand,

Congress delegated authority to the administering

agency to resolve the issue “within the limits of that

delegation.” 467 U.S. at 843-44, 865. In such a case,

“a court may not substitute its own construction of a

statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation

made by the administrator of an agency.” Id. at 844.

But “if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end

12

of the matter[]”: The agency’s interpretation gets no

deference, and courts must give effect to Congress’s

intent. Id. at 842-43.

The Court has emphasized that this Chevron Step

One inquiry requires a comprehensive examination of

the statute. Courts may not reflexively defer to

agencies as a matter of course. Rather, Chevron’s

footnote 9 makes clear that before concluding that a

statute is silent or ambiguous, a court must apply all

“traditional tools of statutory construction.” 467 U.S.

at 843 n.9.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized this point.

In SAS Institute, for example, the Court explained

that “we owe an agency’s interpretation of the law no

deference unless, after ‘employing traditional tools of

statutory construction,’ we find ourselves unable to

discern Congress’s meaning.” 138 S. Ct. at 1358

(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). And in Epic

Systems, it noted that “deference is not due unless a

‘court, employing traditional tools of statutory

construction,’ is left with an unresolved ambiguity.”

138 S. Ct. at 1630 (same). “Where … the canons

supply an answer, ‘Chevron leaves the stage.’” Id.

(citation omitted); see also, e.g., General Dynamics

Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004); INS

v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).

Most recently, the Court’s decision in Kisor I

emphasized the importance of applying the canons of

construction at Step One of any deference inquiry.

There, as in SAS Institute and Epic Systems, the

Court emphasized that when analyzing whether a

statute or regulation is “genuinely ambiguous” at

Step One, “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional

tools’ of construction.” Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2415

(emphasis added) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843

13

n.9). And the Court admonished that when it used

the term “genuinely ambiguous,” “we mean it—

genuinely ambiguous, even after a court has resorted

to all the standard tools of interpretation.” Id. at 2414

(emphasis added). Deference is appropriate “only

when that legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive

question still has no single right answer.” Id. at 2415.

2.

The pro-veteran canon of construction

undoubtedly qualifies as a “traditional tool of

statutory construction” under Chevron. Since World

War II, this Court has repeatedly instructed that

veterans’ benefits laws must be “liberally construed to

protect those who have been obliged to drop their own

affairs to take up the burdens of the nation.” Boone

v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943); see also

Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328

U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (holding that Selective Service

Act “is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those

who left private life to serve their country in its hour

of great need”).

The pro-veteran canon requires courts to interpret

“provisions for benefits to members of the Armed

Services … in the beneficiaries’ favor.” King v. St.

Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991). Indeed,

the Court has characterized the canon as a “rule”

mandating that “interpretive doubt is to be resolved

in the veteran’s favor.” Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118

(emphasis added).

This Court has consistently applied the proveteran canon when interpreting veterans statutes—

including to protect veterans from inflexible

restrictions on the receipt of benefits. See, e.g.,

Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S.

428, 441 (2011) (applying canon to reject “[r]igid

jurisdictional treatment” of appeal deadline); King,

14

502 U.S. at 218, 220 n.9 (applying canon to reject

lower

court

decisions

that

“engrafted

a

reasonableness requirement” onto statute); Coffy v.

Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980)

(“liberally constru[ing]” employment statute “for the

benefit of the returning veteran”).

Notably, the pro-veteran canon is not based on a

judicial policy judgment that veterans are a

particularly praiseworthy group of individuals who

deserve special treatment. Rather, it is a descriptive

canon reflecting this Court’s view of the intent of

Congress. As one expert has explained, this Court’s

embrace of the pro-veteran canon rests “upon the

premise that Congress … created the system with a

residual intent that ambiguity be resolved in the favor

of veterans.” James D. Ridgway, Toward a Less

Adversarial Relationship Between Chevron and

Gardner, 9 U. Mass. L. Rev. 388, 408 (2014).

In Henderson, the Court explained that the canon

is a tool to “ascertain Congress’ intent” on the

meaning of a particular statute. 562 U.S. at 438; see

also id. at 440 (“The solicitude of Congress for

veterans is of long standing.” (quoting United States

v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 647 (1961)). And it is an

especially reliable tool because—as the Court

emphasized in King—the canon is long-standing and

“Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules

of statutory construction.” 502 U.S. at 221 n.9

(citation omitted); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.

Garner, Reading Law 31 (2012) (“A traditional and

hence anticipated rule of interpretation … imparts

meaning.”).

3. Because the pro-veteran canon is a traditional

tool of statutory construction, Chevron, SAS Institute,

Epic Systems, and Kisor I all make clear that it must

15

be considered at Step One when deciding whether a

veterans statute is genuinely ambiguous and eligible

for deference. That is consistent with this Court’s

own treatment of the canon. In Gardner, for example,

the Court implied that deference to VA would only “be

possible after applying the rule that interpretive

doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.” 513

U.S. at 117-18 (emphasis added). And in Henderson,

the Court used the canon to “ascertain Congress’

intent,” 562 U.S. at 438, thereby confirming its

relevance to the Step One inquiry (which likewise

addresses that “intent[],” 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).

This Court has consistently applied similar canons

to ascertain statutory meaning at Chevron Step One.2

The courts of appeals likewise apply the standard

canons at Step One.3 And even the Solicitor General

2

See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife,

551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (canon against implied repeals); INS v.

St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (canon favoring construction of

“lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the

alien” (citation omitted)); id. at 320 n.45 (canon against

retroactivity); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army

Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (canon against

preemption); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank &

Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501-02 (1998) (canon presuming consistent

usage); see also Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1617, 1625-30 (applying

ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and the presumption against

implied repeals).

3

See, e.g., Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas,

918 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that canons apply at

Chevron Step One); Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 340, 343

(6th Cir. 2018) (noting that this Court applies “canons first” at

Step One); Maine Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, 841 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir.

2016) (same); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the

Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 65, 77

(2008) (“[C]anons trump deference.”).

16

has said that “before you ever get to Chevron, you

apply the canons of construction.” Tr. of Oral Arg. at

60, Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2020)

(representing VA).4

There is no reason why the pro-veteran canon

should be treated differently from any other

traditional canon.

3. The Federal Circuit justified its refusal to apply

the pro-veteran canon at Step One because it

concluded the veterans statutes are “silent” on

whether a veteran may resume disability benefits

immediately upon finishing active duty. App.9a n.5.

In doing so, the majority seemed to believe that when

a statute is facially silent—as opposed to

ambiguous—the Step One inquiry does not allow

consideration of canons of construction. Id.; see

App.13a-15a, 26a-28a (O’Malley, J., dissenting).

That approach finds no support in this Court’s

case law. The overarching purpose of the Step One

inquiry is to ascertain the meaning of the statutory

text. That inquiry is the same—and requires courts

to consider “all the ‘traditional tools’ of

construction”—regardless whether the agency asserts

a gap, silence, or ambiguity. Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at

2415 (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843 n.9); see also, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete

& Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 488 (2012) (referring to

gaps and ambiguities interchangeably).

4

See also Fed. Resp’ts Opp’n Br. 9, Bais Yaakov of Spring

Valley v. FCC, No. 17-351 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 1182931

(“At step one of Chevron, courts must analyze a statute’s ‘text,

its context, the structure of the statutory scheme, and canons of

textual construction ….’” (citation omitted)).

17

Here, the panel incorrectly assumed that any time

a statute is “silent” on a particular point, that means

Congress has empowered the agency to create new

substantive rules of law. But silence does not

“automatically mean that a court can proceed to

Chevron step two.” Arangure, 911 F.3d at 338.

Rather, “Chevron’s theory of implicit delegation only

applies to certain kinds of silences—those where we

can plausibly infer Congress intentionally left a

statutory gap for the agency to fill.” Id. As Judge

O’Scannlain has explained, the notion that silence

invariably confers discretion to agencies is a

“caricature of Chevron” that is “entirely alien to our

system of laws.” Oregon Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v.

Perez, 843 F.3d 355, 360 (9th Cir. 2016) (dissenting

from denial of rehearing en banc).

The panel erred by concluding that statutory

silence authorized it to bypass traditional tools of

construction like the pro-veteran canon at Step One

and proceed straight to deference at Step Two.

4. VA’s argument below against applying the proveteran canon was even less persuasive. According to

VA, the canon comes into play only after a court

completes its Chevron analysis: “Where the statute is

ambiguous, the veteran canon applies if interpretive

doubt remains in a veterans’ benefit statute after

other tools of statutory construction, including

deference principles, have failed to resolve the

ambiguity.” VA C.A. Br. 9 (emphasis added).

That makes no sense. “[R]elegating [the proveteran canon’s] consideration until after Chevron

and Auer deference would render it a nullity.” Kisor

III, 995 F.3d at 1370 n.4 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from

denial of rehearing en banc). Indeed, delaying

consideration of key canons until after Step Two is

18

exactly the opposite of what this Court mandated in

Chevron’s footnote 9, which made clear that

traditional tools of statutory construction—such as

the pro-veteran canon—are relevant at Step One

before granting deference. Supra at 11-17. VA’s

approach violates Chevron.

B.

This Court’s Intervention Is Needed to

Vindicate the Pro-Veteran Canon and

Prevent Unwarranted Deference to VA

1. Each year, VA decides over a million disability

claims, awarding approximately $88 billion in

benefits.5

In doing so, it routinely resolves

interpretive questions which then bubble up to the

Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Veterans Court, and

the Federal Circuit. Many of those rulings involve

close questions of statutory or regulatory

construction. Unsurprisingly, VA virtually always

demands Chevron or Auer deference to its

interpretations, which all too often disfavor veterans.

Without the pro-veteran canon as an interpretive

tool to be consulted at Step One, VA’s anti-veteran

proclivities will receive interpretive deference even

when the better view of the law is pro-veteran.

Clarifying the canon’s role is thus crucial to ensuring

that the veterans’ benefit scheme is administered in

the pro-claimant manner that Congress expects. “[I]t

is difficult to overstate the importance of the veteranfriendly approach to veterans’ benefits statutes and

their accompanying regulations.” Kisor v. Shulkin,

5

See U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-21348, VA Disability Benefits: Veterans Benefits Administration

Could Enhance Management of Claims Processor Training at 1

(June 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-348.pdf.

19

880 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Any

rule banishing the pro-veteran canon from Step One

will have an “enormous impact” on veterans and

render that canon “all but inapplicable to future

cases.” Kisor III, 995 F.3d at 1374 (O’Malley, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

2. Only this Court can fix the Federal Circuit’s

refusal to apply the pro-veteran canon at Step One.

Over the past three decades, the Federal Circuit has

been internally divided on whether and how to apply

the canon in Chevron cases. And in recent years most

of its rulings—like the decision below—have

disregarded the canon at Step One. There is no

prospect of consensus emerging anytime soon. This

Court should provide the guidance that the Federal

Circuit, the Veterans Court, and disabled veterans

nationwide so desperately need.

a. The Federal Circuit’s confusion over the

relationship between the pro-veteran canon and

agency-deference doctrines is long-standing and

deeply rooted. The court has lamented that it “is not

clear where the [pro-veteran] canon fits within the

Chevron doctrine, or whether it should be part of the

Chevron analysis at all.” Heino v. Shinseki, 683 F.3d

1372, 1379 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Hudgens v.

McDonald, 823 F.3d 630, 639 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has

adopted different formulations of when the proveteran canon applies, or if it applies at all, in agencydeference cases. Early cases rightly suggested that it

should be applied at Chevron Step One. See, e.g.,

Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocs., Inc. v. Sec’y of

Veterans Affs., 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001);

Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 692

20

(Fed. Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l

Org. of Veterans’ Advocs., Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans

Affs., 981 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020). But more recent

cases have declined to apply the canon at Step One,

deferring instead to VA’s interpretations at Step Two.

See, e.g., Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir.

2008); Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (Fed.

Cir. 2003).

Even when the Federal Circuit defers to VA’s

interpretations, its rationale for doing so is muddled.

Sometimes, the court has suggested that the proveteran canon never applies in Chevron cases. See

Guerra v. Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046, 1051 (Fed. Cir.

2011); Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed.

Cir. 2003). Other times, the court has treated the

canon as a tool of last resort, to be applied only after

all “other interpretive guidelines have been

exhausted, including Chevron.” Nielson v. Shinseki,

607 F.3d 802, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see generally

Ridgway, supra, at 399-402 (collecting cases).

In 2018, the Federal Circuit sought to resolve the

confusion by sua sponte granting en banc hearing and

directing the parties to address “What role, if any,

does the pro-claimant canon play in [the Chevron]

analysis?” Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1374. But the court

did not reach the issue. Instead, the majority ruled at

Step One that the text of the contested statute

unambiguously favored the claimants over VA—and

it thus saw “no reason” to reach the pro-veteran-canon

issue. Id. at 1380. In a concurring opinion, Judge

O’Malley “lament[ed] the court’s failure—yet again—

to address and resolve the tension between the proveteran canon and agency deference.” Id. at 1387

(O’Malley, J., concurring).

21

b. The Federal Circuit again addressed the proveteran canon last year in Kisor v. McDonough (“Kisor

II”), 995 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2021), on remand from

this Court’s decision in Kisor I. The Kisor II panel

split 2-1: Whereas the majority held that the

contested regulation unambiguously supported VA’s

interpretation, 995 F.3d at 1322, Judge Reyna’s

dissent explained that the pro-veteran canon is “a

traditional tool of construction” that “must be

weighed alongside the other traditional tools in

resolving interpretive doubt [at Step One], including

whether interpretative doubt exists,” id. at 1327.

The Federal Circuit then denied rehearing en

banc, issuing 5 separate opinions joined by 11 of the

court’s 12 active judges. Kisor III, 995 F.3d 1347. No

fewer than nine of those judges urged this Court to

provide clarification on the interaction between

deference doctrines and the pro-veteran canon.

Specifically, Judge O’Malley—joined by Judges

Reyna, Newman, and Moore—explained in a dissent

that “canons trump deference,” and argued that this

Court should grant certiorari to resolve the issue. Id.

at 1370 n.4, 1376. And Chief Judge Prost—joined by

Judges Lourie, Wallach, Taranto, and Chen—filed a

concurrence recognizing that the “tension” between

deference doctrines and the pro-veteran canon

“present[s] a difficult and unresolved challenge,” and

welcoming “further guidance” from this Court on how

to “reconcile these competing doctrines.” Id. at 1358.6

6

Kisor has petitioned this Court for review of the Federal

Circuit’s judgment. Kisor v. McDonough, No. 21-465 (filed Sept.

24, 2021). But that petition does not raise either of the questions

presented here, as VA expressly disclaimed any request for

22

c. Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit’s inability

to resolve these questions has trickled down to the

Veterans Court (whose appeals are heard by the

Federal Circuit). Compare Pacheco v. Gibson, 27 Vet.

App. 21, 29 (2014) (en banc) (per curiam) (deferring to

VA’s interpretation under Auer), with id. at 42 (Davis,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (four of

nine judges dissenting from majority’s “fail[ure] to

resolve interpretive doubt in favor of the veteran” and

arguing that Gardner and Federal Circuit precedent

require as much); see also Ridgway, supra, at 402

(explaining that the Veterans Court’s application of

the canon “is no more consistent than it is at the

Federal Circuit”). Indeed, the Veterans Court invited

“guidance from the Supreme Court” on this issue

nearly two decades ago. DeBeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet.

App. 357, 368 (2004).

3. The net effect of the Federal Circuit’s refusal to

apply the pro-veteran canon at Step One is to expand

the range of circumstances in which the Federal

Circuit and Veterans Court must defer to VA’s

interpretation of statutes and regulations. Deferring

to federal agencies on pure legal questions is always

suspect (see infra at 25-28), but it is especially

inappropriate to give such deference to VA, which has

a

long

history

of

advancing

implausible

interpretations that harm veterans.

VA’s track record when it comes to interpreting

the veterans laws is abysmal. Sometimes VA enacts

a rule that simply “flies against the plain language of

the statutory text,” Gardner, 513 U.S. at 122, is

supported by “no fair reading,” Procopio, 913 F.3d at

deference, and the Federal Circuit did not apply deference in

ruling against the veteran.

23

1378, or attempts to “manufacture an ambiguity in

language where none exists in order to redefine the

plain language” of a governing statute, Johnson v.

McDonald, 762 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Or

VA dispenses with clarity altogether, “intentionally”

promulgating a rule so “untenable” and “vague[]” that

its later application amounts to “the equivalent of

‘because I say so’ or ‘we know it when we see it.’” Ray

v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 58, 71 (2019) (citations and

footnotes omitted).

Other times VA’s actions lack “any rhyme or

reason” and can only be described as “irrational,”

“aimless and adrift,” and “just as arbitrary” as

“flipping a coin.” Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 313,

322-25 (2015). And still other times VA appears

hopelessly “confused,” taking a position contrary to

“common sense,” Turner v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 207,

216-17 (2018), or one that “reflects a lack of grasp of

the APA” itself, Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,

632 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed Cir. 2011).

VA’s approach has not gone unnoticed. As Justice

Gorsuch has highlighted, VA too frequently issues

regulations that have “no basis in the relevant

statutes” and “do[] nothing to assist, and much to

impair, the interests of those the law says the agency

is supposed to serve.” Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct.

1994, 1995 (2017) (dissenting from denial of

certiorari).

Given VA’s track record, the Court should be

especially concerned by the Federal Circuit’s failure

to heed the clear limits on deference imposed by

Chevron’s footnote 9. Review is necessary to reaffirm

those limits and protect veterans from VA overreach.

24

C.

This Case Offers an Ideal Vehicle for

Resolving the Question Presented

This case provides a perfect vehicle for addressing

threshold legal issues regarding the scope of Chevron

deference. There are no disputed factual issues; the

parties disagree only about the meaning of statutes

governing award of veterans’ benefits, and the core

principles governing their interpretation.

Moreover, the question presented is outcome

determinative: Buffington would have won this case

if the panel had followed Chevron’s footnote 9 and

applied the pro-veteran canon at Step One. The panel

would have resolved any uncertainty over the

statutory scheme by holding that a veteran is entitled

to resume full disability benefits immediately upon

the conclusion of active-duty service, without being

subject to any sort of one-year limitations period.

As Judge O’Malley (in the Federal Circuit) and

Judge Greenberg (in the Veterans Court) both

recognized, that reflects the best interpretation of the

statutory scheme, because Section 5304(c) authorizes

VA to withhold benefit payments from disabled

veterans only while the veteran is receiving activeservice pay. See App.16a, 56a. Indeed, the Veterans

Administration itself adopted that interpretation

immediately after Section 5304(c) became law in

1958. Supra at 5-6. Buffington has the better

argument based on the text and history of the

relevant statutes. The pro-veteran canon makes it a

slam dunk.

VA won this case because the Federal Circuit

disregarded Chevron’s footnote 9 (and Kisor I) and

failed to apply a traditional—and essential—tool for

construing veterans statutes. This Court should

25

grant certiorari to reaffirm its precedent and protect

veterans from VA’s unreasonable interpretations.

II. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER CHEVRON

The Federal Circuit misapplied Chevron when

ruling for VA in this case. That flawed result

implicates a larger problem—Chevron itself. As

several Justices have recognized in recent years,

Chevron is wrong. The Court should grant certiorari

to overrule it.

A.

Chevron Was Wrongly Decided

The problems with Chevron are legion, as

members of both the Judiciary and academy have

recognized.7 Five flaws bear special emphasis here.

First, and most importantly, Chevron violates the

Constitution’s separation of powers. Article III vests

“[t]he judicial power of the United States”—and with

it, the duty “to say what the law is”—in the

independent federal courts. Marbury v. Madison, 5

U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).

Chevron

abdicates that duty. It forces federal courts to let

executive branch agencies authoritatively interpret

the law in pending cases—even when the courts

themselves disagree with what the agency says. That

is nothing less than a massive “judicially orchestrated

shift of power.”

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing

Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150

7

See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120-21

(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743,

760 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers

Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109-10 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the

judgment); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149

(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Philip Hamburger,

Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (2016).

26

(2016). Neither Congress nor the courts themselves

have authority to transfer judicial power to the

Executive. That approach is unjustified by the

Constitution’s text or structure, and unsupported by

history.8

Second, Chevron upends basic principles of

constitutional due process of law. It is patently unfair

for a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation,

especially when the agency itself is a litigant, before

that same court, in the actual case at hand. Judges

are supposed to be impartial arbiters of law—not

home-team umpires for the executive branch.9

Third, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

instructs federal courts to “decide all relevant

questions of law,” including by “determin[ing] the

meaning … of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706. Contrary to that instruction, however, Chevron

demands that courts not decide fundamental,

8

See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to

Executive Interpretation, 128 Yale L.J. 908 (2017); Kristin

Hickman & Richard Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise

§ 3.1 (6th ed. updated Nov. 1, 2021) (“In scores of cases and in

every term through 1983, the Supreme Court relied on its own

analysis and judgment regarding statutory meaning without

regard for the administering agency.”).

9

See, e.g., Hamburger, supra; United States v. Harris, 907

F.3d 439, 451 n.1 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring),

vacated on reh’g en banc, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019).

Underscoring the problem, the United States has taken the

remarkable position that it possesses unilateral authority to

turn Chevron deference off whenever it would benefit a private

party invoking an agency’s otherwise-binding interpretation

when litigating against a different government entity. See Babb

Tr. of Oral Arg. at 61 (Solicitor General arguing that pro-plaintiff

EEOC interpretations do not receive Chevron deference in

discrimination litigation against federal defendants).

27

outcome-determinative questions of law. As four

Justices have noted, Chevron thus conflicts with

Section 706, which requires “de novo review on

questions of law.” Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2433 (Gorsuch,

J., joined by Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ.,

concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).

Chevron “flout[s] the language of the Act.”

Kavanaugh, supra, at 2150 n.161.

Fourth, Chevron rests on a false presumption

about Congressional intent. Chevron reasoned that

an ambiguity in a statute reflects an implicit

delegation of interpretive authority to federal

agencies. 467 U.S. at 844. But there is no evidence

supporting that presumed delegation.

Most

ambiguities in legal drafting are unintentional, and

there is no reason to believe that every ambiguity in

every statute is both (1) deliberate, and (2) created

with the hope that it would be resolved by an agency.

Many

Justices

and

commentators

have

acknowledged that this core premise of Chevron is

“fictional”—i.e., made up.10 That should be enough to

10 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch,

J., concurring) (“Chevron’s claim about legislative intentions is

no more than a fiction—and one that requires a pretty hefty

suspension of disbelief at that”); David Barron & Elena Kagan,

Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 212

(2001) (“Chevron doctrine at most can rely on a fictionalized

statement of legislative desire”); Stephen Breyer, Judicial

Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363,

380 (1986) (acknowledging that Chevron rests on a “legal

fiction”); Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory Interpretation

from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,

Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 996

(2013) (noting that majority of congressional staffers surveyed

indicated “that their knowledge of Chevron does not mean that

28

condemn it. Why should the meaning of vast swaths

of federal law be determined under a doctrine that

rests on a premise that no one thinks is valid?

Of course, sometimes Congress will intentionally

delegate to agencies the power to issue implementing

regulations, make policy choices based on certain factfinding, or fill gaps in a statutory scheme. But that is

a far cry from pretending that every statutory

ambiguity—even the unintentional ones—reflects

such a delegation. Chevron’s central premise is

overbroad and false.

Fifth, Chevron incentivizes agencies to disregard

the law. As Justice Kavanaugh has explained,

“Chevron encourages the Executive Branch … to be

extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy

goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and

restraints.” Kavanaugh, supra, at 2150; see also

Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring)

(“[W]e should be alarmed that [the agency] felt

sufficiently emboldened by those precedents to make

the bid for deference that it did here.”). By telling

agencies that they are free to adopt any interpretation

that is marginally reasonable—even if it does not

reflect the best view of the statute—Chevron

discourages fidelity to the rule of law.

To sum up: Chevron forces courts to defer to

agency interpretations that the courts themselves

believe are wrong. That is not consistent with an

independent Judiciary or the rule of law. Chevron

was wrongly decided.

they intend to delegate whenever ambiguity remains in finalized

statutory language”).

29

B.

Stare Decisis Does

Retaining Chevron

Not

Support

Following precedent makes sense as a standard

default rule because it usually “promotes the

evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development

of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial

decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived

integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). But that is not always true.

This Court has long recognized that precedents

should be overruled in appropriate circumstances,

based on a careful assessment of factors like the

quality of the precedent’s reasoning in the decision,

its workability, and the effect overruling the

precedent would have on reliance interests and ruleof-law values. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S.

Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019). Here, these factors support

overturning Chevron.

1. As discussed above, Chevron’s deference regime

lacks any sound basis in law. Requiring courts to

defer to agency legal interpretations is at odds with

the Constitution and the APA, and Chevron’s

ambiguity-equals-delegation rationale is widely

acknowledged to be fictional. Supra at 27-28.

These problems with Chevron’s reasoning are

uniquely pernicious due to the doctrine’s broad, crosscutting scope. Because Chevron sets forth a method

of statutory interpretation potentially applicable to

all statutes implemented by federal agencies, its ill

effects are not confined to any single legal issue, but

instead threaten to shape—and distort—the

interpretation of virtually all regulatory regimes, in

perpetuity.

Whereas the cost of retaining any

particular precedent misinterpreting a single

30

statutory provision is comparatively low, the cost of

retaining the Chevron methodology is enormous.

Chevron’s status as a rule of interpretation

suggests that it should not even receive stare decisis

effect in the first place.11 At a minimum, though,

Chevron’s capacity to generate new erroneous

interpretations, of different statutes, over and over

again, weighs strongly in favor of overturning it. See

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.

310, 384 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)

(“[A]llow[ing] the Court’s past missteps to spawn

future mistakes[] undercut[s] the very rule-of-law

values that stare decisis is designed to protect.”).

2.

Chevron deference also undermines the

“evenhanded,

predictable,

and

consistent

development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U.S. at

824.

Chevron tells courts to avoid definitively

declaring what a law means upon a finding of

ambiguity, thus ensuring that the law remains illdefined and subject to politically expedient agency

reinterpretations.

Moreover, National Cable &

Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet

Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), makes clear that

Chevron empowers agencies to require courts “to

overrule their own declarations about the meaning of

existing law in favor of interpretations dictated by

executive agencies.” Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at

1150 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Overruling Chevron

11 See, e.g., Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2443-44 (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring in the judgment); Baldwin v. United States, 140 S.

Ct. 690, 691 n.1 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari); Kristin Hickman & Aaron Nielson, Narrowing

Chevron’s Domain, 70 Duke L.J. 931, 991 (2021).

31

will thus promote—not undermine—consistency and

predictability.

For essentially the same reasons, reliance

interests “count against retaining Chevron.” Id. at

1158 (emphasis added). Chevron and Brand X

affirmatively undermine reliance: They let agencies

change their minds about what the statute means and

require courts to flip-flop along with them. By

allowing federal law to fluctuate according to agency

whims, Chevron creates uncertainty about the law—

and thereby undermines reliance. See Guedes v.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives,

140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (statement of Gorsuch, J.,

respecting denial of certiorari).

These problems are only exacerbated by modernday “political polarization,” a phenomenon which

“makes Chevron … a source of extreme instability in

our legal system.”

Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The

Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Has

Awful Effects, 70 Duke L.J. Online 91, 92 (2021). No

one familiar with controversies over issues like

immigration, climate change, and net neutrality can

seriously argue that Chevron plays a stabilizing role

as to these hot-button issues on which agency policies

“will change dramatically every four to eight years”

depending on who wins the White House. Id. at 96103 (discussing agency flip-flops on DACA, the Clean

Power Plan, and net neutrality, among others).

Overturning Chevron would address these

problems by ensuring that agencies and regulated

entities can rely on the best and most natural

interpretation of statutory language. That result best

serves the rule-of-law values that stare decisis is

meant to advance.

32

3.

Chevron has also proven unworkable in

practice. Chevron’s ambiguity trigger is woefully

indeterminate. “[N]o definitive guide exists for

determining whether statutory language is clear or

ambiguous.” Kavanaugh, supra, at 2138. Not even

the Government—Chevron’s biggest defender—can

offer a coherent explanation for when a statute is

sufficiently ambiguous to trigger Chevron. See Tr. of

Oral Arg. at 71-72, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 201114 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2021) (Assistant to the Solicitor

General: “I don’t think I can give you an answer to

th[e] question” of “[h]ow much ambiguity is enough”).

Thanks to this ambiguity over ambiguity, judges

“have wildly different conceptions of whether a

particular statute is clear or ambiguous.”

Kavanaugh, supra, at 2152. Chevron’s indeterminacy

thus inevitably produces arbitrary and inconsistent

results that are “antithetical to the neutral, impartial

rule of law.” Id. at 2154.

This Court’s many caveats to Chevron complicate

things still further. Under the Major Questions

doctrine, Chevron does not apply to interpretive

“question[s] of deep ‘economic and political

significance.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486

(2015). But this laudable effort to cabin Chevron’s

scope (and mitigate its constitutional harm) creates a

workability problem of its own: There is no clear or

objective way to consistently determine what counts

as a Major Question. Moreover, there is significant

confusion over the scope of the Major Questions

doctrine(s).12

And some Justices have rightly

12 See, e.g.,

Cass Sunstein, There Are Two “Major

Questions” Doctrines, 73 Admin. L. Rev. 475, 477 (2021) (arguing

that there are two versions of the doctrine, “weak” and “strong,”

33

recognized that in many cases ambiguity or a

statutory gap should not be read as a delegation to the

agency, even in the absence of a Major Question.13

There is also real confusion over other threshold

Chevron questions. For example, United States v.

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), declares that

Chevron does not apply unless “Congress delegated

authority to the agency generally to make rules

carrying the force of law, and … the agency

interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in

the exercise of that authority.” Id. at 226-27. But

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002), holds

that interpretations that are merely “long standing”

warrant Chevron deference even if not promulgated

in exercise of an agency’s delegated lawmaking

authority. Moreover, there is considerable confusion

over whether Chevron is mandatory, or waivable by

the government.14

And, as this case itself

demonstrates, at least some judges remain confused

each with “radically different implications”); In re MCP No. 165,

__ F.4th __, 2021 WL 5989357, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).

13 See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208,

223 (2009) (“[S]ometimes statutory silence, when viewed in

context, is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion.”); City

of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2013) (Breyer, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he

existence of statutory ambiguity is sometimes not enough to

warrant the conclusion that Congress has left a deferencewarranting gap for the agency to fill ….”).

14 See, e.g., Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161

(11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (noting circuit split on whether

Chevron deference is waivable); Note, Waiving Chevron

Deference, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1520 (2019); see also Guedes, 140 S.

Ct. at 789-90 (statement of Gorsuch, J., respecting denial of

certiorari).

34

about how to apply Chevron Step One. See supra at

21 (discussing fractured Kisor III opinions).

4. Perhaps due to these workability problems, this

Court appears to be sub silentio abandoning the

Chevron framework in a great many cases to which it

arguably applies. As a leading treatise observes, the

Court sometimes “gives Chevron powerful effect,”

sometimes “ignores Chevron,” and sometimes

“characterizes the Chevron test in strange and

inconsistent ways.” Hickman & Pierce, supra, § 3.5.6;

id. § 3.6.10 (surveying how the Court has treated

Chevron in seemingly eligible cases over the last

decade); see also Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121 (Alito, J.,

dissenting) (“I can only conclude that the Court, for

whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.”).

At a minimum, Chevron remains “hotly

contested,” such that it “cannot reliably function as a

basis for decision in future cases. Citizens United, 558

U.S. at 379 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Court has

repeatedly recognized in recent years that Chevron’s

continued validity is up for debate. See, e.g., Epic

Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1629 (observing that “[n]o party to

these cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron

deference” and holding that no deference was

warranted); SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (“[W]hether

Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for

another day.”). And the government has gotten the

message: Recent Solicitors General have seemed

reluctant—almost

apologetic—when

invoking

Chevron in this Court. See also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos,

139 S. Ct. 893, 908 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)

(noting private-party petitioner’s reticence in relying

on Chevron).

The Court’s unwillingness to consistently apply

the flawed Chevron framework speaks volumes.

35

There is no reason Chevron should continue to govern

lower courts while this Court shuns it. The Court’s

“frequent disregard” of Chevron supports overruling

that precedent. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236,

252 (1998).

*

*

*

Chevron’s deference regime is unlawful. The

Court should at least reaffirm the importance of a

rigorous and comprehensive Step One inquiry that

encompasses the pro-veteran canon. Better yet, the

Court should revisit Chevron and overrule it entirely.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Roman Martinez

Gregory B. in den Berken

Brent T. Murphy

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 637-2200

Richard A. Samp

Counsel of Record

Kara Rollins

Mark Chenoweth

NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES

ALLIANCE

1225 19th Street, NW

Suite 450

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 869-5210

rich.samp@ncla.legal

Counsel for Petitioner

January 3, 2022

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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