Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cecelia F. Abadie, Petitioner v. Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board

Supreme Court briefNov 26, 2021

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

zi-m

No.

3fn tlje Supreme Court of tfje QUniteb States:

Cecelia F. Abadie, Petitioner

Versus

La. Atty. Disciplinary Board, Office of

Disciplinary Counsel, Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Cecelia F. Abadie

Petitioner Pro Se

La. Bar No. 19874

20 White Drive

Hammond, Louisiana 70401

985-542-7859

cfabadie@gmail.com

November 26, 2021

NOV 2 6 2021

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The disciplinary system in Louisiana has

strayed from respecting due process for attorneys who

allege wrongdoing by a judge. Respondent’s client,

Mark Anthony Jenkins, was found not the biological

father in district court. The legal paternity issue was

set for hearing in juvenile court where the parties had

stipulated there was no authentic act of acknowledg

ment by Jenkins. On the day of trial, after a circuit

judge had taken the court record from juvenile court,

the judge refused to rule, falsely claiming district

court decided legal paternity. Opposing counsel filed a

writ application falsely presenting the untried issue

for “review.” Robert Murphy, the writing judge, decid

ed legal paternity by mischaracterizing a statement

as a “judicial confession to signing an acknowledgment of legal paternity.” Actions to nullify the ruling

for lack of supervisory jurisdiction failed in state and

federal courts that all ignored court record evidence.

Respondent was suspended for alleging collusion to

move the issue to circuit court without a trial. The

questions presented are; 1) whether suspending

respondent for a year and a day, after ignoring

evidence that supported her allegation, violated due

process and threatens freedom of speech; and 2)

whether the same disregard for the evidence against

the judge in a federal civil rights action shows access

to due process was blocked, and that compels

correction of the courts through writ of certiorari.

LIST OF PARTIES

Cecelia Farace Abadie, applicant

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board

Office of Disciplinary Counsel, respondent

RULE 14.ldii) LIST

State ofLouisiana Dept, of Children & Family

Services, In the Interest ofMark Jenkins Jr. v. Mark

Jenkins Sr., Docket No. 2003-NS-1371, Jefferson

Parish Juvenile Court, Order in Minutes of July 7,

2014.

State ofLouisiana Dept, of Children & Family

Services In the Interest ofMark Jenkins Jr. v. Mark

Jenkins Sr., Docket No. 2003-NS-1371, Jefferson

Parish Juvenile Court, Minutes of September 15,

2014.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

711-419, 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Jefferson, State of Louisiana, Judgment signed on

Feb. 4, 2015.

State ofLouisiana Dept, of Children & Family

Services: In the Interest ofMark Jenkins Jr. v. Mark

Jenkins Sr., Docket No. 2003-NS-1371,

Ill

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, State of

Louisiana, Minutes of April 27, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

15-CA- 293, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of

Louisiana, Order of May 26, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, No. 2015CA-399, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of

Louisiana, Disposition handed down on July 31, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, No. 2015CA-399, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of

Louisiana; rehearing denied Sept. 2, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

2015-CJ-1622, Supreme Court of the State of

Louisiana, denied writ of certiorari, with one dissent,

Sept. 4, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

711-419, 24th Judicial District Court, State of

Louisiana, denied motion to rebut finding of a judicial

confession, judgment signed Feb.l, 2016.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

711*419, 24th Judicial District Court, judgment on

May 24, 2016! amended to add

dismissal of petition Nov. 7, 2016.

Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So. 3d 1082 (La. App., Feb. 22,

2017).

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

16-CA-482, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal,

State of Louisiana, denied request for rehearing

March 22, 2017.

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

2017-C-0652, Supreme Court of the State of

Louisiana, denied writ of certiorari with “one who

would grant,” Sept. 6, 2017.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al.,

United States District Court, Eastern District of

Louisiana, Civil Action No. 2-18-cv33122, dismissed complaint with prejudice Nov. 27,

2018.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al.,

Civil Action No. 2-18-3122, U. S. District

Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, denied new

trial, Jan. 14, 2019.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Timothy ORourke,

Jefferson Parish Assistant District Attorney,

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, et al., United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 1930112, affirmed district court, Jan. 10, 2020,

designated not to be reported.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Timothy O’Rourke,

Jefferson Parish Assistant District Attorney,

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, et al., United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No. 19-30112,

denied rehearing en banc without poll, Feb. 21, 2020.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Timothy ORourke at al,

No. 20-433, filed July 17, 2020, on October 5, 2020

docket, Writ of certiorari denied.

In re Cecelia F Abadie, No. 2020-B-1276, Supreme

Court of Louisiana. 5/13/21, Rehearing denied June

29, 2021.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

LIST OF PARTIES

RULE 14. l(iii) LIST

APPENDIX

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF CASE.......2

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

A. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Opinion mis

represented the facts in the Jenkins case and

ignored court records that proved a circuit judge

conspired to rule without supervisory jurisdiction. 13

B. The Supreme Court’s Opinion ignored Louisi

ana jurisprudence, and that of the majority of

states interpreting Rule of Professional Conduct

8.2(a), which provides that objective evidence sup

porting an attorney’s allegation against a judge

makes the allegation protected speech

C. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s denial of due

process by failure to consider the evidence repeated

the same denial of due process in the federal district

and circuit courts when her client’s civil right’s

complaint for denial of a trial was dismissed.

D. The failure of the supreme court and federal courts

to recognize a ruling without supervisory jurisdic

tion shows that access to due process can be

Vll

blocked, and only a writ of certiorari can correct the

courts............................................................................ 27

APPENDIX

1. Supreme Court Opinion, Reports of Disciplinary

Committee and Recommendation of the

Disciplinary Board

Supreme Court for the State of Louisiana,

In re- Cecelia F Abadie, No. 202OB-1276

(La. May 13, 2021) Opinion.......................

Attorney Disciplinary Board,

In re-' Cecelia F. Abadie, Report of the

Disciplinary Committee.......................

Attorney Disciplinary Board,

In re- Cecelia F. Abadie, Recommendation

of the Disciplinary Board............................

2. Relevant opinions, orders, findings of fact, and

conclusions of law in state and federal courts

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court for the State of

Louisiana, Dept, of Children & Family Services,

In the Interest ofMark Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark

Jenkins, Sr., No. 2003-NS-1371-0, Section C,

Minutes of July 7, 2014........................................

Vlll

24th Judicial District Court for Jefferson Parish,

State of Louisiana, No: 711-419, Div. A, Mark

Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, Judgment

February 4, 2015 ......................................................

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana Dept of

Children & Fam. Ser., In the Interest ofMark

Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark Jenkins, Sr., NO. 2003-NS1371-0, Sec. C, Minutes of 4/27/2015............................ 40

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana Dept

of Children & Fam. Ser., In the Interest ofMark

Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark Jenkins, Sr., No. 2003-NS1371-0, Sec. C, Minutes of 6/15/2015.......................

Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit, State of

Louisiana, Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha

Jackson, No.l5-C-399 (5th Cir., La.) July 31, 2015

Disposition.....................................................................

Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So.3d 1082 (La. App., 2017)

Quoted but not put into Appendix

3. Orders on requests for rehearing and writ

of certiorari

Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana,

In Re•' Cecelia F. Abadie, No:2020-B-01276,

Office of Disciplinary Board Number(s) 17-DB-

056, June 29, 2021, application for rehearing

denied: three would grant..................................

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana,

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson,

No. 15-C-399, Rehearing denied, September 02,

2015.................................................................................

Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, Mark

Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.

2015-CJ-1622, Sept. 4, 2015, Writ Denied, one

dissent: would grant.................................................

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, State of Louisiana,

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson,

No. 16-CA-w82, rehearing denied 3/22/17............

Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, No. 2017C-0652, Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson,

writ denied, Hughes, J., would grant, Sept. 6,

2017...................................................................................... 57

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, No. 19-30112, Mark Anthony Jenkins v.

Timothy O’Rourke et al., rehearing denied Feb.21,

2020 ................................................................................

5. Previous pleadings in which the questions were

raised

Louisiana Supreme Court “In re Cecelia F.

Abadie,” No. 2020-B-1276, Brief in Opposition

to the Recommendation to the Louisiana Supreme

Court

Louisiana Supreme Court, “In re Cecelia F.

Abadie,” No. 202OB-12716 Attorney Disciplinary

Proceeding, Application for Rehearing, filed

May 26, 2021................................................................. 61

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, In re-'

Cecelia Abadie, Docket No. 17-DB 56, Respond

ent’s Post-Hearing Memorandum, Aug. 12,

2019.............................................................................

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, In reCecelia Abadie, Docket No. 17-DB 56, “Timeline”

w. argument, 4/10/18.................................................

Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr., Plaintiff-Respond

ent v. Latasha Jackson, Defendant- Applicant,

No. 15-C- 399, “Opposition to Latasha Jackson’s

Application for Writ” filed June 30, 2015.............

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal for the State of

Louisiana, No. 16-CA-482, Mark Anthony Jenkins

v. Latasha Jackson, Request for Reconsideration of

Dismissal of Petition to Nullify, filed 3/9/17............... 68

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy

et al., No. 2H8-CV-3122, Complaint................

6. Essential Material

Louisiana Civil Code art 203

24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Jefferson, State of Louisiana, Mark Anthony

Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, No.711-419,

“Rule to Show Cause Why the Birth Certificate

Should Not Be Amended,” filed Oct. 17, 2014...

24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Jefferson, Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha

Jackson,No/ 711-419, “Motion and Order for

Appeal, Feb. 24, 2015.......................................

Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, Louisiana

Dept, of Children & Fam. Ser., In the Interest of

Mark Jenkins, Jr. v. Mark Jenkins, Sr., No. 2003

-NS-1371-0, Transcript excerpt of Hearing of

June 15, 2015...........................................................

Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, 15-C-399,

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson,

Application of Latasha Jackson for Supervisory

Writ, June 23, 2015....................................................

Xll

24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Jefferson, State of Louisiana, Mark Anthony

Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, No. 711-419, Transcript

excerpt of May 16, 2016 hearing on exceptions to

Petition to Nullify.............................................................. 87

United States District Court (E.D. La.) Mark

Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al.,

No. 2:18-CV-3122, 11/27/18 Opinion................

United States Court of Appeal for Fifth Circuit,

(E.D. La.) Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Timothy

03’Rourke et al., No. 19-30112, Jan. 10, 2020)

Opinion.....................................................................

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board,

Office of Disciplinary Counsel, In the matter of

Cecelia Farace Abadie, Docket No. 17-DB-056,

Index Respondent’s Exhibit Binder

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, Office of

Disciplinary Counsel, Dec. 13, 2016 Letter offering

Private admonition.........................................................

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, Office of

Disciplinary Counsel, Letter of January 12, 2018

rejecting discovery requests......................................

Xlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Ames v. Kansas, U.S. 470, S.C. 4 S.Ct. 437

Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (l Wall.) 223, 17 L.Ed.

531 (1864)..............................................................

Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252,

62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941)................

27-8

Code of Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a)

15-6

Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 319

Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209,

13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964)............................................

Hans v. State ofLouisiana, 10 S.Ct 504,134 U.S. 1,

33 L.Ed. 842 (1890).................................................. 28

In the Matter of Emile J. Becker, Jr. 620 N.E.2d

691 (Ind. 1993).......................................................

In re Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453 N.W.

2nd. 313 (Minn. 1990)

XIV

In re Mire, 197 So.3d 656, (La. 2/19/16)

17-20, 27, 28, 29

Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So. 3d 1082 (La. App.2017)

8,9,10

La. Constitution of 1974, Art. 5, sec. 5

Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Karst, 428 So.2d

406 (La. 1983)..........................................................

6,17

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. LTD et al. v.

Zenith Radio Corporation et al, 475 U.S. 574,

109 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).................

Matter of Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, (5* Cir. 1988)

Matter of Westfall, 808 S.W. 2d 829 (Mo. 1991)

Miller -El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)

20,21

Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773

82 L.Ed.1129 (1938)...................................................... 21-23

N Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)

U.S. v. Brown, 72 F. 3rd 25, 30 (5th Cir. 1995)

15,16

Cecelia Farace Abadie respectfully petitions for a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

Louisiana Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

Supreme Court of Louisiana, In re Cecelia F. Abadie,

No. 2020-B-1276, 5/13/21, rehearing denied June 29,

2021.

In re Cecelia F Abadie, Louisiana Disciplinary Board,

Recommendation to the Louisiana Supreme Court, 17DB-056, November, 13, 2020.

In re Cecelia F Abadie, Louisiana Disciplinary Board,

Report of Hearing Committee, No. 17-DB-056,

December 11, 2019.

JURISDICTION

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Opinion issued on

May 13, 2021. Request for Rehearing was filed on May

26, 2021 and denied on June 29, 2021. Jurisdiction is

proper over cases arising under the Constitution of the

United States, according to Article 3, Section 2 of the

Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

United States Constitution, Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting freedom of

speech,....

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Sec.

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States! nor shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law! nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Opposing counsel, Kristyl Treadaway, filed the

disciplinary complaint against respondent on the day

after she and ADA O’Rourke received a courtesy copy of

a letter respondent was planning to send to a legislator

and district attorney. (App.infra, 33-35) The letter

alleged they colluded with state fifth circuit judge

Robert M. Murphy to prevent a trial in juvenile court to

determine if her client, Mark Jenkins, was the legal

father. It also alleged attorney Treadaway filed a writ

application and in it lied, claiming the district court

erred in deciding legal paternity! and that Judge

Murphy decided legal paternity without supervisory

jurisdiction. Respondent decided not to send the letter to

the addressees.

The Underlying Case

Jenkins and Jackson were not married when her

son was born in September, 1997. Jenkins signed the

birth certificate at the hospital! later they married, and

in 2003 they divorced. Jackson obtained child support

through the Department of Child and Family Services

(DCFS) in juvenile court. In 2011, Jenkins learned he

might not be the father of the child and did not recall if

he had signed an authentic act of acknowledgment

besides signing the birth certificate. Only an authentic

act of acknowledgment would make Jenkins the legal

father under La. C.C. art. 203. (App, infra, 74-5)

Normally, an inquiry to the Department of Health and

Hospitals (DHH), Center for Records and Statistics

would answer that question, but DHH produced a copy

of the birth certificate and in a separate statement

reported that an original acknowledgment was

destroyed during Hurricane Katrina without identifying

its form.

After receiving the report from DHH, Jenkins filed

a petition for damages for paternity fraud in district

court on February 15, 2012. The petition requested a

court-ordered paternity test, and revocation of “an

acknowledgment” in case an authentic act was

discovered.

Paternity test results ruled Jenkins out as the

biological father and respondent filed a petition to

nullify the child support order in juvenile court. This

dual court situation was used by disciplinary counsel

and the court to support its charge of duplicative filings.

Respondent explained that the same facts applied to

different actions in different courts, and there had been

several amendments. When Respondent learned that

the state registrar automatically forwarded copies of

acknowledgments to DCFS under a 1995 statute, she

informed juvenile court, and it ordered DCFS to produce

what it had. The ADA reported there was no authentic

act of acknowledgment. That admission left ODC and

the assistant district attorney who obtained the order

for support liable for the negligence or fraud. When the

ADA’s admission was not reported in the minutes,

Respondent requested that it be reported and the judge

set a hearing for that purpose. The hearing was delayed

until April 27, 2015.

On October 17, 2014 Respondent filed a Rule to

Show Cause in district court to obtain a ruling on

biological paternity. The rule requested an order to

DHH to remove Jenkins name from the birth certificate;

that the DNA Test Report be admitted into evidence!

and Jenkins be found not the father of Jackson’s son.

(App. infra, 75-81) Two judgments were signed on

February 4, 2015. Respondent assigned ODC’s exhibit

number, ODC 8p, to the judgment on biological

paternity she submitted into evidence. (App. infra, 3840) Later she realized ODC used that number for the

ruling denying an order to DHH and excluded the

judgment on paternity biological.

On April 27, 2015, the hearing to report the

stipulation in the minutes was held in juvenile court.

Attorney Treadaway stipulated for the parties that

there was no authentic act of acknowledgment. The

judge read the district court judgment of February 4,

2015 and observed that district court had ruled that

Jenkins was not the biological father. He then set the

legal paternity issue for trial on June 15, 2015, and

ordered memoranda on the legal paternity issue. (App.,

infra, 40-42). Treadaway filed an appeal from the

district court’s judgment on May 18, 2015. It stated that

the district court erred in finding “appellee was not the

father of Mark Anthony Jenkins Jr.” (Emphasis added.)

(App., infra, 82-83) The appeal was denied for improper

procedure and she was given until June 25, 2015 to file

an “appropriate application seeking review of the

interlocutory rulings contained in the February 4, 2015

judgment.” On May 26, 2015, respondent amended the

petition in district court to add DCFS as a defendant,

alleging it was liable for paternity fraud or negligence.

Treadaway moved for stay in the juvenile court

proceedings.

On June 15, 2015, the day set for trial, the juvenile

court judge granted the stay without referring to a

trial on legal paternity. (App infra 42-44) The judge and

Treadaway both claimed district court had ruled on

legal paternity and her “appeal” was “pending.”

(App,infra, 83-85). That claim had not been raised

before. The juvenile court judge stated there would be

no argument, and later in the hearing he stated that he

did not have the court record because the circuit court

had “requested it.” (App., infra, 84).

On June 23, 2015, Treadaway filed a writ applica

tion. (App. infra, 85-86). She claimed district court erred

in finding Jenkins not the “legal father.” The Opposition

Brief, (App. infra, 87) stated the issue had not been

decided at trial. The Feb. 4, 2015 judgment (App infra

38-40) proved it. Judge Robert Murphy wrote the

disposition of July 31, 2015 (App infra 44-53) and ruled

Jenkins “judicially confessed” to signing an

“acknowledgment of legal paternity.” (App, infra 49)

That ruling in effect decided that Jenkins was the legal

father. Respondent filed for Rehearing. It was denied.

Respondent applied for writ of certiorari. It was denied

on September 4, 2015 with one dissent. Justice Hughes

wrote:

Respectfully, the seemingly untimely review

and intervention of the Court of Appeal to

decide an issue not addressed in the trial

court’s judgment, based on the concept of

a“judicial confession,” is clearly wrong....

(App., infra, 56)

Respondent sent the letter complaining of

collusion to attorney Treadaway and ADA O’Rourke

on September 14, 2015. Treadaway immediately filed

the disciplinary complaint. Respondent responded

with the court records to prove what had occurred in

the courts and gave a deposition.

On March 10, 2016, Respondent filed a petition in

district court to nullify the circuit court’s ruling for

lack of supervisory jurisdiction. The district court

avoided finding lack of jurisdiction, even though,

during the hearing, the district judge admitted he had

not ruled on legal paternity. (App., infra, 87). The

court dismissed the petition to nullify as “prescribed.”

Respondent pointed out that an action to nullify an

absolutely null ruling does not prescribe. That was

ignored.

Respondent appealed on September 16, 2016. On

December 13, 2016 respondent was offered a private

admonition (App. infra. 97-99). Although the offer by

letter does not state it, the private admonition was

contingent on apologizing for the allegation against

Judge Murphy. The allegation against the judge was

the only infraction cited in the letter.

On appeal, Judge Robert Murphy was on the

panel to review the dismissal of the petition to nullify

his 2015 ruling. The “Facts and Procedural History” in

Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So. 3d 1082 (La. App., 2017),

rendered on February 22, 2017, is reported on pages

1082 through 1088 in chronological order. On page

1087, there are material omissions. It reported:

After the trial court rendered its February

4th judgment, Mr. Jenkins filed a “petition

for Alteration of a Birth Certificate ...on

February 9, 2016. Subsequently he filed a

“Motion to Amend the Petition a Third

Time.” In that Motion, Mr. Jenkins

sought.... Mr. Jenkins also filed a “Motion

for Order to Calculate the Probability of

Paternity.” ...and requested that the DNA

information be used in the instant matter.

On June 23, 2015, Ms. Jackson filed a

supervisory writ with this Court, seeking

review of the trial court’s February 4, 2016

judgments. Ms. Jackson alleged that the trial

court erred when it overruled her exception of

prescription and found Mr. Jenkins not to be

the legal father... Jenkins at 1087.

The hearings in juvenile court on April 27, 2015,

and June 15, 2015 are not even mentioned in the

disposition’s “facts.” The disposition also

misrepresented the law on supervisory jurisdiction:

Because the 24th Judicial District Court is a

district court within our circuit, this Court had

supervisory jurisdiction to render

determinations relevant to Mr. Jenkins’

petition, which included the legal and biological

paternity of [Mark Anthony Jenkins, Jr.].

Jenkins, at 1090 (Emphasis added.)

That “holding” actually claims that a trial on an

issue pled in the petition is not needed for the Court of

Appeal to take up the issue on a supervisory writ

application. Rehearing was requested, (App. 68-72),

and denied on March 22, 2017. (App. 57) Writ of

certiorari was denied on September 6, 2017, with only

Justice Hughes willing to grant it. (App., infra, 57-58)

On March 22, 2018, respondent filed Mark

Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy and Timothy

O’Rourke, a civil rights complaint under U.S.C. 42;1983

in United States District Court, Eastern District of

Louisiana. (App. infra 72-74) It was amended to add

Judge Barron Burmaster of the juvenile court and

attorney Kristyl Treadaway. The Amended Complaint

presented the court records, including Jenkins’ Rule to

Show Cause, the February 4, 2015 Judgment, Jackson’s

Exception of Prescription to the rule, and the fifth

circuit’s disposition of July 31, 2015.

The Rooker-Feldman objection was granted by

ignoring the facts showing lack of supervisory juris-

diction. The Opinion & Reasons copied word-for-word

the “Facts and Procedural History” given in Jenkins

atl084-1088. It ignored the facts regarding events in

juvenile court on April 27, 2015 and June 15, 2015. The

district court made the issue one of simple subject

matter jurisdiction and avoided the issue of supervisory

jurisdiction over the content of the judgment. It ruled:

“...it is clear that the July 31, 2015 order Jenkins

questions is not void for lack subject matter

jurisdiction....” (App. infra 88-91) The Federal Fifth

Circuit affirmed, adopting the Jenkins’ holding and not

noticing that the district court decided subject matter

jurisdiction, but holding referred to supervisory

jurisdiction. (App. infra 91-95)

The Disciplinary Process

Respondent was given no choice of a committee

member. Discovery requests for “specific instances when

she failed to provide competent representation,” and for

law supporting Judge Murphy’s supervisory jurisdiction

were denied in the attached letter, (App. infra. 99-101),

claiming that disciplinary matters are neither civil nor

criminal and discovery does not apply. However,

“Suspension is a quasi-criminal punishment in

character, any disciplinary rules used to impose this

sanction on attorneys must be strictly construed

resolving ambiguities in favor of the person charged.

Matter of Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383,388 (5th Cir. 1988).

Therefore, respondent should have been afforded at

least civil procedure. Respondent had no notice of the

specific documents, within 939 pages of exhibits going

back to 2012, about which she was going to be

questioned. On May 31, 2019, 14 months after Jenkins’

civil rights complaint was filed in federal court, the

hearing before the disciplinary committee took place.

Questioning about the details of her pleadings took

place after hours of the hearing had passed, and

respondent was exhausted.

Respondent had presented a timeline and prehearing argument to the Committee. (App. infra 66-67)

She testified to the court records she had given to the

panel members and entered into evidence. (App. infra

95-97) The records documented the crucial events of

October 17, 2014 through July 31, 2015 (App. 96) and

infra, pages 4*6. In her Post-Hearing Memorandum

(App. infra 64-66), Respondent summarized the

evidence and its significance. She explained it was not

coincidental that the juvenile court judge and opposing

attorney told the same lie at the hearing on June 155

and that the judge’s refusal to hear the issue, and the

attorney’s presentation of the issue in a writ application

from district court were steps that were needed to

illegally present the untried issue to the circuit court.

She pointed to the misrepresentations of facts and law

in Judge Murphy’s disposition that were used to rule

that Jenkins had judicially confessed to signing an

“acknowledgment of legal paternity.”

The Hearing Committee’s Recommendation

ignored the evidence. It stated, “Respondent did not

present any proof of any misconduct, and did not

defend against the Rule 8.2 violation.” (App. infra 27) It

described the civil rights complaint in federal court as a

“continuing the attack” on the judge. (App. infra 27)

The Committee Report stated that respondent’s

letter to opposing counsel was sufficient to prove the

charge of impugning the judge’s integrity. (App. infra

26) The evidence that the judge ruled without super

visory jurisdiction was irrelevant to the Committee. It

accepted every instance of a mistake in respondent’s

work that disciplinary counsel alleged, and ignored

respondent’s explanations for her choices. (App. infra

26) Respondent explained that she delayed service of

the petition in juvenile court while she determined if it

were possible to handle all of the actions in district

court; that the pleadings in district court and juvenile

court were not duplicative because the same facts

applied to the different causes of action in those courts.

She cited the civil procedure article that requires a

petition to nullify a circuit court ruling be filed in

district court. The Disciplinary Board accepted the

findings of incompetence with one exception. After

presenting the court records and explaining that denial

of a trial was denial of due process, (App. infra 59-61),

the only response from the Disciplinary Board was

“Have you apologized to Judge Murphy?”

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

“The supreme court has general supervisory

jurisdiction over all other courts.” La. Constitution of

1974, Art. 5, sec. 5. Therefore, when wrongdoing by a

fifth circuit judge comes to its attention, it is obligated

to pay attention to it and deal with it, even when the

wrongdoing is presented to it in a disciplinary action

against an attorney. Instead of recognizing the violation

of supervisory jurisdiction and the facts that show it

was done by collusion, the supreme court violated law

and due process, and suspended respondent for a year

and a day, requiring her, in effect, to lie in order to be

reinstated.

A. All of the misrepresentations of facts in the

Supreme Court’s Opinion benefitted Judge Murphy

by disparaging respondent; and hiding the fact

that he ruled on legal paternity without

supervisory jurisdiction by fabricating a “judicial

confession” to signing an acknowledgment that the

parties had already stipulated had never been

signed.

Despite being a trier of fact, the Supreme Court’s

“Underlying Facts” did not consider the facts in the

court records submitted by respondent. The “Underlying

Facts” incorrectly stated: “Because respondent

continued to file pleadings on the issue of Mark’s

revocation of his acknowledgment of paternity... on

November 20, 2014, Ms. Treadaway filed a second

exception of prescription, and... Judge Steib again

denied the exception of prescription.” (App. infra 10)

The facts are that Respondent only asked for

revocation of “an acknowledgment” in the petition filed

in district court in February, 2012. Respondent never

asked for a hearing on revocation. In 2013, Latasha

Jackson’s first attorney filed an exception of prescript

ion to revoking an authentic act of acknowledgment

without any evidence that there had been an authentic

act of acknowledgment. On April 27, 2015, Treadaway

stipulated there had been no authentic act of

acknowledgment to revoke. (App. infra 41) Treadaway’s

November 20, 2014 exception of prescription was to

rebut the presumption of biological paternity that is

created by signing the birth certificate acknowledgment.

The “Underlying Facts” incorrectly stated: “Res

pondent opposed the writ application with the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeal, essentially arguing that,

because neither the HHR nor DCFS could produce a

copy of the signed acknowledgment of paternity, the

issue of whether Mark can revoke the acknowledgment

was not prescribed.” (App. infra 11) That was never an

argument. Respondent’s Opposition Brief, (App. infra

60) argued that the circuit court did not have super

visory jurisdiction over that issue.

The “Underlying Facts” incorrectly claimed:

Because the previous pleadings by respondent

in the 24th JDC case indicated that Mark signed

the birth certificate and an acknowledgment of

paternity (considered a judicial confession by the

Fifth Circuit), the Fifth Circuit reversed Judge

Steib’s ruling ...regarding the issue of Mark’s

revocation of his acknowledgment of legal

paternity. (App. infra, ll)

That statement ignored the fact that the district

court (Judge Steib) had not ruled on legal paternity,

and the fifth circuit did not have supervisory jurisdic

tion to decide anything regarding legal paternity,

including the so-called “judicial confession” to signing

an “acknowledgment of legal paternity.”

B. Besides misstating the facts, the Opinion ignored

Code of Professional Conduct Rule 8.2(a) that

requires the court must consider the evidence to

determine objective support for an allegation.

Rule 8.2(a) provides: “A lawyer shall not make a

statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with

reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning

the qualifications or integrity of a judge.” It follows that

consideration of the attorney’s evidence is needed to

determine if the allegation was based on objective

evidence that made it a reasonable conclusion. “The

Louisiana rule is identical to the ABA rule.” U.S. v.

Brown, 72 F. 3rd 25, 30 (5th Cir. 1995). In addition,

the comment to Rule 8.2 “suggests that the rule is

primarily a prohibition on comments made to the

public that would undermine public confidence in the

administration of justice.” US. v. Brown, p. 29. In

respondent’s case, she did not make the allegation

public. She confronted opposing attorneys in a private

letter because she knew they assisted the circuit judge.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209,

13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) held “this rule proscribes only

statements which the lawyer knows to be false or

which the lawyer makes with reckless disregard for the

truth, it comports with the First Amendment’s

guarantee of free speech.” Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v.

Karst, 428 So.2d 406 (La. 1983) interpreted DR 8102(B), the predecessor of Rule 8.2(a). It adopted an

objective standard, rather than a subjective standard,

in analyzing whether a statement is knowingly or

recklessly made.

It is the reasonableness of that belief and

the good faith of the attorney in asserting it

that determines whether or not one had

“knowingly made false accusations against a

judge.” ... In our opinion, DR 8-102(B) is

violated when an attorney intentionally

causes an accusation to be published which

he knows to be false, or which in the

exercise of ordinary care, he should know to

be false.” Karst quoted in In re Mire, 197

So.3d 656, 667 (La. 2/19/16)

Courts of other states have reached similar

conclusions, and have almost universally

disciplined attorneys under an objective

reasonableness standard. Mire at 667.

In re Mire, 197 So. 3d 656 (La. 2016) marks the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s significant deviation from

considering the totality of the attorney’s evidence to

determine if the allegation was reasonable. In a

partition of community property case, trial judge Keaty

made a disclosure regarding her relationship with the

former wife’s family. However, when bias was

suspected, Mire investigated and found the disclosure

was incomplete. Mire obtained a transcript of the

disclosure, and then subpoenaed the court reporter’s

CD. The CD was examined by an expert who testified

that that it did not come from court’s machine. It “was

kind of salt and peppered with different types of audio

files that were on here and there, not just the files that

would come from FTR....” He agreed it was spliced. (

Mire, 662) The technician who produced the CD

testified that the “court reporter provided him with two

forms of media, an audio cassette tape and digital

media.” His job “was to take the two recordings, find

the point where they overlapped, and make them into

one continuous piece of audio. He said he was told the

digital recorder in the courtroom was not working, so

the backup recorder stated via audio cassette tape and

then was switched to the digital recorder once it began

functioning again. He emphasized his splice did not

delete any material; it added matter.” Judge Keaty

testified that perhaps splicing was needed to take out

another hearing but the docket showed there were no

other hearings that day. {Mire, 663)

Despite the testimony, the disciplinary committee

found no factual basis for Mire’s allegations of

corruption, and the board adopted its findings. The

Supreme Court suspended Mire for a year and a day

after giving the following one paragraph analysis.

[R]respondent relies heavily on the

purportedly corrupted audio tape from the

Hunter hearing as providing support for the

assertions of incompetence and corruption of

the legal profession. We acknowledge there is

evidence in the record of these disciplinary

proceedings indicating the court reporter’s

tapes may have been spliced as a result of a

malfunction of the court reporter’s machine.

However, we see no evidentiary support for

respondent’s implication that Judge Keaty or

any person either through incompetence or

corrupt intent added substantive statements

to the official transcript which were not

contained in the original hearing. Ordinary

experience suggests that equipment can

malfunction. (Mire, 668) Emphasis added.

Justice Weimer’s Dissent stated, “The majority

has failed to account for some key evidence....” (Mire,

670). He listed: l) Judge Keaty’s real estate company

was marketing Ms. Hunter’s separate property that was

subject to a community property reimbursement claim.

(670). 2) Splicing was proved but with there was no

proof that the court recorder malfunctioned. 3) Judge

Keaty’s son employed Ms. Hunter’s sister. 4) The court

reporter sued to enjoin Mire from obtaining the tapes. 5)

Judge Keaty recanted her explanation that redaction of

the recordings was needed to take out other hearings

that day. 6) Judge Keaty amended her personal

disclosure form after denying it was inaccurate. 7)

Judge Keaty was in fact recused from the case for a

“community interest.” (Mire, 672)

Justice Weimer stated: “We are required to

evaluate the totality of the facts in this record to

determine if there is an objective factual basis for the

attorney to have made the allegations.” (Mire at 670.)

“The standard the majority describes is focused entirely

on respondent’s statements and whether there is

objective support for those statements.” .... “I believe

that a reasonable person could justifiably disbelieve

that the court’s recording went haywire at the exact

moment of Judge Keaty’s purported disclosure.” (In re

Mire, 190 So.3d 705,706 (Mem)(La.2016), rehearing

denied.

C. In denial of due process in respondent’s case, the

supreme court went farther than “not considering

the totality of evidence,” it ignored all of the

evidence.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Opinion claimed

respondent presented no defense to the charge of

impugning the integrity of Judge Murphy. It claimed

the defense was “unspoken.” It “... seemed to be that

she believes the allegations, contained in the collusion

letter and federal lawsuit.” Then it claimed the

“unspoken” defense made allegations against Judge

Murphy based on “speculation and conjecture rather

than solid evidence.” (App. infra 18) That was the

explanation for not mentioning any defense evidence in

the Opinion. (App. infra 61-63)

Respondent filed an Application for Rehearing

(App. infra 61-63) in which she referred again to the

material court records that proved Judge Murphy ruled

without supervisory jurisdiction in order to find

Jenkins was the legal father. The records proved the

lies to avoid a ruling in juvenile court, where the

stipulation meant Mr. Jenkins was not the legal father.

Though he was not the biological father, and there is

proof he was deceived by both Ms. Jackson and the

Department of Child and family Services, he paid

support until Ms. Jackson’s son was a major, while she

was remarried and a employed as a certified teacher.

Respondent argued that considering the evidence was

required for due process and that the Opinion of the

court was not the result of true adjudication.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “...nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” Due process

means that “(P)ersons whose rights may be affected by

State action are entitled to be heard....” Baldwin v.

Hale, 68 U.S. (l Wall.) 223, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864). “Being

heard” means more than simply the right to file

evidence into the record and present oral and written

argument. Being heard means having a fair tribunal

that will actually consider the evidence. Miller -El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Miller-El dealt with

courts’ failures to consider extensive evidence

presented by the defense regarding exclusion of blacks

from juries.

...this Court concludes that the District Court

did not give full consideration to the substan

tial evidence put forth in support of the prima

facie case. Instead, it accepted without quest

ion the state court’s evaluation .... More fun

damentally, the court was incorrect in not

inquiring whether a “substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right” had been

proved as Sec. 2253(c)( 2) requires. Miller -El

at 324.

Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773,

82 L.Ed. 1129 (1938) dealt with the Department of

Agriculture’s strategy to ignore evidence presented by

market agencies at the Kansas City Stockyards and not

reveal its position to the plaintiffs. The court stated:

“The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to

present evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity to

know the claims of the opposing party and to meet

them. The right to submit argument implies that

opportunity; otherwise the right may be a barren one.”

Morgan 18.

Respondent presented specific facts cited to

specific court documents: the lies told by the juvenile

court judge and attorney Treadaway.' the disposition’s

ruling without supervisory jurisdiction! a circuit court

judge requesting the juvenile court record before the

day set for trial. Those facts were not addressed or

rebutted in the Supreme Court’s Opinion. Instead, it

ignored the facts. The Opinion accepted without

question the disciplinary committee’s and board’s

sketchy and very general rendition of the case. The

only descriptions of the collusion allegation given in the

Opinion were these two paragraphs:

Respondent accused Fifth Circuit Judge

Robert Murphy of colluding with DCFS

against Mark so Mark would not be

reimbursed for the child support payments he

made to Latasha. Respondent also accused

Ms. Treadaway of requesting the stay in the

Juvenile Court case as a way to give the Fifth

Circuit time to collude with the DCFS. (App.

infra 13)

The federal lawsuit accused Judge Murphy,

Mr. O’Rourke, and Ms. Treadaway of

conspiring “to allow Judge Murphy to usurp

the issue of legal paternity from Juvenile

Court.... (t)he conspirators stopped Juvenile

Court from deciding legal paternity, so that it

could take the place of biological paternity,

which was the issue decided in district court.

(App. infra 14)

Morgan recognized the strategy of avoiding a

joining of the issues in order to avoid consideration of

the evidence. Morgan noted how counsel for the

Government gave a “very general” “sketchy” discussion

and did not “reveal the claims of the Government.”

Morgan at 24. There was no information regarding

“the Government’s concrete claims....” Morgan atl9.

... there must be a hearing in a substantial

sense. And to give the substance of a hearing,

which is for the purpose of making

determinations upon the evidence, the officer

who makes the determinations must consider

and appraise the evidence which justifies

them.” Morgan at 23.

Instead of confronting the evidence presented by

the market agencies at the Kansas City Stockyards,

[The]secretary accepts and makes as his

own the findings which have been prepared by

active prosecutors for the Government, after ex

parte discussion with them and without

according any reasonable opportunity to the

respondents in the proceeding to know the

claims thus presented ...That is more than

an irregularity in practice; it is a vital defect.

Morgan at 22.

Failing to act “in accordance with the cherished

judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair

play” discredits the judicial body. Morgan at 22. The

Supreme Court found the Secretary of Agriculture’s

order invalid because the required hearing was not

given. For the same reason, the Supreme Court’s

judgment in respondent’s should be reversed.

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. LTD et al. v.

Zenith Radio Corporation et al, 475 U.S. 574, 109 S.Ct.

1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), gives criteria to evaluate

evidence of collusion. 1) The trier of fact must consider

whether there was an illegal conspiracy that caused

cognizable injury; and 2) whether the evidence tends to

exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators

acted independently. Matsushita at 575.

In the Jenkins case, the injury, denial of a trial on

legal paternity and the opportunity to have the

stipulation of April 27, 2015 considered, was proved by

the juvenile court minutes of June 15, 2015 (App. infra

43-44), and the district court judgment of February 4,

2015. (App. infra, 39). Secondly, the facts show that

the alleged conspirators did not act independently.

Judge Murphy would not have been able to make the

first ruling on legal paternity if Judge Burmaster had

held the trial he had set on June 15, 2015. Before the

June 15, 2015 hearing, Judge Burmaster had ordered

the ADA to search DCFS records for acknowledgments

by Jenkins. He had ordered memoranda on the legal

paternity issue, (App. infra 41) and the right to

reimbursement of child support if fraud was proved. He

read the district court judgment, and the Minutes

reported his statement that district court had found

Jenkins was not the biological father. (App.infra 41)

However, after a circuit court judge requested his

record, as he stated in the hearing on June 15, 2015,

(App. infra 84), suddenly and without explaining why

he came to believe he had been mistaken for over a

year, he refused to rule. He falsely stated that the

district court had decided legal paternity.

It was not a coincidence that attorney Treadaway

told the same lie in court on June 15, 2015. (App. infra

84). There had to be prior agreement or prior instruct

ion from the same source. Treadaway filed her writ

application eight days after claiming her request for a

review was “pending” and claimed district court had

erred in ruling on legal paternity in the judgment of

February 4, 2015. Anyone looking at the district court

judgment of February 4, 2015 (App. infra 38-40)

would know her claim in the assignment of errors was

untrue. After receiving the letter from respondent, she

filed the complaint inviting ODC to examine the case.

She was not concerned that ODC would confront her

with the lie. In all of the hearings, reports and the

Opinion that followed, no one, except respondent,

mentioned her lie about what district court had decided

on February 4, 2015. Finally, Judge Murphy had

obviously been kept informed of what was happening in

the Jenkins case. He knew when to request the

juvenile court record.

A justice asked why Judge Murphy was singled

out from the panel by the allegation. Respondent

pointed to the disposition Judge Murphy wrote. The

disposition of July 31, 2015, (App. infra 44*53) confused

one writ application with another; one exception of

prescription with another! and the law on acknowled

gment by registry of a birth certificate with the law on

authentic acts of acknowledgment. Judge Murphy

avoided the specific term “authentic act of acknowledg

ment” and employed “legal acknowledgment” or “formal

acknowledgment” to avoid distinguishing between a

birth certificate acknowledgment and an acknowled

gment by authentic act. The disposition was confusing.

Unraveling it required close attention and being alert

to the intention to deceive.

Judge Murphy reached his intended ruling that

Jenkins “judicially confessed” to signing an acknow

ledgment of legal paternity by ignoring the require

ments for a judicial confession. In his dissent to denial

of writ of certiorari Justice Hughes stated the judicial

confession was clearly wrong.

The only comment in the Opinion regarding the

explanation was, “Her explanation as to why she

focused her allegations of collusion on Judge Murphy

makes little sense in light of the fact that Judge

Windhorst and Judge Liljeberg also signed the 2nd Fifth

Circuit ruling.” (App. infra. 22-23).

D. The failure of the Supreme Court and the federal

courts to recognize a ruling without supervisory

jurisdiction shows that access to due process was and

can again be blocked. Only a writ of certiorari can

correct the courts.

In the “Initial Brief of Disciplinary Counsel,” on p.

11 cited in Justice Weimer’s Dissent, in In re Mire, at

673, the Justice cited Disciplinary Counsel’s state

ment: “...we can never allow ourselves to tarnish the

image of our profession by accepting the use of

language like that employed by the Respondent.”

Justice Weimer recognized disciplinary counsel’s mis

understanding of his role and duty.

This position is both constitutionally

untenable and unwise. As the Supreme Court

has observed, judicial efforts to squelch

criticisms of the judiciary can result in worse

outcomes than any criticism could:

‘The assumption that respect for the

judiciary can be won by shielding judges from

published criticism wrongly appraises the

character of American public opinion. For it is a

prized American privilege to speak one’s mind,

although not always with perfect taste, on all

public institutions. And an enforced silence,

however limited, solely in the name of preserv

ing the dignity of the bench, would probably

engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt

much more than it would enhance respect.’

Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252,

270-71, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941).

Quoted in In re Mire,

In the cases of Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat.

319, and Ames v. Kansas, U.S. 470, S.C. 4 S.Ct.

437, the court held that when a state instituted

a suit it necessarily submitted itself to all

reviews in and transfers to the federal courts,

which the constitution and laws establishing

the court authorized, i.e., that having

voluntarily taken the position of suitor, the

state had necessitated the enforcement of all

legally established rules by which the rights of

parties litigant were ascertained and adjud

ged.... Hans v. State ofLouisiana, 10 S.Ct 504,

134 U.S. 1, 19, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)

In re Graham, 453 N.W. 2d 313 (Minn. 1990),

involved an attorney who stated in letters to a U.S.

attorney and to the Chief Justice of the Eighth Circuit

that a state judge, a United States Magistrate Judge,

and various attorneys had conspired to fix the outcome

of a federal case. In the Matter of Emile J. Becker, Jr.

620 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 1993), dealt with an attorney who

accused a judge of deliberately failing to record the

witness and making no attempt to correct the damage.

The prosecuting attorney in Matter of Westfall, 808

S.W. 2d 829 (Mo. 1991) spoke on television regarding a

judge’s ruling, stating the judge’s reasons were “a little

bit less than honest” and that he “reached the

conclusion he wanted to reach.” Those allegations were

serious but the evidence was frivolous. Those attorneys

were charged with violating Rule 8.2. Their punish

ments, respectively, were a 60-day suspension, 30’day

suspension, and a public reprimand. Comparing their

punishments to that of respondent and Mire seems to

indicate that the more objective the evidence and

reasonable the allegation, the more the attorney has to

be punished.

The supreme court’s suspensions in Mire and

Abadie are in restraint of reasonable, objectively

supported complaints against judges. The New York

Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 288 (1964) standard

makes a person liable if the statement is false, and the

speaker knew the statement was false or acted with

reckless disregard of the truth. That makes the

disciplinary actions against respondent and attorney

Mire violations of their freedom of speech, and a danger

to all attorneys and the people of Louisiana.

Respondent prays that writ of certiorari issue to

the Louisiana Supreme Court and that after due

consideration, the ruling suspending respondent be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Cecelia Farace Abadie, pro se

La. Bar No. 19874

20 White Drive

Hammond, Louisiana 70401

985-542-7859, cfabadie@gmail.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.