Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Kalab D. Willman, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2021
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No. ____
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
KALAB D. WILLMAN, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES
Respondent.
__________
On Petition for a Writ to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
__________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
__________
THOMAS R. GOVAN JR.
Counsel of Record
SARA J. HICKMON
ESHAWN R. RAWLLEY
MEGAN E. HOFFMAN
DAVID L. BOSNER
RYAN S. CRNKOVICH
MATTHEW L. BLYTH
Appellate Defense Counsel
Air Force Appellate Defense Division
1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100
Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762
(240) 612-4782
Thomas.govan@us.af.mil
Counsel for Petitioners
QUESTION PRESENTED
Article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) obligates the military Courts of Criminal
Appeals (CCAs) to evaluate the entire record to
determine whether a court-martial sentence is correct
in law, correct in fact, and appropriate. In United
States v. Willman, a divided Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces (CAAF) interpreted this mandate to
preclude the CCAs from considering, for sentence
appropriateness purposes, matters properly attached
to the record that are used to determine whether
sentences are correct in law.
The Question Presented is:
Does the CAAF’s decision prevent the
CCAs from fulfilling their Congressionally
imposed mandate pursuant to Article 66,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866, to determine the
appropriateness of sentences imposed by
courts-martial based on the entire record?
i
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA):
United States v. Willman, No. ACM 39642 (Sept.
2, 2020)
United States v. Frantz, No. ACM 39657 (Nov. 10,
2020)
United States v. Turner, No. ACM 39706 (Nov. 25,
2020)
United States v. Williams, No. ACM 39746 (Mar.
12, 2021)
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF):
United States v. Willman, 8.1. M.J. 355 (C.A.A.F.
2021)
United States v. Frantz, No. 21-0146/AF (Aug.
10, 2021)
United States v. Turner, No. 21-0130/AF (Aug.
10, 2021)
United States v. Williams, No. 21-0243/AF (Aug.
10, 2021)
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................. i
RELATED PROCEEDINGS ............................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................... vi
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................... 1
OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................... 1
JURISDICTION ............................................................... 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED .......................................................... 2
INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 7
A. Legal Background ....................................... 7
B. Procedural and Factual Background ....... 12
1. United States v. Willman .................... 12
2. United States v. Frantz ....................... 13
3. United States v. Turner....................... 14
4. United States v. Williams ................... 15
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..................... 16
A. The CAAF’s decision violates the
Congressional mandate of Article
66, UCMJ ............................................ 18
B. The CAAF’s decision will continue to
create confusion in the military
courts ................................................. 21
C. The CAAF’s decision contravenes
Congressional intent for military
iii
courts to serve as the primary
source
for
servicemembers
seeking sentence relief. ...................... 23
D.
The CAAF's decision will preclude
servicemembers from seeking
sentencing relief from improper
post-trial confinement conditions
in the military courts where no
comparable relief is available in
the civilian court system ..................... 27
CONCLUSION .............................................................. 30
APPENDIX ........................................................ 1a
United States v. Willman
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Opinion
(Jul. 21, 2021) ................................................. 4a
United States v. Willman,
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Dec. 21, 2020) .............................................. 23a
United States v. Willman,
United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion
(Sept 3, 2020)................................................ 25a
United States v. Frantz,
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Aug. 10, 2021) ............................................. 56a
United States v. Frantz,
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(March 23, 2021) .......................................... 58a
iv
United States v. Frantz
United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion
(Nov. 10, 2020) ............................................. 60a
United States v. Turner,
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Aug. 10, 2021) ........................................... 127a
United States v. Turner,
United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, Order
(Mar. 15, 2021) ........................................... 129a
United States v. Turner,
United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals, Opinion
(Nov. 25, 2020) ........................................... 131a
United States v. Williams
United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, Order
(Aug. 10, 2021) ........................................... 184a
United States v. Williams,
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Jun. 25, 2021) ............................................ 186a
United States v. Williams,
United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals, Opinion
(Mar. 12, 2021) ........................................... 188a
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137 (1953) ............................................... 27
Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 146 (1950) ............................................... 29
Greer v. United States,
141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021) ........................................... 19
Lawrence v. McCarthy,
344 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003) ................................. 28
Loving v. United States,
62 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F. 2005) .................................. 28
Ortiz v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) ......................................... 2, 7
Noyd v. Bond,
395 U.S. 683 (1969) ......................................... 28, 29
Parisi v. Davidson,
405 U.S. 733 (1972) ............................................... 28
Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1974) ......................................... 27, 28
Puckett v. United States,
556 U.S. 129 (2009) ................................................. 8
Schlesinger v. Councilman,
420 U.S. 738 (1975) ............................................... 23
Schnitzer v. Harvey,
389 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ............................... 29
Sweet v. Taylor,
178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959) ............................. 8
vi
United States v. Boone,
49 M.J. 187 (C.A.A.F. 1998) .................................. 26
United States v. Cole,
31 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1990) ...................................... 7
United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625 (2002) ............................................... 20
United States v. Denedo,
556 U.S. 904 (2009) ................................................. 8
United States v. Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74 (2004) ................................................. 20
United States v. DuBay,
17 C.M.A. 147 (1967) ............................................. 25
United States v. Erby,
54 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2001) ...................... 10, 11, 25
United States v. Fagnan,
12 C.M.A. 192 (1961) .................................... 9-10, 25
United States v. Gay,
75 M.J. 264 (C.A.A.F. 2016) .............................. 9, 11
United States v. Healy,
26 M.J. 394 (C.M.A. 1988) .......................... 9, 22, 26
United States v. Hutchison,
57 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2002) .................................. 26
United States v. Jacinto,
81 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2021) .................................. 22
United States v. Jacinto,
79 M.J. 870 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
2020) ...................................................................... 22
United States v. Jessie,
79 M.J. 437 (C.A.A.F. 2020) ...........................passim
vii
United States v. Kelly,
77 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. 2018) ........................ 7, 24, 26
United States v. Lacy,
50 M.J. 286 (C.A.A.F. 1999) .................................. 26
United States v. Matthews,
2020 AFCCA LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. June 2, 2020) (unpub. Op.) ................ 21
United States v. Murphy,
50 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 1998) ...................................... 18
United States v. Roach,
66 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 2008) ........................ 7, 18, 24
United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55 (2002) ................................................. 19
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST. amend. I.................................................. 8
U.S. CONST. amend. V ............................................. 5, 8
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ...................................passim
Statutes and Regulations
10 U.S.C. § 854 (2016) ................................................ 2
10 U.S.C. § 854 (2019) .............................................. 19
10 U.S.C. § 855 (2016) ................................................ 3
10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2016) ............................................ 3
10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2019) ............................................ 3
10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2016) ...................................... 4, 19
10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1) (2019)........................................ 4
10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2016) ............................................ 5
10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2019) ............................................ 5
viii
10 U.S.C. § 867a (2019) .............................................. 2
10 U.S.C. § 920 (2019) .............................................. 15
10 U.S.C. § 920b (2016) ............................................ 13
10 U.S.C. § 920c (2016) ............................................. 12
10 U.S.C. § 928 (2019) .............................................. 14
28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2019) .............................................. 2
Article 54, Uniform Code of Military
Justice ............................................................... 2, 19
Article 55, Uniform Code of Military
Justice .............................................................passim
Article 66, Uniform Code of Military
Justice .............................................................passim
Article 66(a), Uniform Code of Military
Justice ...................................................................... 3
Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military
Justice .............................................................passim
Article 66(d)(1), Uniform Code of
Military Justice ...................................................... 4
Article 66(f), Uniform Code of Military
Justice .................................................................... 20
Article 67, Uniform Code of Military
Justice ...................................................................... 5
Article 67(a), Uniform Code of Military
Justice ...................................................................... 5
Article 67a, Uniform Code of Military
Justice ...................................................................... 2
Article 120, Uniform Code of Military
Justice .................................................................... 15
ix
Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military
Justice .................................................................... 13
Article 120c, Uniform Code of Military
Justice .................................................................... 12
Article 128, Uniform Code of Military
Justice .................................................................... 14
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017,
Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5330,
130 Stat. 2932 (2016) .............................................. 3
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017,
Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5331,
130 Stat. 2934 (2016) .............................................. 5
Other Authorities
Rule 30A, Rules of Practice and
Procedure, United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (June
22, 2017) ................................................................ 20
Rule 23(b), The Joint Rules of Appellate
Procedure for Courts of Criminal
Appeals (January 1, 2019) .................................... 20
x
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners respectfully petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the judgments of the CAAF.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion in United States v. Willman from the
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) is not
reported, but is available at 2020 CCA LEXIS 300. It
is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet. App. 25a. The
CAAF’s affirmation is published at 81 M.J. 355
(C.A.A.F. 2021) and is reprinted in the Appendix at
Pet. App. 4a.
The opinion in United States v. Frantz from the
AFCCA is not reported, but is available at 2020 CCA
LEXIS 404. It is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet.
App. 60a. The CAAF’s affirmation is not reported, but
is available at 2021 CAAF LEXIS 744. It is reprinted
in the Appendix at Pet. App. 52a.
The opinion in United States v. Turner from the
AFCCA is not reported, but is available at 2020 CCA
LEXIS 428. It is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet.
App. 131a. The CAAF’s affirmation is not reported,
but is available at 2021 CAAF LEXIS 736. It is
reprinted in the Appendix at Pet. App. 118a.
The opinion in United States v. Williams from the
AFCCA is not reported, but is available at 2020 CCA
LEXIS 109. It is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet.
App. 188a. The CAAF’s affirmation is not reported,
but is available at 2021 CAAF LEXIS 745. It is
reprinted in the Appendix at Pet. App. 171a.
1
JURISDICTION
The CAAF granted review of Petitioner Willman’s
direct appeal; on July 21, 2021, it affirmed the
AFCCA’s decision. Pet. App. 4a. The CAAF also
granted Petitioner Frantz’s, Petitioner Turner’s, and
Petitioner Williams’s cases; on August 10, 2021, it
summarily affirmed the AFCCA’s decisions in those
cases as well. Pet. App. 52a, 118a, 171a. On October
12, 2021, the Chief Justice extended the time within
which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to
December 18, 2021. This Court’s jurisdiction over
each case emanates from Article 67a, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 867a, and 28
U.S.C. § 1259. See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2165 (2018).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that: “Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
Article 54, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 854 (2016), Record of Trial,
stated in relevant part:
(a) Each general court-martial shall keep
a separate record of the proceedings in
each case brought before it, and the
record shall be authenticated by the
signature of the military judge
...
2
(c)(1) A complete record of the
proceedings and testimony shall be
prepared—
(A) in each general court-martial case in
which the sentence adjudged includes
death, a dismissal, a discharge, or (if the
sentence adjudged does not include a
discharge) any other punishment which
exceeds that which may otherwise be
adjudged by a special court-martial[.]
Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (2016), Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Prohibited, stated:
Punishment by flogging, or by branding,
marking, or tattooing on the body, or any
other cruel or unusual punishment, may
not be adjudged by any court-martial or
inflicted upon any person subject to this
chapter. The use of irons, single or
double, except for the purpose of safe
custody, is prohibited.
Article 66(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2016),
Review by Court of Criminal Appeals,1 stated in
relevant parts:
The Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA 2016)
subsequently modified Article 66, UCMJ.
See
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year
2017 (NDAA 2017), Pub. L. 114-328, div. E, title LIX,
§ 5330, 130 Stat. 2932. However, the MJA 2016 did
not alter the cited language above. See Article 66(a),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2019).
1
3
Each Judge Advocate General shall
establish a Court of Criminal Appeals
which shall be composed of one or more
panels, and each such panel shall be
composed of not less than three appellate
military judges. For the purposes of
reviewing court-martial cases, the court
may sit in panels or as a whole . . .
Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2016),
Review by Court of Criminal Appeals, stated:2
In a case referred to it, the Court of
Criminal Appeals may act only with
respect to the findings and sentence as
approved by the convening authority. It
may affirm only such findings of guilty
and the sentence or such part and
amount of the sentence, as it finds
correct in law and fact and determines,
on the basis of the entire record, should
be approved. In considering the record,
it may weigh the evidence, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and determine
controverted
questions
of
fact,
2 The MJA 2016 modified the above cited language;
however, the CCAs remain limited to acting “only with
respect to the findings and sentence,” and “may affirm
only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such
part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds
correct in law and fact and determines . . . should be
approved.” Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
866(d)(1) (2019).
4
recognizing that the trial court saw and
heard the witnesses.
Article 67(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2016),
Review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,
stated:3
The Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces shall review the record in—
(1) all cases in which the sentence, as
affirmed by a Court of Criminal Appeals,
extends to death;
(2) all cases reviewed by a Court of
Criminal Appeals which the Judge
Advocate General orders sent to the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
for review; and
(3) all cases reviewed by a Court of
Criminal Appeals in which, upon
petition of the accused and on good cause
shown, the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces has granted review.
The MJA 2016 modified Article 67, UCMJ. See
NDAA 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, div. E, title LIX, § 5331,
130 Stat. 2934. However, the MJA 2016 altered the
cited language above only to the extent that certain
notification is required prior to certifying a case.
Article 67(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2019).
3
5
INTRODUCTION
This case is about removing an unreasonable
imposition on the CCAs’ ability to fulfill their
statutory duties to provide servicemembers the
chance to seek a form of sentencing relief unique to
the military justice system. The CAAF’s decision
below both violates that mandate and produces an
incongruous result.
In a divided opinion, the CAAF held that, on the
one hand, formerly outside-the-record materials that
were properly attached to the record on appeal in
support of Petitioners’ Eighth Amendment and Article
55, UCMJ, claims could be considered by the CCAs in
reviewing those legal challenges. But, on the other
hand, the CAAF held that those same attached
materials were “outside the record” and could not be
considered for purposes of the CCAs’ mandated review
of the appropriateness of Petitioners’ sentences under
Article 66(c), UCMJ.
Beyond violating the plain language of the statute,
the CAAF’s decision is particularly problematic for
servicemembers in the context of asserting claims of
improper post-trial confinement conditions. As in
Petitioners’ cases here, servicemembers’ claims of
improper post-trial confinement conditions often arise
after the record of trial is completed. Unlike in federal
and state courts, which provide procedures for postconviction relief, the military justice system limits
servicemembers’ ability to seek collateral relief. Thus,
despite Congress’ intent to provide servicemembers
the opportunity to seek sentence appropriateness
relief in the CCAs, the CAAF’s decision curtails the
CCAs’ authority to consider evidence properly
supplemented to the record in conducting this unique
6
review, and leaves servicemembers with no other
forum to seek such relief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Legal Background
Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution, “Congress has long provided for
specialized military courts to adjudicate charges
against servicemembers.” Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2170.
Congress vested in the service CCAs the
extraordinary power to review both the legal and
factual findings of courts-martial, as well as the
sentences they impose—a scope of power not granted
by Congress to the CAAF or the federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals:
[T]he scope of review by the Courts of
Criminal Appeals differs in significant
respect from direct review in the civilian
federal appellate courts. In addition to
reviewing the case for legal error in a
manner similar to other appellate
courts…Congress has provided the Courts
of Criminal Appeals with plenary, de novo
power of review and the ability to
determine, on the basis of the entire record
which findings and sentence should be
approved.
United States v. Roach, 66 M.J. 410, 412 (C.A.A.F.
2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see
also United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A.
1990). Given their “awesome, plenary, de novo power
of review . . . it is little wonder that [the CAAF] has
described the CCAs as having a carte blanche to do
justice.” United States v. Kelly, 77 M.J. 404, 406
7
(C.A.A.F. 2018) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Congress intended the CAAF to enforce procedural
safeguards it provided to those serving in the nation’s
armed services, i.e., to “assure that procedural due
process has been observed, that evidence supports the
verdict and judgment of the court, and that
fundamental rights have been observed.” Sweet v.
Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456, 459 (D. Kan. 1959). As noted
by this Court, the Article I origins of the CAAF and
the service CCAs should compel them to be more
attuned to their jurisdictional responsibilities than
their federal judicial brethren. See United States v.
Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 912 (2009).
Article 66(c), UCMJ, statutorily requires the CCAs
to act with respect to the findings and sentence of a
court-martial, and to affirm only such findings of
guilty and the sentence or such part and amount of
the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and
determines, on the basis of the entire record, should
be approved.
In United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437 (C.A.A.F.
2020), the CAAF considered whether the CCA
conducted a proper review of the appellant’s sentence
under Article 66(c), UCMJ, when it did not consider
the appellant’s First and Fifth Amendment claims
when assessing the lawfulness and appropriateness of
his sentence. Id. at 438. The CAAF first considered
whether the CCA was authorized to consider
materials outside the record that the appellant
submitted in support of his constitutional claims. Id.
at 440.
In resolving this question, the CAAF
identified and considered three distinct and
conflicting lines of its own precedent which might
8
inform its decision: 1) precedents restricting the
service CCAs to reviewing materials included in the
“entire record”; 2) precedents allowing the service
CCAs to supplement the record in resolving issues
raised by the record4; and 3) precedents allowing the
CCAs to consider matters entirely outside the record.
Id.
The first line of precedent stems from United
States v. Fagnan, 12 C.M.A. 192, 30 C.M.R. 192
(1961), which established a “clear rule” that the
service CCAs may not consider anything outside of the
“entire record” when reviewing a sentence under
Article 66(c). Id. at 441 (citation omitted). The CAAF
subsequently re-affirmed this rule in United States v.
Healy, 26 M.J. 394 (C.M.A. 1988). Id. The Fagnan
rule did not preclude the service CCAs from
considering an appellant’s confinement conditions if
the record already contained information about those
conditions (for example, by way of an appellant’s
written clemency petition). Id. at 441-42 (citing
United States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264 (C.A.A.F. 2016)).
But the Fagnan rule did preclude the service CCAs
from considering information provided for the first
time at the appellate stage of the litigation, such as an
appellant’s written declaration of post-trial
4 The second line of precedent permits service CCAs to
supplement the record when deciding issues that are
raised, but not fully resolved, by evidence in the
record, see Jessie, 79 M.J. at 442—a situation not at
issue here where the Petitioners’ complaints
regarding their respective post-trial confinement
conditions were not raised by materials already in the
record of trial.
9
confinement conditions. Such matters fall outside of
what the Fagnan court considered “the entire record.”
Jessie, 79 M.J. at 441-42.
The third line of CAAF precedent on the issue of
the scope of Article 66(c) review deviated further from
the first than did the second. This line of precedent
permitted the service CCAs to consider materials
wholly outside what it considered the “entire record”
when reviewing issues which were not raised by any
materials within the record. Id. at 443. The leading
case in this line of precedent is United States v. Erby,
54 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2001), wherein the appellant
sought sentence relief from the CCA because his
treatment at the hands of prison officials amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ. The CCA
held it lacked authority to review appellant’s claim
because the appellant’s alleged mistreatment was not
part of the sentence adjudged, and because the
appellant had failed to raise the matter of his
mistreatment in clemency. Id. at 477. The CAAF
reversed, holding that Article 66(c) did grant the CCA
the authority to review appellant’s cruel and unusual
punishment claim, explaining that Article 66(c)
imposed upon the CCAs the duty to determine
whether a sentence is correct “in law,” which included
the duty to “ensure that the severity of the adjudged
and approved sentence has not been unlawfully
increased by prison officials.” Id at 478-79.
Confronted with all three competing lines of
precedent, the Jessie court, in a split 3-2 decision,
opted to re-affirm Fagnan and its progeny, reasoning
that in Fagnan, it “correctly interpreted the express
requirement that a CCA base its review on the ‘entire
10
record’ to mean that a CCA cannot consider matters
outside the ‘entire record.’” Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444.
But, in re-affirming Fagnan, the Jessie court also
sought to “cabin[]” the third line of precedent,
referring
to
those
decisions
as
potential
5
“aberrations.” Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444-45 (concluding
that “the practice of considering material outside the
record should not be expanded beyond the context of
Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment”). In
other words, the Jessie court held that when a service
CCA is determining whether a sentence is correct in
law and fact and should be approved pursuant to its
statutory responsibilities under Article 66(c), it is
prohibited from allowing the parties to supplement the
record, except in those tightly circumscribed instances
in which the appellant raises Eighth Amendment and
Article 55 claims.
Petitioners’ cases present a novel fact pattern.
Unlike in Gay, the Petitioners did not raise their
Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ,
complaints until their appeal to the CCA (i.e., they did
not raise the issue in clemency or by any other means
through which the issue would have been preserved in
the original record of trial). Unlike in Erby, the issue
before the CCA in these cases was not whether Article
66(c), UCMJ, permits the service CCAs to review
Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, claims
first raised on appeal (i.e., not contained in the
original record of trial), but instead whether, once
those matters have been attached to the record the
It is this third line of precedent at issue in
Petitioners’ cases.
5
11
CCAs may also consider them for Article 66(c), UCMJ,
sentence appropriateness review. Pet. App. 12a.
B. Procedural and Factual Background
1. United States v. Willman
On November 6, 2018, Petitioner, Staff Sergeant
(SSgt) Kalab D. Willman, United States Air Force,
was found guilty, consistent with his pleas, of one
specification of indecent recording in violation of
Article 120c, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920c. Pet. App. 6a.
He was sentenced to confinement for one year,
reduction by one grade to E-4, and a dishonorable
discharge from the service. Id.
While confined post-trial in a military-operated
confinement facility, Petitioner Willman suffered an
injury. Pet. App. 6a. On appeal to the AFCCA,
Petitioner Willman sought sentence relief, alleging
that the government’s failure to provide adequate
medical care for his injury amounted to a violation of
the Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, and
rendered his sentence inappropriate under Article
66(c), UCMJ. Pet. App. 6a-7a. Prior to his appeal to
the AFCCA, Petitioner Willman did not file a formal
complaint about the inadequate medical care, and he
waived his right to submit matters in clemency. Pet.
App. 36a. During Petitioner Willman’s appeal,
however, the AFCCA granted his motion to attach his
written declaration substantiating his cruel and
unusual punishment claim. Pet. App. 6a-7a.
After finding that Petitioner Willman’s claims
raised in his declaration did not amount to Eighth
Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violations, the
AFCCA declined to consider these same declarations
that it, upon motion, had already attached to the
12
record, when conducting its sentence appropriateness
review under Article 66(c), UCMJ. Pet. App. 42a-43a.
Stated differently, even if the confinement conditions
did not present cruel and unusual punishment
concerns under the appropriate legal standards, the
AFCCA declined to consider whether those same
conditions rendered the sentence, as approved,
inappropriately severe. Id. In a 3-2 decision, the
CAAF affirmed the AFCCA’s decision, holding the
AFCCA lacked authority to consider the declarations
when determining if the sentence was inappropriately
severe under Article 66(c), UCMJ—even though it
could consider them for cruel and unusual
punishment claims. Pet. App. 17a.
2. United States v. Frantz
A general court-martial composed of a military
judge alone convicted Senior Airman (SrA) Cory J.
Frantz, contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of
committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 12
years, in violation of Article 120b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
920b. Pet. App. 56a. The military judge sentenced
SrA Frantz to confinement for seven years, a
reduction to the grade of E-1, and a dishonorable
discharge from the service. Pet. App. 57a.
SrA Frantz is serving his term of confinement at
the Naval Consolidated Brig at Miramar, California.
Pet. App. 99a. In a declaration attached to the record
on appeal, SrA Frantz alleged that the Miramar Brig
maintained policies that sex offenders could not
associate with any children and that he was denied
communication with his son, who was not involved in
the charged offense, in violation of Article 55, UCMJ,
and the constitutional right to familial association
13
rooted in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Pet. App. 99a-101a.
The AFCCA analyzed SrA Frantz’s cruel and
unusual punishment claim pursuant to Jessie, and
denied relief. Pet. App. 104a-05a. The court failed to
consider the allegations regarding the Brig’s policies
contained in SrA Frantz’s declaration for sentence
appropriateness. Id. The CAAF, “in view of United
States v. Willman” affirmed. Pet. App. 52a.
3. United States v. Turner
A general court-martial consisting of a military
judge sitting alone convicted SSgt Clayton W.
Turner—contrary to his pleas—of five specifications of
assault consummated by a battery, all in violation of
Article 128, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928. Pet. App. 121a.
The military judge sentenced SSgt Turner to
confinement for eight months, a reduction to the grade
of E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge. Pet. App. 121a22a.
SSgt Turner was directed to serve his term of
confinement at the Taylor County Jail near Abilene,
Texas, rather than at a military confinement facility.
Pet. App. 146a.
While there, he submitted a
complaint to the Commander of the 7th Security
Forces Squadron pursuant to Article 138, UCMJ. Id.
In this complaint, SSgt Turner identified verminridden conditions at the confinement facility. Id.
On appeal before the AFCCA, SSgt Turner
asserted that the conditions of his confinement
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article 55,
UCMJ. Pet. App. 146a. SSgt Turner also sought relief
on the alternative grounds that even if the conditions
14
of his confinement did not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment, they still rendered his sentence
inappropriately severe such that relief was warranted
under Article 66(c), UCMJ. Id
In support of these claims, SSgt Turner submitted
a post-trial declaration for the AFCCA’s consideration
wherein he detailed the unsanitary conditions at the
Taylor County Jail. Pet. App. 147a-48a. Although it
considered the merits of his Eighth Amendment and
Article 55, UCMJ, claims, the AFCCA ultimately
declined to find that his confinement conditions
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Pet. App.
153a. The AFCCA also declined to consider SSgt
Turner’s alternative sentence severity claim grounded
in Article 66(c), UCMJ, entirely because—in its
view—his complaint arose from matters which fell
“outside the record as he did not raise them in his
clemency submission.”
Pet. App. 154a-55a. It
therefore concluded that it could not consider this
issue that was “outside the record” even though it had
previously attached the declarations to the record. Id.
The CAAF affirmed. Pet. App. 118a.
4. United States v. Williams
A general court-martial convicted SSgt Derrick O.
Williams, contrary to his plea, of one specification of
sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 920. Pet. App. 175a. The court-martial
sentenced SSgt Williams to 45 days’ confinement,
reduction to the grade of E-1, hard labor without
confinement for three months, and a dishonorable
discharge. Id.
After SSgt Williams entered confinement on
March 22, 2019, a litany of pay errors followed. Pet.
15
App. 227a-28a. During a period between September
and October 2019, SSgt Williams performed hard
labor without confinement for 12 hours a day, seven
days a week, and received no pay because of
Government errors. Pet. App. 228a. He took a second
job working overnight at a fitness center to support
his family. Id. His coverage under the military’s
health insurance system was also prematurely
revoked, rendering his wife and daughter unable to
obtain prescribed medications. Pet. App. 231a-32a.
Additionally, the wrongful denial of pay resulted in
SSgt Williams missing housing and child support
payments. Pet. App. 231a.
In his appeal to the AFCCA, SSgt Williams
asserted these conditions both unlawfully increased
his sentence and amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
and Article 55, UCMJ. Pet. App. 228a. In support of
these claims, SSgt Williams submitted a post-trial
declaration and documentation of the Government’s
errors. Pet. App. 231a-32a. The AFCCA held that any
deprivation of pay did not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violation. Pet. App.
238a. However, the court concluded that it could not
consider the same matters it attached to the record
when conducting sentence appropriateness review
under Article 66, UCMJ. Pet. App. 240a. The CAAF,
“in view of United States v. Willman,” affirmed. Pet.
App. 171a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The CAAF’s decision prevents a military CCA from
fulfilling its congressionally imposed responsibilities
under Article 66(c), UCMJ. That statute requires the
CCAs to review the legal and factual sufficiency of a
16
conviction and the appropriateness of a sentence
imposed at a court-martial based on the “entire
record.” When the AFCCA attached Petitioners’
respective materials to the record, they became part
of the “entire record” under the plain meaning of that
phrase, such that the AFCCA was permitted—indeed,
obligated—to consider them when evaluating the
appropriateness of Petitioners’ respective sentences
under its Article 66(c) authority.
The CAAF’s restrictive holding in Willman creates
an incongruous result. The CAAF held that matters
properly attached to the record could be considered by
the CCAs in conducting one part of their Article 66(c)
review (whether the sentence was “correct in law”
under the Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ),
but the CCAs could not then consider those same
matters in conducting the other part of their Article
66(c) review (whether the sentence was appropriate).
Yet, as the dissent pointed out, Article 66, UCMJ is
the central source of authority for a CCA to review any
issue, whether that be an alleged violation of the
Eighth Amendment or whether a sentence
appropriate.
Pet. App. 19a.
Once the CCAs
supplement the record on appeal with materials
outside the record, those materials become part of the
record and Article 66, UCMJ, does not authorize the
CCAs to limit which part of their Article 66(c) review
to apply to the “entire record.” Because Willman holds
otherwise, certiorari should be granted to correct this
arbitrary limitation of Congress’s mandate.
This Court should also grant the writ because the
CAAF’s recent decisions addressing this issue,
culminating with Willman, have caused considerable
disagreement and confusion in the military courts.
17
The CCA’ s opinion generated a separate concurrence
in part on this issue and the CAAF’s divided opinion
was split 3-2. Pet. App. 4a, 48a-51a. Even the
majority conceded that its “Article 66(c), UCMJ,
precedents have created an odd paradigm[.]” Pet.
App. 15a. If left unchecked, the CAAF’s incongruous
approach to Article 66, UCMJ, review in Willman
will continue to cause confusing results.
Finally, this issue is of national importance.
Congress implemented a special standard of review
and opportunity for sentence relief on appeal for
servicemembers that is unique to the military justice
system. The jurisdiction of Article I military courts,
however, is tightly bound to congressional statute and
those courts do not have the ability to hear collateral
attacks on convictions; all issues must be resolved on
direct appeal. See United States v. Murphy, 50 M.J. 4,
5 (C.A.A.F. 1998). The CAAF’s restrictive ruling
limits servicemembers’ ability to vindicate their right
to seek sentence appropriateness relief on direct
appeal in military courts, where such a right would
not be available in Article III courts.
A.
The CAAF’s decision violates the
Congressional mandate of Article 66,
UCMJ.
The CAAF’s decision violates the congressionally
imposed mandate of Article 66(c), UCMJ in a number
of ways. First, the CAAF’s decision violates the plain
language of the statute. As Judge Sparks’s dissent
explains, once the CCA attached Petitioners’ formerly
outside-the-record declaration to the record, the
declarations become “part of the record and the lower
court was required to consider this information in
performing its Article 66(c) review.” Pet App. 20a.
18
Second, the CAAF misinterpreted the phrase
“entire record” in Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
866(c) by narrowing its meaning to the “record of
trial,” a term of art, and excluding from its meaning
any matters later attached to the record on motion
granted. Pet. App. 16a. In determining what
constitutes “the entire record” of a case, it is
imperative to note the distinction between that phrase
contained in Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c),
and the term “record of trial” as defined by Congress
in Article 54, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 854 (2019), and
further defined by executive order in R.C.M. 1104.
Reference to the “record” in Article 54, UCMJ, centers
on the “record of the proceedings” of a court-martial.
10 U.S.C. § 854 (“Each general or special courtmartial shall keep a separate record of the
proceedings in each case brought before it.”). By
contrast, when defining the scope of the service CCA’s
review authority, Congress deliberately used a
different phrase; rather than refer to a “record of the
proceedings” of a court-martial (or, to use the phrase
found in the statute’s title, a “record of trial”) as it did
in Article 54, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 854, Congress
expanded the service CCA’s review authority to the
“entire record” when it drafted and passed Article
66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). The CAAF conflates
“entire record” with the “record of trial” even though
these two terms do not equate to the same thing.
Notably, the CAAF’s erroneous view of what
constitutes the “entire record” for Article 66, UCMJ,
review conflicts with federal civilian court practice.
This Court has “repeatedly stated that an appellate
court conducting plain-error review may consider the
entire record—not just the record from the particular
19
proceeding where the error occurred.” Greer v. United
States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2021) (citing United
States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59, 74-75, 122 S. Ct.
1043, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2002)); Puckett v. United
States, 556 U. S. 129, 142-43, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 266 (2009); United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 84-85, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 159 L.
Ed. 2d 157 (2004); United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S.
625, 632-633, and n. 3, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d
860 (2002)) (emphasis added).
Finally, the CAAF’s flawed rationale even
undermines the propriety of its own rules and
practices (as well as those of the CCAs), which permit
it to consider new material on motion from the parties
for issues not raised by the record:
The Court will normally not consider any
facts outside of the record established at
the trial and the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Requests to consider factual
material that is not contained in the
record shall be presented by a motion to
supplement the record filed pursuant to
Rule 30 [of these Rules]. The motion
shall include statements explaining why
the matter was not raised previously at
trial or before the Court of Criminal
Appeals and why it is appropriate to be
considered for the first time in this
Court.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Rules, Rule
30A (emphasis added). And as Judge Sparks’s dissent
also pointed out, the CAAF’s decision ignored Rule
23(b) of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure,
promulgated by Article 66(f), UCMJ, which authorizes
20
the CCAs “to attach documents to the record, which is
precisely what was done in this case.” Pet. App. 19a.
The CAAF’s erroneous decision compels certiorari
review. The CAAF’s flawed view of what constitutes
the “entire record” violates the mandate of Article 66,
UCMJ. If left unchecked, the CAAF’s decision will
constrain the CCAs’ ability to meet their statutory
mandate by unreasonably limiting their Article 66(c)
review of properly supplemented materials in support
of servicemembers’ claims of improper post-trial
confinement.
B.
The CAAF’s decision will continue to
create confusion in the military courts.
This case provides a good vehicle to provide clarity
on an important issue. In the short period of time
between Willman and Jessie, whose rationale
Willman principally relied on, considerable
disagreement has emerged in the military courts over
the CCAs’ authority to consider formerly outside-therecord materials that were attached to the record on
appeal while performing a sentence appropriateness
review under Article 66(c), UCMJ. In the AFCCA
opinion below, Judge Meginley specially concurred,
noting his disagreement with the majority on whether
the court was precluded from considering the
appropriateness of Petitioner Willman’s sentence
under Article 66, UCMJ, based on materials that were
outside the record of trial. Pet. App. 48a. The Chief
Judge of the AFCCA expressed the same opinion in a
special concurrence, see United States v. Matthews,
No. ACM 39593, 2020 AFCCA LEXIS 193, at *16-17
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 2, 2020) (unpub. Op.)
(Johnson, C.J., concurring in the result), and at least
one other CCA held that it had authority to consider
21
materials outside the record that were attached to the
record in support of Eighth Amendment or Article 55,
UCMJ, claims in determining whether a sentence was
appropriate. See United States v. Jacinto, 79 M.J. 870,
890 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2020), aff’d in part, set aside
in part by United States v. Jacinto, 81 M.J. 350
(C.A.A.F. 2021).
The CAAF’s divided 3-2 opinion in Willman did not
alleviate this disagreement, but rather created more
confusion. As the dissent noted, “the majority’s view
sets up the odd situation in this and future cases
where documents that are obviously part of the record
are, curiously, simultaneously outside ‘the entire
record.’” Pet. App. 20a. The dissent further noted a
prior CAAF opinion that appeared to be remain in
conflict with the majority’s rationale. Pet. App. 18a19a. (citing Healy, 26 M.J. at 397, n.6). Specifically,
the dissent pointed out that in Healy, the CAAF
commented that if evidence of insanity, developed
after the trial was completed, was attached to the
appellate record in support an insanity claim, this
information, once attached, was part of the record and
could
be
considered
in
making
sentence
appropriateness determination. Id.
The majority did not address how the holding of
Willman squares with Healy. This fact, combined
with the general incongruent nature of the majority’s
decision, signals that the confusion will continue in
the military courts. This Court should grant certiorari
to correct Willman’s flawed result and provide clarity
on this issue to the military courts.
22
C.
The
CAAF’s
decision
contravenes
Congressional intent for military courts to
serve as the primary source for
servicemembers seeking sentence relief.
This Court should grant review in this case to
address an issue of national importance by ensuring
the uniquely equipped military courts of appeal meet
their statutory charge to affirm, uniformly across the
military services, only those findings and sentences of
courts-martial that are correct in law and fact. The
CAAF, through its erroneous statutory interpretation,
has impermissibly barred the CCAs from meeting
their statutory obligations under Article 66(c), UCMJ.
Specifically, by interpreting Article 66(c), UCMJ, to
exclude from consideration any matters that were not
contained within an original record of trial but were
subsequently attached to the record, the CAAF has
prevented the service CCAs from exercising their
judgment in affirming only findings and sentences
they deem correct in law and fact and should be
approved based on the entire record. Indeed, the
service CCAs must now divest themselves of the
authority to grant relief to those appellants who,
despite failing to carry their very high burden to
substantiate constitutional claims, are nevertheless
deserving of sentence appropriateness relief under
Article 66(c), UCMJ.
Congress established Article I military courts for
the express purpose of adjudicating military-specific
issues, to include issues related to the treatment of
military prisoners confined to military-operated
facilities. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.
738, 757 (1975) (“The military is ‘a specialized society
separate from civilian society’ with ‘laws and
23
traditions of its own [developed] during its long
history.”’) (internal citations omitted). This Court has
recognized:
In enacting the [UCMJ], Congress
attempted
to
balance…military
necessities
against
the
equally
significant interest of ensuring fairness
to servicemen charged with military
offenses, and to formulate a mechanism
by which these often competing interests
can be adjusted…an integrated system of
military courts and review procedures, a
critical element of which is the [U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces]
consisting of civilian judges…who would
gain over time thorough familiarity with
military problems.
Id. at 757-58.
Consistent with these interests, one of the unique
features that Congress established in the military
justice system was a widened scope of review by the
CCAs of findings and sentences. Specifically, through
Article 66, UCMJ, Congress empowered the CCAs
with an “awesome, plenary, de novo power of review,”
Kelley, 77 M.J. at 406, which mandates the CCAs to
conduct a “de novo review of the sentence under
Article 66(c) as part of its responsibility to make an
affirmative
determination
as
to
sentence
appropriateness.” Roach, 66 M.J. at 412. In other
words, Congress provide the CCAs the unique
authority to review the appropriateness of a sentence,
even if no legal or constitutional error occurred. But
the CAAF’s decision here curtails a service member’s
ability to seek this relief regarding improper post-trial
24
confinement conditions, without any other forum to
seek redress.
The widened scope of review granted to the service
CCAs is not the only trait unique to the military
courts which weighs in favor of this position. The lack
of any mechanism in the UCMJ for adjudicating postconviction claims also weighs in favor of granting the
service CCAs considerable discretion when it comes to
ordering fact-finding and supplementing the record.
Indeed, the service CCAs have a number of tools at
their disposal, employed over the course of a halfcentury (e.g., post-trial factfinding hearings pursuant
to United States v. DuBay, 17 C.M.A. 147 (1967),
receipt of affidavits, etc.), to fill gaps in the record
when addressing claims which are, in the civilian
context, collaterally litigated. While Willman does not
discard
these
tools
outright,
the
CAAF’s
determination that such methods cannot be used by
the service CCAs in meeting their Article 66(c),
UCMJ, obligation is incongruous and inconsistent
with calcified precedent—an admission the majority
in the lower court makes in the instant case:
“[Petitioner] argues that [adhering to the Fagnan rule
rather than expanding the Erby exception] creates an
incongruity, with the [service] CCAs having the
authority to review outside-the-record materials for
some purposes, but not for others. We acknowledge
that this Court’s Article 66(c), UCMJ precedents have
created an odd paradigm[.]” Pet. App. 15a.
As incongruous as the decision in Petitioners’ case
is, it is equally arbitrary. Its effect is to bar from relief
those claims which, while not rising to the level of an
Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violation,
nonetheless have merit vis-à-vis whether a particular
25
sentence is appropriate, despite the CCA’s statutory
requirement to conduct this review. Because these
claims center on the conditions of an appellant’s posttrial confinement conditions, it is wholly conceivable
that such claims could ripen after a court-martial’s
convening authority takes action on a sentence, an
entry of judgment is entered, and a record of trial is
completed.
The CAAF’s decision bars sentence
appropriateness relief from appellants who have had
the misfortune of not only being confined under illegal
conditions but of enduring those conditions too late.
The CAAF erroneously circumscribed the CCA’s
historically
broad
discretion
on
sentence
appropriateness. The CAAF itself has recognized that
the “breadth of the power granted to the [CCAs] to
review a case for sentence appropriateness is one of
the unique and longstanding features of the [UCMJ].”
United States v. Hutchison, 57 M.J. 231, 233 (C.A.A.F.
2002) (citations omitted); see also United States v.
Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 287 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (“Congress,
recognizing that the decentralized exercise of such
broad discretion [in the military justice system] is
likely to produce disparate results, has provided the
[CCAs] . . . with the highly discretionary power to
determine whether a sentence ‘should be approved.’”
(citing Article 66(c), UCMJ)). The CCAs role in
sentence review is to “do justice,” as distinguished
from the “discretionary power of the convening
authority to grant mercy.” See United States v. Boone,
49 M.J. 187, 192 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (citation omitted).
Stated differently, the CCAs assure “that justice is
done and that the accused gets the punishment he
deserves.” Healy, 26 M.J. at 395. Indeed, the CAAF
has recently affirmed these “vast powers” by holding
26
that CCAs may disapprove even mandatory minimum
sentencing requirements. See Kelly, 77 M.J. at 406-08
(holding that the mandatory minimum sentencing
requirements under Article 56 of the UCMJ are
inapplicable to reviewing authorities and do not in
any way limit the sentence reviewing powers of the
CCA under Article 66).
Where Congress has charged the CCAs with such
broad discretion and specifically obligated the CCAs
to review the appropriateness of a sentence, the fact
that a service member was unable to raise a post-trial
confinement issue with the military judge or
convening authority prior to the entry of judgment
should not bar consideration of the continued
appropriateness of the sentence.
D.
The CAAF’s decision will preclude
servicemembers
from
seeking
sentencing relief from improper posttrial confinement conditions in the
military courts where no comparable
relief is available in the civilian court
system.
Willman’s effective restriction on complete,
meaningful sentence review under Article 66(c),
UCMJ, has far-reaching implications. By abdicating
the CCAs’ statutory responsibility, the CAAF’s
decision will strip the military justice system of a
remedy and will leave servicemembers without an
adequate forum to seek comparable relief through the
federal judiciary. This is significantly problematic for
several reasons.
First, civilian courts are ill-equipped to handle
military specific issues, particularly those involving
27
the post-trial confinement of servicemembers. As this
Court has acknowledged, “the military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian[.]” Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974). Because “the rights of men
in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to
meet certain overriding demands of discipline and
duty . . . the civil courts are not the agencies which
must determine the precise balance to be struck in
this adjustment.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140
(1953). Rather, Congress has this task. Id. To this
end, Congress established what it intended to be a
self-sufficient, self-correcting uniform military justice
system. The bedrock of this system, the UCMJ, with
its seemingly imprecise standards based on centuries
of customs and general usages, simply “cannot be
equated to a civilian criminal code.” Parker, 417 U.S.
at 749. Accordingly, “Congress has codified primary
responsibility for the supervision of military justice”
in the CAAF. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 (1969).
The civilian courts have correspondingly given a
“substantial degree of civilian deference” to military
tribunals. Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235, 250
(C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing Noyd, 395 U.S. at 694-95).
This deference is grounded in the doctrine of
exhaustion, which generally requires litigants seeking
post-conviction relief to first seek such relief from the
judicial system responsible for the conviction. There is
no authority or precedent promoting civilian courts as
the primary arbiters over military-related claims.
This is for good reason. Included within the militaryspecific exhaustion requirement are concerns
regarding judicial economy, the separation of powers,
the need to maintain good order and discipline in the
28
armed forces, avoiding needless friction between the
civilian and military judicial systems, and respect for
the military courts’ “expertise in interpreting the
technical provisions of the UCMJ.” Id. (citing Noyd,
395 U.S. at 696); accord Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S.
34 (1972); Lawrence v. McCarthy, 344 F.3d 467, 471
(5th Cir. 2003) (“Because the military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian, orderly
government requires that the judiciary scrupulously
avoid interfering with legitimate Army matters.”).
The authority of Article III courts over the military
has thus been limited through a combination of
Congressional design and judicial temperance.
Servicemembers cannot readily pursue their claims in
federal courts. The doctrine set out in Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), prohibits lawsuits by
military prisoners against the federal government.
See Schnitzer v. Harvey, 389 F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (“Every circuit to consider the issue [of whether
and how the Feres doctrine applies to military
prisoners], however, has found the doctrine to apply
without modification.”). Thus, there is no other forum
to consider a service member’s claim that his sentence
is inappropriate based on improper post-trial
confinement conditions that arose after entry of
judgement.
Through Article 66(c), UCMJ, the
appropriate, statutorily required forum for seeking
such relief are the CCAs. But Willman strips those
courts of carrying out this congressionally mandated
duty.
29
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully Submitted,
THOMAS R. GOVAN JR.
Counsel of Record
SARA J. HICKMON
ESHAWN R. RAWLLEY
MEGAN E. HOFFMAN
DAVID L. BOSNER
RYAN S. CRNKOVICH
MATTHEW L. BLYTH
Appellate Defense Counsel
Air Force Appellate Defense Division
1500 West Perimeter Road,
Suite 1100
Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762
(240) 612-4782
thomas.govan@us.af.mil
Counsel for Petitioners
30
APPENDIX
No. ______
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
KALAB D. WILLMAN, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES
Respondent.
__________
On Petition for a Writ to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
__________
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
__________
THOMAS R. GOVAN JR.
Counsel of Record
SARA J. HICKMON
ESHAWN R. RAWLLEY
MEGAN E. HOFFMAN
DAVID L. BOSNER
RYAN S. CRNKOVICH
MATTHEW L. BLYTH
Appellate Defense Counsel
Air Force Appellate Defense Division
1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100
Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762
(240) 612-4782
Thomas.govan@us.af.mil
Counsel for Petitioners
TABLE OF CONTENTS
United States v. Willman
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Opinion
(Jul. 21, 2021)
4a
United States v. Willman
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Dec. 21, 2020)
21a
United States v. Willman
United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion
(Sept. 3, 2020)
23a
United States v. Frantz
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Aug. 10, 2021)
52a
United States v. Frantz
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Mar. 23, 2021)
53a
United States v. Frantz
United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion
(Nov. 10, 2020)
55a
United States v. Turner
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Aug. 10, 2021)
118a
(2a)
United States v. Turner
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Mar. 15, 2021)
119a
United States v. Turner
United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion
(Nov. 25, 2020)
121a
United States v. Williams
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Aug. 10, 2021)
171a
United States v. Williams
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, Order
(Jun. 25, 2021)
172a
United States v. Williams
United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion
(Mar. 12, 2021)
174a
(3a)
This opinion is subject to revision before publication
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Kalab D. WILLMAN, Staff Sergeant
United States Air Force, Appellant
No. 21-0030
Crim. App. No. 39642
Argued April 20, 2021—Decided July 21, 2021
Military Judge: John C. Degnan
For Appellant: Major Megan E. Hoffman (argued);
Mark C. Bruegger, Esq. (on brief).
For Appellee: Captain Cortland T. Bobczynski
(argued); Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Neil and
Mary Ellen Payne, Esq. (on brief).
Judge HARDY delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Judge STUCKY and Judge MAGGS
joined. Judge SPARKS filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Judge OHLSON joined.
(4a)
Judge HARDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In general, Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012), restricts
appellate review performed by the Courts of Criminal
Appeals (CCAs) to consideration of the “entire record”
of the case before them.1 This Court has held,
however, that the CCAs have authority to consider
evidence entirely outside the record when considering
an appellant’s cruel and unusual punishment claims
raised under the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const.
amend. VIII, or Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855
(2012). United States v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478
(C.A.A.F. 2001). This case presents a question that
straddles these two issues: whether the CCAs have
authority to consider outside-the-record evidence
submitted in support of an appellant’s Eighth
Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, claims when
performing sentence appropriateness review under
Article 66(c), UCMJ. Consistent with the plain
language of Article 66(c), UCMJ, and this Court’s
recent decision in United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437
(C.A.A.F. 2020), we conclude that the CCAs do not.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the United
States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA).
I. Background
1 This case was referred to court-martial prior to January 1,
2019, and thus all post-trial procedures were performed in
accordance with the 2016 edition of the Manual for CourtsMartial, United States (MCM). All references to the UCMJ,
Rules for Courts- Martial (R.C.M.), and Military Rules of
Evidence (M.R.E.) are to the2016 edition of the MCM.
(5a)
A military judge convicted Appellant, consistent
with his pleas, of one specification of indecent
recording in violation of Article 120(c), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 920 (2012). Appellant was sentenced to one
year of confinement, reduction to E-4, and a
dishonorable discharge. During his post-trial
confinement, Appellant injured his big toe in a flag
football game, an injury for which Appellant now
claims the Government failed to pro- vide adequate
care. Appellant never filed a formal complaint about
the allegedly insufficient care he received with the
prison health clinic, the prison administration, his
commander, or the convening authority (CA).
Appellant also waived his right to submit matters in
clemency to the CA. As a result, the record contains
no mention of Appellant’s toe in jury or the
subsequent medical treatment he received for that
injury. The CA approved the findings and Appellant’s
sentence as adjudged.
On appeal to the AFCCA, Appellant asserted—for
the first time—that the allegedly deficient medical
care he received violated his Eighth Amendment and
Article 55, UCMJ, rights against cruel and unusual
punishment and rendered his sentence inappropriate
pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ. Appellant detailed
the nature of his injury, medical treatment, and posttrial confinement conditions in a declaration, and filed
a motion requesting the AFCCA attach his declaration
to his assignment of errors. The AFCCA granted the
request.
After
AFCCA
reviewing Appellant’s declaration, the
determined that Appellant’s Eighth
(6a)
Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, claims did not
merit relief. United States v. Willman, No. ACM
39642, 2020 CCA LEXIS 300, at *17–20, 2020 WL
5269775, at *7 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2020)
(unpublished). The CCA concluded that, even if the
facts asserted in the declaration were true, Appellant
failed to meet this burden of establishing that the
prison officials improperly administered medical
treatment and were deliberately indifferent to his
health and safety. Id. at *19–20, 2020 WL 5269775, at
*7.
Turning to Appellant’s Article 66(c), UCMJ,
sentence appropriateness claim, the AFCCA
concluded that the plain language of Article 66(c),
UCMJ, and this Court’s decision in Jessie, 79 M.J.
437, precluded it from considering Appellant’s
“outside-the-record” affidavit. 2020 CCA LEXIS 300,
at *21– 25, 2020 WL 5269775, at *7–9. Concluding
that “the record contains no support to grant
sentencing relief on the basis of Appellant’s claims
about the conditions of post-trial confinement,” the
AFCCA affirmed the sentence as approved by the CA.
Id. at *25, 2020 WL 5269775, at *9.
We granted review of the following issue:
“[w]hether the lower court erred when it ruled that it
could not consider evidence outside the record to
determine sentence appropriateness under Article
66(c), UCMJ.” United States v. Willman, 80 M.J. 470
(C.A.A.F. 2020) (order granting review).
II. Standard of Review
The scope, applicability, and meaning of Article
(7a)
66(c), UCMJ, is a matter of statutory interpretation
that we review de novo. United States v. Gay, 75 M.J.
264, 267 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing United States v.
Schloff, 74 M.J. 312, 313 (C.A.A.F. 2015)).
III. Discussion
Congress specified the jurisdiction and authority of
the CCAs in Article 66, UCMJ. The relevant section
and applicable version of the article states:
[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals may
act only with respect to the findings
and sentence as approved by the
convening authority. It may affirm only
such findings of guilty and the sentence
or such part or amount of the sentence,
as it finds correct in law and fact and
determines, on the basis of the entire
record, should be approved.
Article 66(c), UCMJ. At first glance, these two
sentences suggest that the CCA’s role is
straightforward—to review an appellant’s findings
and sentence as approved by the convening authority
based on the “entire record.” But as we recently
acknowledged in Jessie, this Court’s various
precedents regarding the scope of the CCA’s review of
the “entire record” can be difficult to reconcile. 79 M.J.
at 443. Nevertheless, the Court in Jessie explained
how those cases should be understood. Id. at 441–45
(reviewing in detail the Court’s precedents analyzing
Article 66(c), UCMJ).
The Court began by reaffirming long-standing
precedent from United States v. Fagnan, 12 C.M.A.
(8a)
192, 193, 30 C.M.R. 192, 193 (1961), which
“established a clear rule that the CCAs may not
consider anything outside of the ‘entire record’ when
reviewing a sentence under Article 66(c), UCMJ.”
Jessie, 79 M.J. at 441 (citing Edward S. Adamkewicz
Jr., Appellate Consideration of Matters Outside the
Record of Trial, 32 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1966)). In
Fagnan, the intermediate appellate court—then the
Army Board of Review—declined to consider two
outside-the-record documents when it assessed the
appellant’s sentence: a psychiatric report that the
Army Board of Review itself had requested and a
letter from a correctional officer written on the
appellant’s behalf. 12 C.M.A. at 193, 30 C.M.R. at 193.
The Army Board of Review explained that neither
document was “ ‘part of the record subject to review
under Article 66, and should not be considered with
respect to the appropriateness of the sentence as
approved by the convening authority.’ ” Id. at 193, 30
C.M.R. at 193 (quoting the Army Board of Review’s
opinion).
Although this rule appears strict, the Court
clarified in Jessie that “Fagnan does not preclude the
CCAs from considering prison conditions when
reviewing a sentence under Article 66(c), UCMJ, if the
record contains information about those conditions.”
79 M.J. at 441. In addition to permitting consideration
of any materials contained in the “entire record,” our
precedents also authorize the CCAs to supplement the
record to decide any issues that are raised, but not
fully resolved, by evidence in the record. Two of the
examples highlighted in Jessie illustrate these points.
(9a)
First, in Gay, 75 M.J. 264, the appellant made a
formal clemency complaint about his post-trial
confinement conditions to the convening authority
prior to the convening authority taking action.
Because clemency materials submitted to the
convening authority must be attached to the record of
trial, R.C.M. 1103(b)(3)(C), and the subsequent action
of the convening authority is part of the record of trial,
R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(D)(iv), evidence about the
appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions were
incorporated into the entire record. Thus, the CCA did
not abuse its discretion when it considered the
appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions while
exercising its Article 66(c), UCMJ, sentence
reassessment authority.
Second, in United States v. Brennan, 58 M.J. 351,
352–53 (C.A.A.F. 2003), the appellant described
illegal post-trial punishment that she suffered in a
clemency petition that she filed with the convening
authority prior to the convening authority taking
action. As explained above, those clemency materials
were thus part of the entire record and available for
consideration by the CCA. In addition to the clemency
materials, both the CCA and this Court also
considered a subsequent statement that the appellant
filed before the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 353.
In Jessie, the Court explained that, because the
Brennan appellant raised the issue in her clemency
materials, the CCA’s review of her outside-the-record
statement was consistent with this Court’s long
practice of using “ ‘extra- record fact determinations’ ”
to resolve certain appellate questions. 79 M.J. at 442–
43 (quoting United States v. Parker, 36 M.J. 269, 272
(10a)
(C.M.A. 1993)).
Finally, in Jessie, the Court recognized a
significant exception to the Fagnan rule set forth in
this Court’s precedents: the CCAs may consider
materials completely outside of the “entire record”
when determining whether the manner of execution of
an accused’s sentence violates either the Eighth
Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ. Id. at 443 (citing
Erby, 54 M.J. at 479 (ordering factfinding into the
appellant’s cruel and unusual punishment claim
raised for the first time before the CCA) and United
States v. Pena, 64 M.J. 259, 266–67 (C.A.A.F. 2007)
(reviewing
the
appellant’s
outside-the-record
declaration to decide his cruel and unusual
punishment claim on the merits)). Acknowledging the
significant tension between Fagnan and cases like
Erby and Pena, this Court in Jessie decided to apply
Fagnan and “cabin[ ]” precedents like Erby and Pena
to their express holdings. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444–45
(concluding that “the practice of considering material
outside the record should not be expanded beyond the
context of Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth
Amendment”).
Despite the Court’s careful analysis of our
precedents interpreting the scope of the CCAs’ Article
66(c), UCMJ, authority in Jessie, this case presents a
novel fact pattern that is not squarely on point with
the precedents described above. Here, unlike in Gay
or Brennan, Appellant did not raise his complaints
about his post-trial confinement conditions until his
appeal to the AFCCA. Appellant’s declaration was
thus out- side-the-record and, under Fagnan, the
(11a)
AFCCA had no authority to review it for the purpose
of assessing Appellant’s sentence. However, under the
Fagnan rule exception, the AFCCA did have authority
to consider the Appellant’s outside-the-record
declaration for the purpose of evaluating Appellant’s
Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, claims.
The critical question then is once the AFCCA
considered Appellant’s outside-the-record declaration
to decide his cruel and unusual punishment claims,
could it also consider the declaration to perform its
Article 66(c), UCMJ, sentence appropriateness
review?
Although we acknowledge that reasonable
arguments can be made to the contrary, we agree with
the AFCCA that it could not consider Appellant’s
outside-the-record affidavit. Forced to choose between
strictly enforcing the Fagnan rule and further
expanding the exceptions to that rule that this Court
has created for cruel and unusual punishment claims,
we elect to apply Fagnan. Our reasoning mirrors that
of the Court in Jessie when it expressly declined to
extend the holdings of Erby and Pena beyond the
context of the Eighth Amendment and Article 55,
UCMJ, claims. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444 (“[W]e believe
that Fagnan rather than Erby should control in this
case.”).
The Fagnan rule is derived from the plain
language of the statute, which states that the CCAs
may only act “on the basis of the entire record” when
performing sentence appropriateness review under
Article 66(c), UCMJ. See Fagnan, 12 C.M.A. at 195, 30
C.M.R. at 195 (“[W]e cannot ignore the plain words of
(12a)
the statute involved.”). As we noted in Jessie, this
Court’s precedents establishing exceptions to the
Fagnan rule, such as Erby and Pena, neither discuss
Article 66(c)’s express “entire record” restriction nor
wrestle with the Court’s seemingly contrary holding
in Fagnan. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444. Presumably,
because the Court believed that the CCAs had a “duty”
to determine on direct appeal whether the appellant’s
sentence was being executed in a manner that offends the Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ,
Erby, 54 M.J. at 478, the Court was unconcerned
about whether the evidence about an appellant’s posttrial confinement appeared in the entire record or was
proffered for the first time on appeal. As the Court has
long recognized, facts concerning an appellant’s “posttrial confinement can rarely, if ever, be made the
subject of a brief by trial defense counsel or otherwise
made a part of the ‘entire record.’ ” Fagnan, 12 C.M.A.
at 195, 30 C.M.R at 195. Accordingly, to whatever
extent Article 66(c), UCMJ, imposes a duty to review
all cruel and unusual punishment claims on the
CCAs, it would make no sense to restrict that review
to matters within the “entire record.”
But it does not logically follow that just because
this Court has permitted the CCAs to review outsidethe-record materials to decide Eighth Amendment
and Article 55, UCMJ, claims, we must also authorize
the CCAs to consider those materials when they
perform Article 66, UCMJ, sentence appropriateness
review. To conclude otherwise would create a broad,
extra-statutory exception that would potentially
swallow the text-based Fagnan rule. Any savvy
appellant who wished to supplement the record with
(13a)
outside- the-record materials would have an incentive
to do so by raising Eighth Amendment or Article 55,
UCMJ, claims— regardless of their merit.
Appellant argues that we can trust the CCAs to be
the gatekeepers of the “entire record,” admitting only
those materials that are relevant to an appellant’s
cruel and unusual punishment claims. But we see no
reason to impose a greater burden on the CCAs to
adjudicate arguments over whether outside-therecord materials are relevant to an appellant’s Eighth
Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, claims both by
encouraging appellants to bring such claims and by
raising the consequences of such a determination.
Further, there is a wide range of outside-the-record
materials about an appellant’s post-trial confinement
that would be relevant to such claims (given the low
bar for demonstrating relevancy) without coming
anywhere near establishing a right to relief. Appellant
does not explain why it would be just to consider those
materials when the CCAs assess the sentence of an
appellant who makes an Eighth Amendment or
Article 55, UCMJ, claim but not to review the same
materials for a similarly situated appellant who does
not assert those claims.
It is probably true that we could mandate—and the
CCAs would ably execute—a complicated scheme to
litigate these issues and parse through an appellant’s
proffered evidence, admitting only the relevant and
necessary parts and rejecting the rest, but nothing in
the text of Article 66(c), UCMJ, supports such a
scheme. The fact that such a scheme would be
necessary raises questions not about the Fagnan rule,
(14a)
which is based on the plain text of Article 66(c),
UCMJ, but on our precedents creating exceptions to
the rule. As this Court’s recent decision in United
States v. Guinn, __ M.J. __, __ (14) (C.A.A.F. 2021),
acknowledged, arguments can be made that this
Court’s decisions in cases like Erby and Pena “are not
properly predicated on the plain language of that
statute.” See also id. at __ (2) (Maggs, J, concurring)
(“I agree with the Court that it may be argued, from
the plain meaning of its text, that Article 66(c), UCMJ,
does not give a CCA jurisdiction to address post-trial
confinement conditions that are not part of the
approved sentence.”). Given these issues, we conclude
that the correct approach here is to adhere to the rule
announced in Fagnan rather than to further expand
the exception set forth in cases like Erby and Pena.
Appellant argues that this result creates an
incongruity, with the CCAs having the authority to
review outside-the-record materials for some
purposes, but not for others. We acknowledge that this
Court’s Article 66(c), UCMJ, precedents have created
an odd paradigm, but we do not believe that oddness
justifies further deviation from the plain text of
Article 66(c), UCMJ. The practice of considering
evidence for some purposes but not for others is not
foreign to American courts. See Fed. R. Evid. 105
advisory committee’s note to the 1972 proposed rules
(recognizing the practice of “admitting evidence for a
limited purpose”); see also David P. Leonard, The New
Wigmore: A Treatise On Evidence: Selected Rules Of
Limited Admissibility § 1.6.1 (3d ed. 2019) (examining
situations where evidence is logically relevant for
(15a)
more than one purpose but admissible only for one).
There is no legal reason why the same practice cannot
be applied here. In any case, complete resolution of the
incongruities in our Article 66(c), UCMJ, precedents
is not before us. As was the case in Jessie, the question
here “is not whether we must follow one line of
precedent and completely reject another, but instead
only whether we should expand recent precedents like
Erby into new contexts when this step would further
erode older precedents like Fagnan.” 79 M.J. at 444
n.9. Again, we decline to do so.
Finally, Appellant also argues that when the CCA
granted his motion to attach his outside-the-record
declaration as an appendix to his assignment of
errors, the declaration became part of the “entire
record,” so the Fagnan rule should not apply. We
disagree. Even after the CCA granted Appellant’s
motion, his declaration about his post-trial
confinement conditions is neither part of the record of
trial under R.C.M. 1103(b)(2), nor does it qualify as a
matter attached to the record of trial under R.C.M.
1103(b)(3). And because Appellant waived his right to
submit this matter for clemency to the convening
authority, the “entire record” contains nothing about
this issue, and thus the briefs and arguments that he
and his counsel submitted are not “allied papers”
because they do not address a matter in the record of
trial. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 440– 41 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citation omitted). In Jessie, this
Court described cases like Erby and Pena as allowing
“the CCAs to consider materials outside the ‘entire
record’ when reviewing issues that were not raised by
anything in the record.” Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
(16a)
This Court has never held, or even suggested, that
outside-the-record materials considered to resolve an
appellant’s cruel and usual punishment claims
became part of the entire record. We decline to do so
in the present case.
IV. Decision
For the reasons described above, we conclude that
the CCA did not err when it held that it could not
consider evidence outside the record to determine
sentence appropriateness under Article 66(c), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012), even when it had already
considered that evidence to resolve Appellant’s Eighth
Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855
(2012), claims. The decision of the United States Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
Judge SPARKS, with whom Judge OHLSON joins,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s viewpoint that
United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437 (C.A.A.F. 2020),
and United States v. Fagnan, 12 C.M.A. 192, 30
C.M.R. 192 (1961), preclude the lower court’s review
of the appropriateness of Appellant’s sentence
pursuant to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012), where
Appellant raised his Eighth Amendment and Article
55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (2012), claims for the first
time on appeal and the lower court granted a motion
to attach documents relevant to such allegations.
In Jessie, we held that other than claims of
(17a)
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment or
Article 55, UCMJ, Article 66(c), UCMJ, does not
authorize the lower court to “consider materials
outside the ‘entire record’ when reviewing issues that
were not raised by anything in the record.” 79 M.J. at
443. I disagreed with this holding and would reiterate
as I did in my dissent in Jessie, that “the courts of
criminal appeals are bound, under Article 66, UCMJ,
to consider any colorable constitutional claim related
to sentence appropriateness even if that requires
review of documents outside the record of trial.” Id. at
448 (Sparks, J., dissenting).
Putting my continued disagreement aside, I note
that neither Jessie nor Fagnan discussed sentence
appropriateness review in the context of declarations
attached to the record for the purpose of deciding
Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ,
allegations. An analogous situation arose in United
States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394 (C.M.A. 1988), where this
Court commented in a footnote:
If there is evidence of insanity after the
trial has been completed and the
convening authority has acted, the
Court of Military Review can receive
psychiatric information relevant to
mental competence to stand trial, to
cooperate with the appeal, or mental
responsibility for the crime itself. Once
admitted for this purpose, the
information would be in the “record”
and presumably could be used by the
Court of Military Review in performing
its task of determining what sentence
(18a)
is appropriate.
Id. at 397 n.6 (citation omitted). In my view, the same
outcome should occur in this case. Once the lower
court attached to the record Appellant’s declarations
in support of his Article 55, UCMJ, and Eighth
Amendment claims, this information became part of
the record and the lower court was required to
consider this information in performing its Article
66(c). UCMJ, review. Furthermore, the majority is
ignoring Rule 23(b) of the Joint Rules of Appellate
Procedure for Courts of Criminal Appeals, which was
promulgated pursuant to Article 66(f), UCMJ. This
rule authorizes the lower courts to attach documents
to the record, which is precisely what was done in this
case. Yet, the majority states that Appellant’s
declaration is not part of the entire record because it
does not fall within Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M)
1103(b)(2) or R.C.M. 1103(b)(3). It would appear,
however, when the lower court attached these
documents they became part of the record under Rule
23(b) of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
majority fails to account for this rule.
Article 66, UCMJ, is the central source of the lower
court’s authority to review any issue, to include
alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment and
Article 55, UCMJ. It seems odd for the majority to
hold that, under Jessie and Fagnan, the lower court
has jurisdiction to review alleged violations of the
Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, based on
material that was once outside the original record of
trial until attached to the record by the lower court,
but does not have jurisdiction to consider that same
material for Article 66(c), UCMJ, sentence
(19a)
appropriateness review. By holding that these
documents are outside the record, the majority’s new
rule violates the mandate in Article 66(c), UCMJ, to
consider the “entire record” when affirming “such part
or amount of the sentence.” Notwithstanding the
majority’s view that they are adhering to the plain
text of the statute, a contrary view emerges from my
reading of the Court’s opinion. In my view, the
majority is, in essence, ignoring the law and refusing
to acknowledge the congressional delegation to the
Judge Advocates General. Moreover, the majority’s
view sets up the odd situation in this and future cases
where documents that are obviously part of the record
are, curiously, simultaneously outside “the entire
record.”
For the foregoing reasons I must respectfully dissent.
(20a)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
Washington, D.C.
United States,
Appellee
USCA Dkt. No. 21-0030/AF
Crim.App. No. 39642
v.
ORDER GRANTING REVIEW
Kalab D. Willman,
Appellant
On consideration of the petition for grant of
review of the decision of the United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, it is, by the Court, this
21st day of December, 2020,
ORDERED:
That said petition is hereby granted on the
following issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT IT COULD NOT
CONSIDER EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE
RECORD TO DETERMINE SENTENCE
APPROPRIATENESS UNDER ARTICLE
66(c).
Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.
(21a)
For the Court,
/s/ Joseph R. Perlak
Clerk of the Court
cc:
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Appellate
Defense
Counsel
(Hoffman)
Appellate Government Counsel (Bobczynski)
(22a)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
No. ACM 39642
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Kalab D. WILLMAN
Staff Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial
Judiciary Decided 2 September 2020
Military Judge: John C. Degnan.
Approved
sentence:
Dishonorable
discharge,
confinement for 1 year, and reduction to E-4. Sentence
adjudged 6 November 2018 by GCM convened at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
For Appellant: Major Megan E. Hoffman, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Kubler,
USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason, USAF;
Lieutenant Colonel G. Matt Osborn, USAF; Mary
Ellen Payne, Esquire.
(23a)
Before POSCH, RICHARDSON, and MEGINLEY,
Appellate Military Judges.
Senior Judge POSCH delivered the opinion of the
court, in which Judge RICHARDSON joined. Judge
MEGINLEY filed a separate opinion concurring in
part and in the result.
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,
does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule
of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
POSCH, Senior Judge:
In accordance with Appellant’s unconditional
guilty plea pursuant to a pre- trial agreement (PTA),
a general court-martial composed of a military judge
sitting alone found Appellant guilty of one charge and
specification of indecent recording of the private area
of BM on divers occasions in violation of Article 120c,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §
920c.1 The military judge sentenced Appellant to a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for one year, and
reduction to the grade of E-4. At action, the convening
authority approved the adjudged sentence. In
accordance with the terms of the PTA and Article 58b,
All references in this opinion to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.),
and Military Rules of Evidence are to the Manual for
Courts- Martial, United States (2016 ed.).
1
(24a)
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 858b, the convening authority also
waived mandatory forfeitures of Appellant’s pay and
allowances for a period of six months, or upon his
release from confinement, whichever was sooner, with
the waiver commencing on 8 November 2018, for the
benefit of Appellant’s dependent daughter.2
Appellant raises two issues pursuant to United States
v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982): (1) whether
Appellant is entitled to relief because he was
compelled to give testimonial information after
invoking his right to an attorney and refusing to
answer questions; and (2) whether Appellant suffered
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment3 and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 855, when he was not given proper medical
treatment while in confinement. Alternatively,
Appellant contends that the conditions of his post-trial
confinement render his sentence inappropriately
severe, warranting relief under Article 66(c), UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 866(c).4
The PTA placed no limitation on the sentence the
convening authority could approve. Among the
Government’s PTA concessions, the convening
authority agreed to dismiss with prejudice a charge
and its specifications that alleged Appellant possessed
and viewed child pornography.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4 In addition to these issues, we note the action waived
mandatory forfeitures and directed Appellant’s pay
and allowances “to be paid to AW, spouse of
[Appellant], for the benefit of [Appellant’s] dependent
2
(25a)
Finding no error materially prejudicial to the
substantial rights of Appellant, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant’s conviction is founded on his plea of guilty
to making recordings of the private area of BM, a
sixteen-year-old female, without legal justification or
authorization. Appellant met BM in an Internet chat
forum and began communicating with her in private
through texts and online video chat sessions. In time,
their conversations became sexual and they showed
each other their bodies and masturbated during some
of these sessions. On 14 occasions, Appellant used his
personal laptop computer to record BM engaging in
sexually explicit conduct, including masturbating and
lasciviously exhibiting her genitals and pubic area to
Appellant. BM did not consent to Appellant making
recordings of her during these sessions and was
unaware she was being recorded.
daughter.” Based on the record before us, AW is
Appellant’s dependent daughter and not his spouse;
and this error is repeated in the court-martial order
(CMO). Although Appellant is silent about the error in
the action, he asserts the CMO error “did not prejudice
Appellant or the relief ordered by the Convening
Authority,” and “Appellant does not raise it as an
error here.” We find no prejudice to Appellant by the
error in either the action or the CMO, and conclude
that instructing the convening authority to withdraw
the action and substitute a corrected action, see
R.C.M. 1107(g), is not warranted.
(26a)
Appellant’s conduct came to the attention of
military authorities at Vandenberg Air Force Base
(AFB) after BM’s mother learned that Appellant sent
her daughter a picture of himself with his shirt pulled
up to reveal his stomach. BM’s mother filed a police
report and the matter was ultimately referred to
agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) at Vandenberg AFB. At the time she reported
Appellant’s conduct, BM’s mother was not fully aware
of details of Appellant’s online relationship with her
daughter and the extent of their sexual
communications.
AFOSI agents opened an investigation and, on 7
November 2016, took Appellant into custody. Before
questioning Appellant about his relationship with
BM, an agent advised Appellant of his rights,
including the right to have counsel present at the
interview. See Article 31, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831; Mil.
R. Evid. 305. Following the rights advisement,
Appellant declined to answer questions and requested
legal counsel.
The same day Appellant was questioned, AFOSI
agents conducted a search of Appellant’s home and
seized multiple electronic devices. The AFOSI agents
presented Appellant with a search authorization and
a written order dated 7 November 2016 and signed by
the military magistrate. The written order directed
Appellant “to unlock any and all electronic devices
seized pursuant to the search and seizure
authorization. This include[d] any fingerprint,
password, pin number, or other forms of security
(27a)
systems for the electronic devices.” The military
magistrate also ordered Appellant “to disable all
security and/or lock settings for any and all electronic
devices seized pursuant to this search and seizure
authorization.” According to the AFOSI report of
investigation, when presented with the search
authorization and the written order, Appellant
unlocked his phone and disabled the security settings.
Later in their investigation, the AFOSI agents
presented Appellant with an additional written order
to unlock his other electronic devices. This order was
from the alternate military magistrate at Vandenberg
AFB. Appellant refused to comply with the order and
was issued a letter of reprimand (LOR) by his
commander, Colonel KB, for disobeying the direct
orders given to him by the military magistrates.5
5 Inexplicably, the letter of reprimand (LOR) that is
attached to the AFOSI report of investigation
censures Appellant for disobeying an order from the
primary military magistrate on 7 November 2016,
even though the AFOSI report indicates that
Appellant complied with the order. Also according to
the AFOSI report, Appellant was given two additional
written orders to unlock his electronic devices, on 5
January 2017 and 19 January 2017, which he failed to
obey, but neither incident is referenced in the LOR and
the orders are not included in the record. The report
indicates that Appellant refused to comply with these
orders on the advice of an area defense counsel.
Nonetheless, the failure of the record to explain the
facts underlying the LOR that Appellant received is
not dispositive to our decision.
(28a)
A week after AFOSI agents seized Appellant’s
electronic devices, a preliminary search of Appellant’s
cell phone revealed it did not have the applications
that Appellant and BM used to meet and communicate
over the Internet. Those applications were discovered
in software that was installed on Appellant’s personal
laptop computer. The AFOSI agents’ initial review of
Appellant’s phone also turned up no contraband;
however, the AFOSI agents found a picture of
Appellant with his shirt pulled up and displaying his
abdomen. The AFOSI report of investigation suggests
that this picture corroborated BM’s account of
receiving a picture from Appellant that showed his
stomach. Analysis of Appellant’s laptop uncovered
evidence of Appellant’s communications with BM,
including videos Appellant recorded of BM and the
software Appellant used to record their online
sessions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Appellant’s Right against Self-Incrimination
Appellant contends he is entitled to relief because
he was compelled to give testimonial information
when AFOSI agents unlawfully ordered him to unlock
his electronic devices after he invoked his right to an
attorney and refused to answer questions. In reference
to the LOR he received from his commander,
Appellant claims he is entitled to relief for the almost
two years of stress he experienced having to report for
duty knowing that his commander was upset with him
for disobeying the unlawful orders that were given to
(29a)
him by the military magistrates. Appellant contends
that the only meaningful relief this court can grant is
to set aside his conviction because he has already
served his sentence and is out of confinement.
1. Additional Background
As part of his obligation under the PTA, Appellant
agreed to “[w]aive all waivable motions.” The military
judge conducted an extensive inquiry with Appellant
to ensure Appellant understood the meaning and
effect of this condition. At one point, the military judge
explained:
[Y]our [PTA] states that you waive or give
up the right to make waivable motions. I
advise you that certain motions are waived
or given up if your defense counsel does not
make the motion prior to entering your plea.
Additionally, other motions, even if not
waived by guilty plea, are nonetheless
waived if not brought up during the trial.
Some motions, however, such as motions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, for example,
can never be given up. Do you understand
that this term of your [PTA] means that you
give up the right to make any motion, which
by law is given up when you plead guilty?
Appellant replied, “Yes, sir.”
The military judge then asked Appellant, “Do you
understand that this term of your [PTA] means you
give up the right to make any motion if it is not raised
during the trial?” Appellant responded, “Yes, Your
(30a)
Honor.” Appellant acknowledged that no one forced
him to agree to this term, and that even though the
term originated with the Government, Appellant
acknowledged he freely and voluntarily agreed to the
term in order to receive the benefit of the PTA.
Appellant entered an unconditional plea of guilty
to knowingly and wrongfully making a recording of
the private area of BM without her consent on divers
occasions. During the guilty plea inquiry with the
military judge, Appellant explained that he “recorded
approximately 14 videos” of BM’s private area “using
software installed on [his] laptop.” Appellant
explained that he and BM would have online “video
chat sessions” and that he recorded the videos on his
laptop. At one point, the military judge asked
Appellant what electronic device Appellant used to
communicate with BM. Appellant replied, “Via my
laptop, sir.” Appellant would later agree that the 14
video recordings at issue were found on his laptop
computer.
2. Law
It is well-settled law that an unconditional guilty
plea generally waives any objection related to the
factual question of guilt. Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 910(j); see also United States v. Mooney, 77
M.J. 252, 254 (C.A.A.F. 2018). “Objections that do not
relate to factual issues of guilt are not covered by this
bright-line rule, but the general principle still applies:
[a]n unconditional guilty plea generally ‘waives all
defects which are neither jurisdictional nor a
deprivation of due process of law.’” United States v.
(31a)
Schweitzer, 68 M.J. 133, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting
United States v. Rehorn, 26 C.M.R. 267, 268– 69
(C.M.A. 1958)). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces (CAAF) has observed, “[w]hile the
waiver doctrine is not without limits, those limits are
narrow and relate to situations in which, on its face,
the prosecution may not constitutionally be
maintained.” United States v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279,
282 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citations omitted).
Consequently, an appellant who has entered an
unconditional guilty plea ordinarily may not raise on
appeal an error previously waived at trial. United
States v. Chin, 75 M.J. 220, 222 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing
United States v. Campos, 67 M.J. 330, 332–33
(C.A.A.F. 2009); United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311,
313 (C.A.A.F. 2009)). However, this “ordinary” rule
does not apply to statutory review by a military court
of criminal appeals (CCA) under Article 66(c), UCMJ.
Id. “Article 66(c) empowers CCAs to consider claims .
. . even when those claims have been waived.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Chin, No. ACM 38452, 2015
CCA LEXIS 241, at *9–11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 12 Jun.
2015) (unpub. op.), aff’d, 75 M.J. 220 (C.A.A.F. 2016)).
This is because CCAs maintain an “affirmative
obligation to ensure that the findings and sentence in
each such case are ‘correct in law and fact . . . and
should be approved.’” Id. at 223 (quoting United States
v. Miller, 62 M.J. 471, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (alteration
in original)).
“If an appellant elects to proceed with Article 66,
UCMJ, review the CCAs are required to assess the
(32a)
entire record to determine whether to leave an
accused’s waiver intact, or to correct the error.” Id.
(citation omitted). This requirement does not mean an
unconditional guilty plea is without meaning or effect.
Id. “Waiver at the trial level continues to preclude an
appellant from raising the issue” on appeal, id. (citing
Gladue, 67 M.J. at 313–14), and an “unconditional
guilty plea continues to serve as a factor for a CCA to
weigh in determining whether to nonetheless
disapprove a finding or sentence.” Id.
3. Analysis
At the time Appellant was ordered to unlock his
electronic devices, the CAAF had not decided United
States v. Mitchell, 76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017);
however, Mitchell was decided before Appellant was
arraigned and is factually similar to the conduct of the
AFOSI agents after Appellant invoked his right to
counsel. In Mitchell, the appellant’s phone had been
seized in accordance with a valid search
authorization. Id. at 416. However, after being
advised of his rights under custodial interrogation, the
appellant invoked his right to counsel. Id. Law
enforcement officials then asked the appellant to
input the passcode to unlock his phone, and the
appellant complied. Id. The CAAF concluded that the
Government
violated
the
appellant’s
Fifth
6
Amendment right to counsel as protected by Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), when he was asked to
enter his phone’s passcode in the absence of counsel.
Mitchell, 76 M.J. at 415.
6
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
(33a)
Appellant contends that because an AFOSI agent
unlawfully made Appellant unlock his phone, the
AFOSI agents should never have been allowed to use
the evidence on his phone to build the case against
him. Although AFOSI agents did not find contraband
on Appellant’s phone, they did discover a picture of
him with his shirt raised. Appellant claims AFOSI
agents used this photograph to corroborate
information they obtained from BM and,
consequently, the AFOSI’s investigation materially
benefited from the illegal search of Appellant’s phone.
Even if we assume Appellant’s claim of error
reaches his laptop computer where the 14 charged
images were found, we nonetheless decline to grant
relief. By his unconditional plea of guilty, Appellant
waived the issues of the invocation of the right to
counsel and the lawfulness of the orders to unlock his
phone and other devices and to disable their security
settings. R.C.M. 910(j). Appellant acknowledged on
the record that he was not forced to agree to that term
of the PTA, and this court finds no reason to question
Appellant’s voluntary waiver. Furthermore, the
Government did not offer the LOR that Colonel KB
served on Appellant as evidence at the sentencing
hearing as part of the personnel records of the
accused. See R.C.M. 1001(b)(2). Thus, we find
Appellant was not prejudiced by any error or action by
a Government official.7
Based on our review of the record, we need not decide
the prejudicial impact of Colonel KB’s 11 January
7
(34a)
Further, we conclude Appellant’s claims are
neither jurisdictional nor was Appellant denied the
due process of law, and thus are waived insofar as our
consideration of the factual question of his guilt on
appeal. See R.C.M. 910(j); Schweitzer, 68 M.J. at 136.
We have determined to leave Appellant’s waiver
intact. See Chin, 75 M.J. at 222.
B. Conditions of Post-Trial Confinement
For the first time on appeal, Appellant urges this
court to find he was subjected to impermissible
confinement conditions in violation of Article 55,
UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment. Appellant also
contends the conditions warrant sentencing relief
under this court’s Article 66(c), UCMJ, authority to
approve only so much of a sentence that, based on the
entire record, should be approved. We are not
persuaded.
1. Additional Background
After the conclusion of Appellant’s sentencing
hearing on 6 November 2018, Appellant waived his
right to submit matters in clemency on 27 February
2019, and the convening authority took action the
next day. In his appeal, Appellant submitted a sworn
declaration and asked this court to reduce his
2017 reprimand of Appellant for disobeying orders to
unlock his devices after Appellant asked for legal
counsel, particularly the portion that reads, “[m]ake
no mistake, these were lawful orders from properly
appointed military magistrates . . . ”
(35a)
sentence because he did not receive proper medical
treatment for an injury that occurred in December
2018 when he was confined at the Naval Consolidated
Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. Appellant did not
raise a claim of improper medical treatment to the
convening authority when he waived clemency.
Appellant explains in his declaration that near the
end of December, another inmate stepped on his foot
during a game of flag football, causing significant
bruising to his large toe and toenail. Over the next two
to three weeks his toenail swelled and became painful.
It discharged pus and became detached from the nail
bed. On 14 January 2019, Appellant reported to sick
call for a medical evaluation. A medical staff member
concluded that no action was needed. Appellant
requested the nail be removed and that the issue be
raised to a supervisor. The supervisor refused to
remove the nail, applied an antiseptic, and gave
Appellant instructions to return to sick call should the
issue worsen. Later that evening, the nail completely
detached from the nail bed when Appellant removed
his boots and socks.
Approximately three weeks later, Appellant
returned to sick call to have his condition reevaluated
because the nail was regrowing over the exposed nail
bed in an unusual manner and with significant
discoloration, and caused pain when Appellant
donned his socks and boots each morning. Appellant
was again told by medical personnel that no action
was needed and to return to sick call if additional
symptoms or issues developed. In his 3 September
(36a)
2019 declaration to this court, Appellant states that in
the months since the onset of the issue, he is unable
to put on socks and shoes without “slow and
methodical effort.” His nail has yet to regenerate fully
and it remains an unusual color and form.
In response to Appellant’s sworn statement, the
Government provided a sworn declaration from a legal
officer at the Naval Consolidated Brig. The
declaration states that Appellant served a period of
confinement at the facility from 28 November 2018
until 11 August 2019, and he sustained an injury to
his toe during a recreational activity. After a medical
evaluation, a member of the medical staff determined
the best course of action was to let the nail remain
intact until it fell off spontaneously because removing
the nail would have left Appellant’s toenail matrix
exposed, which could increase the chances of an injury
or infection. An antiseptic solution was administered
“to decrease the amount of surface pathogens to help
prevent further infection.” Appellant was advised he
could cover the area with a plastic bandage to prevent
the nail from catching on his socks. The medical staff
member concluded there was no mandate to remove
Appellant’s toenail. The declaration explained that in
the opinion of the medical staff member, toenails can
grow back abnormally or discolored after a traumatic
event to the nail bed and it may take months or years
for the nail to fully grow. Lastly, the declaration
asserted that a review of Appellant’s prisoner record
did not contain any requests for redress or grievances.
2. Law
(37a)
“Both the Eighth Amendment and Article 55,
UCMJ, prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. In
general, we apply the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment to claims raised under
Article 55, UCMJ, except where legislative intent to
provide greater protections under Article 55, UCMJ,
is apparent.” United States v. Gay, 74 M.J. 736, 740
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (citing United States v.
Avila, 53 M.J. 99, 101 (C.A.A.F. 2000)), aff’d, 75 M.J.
264 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits two types of
punishments: (1) those ‘incompatible with the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society’ or (2) those ‘which involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” United
States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F. 2006)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03
(1976)). A violation of the Eighth Amendment is
shown by demonstrating:
(1) an objectively, sufficiently serious act or
omission resulting in the denial of
necessities; (2) a culpable state of mind on
the part of prison officials amounting to
deliberate indifference to [appellant]’s
health and safety; and (3) that [appellant]
“has exhausted the prisoner-grievance
system . . . and that he has petitioned for
relief under Article 138, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §
938 [2000].”
Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (footnotes
(38a)
omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 46 M.J. 248,
250 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
The CAAF has emphasized that “[a] prisoner must
seek administrative relief prior to invoking judicial
intervention to redress concerns regarding post-trial
confinement conditions.” United States v. Wise, 64
M.J. 468, 469 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United States v.
White, 54 M.J. 469, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). “This
requirement ‘promot[es] resolution of grievances at
the lowest possible level [and ensures] that an
adequate record has been developed [to aid appellate
review].’” Id. at 471 (alterations in original) (quoting
Miller, 46 M.J. at 250).
Except under some unusual or egregious
circumstance, an appellant must demonstrate he or
she has exhausted the prisoner grievance process
provided by the confinement facility and has
petitioned for relief under Article 138, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 938. White, 54 M.J. at 472 (citation omitted).
Under Article 66(c), UCMJ, we have broad
authority and the mandate to approve only so much of
the sentence as we find “correct in law and fact and
determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved.” See also United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J.
219, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (observing that the
“legislative history of Article 66 reflects congressional
intent to vest broad power in the Courts of Criminal
Appeals”). The scope of our Article 66(c), UCMJ,
authority to consider claims of post-trial confinement
conditions “is limited to consideration of these claims
as part of our determination of sentence
(39a)
appropriateness.” United States v. Towns, 52 M.J.
830, 833 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (citation omitted),
aff’d, 55 M.J. 361 (C.A.A.F. 2001). “It is also limited to
claims based on post-trial treatment that occurs prior
to the action of the convening authority and which is
documented in the record of trial.” Id. (citing Article
66(c), UCMJ).
3. Analysis
a. Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth
Amendment
We conclude that even if the facts, as asserted by
Appellant in his declaration, are true, Appellant has
not met his burden to establish prison officials failed
to administer proper medical treatment, and, thus,
grounds for relief.8
Article 55, UCMJ, prohibits infliction of
“[p]unishment by flogging, or by branding, marking,
or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual
punishment.” The Eighth Amendment prohibits
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners,” whether manifested by prison guards
“intentionally denying or delaying access to medical
care or intentionally interfering with the treatment
8 Having applied the decisional framework announced
in United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 248 (C.A.A.F.
1997), for evaluating conditions of post-trial
confinement, and considered the entire record, we find
we can resolve the issues raised by Appellant without
additional factfinding. See United States v. Fagan, 59
M.J. 238, 242 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
(40a)
once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–
05 (1976) (citation omitted). However, “[m]edical
malpractice does not become a constitutional violation
merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to
state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Id.
at 106. “Deliberate indifference” requires that the
responsible official must be aware of an excessive risk
to an inmate’s health or safety and disregard that risk.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[I]t is
enough that the official acted or failed to act despite
his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”
Id. at 842 (citation omitted). However, “prison officials
who [lack] knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have
inflicted punishment.” Id. at 844.
Apart from Appellant’s factual declaration, we find
no basis for the assertions made by Appellant’s
counsel on behalf of Appellant that (1) Appellant’s
“serious and potentially disabling medical issue—an
infected toe—was brushed aside by brig medical
personnel and not taken seriously;” (2) “[t]he brig sick
bay officials’ lack of concern led to a long-term
infection and permanent damage to the digit that
continues to this day;” and that (3) “[t]here is no
explanation for the conditions under which Appellant
was kept except that the confinement facility officials
deliberately and willfully disregarded Appellant’s
well-being.” The most Appellant shows from the posttrial declarations is that the treatment of his injured
toe was aimed at preventing infection. Appellant has
(41a)
not shown that either alternative or additional
medical interventions would have restored his health
to the same condition before the injury happened.
In the present case, the information provided by
Appellant in his appeal lacks evidence that prison
officials were aware of a substantial risk of serious
harm to Appellant’s health or safety and disregarded
that risk. We find that Appellant has not presented
evidence to establish wrongful intent, namely, that
any official failed to properly administer treatment for
the purpose of increasing Appellant’s suffering or the
severity of his sentence. Appellant has not shown
conduct of prison officials that rises to the level of
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment
whether manifested by prison guards “intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. Moreover, a
review of Appellant’s case does not reveal any
information to suggest that Appellant attempted to
use a grievance process to address his complaint. See
Wise, 64 M.J. at 469; White, 54 M.J. at 471.
We find Appellant’s post-trial claims do not
demonstrate circumstances warranting relief under
Article 55, UCMJ, or the Eighth Amendment. Even if
the facts as asserted by Appellant are true, there is
insufficient evidence to objectively conclude that a
sufficiently serious act or omission occurred which
resulted in the denial of necessities. See Lovett, 63
M.J. at 215. The information falls far short of wrongful
(42a)
intent, namely, a culpable state of mind of an
identifiable official which constituted deliberate
indifference to Appellant’s health and safety. See id.
Finally, the record does not provide evidence that
Appellant attempted to use a grievance process to
address complaints of mistreatment. See id.
Accordingly, Appellant does not warrant relief under
Article 55 or the Eighth Amendment and we conclude
his sentence is correct in law.
b. Appropriateness of Sentence
Having resolved Appellant’s Article 55 and Eighth
Amendment claims, we next consider if our review of
whether Appellant’s sentence should be approved “on
the basis of the entire record,” Article 66(c), UCMJ,
permits or precludes our consideration of the posttrial confinement conditions Appellant presents for
the first time on appeal. We conclude Article 66(c)
limits our review of the appropriateness of the
sentence to the record and thus precludes
consideration of Appellant’s statements of fact about
those conditions.
In United States v. Jessie, the CAAF observed that
some of the court’s precedents hold that CCAs “may
consider only what is in the record” when reviewing a
sentence under Article 66(c). 79 M.J 437, 440
(C.A.A.F. 2020) (citation omitted). The CAAF noted
that the leading case for these precedents is United
States v. Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. 192 (C.M.A. 1961), in
which the appellant asked the Army Board of Review
to reject his punitive discharge based on a favorable
psychiatric assessment and a favorable report
(43a)
regarding his conduct while in confinement. Jessie, 79
M.J. at 441 (citing Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. at 193). The
Board of Review declined to consider these documents,
explaining that because the submission “concerns
matters which occurred months after the convening
authority acted upon the sentence and forwarded the
record of trial, it is not a part of the record subject to
review under Article 66.” Id. (quoting Fagnan, 30
C.M.R. at 193). The United States Court of Military
Appeals, the predecessor to the CAAF, affirmed,
holding that under Article 66(c), UCMJ, “the board of
review is expressly restricted by Congress to the
‘entire record’ in assessing the appropriateness of the
sentence.” Id. (quoting Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. at 194). The
Jessie court reiterated the reasoning in Fagnan that
“if military justice proceedings are to be ‘truly judicial
in nature,’ then the appellate courts cannot ‘consider
information relating to the appropriateness of
sentences when it has theretofore formed no part of
the record.’” Id. (quoting Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. at 195).
In Jessie, our superior court concluded that
“Fagnan established a clear rule that the CCAs may
not consider anything outside of the ‘entire record’
when reviewing a sentence under Article 66(c),
UCMJ.” Id. (citation omitted). Specifically in regard to
conditions of post-trial confinement, “[t]he rule in
Fagnan does not preclude the CCAs from considering
prison conditions when reviewing a sentence under
Article 66(c), UCMJ, if the record contains information
about those conditions.” Id. at 441–42 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 444 n.10 (“Because both the
(44a)
sentence appropriateness and correctness in law
determinations require a decision based upon the
‘entire record,’ we need not determine whether
posttrial confinement conditions fall under one or both
provisions.”).
Here, the “entire record”9 contains no information
about the conditions of Appellant’s post-trial
confinement. Although we exercised our authority to
consider outside-the-record matters to determine if
Appellant’s sentence is correct in law under Article 55,
UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment, see United States
v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478 (C.A.A.F. 2001), we are
precluded from considering Appellant’s statement of
facts about these conditions to determine if his
sentence is appropriate and “should be approved” as
part of our Article 66(c) review. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 441.
In United States v. Gay, the CAAF affirmed a decision
of this court that reduced an appellant’s sentence
under Article 66(c) because prison officials, without
justification, had made him serve part of his sentence
in maximum security solitary confinement. 75 M.J.
264, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2016). However, information about
9 See R.C.M. 1103(b)(2) (contents of the record) and
R.C.M. 1103(b)(3) (matters attached to the record). In
addition, the “entire record” includes briefs and
arguments that appellate counsel and an appellant
personally present regarding matters that are already
in the record of trial, R.C.M. 1103(b)(2), or have been
attached to the record of trial under R.C.M. 1103(b)(3).
See Jessie, 79 M.J. at 440–41 (citing United States v.
Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 396 (C.M.A. 1988)).
(45a)
these conditions was part of the record of trial because
the appellant had requested additional confinement
credit when he complained about the conditions to the
convening authority. Id. at 265–66. Unlike Gay,
neither the record of trial nor the matters attached to
Appellant’s record of trial mentions the conditions
Appellant raises for the first time after the convening
authority took action in Appellant’s case.
It may seem incongruous to consider outside-therecord matters to evaluate Appellant’s Article 55 and
Eighth Amendment claims, and then not consider
those matters in this court’s sentence appropriateness
review under Article 66(c). Nonetheless, our superior
court has declined to further erode precedents like
Fagnan, noting, “[w]e see nothing in the statutory text
[of Article 66(c)] requiring special treatment for all
appeals raising statutory or constitutional claims.”
Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444. The CAAF further rejected the
contention “that appellants should have the right to
supplement the record whenever they raise claims of
constitutional or statutory violations.”10 Id. at 443.
We depart from our esteemed colleague concurring
in the result in regard to the position that was taken
by Chief Judge Johnson in United States v. Matthews,
No. ACM 39593, 2020 CCA LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
“The ‘entire record’ restriction . . . applies equally
whether the CCA is reviewing a sentence’s correctness
in law, reviewing a sentence’s correctness in fact, or
determining whether a sentence should be approved.”
Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444 (footnote omitted).
10
(46a)
App. 2 Jun. 2020) (unpub. op.) (J. Johnson, C.J.,
concurring in the result). Like this case, the Matthews
appellant raised his Article 55, UCMJ, and Eighth
Amendment claims for the first time on appeal and
based them on material outside the original record of
trial. Matthews, unpub. op. at *12. Chief Judge
Johnson simply concluded that the question of this
court’s authority to grant sentence appropriateness
relief under Article 66(c), UCMJ, for claimed
violations of Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth
Amendment was not before the CAAF in Jessie, and
thus “the CAAF’s position on this point is undecided
and unclear.” Matthews, unpub. op. at *16–17 (J.
Johnson, C.J., concurring in the result). In our view,
the CAAF’s majority opinion was resolute and clear.
Following the court’s Article 66(c) mandate to
approve only so much of a sentence that, based on “the
entire record, should be approved,” we conclude the
record contains no support to grant sentencing relief
on the basis of Appellant’s claims about the conditions
of post-trial confinement.
III. CONCLUSION
The approved findings and sentence are correct in law
and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the
substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles
59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c).
Accordingly, the findings and the sentence are
AFFIRMED.11
11 Although not raised by the parties, we note an error
in the CMO where the charged article is incorrectly
(47a)
MEGINLEY, Judge (concurring in the result):
I agree with the majority in that Appellant is not
entitled to relief for cruel or unusual conditions of
post-trial confinement in violation of the Eighth
Amendment1 or Article 55, Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 855. Nor do I believe the
conditions Appellant describes render his sentence
inappropriately severe, warranting relief under
Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).
However, I disagree with the premise that we are
precluded from considering the appropriateness of
Appellant’s sentence pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 866, in a case such as this where Appellant
raises his Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ,
claims for the first time on appeal, and supports his
claim with material that is outside of the original
record of trial. I agree with the observations made by
Chief Judge Johnson in his concurring opinion in
United States v. Matthews, No. ACM 39593, 2020 CCA
LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2 Jun. 2020) (unpub.
op.), in his assessment of our superior court’s recent
decision in United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437
(C.A.A.F. 2020):
Article 66, UCMJ, is the fundamental source of
this court’s authority to review any issue, to include
identified as Article “120” rather than “120c.” We
direct the publication of a corrected CMO to remedy
this error.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
(48a)
alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment and
Article 55, UCMJ. It does seem incongruous (to borrow
the majority’s term) to find that, under Jessie, we have
jurisdiction to review alleged violations of the Eighth
Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, based on material
outside the original record of trial, but to find we lack
jurisdiction to consider such materials for the purpose
of “affirm[ing] only such findings of guilty and the
sentence . . . as [we] find correct in law and fact and
determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved”—which is our fundamental charge and
mandate in accordance with the text of Article 66
itself. See United States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264, 268
(C.A.A.F. 2016). Matthews, unpub. op. at *17–18 (J.
Johnson, C.J., concurring in the result).
I am troubled by the precedent that will be set if a
hardline rule is established that Courts of Criminal
Appeals cannot consider anything outside of the
record for post-trial issues unless an Eighth
Amendment or Article 55 issue is raised. Since United
States v. Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. 192 (C.M.A. 1961), was
decided, prison and confinement systems have greatly
evolved, post-trial processing has undergone a
massive transformation, and most importantly,
appellants have changed. The Department of Defense
is coming to terms with the racial and gender
disparity issues that have existed in our military
justice sys tem for quite some time. We have also
learned to recognize the need to make
accommodations in our confinement systems for
certain segments of our military population which
(49a)
may have been marginalized or ignored, such as those
who may identify as gay, lesbian, or transgender.
How these evolving issues will play out in postpunishment context is unknown. Yet, the time to
include post-trial matters in the record is nearly
irrelevant; gone are the days when an appellant could
be in confinement for months before action. Now,
depending on how quickly a legal office can process a
record, entry of judgment can take place in a matter
of days.
Nor do I believe in the notion we could, or should,
require our Airmen to seek relief for these issues
solely in the federal court system. We have an
obligation to be prepared to consider non-traditional
post-trial confinement issues as part of our charge.
Courts of Criminal Appeals need flexibility in posttrial submissions so that we can continue to reconcile
injustices and shortcomings in order to continue to
adapt to our ever-changing military population. I
agree with the point made by Judge Sparks in his
dissenting opinion in Jessie, noting:
The majority is correct that Article 66,
UCMJ, instructs the lower courts to review
issues “on the basis of the entire record.” But
it also entrusts the lower court with the
weightier responsibility of ensuring an
accused's sentence is “correct in law.” Confining our review only to the existing record,
without exception, would limit the lower
court’s ability to do this.
(50a)
Jessie, at 448 (Sparks, J., dissenting).
By closing the door on non-Eighth Amendment and
Article 55 claims, we are perhaps closing the door on
due process and First Amendment2 issues (as seen in
Jessie), and other matters we simply cannot
anticipate—matters that were not envisioned when
Fagnan was decided.
FOR THE COURT
CAROL K. JOYCE
Clerk of the Court
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
(51a)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
Washington, D.C.
United States,
Appellee
USCA Dkt. No. 21-0146/AF
Crim.App. No. 39657
v.
ORDER
Cory J.
Frantz,,
Appellant
On further consideration of the granted issue (81
M.J.
(C.A.A.F.
March 23, 2021)), and in view of United States v.
Willman, 81 M.J.
(C.A.A.F.
July 21, 2021), it is, by the Court, this 10th day of
August, 2021,
ORDERED:
That the decision of the United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals is hereby affirmed.
For the Court,
/s/
cc:
David A. Anderson
Acting Clerk of the Court
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel (Bosner)
Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)
(52a)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ARMED FORCES
Washington, D.C.
United States,
Appellee
v.
USCA Dkt. No. 21-0146/AF
Crim.App. No. 39657
ORDER GRANTING REVIEW
Cory J.
Frantz,,
Appellant
On consideration of the petition for grant of
review of the decision of the United States Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, it is, by the Court, this
23rd day of March, 2021,
ORDERED:
That said petition is hereby granted on the
following issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED
WHEN IT RULED THAT IT COULD NOT
CONSIDER EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE
RECORD TO DETERMINE SENTENCE
APPROPRIATENESS UNDER ARTICLE
66(c), UCMJ.
No briefs will be filed under Rule 25.
(53a)
For the Court,
/s/
cc:
Joseph R. Perlak
Clerk of the Court
The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force
Appellate Defense Counsel (Bosner)
Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)
(54a)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
No. ACM 39657
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Cory J. FRANTZ
Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
Decided 10 November 2020
Military Judge: Mark W. Milam.
Approved
sentence:
Dishonorable
discharge,
confinement
for
7
years, and reduction to E-1.
Sentence adjudged 19 October 2018 by GCM convened
at Aviano Air Base, Italy.
For Appellant: Major Mark J. Schwartz, USAF; Captain
David L. Bosner, USAF; Tami L. Mitchell, Esquire.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason, USAF;
Major Jessica L. Delaney, USAF; Major Peter F. Kellett,
USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before J. JOHNSON, POSCH, and KEY, Appellate
Military Judges.
(55a)
Chief Judge J. JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the
court, in which Senior Judge POSCH and Judge KEY
joined.
This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does
not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule of
Practice and Procedure 30.4.
J. JOHNSON, Chief Judge:
A general court-martial composed of a military
judge alone convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas,
of two specifications of committing lewd acts upon a
child under the age of 12 years, in violation of Article
120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10
U.S.C. § 920b.1,2 The military judge sentenced
Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement
for seven years, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The
convening authority approved the adjudged sentence,
but deferred automatic forfeitures of pay and
All references in this opinion to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), Rules for Courts-Martial,
and Military Rules of Evidence are to the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.).
2 The
military judge found Appellant guilty of
Specification 3 of the Charge by exceptions and
substitutions. The military judge found Appellant not
guilty of two specifications of sexual assault of a child
under the age of 12 years in violation of Article 120b,
UCMJ.
1
(56a)
allowances until action pursuant to Articles 57(a) and
58b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 857(a), 858b, and waived the
automatic forfeitures for the benefit of Appellant’s
dependent child until the earlier of six months or the
expiration of Appellant’s term of service pursuant to
Article 58b, UCMJ.
Appellant raises nine issues on appeal: (1) whether
the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support his convictions; (2) whether the finding of
guilty with regard to Specification 3 of the Charge is
fatally ambiguous; (3) whether the Government
violated Appellant’s right to equal access to evidence;
(4) whether the military judge abandoned his
impartial judicial role and erroneously failed to
disqualify himself; (5) whether Appellant’s sentence is
inappropriately severe; (6) whether the Government’s
failure to defer and waive automatic forfeitures in
accordance with the convening authority’s direction
warrants relief; (7) whether the Naval Consolidated
Brig Miramar (Miramar Brig) policy of preventing
Appellant from having contact with his minor son is
unconstitutional or violates Article 55, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 855; (8) whether the military judge abused
his discretion in declining to admit a defense exhibit;
and (9) whether the delay in procuring prescription
eyeglasses for Appellant during his confinement
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.3 In
Appellant personally raises issues (8) and (9)
pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431
(C.M.A. 1992). We have carefully considered issues (8)
and (9), and we find they warrant neither further
3
(57a)
addition, although not raised by Appellant, we
consider two further issues: whether the convening
authority’s failure to state his reasons for denying
Appellant’s request to defer his reduction in grade
warrants relief; and whether Appellant is entitled to
relief for facially unreasonable appellate delay. We
affirm the findings, but we find that an error with
respect to the convening authority’s denial of the
requested deferment of the reduction in grade
warrants relief with respect to the sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellant met AS, then a divorced mother of three
children, in June 2013 when they both lived in the
state of Washington. They began dating, and
Appellant moved in with AS and her children for a
period of time before he departed for Air Force basic
training in November 2013. Appellant and AS
married in February 2014 after Appellant learned he
would be stationed at Aviano Air Base (AB) in Italy.
Appellant and AS moved to Italy in July 2014, and
AS’s children joined them there approximately one
month later.
The family eventually settled in a four-story house
in a town near Aviano AB. On weekends AS would
regularly go to the on-base fitness center, a drive of
approximately 30 minutes each way, leaving
Appellant with the children, who were nine, five, and
discussion nor relief. See United States v. Matias, 25
M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A. 1987).
(58a)
three years old at the time. AS noticed that Appellant
seemed to favor the oldest child, her daughter JZ, over
the other children. For example, Appellant bought
clothes for JZ, helped her clean her room, and tucked
her into bed at night without doing the same for the
other children.
JZ exhibited troubling behavior after she arrived
in Italy. She showed no motivation in the on-base
school, which assigned a counselor to meet with JZ
regularly. At home, JZ resisted bathing, she was
aggressive toward her younger brother, and she would
spend time alone in a dark room.
In Italy, AS’s marriage to Appellant deteriorated.
According to AS, the couple frequently argued about
the children, finances, and managing the household.
Tensions increased in January 2015 when Appellant
traveled to Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, for
several weeks of training. While Appellant was there,
AS informed him she did not want to continue the
marriage. Soon afterwards, AS found JZ in her
bedroom holding a tablet and crying. JZ asked AS to
“take back” what she said to Appellant so they would
not “have to go.” AS looked at the tablet and
discovered JZ had been messaging with Appellant via
Facebook. AS did not inspect the messages at that
point, but replied to Appellant’s messages to the effect
that he should not contact JZ.
Within a few days, AS inspected the messages
more closely. Some of the messages alarmed her. At
one point in these messages, JZ wrote, “And I still will
(59a)
not tell anybody,” to which Appellant responded,
“Good,” before JZ finished her sentence, “About us!”
Shortly thereafter, Appellant sent JZ messages
asking if she knew how to delete Facebook messages
before sending her instructions on how to do so. Later,
JZ made cryptic references to the “last night with
[Appellant]” when he was “doin the laundry,” which
“still haunt[ed]” her. JZ asked Appellant if he
remembered “the laundry,” to which Appellant
responded that he did remember “[t]alking to [JZ]
while doing laundry.” JZ responded with a “thumbs
up” symbol, to which Appellant responded with a
winking emoji and “[t]hought so.” Appellant and JZ
shared that each missed the other and liked the
other’s smile. Coupled with JZ’s troubling behavior,
the messages led AS to believe that “there was
something going on” and she “wanted it to be
investigated.” Although most of these electronic
messages were later lost, AS printed a copy at the
time.
AS took the messages to the Family Advocacy
office at Aviano AB. Family Advocacy referred AS to
the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).
However, when the AFOSI interviewed JZ, she denied
that Appellant had abused her, and the investigation
ended.
AS and the children moved out of the house to stay
with friends before Appellant returned from Nellis
AFB, and the children never lived with Appellant
again. According to AS, Appellant was uncooperative
with AS’s efforts to return to the United States, and
(60a)
he refused to provide adequate financial support until
she sought assistance from his chain of command. As
a result, AS sold most of the family’s belongings in
order to raise money, which caused further acrimony.
AS and her children were eventually able to leave
Italy and return to Washington; the divorce became
final in March 2016.
In the months that followed their departure from
Italy, JZ moved multiple times within Washington
between her mother AS, her biological father, and her
grandparents. By the beginning of 2017, JZ was 11
years old and again living with AS, who had
remarried. Although AS had taken away JZ’s tablet,
JZ’s school had provided her a laptop computer with
Internet capability. In early 2017, AS learned that JZ
had been communicating again via Facebook with
Appellant, who was still stationed at Aviano AB.
When confronted, JZ initially denied communicating
with Appellant, but soon JZ admitted that she had
been doing so, and she permitted AS to read the
messages. As AS and her husband reviewed the
messages, JZ initially lay quietly on a couch before she
covered her head with a blanket and began to cry.
The messages between Appellant and JZ ranged
from mundane descriptions of daily activities, to false
claims by JZ on such subjects as owning horses and
being pregnant, to expressions of mutual affection and
attraction. Appellant repeatedly commented that he
felt a special bond with JZ, that he thought she was
beautiful, and that he wanted to hold and kiss her.
One notable early exchange included the following:
(61a)
[JZ:] remember when mom used to go to the
gym on weekends and we would hang out
[Appellant:] Yes
[JZ:] do you remember what we did when we
hung out
[Appellant:] Yes
Do you
She didn’t like me and you spending time
together
[JZ:] Yea I do
Did she know?!
[Appellant:] Idk what you told her or what she
thinks she knows I didn’t say anything about
hanging out
We watched movies
[JZ:] I said the same thing
In later messages, Appellant implied and then
expressed his purported sexual attraction to JZ more
openly. Appellant told JZ he thought about sex often,
had thought about having sex with JZ, and would be
willing to have sex with her when she was older,
because “that’s the legal answer.” When JZ told
Appellant she would kiss and marry Appellant if she
was his age, he responded that JZ was “gorgeous,
smart and fun,” and he would kiss and marry her too
(62a)
if they were the same age. Later, Appellant told JZ he
could “teach [her] a thing or two” about sex “when she
was ready to learn.” When JZ asked Appellant if he
would send her a picture of his “you know what” if she
asked him to, Appellant responded that he “would if
[JZ] sent one back.” JZ replied that she “would send
one” when she was “alone,” to which Appellant
responded “Damn,”
“Same.” When JZ asked
Appellant “on a scale of 1-10 how bad do you want to
have sex with me,” Appellant told her the answer was
ten; JZ responded “same.” Then the following
exchange ensued:
[JZ:] I am being for real with this one…It
honestly SUCKS that we cant have sex till im
18
[Appellant:] Yeah
Well I think it’s 17 with consent If you really
wanted to
[JZ:] yeah
[Appellant:] But 18 is just safer
[JZ:] yep for sure
[Appellant:] Does suck
[JZ:] yea if you REALLY wanted to… would
you have sex while it is still illegal just
questioning
[Appellant:] Maybe
(63a)
But it’s better when you are of age
[JZ:] yup
[Appellant:] Just because it can still come back
on me
[JZ:] yea it can
[Appellant:] That’s why I said maybe because
it’s not yes but it’s not saying no
[JZ:] true true
[Appellant:] Wish you were of age now
Later, Appellant and JZ joked about JZ taking her
pants and underwear off when she came to visit him
sometime. When Appellant dared her to do so, JZ
asked “Why? What will you do if I do?” Appellant
responded, “Idk,” “That’s hot though.” At another
point, Appellant suggested JZ might secretly meet
Appellant when he came to Washington to visit his
father.
Perceiving that some of the messages were sexual
in nature, AS asked JZ if Appellant had done anything
to her physically while they were in Italy. JZ replied
that Appellant had. The following morning AS took JZ
to the civilian police in Washington, who began an
investigation and contacted the AFOSI.
At trial, JZ testified inter alia that Appellant
touched her inappropriately when they lived together
(64a)
in Italy.4 According to JZ, on multiple occasions when
AS was at the gym, Appellant brought JZ to the
laundry room while her brother and sister were
upstairs watching movies. In the laundry room,
Appellant put her on top of the dryer or washing
machine and put his hands underneath her shirt. She
further testified that “sometimes” he would also pick
her up and hold her by her “butt” against the front of
his body, and sometimes he “wrapped his hands
around [her] waist.” JZ further testified that on
multiple occasions when AS was away from the house
Appellant took JZ to JZ’s bedroom, which like the
laundry room was on the bottom floor. According to
JZ, in the bedroom Appellant inserted his fingers and
his tongue in her vagina as she lay on the bed.
The military judge found Appellant guilty of one
specification of committing lewd acts on JZ by
communicating indecent language to her on divers
occasions with the intent to gratify his sexual desire,
and one specification of committing a lewd act on JZ
by “putting his arms around [JZ], and intentionally
touching and holding onto her buttocks with his
hands, with an intent to gratify his sexual desire.” The
military judge found Appellant not guilty of one
specification of sexual assault against JZ by
penetrating her vulva with his fingers and one
specification of sexual assault by penetrating her
vulva with his tongue, both with the intent to gratify
4 JZ was 13 years old at the time of Appellant’s trial.
(65a)
his sexual desire.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
1. Law
We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de
novo. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399
(C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted). Our assessment of
legal and factual sufficiency is limited to the evidence
produced at trial. United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270,
272 (C.M.A. 1993) (citations omitted).
“The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J.
294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted). “[I]n
resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound
to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence
of record in favor of the prosecution.” United States v.
Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations
omitted). As a result, “[t]he standard for legal
sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a
conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221
(C.A.A.F. 2019) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after
weighing the evidence in the record of trial and
making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses, [we are] convinced of the [appellant]’s
(66a)
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987). “In
conducting this unique appellate role, we take ‘a fresh,
impartial look at the evidence,’ applying ‘neither a
presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt’
to ‘make [our] own independent determination as to
whether the evidence constitutes proof of each
required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United
States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
Washington, 57 M.J. at 399), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289
(C.A.A.F. 2018). Article 120b(c), UCMJ, provides:
“Any person subject to this chapter who commits a
lewd act upon a child is guilty of sexual abuse of a
child and shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(2016 ed.) (MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 45b.a.(c). A “child” is “any
person who has not attained the age of 16 years.”
MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45b.a.(h)(4). The term “lewd act”
includes, inter alia, “any sexual contact with a child”
and “intentionally communicating indecent language
to a child by any means, including via any
communication technology, with an intent to . . .
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”
MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45b.a.(h)(5). “‘Indecent’ language is
that which is grossly offensive to modesty, decency, or
propriety, or shocks the moral sense, because of its
vulgar, filthy, or disgusting nature, or its tendency to
incite lustful thought. Language is indecent if it tends
reasonably to corrupt morals or incite libidinous
thoughts.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 89.c. “Sexual contact”
includes “any touching . . . either directly or through
(67a)
the clothing, [of] any body part of any person, if done
with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45.a.(g)(2); see MCM, pt.
IV, ¶ 45b.a.(h)(1).
2. Analysis
Appellant asserts the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support his conviction for
either specification for which the military judge found
him guilty. We consider each specification in turn.
a. Intentionally Communicating Indecent
Language
On appeal, Appellant does not contest that he in
fact sent the messages in question to JZ, that he did
so intentionally, or that he knew JZ’s age. With
respect to the content of the messages, the indecency
of a communication depends on “the context in which
it is made.” United States v. Green, 68 M.J. 266, 270
(C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted). In this case,
Appellant communicated to an 11-year-old child that
he thought about sex a lot, that he desired to have
sexual intercourse with her in the future, that his
sexual desire for her was a ten out of ten, that it
“sucked” that they could not have sex before she was
17 or 18 years old, and that he would “maybe” have
sex with her earlier even if it was illegal. In addition,
he discussed—albeit hypothetically—sending a photo
of his genitals to JZ in return for a photo of hers. The
context for these communications included, as the
military judge found, that Appellant had previously
touched JZ’s buttocks and torso with the intent to
(68a)
gratify his sexual desire, when she was only nine
years old and he was her stepfather. We find
Appellant sent JZ messages that were “grossly
offensive to modesty, decency, or propriety,” and
therefore indecent. MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 89.c.
Without conceding indecency, Appellant contends
for purposes of argument that even if we find some of
his later messages were indecent, there is insufficient
evidence of his intent to gratify his sexual desire,
because he told JZ they should wait until she was 18
years old to have sex. We disagree and find ample
evidence that Appellant intended to gratify his sexual
desire at the time he sent the messages. Again, the
context for these messages included that Appellant
had touched JZ’s body for the purpose of gratifying his
sexual desire when they lived in Italy. The nature of
the messages and Appellant’s comments suggest he
found his communications with JZ sexually
stimulating. If there were any doubt, his comment
that he found contemplating JZ removing her pants
and underwear when she visited him to be “hot” would
lay it to rest.
b. Sexual Contact
With respect to the specification that Appellant
committed sexual contact on JZ by putting his arms
around her and putting his hands on her buttocks
with the intent to gratify his sexual desire, Appellant
contends JZ’s testimony is simply not credible enough
to sustain his conviction. In fact, there are significant
problems with JZ’s credibility. She was reluctant to
(69a)
testify about certain events, notably the sexual acts
Appellant allegedly performed on her in her bedroom
in Italy. Her testimony was sometimes confusing and
incomplete, requiring the counsel and military judge
to readdress the same events with her multiple times.
More significantly, by her own admission JZ lied
about many things from 2015 to 2017. She often lied
in her 2017 messages to Appellant about owning
horses and having a boyfriend, and she lied to
Appellant and others about being pregnant; according
to JZ, she did so to get “attention.” More
problematically, JZ admitted that she had lied to
investigators about Appellant’s offenses. She lied to
the AFOSI in 2015 when she denied Appellant had
touched her inappropriately, because she was “young,
dumb, and [she] thought [she] would get in trouble.”
JZ admitted she lied to the civilian police in 2017
when she told them she kicked Appellant when he was
touching her, and when she claimed at one point
Appellant had threatened to kill her mother AS. JZ
testified she did not know why she told these lies. JZ
told the military judge she understood it was
important to tell the truth in her courtroom
testimony, and she indicated she had put her “lying
ways” behind her; however, when the military judge
asked JZ why he should believe what she said about
Appellant when she had “said so many lies in the
past,” she responded “I don’t have an answer to that.”
The military judge evidently recognized JZ’s
credibility problems. He questioned her directly about
the importance of telling the truth and confronted her
(70a)
about her admitted past false statements. Notably,
after both parties rested the military judge recalled JZ
to give further testimony. Among other questions, the
military judge focused JZ on “the first time” Appellant
touched JZ, which she confirmed was in the laundry
room. JZ described again how Appellant picked her up
and put her on the washing machine or dryer. Then
Appellant put his hands “in [her] shirt” and “around
[her] waist.” At another point, he “picked [her] up and
held [her] by the butt.” She explained:
So you know how like you hold like a little
kid off to the side or like you’re holding
someone and you kind of like hold them kind
of like by the thigh I guess. He had his hands
like around my butt.
....
I think he was lifting me off of whatever I
was sitting on. And he had picked me up and
he was holding me by the butt. And then
instead of like having me off to the side kind
of on his hip, he kind of had me in front of
him.
The military judge found Appellant not guilty of
the alleged sexual acts in JZ’s bedroom. However, he
found Appellant guilty of one instance of alleged
sexual contact in the laundry room, in accordance
with JZ’s recall testimony. Significantly, unlike the
alleged bedroom incidents, JZ’s contemporary
messages to Appellant in 2015 corroborated that
something significant occurred between her and
(71a)
Appellant in the laundry room. In addition, her
testimony regarding this incident was more certain,
specific, and definite than her description of the
bedroom incidents. We are also cognizant that the
military judge observed JZ’s testimony and evidently
carefully considered her credibility. Coupled with
Appellant’s response of “good” when JZ promised not
to “tell anybody” about them in 2015, Appellant
immediately sending instructions on how to delete
Facebook messages, and other evidence of Appellant’s
sexual interest in JZ, we conclude the evidence
supports the military judge’s findings.
c. Conclusion as to Legal and Factual
Sufficiency
Drawing every reasonable inference from the
evidence of record in favor of the Government, we
conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support
Appellant’s convictions for sexual abuse of a child by
communicating indecent language and by sexual
contact. See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297–98.
Additionally, having weighed the evidence in the
record of trial and having made allowances for not
having personally observed the witnesses, we are
convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Turner, 25 M.J. at 325.
B. Ambiguous Finding
1. Additional Background
Specification 3 of the Charge alleged that
Appellant:
[D]id, at or near Fanna, Italy, on divers
(72a)
occasions, between on or about 7 August
2014 and on or about 21 January 2015,
commit lewd acts upon [JZ], a child who
had not attained the age of 12 years, to wit:
intentionally touching her buttocks with
his hands, with an intent to gratify his
sexual desire.
(Emphasis added).
JZ’s initial testimony indicated Appellant touched
her on her buttocks and elsewhere multiple times in
the laundry room. As described above, after both
parties had rested, the military judge exercised his
authority under Article 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846, to
recall JZ for additional testimony. During that recall
testimony, the military judge had JZ focus on “the first
time” Appellant touched JZ, which JZ confirmed was
in the laundry room. JZ again described how
Appellant put his arms around her and held her by
her buttocks on that occasion.
The military judge found Appellant guilty of
Specification 3 by exceptions and substitutions.
According to the modified specification, the military
judge found that Appellant:
[D]id, at or near Fanna, Italy, in the laundry
room of the family home, on the day of the
first alleged touching incident, between
on or about 7 August 2014 and on or about
21 January 2015, commit a lewd act upon
[JZ], a child who had not attained the age
of 12 years, to wit: putting his arms
(73a)
around [JZ], and intentionally touching
and holding onto her buttocks with his
hands, with an intent to gratify his sexual
desire.
2. Law
“Whether a verdict is ambiguous and thus
precludes a [Court of Criminal Appeals] from
performing a factual sufficiency review is a question
of law reviewed de novo.” United States v. Ross, 68
M.J. 415, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (emphasis and citation
omitted).
“One or more words or figures may be excepted
from a specification, and, when necessary, others
substituted, if the remaining language of the
specification, with or without substitutions, states an
offense by the accused which is punishable by courtmartial.” United States v. Trew, 68 M.J. 364, 367
(C.A.A.F. 2010) (quoting Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 918(a)(1), Discussion).
“[W]hen the phrase ‘on divers occasions’ is removed
from a specification, the effect is that ‘the accused has
been found guilty of misconduct on a single occasion
and not guilty on the remaining occasions.’” United
States v. Wilson, 67 M.J. 423, 428 (C.A.A.F. 2009)
(quoting United States v. Augspurger, 61 M.J. 189, 190
(C.A.A.F. 2005)). “If there is no indication on the
record which of the alleged incidents forms the basis
of the conviction, then the findings of guilt are
ambiguous and the Court of Criminal Appeals cannot
perform a factual sufficiency review.” Id. (citing
(74a)
United States v. Walters, 58 M.J. 391, 396–97
(C.A.A.F. 2003)). “[T]he remedy for a Walters violation
is to set aside the finding of guilty to the affected
specification and dismiss it with prejudice.” United
States v. Scheurer, 62 M.J. 100, 112 (C.A.A.F. 2005)
(footnote omitted).
3. Analysis
Appellant was charged with intentionally touching
JZ’s buttocks on divers occasions. The military judge
excepted the “on divers occasions” language and found
Appellant guilty of touching JZ on only a single
occasion, “on the day of the first alleged touching
incident” which occurred “in the laundry room.” By
specifying in the substituted language the single
occasion for which he was finding Appellant guilty,
the military judge ensured the record indicated which
alleged incident formed the basis of the conviction,
and thereby avoided a fa- tally ambiguous finding.
Appellant contends the finding is nevertheless
fatally ambiguous because the military judge did not
identify the date on which he found the unlawful
touching occurred. However, we find nothing in
Walters or its progeny that requires that a date be
used to “reflect the specific instance of conduct upon
which [the] modified findings are based.” Walters, 58
M.J. at 396. In many cases, a witness may provide
testimony of sufficient strength to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, yet be unable to recall the date of
the event with any specificity. In this case, JZ testified
specifically to Appellant’s actions on the first occasion
(75a)
that he touched her in the laundry room, and the
military judge made clear that single identifiable
incident was the basis for his non-divers findings.
That is an adequate indication for this court to
perform its factual sufficiency review, and it is what
Walters requires.
C. Equal Access to Evidence
1. Additional Background
At trial, AS testified that when she discovered the
first exchange of Facebook messages between
Appellant and JZ in 2015, she made screenshots of
messages on JZ’s Facebook account. AS then emailed
these screenshots to herself, printed them out, and
provided these printouts to the Family Advocacy office
and to the AFOSI at Aviano AB. After AS discovered
Appellant’s second Facebook exchange with JZ in
2017, she found that the 2015 conversation had been
deleted. However, she still had her email to herself
from 2015.
At the conclusion of AS’s direct examination, trial
defense counsel informed the military judge that this
was the first time they had learned about her email to
herself, which the Defense had not received in
discovery, although they had received the screenshots
of the messages. Trial defense counsel stated the
Defense would not be prepared to cross-examine AS
“until we get that discovery from the government.”
Senior trial counsel explained the email had not been
turned over because it was not in the possession of the
Government; AS had accessed the email herself. The
(76a)
military judge recessed the court-martial for 43
minutes in order for AS to provide the email to the
parties. Trial defense counsel then proceeded with
cross-examination without further delay.
Subsequently, Special Agent (SA) IP of the AFOSI
testified regarding various steps he took to investigate
the case. On cross-examination, senior trial defense
counsel asked SA IP whether he had attempted to
download JZ’s entire Facebook profile. SA IP testified
that he had, through a process offered by Facebook
itself which he described as a “dump” of “every single
piece of information or activity that [JZ] ever did on
Facebook.”5 However, SA IP testified he did not review
the entire “dump.” He began to review the chat
portion, but found “it was hard to tell who [was]
sending and who was receiving the messages, because
instead of having a name, you had a number.” As a
result, SA IP decided to rely on screenshots or
“snippets” that the agents created from the messages
displayed onscreen, because those “would be a good
representation of what the communication was.”
However, these screenshots would not have included
any deleted messages. SA IP did not know if the
“dump” would have included deleted messages.
In response to questions from the military judge,
5 On redirect examination, SA IP explained that AS
had provided oral and written consent for the
Facebook “dump,” although he understood the scope
was limited to Facebook messages between Appellant
and JZ.
(77a)
SA IP testified that as of Appellant’s trial, AFOSI no
longer had the Facebook “dump.” He explained that
he “never saved it out of the computer that we have,
and t
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