Reply Brief — Sojourner Rudisill, Petitioner v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 9, 2022

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No. 21-956

In The

SOJOURNER RUDISILL,

v.

Petitioner,

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND

AEROSPACE WORKERS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

Alexandra Mansbach

Counsel of Record

Hyland Hunt

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

300 New Jersey Ave. N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 868-6915

lmansbach@deutschhunt.com

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 2

I.

The Question Presented Is Recurring,

Important, And Implicated Here. ...................... 2

A. Section 153 First(q) Applies Here. ............ 2

B. The Availability of Due Process Review

Is Outcome Dispositive Here and in

Other Cases. ............................................... 4

II.

The Question Is Cleanly Presented. .................. 6

A. No Forfeiture Stands in the Way of

Review. ....................................................... 7

B. The Merit of Petitioner’s Due Process

Claim Is an Issue for Remand. .................. 8

III.

The Decision Is Wrong. .................................... 10

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 12

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Airline Prof’ls Ass’n of the Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,

Local Union No. 1224 v. ABX Air, Inc.,

274 F.3d 1023 (6th Cir. 2001) ................................... 2

Anderson v. Branen,

17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994) ........................................ 8

Betts v. United Airlines, Inc.,

768 F. App’x 577 (7th Cir. 2019) .............................. 2

Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen.

Comm. of Adjustment v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

522 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................... 11

Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v.

Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

905 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2018) ..................................... 4

Briscoe v. Lahue,

460 U.S. 325 (1983) ................................................... 3

Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc.,

836 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2016) ...................................... 8

Chernak v. Sw. Airlines Co.,

778 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1985) ................................... 2

Cirko ex rel. Cirko v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

948 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2020) ...................................... 8

iii

Edelman v. W. Airlines, Inc.,

892 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1989) ............................... 2, 10

Hall v. E. Air Lines, Inc.,

511 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1975) ..................................... 2

Hart v. Overseas Nat’l Airways, Inc.,

541 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1976) .................................. 2, 3

Hunt v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,

600 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1979) ..................................... 3

International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R.,

24 F.3d 369 (2d Cir. 1994) ........................................ 5

International Ass’n of Machinists v. Central

Airlines, Inc.,

372 U.S. 682 (1963) ............................................... 3, 4

Keach v. New Brunswick S. Ry. Ltd.,

953 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2020) ....................................... 8

Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co.,

362 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 2004) ................................... 5

Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co.,

No. 2:01-CV-0010BSJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

23162 (D. Utah Apr. 6, 2006).................................... 5

Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co.,

No. 2:01-CV0010J, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

87749 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2006) .................................. 5

iv

Kotakis v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co.,

520 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1975) ................................... 11

Loveless v. E. Air Lines,

681 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982) ................................. 2

Martino v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co.,

582 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2014) .................................. 4

Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l,

530 F.2d 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ................................. 2

Pokuta v. TWA,

191 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999) ..................................... 5

Rosen v. E. Air Lines,

400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968) ................................... 10

Shafii v. PLC British Airways,

22 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1994) ................................ 2, 3, 11

Sheehan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

576 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1978) ................................. 11

Sullivan v. Endeavor Air, Inc.,

856 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2017) ..................................... 2

The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.,

228 U.S. 22 (1913) ..................................................... 6

Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Price,

360 U.S. 601 (1959) ................................................. 10

v

Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan,

439 U.S. 89 (1978) ............................................. 11, 12

Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs &

Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment,

558 U.S. 67 (2009) ..................................................... 1

United Transp. Union (C) & (T) v.

Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

812 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1987) ................................... 7

United Transp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

116 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1997) ..................................... 4

Utah v. Evans,

536 U.S. 452 (2002) ................................................. 10

Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,

501 U.S. 1083 (1991) ................................................. 7

Webster v. Doe,

486 U.S. 592 (1988) ............................................... 10

STATUTES:

45 U.S.C. § 153 First(j) ............................................. 6, 8

45 U.S.C. § 153 First(q) ............ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

S. Rep. No. 89-1201 (1966) ......................................... 10

INTRODUCTION

Everyone agrees that an intractable and

acknowledged split persists on the question presented.

Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs &

Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 75

(2009) (acknowledging split). The Court granted

review of that question once before. It should do so

again to resolve the question it left unanswered. The

question is critical to the fair resolution of labor

disputes in transportation industries employing

hundreds of thousands of Americans. With livelihoods

at stake, it is vital for this Court to establish a uniform

national rule regarding whether judicial review is

available to preserve the constitutional guarantee of

fundamentally fair hearings before governmentmandated arbitration boards.

This case is a clean vehicle to resolve this

important and outcome-determinative issue. It is

squarely presented here because, consistent with the

near-unanimous agreement of the courts of appeals,

all parties and the courts below applied § 153 First(q)

to this airline-related case. And as in other cases, the

availability of due process review is dispositive for

Petitioner’s claims. This record is well suited to

answer the question presented. Respondents’ focus on

issues that may remain for the district court on

remand cannot mask the pressing need for this Court’s

guidance.

(1)

2

ARGUMENT

I.

The Question Presented Is Recurring,

Important, And Implicated Here.

A. Section 153 First(q) Applies Here.

1. As the case comes to the Court, that Petitioner

was employed by an airline rather than a railroad is a

distinction without a difference. Courts routinely

apply 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(q) to airlines. See, e.g.,

Hart v. Overseas Nat’l Airways, Inc., 541 F.2d 386, 392

n.15 (3d Cir. 1976); Airline Prof’ls Ass’n of the Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1224 v. ABX Air,

Inc., 274 F.3d 1023, 1030 (6th Cir. 2001); Betts v.

United Airlines, Inc., 768 F. App’x 577, 578-79 (7th

Cir. 2019); Sullivan v. Endeavor Air, Inc., 856 F.3d

533, 536 (8th Cir. 2017); Chernak v. Sw. Airlines Co.,

778 F.2d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 1985); Loveless v. E. Air

Lines, 681 F.2d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 1982); Nw.

Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 530 F.2d

1048, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Same when they are

considering due process. See, e.g., Shafii v. PLC

British Airways, 22 F.3d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1994);

Edelman v. W. Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839, 841-42 (9th

Cir. 1989); Hall v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 511 F.2d 663, 66364 (5th Cir. 1975).

The Court need not decide whether most courts of

appeals are right to apply § 153 First(q) to airlines,

because throughout this entire litigation, all of the

parties asserted that it applied. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Dkt.

9 at 6; Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30 at 9-10; Dist. Ct. Dkt. 13 at 9;

Dist. Ct. Dkt. 31 at 9; 3d Cir. Dkt. 19 at 7; 3d Cir. Dkt.

3

14 at 8.1 Moreover, both the district court and Third

Circuit decided the case by applying § 153 First(q).

Pet. App. 6, 12, 24-25. This Court can decide the

question on the same grounds. See Briscoe v. Lahue,

460 U.S. 325, 328 n.3 (1983) (“[W]e make the same

assumptions [as the court of appeals] for purposes of

deciding this case.”).

2. Although the Court need not address this

issue, there is no reason to think that § 153 First(q)

does not apply to review of airline System Review

Board (“Board”) decisions. As the Second Circuit

explained, “[b]ecause the [Board] occupies the position

of the statutorily-created NRAB, [it] is subject to the

same statutory and constitutional constraints as the

NRAB.” Shafii, 22 F.3d at 61; see also, e.g., Hart, 541

F.2d at 392 n.15 (“[T]he arbitration provisions

of § 153 were…to be utilized by analogy in airline

disputes in the same fashion as in railway

controversies.”); Hunt v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 600 F.2d

176, 178-79 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing cases beginning in

1967).

Respondents nevertheless suggest that § 153

First(q) cannot permit due process review of airline

Boards because these Boards are not state actors. AA

BIO 21; IAM BIO 8-9. But as courts (and even

American, BIO 21) have acknowledged, this Court

held otherwise in International Ass’n of Machinists v.

Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963). There, the

1 American Airlines (“American”) argued (before the district court

only) that § 153’s statute of limitations did not apply to air

carriers, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 13 at 8 n.7, but it nevertheless argued that

the § 153 First(q) jurisdictional limits prohibited review of

Petitioner’s due process claims. Id. at 11-12; Dist. Ct. Dkt. 31 at

9.

4

Court explained that “when Congress ordered the

establishment of system boards to hear and decide

airline contract disputes, it intended the Board to be

and to act as a public agency, not as a private gobetween [and for] its awards to have legal effect, not

merely that of private advice.” Id. at 695. In the

context of the entire statutory scheme, Congress’s

requirement that airline employees use the Boards as

mandatory dispute mechanisms is sufficient to confer

“public agency” status on the Boards for purposes of

state action.

B. The Availability of Due Process Review

Is Outcome Dispositive Here and in

Other Cases.

The availability of judicial review for due process

violations is an important and recurring issue.

American argues it isn’t, on the theory that every

potential due process claim could be reviewed under

one of the three delineated grounds in § 153 First(q)

instead. But the courts that review due process claims

do not regard them as merely duplicative of the listed

grounds. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Union Pac.

R.R. Co., 116 F.3d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing

due process as an “independent ground, in addition to

the three enumerated in the statute”). Contrary to

American’s suggestion, BIO 17, courts have continued

to view due process as a separate, additional ground

after this Court’s 2009 decision in Union Pacific. See,

e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. Union

Pac. R.R. Co., 905 F.3d 537, 542-43 (7th Cir. 2018);

Martino v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 582 F. App’x

27, 29 (2d Cir. 2014). And cases show that it matters

5

whether or not an employee can obtain judicial review

for due process violations.

For instance, in International Ass’n of Machinists

& Aerospace Workers v. Metro-North Commuter

Railroad, 24 F.3d 369 (2d Cir. 1994), the plaintiff

objected because an arbitrator had a conflict of

interest, having served as “both an IAM employee and

a voting member of the NRAB division empowered to

decide the [] dispute.” Id. at 371. The court found that

“none of the[] [§ 153 First(q)] grounds” applied, but

nonetheless affirmed the district court’s order setting

aside an award because it violated due process. Id. at

371-72; see also Pokuta v. TWA, 191 F.3d 834, 839-40

(7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing claim that “[fell] within

none of [the § 153 First(q)] categories” under due

process, though finding no violation).

And in Kinross, the district court initially found

an arbitration award invalid on due process grounds

because the arbitration board had “improperly

considered” certain testimony and submissions.

Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co., 362 F.3d 658, 660 (10th Cir.

2004). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated and

remanded the district court’s decision, holding that

§ 153 First(q) did not allow due process review. Id. at

662. On remand, the district rejected the statute-based

objections and affirmed the arbitration award. Kinross

v. Utah Ry. Co., No. 2:01-CV-0010BSJ, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 23162 (D. Utah Apr. 6, 2006); Kinross v. Utah

Ry. Co., No. 2:01-CV0010J, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

87749 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2006). Thus, the availability

of due process review was outcome-determinative.

The availability of due process review is

dispositive here, too, given the way this case was pled

by Petitioner, proceeding pro se. A plaintiff

6

“is master to decide what law he will rely upon.” The

Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25

(1913). Perhaps, as American suggests (BIO 15), a

careful attorney would have relied on the RLA’s

guarantee that parties “may be heard…by counsel, or

other representatives, as they may respectively elect.”

45 U.S.C. § 153 First(j). Yet here, Petitioner’s

complaint does not allege failure to follow RLA

procedures, but rather a violation of due process,

Court of Appeals Appendix, Dkt. 11, No. 21-1093 (3d

Cir.) (C.A.) 35, and therefore succeeds or fails on that

basis alone.

Even if successful due process claims are rare,

judicial review is critical when mandatory arbitration

boards so transgress fundamental fairness and

procedural norms as to violate due process—whether

or not a creative lawyer might be able to shoehorn the

claim into a statutory violation. Absent this Court’s

guidance, such judicial review will be available in

some places and not others, yielding divergent results

and differential protection of constitutional rights

based solely on geography.

II.

The Question Is Cleanly Presented.

The complaint, which must be accepted at this

stage, alleges that the Board effectively requested the

expulsion of Petitioner’s counsel from the hearing. The

petition cleanly presents the question whether § 153

First(q) bars judicial review of Petitioner’s due process

claim based on this expulsion.

7

A. No Forfeiture Stands in the Way of

Review.

American now argues that Petitioner forfeited

her due process claim by failing to object to the Board.

But American itself forfeited this argument by not

making it to the district court. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 13.2

American did raise forfeiture in the Third Circuit, but

that court did not decide the case on that ground,

resting its decision on the question presented, which

suffices for this Court’s review. See Va. Bankshares,

Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1099 n.8 (1991) (“It

suffices for our purposes that the court below passed

on the issue presented[.]”).

Even if American had not forfeited its forfeiture

objection, a court applying the correct interpretation

of § 153 First(q) would reach the merits of Petitioner’s

due process claim. The requirement to raise an issue

before the Board is not jurisdictional and therefore

may be excused, see United Transp. Union (C) & (T) v.

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 812 F.2d 630, 631-32 (10th Cir.

1987), and would be here for a number of reasons.

First, Petitioner was effectively pro se on this issue,

because her union counsel was the one who conveyed

the apparent agreement between the Board,

American, and IAM that her counsel of choice had to

leave. C.A. 45 (¶¶43-45). Forfeiture is frequently

2 American argued to the district court that there was no state

action because the Board had not officially ruled on Petitioner’s

counsel’s expulsion, and that Petitioner’s right to counsel under

the CBA was inapposite because the Board had not ruled on this

CBA-bound issue, id. at 11-12 nn.8-9, but did not argue that

Petitioner had forfeited her due process argument by failing to

explicitly raise it.

8

excused for pro se parties. See, e.g., Cirko ex rel. Cirko

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 948 F.3d 148, 157 (3d Cir.

2020).

Second, there is no forfeiture where objection

“would have been futile” because the ground was

“already thoroughly discussed.” Anderson v. Branen,

17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Keach v.

New Brunswick S. Ry. Ltd., 953 F.3d 29, 38 n.2 (1st

Cir. 2020) (no waiver where “there would have been no

reason for [plaintiff] to argue this point”). Counsel for

IAM told Petitioner, in full sight and hearing of the

Board, that her counsel had to leave and that the

neutral member of the Board concurred in this

decision. C.A. 45 ¶¶43-46. The Board heard this

exchange and watched counsel leave and said nothing.

Id. at 45-46 ¶¶46-48, 48 ¶70. There was no response

from the Board when IAM counsel indicated that the

hearing would be cancelled if her private counsel was

not removed. Id. at 46 ¶47. To Petitioner, it was clear

that the Board, acting through IAM’s counsel, had

expelled her attorney, making objection futile. “[A]

litigant [need not] engage in futile gestures merely to

avoid a claim of waiver.” Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin.,

Inc., 836 F.3d 291, 293 (3d Cir. 2016) (second

alteration in original) (citation omitted).

B. The Merit of Petitioner’s Due Process

Claim Is an Issue for Remand.

American argues (BIO 20-22) that the Court

should not resolve whether Petitioner is entitled to

judicial review because her claim would fail on the

merits. That puts the cart before the horse. The RLA’s

counsel guarantee, § 153 First(j), reinforces that

9

Petitioner did not receive the fair hearing she was due,

but setting aside whether Petitioner will ultimately

win on the merits, the question here is whether she

even has the right to try. The Third Circuit said no

because of its per se bar on due process claims, not

because it peeked at the likely results. The Court

should not delay reviewing this important question

simply because there are follow-on issues to be

determined by the district court on remand.3

Nor is the result preordained based on the district

court’s resolution of Petitioner’s other claims. In the

context of Petitioner’s fraud claim, the district court

found that Petitioner had not alleged sufficient

(mis)conduct by the Board, “considering the extremely

high degree of improper conduct” required under the

fraud standard. Pet. App. 15. That is not the same as

holding Petitioner had alleged no conduct by the Board

that could constitute state action. Indeed, the district

court went on to analyze the fraud claim “[e]ven

assuming that…[the allegations are] sufficient to

allege conduct by the Board itself,” and found that the

claim failed for other reasons applicable only to the

fraud standard. Id. at 15-16. Whether the Board’s

apparent request to exclude Petitioner’s counsel

constitutes “state action” is a question that no court

has ruled on in Petitioner’s case, even implicitly, and

it does not stand in the way of the Court reaching the

question presented.

3 Similarly, whether IAM is a valid party does not affect the

suitability of this case as a vehicle because all agree that

American is a proper party. IAM BIO 12-13. IAM’s status poses

no bar to resolving the question presented, and can be addressed

on remand.

10

III. The Decision Is Wrong.

The RLA does not foreclose due process review of

arbitrator decisions. The Third Circuit’s contrary

position, shared by the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh

Circuits, is wrong and requires review.

Courts historically reviewed RLA arbitration

decisions for due process violations. Then, in Union

Pacific Railroad Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959), the

Supreme Court held that RLA arbitration decisions

could be reviewed only for constitutional errors.

In enacting § 153 First(q), Congress’s purpose

was to ameliorate this unfairness and expand, not

limit, judicial review. S. Rep. No. 89-1201, at 3 (1966)

(“If...an employee fails to receive an award in his favor,

there is no means by which judicial review may be

obtained...[T]his result is unfair.”). Congress did not

say that the new statutory grounds were “exclusive,”

or in any way indicate that it was withdrawing wellestablished due process review. See Edelman, 892 F.2d

at 846-47 (legislative history contains no indication of

any intention to restrict pre-existing review). The

absence of a clear withdrawal is dispositive. Webster v.

Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (“[W]here Congress

intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional

claims, its intent to do so must be clear.”). And the

implication that Congress would bar judicial due

process review sub silentio is even weaker where, as

here, courts had previously exercised jurisdiction over

these claims. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 463 (2002).

Consistent with these principles, after 1966,

courts continued to review due process claims. See,

e.g., Rosen v. E. Air Lines, 400 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959 (1968); Kotakis v. Elgin, J.

11

& E. Ry. Co., 520 F.2d 570, 574 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

423 U.S. 1016 (1975). The uncertainty about such

review only arose after this Court’s decision in Union

Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978),

based on a misreading of the case.

In Sheehan, a railroad employee claimed that he

was denied due process by the NRAB when it rejected

his argument about tolling the time limit in the

collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 90. The Tenth

Circuit held that the NRAB’s failure to consider the

merits of Sheehan’s claims was a denial of due process.

Sheehan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 576 F.2d 854, 856

(10th Cir. 1978). In a brief per curiam opinion, the

Court reversed. The Court was unsure of the basis of

the Tenth Circuit’s ruling; if the basis was the denial

of due process for failing to consider Sheehan’s claim,

then the Tenth Circuit was “simply mistaken,”

because the NRAB did consider (and reject) it. 439

U.S. at 92. But if the Tenth Circuit was reversing on

the merits of the tolling issue, it had exceeded its

jurisdiction under the RLA. Id. at 92-93. The Court

explained that the Tenth Circuit had no authority to

overrule a “purely legal” decision of the NRAB

interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Id.

at 91, 93. It was in this context that the Court

discussed the narrowness of the review provisions of

the RLA. Id. at 93.

As the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have

explicitly held, Sheehan did not hold that the RLA bars

review of due process claims. Shafii, 22 F.3d at 63-64;

Edelman, 892 F.2d at 846-47; Bhd. of Locomotive

Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v.

Union Pac. R.R. Co., 522 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2008).

In fact, Sheehan itself considered the due process

12

claim on the merits, 439 U.S. at 92, and it repeatedly

cites Price, which allows due process review, id. at 94.

The Third Circuit, like the three other courts of

appeals to have misinterpreted § 153 First(q), have

simply over-read Sheehan, without much analysis, to

announce a statutory interpretation it never

countenanced. Only this Court can correct this error

and restore uniformity to the law.

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Alexandra Mansbach

Counsel of Record

Hyland Hunt

DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC

300 New Jersey Ave. N.W.

Suite 900

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 868-6915

lmansbach@deutschhunt.com

Counsel for Petitioner

May 2022

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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