Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Thomas H. Buffington, Petitioner v. Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Supreme Court briefJan 3, 2022
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No. 21-____
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
THOMAS H. BUFFINGTON,
Petitioner,
V.
DENIS MCDONOUGH,
SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Roman Martinez
Gregory B. in den Berken
Brent T. Murphy
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
555 Eleventh Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 637-2200
Richard A. Samp
Counsel of Record
Kara Rollins
Mark Chenoweth
NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES
ALLIANCE
1225 19th Street, NW
Suite 450
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 869-5210
rich.samp@ncla.legal
Counsel for Petitioner
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This Court has repeatedly held that when
assessing whether to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute under Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. courts
must apply all “traditional tools of statutory
construction” at Step One of the analysis. 467 U.S.
837, 843 n.9 (1984). Here, the Federal Circuit refused
to apply the pro-veteran canon of construction—an
interpretive tool that this Court has regularly invoked
for nearly 80 years—when assessing petitioner’s
statutory right to resume disability benefits after
finishing a period of active duty. The Federal Circuit
then deferred to the Department of Veterans Affairs’
implausible construction of the relevant statutes,
thereby depriving petitioner of nearly three years of
disability benefits to which he was legally entitled.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the Chevron doctrine permits courts
to defer to VA’s construction of a statute designed to
benefit veterans, without first considering the proveteran canon of construction.
2. Whether Chevron should be overruled.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner Thomas H. Buffington was the
appellant in both the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims (the “Veterans Court”) and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Secretary of Veterans Affairs Robert L. Wilkie was
the appellee in the Veterans Court and, initially, in
the Federal Circuit. He was replaced in the Federal
Circuit by his successor, Respondent Secretary of
Veterans Affairs Denis McDonough. McDonough is
being sued in his official capacity only.
iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Buffington v. Wilkie, No. 17-4382 (Vet. App.).
Judgment entered December 11, 2019.
Buffington v. McDonough, No. 20-1479 (Fed. Cir.).
Judgment entered August 6, 2021.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Questions Presented ................................................... i
Parties to the Proceeding ........................................... ii
Related Proceedings .................................................. iii
Table of Authorities .................................................. vi
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari..................................1
Opinions and Orders Below ........................................1
Jurisdiction..................................................................1
Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Involved ..........1
Introduction .................................................................2
Statement of the Case .................................................5
Reasons for Granting the Writ .................................11
I.
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO
APPLY THE PRO-VETERAN CANON AT
CHEVRON STEP ONE WARRANTS REVIEW ...........11
A.
The Federal Circuit’s Decision
Conflicts with Chevron and Its
Progeny......................................................11
B.
This Court’s Intervention Is Needed
to Vindicate the Pro-Veteran Canon
and
Prevent
Unwarranted
Deference to VA ........................................18
C.
This Case Offers an Ideal Vehicle for
Resolving the Question Presented ...........24
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
II.
THE
COURT
SHOULD
RECONSIDER
CHEVRON ............................................................25
A.
Chevron Was Wrongly Decided ................25
B.
Stare Decisis Does Not Support
Retaining Chevron ....................................29
Conclusion .................................................................35
APPENDIX
Appendix A—Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Aug. 6, 2020) ............................................... App.1a
Appendix B—Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(July 12, 2019)............................................ App.31a
Appendix C—Opinion of the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals (July 20, 2017) ............. App.58a
Appendix D—Letter from Department of
Veterans Affairs to Thomas H.
Buffington informing him of start date
for disability benefits (Aug. 20, 2009) ....... App.70a
Appendix E—Relevant Statutes and
Regulations ................................................ App.75a
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Arangure v. Whitaker,
911 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2018)..........................15, 17
Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997) ................................................2
Baldwin v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 690 (2020)............................................30
Barnhart v. Walton,
535 U.S. 212 (2002) ..............................................33
BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos,
139 S. Ct. 893 (2019)............................................34
Boone v. Lightner,
319 U.S. 561 (1943) ..............................................13
Brown v. Gardner,
513 U.S. 115 (1994) .............................. 3, 13, 15, 22
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) ...................................... passim
Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) ........................................30, 34
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
City of Arlington v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290 (2013) ..............................................33
Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,
447 U.S. 191 (1980) ..............................................14
DeBeaord v. Principi,
18 Vet. App. 357 (2004) .......................................22
Disabled American Veterans v. Gober,
234 F.3d 682 (Fed. Cir. 2000), overruled
on other grounds by National
Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc.
v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 981 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ...........................................20
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,
556 U.S. 208 (2009) ..............................................33
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).......................... 2, 12, 15, 34
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp.,
328 U.S. 275 (1946) ..............................................13
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline,
540 U.S. 581 (2004) ..............................................12
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Gray v. McDonald,
27 Vet. App. 313 (2015) .......................................23
Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms & Explosives,
140 S. Ct. 789 (2020)......................................31, 33
Guerra v. Shinseki,
642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ............................20
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,
834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016)................ 25, 27, 30
Haas v. Peake,
544 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................20
Heino v. Shinseki,
683 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................19
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,
562 U.S. 428 (2011) .................................. 13, 14, 15
Hohn v. United States,
524 U.S. 236 (1998) ..............................................35
Hudgens v. McDonald,
823 F.3d 630 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..............................19
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987) ..............................................12
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
INS v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289 (2001) ..............................................15
Johnson v. McDonald,
762 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................23
King v. Burwell,
576 U.S. 473 (2015) ..............................................32
King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital,
502 U.S. 215 (1991) ........................................13, 14
Kisor v. McDonough,
995 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............................21
Kisor v. McDonough,
995 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ............ 4, 17, 19, 21
Kisor v. Shulkin,
880 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................18
Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).................................. passim
Knick v. Township of Scott,
139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)..........................................29
Maine Medical Center v. Burwell,
841 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2016) ..................................15
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ...............................25
Martin v. Social Security Administration,
903 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2018)............................33
Mathis v. Shulkin,
137 S. Ct. 1994 (2017)..........................................23
In re MCP No. 165,
__ F.4th __, 2021 WL 5989357 (6th Cir.
Dec. 17, 2021) .......................................................33
Michigan v. EPA,
576 U.S. 743 (2015) ........................................25, 28
National Association of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644 (2007) ..............................................15
National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services,
545 U.S. 967 (2005) ..............................................30
National Credit Union Administration v.
First National Bank & Trust Co.,
522 U.S. 479 (1998) ..............................................15
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
National Organization of Veterans’
Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ...............19
Nielson v. Shinseki,
607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..............................20
Oregon Restaurant & Lodging Association
v. Perez, 843 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 2016) .................17
Pacheco v. Gibson,
27 Vet. App. 21 (2014) .........................................22
Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991) ........................................29, 30
Pereira v. Sessions,
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018)....................................25, 34
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,
575 U.S. 92 (2015) ................................................25
Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
632 F.3d 1345 (Fed Cir. 2011) .............................23
Procopio v. Wilkie,
913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .................. 3, 20, 22
Ray v. Wilkie,
31 Vet. App. 58 (2019) .........................................23
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018)................................ 2, 12, 34
Sears v. Principi,
349 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................20
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) ...........................15
Terry v. Principi,
340 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ............................20
Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas,
918 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019)................................15
Turner v. Shulkin,
29 Vet. App. 207 (2018) .......................................23
United States v. Harris,
907 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2018), vacated on
reh’g en banc, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir.
2019) .....................................................................26
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply,
LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012) ....................................16
United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001) ..............................................33
xiii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
United States v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 643 (1961) ..............................................14
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
5 U.S.C. § 706 ............................................................26
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)......................................................1
38 U.S.C. § 1110 ..........................................................5
38 U.S.C. § 1131 ..........................................................5
38 U.S.C. § 5304(c) ......................................................5
38 C.F.R. § 3.654 .........................................................6
38 C.F.R. § 3.654(b) .....................................................6
OTHER AUTHORITIES
26 Fed. Reg. 1561 (Feb. 24, 1961)...............................6
27 Fed. Reg. 11,886 (Dec. 1, 1962)..............................6
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons
in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 65 (2008) ................15
Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial
Deference to Executive Interpretation,
128 Yale L.J. 908 (2017) ......................................26
xiv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
David Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 201 (2001) ....................................................27
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of
Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin.
L. Rev. 363 (1986) ................................................27
Fed. Resp’ts Opp’n Br., Bais Yaakov of
Spring Valley v. FCC, No. 17-351 (U.S.
Jan. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 1182931 .......................27
Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 (2013) ......................27
Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (2016) .............................25, 26
Kisor v. McDonough, No. 21-465
(U.S. filed Sept. 24, 2021) ....................................21
Kristin Hickman & Aaron Nielson,
Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 Duke
L.J. 931 (2021) .....................................................30
Kristin Hickman & Richard Pierce, Jr.,
Administrative Law Treatise (6th ed.
updated Nov. 1, 2021) ....................................26, 34
xv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118
(2016) .................................................. 25, 27, 28, 32
Note, Waiving Chevron Deference, 132
Harv. L. Rev. 1520 (2019) ....................................33
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Combination of
Chevron and Political Polarity Has
Awful Effects, 70 Duke L.J. Online 91
(2021) ....................................................................31
James D. Ridgway, Toward a Less
Adversarial Relationship Between
Chevron and Gardner, 9 U. Mass. L.
Rev. 388 (2014) ........................................ 14, 20, 22
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law (2012) ...........................................................14
Cass Sunstein, There Are Two “Major
Questions” Doctrines, 73 Admin. L. Rev.
475 (2021) .............................................................32
Tr. of Oral Arg., Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882
(U.S. Jan. 15, 2020) .......................................16, 26
Tr. of Oral Arg., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra,
No. 20-1114 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2021) ........................32
xvi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
GAO-21-348, VA Disability Benefits:
Veterans Benefits Administration Could
Enhance Management of Claims
Processor Training (June 2021),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21348.pdf ..................................................................18
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully seeks a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The opinion of the Federal Circuit is reported at 7
F.4th 1361 and is reproduced at App.1a-30a. The
opinion of the Veterans Court is reported at 31 Vet.
App. 293 and is reproduced at App.31a-57a. The
opinion of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals is
unreported and is reproduced at App.58a-69a. The
letter from the Department of Veterans Affairs
informing petitioner of the start date for his disability
benefits is reproduced at App.70a-74a.
JURISDICTION
The Federal Circuit issued its judgment on August
6, 2021. On October 22, 2021, Chief Justice John
Roberts extended the time to file a petition for a writ
of certiorari until December 6, 2021, and on
November 27, 2021, further extended the time until
January 3, 2022. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The relevant statutory and regulatory provisions
are set out in the appendix to this petition. App.75a78a.
2
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, this Court has repeatedly placed
limits on when courts must defer to federal agencies
when construing statutes and regulations under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). Among the most
important such limits has been a rigorous
enforcement of the comprehensive Step One inquiry
into whether the relevant statute or regulation is
truly ambiguous and thus eligible for deference. As
this Court originally made clear in footnote 9 of
Chevron, courts must apply all “traditional tools of
statutory construction” in conducting the ambiguity
analysis at Step One. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. The Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed that principle ever since.
See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie (“Kisor I”), 139 S. Ct. 2400,
2415 (2019); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612,
1630 (2018); SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348,
1358 (2018).
In this case, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit
flouted this Court’s direction and refused to apply an
important and long-standing rule of construction—
the pro-veteran canon—before finding a veterans
disability statute ambiguous at Step One. Proceeding
to Step Two, the court then deferred to the antiveteran interpretation offered by the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA). As a result, it upheld VA’s
decision to deny petitioner Thomas Buffington nearly
three years of disability benefits that VA had
previously determined he was entitled to receive.
Under VA’s interpretation, Buffington could not
receive those benefits because he had waited too long
to ask for them to be reinstated after completing a
short period of Air Force active duty.
VA’s
3
interpretation essentially invented a one-year
forfeiture rule governing requests for reinstatement
of benefits, without any basis in the statutory text.
The Federal Circuit’s ruling is wrong—and should
be overturned by this Court—for two reasons.
First, the Federal Circuit violated Chevron’s
footnote 9 by refusing to apply the pro-veteran canon,
a “traditional tool[] of statutory construction”
regularly used to interpret laws pertaining to
veterans. See 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. That canon—
under which “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in
the veteran’s favor,” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115,
118 (1994)—has been applied by this Court for nearly
80 years. It is indisputably part of the “legal toolkit”
for interpreting statutes affecting veterans. Kisor I,
139 S. Ct. at 2415. Accordingly, as Judge O’Malley
rightly explained in her dissent below, the canon must
“be employed before resorting to Chevron deference,”
at Step One of the analysis. App.28a. Here, the proveteran canon establishes that Buffington is entitled
to the full disability benefits he earned, and not
merely the one year of retroactive benefits allowed by
VA.
The Federal Circuit’s refusal to apply the proveteran canon was not surprising. For over a decade,
judges on that court have expressed widely divergent
views on how the pro-veteran canon intersects with
deference doctrines, and in recent years it has
repeatedly refused to apply the canon at Step One. In
2018, the court granted en banc review to consider
whether and how the pro-veteran canon applies in
Chevron cases, but then decided the case on other
grounds. See Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371, 1374,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (en banc). And last spring,
members of that court wrote 5 different opinions
4
dividing on the issue—with none commanding a
majority, and with a total of nine judges urging this
Court to provide further guidance on the issue. See
Kisor v. McDonough (“Kisor III”), 995 F.3d 1347, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2021) (Prost, C.J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc); id. at 1376 (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
This Court should now provide that guidance. The
Federal Circuit’s persistent refusal to apply the proveteran canon at Step One defies this Court’s
precedent and condones a massive (and unwarranted)
expansion of VA power. It does so, moreover, in a way
that contravenes the intent of Congress and harms
our Nation’s veterans. The Court should grant review
to reaffirm the limits on Chevron deference and
protect veterans from an agency prone to issuing
unlawful regulations against veterans’ interests.
Second, the Federal Circuit’s ruling spotlights the
fundamental ways in which Chevron itself is contrary
to law.
The Federal Circuit faced competing
interpretations of the veterans’ disability benefits law
at issue, one offered by Buffington, the other by VA.
But instead of deciding for itself which interpretation
was correct, the court invoked Chevron and rubberstamped VA’s construction. Such abdication of the
independent Judiciary’s responsibility to say what
the law is cannot be reconciled with the constitutional
separation of powers, with basic principles of due
process of law, or with the Administrative Procedure
Act. Chevron was wrongly decided.
Stare decisis does not support retaining Chevron
in the face of these problems. After 37 years,
experience has shown that Chevron’s deference
regime is wrong, unworkable in practice, leads to
arbitrary and subjective decisions, and affirmatively
5
undermines the stable development of law. Instead of
tinkering at the margins, this Court should now
reconsider—and overrule—Chevron.
This case provides an ideal vehicle for considering
these questions. Buffington served our Nation with
distinction in the Air Force for over nine years and
became disabled in the course of that service. He is
now being denied benefits based on VA’s arbitrary
decision to create a one-year forfeiture rule with no
grounding in the statutory text. This Court should
either cabin Chevron’s scope by enforcing footnote 9
or overrule Chevron altogether. Either way, the
Federal Circuit’s anti-veteran decision should not
stand.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Throughout our Nation’s history, Congress has
provided generous benefits for those who serve our
country in uniform. Federal law instructs that “the
United States will pay” veterans compensation “[f]or
disability resulting from personal injury suffered or
disease contracted in line of duty” during wartime, 38
U.S.C. § 1110, or peacetime, id. § 1131. At the same
time, Congress has determined that veterans should
not receive disability compensation “for any period for
which [they] receive[] active service pay.”
Id.
§ 5304(c). Thus, if a veteran retires from military
service and is awarded disability benefits but is later
recalled to active duty, he may not simultaneously
receive both active-duty pay and disability pay for the
same period of time.
Section 5304(c) places no restriction on a veteran’s
right to resume disability compensation when such
active duty concludes. And indeed, shortly after that
statute was enacted in 1958, the Veterans
6
Administration (VA’s predecessor) issued a regulation
interpreting that law as requiring that disability
payments “be resumed the day following release from
active duty if otherwise in order.” 26 Fed. Reg. 1561,
1599 (Feb. 24, 1961) (establishing 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.654(b)).
In 1962, however, the Veterans Administration
amended that regulation to create a brand-new
forfeiture rule restricting veterans’ ability to resume
their disability benefits following active service.
Specifically, the Veterans Administration determined
that any request by a veteran to resume benefits
would take effect “the day following release from
active duty”—but only “if [a] claim for
recommencement of payments is received within 1
year from the date of such release.” 27 Fed. Reg.
11,886, 11,890 (Dec. 1, 1962) (revising 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.654 and adding subsection (b)(2)). If such a claim
was not received within a year of the veteran’s release
from active duty, “payments will be resumed effective
1 year prior to the date of receipt of a new claim.” Id.
(emphasis added).
The Veterans Administration thus created a
forfeiture rule under which veterans would lose
disability benefits they have earned if they waited
more than one year before submitting a claim to
resume benefits. The rulemaking did not indicate any
source of statutory authority for creating this rule.
The modified version of Section 3.654 remains in
effect today.
2. Buffington served on active duty in the U.S. Air
Force from September 1992 to May 2000. App.3a.
After being honorably discharged, Buffington sought
disability compensation for tinnitus in July 2000. Id.
VA concluded that Buffington’s tinnitus was service
7
connected, rated his disability at 10%, and began
paying him disability compensation effective May 31,
2000. Id. VA has never disputed that, from 2002
onward, Buffington continued to suffer from his
service-connected disability and that the proper
disability rating is 10%.
In July 2003, Buffington was recalled to active
duty in the Air National Guard. Id. Buffington
informed VA of his activation. Id. Applying 38 U.S.C.
§ 5304(c), VA discontinued paying Buffington
disability compensation effective July 20, 2003, the
day before his active service began. App.3a.
Buffington served on active duty from July 2003 to
June 2004, and then again from November 2004 to
July 2005. Id. VA did not reinstate his disability
benefits between those periods of active duty; nor did
VA do so when the second period concluded. In
January 2009, Buffington formally requested that VA
reinstate his disability benefits, including by paying
the benefits he had earned in the periods of time
(between June 2004 and November 2004, and after
July 2005) when he had not received active-duty pay.
See App.33a.
On August 20, 2009, VA agreed to reinstate
Buffington’s benefits “at the same 10 percent service
connected disability rating [he] w[as] awarded prior
to [his] return to active duty.” But VA refused to
award him the benefits due for the full periods in
which he had not received active-duty pay. Instead,
VA informed him that his reinstatement would only
be retroactive to February 1, 2008. App.70a-74a. VA
explained:
We received your request for the
reinstatement of your VA Compensation
8
benefit more than one year after your
release from active duty. By law we are
only permitted to make payments
retroactive to one year prior to the date
we received your request.
App.72a.
3.
Buffington appealed, and the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. App.58a-69a. The Board
explained that under Section 3.654(b)(2), “VA cannot
resume compensation payments more than one year
prior to the date of the claim.” App.65a
4. Buffington appealed to the Veterans Court,
arguing that Section 3.654(b)(2) is invalid because it
conflicts with 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 5304(c).
Specifically, Buffington noted that Section 1110(a)
creates a mandatory duty that VA “will pay” disability
benefits once service connection is established, and
Section 5304(c) is “clear” that VA may withhold or
suspend a veteran’s disability benefits only “‘for any
period for which such [veteran] receives active service
pay.’” App.35a. Buffington argued that Section
3.654(b)(2) conflicts with these statutory provisions
because it lets VA withhold a veteran’s disability
benefits for periods during which the veteran is not
receiving active-service pay. Id.
A divided panel affirmed. App.31a-57a. The
majority concluded that the relevant statutes are
silent on the effective date for recommencement of
disability benefits that were discontinued due to reentry into active service. App.42a-43a. The majority
then granted Chevron deference to Section
3.654(b)(2), concluding that the regulation was a
permissible interpretation of a statutory “gap.”
App.42a-48a.
9
Judge Greenberg dissented. He argued that the
regulation “creates an unnecessary and inappropriate
impediment to a veteran receiving benefits he has
already established entitlement to.” App.57a. He
also criticized the majority’s resort to Chevron, calling
it “nothing more than a rubber stamping of the
Government’s attempt to misuse its [regulatory]
authority.” App.56a. Judge Greenberg explained
that he would “stop this business of making up
excuses for judges to abdicate their job of interpreting
the law, and simply allow the court of appeals to
afford a ‘claimant’ its best independent judgment of
the law’s meaning.’” Id. (quoting Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at
2426 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)).
5. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed,
also based on Chevron deference. App.1a-30a.
At Step One, Buffington again argued that 38
U.S.C. §§ 11101 and 5304(c) unambiguously establish
that a veteran who has been recalled to active duty
may be deprived of disability benefits that he has
previously been granted only during “any period for
which such [veteran] receives active service pay.” He
also argued that the pro-veteran canon of
interpretation applies at Step One and precluded
deference to VA at Step Two.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. It held that
Section 5304(c) does not resolve the question because
it does not explicitly say that the period during which
the veteran receives active-service pay is the only
1
The Federal Circuit noted that Buffington’s claim is
actually governed by Section 1131, not Section 1110, because he
served during peacetime—but also that “any differences
[between those provisions] are immaterial for purposes of this
appeal.” App.7a-8a n.3.
10
period during which payments are barred. App.7a.
The majority concluded that “the statutory scheme is
silent regarding the effective date for recommencing
benefits when a disabled veteran leaves active
service.” App.9a. Because of that silence, the court
refused to apply the pro-veteran canon at Step One,
and instead proceeded to consider whether VA’s
interpretation was reasonable at Step Two. App.9a
n.5 (“Because we hold the statutory scheme is silent,
we need not resolve the parties’ dispute regarding the
pro-veteran canon.”). At Step Two, the majority
upheld Section 3.654(b)(2) as a permissible gap-filling
regulation. App.9a-11a.
Judge O’Malley dissented. App.12a-30a. She
concluded that the statutory scheme, particularly 38
U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5110(a), and 5304(c), unambiguously
provides that a disabled veteran who returns to active
service “remains entitled to the benefits for which he
originally qualified,” except for the precise period
during which he receives active-service pay. App.16a17a. Alternatively, she would have applied the proveteran canon at Step One and thereby resolved any
statutory ambiguity in Buffington’s favor. App.26a28a. Judge O’Malley explained that “a correct
Chevron step one analysis … must take into account
all other traditional canons of construction along the
way, including the pro-veteran canon of construction.”
App.26a (citing Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2414); see also
App.28a (explaining that the pro-veteran canon is “an
interpretive tool in the court’s statutory construction
toolbox that is to be employed before resorting to
Chevron deference”).
11
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REFUSAL TO APPLY THE
PRO-VETERAN CANON AT CHEVRON STEP ONE
WARRANTS REVIEW
The Federal Circuit rejected Buffington’s claim for
benefits because it refused to apply the pro-veteran
canon at Step One of the Chevron inquiry when
determining whether VA’s interpretation was eligible
for deference.
That refusal defies this Court’s
repeated instruction—in Chevron’s footnote 9 and
ever since—that the Step One analysis must consider
all “traditional tools of statutory construction.” 467
U.S. at 843 n.9. The Federal Circuit has been
confused and divided over the pro-veteran canon’s
interplay with deference for years. And that issue is
enormously important to the proper interpretation of
veterans-related statutes. This Court should grant
review to resolve the confusion, clarify that the
comprehensive Step One inquiry includes the proveteran canon, and curb VA’s expansive assertion of
interpretive authority.
A.
The Federal Circuit’s Decision Conflicts
with Chevron and Its Progeny
1.
Chevron’s “principle of deference to
administrative interpretations” is rooted in a judicial
assumption that when a “statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand,
Congress delegated authority to the administering
agency to resolve the issue “within the limits of that
delegation.” 467 U.S. at 843-44, 865. In such a case,
“a court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.” Id. at 844.
But “if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
12
of the matter[]”: The agency’s interpretation gets no
deference, and courts must give effect to Congress’s
intent. Id. at 842-43.
The Court has emphasized that this Chevron Step
One inquiry requires a comprehensive examination of
the statute. Courts may not reflexively defer to
agencies as a matter of course. Rather, Chevron’s
footnote 9 makes clear that before concluding that a
statute is silent or ambiguous, a court must apply all
“traditional tools of statutory construction.” 467 U.S.
at 843 n.9.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized this point.
In SAS Institute, for example, the Court explained
that “we owe an agency’s interpretation of the law no
deference unless, after ‘employing traditional tools of
statutory construction,’ we find ourselves unable to
discern Congress’s meaning.” 138 S. Ct. at 1358
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). And in Epic
Systems, it noted that “deference is not due unless a
‘court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction,’ is left with an unresolved ambiguity.”
138 S. Ct. at 1630 (same). “Where … the canons
supply an answer, ‘Chevron leaves the stage.’” Id.
(citation omitted); see also, e.g., General Dynamics
Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004); INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
Most recently, the Court’s decision in Kisor I
emphasized the importance of applying the canons of
construction at Step One of any deference inquiry.
There, as in SAS Institute and Epic Systems, the
Court emphasized that when analyzing whether a
statute or regulation is “genuinely ambiguous” at
Step One, “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional
tools’ of construction.” Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2415
(emphasis added) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
13
n.9). And the Court admonished that when it used
the term “genuinely ambiguous,” “we mean it—
genuinely ambiguous, even after a court has resorted
to all the standard tools of interpretation.” Id. at 2414
(emphasis added). Deference is appropriate “only
when that legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive
question still has no single right answer.” Id. at 2415.
2.
The pro-veteran canon of construction
undoubtedly qualifies as a “traditional tool of
statutory construction” under Chevron. Since World
War II, this Court has repeatedly instructed that
veterans’ benefits laws must be “liberally construed to
protect those who have been obliged to drop their own
affairs to take up the burdens of the nation.” Boone
v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943); see also
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328
U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (holding that Selective Service
Act “is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those
who left private life to serve their country in its hour
of great need”).
The pro-veteran canon requires courts to interpret
“provisions for benefits to members of the Armed
Services … in the beneficiaries’ favor.” King v. St.
Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991). Indeed,
the Court has characterized the canon as a “rule”
mandating that “interpretive doubt is to be resolved
in the veteran’s favor.” Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118
(emphasis added).
This Court has consistently applied the proveteran canon when interpreting veterans statutes—
including to protect veterans from inflexible
restrictions on the receipt of benefits. See, e.g.,
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S.
428, 441 (2011) (applying canon to reject “[r]igid
jurisdictional treatment” of appeal deadline); King,
14
502 U.S. at 218, 220 n.9 (applying canon to reject
lower
court
decisions
that
“engrafted
a
reasonableness requirement” onto statute); Coffy v.
Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980)
(“liberally constru[ing]” employment statute “for the
benefit of the returning veteran”).
Notably, the pro-veteran canon is not based on a
judicial policy judgment that veterans are a
particularly praiseworthy group of individuals who
deserve special treatment. Rather, it is a descriptive
canon reflecting this Court’s view of the intent of
Congress. As one expert has explained, this Court’s
embrace of the pro-veteran canon rests “upon the
premise that Congress … created the system with a
residual intent that ambiguity be resolved in the favor
of veterans.” James D. Ridgway, Toward a Less
Adversarial Relationship Between Chevron and
Gardner, 9 U. Mass. L. Rev. 388, 408 (2014).
In Henderson, the Court explained that the canon
is a tool to “ascertain Congress’ intent” on the
meaning of a particular statute. 562 U.S. at 438; see
also id. at 440 (“The solicitude of Congress for
veterans is of long standing.” (quoting United States
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 647 (1961)). And it is an
especially reliable tool because—as the Court
emphasized in King—the canon is long-standing and
“Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules
of statutory construction.” 502 U.S. at 221 n.9
(citation omitted); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law 31 (2012) (“A traditional and
hence anticipated rule of interpretation … imparts
meaning.”).
3. Because the pro-veteran canon is a traditional
tool of statutory construction, Chevron, SAS Institute,
Epic Systems, and Kisor I all make clear that it must
15
be considered at Step One when deciding whether a
veterans statute is genuinely ambiguous and eligible
for deference. That is consistent with this Court’s
own treatment of the canon. In Gardner, for example,
the Court implied that deference to VA would only “be
possible after applying the rule that interpretive
doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.” 513
U.S. at 117-18 (emphasis added). And in Henderson,
the Court used the canon to “ascertain Congress’
intent,” 562 U.S. at 438, thereby confirming its
relevance to the Step One inquiry (which likewise
addresses that “intent[],” 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
This Court has consistently applied similar canons
to ascertain statutory meaning at Chevron Step One.2
The courts of appeals likewise apply the standard
canons at Step One.3 And even the Solicitor General
2
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (canon against implied repeals); INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (canon favoring construction of
“lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien” (citation omitted)); id. at 320 n.45 (canon against
retroactivity); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (canon against
preemption); Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank &
Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501-02 (1998) (canon presuming consistent
usage); see also Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1617, 1625-30 (applying
ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and the presumption against
implied repeals).
3
See, e.g., Texas v. Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas,
918 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that canons apply at
Chevron Step One); Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 340, 343
(6th Cir. 2018) (noting that this Court applies “canons first” at
Step One); Maine Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, 841 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir.
2016) (same); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the
Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 65, 77
(2008) (“[C]anons trump deference.”).
16
has said that “before you ever get to Chevron, you
apply the canons of construction.” Tr. of Oral Arg. at
60, Babb v. Wilkie, No. 18-882 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2020)
(representing VA).4
There is no reason why the pro-veteran canon
should be treated differently from any other
traditional canon.
3. The Federal Circuit justified its refusal to apply
the pro-veteran canon at Step One because it
concluded the veterans statutes are “silent” on
whether a veteran may resume disability benefits
immediately upon finishing active duty. App.9a n.5.
In doing so, the majority seemed to believe that when
a statute is facially silent—as opposed to
ambiguous—the Step One inquiry does not allow
consideration of canons of construction. Id.; see
App.13a-15a, 26a-28a (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
That approach finds no support in this Court’s
case law. The overarching purpose of the Step One
inquiry is to ascertain the meaning of the statutory
text. That inquiry is the same—and requires courts
to consider “all the ‘traditional tools’ of
construction”—regardless whether the agency asserts
a gap, silence, or ambiguity. Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at
2415 (emphasis added) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843 n.9); see also, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete
& Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 488 (2012) (referring to
gaps and ambiguities interchangeably).
4
See also Fed. Resp’ts Opp’n Br. 9, Bais Yaakov of Spring
Valley v. FCC, No. 17-351 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 1182931
(“At step one of Chevron, courts must analyze a statute’s ‘text,
its context, the structure of the statutory scheme, and canons of
textual construction ….’” (citation omitted)).
17
Here, the panel incorrectly assumed that any time
a statute is “silent” on a particular point, that means
Congress has empowered the agency to create new
substantive rules of law. But silence does not
“automatically mean that a court can proceed to
Chevron step two.” Arangure, 911 F.3d at 338.
Rather, “Chevron’s theory of implicit delegation only
applies to certain kinds of silences—those where we
can plausibly infer Congress intentionally left a
statutory gap for the agency to fill.” Id. As Judge
O’Scannlain has explained, the notion that silence
invariably confers discretion to agencies is a
“caricature of Chevron” that is “entirely alien to our
system of laws.” Oregon Rest. & Lodging Ass’n v.
Perez, 843 F.3d 355, 360 (9th Cir. 2016) (dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
The panel erred by concluding that statutory
silence authorized it to bypass traditional tools of
construction like the pro-veteran canon at Step One
and proceed straight to deference at Step Two.
4. VA’s argument below against applying the proveteran canon was even less persuasive. According to
VA, the canon comes into play only after a court
completes its Chevron analysis: “Where the statute is
ambiguous, the veteran canon applies if interpretive
doubt remains in a veterans’ benefit statute after
other tools of statutory construction, including
deference principles, have failed to resolve the
ambiguity.” VA C.A. Br. 9 (emphasis added).
That makes no sense. “[R]elegating [the proveteran canon’s] consideration until after Chevron
and Auer deference would render it a nullity.” Kisor
III, 995 F.3d at 1370 n.4 (O’Malley, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). Indeed, delaying
consideration of key canons until after Step Two is
18
exactly the opposite of what this Court mandated in
Chevron’s footnote 9, which made clear that
traditional tools of statutory construction—such as
the pro-veteran canon—are relevant at Step One
before granting deference. Supra at 11-17. VA’s
approach violates Chevron.
B.
This Court’s Intervention Is Needed to
Vindicate the Pro-Veteran Canon and
Prevent Unwarranted Deference to VA
1. Each year, VA decides over a million disability
claims, awarding approximately $88 billion in
benefits.5
In doing so, it routinely resolves
interpretive questions which then bubble up to the
Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Veterans Court, and
the Federal Circuit. Many of those rulings involve
close questions of statutory or regulatory
construction. Unsurprisingly, VA virtually always
demands Chevron or Auer deference to its
interpretations, which all too often disfavor veterans.
Without the pro-veteran canon as an interpretive
tool to be consulted at Step One, VA’s anti-veteran
proclivities will receive interpretive deference even
when the better view of the law is pro-veteran.
Clarifying the canon’s role is thus crucial to ensuring
that the veterans’ benefit scheme is administered in
the pro-claimant manner that Congress expects. “[I]t
is difficult to overstate the importance of the veteranfriendly approach to veterans’ benefits statutes and
their accompanying regulations.” Kisor v. Shulkin,
5
See U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-21348, VA Disability Benefits: Veterans Benefits Administration
Could Enhance Management of Claims Processor Training at 1
(June 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-348.pdf.
19
880 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Any
rule banishing the pro-veteran canon from Step One
will have an “enormous impact” on veterans and
render that canon “all but inapplicable to future
cases.” Kisor III, 995 F.3d at 1374 (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
2. Only this Court can fix the Federal Circuit’s
refusal to apply the pro-veteran canon at Step One.
Over the past three decades, the Federal Circuit has
been internally divided on whether and how to apply
the canon in Chevron cases. And in recent years most
of its rulings—like the decision below—have
disregarded the canon at Step One. There is no
prospect of consensus emerging anytime soon. This
Court should provide the guidance that the Federal
Circuit, the Veterans Court, and disabled veterans
nationwide so desperately need.
a. The Federal Circuit’s confusion over the
relationship between the pro-veteran canon and
agency-deference doctrines is long-standing and
deeply rooted. The court has lamented that it “is not
clear where the [pro-veteran] canon fits within the
Chevron doctrine, or whether it should be part of the
Chevron analysis at all.” Heino v. Shinseki, 683 F.3d
1372, 1379 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Hudgens v.
McDonald, 823 F.3d 630, 639 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has
adopted different formulations of when the proveteran canon applies, or if it applies at all, in agencydeference cases. Early cases rightly suggested that it
should be applied at Chevron Step One. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocs., Inc. v. Sec’y of
Veterans Affs., 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 692
20
(Fed. Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l
Org. of Veterans’ Advocs., Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans
Affs., 981 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020). But more recent
cases have declined to apply the canon at Step One,
deferring instead to VA’s interpretations at Step Two.
See, e.g., Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
Even when the Federal Circuit defers to VA’s
interpretations, its rationale for doing so is muddled.
Sometimes, the court has suggested that the proveteran canon never applies in Chevron cases. See
Guerra v. Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046, 1051 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). Other times, the court has treated the
canon as a tool of last resort, to be applied only after
all “other interpretive guidelines have been
exhausted, including Chevron.” Nielson v. Shinseki,
607 F.3d 802, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see generally
Ridgway, supra, at 399-402 (collecting cases).
In 2018, the Federal Circuit sought to resolve the
confusion by sua sponte granting en banc hearing and
directing the parties to address “What role, if any,
does the pro-claimant canon play in [the Chevron]
analysis?” Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1374. But the court
did not reach the issue. Instead, the majority ruled at
Step One that the text of the contested statute
unambiguously favored the claimants over VA—and
it thus saw “no reason” to reach the pro-veteran-canon
issue. Id. at 1380. In a concurring opinion, Judge
O’Malley “lament[ed] the court’s failure—yet again—
to address and resolve the tension between the proveteran canon and agency deference.” Id. at 1387
(O’Malley, J., concurring).
21
b. The Federal Circuit again addressed the proveteran canon last year in Kisor v. McDonough (“Kisor
II”), 995 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2021), on remand from
this Court’s decision in Kisor I. The Kisor II panel
split 2-1: Whereas the majority held that the
contested regulation unambiguously supported VA’s
interpretation, 995 F.3d at 1322, Judge Reyna’s
dissent explained that the pro-veteran canon is “a
traditional tool of construction” that “must be
weighed alongside the other traditional tools in
resolving interpretive doubt [at Step One], including
whether interpretative doubt exists,” id. at 1327.
The Federal Circuit then denied rehearing en
banc, issuing 5 separate opinions joined by 11 of the
court’s 12 active judges. Kisor III, 995 F.3d 1347. No
fewer than nine of those judges urged this Court to
provide clarification on the interaction between
deference doctrines and the pro-veteran canon.
Specifically, Judge O’Malley—joined by Judges
Reyna, Newman, and Moore—explained in a dissent
that “canons trump deference,” and argued that this
Court should grant certiorari to resolve the issue. Id.
at 1370 n.4, 1376. And Chief Judge Prost—joined by
Judges Lourie, Wallach, Taranto, and Chen—filed a
concurrence recognizing that the “tension” between
deference doctrines and the pro-veteran canon
“present[s] a difficult and unresolved challenge,” and
welcoming “further guidance” from this Court on how
to “reconcile these competing doctrines.” Id. at 1358.6
6
Kisor has petitioned this Court for review of the Federal
Circuit’s judgment. Kisor v. McDonough, No. 21-465 (filed Sept.
24, 2021). But that petition does not raise either of the questions
presented here, as VA expressly disclaimed any request for
22
c. Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit’s inability
to resolve these questions has trickled down to the
Veterans Court (whose appeals are heard by the
Federal Circuit). Compare Pacheco v. Gibson, 27 Vet.
App. 21, 29 (2014) (en banc) (per curiam) (deferring to
VA’s interpretation under Auer), with id. at 42 (Davis,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (four of
nine judges dissenting from majority’s “fail[ure] to
resolve interpretive doubt in favor of the veteran” and
arguing that Gardner and Federal Circuit precedent
require as much); see also Ridgway, supra, at 402
(explaining that the Veterans Court’s application of
the canon “is no more consistent than it is at the
Federal Circuit”). Indeed, the Veterans Court invited
“guidance from the Supreme Court” on this issue
nearly two decades ago. DeBeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet.
App. 357, 368 (2004).
3. The net effect of the Federal Circuit’s refusal to
apply the pro-veteran canon at Step One is to expand
the range of circumstances in which the Federal
Circuit and Veterans Court must defer to VA’s
interpretation of statutes and regulations. Deferring
to federal agencies on pure legal questions is always
suspect (see infra at 25-28), but it is especially
inappropriate to give such deference to VA, which has
a
long
history
of
advancing
implausible
interpretations that harm veterans.
VA’s track record when it comes to interpreting
the veterans laws is abysmal. Sometimes VA enacts
a rule that simply “flies against the plain language of
the statutory text,” Gardner, 513 U.S. at 122, is
supported by “no fair reading,” Procopio, 913 F.3d at
deference, and the Federal Circuit did not apply deference in
ruling against the veteran.
23
1378, or attempts to “manufacture an ambiguity in
language where none exists in order to redefine the
plain language” of a governing statute, Johnson v.
McDonald, 762 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Or
VA dispenses with clarity altogether, “intentionally”
promulgating a rule so “untenable” and “vague[]” that
its later application amounts to “the equivalent of
‘because I say so’ or ‘we know it when we see it.’” Ray
v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 58, 71 (2019) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
Other times VA’s actions lack “any rhyme or
reason” and can only be described as “irrational,”
“aimless and adrift,” and “just as arbitrary” as
“flipping a coin.” Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 313,
322-25 (2015). And still other times VA appears
hopelessly “confused,” taking a position contrary to
“common sense,” Turner v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 207,
216-17 (2018), or one that “reflects a lack of grasp of
the APA” itself, Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,
632 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed Cir. 2011).
VA’s approach has not gone unnoticed. As Justice
Gorsuch has highlighted, VA too frequently issues
regulations that have “no basis in the relevant
statutes” and “do[] nothing to assist, and much to
impair, the interests of those the law says the agency
is supposed to serve.” Mathis v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct.
1994, 1995 (2017) (dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
Given VA’s track record, the Court should be
especially concerned by the Federal Circuit’s failure
to heed the clear limits on deference imposed by
Chevron’s footnote 9. Review is necessary to reaffirm
those limits and protect veterans from VA overreach.
24
C.
This Case Offers an Ideal Vehicle for
Resolving the Question Presented
This case provides a perfect vehicle for addressing
threshold legal issues regarding the scope of Chevron
deference. There are no disputed factual issues; the
parties disagree only about the meaning of statutes
governing award of veterans’ benefits, and the core
principles governing their interpretation.
Moreover, the question presented is outcome
determinative: Buffington would have won this case
if the panel had followed Chevron’s footnote 9 and
applied the pro-veteran canon at Step One. The panel
would have resolved any uncertainty over the
statutory scheme by holding that a veteran is entitled
to resume full disability benefits immediately upon
the conclusion of active-duty service, without being
subject to any sort of one-year limitations period.
As Judge O’Malley (in the Federal Circuit) and
Judge Greenberg (in the Veterans Court) both
recognized, that reflects the best interpretation of the
statutory scheme, because Section 5304(c) authorizes
VA to withhold benefit payments from disabled
veterans only while the veteran is receiving activeservice pay. See App.16a, 56a. Indeed, the Veterans
Administration itself adopted that interpretation
immediately after Section 5304(c) became law in
1958. Supra at 5-6. Buffington has the better
argument based on the text and history of the
relevant statutes. The pro-veteran canon makes it a
slam dunk.
VA won this case because the Federal Circuit
disregarded Chevron’s footnote 9 (and Kisor I) and
failed to apply a traditional—and essential—tool for
construing veterans statutes. This Court should
25
grant certiorari to reaffirm its precedent and protect
veterans from VA’s unreasonable interpretations.
II. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER CHEVRON
The Federal Circuit misapplied Chevron when
ruling for VA in this case. That flawed result
implicates a larger problem—Chevron itself. As
several Justices have recognized in recent years,
Chevron is wrong. The Court should grant certiorari
to overrule it.
A.
Chevron Was Wrongly Decided
The problems with Chevron are legion, as
members of both the Judiciary and academy have
recognized.7 Five flaws bear special emphasis here.
First, and most importantly, Chevron violates the
Constitution’s separation of powers. Article III vests
“[t]he judicial power of the United States”—and with
it, the duty “to say what the law is”—in the
independent federal courts. Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
Chevron
abdicates that duty. It forces federal courts to let
executive branch agencies authoritatively interpret
the law in pending cases—even when the courts
themselves disagree with what the agency says. That
is nothing less than a massive “judicially orchestrated
shift of power.”
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing
Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150
7
See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120-21
(2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743,
760 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109-10 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Philip Hamburger,
Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (2016).
26
(2016). Neither Congress nor the courts themselves
have authority to transfer judicial power to the
Executive. That approach is unjustified by the
Constitution’s text or structure, and unsupported by
history.8
Second, Chevron upends basic principles of
constitutional due process of law. It is patently unfair
for a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation,
especially when the agency itself is a litigant, before
that same court, in the actual case at hand. Judges
are supposed to be impartial arbiters of law—not
home-team umpires for the executive branch.9
Third, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
instructs federal courts to “decide all relevant
questions of law,” including by “determin[ing] the
meaning … of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706. Contrary to that instruction, however, Chevron
demands that courts not decide fundamental,
8
See Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to
Executive Interpretation, 128 Yale L.J. 908 (2017); Kristin
Hickman & Richard Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
§ 3.1 (6th ed. updated Nov. 1, 2021) (“In scores of cases and in
every term through 1983, the Supreme Court relied on its own
analysis and judgment regarding statutory meaning without
regard for the administering agency.”).
9
See, e.g., Hamburger, supra; United States v. Harris, 907
F.3d 439, 451 n.1 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring),
vacated on reh’g en banc, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019).
Underscoring the problem, the United States has taken the
remarkable position that it possesses unilateral authority to
turn Chevron deference off whenever it would benefit a private
party invoking an agency’s otherwise-binding interpretation
when litigating against a different government entity. See Babb
Tr. of Oral Arg. at 61 (Solicitor General arguing that pro-plaintiff
EEOC interpretations do not receive Chevron deference in
discrimination litigation against federal defendants).
27
outcome-determinative questions of law. As four
Justices have noted, Chevron thus conflicts with
Section 706, which requires “de novo review on
questions of law.” Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2433 (Gorsuch,
J., joined by Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
Chevron “flout[s] the language of the Act.”
Kavanaugh, supra, at 2150 n.161.
Fourth, Chevron rests on a false presumption
about Congressional intent. Chevron reasoned that
an ambiguity in a statute reflects an implicit
delegation of interpretive authority to federal
agencies. 467 U.S. at 844. But there is no evidence
supporting that presumed delegation.
Most
ambiguities in legal drafting are unintentional, and
there is no reason to believe that every ambiguity in
every statute is both (1) deliberate, and (2) created
with the hope that it would be resolved by an agency.
Many
Justices
and
commentators
have
acknowledged that this core premise of Chevron is
“fictional”—i.e., made up.10 That should be enough to
10 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring) (“Chevron’s claim about legislative intentions is
no more than a fiction—and one that requires a pretty hefty
suspension of disbelief at that”); David Barron & Elena Kagan,
Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 212
(2001) (“Chevron doctrine at most can rely on a fictionalized
statement of legislative desire”); Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363,
380 (1986) (acknowledging that Chevron rests on a “legal
fiction”); Abbe Gluck & Lisa Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 996
(2013) (noting that majority of congressional staffers surveyed
indicated “that their knowledge of Chevron does not mean that
28
condemn it. Why should the meaning of vast swaths
of federal law be determined under a doctrine that
rests on a premise that no one thinks is valid?
Of course, sometimes Congress will intentionally
delegate to agencies the power to issue implementing
regulations, make policy choices based on certain factfinding, or fill gaps in a statutory scheme. But that is
a far cry from pretending that every statutory
ambiguity—even the unintentional ones—reflects
such a delegation. Chevron’s central premise is
overbroad and false.
Fifth, Chevron incentivizes agencies to disregard
the law. As Justice Kavanaugh has explained,
“Chevron encourages the Executive Branch … to be
extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy
goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and
restraints.” Kavanaugh, supra, at 2150; see also
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[W]e should be alarmed that [the agency] felt
sufficiently emboldened by those precedents to make
the bid for deference that it did here.”). By telling
agencies that they are free to adopt any interpretation
that is marginally reasonable—even if it does not
reflect the best view of the statute—Chevron
discourages fidelity to the rule of law.
To sum up: Chevron forces courts to defer to
agency interpretations that the courts themselves
believe are wrong. That is not consistent with an
independent Judiciary or the rule of law. Chevron
was wrongly decided.
they intend to delegate whenever ambiguity remains in finalized
statutory language”).
29
B.
Stare Decisis Does
Retaining Chevron
Not
Support
Following precedent makes sense as a standard
default rule because it usually “promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development
of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). But that is not always true.
This Court has long recognized that precedents
should be overruled in appropriate circumstances,
based on a careful assessment of factors like the
quality of the precedent’s reasoning in the decision,
its workability, and the effect overruling the
precedent would have on reliance interests and ruleof-law values. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S.
Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019). Here, these factors support
overturning Chevron.
1. As discussed above, Chevron’s deference regime
lacks any sound basis in law. Requiring courts to
defer to agency legal interpretations is at odds with
the Constitution and the APA, and Chevron’s
ambiguity-equals-delegation rationale is widely
acknowledged to be fictional. Supra at 27-28.
These problems with Chevron’s reasoning are
uniquely pernicious due to the doctrine’s broad, crosscutting scope. Because Chevron sets forth a method
of statutory interpretation potentially applicable to
all statutes implemented by federal agencies, its ill
effects are not confined to any single legal issue, but
instead threaten to shape—and distort—the
interpretation of virtually all regulatory regimes, in
perpetuity.
Whereas the cost of retaining any
particular precedent misinterpreting a single
30
statutory provision is comparatively low, the cost of
retaining the Chevron methodology is enormous.
Chevron’s status as a rule of interpretation
suggests that it should not even receive stare decisis
effect in the first place.11 At a minimum, though,
Chevron’s capacity to generate new erroneous
interpretations, of different statutes, over and over
again, weighs strongly in favor of overturning it. See
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 384 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“[A]llow[ing] the Court’s past missteps to spawn
future mistakes[] undercut[s] the very rule-of-law
values that stare decisis is designed to protect.”).
2.
Chevron deference also undermines the
“evenhanded,
predictable,
and
consistent
development of legal principles.” Payne, 501 U.S. at
824.
Chevron tells courts to avoid definitively
declaring what a law means upon a finding of
ambiguity, thus ensuring that the law remains illdefined and subject to politically expedient agency
reinterpretations.
Moreover, National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet
Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), makes clear that
Chevron empowers agencies to require courts “to
overrule their own declarations about the meaning of
existing law in favor of interpretations dictated by
executive agencies.” Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at
1150 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Overruling Chevron
11 See, e.g., Kisor I, 139 S. Ct. at 2443-44 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Baldwin v. United States, 140 S.
Ct. 690, 691 n.1 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Kristin Hickman & Aaron Nielson, Narrowing
Chevron’s Domain, 70 Duke L.J. 931, 991 (2021).
31
will thus promote—not undermine—consistency and
predictability.
For essentially the same reasons, reliance
interests “count against retaining Chevron.” Id. at
1158 (emphasis added). Chevron and Brand X
affirmatively undermine reliance: They let agencies
change their minds about what the statute means and
require courts to flip-flop along with them. By
allowing federal law to fluctuate according to agency
whims, Chevron creates uncertainty about the law—
and thereby undermines reliance. See Guedes v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives,
140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (statement of Gorsuch, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari).
These problems are only exacerbated by modernday “political polarization,” a phenomenon which
“makes Chevron … a source of extreme instability in
our legal system.”
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Has
Awful Effects, 70 Duke L.J. Online 91, 92 (2021). No
one familiar with controversies over issues like
immigration, climate change, and net neutrality can
seriously argue that Chevron plays a stabilizing role
as to these hot-button issues on which agency policies
“will change dramatically every four to eight years”
depending on who wins the White House. Id. at 96103 (discussing agency flip-flops on DACA, the Clean
Power Plan, and net neutrality, among others).
Overturning Chevron would address these
problems by ensuring that agencies and regulated
entities can rely on the best and most natural
interpretation of statutory language. That result best
serves the rule-of-law values that stare decisis is
meant to advance.
32
3.
Chevron has also proven unworkable in
practice. Chevron’s ambiguity trigger is woefully
indeterminate. “[N]o definitive guide exists for
determining whether statutory language is clear or
ambiguous.” Kavanaugh, supra, at 2138. Not even
the Government—Chevron’s biggest defender—can
offer a coherent explanation for when a statute is
sufficiently ambiguous to trigger Chevron. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. at 71-72, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 201114 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2021) (Assistant to the Solicitor
General: “I don’t think I can give you an answer to
th[e] question” of “[h]ow much ambiguity is enough”).
Thanks to this ambiguity over ambiguity, judges
“have wildly different conceptions of whether a
particular statute is clear or ambiguous.”
Kavanaugh, supra, at 2152. Chevron’s indeterminacy
thus inevitably produces arbitrary and inconsistent
results that are “antithetical to the neutral, impartial
rule of law.” Id. at 2154.
This Court’s many caveats to Chevron complicate
things still further. Under the Major Questions
doctrine, Chevron does not apply to interpretive
“question[s] of deep ‘economic and political
significance.’” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486
(2015). But this laudable effort to cabin Chevron’s
scope (and mitigate its constitutional harm) creates a
workability problem of its own: There is no clear or
objective way to consistently determine what counts
as a Major Question. Moreover, there is significant
confusion over the scope of the Major Questions
doctrine(s).12
And some Justices have rightly
12 See, e.g.,
Cass Sunstein, There Are Two “Major
Questions” Doctrines, 73 Admin. L. Rev. 475, 477 (2021) (arguing
that there are two versions of the doctrine, “weak” and “strong,”
33
recognized that in many cases ambiguity or a
statutory gap should not be read as a delegation to the
agency, even in the absence of a Major Question.13
There is also real confusion over other threshold
Chevron questions. For example, United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), declares that
Chevron does not apply unless “Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and … the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority.” Id. at 226-27. But
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002), holds
that interpretations that are merely “long standing”
warrant Chevron deference even if not promulgated
in exercise of an agency’s delegated lawmaking
authority. Moreover, there is considerable confusion
over whether Chevron is mandatory, or waivable by
the government.14
And, as this case itself
demonstrates, at least some judges remain confused
each with “radically different implications”); In re MCP No. 165,
__ F.4th __, 2021 WL 5989357, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).
13 See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208,
223 (2009) (“[S]ometimes statutory silence, when viewed in
context, is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion.”); City
of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he
existence of statutory ambiguity is sometimes not enough to
warrant the conclusion that Congress has left a deferencewarranting gap for the agency to fill ….”).
14 See, e.g., Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161
(11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (noting circuit split on whether
Chevron deference is waivable); Note, Waiving Chevron
Deference, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1520 (2019); see also Guedes, 140 S.
Ct. at 789-90 (statement of Gorsuch, J., respecting denial of
certiorari).
34
about how to apply Chevron Step One. See supra at
21 (discussing fractured Kisor III opinions).
4. Perhaps due to these workability problems, this
Court appears to be sub silentio abandoning the
Chevron framework in a great many cases to which it
arguably applies. As a leading treatise observes, the
Court sometimes “gives Chevron powerful effect,”
sometimes “ignores Chevron,” and sometimes
“characterizes the Chevron test in strange and
inconsistent ways.” Hickman & Pierce, supra, § 3.5.6;
id. § 3.6.10 (surveying how the Court has treated
Chevron in seemingly eligible cases over the last
decade); see also Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“I can only conclude that the Court, for
whatever reason, is simply ignoring Chevron.”).
At a minimum, Chevron remains “hotly
contested,” such that it “cannot reliably function as a
basis for decision in future cases. Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 379 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Court has
repeatedly recognized in recent years that Chevron’s
continued validity is up for debate. See, e.g., Epic
Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1629 (observing that “[n]o party to
these cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron
deference” and holding that no deference was
warranted); SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1358 (“[W]hether
Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for
another day.”). And the government has gotten the
message: Recent Solicitors General have seemed
reluctant—almost
apologetic—when
invoking
Chevron in this Court. See also BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos,
139 S. Ct. 893, 908 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(noting private-party petitioner’s reticence in relying
on Chevron).
The Court’s unwillingness to consistently apply
the flawed Chevron framework speaks volumes.
35
There is no reason Chevron should continue to govern
lower courts while this Court shuns it. The Court’s
“frequent disregard” of Chevron supports overruling
that precedent. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236,
252 (1998).
*
*
*
Chevron’s deference regime is unlawful. The
Court should at least reaffirm the importance of a
rigorous and comprehensive Step One inquiry that
encompasses the pro-veteran canon. Better yet, the
Court should revisit Chevron and overrule it entirely.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Roman Martinez
Gregory B. in den Berken
Brent T. Murphy
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
555 Eleventh Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 637-2200
Richard A. Samp
Counsel of Record
Kara Rollins
Mark Chenoweth
NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES
ALLIANCE
1225 19th Street, NW
Suite 450
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 869-5210
rich.samp@ncla.legal
Counsel for Petitioner
January 3, 2022
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.