Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Kalab D. Willman, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2021

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No. ____

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

KALAB D. WILLMAN, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES

Respondent.

__________

On Petition for a Writ to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

__________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

THOMAS R. GOVAN JR.

Counsel of Record

SARA J. HICKMON

ESHAWN R. RAWLLEY

MEGAN E. HOFFMAN

DAVID L. BOSNER

RYAN S. CRNKOVICH

MATTHEW L. BLYTH

Appellate Defense Counsel

Air Force Appellate Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4782

Thomas.govan@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

Article 66 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ) obligates the military Courts of Criminal

Appeals (CCAs) to evaluate the entire record to

determine whether a court-martial sentence is correct

in law, correct in fact, and appropriate. In United

States v. Willman, a divided Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces (CAAF) interpreted this mandate to

preclude the CCAs from considering, for sentence

appropriateness purposes, matters properly attached

to the record that are used to determine whether

sentences are correct in law.

The Question Presented is:

Does the CAAF’s decision prevent the

CCAs from fulfilling their Congressionally

imposed mandate pursuant to Article 66,

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866, to determine the

appropriateness of sentences imposed by

courts-martial based on the entire record?

i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA):

United States v. Willman, No. ACM 39642 (Sept.

2, 2020)

United States v. Frantz, No. ACM 39657 (Nov. 10,

2020)

United States v. Turner, No. ACM 39706 (Nov. 25,

2020)

United States v. Williams, No. ACM 39746 (Mar.

12, 2021)

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF):

United States v. Willman, 8.1. M.J. 355 (C.A.A.F.

2021)

United States v. Frantz, No. 21-0146/AF (Aug.

10, 2021)

United States v. Turner, No. 21-0130/AF (Aug.

10, 2021)

United States v. Williams, No. 21-0243/AF (Aug.

10, 2021)

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .................................................. i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ............................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................... vi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI .......................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ......................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ............................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED .......................................................... 2

INTRODUCTION ............................................................. 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 7

A. Legal Background ....................................... 7

B. Procedural and Factual Background ....... 12

1. United States v. Willman .................... 12

2. United States v. Frantz ....................... 13

3. United States v. Turner....................... 14

4. United States v. Williams ................... 15

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..................... 16

A. The CAAF’s decision violates the

Congressional mandate of Article

66, UCMJ ............................................ 18

B. The CAAF’s decision will continue to

create confusion in the military

courts ................................................. 21

C. The CAAF’s decision contravenes

Congressional intent for military

iii

courts to serve as the primary

source

for

servicemembers

seeking sentence relief. ...................... 23

D.

The CAAF's decision will preclude

servicemembers from seeking

sentencing relief from improper

post-trial confinement conditions

in the military courts where no

comparable relief is available in

the civilian court system ..................... 27

CONCLUSION .............................................................. 30

APPENDIX ........................................................ 1a

United States v. Willman

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Opinion

(Jul. 21, 2021) ................................................. 4a

United States v. Willman,

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Dec. 21, 2020) .............................................. 23a

United States v. Willman,

United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion

(Sept 3, 2020)................................................ 25a

United States v. Frantz,

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Aug. 10, 2021) ............................................. 56a

United States v. Frantz,

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(March 23, 2021) .......................................... 58a

iv

United States v. Frantz

United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion

(Nov. 10, 2020) ............................................. 60a

United States v. Turner,

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Aug. 10, 2021) ........................................... 127a

United States v. Turner,

United States Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces, Order

(Mar. 15, 2021) ........................................... 129a

United States v. Turner,

United States Air Force Court of Criminal

Appeals, Opinion

(Nov. 25, 2020) ........................................... 131a

United States v. Williams

United States Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces, Order

(Aug. 10, 2021) ........................................... 184a

United States v. Williams,

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Jun. 25, 2021) ............................................ 186a

United States v. Williams,

United States Air Force Court of

Criminal Appeals, Opinion

(Mar. 12, 2021) ........................................... 188a

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Burns v. Wilson,

346 U.S. 137 (1953) ............................................... 27

Feres v. United States,

340 U.S. 146 (1950) ............................................... 29

Greer v. United States,

141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021) ........................................... 19

Lawrence v. McCarthy,

344 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003) ................................. 28

Loving v. United States,

62 M.J. 235 (C.A.A.F. 2005) .................................. 28

Ortiz v. United States,

138 S. Ct. 2165 (2018) ......................................... 2, 7

Noyd v. Bond,

395 U.S. 683 (1969) ......................................... 28, 29

Parisi v. Davidson,

405 U.S. 733 (1972) ............................................... 28

Parker v. Levy,

417 U.S. 733 (1974) ......................................... 27, 28

Puckett v. United States,

556 U.S. 129 (2009) ................................................. 8

Schlesinger v. Councilman,

420 U.S. 738 (1975) ............................................... 23

Schnitzer v. Harvey,

389 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ............................... 29

Sweet v. Taylor,

178 F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959) ............................. 8

vi

United States v. Boone,

49 M.J. 187 (C.A.A.F. 1998) .................................. 26

United States v. Cole,

31 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1990) ...................................... 7

United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625 (2002) ............................................... 20

United States v. Denedo,

556 U.S. 904 (2009) ................................................. 8

United States v. Dominguez Benitez,

542 U.S. 74 (2004) ................................................. 20

United States v. DuBay,

17 C.M.A. 147 (1967) ............................................. 25

United States v. Erby,

54 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2001) ...................... 10, 11, 25

United States v. Fagnan,

12 C.M.A. 192 (1961) .................................... 9-10, 25

United States v. Gay,

75 M.J. 264 (C.A.A.F. 2016) .............................. 9, 11

United States v. Healy,

26 M.J. 394 (C.M.A. 1988) .......................... 9, 22, 26

United States v. Hutchison,

57 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2002) .................................. 26

United States v. Jacinto,

81 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2021) .................................. 22

United States v. Jacinto,

79 M.J. 870 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.

2020) ...................................................................... 22

United States v. Jessie,

79 M.J. 437 (C.A.A.F. 2020) ...........................passim

vii

United States v. Kelly,

77 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. 2018) ........................ 7, 24, 26

United States v. Lacy,

50 M.J. 286 (C.A.A.F. 1999) .................................. 26

United States v. Matthews,

2020 AFCCA LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct.

Crim. App. June 2, 2020) (unpub. Op.) ................ 21

United States v. Murphy,

50 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 1998) ...................................... 18

United States v. Roach,

66 M.J. 410 (C.A.A.F. 2008) ........................ 7, 18, 24

United States v. Vonn,

535 U.S. 55 (2002) ................................................. 19

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. CONST. amend. I.................................................. 8

U.S. CONST. amend. V ............................................. 5, 8

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ...................................passim

Statutes and Regulations

10 U.S.C. § 854 (2016) ................................................ 2

10 U.S.C. § 854 (2019) .............................................. 19

10 U.S.C. § 855 (2016) ................................................ 3

10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2016) ............................................ 3

10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2019) ............................................ 3

10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2016) ...................................... 4, 19

10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1) (2019)........................................ 4

10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2016) ............................................ 5

10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2019) ............................................ 5

viii

10 U.S.C. § 867a (2019) .............................................. 2

10 U.S.C. § 920 (2019) .............................................. 15

10 U.S.C. § 920b (2016) ............................................ 13

10 U.S.C. § 920c (2016) ............................................. 12

10 U.S.C. § 928 (2019) .............................................. 14

28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2019) .............................................. 2

Article 54, Uniform Code of Military

Justice ............................................................... 2, 19

Article 55, Uniform Code of Military

Justice .............................................................passim

Article 66, Uniform Code of Military

Justice .............................................................passim

Article 66(a), Uniform Code of Military

Justice ...................................................................... 3

Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military

Justice .............................................................passim

Article 66(d)(1), Uniform Code of

Military Justice ...................................................... 4

Article 66(f), Uniform Code of Military

Justice .................................................................... 20

Article 67, Uniform Code of Military

Justice ...................................................................... 5

Article 67(a), Uniform Code of Military

Justice ...................................................................... 5

Article 67a, Uniform Code of Military

Justice ...................................................................... 2

Article 120, Uniform Code of Military

Justice .................................................................... 15

ix

Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military

Justice .................................................................... 13

Article 120c, Uniform Code of Military

Justice .................................................................... 12

Article 128, Uniform Code of Military

Justice .................................................................... 14

National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2017,

Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5330,

130 Stat. 2932 (2016) .............................................. 3

National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2017,

Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5331,

130 Stat. 2934 (2016) .............................................. 5

Other Authorities

Rule 30A, Rules of Practice and

Procedure, United States Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces (June

22, 2017) ................................................................ 20

Rule 23(b), The Joint Rules of Appellate

Procedure for Courts of Criminal

Appeals (January 1, 2019) .................................... 20

x

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners respectfully petition for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgments of the CAAF.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion in United States v. Willman from the

Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) is not

reported, but is available at 2020 CCA LEXIS 300. It

is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet. App. 25a. The

CAAF’s affirmation is published at 81 M.J. 355

(C.A.A.F. 2021) and is reprinted in the Appendix at

Pet. App. 4a.

The opinion in United States v. Frantz from the

AFCCA is not reported, but is available at 2020 CCA

LEXIS 404. It is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet.

App. 60a. The CAAF’s affirmation is not reported, but

is available at 2021 CAAF LEXIS 744. It is reprinted

in the Appendix at Pet. App. 52a.

The opinion in United States v. Turner from the

AFCCA is not reported, but is available at 2020 CCA

LEXIS 428. It is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet.

App. 131a. The CAAF’s affirmation is not reported,

but is available at 2021 CAAF LEXIS 736. It is

reprinted in the Appendix at Pet. App. 118a.

The opinion in United States v. Williams from the

AFCCA is not reported, but is available at 2020 CCA

LEXIS 109. It is reprinted in the Appendix at Pet.

App. 188a. The CAAF’s affirmation is not reported,

but is available at 2021 CAAF LEXIS 745. It is

reprinted in the Appendix at Pet. App. 171a.

1

JURISDICTION

The CAAF granted review of Petitioner Willman’s

direct appeal; on July 21, 2021, it affirmed the

AFCCA’s decision. Pet. App. 4a. The CAAF also

granted Petitioner Frantz’s, Petitioner Turner’s, and

Petitioner Williams’s cases; on August 10, 2021, it

summarily affirmed the AFCCA’s decisions in those

cases as well. Pet. App. 52a, 118a, 171a. On October

12, 2021, the Chief Justice extended the time within

which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to

December 18, 2021. This Court’s jurisdiction over

each case emanates from Article 67a, Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 867a, and 28

U.S.C. § 1259. See Ortiz v. United States, 138 S. Ct.

2165 (2018).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that: “Excessive bail shall not

be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend.

VIII.

Article 54, Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 854 (2016), Record of Trial,

stated in relevant part:

(a) Each general court-martial shall keep

a separate record of the proceedings in

each case brought before it, and the

record shall be authenticated by the

signature of the military judge

...

2

(c)(1) A complete record of the

proceedings and testimony shall be

prepared—

(A) in each general court-martial case in

which the sentence adjudged includes

death, a dismissal, a discharge, or (if the

sentence adjudged does not include a

discharge) any other punishment which

exceeds that which may otherwise be

adjudged by a special court-martial[.]

Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (2016), Cruel

and Unusual Punishments Prohibited, stated:

Punishment by flogging, or by branding,

marking, or tattooing on the body, or any

other cruel or unusual punishment, may

not be adjudged by any court-martial or

inflicted upon any person subject to this

chapter. The use of irons, single or

double, except for the purpose of safe

custody, is prohibited.

Article 66(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2016),

Review by Court of Criminal Appeals,1 stated in

relevant parts:

The Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA 2016)

subsequently modified Article 66, UCMJ.

See

National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year

2017 (NDAA 2017), Pub. L. 114-328, div. E, title LIX,

§ 5330, 130 Stat. 2932. However, the MJA 2016 did

not alter the cited language above. See Article 66(a),

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (2019).

1

3

Each Judge Advocate General shall

establish a Court of Criminal Appeals

which shall be composed of one or more

panels, and each such panel shall be

composed of not less than three appellate

military judges. For the purposes of

reviewing court-martial cases, the court

may sit in panels or as a whole . . .

Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2016),

Review by Court of Criminal Appeals, stated:2

In a case referred to it, the Court of

Criminal Appeals may act only with

respect to the findings and sentence as

approved by the convening authority. It

may affirm only such findings of guilty

and the sentence or such part and

amount of the sentence, as it finds

correct in law and fact and determines,

on the basis of the entire record, should

be approved. In considering the record,

it may weigh the evidence, judge the

credibility of witnesses, and determine

controverted

questions

of

fact,

2 The MJA 2016 modified the above cited language;

however, the CCAs remain limited to acting “only with

respect to the findings and sentence,” and “may affirm

only such findings of guilty, and the sentence or such

part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds

correct in law and fact and determines . . . should be

approved.” Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §

866(d)(1) (2019).

4

recognizing that the trial court saw and

heard the witnesses.

Article 67(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2016),

Review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,

stated:3

The Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces shall review the record in—

(1) all cases in which the sentence, as

affirmed by a Court of Criminal Appeals,

extends to death;

(2) all cases reviewed by a Court of

Criminal Appeals which the Judge

Advocate General orders sent to the

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

for review; and

(3) all cases reviewed by a Court of

Criminal Appeals in which, upon

petition of the accused and on good cause

shown, the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces has granted review.

The MJA 2016 modified Article 67, UCMJ. See

NDAA 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, div. E, title LIX, § 5331,

130 Stat. 2934. However, the MJA 2016 altered the

cited language above only to the extent that certain

notification is required prior to certifying a case.

Article 67(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2019).

3

5

INTRODUCTION

This case is about removing an unreasonable

imposition on the CCAs’ ability to fulfill their

statutory duties to provide servicemembers the

chance to seek a form of sentencing relief unique to

the military justice system. The CAAF’s decision

below both violates that mandate and produces an

incongruous result.

In a divided opinion, the CAAF held that, on the

one hand, formerly outside-the-record materials that

were properly attached to the record on appeal in

support of Petitioners’ Eighth Amendment and Article

55, UCMJ, claims could be considered by the CCAs in

reviewing those legal challenges. But, on the other

hand, the CAAF held that those same attached

materials were “outside the record” and could not be

considered for purposes of the CCAs’ mandated review

of the appropriateness of Petitioners’ sentences under

Article 66(c), UCMJ.

Beyond violating the plain language of the statute,

the CAAF’s decision is particularly problematic for

servicemembers in the context of asserting claims of

improper post-trial confinement conditions. As in

Petitioners’ cases here, servicemembers’ claims of

improper post-trial confinement conditions often arise

after the record of trial is completed. Unlike in federal

and state courts, which provide procedures for postconviction relief, the military justice system limits

servicemembers’ ability to seek collateral relief. Thus,

despite Congress’ intent to provide servicemembers

the opportunity to seek sentence appropriateness

relief in the CCAs, the CAAF’s decision curtails the

CCAs’ authority to consider evidence properly

supplemented to the record in conducting this unique

6

review, and leaves servicemembers with no other

forum to seek such relief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the United

States Constitution, “Congress has long provided for

specialized military courts to adjudicate charges

against servicemembers.” Ortiz, 138 S. Ct. at 2170.

Congress vested in the service CCAs the

extraordinary power to review both the legal and

factual findings of courts-martial, as well as the

sentences they impose—a scope of power not granted

by Congress to the CAAF or the federal Circuit Courts

of Appeals:

[T]he scope of review by the Courts of

Criminal Appeals differs in significant

respect from direct review in the civilian

federal appellate courts. In addition to

reviewing the case for legal error in a

manner similar to other appellate

courts…Congress has provided the Courts

of Criminal Appeals with plenary, de novo

power of review and the ability to

determine, on the basis of the entire record

which findings and sentence should be

approved.

United States v. Roach, 66 M.J. 410, 412 (C.A.A.F.

2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see

also United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A.

1990). Given their “awesome, plenary, de novo power

of review . . . it is little wonder that [the CAAF] has

described the CCAs as having a carte blanche to do

justice.” United States v. Kelly, 77 M.J. 404, 406

7

(C.A.A.F. 2018) (internal quotations and citations

omitted).

Congress intended the CAAF to enforce procedural

safeguards it provided to those serving in the nation’s

armed services, i.e., to “assure that procedural due

process has been observed, that evidence supports the

verdict and judgment of the court, and that

fundamental rights have been observed.” Sweet v.

Taylor, 178 F. Supp. 456, 459 (D. Kan. 1959). As noted

by this Court, the Article I origins of the CAAF and

the service CCAs should compel them to be more

attuned to their jurisdictional responsibilities than

their federal judicial brethren. See United States v.

Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 912 (2009).

Article 66(c), UCMJ, statutorily requires the CCAs

to act with respect to the findings and sentence of a

court-martial, and to affirm only such findings of

guilty and the sentence or such part and amount of

the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and

determines, on the basis of the entire record, should

be approved.

In United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437 (C.A.A.F.

2020), the CAAF considered whether the CCA

conducted a proper review of the appellant’s sentence

under Article 66(c), UCMJ, when it did not consider

the appellant’s First and Fifth Amendment claims

when assessing the lawfulness and appropriateness of

his sentence. Id. at 438. The CAAF first considered

whether the CCA was authorized to consider

materials outside the record that the appellant

submitted in support of his constitutional claims. Id.

at 440.

In resolving this question, the CAAF

identified and considered three distinct and

conflicting lines of its own precedent which might

8

inform its decision: 1) precedents restricting the

service CCAs to reviewing materials included in the

“entire record”; 2) precedents allowing the service

CCAs to supplement the record in resolving issues

raised by the record4; and 3) precedents allowing the

CCAs to consider matters entirely outside the record.

Id.

The first line of precedent stems from United

States v. Fagnan, 12 C.M.A. 192, 30 C.M.R. 192

(1961), which established a “clear rule” that the

service CCAs may not consider anything outside of the

“entire record” when reviewing a sentence under

Article 66(c). Id. at 441 (citation omitted). The CAAF

subsequently re-affirmed this rule in United States v.

Healy, 26 M.J. 394 (C.M.A. 1988). Id. The Fagnan

rule did not preclude the service CCAs from

considering an appellant’s confinement conditions if

the record already contained information about those

conditions (for example, by way of an appellant’s

written clemency petition). Id. at 441-42 (citing

United States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264 (C.A.A.F. 2016)).

But the Fagnan rule did preclude the service CCAs

from considering information provided for the first

time at the appellate stage of the litigation, such as an

appellant’s written declaration of post-trial

4 The second line of precedent permits service CCAs to

supplement the record when deciding issues that are

raised, but not fully resolved, by evidence in the

record, see Jessie, 79 M.J. at 442—a situation not at

issue here where the Petitioners’ complaints

regarding their respective post-trial confinement

conditions were not raised by materials already in the

record of trial.

9

confinement conditions. Such matters fall outside of

what the Fagnan court considered “the entire record.”

Jessie, 79 M.J. at 441-42.

The third line of CAAF precedent on the issue of

the scope of Article 66(c) review deviated further from

the first than did the second. This line of precedent

permitted the service CCAs to consider materials

wholly outside what it considered the “entire record”

when reviewing issues which were not raised by any

materials within the record. Id. at 443. The leading

case in this line of precedent is United States v. Erby,

54 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2001), wherein the appellant

sought sentence relief from the CCA because his

treatment at the hands of prison officials amounted to

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ. The CCA

held it lacked authority to review appellant’s claim

because the appellant’s alleged mistreatment was not

part of the sentence adjudged, and because the

appellant had failed to raise the matter of his

mistreatment in clemency. Id. at 477. The CAAF

reversed, holding that Article 66(c) did grant the CCA

the authority to review appellant’s cruel and unusual

punishment claim, explaining that Article 66(c)

imposed upon the CCAs the duty to determine

whether a sentence is correct “in law,” which included

the duty to “ensure that the severity of the adjudged

and approved sentence has not been unlawfully

increased by prison officials.” Id at 478-79.

Confronted with all three competing lines of

precedent, the Jessie court, in a split 3-2 decision,

opted to re-affirm Fagnan and its progeny, reasoning

that in Fagnan, it “correctly interpreted the express

requirement that a CCA base its review on the ‘entire

10

record’ to mean that a CCA cannot consider matters

outside the ‘entire record.’” Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444.

But, in re-affirming Fagnan, the Jessie court also

sought to “cabin[]” the third line of precedent,

referring

to

those

decisions

as

potential

5

“aberrations.” Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444-45 (concluding

that “the practice of considering material outside the

record should not be expanded beyond the context of

Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment”). In

other words, the Jessie court held that when a service

CCA is determining whether a sentence is correct in

law and fact and should be approved pursuant to its

statutory responsibilities under Article 66(c), it is

prohibited from allowing the parties to supplement the

record, except in those tightly circumscribed instances

in which the appellant raises Eighth Amendment and

Article 55 claims.

Petitioners’ cases present a novel fact pattern.

Unlike in Gay, the Petitioners did not raise their

Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ,

complaints until their appeal to the CCA (i.e., they did

not raise the issue in clemency or by any other means

through which the issue would have been preserved in

the original record of trial). Unlike in Erby, the issue

before the CCA in these cases was not whether Article

66(c), UCMJ, permits the service CCAs to review

Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, claims

first raised on appeal (i.e., not contained in the

original record of trial), but instead whether, once

those matters have been attached to the record the

It is this third line of precedent at issue in

Petitioners’ cases.

5

11

CCAs may also consider them for Article 66(c), UCMJ,

sentence appropriateness review. Pet. App. 12a.

B. Procedural and Factual Background

1. United States v. Willman

On November 6, 2018, Petitioner, Staff Sergeant

(SSgt) Kalab D. Willman, United States Air Force,

was found guilty, consistent with his pleas, of one

specification of indecent recording in violation of

Article 120c, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920c. Pet. App. 6a.

He was sentenced to confinement for one year,

reduction by one grade to E-4, and a dishonorable

discharge from the service. Id.

While confined post-trial in a military-operated

confinement facility, Petitioner Willman suffered an

injury. Pet. App. 6a. On appeal to the AFCCA,

Petitioner Willman sought sentence relief, alleging

that the government’s failure to provide adequate

medical care for his injury amounted to a violation of

the Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, and

rendered his sentence inappropriate under Article

66(c), UCMJ. Pet. App. 6a-7a. Prior to his appeal to

the AFCCA, Petitioner Willman did not file a formal

complaint about the inadequate medical care, and he

waived his right to submit matters in clemency. Pet.

App. 36a. During Petitioner Willman’s appeal,

however, the AFCCA granted his motion to attach his

written declaration substantiating his cruel and

unusual punishment claim. Pet. App. 6a-7a.

After finding that Petitioner Willman’s claims

raised in his declaration did not amount to Eighth

Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violations, the

AFCCA declined to consider these same declarations

that it, upon motion, had already attached to the

12

record, when conducting its sentence appropriateness

review under Article 66(c), UCMJ. Pet. App. 42a-43a.

Stated differently, even if the confinement conditions

did not present cruel and unusual punishment

concerns under the appropriate legal standards, the

AFCCA declined to consider whether those same

conditions rendered the sentence, as approved,

inappropriately severe. Id. In a 3-2 decision, the

CAAF affirmed the AFCCA’s decision, holding the

AFCCA lacked authority to consider the declarations

when determining if the sentence was inappropriately

severe under Article 66(c), UCMJ—even though it

could consider them for cruel and unusual

punishment claims. Pet. App. 17a.

2. United States v. Frantz

A general court-martial composed of a military

judge alone convicted Senior Airman (SrA) Cory J.

Frantz, contrary to his pleas, of two specifications of

committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 12

years, in violation of Article 120b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §

920b. Pet. App. 56a. The military judge sentenced

SrA Frantz to confinement for seven years, a

reduction to the grade of E-1, and a dishonorable

discharge from the service. Pet. App. 57a.

SrA Frantz is serving his term of confinement at

the Naval Consolidated Brig at Miramar, California.

Pet. App. 99a. In a declaration attached to the record

on appeal, SrA Frantz alleged that the Miramar Brig

maintained policies that sex offenders could not

associate with any children and that he was denied

communication with his son, who was not involved in

the charged offense, in violation of Article 55, UCMJ,

and the constitutional right to familial association

13

rooted in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

Pet. App. 99a-101a.

The AFCCA analyzed SrA Frantz’s cruel and

unusual punishment claim pursuant to Jessie, and

denied relief. Pet. App. 104a-05a. The court failed to

consider the allegations regarding the Brig’s policies

contained in SrA Frantz’s declaration for sentence

appropriateness. Id. The CAAF, “in view of United

States v. Willman” affirmed. Pet. App. 52a.

3. United States v. Turner

A general court-martial consisting of a military

judge sitting alone convicted SSgt Clayton W.

Turner—contrary to his pleas—of five specifications of

assault consummated by a battery, all in violation of

Article 128, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928. Pet. App. 121a.

The military judge sentenced SSgt Turner to

confinement for eight months, a reduction to the grade

of E-1, and a bad-conduct discharge. Pet. App. 121a22a.

SSgt Turner was directed to serve his term of

confinement at the Taylor County Jail near Abilene,

Texas, rather than at a military confinement facility.

Pet. App. 146a.

While there, he submitted a

complaint to the Commander of the 7th Security

Forces Squadron pursuant to Article 138, UCMJ. Id.

In this complaint, SSgt Turner identified verminridden conditions at the confinement facility. Id.

On appeal before the AFCCA, SSgt Turner

asserted that the conditions of his confinement

amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article 55,

UCMJ. Pet. App. 146a. SSgt Turner also sought relief

on the alternative grounds that even if the conditions

14

of his confinement did not amount to cruel and

unusual punishment, they still rendered his sentence

inappropriately severe such that relief was warranted

under Article 66(c), UCMJ. Id

In support of these claims, SSgt Turner submitted

a post-trial declaration for the AFCCA’s consideration

wherein he detailed the unsanitary conditions at the

Taylor County Jail. Pet. App. 147a-48a. Although it

considered the merits of his Eighth Amendment and

Article 55, UCMJ, claims, the AFCCA ultimately

declined to find that his confinement conditions

amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Pet. App.

153a. The AFCCA also declined to consider SSgt

Turner’s alternative sentence severity claim grounded

in Article 66(c), UCMJ, entirely because—in its

view—his complaint arose from matters which fell

“outside the record as he did not raise them in his

clemency submission.”

Pet. App. 154a-55a. It

therefore concluded that it could not consider this

issue that was “outside the record” even though it had

previously attached the declarations to the record. Id.

The CAAF affirmed. Pet. App. 118a.

4. United States v. Williams

A general court-martial convicted SSgt Derrick O.

Williams, contrary to his plea, of one specification of

sexual assault in violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 920. Pet. App. 175a. The court-martial

sentenced SSgt Williams to 45 days’ confinement,

reduction to the grade of E-1, hard labor without

confinement for three months, and a dishonorable

discharge. Id.

After SSgt Williams entered confinement on

March 22, 2019, a litany of pay errors followed. Pet.

15

App. 227a-28a. During a period between September

and October 2019, SSgt Williams performed hard

labor without confinement for 12 hours a day, seven

days a week, and received no pay because of

Government errors. Pet. App. 228a. He took a second

job working overnight at a fitness center to support

his family. Id. His coverage under the military’s

health insurance system was also prematurely

revoked, rendering his wife and daughter unable to

obtain prescribed medications. Pet. App. 231a-32a.

Additionally, the wrongful denial of pay resulted in

SSgt Williams missing housing and child support

payments. Pet. App. 231a.

In his appeal to the AFCCA, SSgt Williams

asserted these conditions both unlawfully increased

his sentence and amounted to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment

and Article 55, UCMJ. Pet. App. 228a. In support of

these claims, SSgt Williams submitted a post-trial

declaration and documentation of the Government’s

errors. Pet. App. 231a-32a. The AFCCA held that any

deprivation of pay did not rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violation. Pet. App.

238a. However, the court concluded that it could not

consider the same matters it attached to the record

when conducting sentence appropriateness review

under Article 66, UCMJ. Pet. App. 240a. The CAAF,

“in view of United States v. Willman,” affirmed. Pet.

App. 171a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The CAAF’s decision prevents a military CCA from

fulfilling its congressionally imposed responsibilities

under Article 66(c), UCMJ. That statute requires the

CCAs to review the legal and factual sufficiency of a

16

conviction and the appropriateness of a sentence

imposed at a court-martial based on the “entire

record.” When the AFCCA attached Petitioners’

respective materials to the record, they became part

of the “entire record” under the plain meaning of that

phrase, such that the AFCCA was permitted—indeed,

obligated—to consider them when evaluating the

appropriateness of Petitioners’ respective sentences

under its Article 66(c) authority.

The CAAF’s restrictive holding in Willman creates

an incongruous result. The CAAF held that matters

properly attached to the record could be considered by

the CCAs in conducting one part of their Article 66(c)

review (whether the sentence was “correct in law”

under the Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ),

but the CCAs could not then consider those same

matters in conducting the other part of their Article

66(c) review (whether the sentence was appropriate).

Yet, as the dissent pointed out, Article 66, UCMJ is

the central source of authority for a CCA to review any

issue, whether that be an alleged violation of the

Eighth Amendment or whether a sentence

appropriate.

Pet. App. 19a.

Once the CCAs

supplement the record on appeal with materials

outside the record, those materials become part of the

record and Article 66, UCMJ, does not authorize the

CCAs to limit which part of their Article 66(c) review

to apply to the “entire record.” Because Willman holds

otherwise, certiorari should be granted to correct this

arbitrary limitation of Congress’s mandate.

This Court should also grant the writ because the

CAAF’s recent decisions addressing this issue,

culminating with Willman, have caused considerable

disagreement and confusion in the military courts.

17

The CCA’ s opinion generated a separate concurrence

in part on this issue and the CAAF’s divided opinion

was split 3-2. Pet. App. 4a, 48a-51a. Even the

majority conceded that its “Article 66(c), UCMJ,

precedents have created an odd paradigm[.]” Pet.

App. 15a. If left unchecked, the CAAF’s incongruous

approach to Article 66, UCMJ, review in Willman

will continue to cause confusing results.

Finally, this issue is of national importance.

Congress implemented a special standard of review

and opportunity for sentence relief on appeal for

servicemembers that is unique to the military justice

system. The jurisdiction of Article I military courts,

however, is tightly bound to congressional statute and

those courts do not have the ability to hear collateral

attacks on convictions; all issues must be resolved on

direct appeal. See United States v. Murphy, 50 M.J. 4,

5 (C.A.A.F. 1998). The CAAF’s restrictive ruling

limits servicemembers’ ability to vindicate their right

to seek sentence appropriateness relief on direct

appeal in military courts, where such a right would

not be available in Article III courts.

A.

The CAAF’s decision violates the

Congressional mandate of Article 66,

UCMJ.

The CAAF’s decision violates the congressionally

imposed mandate of Article 66(c), UCMJ in a number

of ways. First, the CAAF’s decision violates the plain

language of the statute. As Judge Sparks’s dissent

explains, once the CCA attached Petitioners’ formerly

outside-the-record declaration to the record, the

declarations become “part of the record and the lower

court was required to consider this information in

performing its Article 66(c) review.” Pet App. 20a.

18

Second, the CAAF misinterpreted the phrase

“entire record” in Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §

866(c) by narrowing its meaning to the “record of

trial,” a term of art, and excluding from its meaning

any matters later attached to the record on motion

granted. Pet. App. 16a. In determining what

constitutes “the entire record” of a case, it is

imperative to note the distinction between that phrase

contained in Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c),

and the term “record of trial” as defined by Congress

in Article 54, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 854 (2019), and

further defined by executive order in R.C.M. 1104.

Reference to the “record” in Article 54, UCMJ, centers

on the “record of the proceedings” of a court-martial.

10 U.S.C. § 854 (“Each general or special courtmartial shall keep a separate record of the

proceedings in each case brought before it.”). By

contrast, when defining the scope of the service CCA’s

review authority, Congress deliberately used a

different phrase; rather than refer to a “record of the

proceedings” of a court-martial (or, to use the phrase

found in the statute’s title, a “record of trial”) as it did

in Article 54, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 854, Congress

expanded the service CCA’s review authority to the

“entire record” when it drafted and passed Article

66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). The CAAF conflates

“entire record” with the “record of trial” even though

these two terms do not equate to the same thing.

Notably, the CAAF’s erroneous view of what

constitutes the “entire record” for Article 66, UCMJ,

review conflicts with federal civilian court practice.

This Court has “repeatedly stated that an appellate

court conducting plain-error review may consider the

entire record—not just the record from the particular

19

proceeding where the error occurred.” Greer v. United

States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2021) (citing United

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59, 74-75, 122 S. Ct.

1043, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2002)); Puckett v. United

States, 556 U. S. 129, 142-43, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 173 L.

Ed. 2d 266 (2009); United States v. Dominguez

Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 84-85, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 159 L.

Ed. 2d 157 (2004); United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S.

625, 632-633, and n. 3, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d

860 (2002)) (emphasis added).

Finally, the CAAF’s flawed rationale even

undermines the propriety of its own rules and

practices (as well as those of the CCAs), which permit

it to consider new material on motion from the parties

for issues not raised by the record:

The Court will normally not consider any

facts outside of the record established at

the trial and the Court of Criminal

Appeals. Requests to consider factual

material that is not contained in the

record shall be presented by a motion to

supplement the record filed pursuant to

Rule 30 [of these Rules]. The motion

shall include statements explaining why

the matter was not raised previously at

trial or before the Court of Criminal

Appeals and why it is appropriate to be

considered for the first time in this

Court.

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Rules, Rule

30A (emphasis added). And as Judge Sparks’s dissent

also pointed out, the CAAF’s decision ignored Rule

23(b) of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure,

promulgated by Article 66(f), UCMJ, which authorizes

20

the CCAs “to attach documents to the record, which is

precisely what was done in this case.” Pet. App. 19a.

The CAAF’s erroneous decision compels certiorari

review. The CAAF’s flawed view of what constitutes

the “entire record” violates the mandate of Article 66,

UCMJ. If left unchecked, the CAAF’s decision will

constrain the CCAs’ ability to meet their statutory

mandate by unreasonably limiting their Article 66(c)

review of properly supplemented materials in support

of servicemembers’ claims of improper post-trial

confinement.

B.

The CAAF’s decision will continue to

create confusion in the military courts.

This case provides a good vehicle to provide clarity

on an important issue. In the short period of time

between Willman and Jessie, whose rationale

Willman principally relied on, considerable

disagreement has emerged in the military courts over

the CCAs’ authority to consider formerly outside-therecord materials that were attached to the record on

appeal while performing a sentence appropriateness

review under Article 66(c), UCMJ. In the AFCCA

opinion below, Judge Meginley specially concurred,

noting his disagreement with the majority on whether

the court was precluded from considering the

appropriateness of Petitioner Willman’s sentence

under Article 66, UCMJ, based on materials that were

outside the record of trial. Pet. App. 48a. The Chief

Judge of the AFCCA expressed the same opinion in a

special concurrence, see United States v. Matthews,

No. ACM 39593, 2020 AFCCA LEXIS 193, at *16-17

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 2, 2020) (unpub. Op.)

(Johnson, C.J., concurring in the result), and at least

one other CCA held that it had authority to consider

21

materials outside the record that were attached to the

record in support of Eighth Amendment or Article 55,

UCMJ, claims in determining whether a sentence was

appropriate. See United States v. Jacinto, 79 M.J. 870,

890 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2020), aff’d in part, set aside

in part by United States v. Jacinto, 81 M.J. 350

(C.A.A.F. 2021).

The CAAF’s divided 3-2 opinion in Willman did not

alleviate this disagreement, but rather created more

confusion. As the dissent noted, “the majority’s view

sets up the odd situation in this and future cases

where documents that are obviously part of the record

are, curiously, simultaneously outside ‘the entire

record.’” Pet. App. 20a. The dissent further noted a

prior CAAF opinion that appeared to be remain in

conflict with the majority’s rationale. Pet. App. 18a19a. (citing Healy, 26 M.J. at 397, n.6). Specifically,

the dissent pointed out that in Healy, the CAAF

commented that if evidence of insanity, developed

after the trial was completed, was attached to the

appellate record in support an insanity claim, this

information, once attached, was part of the record and

could

be

considered

in

making

sentence

appropriateness determination. Id.

The majority did not address how the holding of

Willman squares with Healy. This fact, combined

with the general incongruent nature of the majority’s

decision, signals that the confusion will continue in

the military courts. This Court should grant certiorari

to correct Willman’s flawed result and provide clarity

on this issue to the military courts.

22

C.

The

CAAF’s

decision

contravenes

Congressional intent for military courts to

serve as the primary source for

servicemembers seeking sentence relief.

This Court should grant review in this case to

address an issue of national importance by ensuring

the uniquely equipped military courts of appeal meet

their statutory charge to affirm, uniformly across the

military services, only those findings and sentences of

courts-martial that are correct in law and fact. The

CAAF, through its erroneous statutory interpretation,

has impermissibly barred the CCAs from meeting

their statutory obligations under Article 66(c), UCMJ.

Specifically, by interpreting Article 66(c), UCMJ, to

exclude from consideration any matters that were not

contained within an original record of trial but were

subsequently attached to the record, the CAAF has

prevented the service CCAs from exercising their

judgment in affirming only findings and sentences

they deem correct in law and fact and should be

approved based on the entire record. Indeed, the

service CCAs must now divest themselves of the

authority to grant relief to those appellants who,

despite failing to carry their very high burden to

substantiate constitutional claims, are nevertheless

deserving of sentence appropriateness relief under

Article 66(c), UCMJ.

Congress established Article I military courts for

the express purpose of adjudicating military-specific

issues, to include issues related to the treatment of

military prisoners confined to military-operated

facilities. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.

738, 757 (1975) (“The military is ‘a specialized society

separate from civilian society’ with ‘laws and

23

traditions of its own [developed] during its long

history.”’) (internal citations omitted). This Court has

recognized:

In enacting the [UCMJ], Congress

attempted

to

balance…military

necessities

against

the

equally

significant interest of ensuring fairness

to servicemen charged with military

offenses, and to formulate a mechanism

by which these often competing interests

can be adjusted…an integrated system of

military courts and review procedures, a

critical element of which is the [U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces]

consisting of civilian judges…who would

gain over time thorough familiarity with

military problems.

Id. at 757-58.

Consistent with these interests, one of the unique

features that Congress established in the military

justice system was a widened scope of review by the

CCAs of findings and sentences. Specifically, through

Article 66, UCMJ, Congress empowered the CCAs

with an “awesome, plenary, de novo power of review,”

Kelley, 77 M.J. at 406, which mandates the CCAs to

conduct a “de novo review of the sentence under

Article 66(c) as part of its responsibility to make an

affirmative

determination

as

to

sentence

appropriateness.” Roach, 66 M.J. at 412. In other

words, Congress provide the CCAs the unique

authority to review the appropriateness of a sentence,

even if no legal or constitutional error occurred. But

the CAAF’s decision here curtails a service member’s

ability to seek this relief regarding improper post-trial

24

confinement conditions, without any other forum to

seek redress.

The widened scope of review granted to the service

CCAs is not the only trait unique to the military

courts which weighs in favor of this position. The lack

of any mechanism in the UCMJ for adjudicating postconviction claims also weighs in favor of granting the

service CCAs considerable discretion when it comes to

ordering fact-finding and supplementing the record.

Indeed, the service CCAs have a number of tools at

their disposal, employed over the course of a halfcentury (e.g., post-trial factfinding hearings pursuant

to United States v. DuBay, 17 C.M.A. 147 (1967),

receipt of affidavits, etc.), to fill gaps in the record

when addressing claims which are, in the civilian

context, collaterally litigated. While Willman does not

discard

these

tools

outright,

the

CAAF’s

determination that such methods cannot be used by

the service CCAs in meeting their Article 66(c),

UCMJ, obligation is incongruous and inconsistent

with calcified precedent—an admission the majority

in the lower court makes in the instant case:

“[Petitioner] argues that [adhering to the Fagnan rule

rather than expanding the Erby exception] creates an

incongruity, with the [service] CCAs having the

authority to review outside-the-record materials for

some purposes, but not for others. We acknowledge

that this Court’s Article 66(c), UCMJ precedents have

created an odd paradigm[.]” Pet. App. 15a.

As incongruous as the decision in Petitioners’ case

is, it is equally arbitrary. Its effect is to bar from relief

those claims which, while not rising to the level of an

Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, violation,

nonetheless have merit vis-à-vis whether a particular

25

sentence is appropriate, despite the CCA’s statutory

requirement to conduct this review. Because these

claims center on the conditions of an appellant’s posttrial confinement conditions, it is wholly conceivable

that such claims could ripen after a court-martial’s

convening authority takes action on a sentence, an

entry of judgment is entered, and a record of trial is

completed.

The CAAF’s decision bars sentence

appropriateness relief from appellants who have had

the misfortune of not only being confined under illegal

conditions but of enduring those conditions too late.

The CAAF erroneously circumscribed the CCA’s

historically

broad

discretion

on

sentence

appropriateness. The CAAF itself has recognized that

the “breadth of the power granted to the [CCAs] to

review a case for sentence appropriateness is one of

the unique and longstanding features of the [UCMJ].”

United States v. Hutchison, 57 M.J. 231, 233 (C.A.A.F.

2002) (citations omitted); see also United States v.

Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 287 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (“Congress,

recognizing that the decentralized exercise of such

broad discretion [in the military justice system] is

likely to produce disparate results, has provided the

[CCAs] . . . with the highly discretionary power to

determine whether a sentence ‘should be approved.’”

(citing Article 66(c), UCMJ)). The CCAs role in

sentence review is to “do justice,” as distinguished

from the “discretionary power of the convening

authority to grant mercy.” See United States v. Boone,

49 M.J. 187, 192 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (citation omitted).

Stated differently, the CCAs assure “that justice is

done and that the accused gets the punishment he

deserves.” Healy, 26 M.J. at 395. Indeed, the CAAF

has recently affirmed these “vast powers” by holding

26

that CCAs may disapprove even mandatory minimum

sentencing requirements. See Kelly, 77 M.J. at 406-08

(holding that the mandatory minimum sentencing

requirements under Article 56 of the UCMJ are

inapplicable to reviewing authorities and do not in

any way limit the sentence reviewing powers of the

CCA under Article 66).

Where Congress has charged the CCAs with such

broad discretion and specifically obligated the CCAs

to review the appropriateness of a sentence, the fact

that a service member was unable to raise a post-trial

confinement issue with the military judge or

convening authority prior to the entry of judgment

should not bar consideration of the continued

appropriateness of the sentence.

D.

The CAAF’s decision will preclude

servicemembers

from

seeking

sentencing relief from improper posttrial confinement conditions in the

military courts where no comparable

relief is available in the civilian court

system.

Willman’s effective restriction on complete,

meaningful sentence review under Article 66(c),

UCMJ, has far-reaching implications. By abdicating

the CCAs’ statutory responsibility, the CAAF’s

decision will strip the military justice system of a

remedy and will leave servicemembers without an

adequate forum to seek comparable relief through the

federal judiciary. This is significantly problematic for

several reasons.

First, civilian courts are ill-equipped to handle

military specific issues, particularly those involving

27

the post-trial confinement of servicemembers. As this

Court has acknowledged, “the military constitutes a

specialized community governed by a separate

discipline from that of the civilian[.]” Parker v. Levy,

417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974). Because “the rights of men

in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to

meet certain overriding demands of discipline and

duty . . . the civil courts are not the agencies which

must determine the precise balance to be struck in

this adjustment.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140

(1953). Rather, Congress has this task. Id. To this

end, Congress established what it intended to be a

self-sufficient, self-correcting uniform military justice

system. The bedrock of this system, the UCMJ, with

its seemingly imprecise standards based on centuries

of customs and general usages, simply “cannot be

equated to a civilian criminal code.” Parker, 417 U.S.

at 749. Accordingly, “Congress has codified primary

responsibility for the supervision of military justice”

in the CAAF. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 (1969).

The civilian courts have correspondingly given a

“substantial degree of civilian deference” to military

tribunals. Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235, 250

(C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing Noyd, 395 U.S. at 694-95).

This deference is grounded in the doctrine of

exhaustion, which generally requires litigants seeking

post-conviction relief to first seek such relief from the

judicial system responsible for the conviction. There is

no authority or precedent promoting civilian courts as

the primary arbiters over military-related claims.

This is for good reason. Included within the militaryspecific exhaustion requirement are concerns

regarding judicial economy, the separation of powers,

the need to maintain good order and discipline in the

28

armed forces, avoiding needless friction between the

civilian and military judicial systems, and respect for

the military courts’ “expertise in interpreting the

technical provisions of the UCMJ.” Id. (citing Noyd,

395 U.S. at 696); accord Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S.

34 (1972); Lawrence v. McCarthy, 344 F.3d 467, 471

(5th Cir. 2003) (“Because the military constitutes a

specialized community governed by a separate

discipline from that of the civilian, orderly

government requires that the judiciary scrupulously

avoid interfering with legitimate Army matters.”).

The authority of Article III courts over the military

has thus been limited through a combination of

Congressional design and judicial temperance.

Servicemembers cannot readily pursue their claims in

federal courts. The doctrine set out in Feres v. United

States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), prohibits lawsuits by

military prisoners against the federal government.

See Schnitzer v. Harvey, 389 F.3d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (“Every circuit to consider the issue [of whether

and how the Feres doctrine applies to military

prisoners], however, has found the doctrine to apply

without modification.”). Thus, there is no other forum

to consider a service member’s claim that his sentence

is inappropriate based on improper post-trial

confinement conditions that arose after entry of

judgement.

Through Article 66(c), UCMJ, the

appropriate, statutorily required forum for seeking

such relief are the CCAs. But Willman strips those

courts of carrying out this congressionally mandated

duty.

29

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully Submitted,

THOMAS R. GOVAN JR.

Counsel of Record

SARA J. HICKMON

ESHAWN R. RAWLLEY

MEGAN E. HOFFMAN

DAVID L. BOSNER

RYAN S. CRNKOVICH

MATTHEW L. BLYTH

Appellate Defense Counsel

Air Force Appellate Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road,

Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4782

thomas.govan@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioners

30

APPENDIX

No. ______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

KALAB D. WILLMAN, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES

Respondent.

__________

On Petition for a Writ to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

__________

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________

THOMAS R. GOVAN JR.

Counsel of Record

SARA J. HICKMON

ESHAWN R. RAWLLEY

MEGAN E. HOFFMAN

DAVID L. BOSNER

RYAN S. CRNKOVICH

MATTHEW L. BLYTH

Appellate Defense Counsel

Air Force Appellate Defense Division

1500 West Perimeter Road, Suite 1100

Joint Base Andrews, MD 20762

(240) 612-4782

Thomas.govan@us.af.mil

Counsel for Petitioners

TABLE OF CONTENTS

United States v. Willman

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Opinion

(Jul. 21, 2021)

4a

United States v. Willman

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Dec. 21, 2020)

21a

United States v. Willman

United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion

(Sept. 3, 2020)

23a

United States v. Frantz

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Aug. 10, 2021)

52a

United States v. Frantz

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Mar. 23, 2021)

53a

United States v. Frantz

United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion

(Nov. 10, 2020)

55a

United States v. Turner

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Aug. 10, 2021)

118a

(2a)

United States v. Turner

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Mar. 15, 2021)

119a

United States v. Turner

United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion

(Nov. 25, 2020)

121a

United States v. Williams

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Aug. 10, 2021)

171a

United States v. Williams

United States Court of Appeals

for the Armed Forces, Order

(Jun. 25, 2021)

172a

United States v. Williams

United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, Opinion

(Mar. 12, 2021)

174a

(3a)

This opinion is subject to revision before publication

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Kalab D. WILLMAN, Staff Sergeant

United States Air Force, Appellant

No. 21-0030

Crim. App. No. 39642

Argued April 20, 2021—Decided July 21, 2021

Military Judge: John C. Degnan

For Appellant: Major Megan E. Hoffman (argued);

Mark C. Bruegger, Esq. (on brief).

For Appellee: Captain Cortland T. Bobczynski

(argued); Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Neil and

Mary Ellen Payne, Esq. (on brief).

Judge HARDY delivered the opinion of the Court, in

which Chief Judge STUCKY and Judge MAGGS

joined. Judge SPARKS filed a dissenting opinion, in

which Judge OHLSON joined.

(4a)

Judge HARDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

In general, Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012), restricts

appellate review performed by the Courts of Criminal

Appeals (CCAs) to consideration of the “entire record”

of the case before them.1 This Court has held,

however, that the CCAs have authority to consider

evidence entirely outside the record when considering

an appellant’s cruel and unusual punishment claims

raised under the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const.

amend. VIII, or Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855

(2012). United States v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478

(C.A.A.F. 2001). This case presents a question that

straddles these two issues: whether the CCAs have

authority to consider outside-the-record evidence

submitted in support of an appellant’s Eighth

Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, claims when

performing sentence appropriateness review under

Article 66(c), UCMJ. Consistent with the plain

language of Article 66(c), UCMJ, and this Court’s

recent decision in United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437

(C.A.A.F. 2020), we conclude that the CCAs do not.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the United

States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA).

I. Background

1 This case was referred to court-martial prior to January 1,

2019, and thus all post-trial procedures were performed in

accordance with the 2016 edition of the Manual for CourtsMartial, United States (MCM). All references to the UCMJ,

Rules for Courts- Martial (R.C.M.), and Military Rules of

Evidence (M.R.E.) are to the2016 edition of the MCM.

(5a)

A military judge convicted Appellant, consistent

with his pleas, of one specification of indecent

recording in violation of Article 120(c), UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 920 (2012). Appellant was sentenced to one

year of confinement, reduction to E-4, and a

dishonorable discharge. During his post-trial

confinement, Appellant injured his big toe in a flag

football game, an injury for which Appellant now

claims the Government failed to pro- vide adequate

care. Appellant never filed a formal complaint about

the allegedly insufficient care he received with the

prison health clinic, the prison administration, his

commander, or the convening authority (CA).

Appellant also waived his right to submit matters in

clemency to the CA. As a result, the record contains

no mention of Appellant’s toe in jury or the

subsequent medical treatment he received for that

injury. The CA approved the findings and Appellant’s

sentence as adjudged.

On appeal to the AFCCA, Appellant asserted—for

the first time—that the allegedly deficient medical

care he received violated his Eighth Amendment and

Article 55, UCMJ, rights against cruel and unusual

punishment and rendered his sentence inappropriate

pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ. Appellant detailed

the nature of his injury, medical treatment, and posttrial confinement conditions in a declaration, and filed

a motion requesting the AFCCA attach his declaration

to his assignment of errors. The AFCCA granted the

request.

After

AFCCA

reviewing Appellant’s declaration, the

determined that Appellant’s Eighth

(6a)

Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, claims did not

merit relief. United States v. Willman, No. ACM

39642, 2020 CCA LEXIS 300, at *17–20, 2020 WL

5269775, at *7 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2020)

(unpublished). The CCA concluded that, even if the

facts asserted in the declaration were true, Appellant

failed to meet this burden of establishing that the

prison officials improperly administered medical

treatment and were deliberately indifferent to his

health and safety. Id. at *19–20, 2020 WL 5269775, at

*7.

Turning to Appellant’s Article 66(c), UCMJ,

sentence appropriateness claim, the AFCCA

concluded that the plain language of Article 66(c),

UCMJ, and this Court’s decision in Jessie, 79 M.J.

437, precluded it from considering Appellant’s

“outside-the-record” affidavit. 2020 CCA LEXIS 300,

at *21– 25, 2020 WL 5269775, at *7–9. Concluding

that “the record contains no support to grant

sentencing relief on the basis of Appellant’s claims

about the conditions of post-trial confinement,” the

AFCCA affirmed the sentence as approved by the CA.

Id. at *25, 2020 WL 5269775, at *9.

We granted review of the following issue:

“[w]hether the lower court erred when it ruled that it

could not consider evidence outside the record to

determine sentence appropriateness under Article

66(c), UCMJ.” United States v. Willman, 80 M.J. 470

(C.A.A.F. 2020) (order granting review).

II. Standard of Review

The scope, applicability, and meaning of Article

(7a)

66(c), UCMJ, is a matter of statutory interpretation

that we review de novo. United States v. Gay, 75 M.J.

264, 267 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing United States v.

Schloff, 74 M.J. 312, 313 (C.A.A.F. 2015)).

III. Discussion

Congress specified the jurisdiction and authority of

the CCAs in Article 66, UCMJ. The relevant section

and applicable version of the article states:

[T]he Court of Criminal Appeals may

act only with respect to the findings

and sentence as approved by the

convening authority. It may affirm only

such findings of guilty and the sentence

or such part or amount of the sentence,

as it finds correct in law and fact and

determines, on the basis of the entire

record, should be approved.

Article 66(c), UCMJ. At first glance, these two

sentences suggest that the CCA’s role is

straightforward—to review an appellant’s findings

and sentence as approved by the convening authority

based on the “entire record.” But as we recently

acknowledged in Jessie, this Court’s various

precedents regarding the scope of the CCA’s review of

the “entire record” can be difficult to reconcile. 79 M.J.

at 443. Nevertheless, the Court in Jessie explained

how those cases should be understood. Id. at 441–45

(reviewing in detail the Court’s precedents analyzing

Article 66(c), UCMJ).

The Court began by reaffirming long-standing

precedent from United States v. Fagnan, 12 C.M.A.

(8a)

192, 193, 30 C.M.R. 192, 193 (1961), which

“established a clear rule that the CCAs may not

consider anything outside of the ‘entire record’ when

reviewing a sentence under Article 66(c), UCMJ.”

Jessie, 79 M.J. at 441 (citing Edward S. Adamkewicz

Jr., Appellate Consideration of Matters Outside the

Record of Trial, 32 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1966)). In

Fagnan, the intermediate appellate court—then the

Army Board of Review—declined to consider two

outside-the-record documents when it assessed the

appellant’s sentence: a psychiatric report that the

Army Board of Review itself had requested and a

letter from a correctional officer written on the

appellant’s behalf. 12 C.M.A. at 193, 30 C.M.R. at 193.

The Army Board of Review explained that neither

document was “ ‘part of the record subject to review

under Article 66, and should not be considered with

respect to the appropriateness of the sentence as

approved by the convening authority.’ ” Id. at 193, 30

C.M.R. at 193 (quoting the Army Board of Review’s

opinion).

Although this rule appears strict, the Court

clarified in Jessie that “Fagnan does not preclude the

CCAs from considering prison conditions when

reviewing a sentence under Article 66(c), UCMJ, if the

record contains information about those conditions.”

79 M.J. at 441. In addition to permitting consideration

of any materials contained in the “entire record,” our

precedents also authorize the CCAs to supplement the

record to decide any issues that are raised, but not

fully resolved, by evidence in the record. Two of the

examples highlighted in Jessie illustrate these points.

(9a)

First, in Gay, 75 M.J. 264, the appellant made a

formal clemency complaint about his post-trial

confinement conditions to the convening authority

prior to the convening authority taking action.

Because clemency materials submitted to the

convening authority must be attached to the record of

trial, R.C.M. 1103(b)(3)(C), and the subsequent action

of the convening authority is part of the record of trial,

R.C.M. 1103(b)(2)(D)(iv), evidence about the

appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions were

incorporated into the entire record. Thus, the CCA did

not abuse its discretion when it considered the

appellant’s post-trial confinement conditions while

exercising its Article 66(c), UCMJ, sentence

reassessment authority.

Second, in United States v. Brennan, 58 M.J. 351,

352–53 (C.A.A.F. 2003), the appellant described

illegal post-trial punishment that she suffered in a

clemency petition that she filed with the convening

authority prior to the convening authority taking

action. As explained above, those clemency materials

were thus part of the entire record and available for

consideration by the CCA. In addition to the clemency

materials, both the CCA and this Court also

considered a subsequent statement that the appellant

filed before the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 353.

In Jessie, the Court explained that, because the

Brennan appellant raised the issue in her clemency

materials, the CCA’s review of her outside-the-record

statement was consistent with this Court’s long

practice of using “ ‘extra- record fact determinations’ ”

to resolve certain appellate questions. 79 M.J. at 442–

43 (quoting United States v. Parker, 36 M.J. 269, 272

(10a)

(C.M.A. 1993)).

Finally, in Jessie, the Court recognized a

significant exception to the Fagnan rule set forth in

this Court’s precedents: the CCAs may consider

materials completely outside of the “entire record”

when determining whether the manner of execution of

an accused’s sentence violates either the Eighth

Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ. Id. at 443 (citing

Erby, 54 M.J. at 479 (ordering factfinding into the

appellant’s cruel and unusual punishment claim

raised for the first time before the CCA) and United

States v. Pena, 64 M.J. 259, 266–67 (C.A.A.F. 2007)

(reviewing

the

appellant’s

outside-the-record

declaration to decide his cruel and unusual

punishment claim on the merits)). Acknowledging the

significant tension between Fagnan and cases like

Erby and Pena, this Court in Jessie decided to apply

Fagnan and “cabin[ ]” precedents like Erby and Pena

to their express holdings. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444–45

(concluding that “the practice of considering material

outside the record should not be expanded beyond the

context of Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth

Amendment”).

Despite the Court’s careful analysis of our

precedents interpreting the scope of the CCAs’ Article

66(c), UCMJ, authority in Jessie, this case presents a

novel fact pattern that is not squarely on point with

the precedents described above. Here, unlike in Gay

or Brennan, Appellant did not raise his complaints

about his post-trial confinement conditions until his

appeal to the AFCCA. Appellant’s declaration was

thus out- side-the-record and, under Fagnan, the

(11a)

AFCCA had no authority to review it for the purpose

of assessing Appellant’s sentence. However, under the

Fagnan rule exception, the AFCCA did have authority

to consider the Appellant’s outside-the-record

declaration for the purpose of evaluating Appellant’s

Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, claims.

The critical question then is once the AFCCA

considered Appellant’s outside-the-record declaration

to decide his cruel and unusual punishment claims,

could it also consider the declaration to perform its

Article 66(c), UCMJ, sentence appropriateness

review?

Although we acknowledge that reasonable

arguments can be made to the contrary, we agree with

the AFCCA that it could not consider Appellant’s

outside-the-record affidavit. Forced to choose between

strictly enforcing the Fagnan rule and further

expanding the exceptions to that rule that this Court

has created for cruel and unusual punishment claims,

we elect to apply Fagnan. Our reasoning mirrors that

of the Court in Jessie when it expressly declined to

extend the holdings of Erby and Pena beyond the

context of the Eighth Amendment and Article 55,

UCMJ, claims. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444 (“[W]e believe

that Fagnan rather than Erby should control in this

case.”).

The Fagnan rule is derived from the plain

language of the statute, which states that the CCAs

may only act “on the basis of the entire record” when

performing sentence appropriateness review under

Article 66(c), UCMJ. See Fagnan, 12 C.M.A. at 195, 30

C.M.R. at 195 (“[W]e cannot ignore the plain words of

(12a)

the statute involved.”). As we noted in Jessie, this

Court’s precedents establishing exceptions to the

Fagnan rule, such as Erby and Pena, neither discuss

Article 66(c)’s express “entire record” restriction nor

wrestle with the Court’s seemingly contrary holding

in Fagnan. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444. Presumably,

because the Court believed that the CCAs had a “duty”

to determine on direct appeal whether the appellant’s

sentence was being executed in a manner that offends the Eighth Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ,

Erby, 54 M.J. at 478, the Court was unconcerned

about whether the evidence about an appellant’s posttrial confinement appeared in the entire record or was

proffered for the first time on appeal. As the Court has

long recognized, facts concerning an appellant’s “posttrial confinement can rarely, if ever, be made the

subject of a brief by trial defense counsel or otherwise

made a part of the ‘entire record.’ ” Fagnan, 12 C.M.A.

at 195, 30 C.M.R at 195. Accordingly, to whatever

extent Article 66(c), UCMJ, imposes a duty to review

all cruel and unusual punishment claims on the

CCAs, it would make no sense to restrict that review

to matters within the “entire record.”

But it does not logically follow that just because

this Court has permitted the CCAs to review outsidethe-record materials to decide Eighth Amendment

and Article 55, UCMJ, claims, we must also authorize

the CCAs to consider those materials when they

perform Article 66, UCMJ, sentence appropriateness

review. To conclude otherwise would create a broad,

extra-statutory exception that would potentially

swallow the text-based Fagnan rule. Any savvy

appellant who wished to supplement the record with

(13a)

outside- the-record materials would have an incentive

to do so by raising Eighth Amendment or Article 55,

UCMJ, claims— regardless of their merit.

Appellant argues that we can trust the CCAs to be

the gatekeepers of the “entire record,” admitting only

those materials that are relevant to an appellant’s

cruel and unusual punishment claims. But we see no

reason to impose a greater burden on the CCAs to

adjudicate arguments over whether outside-therecord materials are relevant to an appellant’s Eighth

Amendment or Article 55, UCMJ, claims both by

encouraging appellants to bring such claims and by

raising the consequences of such a determination.

Further, there is a wide range of outside-the-record

materials about an appellant’s post-trial confinement

that would be relevant to such claims (given the low

bar for demonstrating relevancy) without coming

anywhere near establishing a right to relief. Appellant

does not explain why it would be just to consider those

materials when the CCAs assess the sentence of an

appellant who makes an Eighth Amendment or

Article 55, UCMJ, claim but not to review the same

materials for a similarly situated appellant who does

not assert those claims.

It is probably true that we could mandate—and the

CCAs would ably execute—a complicated scheme to

litigate these issues and parse through an appellant’s

proffered evidence, admitting only the relevant and

necessary parts and rejecting the rest, but nothing in

the text of Article 66(c), UCMJ, supports such a

scheme. The fact that such a scheme would be

necessary raises questions not about the Fagnan rule,

(14a)

which is based on the plain text of Article 66(c),

UCMJ, but on our precedents creating exceptions to

the rule. As this Court’s recent decision in United

States v. Guinn, __ M.J. __, __ (14) (C.A.A.F. 2021),

acknowledged, arguments can be made that this

Court’s decisions in cases like Erby and Pena “are not

properly predicated on the plain language of that

statute.” See also id. at __ (2) (Maggs, J, concurring)

(“I agree with the Court that it may be argued, from

the plain meaning of its text, that Article 66(c), UCMJ,

does not give a CCA jurisdiction to address post-trial

confinement conditions that are not part of the

approved sentence.”). Given these issues, we conclude

that the correct approach here is to adhere to the rule

announced in Fagnan rather than to further expand

the exception set forth in cases like Erby and Pena.

Appellant argues that this result creates an

incongruity, with the CCAs having the authority to

review outside-the-record materials for some

purposes, but not for others. We acknowledge that this

Court’s Article 66(c), UCMJ, precedents have created

an odd paradigm, but we do not believe that oddness

justifies further deviation from the plain text of

Article 66(c), UCMJ. The practice of considering

evidence for some purposes but not for others is not

foreign to American courts. See Fed. R. Evid. 105

advisory committee’s note to the 1972 proposed rules

(recognizing the practice of “admitting evidence for a

limited purpose”); see also David P. Leonard, The New

Wigmore: A Treatise On Evidence: Selected Rules Of

Limited Admissibility § 1.6.1 (3d ed. 2019) (examining

situations where evidence is logically relevant for

(15a)

more than one purpose but admissible only for one).

There is no legal reason why the same practice cannot

be applied here. In any case, complete resolution of the

incongruities in our Article 66(c), UCMJ, precedents

is not before us. As was the case in Jessie, the question

here “is not whether we must follow one line of

precedent and completely reject another, but instead

only whether we should expand recent precedents like

Erby into new contexts when this step would further

erode older precedents like Fagnan.” 79 M.J. at 444

n.9. Again, we decline to do so.

Finally, Appellant also argues that when the CCA

granted his motion to attach his outside-the-record

declaration as an appendix to his assignment of

errors, the declaration became part of the “entire

record,” so the Fagnan rule should not apply. We

disagree. Even after the CCA granted Appellant’s

motion, his declaration about his post-trial

confinement conditions is neither part of the record of

trial under R.C.M. 1103(b)(2), nor does it qualify as a

matter attached to the record of trial under R.C.M.

1103(b)(3). And because Appellant waived his right to

submit this matter for clemency to the convening

authority, the “entire record” contains nothing about

this issue, and thus the briefs and arguments that he

and his counsel submitted are not “allied papers”

because they do not address a matter in the record of

trial. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 440– 41 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (citation omitted). In Jessie, this

Court described cases like Erby and Pena as allowing

“the CCAs to consider materials outside the ‘entire

record’ when reviewing issues that were not raised by

anything in the record.” Id. at 443 (emphasis added).

(16a)

This Court has never held, or even suggested, that

outside-the-record materials considered to resolve an

appellant’s cruel and usual punishment claims

became part of the entire record. We decline to do so

in the present case.

IV. Decision

For the reasons described above, we conclude that

the CCA did not err when it held that it could not

consider evidence outside the record to determine

sentence appropriateness under Article 66(c), UCMJ,

10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012), even when it had already

considered that evidence to resolve Appellant’s Eighth

Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855

(2012), claims. The decision of the United States Air

Force Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Judge SPARKS, with whom Judge OHLSON joins,

dissenting.

I must dissent from the majority’s viewpoint that

United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437 (C.A.A.F. 2020),

and United States v. Fagnan, 12 C.M.A. 192, 30

C.M.R. 192 (1961), preclude the lower court’s review

of the appropriateness of Appellant’s sentence

pursuant to Article 66(c), Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012), where

Appellant raised his Eighth Amendment and Article

55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 855 (2012), claims for the first

time on appeal and the lower court granted a motion

to attach documents relevant to such allegations.

In Jessie, we held that other than claims of

(17a)

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment or

Article 55, UCMJ, Article 66(c), UCMJ, does not

authorize the lower court to “consider materials

outside the ‘entire record’ when reviewing issues that

were not raised by anything in the record.” 79 M.J. at

443. I disagreed with this holding and would reiterate

as I did in my dissent in Jessie, that “the courts of

criminal appeals are bound, under Article 66, UCMJ,

to consider any colorable constitutional claim related

to sentence appropriateness even if that requires

review of documents outside the record of trial.” Id. at

448 (Sparks, J., dissenting).

Putting my continued disagreement aside, I note

that neither Jessie nor Fagnan discussed sentence

appropriateness review in the context of declarations

attached to the record for the purpose of deciding

Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ,

allegations. An analogous situation arose in United

States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394 (C.M.A. 1988), where this

Court commented in a footnote:

If there is evidence of insanity after the

trial has been completed and the

convening authority has acted, the

Court of Military Review can receive

psychiatric information relevant to

mental competence to stand trial, to

cooperate with the appeal, or mental

responsibility for the crime itself. Once

admitted for this purpose, the

information would be in the “record”

and presumably could be used by the

Court of Military Review in performing

its task of determining what sentence

(18a)

is appropriate.

Id. at 397 n.6 (citation omitted). In my view, the same

outcome should occur in this case. Once the lower

court attached to the record Appellant’s declarations

in support of his Article 55, UCMJ, and Eighth

Amendment claims, this information became part of

the record and the lower court was required to

consider this information in performing its Article

66(c). UCMJ, review. Furthermore, the majority is

ignoring Rule 23(b) of the Joint Rules of Appellate

Procedure for Courts of Criminal Appeals, which was

promulgated pursuant to Article 66(f), UCMJ. This

rule authorizes the lower courts to attach documents

to the record, which is precisely what was done in this

case. Yet, the majority states that Appellant’s

declaration is not part of the entire record because it

does not fall within Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M)

1103(b)(2) or R.C.M. 1103(b)(3). It would appear,

however, when the lower court attached these

documents they became part of the record under Rule

23(b) of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure. The

majority fails to account for this rule.

Article 66, UCMJ, is the central source of the lower

court’s authority to review any issue, to include

alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment and

Article 55, UCMJ. It seems odd for the majority to

hold that, under Jessie and Fagnan, the lower court

has jurisdiction to review alleged violations of the

Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, based on

material that was once outside the original record of

trial until attached to the record by the lower court,

but does not have jurisdiction to consider that same

material for Article 66(c), UCMJ, sentence

(19a)

appropriateness review. By holding that these

documents are outside the record, the majority’s new

rule violates the mandate in Article 66(c), UCMJ, to

consider the “entire record” when affirming “such part

or amount of the sentence.” Notwithstanding the

majority’s view that they are adhering to the plain

text of the statute, a contrary view emerges from my

reading of the Court’s opinion. In my view, the

majority is, in essence, ignoring the law and refusing

to acknowledge the congressional delegation to the

Judge Advocates General. Moreover, the majority’s

view sets up the odd situation in this and future cases

where documents that are obviously part of the record

are, curiously, simultaneously outside “the entire

record.”

For the foregoing reasons I must respectfully dissent.

(20a)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D.C.

United States,

Appellee

USCA Dkt. No. 21-0030/AF

Crim.App. No. 39642

v.

ORDER GRANTING REVIEW

Kalab D. Willman,

Appellant

On consideration of the petition for grant of

review of the decision of the United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, it is, by the Court, this

21st day of December, 2020,

ORDERED:

That said petition is hereby granted on the

following issue:

WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED

WHEN IT RULED THAT IT COULD NOT

CONSIDER EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE

RECORD TO DETERMINE SENTENCE

APPROPRIATENESS UNDER ARTICLE

66(c).

Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

(21a)

For the Court,

/s/ Joseph R. Perlak

Clerk of the Court

cc:

The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate

Defense

Counsel

(Hoffman)

Appellate Government Counsel (Bobczynski)

(22a)

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT

OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

No. ACM 39642

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Kalab D. WILLMAN

Staff Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial

Judiciary Decided 2 September 2020

Military Judge: John C. Degnan.

Approved

sentence:

Dishonorable

discharge,

confinement for 1 year, and reduction to E-4. Sentence

adjudged 6 November 2018 by GCM convened at

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

For Appellant: Major Megan E. Hoffman, USAF.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Kubler,

USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason, USAF;

Lieutenant Colonel G. Matt Osborn, USAF; Mary

Ellen Payne, Esquire.

(23a)

Before POSCH, RICHARDSON, and MEGINLEY,

Appellate Military Judges.

Senior Judge POSCH delivered the opinion of the

court, in which Judge RICHARDSON joined. Judge

MEGINLEY filed a separate opinion concurring in

part and in the result.

This is an unpublished opinion and, as such,

does not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule

of Practice and Procedure 30.4.

POSCH, Senior Judge:

In accordance with Appellant’s unconditional

guilty plea pursuant to a pre- trial agreement (PTA),

a general court-martial composed of a military judge

sitting alone found Appellant guilty of one charge and

specification of indecent recording of the private area

of BM on divers occasions in violation of Article 120c,

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §

920c.1 The military judge sentenced Appellant to a

dishonorable discharge, confinement for one year, and

reduction to the grade of E-4. At action, the convening

authority approved the adjudged sentence. In

accordance with the terms of the PTA and Article 58b,

All references in this opinion to the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.),

and Military Rules of Evidence are to the Manual for

Courts- Martial, United States (2016 ed.).

1

(24a)

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 858b, the convening authority also

waived mandatory forfeitures of Appellant’s pay and

allowances for a period of six months, or upon his

release from confinement, whichever was sooner, with

the waiver commencing on 8 November 2018, for the

benefit of Appellant’s dependent daughter.2

Appellant raises two issues pursuant to United States

v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982): (1) whether

Appellant is entitled to relief because he was

compelled to give testimonial information after

invoking his right to an attorney and refusing to

answer questions; and (2) whether Appellant suffered

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment3 and Article 55, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.

§ 855, when he was not given proper medical

treatment while in confinement. Alternatively,

Appellant contends that the conditions of his post-trial

confinement render his sentence inappropriately

severe, warranting relief under Article 66(c), UCMJ,

10 U.S.C. § 866(c).4

The PTA placed no limitation on the sentence the

convening authority could approve. Among the

Government’s PTA concessions, the convening

authority agreed to dismiss with prejudice a charge

and its specifications that alleged Appellant possessed

and viewed child pornography.

3 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

4 In addition to these issues, we note the action waived

mandatory forfeitures and directed Appellant’s pay

and allowances “to be paid to AW, spouse of

[Appellant], for the benefit of [Appellant’s] dependent

2

(25a)

Finding no error materially prejudicial to the

substantial rights of Appellant, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant’s conviction is founded on his plea of guilty

to making recordings of the private area of BM, a

sixteen-year-old female, without legal justification or

authorization. Appellant met BM in an Internet chat

forum and began communicating with her in private

through texts and online video chat sessions. In time,

their conversations became sexual and they showed

each other their bodies and masturbated during some

of these sessions. On 14 occasions, Appellant used his

personal laptop computer to record BM engaging in

sexually explicit conduct, including masturbating and

lasciviously exhibiting her genitals and pubic area to

Appellant. BM did not consent to Appellant making

recordings of her during these sessions and was

unaware she was being recorded.

daughter.” Based on the record before us, AW is

Appellant’s dependent daughter and not his spouse;

and this error is repeated in the court-martial order

(CMO). Although Appellant is silent about the error in

the action, he asserts the CMO error “did not prejudice

Appellant or the relief ordered by the Convening

Authority,” and “Appellant does not raise it as an

error here.” We find no prejudice to Appellant by the

error in either the action or the CMO, and conclude

that instructing the convening authority to withdraw

the action and substitute a corrected action, see

R.C.M. 1107(g), is not warranted.

(26a)

Appellant’s conduct came to the attention of

military authorities at Vandenberg Air Force Base

(AFB) after BM’s mother learned that Appellant sent

her daughter a picture of himself with his shirt pulled

up to reveal his stomach. BM’s mother filed a police

report and the matter was ultimately referred to

agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations

(AFOSI) at Vandenberg AFB. At the time she reported

Appellant’s conduct, BM’s mother was not fully aware

of details of Appellant’s online relationship with her

daughter and the extent of their sexual

communications.

AFOSI agents opened an investigation and, on 7

November 2016, took Appellant into custody. Before

questioning Appellant about his relationship with

BM, an agent advised Appellant of his rights,

including the right to have counsel present at the

interview. See Article 31, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831; Mil.

R. Evid. 305. Following the rights advisement,

Appellant declined to answer questions and requested

legal counsel.

The same day Appellant was questioned, AFOSI

agents conducted a search of Appellant’s home and

seized multiple electronic devices. The AFOSI agents

presented Appellant with a search authorization and

a written order dated 7 November 2016 and signed by

the military magistrate. The written order directed

Appellant “to unlock any and all electronic devices

seized pursuant to the search and seizure

authorization. This include[d] any fingerprint,

password, pin number, or other forms of security

(27a)

systems for the electronic devices.” The military

magistrate also ordered Appellant “to disable all

security and/or lock settings for any and all electronic

devices seized pursuant to this search and seizure

authorization.” According to the AFOSI report of

investigation, when presented with the search

authorization and the written order, Appellant

unlocked his phone and disabled the security settings.

Later in their investigation, the AFOSI agents

presented Appellant with an additional written order

to unlock his other electronic devices. This order was

from the alternate military magistrate at Vandenberg

AFB. Appellant refused to comply with the order and

was issued a letter of reprimand (LOR) by his

commander, Colonel KB, for disobeying the direct

orders given to him by the military magistrates.5

5 Inexplicably, the letter of reprimand (LOR) that is

attached to the AFOSI report of investigation

censures Appellant for disobeying an order from the

primary military magistrate on 7 November 2016,

even though the AFOSI report indicates that

Appellant complied with the order. Also according to

the AFOSI report, Appellant was given two additional

written orders to unlock his electronic devices, on 5

January 2017 and 19 January 2017, which he failed to

obey, but neither incident is referenced in the LOR and

the orders are not included in the record. The report

indicates that Appellant refused to comply with these

orders on the advice of an area defense counsel.

Nonetheless, the failure of the record to explain the

facts underlying the LOR that Appellant received is

not dispositive to our decision.

(28a)

A week after AFOSI agents seized Appellant’s

electronic devices, a preliminary search of Appellant’s

cell phone revealed it did not have the applications

that Appellant and BM used to meet and communicate

over the Internet. Those applications were discovered

in software that was installed on Appellant’s personal

laptop computer. The AFOSI agents’ initial review of

Appellant’s phone also turned up no contraband;

however, the AFOSI agents found a picture of

Appellant with his shirt pulled up and displaying his

abdomen. The AFOSI report of investigation suggests

that this picture corroborated BM’s account of

receiving a picture from Appellant that showed his

stomach. Analysis of Appellant’s laptop uncovered

evidence of Appellant’s communications with BM,

including videos Appellant recorded of BM and the

software Appellant used to record their online

sessions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Appellant’s Right against Self-Incrimination

Appellant contends he is entitled to relief because

he was compelled to give testimonial information

when AFOSI agents unlawfully ordered him to unlock

his electronic devices after he invoked his right to an

attorney and refused to answer questions. In reference

to the LOR he received from his commander,

Appellant claims he is entitled to relief for the almost

two years of stress he experienced having to report for

duty knowing that his commander was upset with him

for disobeying the unlawful orders that were given to

(29a)

him by the military magistrates. Appellant contends

that the only meaningful relief this court can grant is

to set aside his conviction because he has already

served his sentence and is out of confinement.

1. Additional Background

As part of his obligation under the PTA, Appellant

agreed to “[w]aive all waivable motions.” The military

judge conducted an extensive inquiry with Appellant

to ensure Appellant understood the meaning and

effect of this condition. At one point, the military judge

explained:

[Y]our [PTA] states that you waive or give

up the right to make waivable motions. I

advise you that certain motions are waived

or given up if your defense counsel does not

make the motion prior to entering your plea.

Additionally, other motions, even if not

waived by guilty plea, are nonetheless

waived if not brought up during the trial.

Some motions, however, such as motions to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, for example,

can never be given up. Do you understand

that this term of your [PTA] means that you

give up the right to make any motion, which

by law is given up when you plead guilty?

Appellant replied, “Yes, sir.”

The military judge then asked Appellant, “Do you

understand that this term of your [PTA] means you

give up the right to make any motion if it is not raised

during the trial?” Appellant responded, “Yes, Your

(30a)

Honor.” Appellant acknowledged that no one forced

him to agree to this term, and that even though the

term originated with the Government, Appellant

acknowledged he freely and voluntarily agreed to the

term in order to receive the benefit of the PTA.

Appellant entered an unconditional plea of guilty

to knowingly and wrongfully making a recording of

the private area of BM without her consent on divers

occasions. During the guilty plea inquiry with the

military judge, Appellant explained that he “recorded

approximately 14 videos” of BM’s private area “using

software installed on [his] laptop.” Appellant

explained that he and BM would have online “video

chat sessions” and that he recorded the videos on his

laptop. At one point, the military judge asked

Appellant what electronic device Appellant used to

communicate with BM. Appellant replied, “Via my

laptop, sir.” Appellant would later agree that the 14

video recordings at issue were found on his laptop

computer.

2. Law

It is well-settled law that an unconditional guilty

plea generally waives any objection related to the

factual question of guilt. Rule for Courts-Martial

(R.C.M.) 910(j); see also United States v. Mooney, 77

M.J. 252, 254 (C.A.A.F. 2018). “Objections that do not

relate to factual issues of guilt are not covered by this

bright-line rule, but the general principle still applies:

[a]n unconditional guilty plea generally ‘waives all

defects which are neither jurisdictional nor a

deprivation of due process of law.’” United States v.

(31a)

Schweitzer, 68 M.J. 133, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting

United States v. Rehorn, 26 C.M.R. 267, 268– 69

(C.M.A. 1958)). The United States Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces (CAAF) has observed, “[w]hile the

waiver doctrine is not without limits, those limits are

narrow and relate to situations in which, on its face,

the prosecution may not constitutionally be

maintained.” United States v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279,

282 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citations omitted).

Consequently, an appellant who has entered an

unconditional guilty plea ordinarily may not raise on

appeal an error previously waived at trial. United

States v. Chin, 75 M.J. 220, 222 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (citing

United States v. Campos, 67 M.J. 330, 332–33

(C.A.A.F. 2009); United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311,

313 (C.A.A.F. 2009)). However, this “ordinary” rule

does not apply to statutory review by a military court

of criminal appeals (CCA) under Article 66(c), UCMJ.

Id. “Article 66(c) empowers CCAs to consider claims .

. . even when those claims have been waived.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Chin, No. ACM 38452, 2015

CCA LEXIS 241, at *9–11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 12 Jun.

2015) (unpub. op.), aff’d, 75 M.J. 220 (C.A.A.F. 2016)).

This is because CCAs maintain an “affirmative

obligation to ensure that the findings and sentence in

each such case are ‘correct in law and fact . . . and

should be approved.’” Id. at 223 (quoting United States

v. Miller, 62 M.J. 471, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (alteration

in original)).

“If an appellant elects to proceed with Article 66,

UCMJ, review the CCAs are required to assess the

(32a)

entire record to determine whether to leave an

accused’s waiver intact, or to correct the error.” Id.

(citation omitted). This requirement does not mean an

unconditional guilty plea is without meaning or effect.

Id. “Waiver at the trial level continues to preclude an

appellant from raising the issue” on appeal, id. (citing

Gladue, 67 M.J. at 313–14), and an “unconditional

guilty plea continues to serve as a factor for a CCA to

weigh in determining whether to nonetheless

disapprove a finding or sentence.” Id.

3. Analysis

At the time Appellant was ordered to unlock his

electronic devices, the CAAF had not decided United

States v. Mitchell, 76 M.J. 413 (C.A.A.F. 2017);

however, Mitchell was decided before Appellant was

arraigned and is factually similar to the conduct of the

AFOSI agents after Appellant invoked his right to

counsel. In Mitchell, the appellant’s phone had been

seized in accordance with a valid search

authorization. Id. at 416. However, after being

advised of his rights under custodial interrogation, the

appellant invoked his right to counsel. Id. Law

enforcement officials then asked the appellant to

input the passcode to unlock his phone, and the

appellant complied. Id. The CAAF concluded that the

Government

violated

the

appellant’s

Fifth

6

Amendment right to counsel as protected by Edwards

v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), when he was asked to

enter his phone’s passcode in the absence of counsel.

Mitchell, 76 M.J. at 415.

6

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

(33a)

Appellant contends that because an AFOSI agent

unlawfully made Appellant unlock his phone, the

AFOSI agents should never have been allowed to use

the evidence on his phone to build the case against

him. Although AFOSI agents did not find contraband

on Appellant’s phone, they did discover a picture of

him with his shirt raised. Appellant claims AFOSI

agents used this photograph to corroborate

information they obtained from BM and,

consequently, the AFOSI’s investigation materially

benefited from the illegal search of Appellant’s phone.

Even if we assume Appellant’s claim of error

reaches his laptop computer where the 14 charged

images were found, we nonetheless decline to grant

relief. By his unconditional plea of guilty, Appellant

waived the issues of the invocation of the right to

counsel and the lawfulness of the orders to unlock his

phone and other devices and to disable their security

settings. R.C.M. 910(j). Appellant acknowledged on

the record that he was not forced to agree to that term

of the PTA, and this court finds no reason to question

Appellant’s voluntary waiver. Furthermore, the

Government did not offer the LOR that Colonel KB

served on Appellant as evidence at the sentencing

hearing as part of the personnel records of the

accused. See R.C.M. 1001(b)(2). Thus, we find

Appellant was not prejudiced by any error or action by

a Government official.7

Based on our review of the record, we need not decide

the prejudicial impact of Colonel KB’s 11 January

7

(34a)

Further, we conclude Appellant’s claims are

neither jurisdictional nor was Appellant denied the

due process of law, and thus are waived insofar as our

consideration of the factual question of his guilt on

appeal. See R.C.M. 910(j); Schweitzer, 68 M.J. at 136.

We have determined to leave Appellant’s waiver

intact. See Chin, 75 M.J. at 222.

B. Conditions of Post-Trial Confinement

For the first time on appeal, Appellant urges this

court to find he was subjected to impermissible

confinement conditions in violation of Article 55,

UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment. Appellant also

contends the conditions warrant sentencing relief

under this court’s Article 66(c), UCMJ, authority to

approve only so much of a sentence that, based on the

entire record, should be approved. We are not

persuaded.

1. Additional Background

After the conclusion of Appellant’s sentencing

hearing on 6 November 2018, Appellant waived his

right to submit matters in clemency on 27 February

2019, and the convening authority took action the

next day. In his appeal, Appellant submitted a sworn

declaration and asked this court to reduce his

2017 reprimand of Appellant for disobeying orders to

unlock his devices after Appellant asked for legal

counsel, particularly the portion that reads, “[m]ake

no mistake, these were lawful orders from properly

appointed military magistrates . . . ”

(35a)

sentence because he did not receive proper medical

treatment for an injury that occurred in December

2018 when he was confined at the Naval Consolidated

Brig in Charleston, South Carolina. Appellant did not

raise a claim of improper medical treatment to the

convening authority when he waived clemency.

Appellant explains in his declaration that near the

end of December, another inmate stepped on his foot

during a game of flag football, causing significant

bruising to his large toe and toenail. Over the next two

to three weeks his toenail swelled and became painful.

It discharged pus and became detached from the nail

bed. On 14 January 2019, Appellant reported to sick

call for a medical evaluation. A medical staff member

concluded that no action was needed. Appellant

requested the nail be removed and that the issue be

raised to a supervisor. The supervisor refused to

remove the nail, applied an antiseptic, and gave

Appellant instructions to return to sick call should the

issue worsen. Later that evening, the nail completely

detached from the nail bed when Appellant removed

his boots and socks.

Approximately three weeks later, Appellant

returned to sick call to have his condition reevaluated

because the nail was regrowing over the exposed nail

bed in an unusual manner and with significant

discoloration, and caused pain when Appellant

donned his socks and boots each morning. Appellant

was again told by medical personnel that no action

was needed and to return to sick call if additional

symptoms or issues developed. In his 3 September

(36a)

2019 declaration to this court, Appellant states that in

the months since the onset of the issue, he is unable

to put on socks and shoes without “slow and

methodical effort.” His nail has yet to regenerate fully

and it remains an unusual color and form.

In response to Appellant’s sworn statement, the

Government provided a sworn declaration from a legal

officer at the Naval Consolidated Brig. The

declaration states that Appellant served a period of

confinement at the facility from 28 November 2018

until 11 August 2019, and he sustained an injury to

his toe during a recreational activity. After a medical

evaluation, a member of the medical staff determined

the best course of action was to let the nail remain

intact until it fell off spontaneously because removing

the nail would have left Appellant’s toenail matrix

exposed, which could increase the chances of an injury

or infection. An antiseptic solution was administered

“to decrease the amount of surface pathogens to help

prevent further infection.” Appellant was advised he

could cover the area with a plastic bandage to prevent

the nail from catching on his socks. The medical staff

member concluded there was no mandate to remove

Appellant’s toenail. The declaration explained that in

the opinion of the medical staff member, toenails can

grow back abnormally or discolored after a traumatic

event to the nail bed and it may take months or years

for the nail to fully grow. Lastly, the declaration

asserted that a review of Appellant’s prisoner record

did not contain any requests for redress or grievances.

2. Law

(37a)

“Both the Eighth Amendment and Article 55,

UCMJ, prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. In

general, we apply the Supreme Court’s interpretation

of the Eighth Amendment to claims raised under

Article 55, UCMJ, except where legislative intent to

provide greater protections under Article 55, UCMJ,

is apparent.” United States v. Gay, 74 M.J. 736, 740

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (citing United States v.

Avila, 53 M.J. 99, 101 (C.A.A.F. 2000)), aff’d, 75 M.J.

264 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits two types of

punishments: (1) those ‘incompatible with the

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress

of a maturing society’ or (2) those ‘which involve the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” United

States v. Lovett, 63 M.J. 211, 215 (C.A.A.F. 2006)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03

(1976)). A violation of the Eighth Amendment is

shown by demonstrating:

(1) an objectively, sufficiently serious act or

omission resulting in the denial of

necessities; (2) a culpable state of mind on

the part of prison officials amounting to

deliberate indifference to [appellant]’s

health and safety; and (3) that [appellant]

“has exhausted the prisoner-grievance

system . . . and that he has petitioned for

relief under Article 138, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §

938 [2000].”

Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (footnotes

(38a)

omitted) (quoting United States v. Miller, 46 M.J. 248,

250 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).

The CAAF has emphasized that “[a] prisoner must

seek administrative relief prior to invoking judicial

intervention to redress concerns regarding post-trial

confinement conditions.” United States v. Wise, 64

M.J. 468, 469 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United States v.

White, 54 M.J. 469, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). “This

requirement ‘promot[es] resolution of grievances at

the lowest possible level [and ensures] that an

adequate record has been developed [to aid appellate

review].’” Id. at 471 (alterations in original) (quoting

Miller, 46 M.J. at 250).

Except under some unusual or egregious

circumstance, an appellant must demonstrate he or

she has exhausted the prisoner grievance process

provided by the confinement facility and has

petitioned for relief under Article 138, UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 938. White, 54 M.J. at 472 (citation omitted).

Under Article 66(c), UCMJ, we have broad

authority and the mandate to approve only so much of

the sentence as we find “correct in law and fact and

determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be

approved.” See also United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J.

219, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (observing that the

“legislative history of Article 66 reflects congressional

intent to vest broad power in the Courts of Criminal

Appeals”). The scope of our Article 66(c), UCMJ,

authority to consider claims of post-trial confinement

conditions “is limited to consideration of these claims

as part of our determination of sentence

(39a)

appropriateness.” United States v. Towns, 52 M.J.

830, 833 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (citation omitted),

aff’d, 55 M.J. 361 (C.A.A.F. 2001). “It is also limited to

claims based on post-trial treatment that occurs prior

to the action of the convening authority and which is

documented in the record of trial.” Id. (citing Article

66(c), UCMJ).

3. Analysis

a. Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth

Amendment

We conclude that even if the facts, as asserted by

Appellant in his declaration, are true, Appellant has

not met his burden to establish prison officials failed

to administer proper medical treatment, and, thus,

grounds for relief.8

Article 55, UCMJ, prohibits infliction of

“[p]unishment by flogging, or by branding, marking,

or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual

punishment.” The Eighth Amendment prohibits

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners,” whether manifested by prison guards

“intentionally denying or delaying access to medical

care or intentionally interfering with the treatment

8 Having applied the decisional framework announced

in United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 248 (C.A.A.F.

1997), for evaluating conditions of post-trial

confinement, and considered the entire record, we find

we can resolve the issues raised by Appellant without

additional factfinding. See United States v. Fagan, 59

M.J. 238, 242 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

(40a)

once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–

05 (1976) (citation omitted). However, “[m]edical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation

merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to

state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts

or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Id.

at 106. “Deliberate indifference” requires that the

responsible official must be aware of an excessive risk

to an inmate’s health or safety and disregard that risk.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[I]t is

enough that the official acted or failed to act despite

his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Id. at 842 (citation omitted). However, “prison officials

who [lack] knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have

inflicted punishment.” Id. at 844.

Apart from Appellant’s factual declaration, we find

no basis for the assertions made by Appellant’s

counsel on behalf of Appellant that (1) Appellant’s

“serious and potentially disabling medical issue—an

infected toe—was brushed aside by brig medical

personnel and not taken seriously;” (2) “[t]he brig sick

bay officials’ lack of concern led to a long-term

infection and permanent damage to the digit that

continues to this day;” and that (3) “[t]here is no

explanation for the conditions under which Appellant

was kept except that the confinement facility officials

deliberately and willfully disregarded Appellant’s

well-being.” The most Appellant shows from the posttrial declarations is that the treatment of his injured

toe was aimed at preventing infection. Appellant has

(41a)

not shown that either alternative or additional

medical interventions would have restored his health

to the same condition before the injury happened.

In the present case, the information provided by

Appellant in his appeal lacks evidence that prison

officials were aware of a substantial risk of serious

harm to Appellant’s health or safety and disregarded

that risk. We find that Appellant has not presented

evidence to establish wrongful intent, namely, that

any official failed to properly administer treatment for

the purpose of increasing Appellant’s suffering or the

severity of his sentence. Appellant has not shown

conduct of prison officials that rises to the level of

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment

whether manifested by prison guards “intentionally

denying or delaying access to medical care or

intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. Moreover, a

review of Appellant’s case does not reveal any

information to suggest that Appellant attempted to

use a grievance process to address his complaint. See

Wise, 64 M.J. at 469; White, 54 M.J. at 471.

We find Appellant’s post-trial claims do not

demonstrate circumstances warranting relief under

Article 55, UCMJ, or the Eighth Amendment. Even if

the facts as asserted by Appellant are true, there is

insufficient evidence to objectively conclude that a

sufficiently serious act or omission occurred which

resulted in the denial of necessities. See Lovett, 63

M.J. at 215. The information falls far short of wrongful

(42a)

intent, namely, a culpable state of mind of an

identifiable official which constituted deliberate

indifference to Appellant’s health and safety. See id.

Finally, the record does not provide evidence that

Appellant attempted to use a grievance process to

address complaints of mistreatment. See id.

Accordingly, Appellant does not warrant relief under

Article 55 or the Eighth Amendment and we conclude

his sentence is correct in law.

b. Appropriateness of Sentence

Having resolved Appellant’s Article 55 and Eighth

Amendment claims, we next consider if our review of

whether Appellant’s sentence should be approved “on

the basis of the entire record,” Article 66(c), UCMJ,

permits or precludes our consideration of the posttrial confinement conditions Appellant presents for

the first time on appeal. We conclude Article 66(c)

limits our review of the appropriateness of the

sentence to the record and thus precludes

consideration of Appellant’s statements of fact about

those conditions.

In United States v. Jessie, the CAAF observed that

some of the court’s precedents hold that CCAs “may

consider only what is in the record” when reviewing a

sentence under Article 66(c). 79 M.J 437, 440

(C.A.A.F. 2020) (citation omitted). The CAAF noted

that the leading case for these precedents is United

States v. Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. 192 (C.M.A. 1961), in

which the appellant asked the Army Board of Review

to reject his punitive discharge based on a favorable

psychiatric assessment and a favorable report

(43a)

regarding his conduct while in confinement. Jessie, 79

M.J. at 441 (citing Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. at 193). The

Board of Review declined to consider these documents,

explaining that because the submission “concerns

matters which occurred months after the convening

authority acted upon the sentence and forwarded the

record of trial, it is not a part of the record subject to

review under Article 66.” Id. (quoting Fagnan, 30

C.M.R. at 193). The United States Court of Military

Appeals, the predecessor to the CAAF, affirmed,

holding that under Article 66(c), UCMJ, “the board of

review is expressly restricted by Congress to the

‘entire record’ in assessing the appropriateness of the

sentence.” Id. (quoting Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. at 194). The

Jessie court reiterated the reasoning in Fagnan that

“if military justice proceedings are to be ‘truly judicial

in nature,’ then the appellate courts cannot ‘consider

information relating to the appropriateness of

sentences when it has theretofore formed no part of

the record.’” Id. (quoting Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. at 195).

In Jessie, our superior court concluded that

“Fagnan established a clear rule that the CCAs may

not consider anything outside of the ‘entire record’

when reviewing a sentence under Article 66(c),

UCMJ.” Id. (citation omitted). Specifically in regard to

conditions of post-trial confinement, “[t]he rule in

Fagnan does not preclude the CCAs from considering

prison conditions when reviewing a sentence under

Article 66(c), UCMJ, if the record contains information

about those conditions.” Id. at 441–42 (emphasis

added); see also id. at 444 n.10 (“Because both the

(44a)

sentence appropriateness and correctness in law

determinations require a decision based upon the

‘entire record,’ we need not determine whether

posttrial confinement conditions fall under one or both

provisions.”).

Here, the “entire record”9 contains no information

about the conditions of Appellant’s post-trial

confinement. Although we exercised our authority to

consider outside-the-record matters to determine if

Appellant’s sentence is correct in law under Article 55,

UCMJ, and the Eighth Amendment, see United States

v. Erby, 54 M.J. 476, 478 (C.A.A.F. 2001), we are

precluded from considering Appellant’s statement of

facts about these conditions to determine if his

sentence is appropriate and “should be approved” as

part of our Article 66(c) review. Jessie, 79 M.J. at 441.

In United States v. Gay, the CAAF affirmed a decision

of this court that reduced an appellant’s sentence

under Article 66(c) because prison officials, without

justification, had made him serve part of his sentence

in maximum security solitary confinement. 75 M.J.

264, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2016). However, information about

9 See R.C.M. 1103(b)(2) (contents of the record) and

R.C.M. 1103(b)(3) (matters attached to the record). In

addition, the “entire record” includes briefs and

arguments that appellate counsel and an appellant

personally present regarding matters that are already

in the record of trial, R.C.M. 1103(b)(2), or have been

attached to the record of trial under R.C.M. 1103(b)(3).

See Jessie, 79 M.J. at 440–41 (citing United States v.

Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 396 (C.M.A. 1988)).

(45a)

these conditions was part of the record of trial because

the appellant had requested additional confinement

credit when he complained about the conditions to the

convening authority. Id. at 265–66. Unlike Gay,

neither the record of trial nor the matters attached to

Appellant’s record of trial mentions the conditions

Appellant raises for the first time after the convening

authority took action in Appellant’s case.

It may seem incongruous to consider outside-therecord matters to evaluate Appellant’s Article 55 and

Eighth Amendment claims, and then not consider

those matters in this court’s sentence appropriateness

review under Article 66(c). Nonetheless, our superior

court has declined to further erode precedents like

Fagnan, noting, “[w]e see nothing in the statutory text

[of Article 66(c)] requiring special treatment for all

appeals raising statutory or constitutional claims.”

Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444. The CAAF further rejected the

contention “that appellants should have the right to

supplement the record whenever they raise claims of

constitutional or statutory violations.”10 Id. at 443.

We depart from our esteemed colleague concurring

in the result in regard to the position that was taken

by Chief Judge Johnson in United States v. Matthews,

No. ACM 39593, 2020 CCA LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct. Crim.

“The ‘entire record’ restriction . . . applies equally

whether the CCA is reviewing a sentence’s correctness

in law, reviewing a sentence’s correctness in fact, or

determining whether a sentence should be approved.”

Jessie, 79 M.J. at 444 (footnote omitted).

10

(46a)

App. 2 Jun. 2020) (unpub. op.) (J. Johnson, C.J.,

concurring in the result). Like this case, the Matthews

appellant raised his Article 55, UCMJ, and Eighth

Amendment claims for the first time on appeal and

based them on material outside the original record of

trial. Matthews, unpub. op. at *12. Chief Judge

Johnson simply concluded that the question of this

court’s authority to grant sentence appropriateness

relief under Article 66(c), UCMJ, for claimed

violations of Article 55, UCMJ, and the Eighth

Amendment was not before the CAAF in Jessie, and

thus “the CAAF’s position on this point is undecided

and unclear.” Matthews, unpub. op. at *16–17 (J.

Johnson, C.J., concurring in the result). In our view,

the CAAF’s majority opinion was resolute and clear.

Following the court’s Article 66(c) mandate to

approve only so much of a sentence that, based on “the

entire record, should be approved,” we conclude the

record contains no support to grant sentencing relief

on the basis of Appellant’s claims about the conditions

of post-trial confinement.

III. CONCLUSION

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law

and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the

substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles

59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c).

Accordingly, the findings and the sentence are

AFFIRMED.11

11 Although not raised by the parties, we note an error

in the CMO where the charged article is incorrectly

(47a)

MEGINLEY, Judge (concurring in the result):

I agree with the majority in that Appellant is not

entitled to relief for cruel or unusual conditions of

post-trial confinement in violation of the Eighth

Amendment1 or Article 55, Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 855. Nor do I believe the

conditions Appellant describes render his sentence

inappropriately severe, warranting relief under

Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).

However, I disagree with the premise that we are

precluded from considering the appropriateness of

Appellant’s sentence pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ,

10 U.S.C. § 866, in a case such as this where Appellant

raises his Eighth Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ,

claims for the first time on appeal, and supports his

claim with material that is outside of the original

record of trial. I agree with the observations made by

Chief Judge Johnson in his concurring opinion in

United States v. Matthews, No. ACM 39593, 2020 CCA

LEXIS 193 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2 Jun. 2020) (unpub.

op.), in his assessment of our superior court’s recent

decision in United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437

(C.A.A.F. 2020):

Article 66, UCMJ, is the fundamental source of

this court’s authority to review any issue, to include

identified as Article “120” rather than “120c.” We

direct the publication of a corrected CMO to remedy

this error.

1

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

(48a)

alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment and

Article 55, UCMJ. It does seem incongruous (to borrow

the majority’s term) to find that, under Jessie, we have

jurisdiction to review alleged violations of the Eighth

Amendment and Article 55, UCMJ, based on material

outside the original record of trial, but to find we lack

jurisdiction to consider such materials for the purpose

of “affirm[ing] only such findings of guilty and the

sentence . . . as [we] find correct in law and fact and

determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be

approved”—which is our fundamental charge and

mandate in accordance with the text of Article 66

itself. See United States v. Gay, 75 M.J. 264, 268

(C.A.A.F. 2016). Matthews, unpub. op. at *17–18 (J.

Johnson, C.J., concurring in the result).

I am troubled by the precedent that will be set if a

hardline rule is established that Courts of Criminal

Appeals cannot consider anything outside of the

record for post-trial issues unless an Eighth

Amendment or Article 55 issue is raised. Since United

States v. Fagnan, 30 C.M.R. 192 (C.M.A. 1961), was

decided, prison and confinement systems have greatly

evolved, post-trial processing has undergone a

massive transformation, and most importantly,

appellants have changed. The Department of Defense

is coming to terms with the racial and gender

disparity issues that have existed in our military

justice sys tem for quite some time. We have also

learned to recognize the need to make

accommodations in our confinement systems for

certain segments of our military population which

(49a)

may have been marginalized or ignored, such as those

who may identify as gay, lesbian, or transgender.

How these evolving issues will play out in postpunishment context is unknown. Yet, the time to

include post-trial matters in the record is nearly

irrelevant; gone are the days when an appellant could

be in confinement for months before action. Now,

depending on how quickly a legal office can process a

record, entry of judgment can take place in a matter

of days.

Nor do I believe in the notion we could, or should,

require our Airmen to seek relief for these issues

solely in the federal court system. We have an

obligation to be prepared to consider non-traditional

post-trial confinement issues as part of our charge.

Courts of Criminal Appeals need flexibility in posttrial submissions so that we can continue to reconcile

injustices and shortcomings in order to continue to

adapt to our ever-changing military population. I

agree with the point made by Judge Sparks in his

dissenting opinion in Jessie, noting:

The majority is correct that Article 66,

UCMJ, instructs the lower courts to review

issues “on the basis of the entire record.” But

it also entrusts the lower court with the

weightier responsibility of ensuring an

accused's sentence is “correct in law.” Confining our review only to the existing record,

without exception, would limit the lower

court’s ability to do this.

(50a)

Jessie, at 448 (Sparks, J., dissenting).

By closing the door on non-Eighth Amendment and

Article 55 claims, we are perhaps closing the door on

due process and First Amendment2 issues (as seen in

Jessie), and other matters we simply cannot

anticipate—matters that were not envisioned when

Fagnan was decided.

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court

2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.

(51a)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D.C.

United States,

Appellee

USCA Dkt. No. 21-0146/AF

Crim.App. No. 39657

v.

ORDER

Cory J.

Frantz,,

Appellant

On further consideration of the granted issue (81

M.J.

(C.A.A.F.

March 23, 2021)), and in view of United States v.

Willman, 81 M.J.

(C.A.A.F.

July 21, 2021), it is, by the Court, this 10th day of

August, 2021,

ORDERED:

That the decision of the United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals is hereby affirmed.

For the Court,

/s/

cc:

David A. Anderson

Acting Clerk of the Court

The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel (Bosner)

Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)

(52a)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D.C.

United States,

Appellee

v.

USCA Dkt. No. 21-0146/AF

Crim.App. No. 39657

ORDER GRANTING REVIEW

Cory J.

Frantz,,

Appellant

On consideration of the petition for grant of

review of the decision of the United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Appeals, it is, by the Court, this

23rd day of March, 2021,

ORDERED:

That said petition is hereby granted on the

following issue:

WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED

WHEN IT RULED THAT IT COULD NOT

CONSIDER EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE

RECORD TO DETERMINE SENTENCE

APPROPRIATENESS UNDER ARTICLE

66(c), UCMJ.

No briefs will be filed under Rule 25.

(53a)

For the Court,

/s/

cc:

Joseph R. Perlak

Clerk of the Court

The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel (Bosner)

Appellate Government Counsel (Payne)

(54a)

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT

OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

No. ACM 39657

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Cory J. FRANTZ

Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary

Decided 10 November 2020

Military Judge: Mark W. Milam.

Approved

sentence:

Dishonorable

discharge,

confinement

for

7

years, and reduction to E-1.

Sentence adjudged 19 October 2018 by GCM convened

at Aviano Air Base, Italy.

For Appellant: Major Mark J. Schwartz, USAF; Captain

David L. Bosner, USAF; Tami L. Mitchell, Esquire.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Brian C. Mason, USAF;

Major Jessica L. Delaney, USAF; Major Peter F. Kellett,

USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.

Before J. JOHNSON, POSCH, and KEY, Appellate

Military Judges.

(55a)

Chief Judge J. JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the

court, in which Senior Judge POSCH and Judge KEY

joined.

This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does

not serve as precedent under AFCCA Rule of

Practice and Procedure 30.4.

J. JOHNSON, Chief Judge:

A general court-martial composed of a military

judge alone convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas,

of two specifications of committing lewd acts upon a

child under the age of 12 years, in violation of Article

120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10

U.S.C. § 920b.1,2 The military judge sentenced

Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement

for seven years, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The

convening authority approved the adjudged sentence,

but deferred automatic forfeitures of pay and

All references in this opinion to the Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ), Rules for Courts-Martial,

and Military Rules of Evidence are to the Manual for

Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.).

2 The

military judge found Appellant guilty of

Specification 3 of the Charge by exceptions and

substitutions. The military judge found Appellant not

guilty of two specifications of sexual assault of a child

under the age of 12 years in violation of Article 120b,

UCMJ.

1

(56a)

allowances until action pursuant to Articles 57(a) and

58b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 857(a), 858b, and waived the

automatic forfeitures for the benefit of Appellant’s

dependent child until the earlier of six months or the

expiration of Appellant’s term of service pursuant to

Article 58b, UCMJ.

Appellant raises nine issues on appeal: (1) whether

the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support his convictions; (2) whether the finding of

guilty with regard to Specification 3 of the Charge is

fatally ambiguous; (3) whether the Government

violated Appellant’s right to equal access to evidence;

(4) whether the military judge abandoned his

impartial judicial role and erroneously failed to

disqualify himself; (5) whether Appellant’s sentence is

inappropriately severe; (6) whether the Government’s

failure to defer and waive automatic forfeitures in

accordance with the convening authority’s direction

warrants relief; (7) whether the Naval Consolidated

Brig Miramar (Miramar Brig) policy of preventing

Appellant from having contact with his minor son is

unconstitutional or violates Article 55, UCMJ, 10

U.S.C. § 855; (8) whether the military judge abused

his discretion in declining to admit a defense exhibit;

and (9) whether the delay in procuring prescription

eyeglasses for Appellant during his confinement

constituted cruel and unusual punishment.3 In

Appellant personally raises issues (8) and (9)

pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431

(C.M.A. 1992). We have carefully considered issues (8)

and (9), and we find they warrant neither further

3

(57a)

addition, although not raised by Appellant, we

consider two further issues: whether the convening

authority’s failure to state his reasons for denying

Appellant’s request to defer his reduction in grade

warrants relief; and whether Appellant is entitled to

relief for facially unreasonable appellate delay. We

affirm the findings, but we find that an error with

respect to the convening authority’s denial of the

requested deferment of the reduction in grade

warrants relief with respect to the sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant met AS, then a divorced mother of three

children, in June 2013 when they both lived in the

state of Washington. They began dating, and

Appellant moved in with AS and her children for a

period of time before he departed for Air Force basic

training in November 2013. Appellant and AS

married in February 2014 after Appellant learned he

would be stationed at Aviano Air Base (AB) in Italy.

Appellant and AS moved to Italy in July 2014, and

AS’s children joined them there approximately one

month later.

The family eventually settled in a four-story house

in a town near Aviano AB. On weekends AS would

regularly go to the on-base fitness center, a drive of

approximately 30 minutes each way, leaving

Appellant with the children, who were nine, five, and

discussion nor relief. See United States v. Matias, 25

M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A. 1987).

(58a)

three years old at the time. AS noticed that Appellant

seemed to favor the oldest child, her daughter JZ, over

the other children. For example, Appellant bought

clothes for JZ, helped her clean her room, and tucked

her into bed at night without doing the same for the

other children.

JZ exhibited troubling behavior after she arrived

in Italy. She showed no motivation in the on-base

school, which assigned a counselor to meet with JZ

regularly. At home, JZ resisted bathing, she was

aggressive toward her younger brother, and she would

spend time alone in a dark room.

In Italy, AS’s marriage to Appellant deteriorated.

According to AS, the couple frequently argued about

the children, finances, and managing the household.

Tensions increased in January 2015 when Appellant

traveled to Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, for

several weeks of training. While Appellant was there,

AS informed him she did not want to continue the

marriage. Soon afterwards, AS found JZ in her

bedroom holding a tablet and crying. JZ asked AS to

“take back” what she said to Appellant so they would

not “have to go.” AS looked at the tablet and

discovered JZ had been messaging with Appellant via

Facebook. AS did not inspect the messages at that

point, but replied to Appellant’s messages to the effect

that he should not contact JZ.

Within a few days, AS inspected the messages

more closely. Some of the messages alarmed her. At

one point in these messages, JZ wrote, “And I still will

(59a)

not tell anybody,” to which Appellant responded,

“Good,” before JZ finished her sentence, “About us!”

Shortly thereafter, Appellant sent JZ messages

asking if she knew how to delete Facebook messages

before sending her instructions on how to do so. Later,

JZ made cryptic references to the “last night with

[Appellant]” when he was “doin the laundry,” which

“still haunt[ed]” her. JZ asked Appellant if he

remembered “the laundry,” to which Appellant

responded that he did remember “[t]alking to [JZ]

while doing laundry.” JZ responded with a “thumbs

up” symbol, to which Appellant responded with a

winking emoji and “[t]hought so.” Appellant and JZ

shared that each missed the other and liked the

other’s smile. Coupled with JZ’s troubling behavior,

the messages led AS to believe that “there was

something going on” and she “wanted it to be

investigated.” Although most of these electronic

messages were later lost, AS printed a copy at the

time.

AS took the messages to the Family Advocacy

office at Aviano AB. Family Advocacy referred AS to

the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).

However, when the AFOSI interviewed JZ, she denied

that Appellant had abused her, and the investigation

ended.

AS and the children moved out of the house to stay

with friends before Appellant returned from Nellis

AFB, and the children never lived with Appellant

again. According to AS, Appellant was uncooperative

with AS’s efforts to return to the United States, and

(60a)

he refused to provide adequate financial support until

she sought assistance from his chain of command. As

a result, AS sold most of the family’s belongings in

order to raise money, which caused further acrimony.

AS and her children were eventually able to leave

Italy and return to Washington; the divorce became

final in March 2016.

In the months that followed their departure from

Italy, JZ moved multiple times within Washington

between her mother AS, her biological father, and her

grandparents. By the beginning of 2017, JZ was 11

years old and again living with AS, who had

remarried. Although AS had taken away JZ’s tablet,

JZ’s school had provided her a laptop computer with

Internet capability. In early 2017, AS learned that JZ

had been communicating again via Facebook with

Appellant, who was still stationed at Aviano AB.

When confronted, JZ initially denied communicating

with Appellant, but soon JZ admitted that she had

been doing so, and she permitted AS to read the

messages. As AS and her husband reviewed the

messages, JZ initially lay quietly on a couch before she

covered her head with a blanket and began to cry.

The messages between Appellant and JZ ranged

from mundane descriptions of daily activities, to false

claims by JZ on such subjects as owning horses and

being pregnant, to expressions of mutual affection and

attraction. Appellant repeatedly commented that he

felt a special bond with JZ, that he thought she was

beautiful, and that he wanted to hold and kiss her.

One notable early exchange included the following:

(61a)

[JZ:] remember when mom used to go to the

gym on weekends and we would hang out

[Appellant:] Yes

[JZ:] do you remember what we did when we

hung out

[Appellant:] Yes

Do you

She didn’t like me and you spending time

together

[JZ:] Yea I do

Did she know?!

[Appellant:] Idk what you told her or what she

thinks she knows I didn’t say anything about

hanging out

We watched movies

[JZ:] I said the same thing

In later messages, Appellant implied and then

expressed his purported sexual attraction to JZ more

openly. Appellant told JZ he thought about sex often,

had thought about having sex with JZ, and would be

willing to have sex with her when she was older,

because “that’s the legal answer.” When JZ told

Appellant she would kiss and marry Appellant if she

was his age, he responded that JZ was “gorgeous,

smart and fun,” and he would kiss and marry her too

(62a)

if they were the same age. Later, Appellant told JZ he

could “teach [her] a thing or two” about sex “when she

was ready to learn.” When JZ asked Appellant if he

would send her a picture of his “you know what” if she

asked him to, Appellant responded that he “would if

[JZ] sent one back.” JZ replied that she “would send

one” when she was “alone,” to which Appellant

responded “Damn,”

“Same.” When JZ asked

Appellant “on a scale of 1-10 how bad do you want to

have sex with me,” Appellant told her the answer was

ten; JZ responded “same.” Then the following

exchange ensued:

[JZ:] I am being for real with this one…It

honestly SUCKS that we cant have sex till im

18

[Appellant:] Yeah

Well I think it’s 17 with consent If you really

wanted to

[JZ:] yeah

[Appellant:] But 18 is just safer

[JZ:] yep for sure

[Appellant:] Does suck

[JZ:] yea if you REALLY wanted to… would

you have sex while it is still illegal just

questioning

[Appellant:] Maybe

(63a)

But it’s better when you are of age

[JZ:] yup

[Appellant:] Just because it can still come back

on me

[JZ:] yea it can

[Appellant:] That’s why I said maybe because

it’s not yes but it’s not saying no

[JZ:] true true

[Appellant:] Wish you were of age now

Later, Appellant and JZ joked about JZ taking her

pants and underwear off when she came to visit him

sometime. When Appellant dared her to do so, JZ

asked “Why? What will you do if I do?” Appellant

responded, “Idk,” “That’s hot though.” At another

point, Appellant suggested JZ might secretly meet

Appellant when he came to Washington to visit his

father.

Perceiving that some of the messages were sexual

in nature, AS asked JZ if Appellant had done anything

to her physically while they were in Italy. JZ replied

that Appellant had. The following morning AS took JZ

to the civilian police in Washington, who began an

investigation and contacted the AFOSI.

At trial, JZ testified inter alia that Appellant

touched her inappropriately when they lived together

(64a)

in Italy.4 According to JZ, on multiple occasions when

AS was at the gym, Appellant brought JZ to the

laundry room while her brother and sister were

upstairs watching movies. In the laundry room,

Appellant put her on top of the dryer or washing

machine and put his hands underneath her shirt. She

further testified that “sometimes” he would also pick

her up and hold her by her “butt” against the front of

his body, and sometimes he “wrapped his hands

around [her] waist.” JZ further testified that on

multiple occasions when AS was away from the house

Appellant took JZ to JZ’s bedroom, which like the

laundry room was on the bottom floor. According to

JZ, in the bedroom Appellant inserted his fingers and

his tongue in her vagina as she lay on the bed.

The military judge found Appellant guilty of one

specification of committing lewd acts on JZ by

communicating indecent language to her on divers

occasions with the intent to gratify his sexual desire,

and one specification of committing a lewd act on JZ

by “putting his arms around [JZ], and intentionally

touching and holding onto her buttocks with his

hands, with an intent to gratify his sexual desire.” The

military judge found Appellant not guilty of one

specification of sexual assault against JZ by

penetrating her vulva with his fingers and one

specification of sexual assault by penetrating her

vulva with his tongue, both with the intent to gratify

4 JZ was 13 years old at the time of Appellant’s trial.

(65a)

his sexual desire.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency

1. Law

We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de

novo. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399

(C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted). Our assessment of

legal and factual sufficiency is limited to the evidence

produced at trial. United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270,

272 (C.M.A. 1993) (citations omitted).

“The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Robinson, 77 M.J.

294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted). “[I]n

resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound

to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence

of record in favor of the prosecution.” United States v.

Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations

omitted). As a result, “[t]he standard for legal

sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a

conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221

(C.A.A.F. 2019) (alteration in original) (citation

omitted).

The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after

weighing the evidence in the record of trial and

making allowances for not having personally observed

the witnesses, [we are] convinced of the [appellant]’s

(66a)

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987). “In

conducting this unique appellate role, we take ‘a fresh,

impartial look at the evidence,’ applying ‘neither a

presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt’

to ‘make [our] own independent determination as to

whether the evidence constitutes proof of each

required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United

States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim.

App. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting

Washington, 57 M.J. at 399), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289

(C.A.A.F. 2018). Article 120b(c), UCMJ, provides:

“Any person subject to this chapter who commits a

lewd act upon a child is guilty of sexual abuse of a

child and shall be punished as a court-martial may

direct.” Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

(2016 ed.) (MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 45b.a.(c). A “child” is “any

person who has not attained the age of 16 years.”

MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45b.a.(h)(4). The term “lewd act”

includes, inter alia, “any sexual contact with a child”

and “intentionally communicating indecent language

to a child by any means, including via any

communication technology, with an intent to . . .

arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.”

MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45b.a.(h)(5). “‘Indecent’ language is

that which is grossly offensive to modesty, decency, or

propriety, or shocks the moral sense, because of its

vulgar, filthy, or disgusting nature, or its tendency to

incite lustful thought. Language is indecent if it tends

reasonably to corrupt morals or incite libidinous

thoughts.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 89.c. “Sexual contact”

includes “any touching . . . either directly or through

(67a)

the clothing, [of] any body part of any person, if done

with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of

any person.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 45.a.(g)(2); see MCM, pt.

IV, ¶ 45b.a.(h)(1).

2. Analysis

Appellant asserts the evidence was legally and

factually insufficient to support his conviction for

either specification for which the military judge found

him guilty. We consider each specification in turn.

a. Intentionally Communicating Indecent

Language

On appeal, Appellant does not contest that he in

fact sent the messages in question to JZ, that he did

so intentionally, or that he knew JZ’s age. With

respect to the content of the messages, the indecency

of a communication depends on “the context in which

it is made.” United States v. Green, 68 M.J. 266, 270

(C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted). In this case,

Appellant communicated to an 11-year-old child that

he thought about sex a lot, that he desired to have

sexual intercourse with her in the future, that his

sexual desire for her was a ten out of ten, that it

“sucked” that they could not have sex before she was

17 or 18 years old, and that he would “maybe” have

sex with her earlier even if it was illegal. In addition,

he discussed—albeit hypothetically—sending a photo

of his genitals to JZ in return for a photo of hers. The

context for these communications included, as the

military judge found, that Appellant had previously

touched JZ’s buttocks and torso with the intent to

(68a)

gratify his sexual desire, when she was only nine

years old and he was her stepfather. We find

Appellant sent JZ messages that were “grossly

offensive to modesty, decency, or propriety,” and

therefore indecent. MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 89.c.

Without conceding indecency, Appellant contends

for purposes of argument that even if we find some of

his later messages were indecent, there is insufficient

evidence of his intent to gratify his sexual desire,

because he told JZ they should wait until she was 18

years old to have sex. We disagree and find ample

evidence that Appellant intended to gratify his sexual

desire at the time he sent the messages. Again, the

context for these messages included that Appellant

had touched JZ’s body for the purpose of gratifying his

sexual desire when they lived in Italy. The nature of

the messages and Appellant’s comments suggest he

found his communications with JZ sexually

stimulating. If there were any doubt, his comment

that he found contemplating JZ removing her pants

and underwear when she visited him to be “hot” would

lay it to rest.

b. Sexual Contact

With respect to the specification that Appellant

committed sexual contact on JZ by putting his arms

around her and putting his hands on her buttocks

with the intent to gratify his sexual desire, Appellant

contends JZ’s testimony is simply not credible enough

to sustain his conviction. In fact, there are significant

problems with JZ’s credibility. She was reluctant to

(69a)

testify about certain events, notably the sexual acts

Appellant allegedly performed on her in her bedroom

in Italy. Her testimony was sometimes confusing and

incomplete, requiring the counsel and military judge

to readdress the same events with her multiple times.

More significantly, by her own admission JZ lied

about many things from 2015 to 2017. She often lied

in her 2017 messages to Appellant about owning

horses and having a boyfriend, and she lied to

Appellant and others about being pregnant; according

to JZ, she did so to get “attention.” More

problematically, JZ admitted that she had lied to

investigators about Appellant’s offenses. She lied to

the AFOSI in 2015 when she denied Appellant had

touched her inappropriately, because she was “young,

dumb, and [she] thought [she] would get in trouble.”

JZ admitted she lied to the civilian police in 2017

when she told them she kicked Appellant when he was

touching her, and when she claimed at one point

Appellant had threatened to kill her mother AS. JZ

testified she did not know why she told these lies. JZ

told the military judge she understood it was

important to tell the truth in her courtroom

testimony, and she indicated she had put her “lying

ways” behind her; however, when the military judge

asked JZ why he should believe what she said about

Appellant when she had “said so many lies in the

past,” she responded “I don’t have an answer to that.”

The military judge evidently recognized JZ’s

credibility problems. He questioned her directly about

the importance of telling the truth and confronted her

(70a)

about her admitted past false statements. Notably,

after both parties rested the military judge recalled JZ

to give further testimony. Among other questions, the

military judge focused JZ on “the first time” Appellant

touched JZ, which she confirmed was in the laundry

room. JZ described again how Appellant picked her up

and put her on the washing machine or dryer. Then

Appellant put his hands “in [her] shirt” and “around

[her] waist.” At another point, he “picked [her] up and

held [her] by the butt.” She explained:

So you know how like you hold like a little

kid off to the side or like you’re holding

someone and you kind of like hold them kind

of like by the thigh I guess. He had his hands

like around my butt.

....

I think he was lifting me off of whatever I

was sitting on. And he had picked me up and

he was holding me by the butt. And then

instead of like having me off to the side kind

of on his hip, he kind of had me in front of

him.

The military judge found Appellant not guilty of

the alleged sexual acts in JZ’s bedroom. However, he

found Appellant guilty of one instance of alleged

sexual contact in the laundry room, in accordance

with JZ’s recall testimony. Significantly, unlike the

alleged bedroom incidents, JZ’s contemporary

messages to Appellant in 2015 corroborated that

something significant occurred between her and

(71a)

Appellant in the laundry room. In addition, her

testimony regarding this incident was more certain,

specific, and definite than her description of the

bedroom incidents. We are also cognizant that the

military judge observed JZ’s testimony and evidently

carefully considered her credibility. Coupled with

Appellant’s response of “good” when JZ promised not

to “tell anybody” about them in 2015, Appellant

immediately sending instructions on how to delete

Facebook messages, and other evidence of Appellant’s

sexual interest in JZ, we conclude the evidence

supports the military judge’s findings.

c. Conclusion as to Legal and Factual

Sufficiency

Drawing every reasonable inference from the

evidence of record in favor of the Government, we

conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support

Appellant’s convictions for sexual abuse of a child by

communicating indecent language and by sexual

contact. See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297–98.

Additionally, having weighed the evidence in the

record of trial and having made allowances for not

having personally observed the witnesses, we are

convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Turner, 25 M.J. at 325.

B. Ambiguous Finding

1. Additional Background

Specification 3 of the Charge alleged that

Appellant:

[D]id, at or near Fanna, Italy, on divers

(72a)

occasions, between on or about 7 August

2014 and on or about 21 January 2015,

commit lewd acts upon [JZ], a child who

had not attained the age of 12 years, to wit:

intentionally touching her buttocks with

his hands, with an intent to gratify his

sexual desire.

(Emphasis added).

JZ’s initial testimony indicated Appellant touched

her on her buttocks and elsewhere multiple times in

the laundry room. As described above, after both

parties had rested, the military judge exercised his

authority under Article 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846, to

recall JZ for additional testimony. During that recall

testimony, the military judge had JZ focus on “the first

time” Appellant touched JZ, which JZ confirmed was

in the laundry room. JZ again described how

Appellant put his arms around her and held her by

her buttocks on that occasion.

The military judge found Appellant guilty of

Specification 3 by exceptions and substitutions.

According to the modified specification, the military

judge found that Appellant:

[D]id, at or near Fanna, Italy, in the laundry

room of the family home, on the day of the

first alleged touching incident, between

on or about 7 August 2014 and on or about

21 January 2015, commit a lewd act upon

[JZ], a child who had not attained the age

of 12 years, to wit: putting his arms

(73a)

around [JZ], and intentionally touching

and holding onto her buttocks with his

hands, with an intent to gratify his sexual

desire.

2. Law

“Whether a verdict is ambiguous and thus

precludes a [Court of Criminal Appeals] from

performing a factual sufficiency review is a question

of law reviewed de novo.” United States v. Ross, 68

M.J. 415, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (emphasis and citation

omitted).

“One or more words or figures may be excepted

from a specification, and, when necessary, others

substituted, if the remaining language of the

specification, with or without substitutions, states an

offense by the accused which is punishable by courtmartial.” United States v. Trew, 68 M.J. 364, 367

(C.A.A.F. 2010) (quoting Rule for Courts-Martial

(R.C.M.) 918(a)(1), Discussion).

“[W]hen the phrase ‘on divers occasions’ is removed

from a specification, the effect is that ‘the accused has

been found guilty of misconduct on a single occasion

and not guilty on the remaining occasions.’” United

States v. Wilson, 67 M.J. 423, 428 (C.A.A.F. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Augspurger, 61 M.J. 189, 190

(C.A.A.F. 2005)). “If there is no indication on the

record which of the alleged incidents forms the basis

of the conviction, then the findings of guilt are

ambiguous and the Court of Criminal Appeals cannot

perform a factual sufficiency review.” Id. (citing

(74a)

United States v. Walters, 58 M.J. 391, 396–97

(C.A.A.F. 2003)). “[T]he remedy for a Walters violation

is to set aside the finding of guilty to the affected

specification and dismiss it with prejudice.” United

States v. Scheurer, 62 M.J. 100, 112 (C.A.A.F. 2005)

(footnote omitted).

3. Analysis

Appellant was charged with intentionally touching

JZ’s buttocks on divers occasions. The military judge

excepted the “on divers occasions” language and found

Appellant guilty of touching JZ on only a single

occasion, “on the day of the first alleged touching

incident” which occurred “in the laundry room.” By

specifying in the substituted language the single

occasion for which he was finding Appellant guilty,

the military judge ensured the record indicated which

alleged incident formed the basis of the conviction,

and thereby avoided a fa- tally ambiguous finding.

Appellant contends the finding is nevertheless

fatally ambiguous because the military judge did not

identify the date on which he found the unlawful

touching occurred. However, we find nothing in

Walters or its progeny that requires that a date be

used to “reflect the specific instance of conduct upon

which [the] modified findings are based.” Walters, 58

M.J. at 396. In many cases, a witness may provide

testimony of sufficient strength to prove guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, yet be unable to recall the date of

the event with any specificity. In this case, JZ testified

specifically to Appellant’s actions on the first occasion

(75a)

that he touched her in the laundry room, and the

military judge made clear that single identifiable

incident was the basis for his non-divers findings.

That is an adequate indication for this court to

perform its factual sufficiency review, and it is what

Walters requires.

C. Equal Access to Evidence

1. Additional Background

At trial, AS testified that when she discovered the

first exchange of Facebook messages between

Appellant and JZ in 2015, she made screenshots of

messages on JZ’s Facebook account. AS then emailed

these screenshots to herself, printed them out, and

provided these printouts to the Family Advocacy office

and to the AFOSI at Aviano AB. After AS discovered

Appellant’s second Facebook exchange with JZ in

2017, she found that the 2015 conversation had been

deleted. However, she still had her email to herself

from 2015.

At the conclusion of AS’s direct examination, trial

defense counsel informed the military judge that this

was the first time they had learned about her email to

herself, which the Defense had not received in

discovery, although they had received the screenshots

of the messages. Trial defense counsel stated the

Defense would not be prepared to cross-examine AS

“until we get that discovery from the government.”

Senior trial counsel explained the email had not been

turned over because it was not in the possession of the

Government; AS had accessed the email herself. The

(76a)

military judge recessed the court-martial for 43

minutes in order for AS to provide the email to the

parties. Trial defense counsel then proceeded with

cross-examination without further delay.

Subsequently, Special Agent (SA) IP of the AFOSI

testified regarding various steps he took to investigate

the case. On cross-examination, senior trial defense

counsel asked SA IP whether he had attempted to

download JZ’s entire Facebook profile. SA IP testified

that he had, through a process offered by Facebook

itself which he described as a “dump” of “every single

piece of information or activity that [JZ] ever did on

Facebook.”5 However, SA IP testified he did not review

the entire “dump.” He began to review the chat

portion, but found “it was hard to tell who [was]

sending and who was receiving the messages, because

instead of having a name, you had a number.” As a

result, SA IP decided to rely on screenshots or

“snippets” that the agents created from the messages

displayed onscreen, because those “would be a good

representation of what the communication was.”

However, these screenshots would not have included

any deleted messages. SA IP did not know if the

“dump” would have included deleted messages.

In response to questions from the military judge,

5 On redirect examination, SA IP explained that AS

had provided oral and written consent for the

Facebook “dump,” although he understood the scope

was limited to Facebook messages between Appellant

and JZ.

(77a)

SA IP testified that as of Appellant’s trial, AFOSI no

longer had the Facebook “dump.” He explained that

he “never saved it out of the computer that we have,

and t

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