Reply Brief — Sojourner Rudisill, Petitioner v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 9, 2022
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No. 21-956
In The
SOJOURNER RUDISILL,
v.
Petitioner,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND
AEROSPACE WORKERS, ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER
Alexandra Mansbach
Counsel of Record
Hyland Hunt
DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC
300 New Jersey Ave. N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 868-6915
lmansbach@deutschhunt.com
Counsel for Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 2
I.
The Question Presented Is Recurring,
Important, And Implicated Here. ...................... 2
A. Section 153 First(q) Applies Here. ............ 2
B. The Availability of Due Process Review
Is Outcome Dispositive Here and in
Other Cases. ............................................... 4
II.
The Question Is Cleanly Presented. .................. 6
A. No Forfeiture Stands in the Way of
Review. ....................................................... 7
B. The Merit of Petitioner’s Due Process
Claim Is an Issue for Remand. .................. 8
III.
The Decision Is Wrong. .................................... 10
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 12
(i)
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Airline Prof’ls Ass’n of the Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local Union No. 1224 v. ABX Air, Inc.,
274 F.3d 1023 (6th Cir. 2001) ................................... 2
Anderson v. Branen,
17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994) ........................................ 8
Betts v. United Airlines, Inc.,
768 F. App’x 577 (7th Cir. 2019) .............................. 2
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen.
Comm. of Adjustment v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
522 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................... 11
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
905 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2018) ..................................... 4
Briscoe v. Lahue,
460 U.S. 325 (1983) ................................................... 3
Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc.,
836 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2016) ...................................... 8
Chernak v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
778 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1985) ................................... 2
Cirko ex rel. Cirko v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
948 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2020) ...................................... 8
iii
Edelman v. W. Airlines, Inc.,
892 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1989) ............................... 2, 10
Hall v. E. Air Lines, Inc.,
511 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1975) ..................................... 2
Hart v. Overseas Nat’l Airways, Inc.,
541 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1976) .................................. 2, 3
Hunt v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,
600 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1979) ..................................... 3
International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R.,
24 F.3d 369 (2d Cir. 1994) ........................................ 5
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Central
Airlines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 682 (1963) ............................................... 3, 4
Keach v. New Brunswick S. Ry. Ltd.,
953 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2020) ....................................... 8
Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co.,
362 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 2004) ................................... 5
Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co.,
No. 2:01-CV-0010BSJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23162 (D. Utah Apr. 6, 2006).................................... 5
Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co.,
No. 2:01-CV0010J, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87749 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2006) .................................. 5
iv
Kotakis v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co.,
520 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1975) ................................... 11
Loveless v. E. Air Lines,
681 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982) ................................. 2
Martino v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co.,
582 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2014) .................................. 4
Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l,
530 F.2d 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ................................. 2
Pokuta v. TWA,
191 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999) ..................................... 5
Rosen v. E. Air Lines,
400 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968) ................................... 10
Shafii v. PLC British Airways,
22 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1994) ................................ 2, 3, 11
Sheehan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
576 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1978) ................................. 11
Sullivan v. Endeavor Air, Inc.,
856 F.3d 533 (8th Cir. 2017) ..................................... 2
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.,
228 U.S. 22 (1913) ..................................................... 6
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Price,
360 U.S. 601 (1959) ................................................. 10
v
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Sheehan,
439 U.S. 89 (1978) ............................................. 11, 12
Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs &
Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment,
558 U.S. 67 (2009) ..................................................... 1
United Transp. Union (C) & (T) v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
812 F.2d 630 (10th Cir. 1987) ................................... 7
United Transp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
116 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1997) ..................................... 4
Utah v. Evans,
536 U.S. 452 (2002) ................................................. 10
Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
501 U.S. 1083 (1991) ................................................. 7
Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988) ............................................... 10
STATUTES:
45 U.S.C. § 153 First(j) ............................................. 6, 8
45 U.S.C. § 153 First(q) ............ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12
OTHER AUTHORITIES:
S. Rep. No. 89-1201 (1966) ......................................... 10
INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that an intractable and
acknowledged split persists on the question presented.
Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs &
Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 75
(2009) (acknowledging split). The Court granted
review of that question once before. It should do so
again to resolve the question it left unanswered. The
question is critical to the fair resolution of labor
disputes in transportation industries employing
hundreds of thousands of Americans. With livelihoods
at stake, it is vital for this Court to establish a uniform
national rule regarding whether judicial review is
available to preserve the constitutional guarantee of
fundamentally fair hearings before governmentmandated arbitration boards.
This case is a clean vehicle to resolve this
important and outcome-determinative issue. It is
squarely presented here because, consistent with the
near-unanimous agreement of the courts of appeals,
all parties and the courts below applied § 153 First(q)
to this airline-related case. And as in other cases, the
availability of due process review is dispositive for
Petitioner’s claims. This record is well suited to
answer the question presented. Respondents’ focus on
issues that may remain for the district court on
remand cannot mask the pressing need for this Court’s
guidance.
(1)
2
ARGUMENT
I.
The Question Presented Is Recurring,
Important, And Implicated Here.
A. Section 153 First(q) Applies Here.
1. As the case comes to the Court, that Petitioner
was employed by an airline rather than a railroad is a
distinction without a difference. Courts routinely
apply 45 U.S.C. § 153 First(q) to airlines. See, e.g.,
Hart v. Overseas Nat’l Airways, Inc., 541 F.2d 386, 392
n.15 (3d Cir. 1976); Airline Prof’ls Ass’n of the Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1224 v. ABX Air,
Inc., 274 F.3d 1023, 1030 (6th Cir. 2001); Betts v.
United Airlines, Inc., 768 F. App’x 577, 578-79 (7th
Cir. 2019); Sullivan v. Endeavor Air, Inc., 856 F.3d
533, 536 (8th Cir. 2017); Chernak v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
778 F.2d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 1985); Loveless v. E. Air
Lines, 681 F.2d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 1982); Nw.
Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 530 F.2d
1048, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Same when they are
considering due process. See, e.g., Shafii v. PLC
British Airways, 22 F.3d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1994);
Edelman v. W. Airlines, Inc., 892 F.2d 839, 841-42 (9th
Cir. 1989); Hall v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 511 F.2d 663, 66364 (5th Cir. 1975).
The Court need not decide whether most courts of
appeals are right to apply § 153 First(q) to airlines,
because throughout this entire litigation, all of the
parties asserted that it applied. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Dkt.
9 at 6; Dist. Ct. Dkt. 30 at 9-10; Dist. Ct. Dkt. 13 at 9;
Dist. Ct. Dkt. 31 at 9; 3d Cir. Dkt. 19 at 7; 3d Cir. Dkt.
3
14 at 8.1 Moreover, both the district court and Third
Circuit decided the case by applying § 153 First(q).
Pet. App. 6, 12, 24-25. This Court can decide the
question on the same grounds. See Briscoe v. Lahue,
460 U.S. 325, 328 n.3 (1983) (“[W]e make the same
assumptions [as the court of appeals] for purposes of
deciding this case.”).
2. Although the Court need not address this
issue, there is no reason to think that § 153 First(q)
does not apply to review of airline System Review
Board (“Board”) decisions. As the Second Circuit
explained, “[b]ecause the [Board] occupies the position
of the statutorily-created NRAB, [it] is subject to the
same statutory and constitutional constraints as the
NRAB.” Shafii, 22 F.3d at 61; see also, e.g., Hart, 541
F.2d at 392 n.15 (“[T]he arbitration provisions
of § 153 were…to be utilized by analogy in airline
disputes in the same fashion as in railway
controversies.”); Hunt v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 600 F.2d
176, 178-79 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing cases beginning in
1967).
Respondents nevertheless suggest that § 153
First(q) cannot permit due process review of airline
Boards because these Boards are not state actors. AA
BIO 21; IAM BIO 8-9. But as courts (and even
American, BIO 21) have acknowledged, this Court
held otherwise in International Ass’n of Machinists v.
Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963). There, the
1 American Airlines (“American”) argued (before the district court
only) that § 153’s statute of limitations did not apply to air
carriers, Dist. Ct. Dkt. 13 at 8 n.7, but it nevertheless argued that
the § 153 First(q) jurisdictional limits prohibited review of
Petitioner’s due process claims. Id. at 11-12; Dist. Ct. Dkt. 31 at
9.
4
Court explained that “when Congress ordered the
establishment of system boards to hear and decide
airline contract disputes, it intended the Board to be
and to act as a public agency, not as a private gobetween [and for] its awards to have legal effect, not
merely that of private advice.” Id. at 695. In the
context of the entire statutory scheme, Congress’s
requirement that airline employees use the Boards as
mandatory dispute mechanisms is sufficient to confer
“public agency” status on the Boards for purposes of
state action.
B. The Availability of Due Process Review
Is Outcome Dispositive Here and in
Other Cases.
The availability of judicial review for due process
violations is an important and recurring issue.
American argues it isn’t, on the theory that every
potential due process claim could be reviewed under
one of the three delineated grounds in § 153 First(q)
instead. But the courts that review due process claims
do not regard them as merely duplicative of the listed
grounds. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 116 F.3d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing
due process as an “independent ground, in addition to
the three enumerated in the statute”). Contrary to
American’s suggestion, BIO 17, courts have continued
to view due process as a separate, additional ground
after this Court’s 2009 decision in Union Pacific. See,
e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 905 F.3d 537, 542-43 (7th Cir. 2018);
Martino v. Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 582 F. App’x
27, 29 (2d Cir. 2014). And cases show that it matters
5
whether or not an employee can obtain judicial review
for due process violations.
For instance, in International Ass’n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers v. Metro-North Commuter
Railroad, 24 F.3d 369 (2d Cir. 1994), the plaintiff
objected because an arbitrator had a conflict of
interest, having served as “both an IAM employee and
a voting member of the NRAB division empowered to
decide the [] dispute.” Id. at 371. The court found that
“none of the[] [§ 153 First(q)] grounds” applied, but
nonetheless affirmed the district court’s order setting
aside an award because it violated due process. Id. at
371-72; see also Pokuta v. TWA, 191 F.3d 834, 839-40
(7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing claim that “[fell] within
none of [the § 153 First(q)] categories” under due
process, though finding no violation).
And in Kinross, the district court initially found
an arbitration award invalid on due process grounds
because the arbitration board had “improperly
considered” certain testimony and submissions.
Kinross v. Utah Ry. Co., 362 F.3d 658, 660 (10th Cir.
2004). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court’s decision, holding that
§ 153 First(q) did not allow due process review. Id. at
662. On remand, the district rejected the statute-based
objections and affirmed the arbitration award. Kinross
v. Utah Ry. Co., No. 2:01-CV-0010BSJ, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23162 (D. Utah Apr. 6, 2006); Kinross v. Utah
Ry. Co., No. 2:01-CV0010J, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87749 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2006). Thus, the availability
of due process review was outcome-determinative.
The availability of due process review is
dispositive here, too, given the way this case was pled
by Petitioner, proceeding pro se. A plaintiff
6
“is master to decide what law he will rely upon.” The
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25
(1913). Perhaps, as American suggests (BIO 15), a
careful attorney would have relied on the RLA’s
guarantee that parties “may be heard…by counsel, or
other representatives, as they may respectively elect.”
45 U.S.C. § 153 First(j). Yet here, Petitioner’s
complaint does not allege failure to follow RLA
procedures, but rather a violation of due process,
Court of Appeals Appendix, Dkt. 11, No. 21-1093 (3d
Cir.) (C.A.) 35, and therefore succeeds or fails on that
basis alone.
Even if successful due process claims are rare,
judicial review is critical when mandatory arbitration
boards so transgress fundamental fairness and
procedural norms as to violate due process—whether
or not a creative lawyer might be able to shoehorn the
claim into a statutory violation. Absent this Court’s
guidance, such judicial review will be available in
some places and not others, yielding divergent results
and differential protection of constitutional rights
based solely on geography.
II.
The Question Is Cleanly Presented.
The complaint, which must be accepted at this
stage, alleges that the Board effectively requested the
expulsion of Petitioner’s counsel from the hearing. The
petition cleanly presents the question whether § 153
First(q) bars judicial review of Petitioner’s due process
claim based on this expulsion.
7
A. No Forfeiture Stands in the Way of
Review.
American now argues that Petitioner forfeited
her due process claim by failing to object to the Board.
But American itself forfeited this argument by not
making it to the district court. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 13.2
American did raise forfeiture in the Third Circuit, but
that court did not decide the case on that ground,
resting its decision on the question presented, which
suffices for this Court’s review. See Va. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1099 n.8 (1991) (“It
suffices for our purposes that the court below passed
on the issue presented[.]”).
Even if American had not forfeited its forfeiture
objection, a court applying the correct interpretation
of § 153 First(q) would reach the merits of Petitioner’s
due process claim. The requirement to raise an issue
before the Board is not jurisdictional and therefore
may be excused, see United Transp. Union (C) & (T) v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 812 F.2d 630, 631-32 (10th Cir.
1987), and would be here for a number of reasons.
First, Petitioner was effectively pro se on this issue,
because her union counsel was the one who conveyed
the apparent agreement between the Board,
American, and IAM that her counsel of choice had to
leave. C.A. 45 (¶¶43-45). Forfeiture is frequently
2 American argued to the district court that there was no state
action because the Board had not officially ruled on Petitioner’s
counsel’s expulsion, and that Petitioner’s right to counsel under
the CBA was inapposite because the Board had not ruled on this
CBA-bound issue, id. at 11-12 nn.8-9, but did not argue that
Petitioner had forfeited her due process argument by failing to
explicitly raise it.
8
excused for pro se parties. See, e.g., Cirko ex rel. Cirko
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 948 F.3d 148, 157 (3d Cir.
2020).
Second, there is no forfeiture where objection
“would have been futile” because the ground was
“already thoroughly discussed.” Anderson v. Branen,
17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Keach v.
New Brunswick S. Ry. Ltd., 953 F.3d 29, 38 n.2 (1st
Cir. 2020) (no waiver where “there would have been no
reason for [plaintiff] to argue this point”). Counsel for
IAM told Petitioner, in full sight and hearing of the
Board, that her counsel had to leave and that the
neutral member of the Board concurred in this
decision. C.A. 45 ¶¶43-46. The Board heard this
exchange and watched counsel leave and said nothing.
Id. at 45-46 ¶¶46-48, 48 ¶70. There was no response
from the Board when IAM counsel indicated that the
hearing would be cancelled if her private counsel was
not removed. Id. at 46 ¶47. To Petitioner, it was clear
that the Board, acting through IAM’s counsel, had
expelled her attorney, making objection futile. “[A]
litigant [need not] engage in futile gestures merely to
avoid a claim of waiver.” Chassen v. Fid. Nat’l Fin.,
Inc., 836 F.3d 291, 293 (3d Cir. 2016) (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted).
B. The Merit of Petitioner’s Due Process
Claim Is an Issue for Remand.
American argues (BIO 20-22) that the Court
should not resolve whether Petitioner is entitled to
judicial review because her claim would fail on the
merits. That puts the cart before the horse. The RLA’s
counsel guarantee, § 153 First(j), reinforces that
9
Petitioner did not receive the fair hearing she was due,
but setting aside whether Petitioner will ultimately
win on the merits, the question here is whether she
even has the right to try. The Third Circuit said no
because of its per se bar on due process claims, not
because it peeked at the likely results. The Court
should not delay reviewing this important question
simply because there are follow-on issues to be
determined by the district court on remand.3
Nor is the result preordained based on the district
court’s resolution of Petitioner’s other claims. In the
context of Petitioner’s fraud claim, the district court
found that Petitioner had not alleged sufficient
(mis)conduct by the Board, “considering the extremely
high degree of improper conduct” required under the
fraud standard. Pet. App. 15. That is not the same as
holding Petitioner had alleged no conduct by the Board
that could constitute state action. Indeed, the district
court went on to analyze the fraud claim “[e]ven
assuming that…[the allegations are] sufficient to
allege conduct by the Board itself,” and found that the
claim failed for other reasons applicable only to the
fraud standard. Id. at 15-16. Whether the Board’s
apparent request to exclude Petitioner’s counsel
constitutes “state action” is a question that no court
has ruled on in Petitioner’s case, even implicitly, and
it does not stand in the way of the Court reaching the
question presented.
3 Similarly, whether IAM is a valid party does not affect the
suitability of this case as a vehicle because all agree that
American is a proper party. IAM BIO 12-13. IAM’s status poses
no bar to resolving the question presented, and can be addressed
on remand.
10
III. The Decision Is Wrong.
The RLA does not foreclose due process review of
arbitrator decisions. The Third Circuit’s contrary
position, shared by the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits, is wrong and requires review.
Courts historically reviewed RLA arbitration
decisions for due process violations. Then, in Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 (1959), the
Supreme Court held that RLA arbitration decisions
could be reviewed only for constitutional errors.
In enacting § 153 First(q), Congress’s purpose
was to ameliorate this unfairness and expand, not
limit, judicial review. S. Rep. No. 89-1201, at 3 (1966)
(“If...an employee fails to receive an award in his favor,
there is no means by which judicial review may be
obtained...[T]his result is unfair.”). Congress did not
say that the new statutory grounds were “exclusive,”
or in any way indicate that it was withdrawing wellestablished due process review. See Edelman, 892 F.2d
at 846-47 (legislative history contains no indication of
any intention to restrict pre-existing review). The
absence of a clear withdrawal is dispositive. Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (“[W]here Congress
intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional
claims, its intent to do so must be clear.”). And the
implication that Congress would bar judicial due
process review sub silentio is even weaker where, as
here, courts had previously exercised jurisdiction over
these claims. Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 463 (2002).
Consistent with these principles, after 1966,
courts continued to review due process claims. See,
e.g., Rosen v. E. Air Lines, 400 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959 (1968); Kotakis v. Elgin, J.
11
& E. Ry. Co., 520 F.2d 570, 574 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1016 (1975). The uncertainty about such
review only arose after this Court’s decision in Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978),
based on a misreading of the case.
In Sheehan, a railroad employee claimed that he
was denied due process by the NRAB when it rejected
his argument about tolling the time limit in the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 90. The Tenth
Circuit held that the NRAB’s failure to consider the
merits of Sheehan’s claims was a denial of due process.
Sheehan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 576 F.2d 854, 856
(10th Cir. 1978). In a brief per curiam opinion, the
Court reversed. The Court was unsure of the basis of
the Tenth Circuit’s ruling; if the basis was the denial
of due process for failing to consider Sheehan’s claim,
then the Tenth Circuit was “simply mistaken,”
because the NRAB did consider (and reject) it. 439
U.S. at 92. But if the Tenth Circuit was reversing on
the merits of the tolling issue, it had exceeded its
jurisdiction under the RLA. Id. at 92-93. The Court
explained that the Tenth Circuit had no authority to
overrule a “purely legal” decision of the NRAB
interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
at 91, 93. It was in this context that the Court
discussed the narrowness of the review provisions of
the RLA. Id. at 93.
As the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have
explicitly held, Sheehan did not hold that the RLA bars
review of due process claims. Shafii, 22 F.3d at 63-64;
Edelman, 892 F.2d at 846-47; Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 522 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2008).
In fact, Sheehan itself considered the due process
12
claim on the merits, 439 U.S. at 92, and it repeatedly
cites Price, which allows due process review, id. at 94.
The Third Circuit, like the three other courts of
appeals to have misinterpreted § 153 First(q), have
simply over-read Sheehan, without much analysis, to
announce a statutory interpretation it never
countenanced. Only this Court can correct this error
and restore uniformity to the law.
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Alexandra Mansbach
Counsel of Record
Hyland Hunt
DEUTSCH HUNT PLLC
300 New Jersey Ave. N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 868-6915
lmansbach@deutschhunt.com
Counsel for Petitioner
May 2022
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.