Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gary L. Boyle, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJun 9, 2022

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No. ___ - ________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

__________________________________________________

GARY L. BOYLE,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

__________________________________________________

PETITIONER’S APPENDIX

__________________________________________________

United States v. Gary L. Boyle,

28 F.4th 798 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)

28 F.4th 798

affirmed. The district court was aware of the

length and gravity of the 90-year cumulative

sentences. What mattered most, however, was

the atrocity of Boyle’s offense conduct.

UNITED STATES of America, PlaintiffAppellee,

v.

Gary L. BOYLE, Defendant-Appellant.

Jeffrey Kienstra, Attorney, Office of the

United States Attorney, Peoria, IL, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 21-1093

United States Court of Appeals,

Seventh Circuit.

Lew A. Wasserman, Attorney, Law Offices of

Lew A. Wasserman, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued October 28, 2021

Decided March 14, 2022

Summaries:

Before Ripple,

Circuit Judges.

Hamilton,

and

Scudder,

Source: Justia

Scudder, Circuit Judge.

Kik Messenger flagged suspected child

pornography, involving a girl, about eight

years old, engaging in explicit sexual acts with

an adult male. Agents traced the files to

Boyle’s Decatur home. Boyle admitted that he

was the man in the images and had livestreamed his sexual abuse of the girl. A search

of Boyle’s cell phone revealed 100 images and

videos of other children being sexually abused

and exploited. The eight-year-old stated that

the sexual abuse started when she was five.

Boyle pled guilty in state court to predatory

criminal sexual assault of a child and was

sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. In

federal court, Boyle pled guilty based on his

production and distribution of visual

depictions of that abuse. His Guidelines range

was life imprisonment, subject to the

cumulative statutory maximum of 230 years.

The district court sentenced Boyle to 50 years’

imprisonment, consecutive to his state

sentence because the sexual assault “was a

separate course of conduct” from the

production and possession. The court

acknowledged the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)

sentencing objectives and the horrors of

Boyle’s own background but stated that Boyle

sentenced the child “to a lifetime of

nightmares” and immortalized her trauma by

live-streaming it. The Seventh Circuit

Gary Boyle challenges a 50-year federal

sentence he received for producing and

possessing child pornography. The district

court ran the time consecutive to a 40-year

state sentence Boyle had already received for

similar conduct. The district court was well

aware of the length and gravity of the 90-year

cumulative sentences. What mattered most,

however, was the atrocity of Boyle's offense

conduct—his sexual assault of an eight-yearold girl on a video livestreamed to other child

sexual predators. We affirm.

I

Gary Boyle's legal trouble began in February

2019, when Kik Messenger—a smartphone

application that allows users to send texts,

pictures, and videos—flagged images and

videos of suspected child pornography for law

enforcement officials. Agents investigated and

confirmed

[28 F.4th 800]

that the images and videos depicted a young

girl, about eight years old, undressing and

engaging in explicit sexual acts with an adult

male.

-1-

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)

Law enforcement traced the files to Gary

Boyle's home in Decatur, Illinois. After

agreeing to speak with the agents, Boyle

admitted not only that he was the man in the

images, but also that he used the flagged Kik

account to receive and share child

pornography. He told agents that on February

4, 2019 he sexually abused the child and "livestream[ed] his sexual abuse ... to the other

members in his Kik group." A subsequent

search of Boyle's cell phone revealed 100

images and videos of children other than the

victim being sexually abused and exploited.

The eight-year-old told a family member that

the sexual abuse started when she was five.

The government asked for a stiff sentence.

Emphasizing the gravity of Boyle's conduct, it

urged the district court to sentence him to

230 years—the statutory maximum 30-year

sentence on each of the seven production

counts plus the maximum 20-year sentence

on the possession count. And based on its

view that the creation of each picture and

video inflicted distinct and incremental harm

on Boyle's victim—harm wholly separate from

the traumatic abuse itself—the government

asked the court to run those sentences both

consecutively to one another and to Boyle's

40-year state sentence. Defense counsel

acknowledged that "the Court c[ould] fashion

any sentence it wishe[d]" within the

"thousands of months" it had to work with,

but reiterated Boyle's position that running

any and all federal time concurrent with the

40-year state sentence would achieve the

sentencing aims of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

State and federal charges quickly followed. In

July 2020 Boyle pled guilty in state court to a

single count of predatory criminal sexual

assault of a child. The count charged that the

sexual assault occurred between October 10,

2010 and February 3, 2019. The state court

sentenced Boyle to 40 years' imprisonment.

The district court also heard at sentencing

from Boyle's victim and her mother. The

child, 10 at the time, appeared in court and

submitted a written statement for the

prosecutor to read aloud. She described how

Boyle's sexual abuse had filled her with "ugly

thoughts and feelings" that made her angry,

sad, and scared—and left her feeling, at times,

like she "shouldn't be alive." She told the

district judge that, although she felt like the

abuse she suffered was her own fault, she

remained determined (with the help of

others) not to allow Boyle's wrongdoing to

destroy or define her.

Boyle's federal case was different. It focused

not on the sexual abuse itself but on his

production and distribution of visual

depictions of that abuse. Seven of the eight

federal charges stemmed from the videos and

images Boyle created on February 4, 2019—

the day he livestreamed the sexual assault to

other members of the Kik messenger group.

The eighth count charged possession of child

pornography. The district court accepted

Boyle's guilty plea to all eight charges in

October 2020.

After hearing from both parties at sentencing

and resolving Boyle's two objections to the

presentence investigation report, or PSR, the

district court adopted the PSR's calculation of

a total offense level of 43 and a criminal

history category of IV. Those totals resulted in

an advisory Guidelines range of life

imprisonment, subject to the cumulative

statutory maximum of 230 years for all

offenses of conviction.

When it came her turn, the child's mother

expressed her own overwhelming guilt for not

keeping her daughter safe. She told

[28 F.4th 801]

the district judge that Boyle had stolen "her

[daughter's] childness, her innocence, her

dreams, self-esteem, and self-worth" and that

her daughter had become fearful, distrustful,

isolated, and uncomfortable with physical

affection. In her view, "no amount of prison

-2-

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)

time will ever be enough" for making the

young girl "a statistic" and creating images

and videos of her abuse that would never go

away.

nightmares and self-doubt" through his abuse

but also immortalized her trauma by

livestreaming it over Kik to others. And the

court pledged to protect the victim and her

mother from Boyle for the rest of their lives—

hence the decision to ensure, through the 50year consecutive sentence, that Boyle would

face combined federal and state sentences of

"of 90 years or nearly 90 years."

After hearing these statements, considering

all other information presented by the parties,

and applying the factors in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a), the district court sentenced Boyle to

50 years' imprisonment. The court imposed

30-year sentences on each of the seven

production counts, stating that each of those

sentences would run concurrent with one

another because Boyle's conduct "occur[ed] ...

over the course of the same day." On top of

those 30-year sentences, however, the district

court imposed a 20-year sentence on the

possession count. The court explained that

the child pornography possession charge was

a "completely different count on a completely

different day and a completely different time

period," and subjected children other than

Boyle's victim "to the perverted and distorted

and sick nature" of individuals seeking out

child pornography on the internet.

Boyle timely appealed.

II

"Federal criminal sentences must be both

procedurally

sound

and

substantively

reasonable," and Boyle attacks his sentence

on both fronts. United States v. Morgan , 987

F.3d 627, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2021).

We review sentencing challenges not

presented to the district court only for plain

error. See United States v. Roush , 2 F.4th

616, 618 (7th Cir. 2021). If the district court

properly calculated the advisory Guidelines

range, we review the ultimate sentence

deferentially under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S.

38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

Finally, the district court announced that

Boyle's cumulative 50-year federal sentence

would run consecutive to his 40-year state

sentence because "there could be no

question" that the conduct at the heart of

Boyle's state conviction—the sexual assault,

itself—"was a separate course of conduct"

from the production and possession offenses

at issue in his federal prosecution.

A

Boyle first contends that the district court

committed two procedural errors in

calculating the advisory Guidelines range of

life imprisonment. He sees what he calls

In imposing Boyle's sentence, the district

court expressed his understandable disgust at

the conduct before him. The court recognized

that Boyle did not need to be sentenced to

230 years' imprisonment to accomplish the

objectives of federal sentencing in § 3553(a).

And so, too, did the court acknowledge in

mitigation that the horrors of Boyle's own

background contributed, at some level, to the

sexual abuse he inflicted on the victim. In

weighing everything, though, the district

judge underscored that Boyle not only

effectively sentenced the child "to a lifetime of

[28 F.4th 802]

double- or even triple-counting in the district

court's determination of his offense level and

criminal history category. Boyle also insists

that the district court overlooked key

guidance in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 requiring the

imposition of a concurrent (not consecutive)

federal sentence. Both errors, Boyle presses,

require resentencing.

-3-

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)

Boyle is right that a district court's failure to

correctly calculate a defendant's Guidelines

range constitutes procedural error. See

Rosales-Mireles v. United States , ––– U.S. –

–––, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904, 201 L.Ed.2d 376

(2018). How closely we review alleged errors,

however, turns on whether Boyle preserved

his objections to the Guidelines calculations

in the district court. A defendant waives an

objection if he "intentionally relinquishes or

abandons" an argument below. United States

v. Oliver , 873 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2017)

(citation omitted). In those circumstances, we

will not entertain the objection for the first

time on appeal. See id. But if there is no

"strategic justification" for the defendant's

failure to make the objection in the district

court, and he "merely fail[ed] to raise an

argument due to accident or neglect," we treat

the argument as forfeited, not waived. Id. ;

see also United States v. Anderson , 604 F.3d

997, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2010). To overcome

forfeiture, the defendant must show that the

district court committed plain error that

affected both his substantial rights and the

fairness or integrity of the proceedings. See

United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 735–

36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) ;

Oliver , 873 F.3d at 607.

strategic reasons why a criminal defendant

will elect to pursue one sentencing argument"

instead of another but warning that "when the

defendant selects as a matter of strategy, he

also waives those arguments he decided not

to present").

Nor is it difficult to "conceive of [a] strategic

reason" for counsel's decision to forgo the

argument Boyle now presses on appeal.

Oliver , 873 F.3d at 607. Not only is double

counting "generally permissible unless ...

expressly prohibit[ed]," but the Guidelines

provisions at issue here specifically permit the

double counting Boyle now challenges.

United States v. Vizcarra , 668 F.3d 516, 519

(7th Cir. 2012) ; see also U.S.S.G. §

2G2.2(b)(5) & app. notes 1 & 5 (clarifying that

a defendant's prior conviction accounted for

as part of a "pattern of activity involving the

sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" is

"not excluded from consideration of whether

that conviction receives criminal history

points"); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) & app. note 4

(explaining that "[a]n occasion of prohibited

sexual conduct may be considered ... without

regard to whether the occasion" occurred

during the commission of the federal offense

or resulted in a conviction).

1

2

We see nothing to Boyle's objection that the

district court, in determining the advisory

Guidelines range, engaged in double counting

by "conflat[ing] offense characteristics,

relevant conduct, and criminal history score."

Boyle's second argument requires more

unpacking. He points to

[28 F.4th 803]

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2) which, he says,

required the district court to run the 50-year

sentence concurrently to the remainder of his

40-year state sentence—a 40-year difference

in his total term of incarceration. But Boyle

forfeited this point by not raising it in the

district court, leaving us to review only for

plain error.

Foremost, Boyle waived the contention by

failing to raise the point in the district court.

We can infer that Boyle's trial counsel made a

"knowing and intentional decision" not to do

so because counsel raised two other (albeit,

unsuccessful) objections to the PSR and

ultimately agreed at sentencing that the

offense level and criminal history category

calculations were correct. United States v.

Jaimes-Jaimes , 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.

2005) (acknowledging there "may be sound

On the merits, we see no error. Explaining

why requires us to get into the weeds of the

applicable Guidelines.

-4-

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)

The beginning point is § 5G1.3(b) itself. If a

defendant has an undischarged term of

imprisonment, and that sentence "resulted

from another offense that is relevant conduct

to the instant offense of conviction" then "the

sentence for the instant offense shall be

imposed to run concurrently to the remainder

of the undischarged term of imprisonment."

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). In "any other case

involving

an

undischarged

term

of

imprisonment," the district court has the

discretion to run the federal sentence

"concurrently, partially concurrently," or, as

here, "consecutively to" the defendant's state

sentence. Id. § 5G1.3(d).

to his federal convictions for producing

sexually exploitative images and possessing

child pornography.

Two of the three possible "types" of relevancy

can be ruled out based on the chronology of

events: the conduct at the heart of Boyle's

state charge occurred on or before February

3, 2019, but his federal conviction captured

conduct from February 4, 2019 onward. The

abuse underpinning his state conviction was

therefore not committed "during the

commission of" his federal offenses, nor can

Boyle's earlier sexual abuse of the victim

reasonably be characterized as conduct

committed "in preparation for" his federal

offenses. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1). And because the

state conduct occurred before the federal

conduct, Boyle's state conviction does not

encompass "harm that resulted from" his

federal conduct either. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(3).

Applying the direction from those provisions

requires the threshold determination of

whether Boyle's state offense constituted

"relevant conduct" to his federal offense. To

answer that question, we need to follow the

cross reference in § 5G1.3(b) to the

Guidelines' definition of "relevant conduct" in

§ 1B1.3. Section 5G1.3(b) only draws on some

parts of § 1B1.3's definition, however. By the

terms of the cross reference, a defendant's

state conviction is "relevant conduct" only if it

encompasses: (1) acts or omissions

committed by the defendant that occurred

during the commission of or in preparation

for the federal crime; (2) acts or omissions

that were part of the "same course of conduct

or common scheme or plan" as the federal

conviction; or (3) harm that resulted from the

federally-charged

conduct.

U.S.S.G.

§

5G1.3(b) (framing the inquiry as whether the

state offense is relevant conduct "under the

provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or

(a)(3) of § 1B1.3"); id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)–(3). The

"same course of conduct" and "common

scheme or plan" tests apply only if the federal

count of conviction may be grouped under §

3D1.2(d) of the Guidelines. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).

These conclusions narrow the pertinent

inquiry. Boyle's state conviction is only

"relevant conduct" for § 5G1.3(b) purposes if

the sexual abuse was part of the "same course

of conduct" or a "common scheme" as his

production or possession of images and

videos of child sexual abuse. At this point,

however, yet another Guidelines cross

reference comes into play because

[28 F.4th 804]

the definition of relevant conduct in §

1B1.3(a)(2) applies "solely with respect to

offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d)

would require grouping of multiple counts."

And by following that cross reference to §

3D1.2(d), we learn that Boyle's seven counts

of

conviction

for

producing

child

pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)

cannot be grouped. Id. § 3D1.2(d) (explaining

that "[s]pecifically excluded from the

operation of this subsection" are offenses

covered by § 2G2.1, which includes violations

of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) ).

The Sentencing Commission's direction finds

straightforward application on the record

before the district court. Boyle's state court

offense conduct—a single act of sexually

assaulting a child—is not "relevant conduct"

-5-

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)

That leaves only Boyle's conviction for

possession of child pornography. Possession

offenses may be grouped under § 3D1.2(d).

Id. (stating that offenses covered by § 2G2.2,

including violations of 18 U.S.C. §

2252A(a)(5)(B), "are to be grouped"). Boyle's

state conviction may therefore qualify as

relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2) if the

sexual abuse of the minor victim was part of

the "same course of conduct" or "common

scheme or plan" as his possession of child

pornography.

***

"For two or more offenses to constitute part

of a common scheme or plan," the Guidelines

explain, "they must be substantially

connected to each other by at least one

common factor, such as common victims,

common accomplices, common purpose, or

similar modus operandi. " Id. § 1B1.3 app.

note 5(B)(i). Alternatively, offenses may be

deemed part of the "same course of conduct"

if they are sufficiently related as to constitute

"part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing

series of offenses." Id. § 1B1.3 app. note

5(B)(ii).

That leaves Boyle's challenge to the

substantive reasonableness of his 50-year

federal sentence. Our review is deferential, as

we will "presume that a within-guidelines

sentence is reasonable." Morgan , 987 F.3d at

632 (cleaned up).

In sum, because Boyle's state offense was not

"relevant conduct" to his federal offense

within the meaning of § 5G1.3(b), the district

court did not err in imposing his 50-year

federal sentence to run consecutive to his 40year state sentence. Neither of Boyle's alleged

procedural errors therefore warrants remand

for resentencing.

B

Everyone recognizes that Boyle's 50-year

federal sentence—which he will only begin to

serve after finishing his 40-year state

sentence—effectively amounts to a life

sentence. "Barring proceedings that vacate"

part of Boyle's sentences, "he will die in

prison" and "death in prison is not to be

ordered lightly." United States v. Nania , 724

F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted); see also United States v. Patrick ,

707 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[A]

sentence of death in prison is notably harsher

than a sentence that stops even a short period

before.").

Against this backdrop, we conclude that

Boyle's state sexual abuse conviction is

neither part of a "common scheme or plan"

nor part of the "same course of conduct" as

his federal child pornography possession

conviction. The two offenses involved

different victims, constituted materially

different conduct, and were at least somewhat

separated in time.

[28 F.4th 805]

Boyle's challenge to the length of his sentence

blends substantive and procedural concerns

but, at bottom, rests on his belief that the

district court inadequately justified its

decision to impose a consecutive federal

sentence. To our eye, however, three

interrelated and permitted considerations

stand out in the district court's remarks at

sentencing:

Viewed from a high enough level of

generality, Boyle's offenses of possessing

child pornography and sexually abusing a

child are undoubtedly related: both involve

the sexual exploitation of children. But the

Sentencing Guidelines demand a more

particular comparison of the conduct at issue,

and Boyle's state offense is not "relevant

conduct" under either the "common scheme"

or "same course of conduct" test prescribed

by the Guidelines.

• Gravity of Offense Conduct :

Faced with conduct that defense

-6-

United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)

counsel

conceded

was

"abhorrent" and "terrible and

damaging and tragic," the

district court emphasized that

Boyle "deserve[d] the same

sentence" that he imposed on

his victim—"a lifetime of

nightmares and self-doubt"—so

he "can consider what [he] did

wrong."

On this record, we have no doubt the district

court adequately considered the § 3553(a)

sentencing factors. The district court selected

and structured a sentence to recognize,

perhaps above all else, that the "senseless

acts" of Boyle and offenders like him "damage

children for the rest of their lives." Nania ,

724 F.3d at 842. The court could have

imposed a longer federal sentence but chose

to reach the same result by running Boyle's

federal sentence consecutive to his state

sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d). That was

not an abuse of discretion.

• Victim Protection : The court

was resolute in its desire to

impose a sentence that would

protect the victim and her

mother from Boyle. In short, the

district court selected a sentence

sure to prevent Boyle from

abusing or even "shar[ing] the

same air as [the victim]" ever

again.

Because the district court properly calculated

Boyle's advisory Guidelines range and did not

abuse its discretion in imposing a consecutive

50-year federal sentence, we AFFIRM.

• Punishing Distinct Crimes :

The district court saw Boyle's

federal offense conduct as

distinct from his state offense

conduct. Indeed, it saw the

production and livestreaming of

the video of his sexual assault of

the child as acts reflecting

incremental wrongdoing. As the

court put it, Boyle decided that

the abuse itself was "not

enough" and that he instead

"needed to stream his own

sexual abuse" of the victim for

others to see, thereby producing

enduring images of that abuse

that would follow the child

forever. And Boyle's possession

of child pornography—conduct

he engaged in "on a completely

different day and a completely

different time period"—further

"subject[ed] other young people

who have been abused to the

perverted and distorted and sick

nature of those seeking the

internet for their satisfaction."

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gary L. Boyle, Petitioner v. United States | Frix