Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gary L. Boyle, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJun 9, 2022
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No. ___ - ________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
__________________________________________________
GARY L. BOYLE,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
__________________________________________________
PETITIONER’S APPENDIX
__________________________________________________
United States v. Gary L. Boyle,
28 F.4th 798 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)
28 F.4th 798
affirmed. The district court was aware of the
length and gravity of the 90-year cumulative
sentences. What mattered most, however, was
the atrocity of Boyle’s offense conduct.
UNITED STATES of America, PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
Gary L. BOYLE, Defendant-Appellant.
Jeffrey Kienstra, Attorney, Office of the
United States Attorney, Peoria, IL, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
No. 21-1093
United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Lew A. Wasserman, Attorney, Law Offices of
Lew A. Wasserman, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued October 28, 2021
Decided March 14, 2022
Summaries:
Before Ripple,
Circuit Judges.
Hamilton,
and
Scudder,
Source: Justia
Scudder, Circuit Judge.
Kik Messenger flagged suspected child
pornography, involving a girl, about eight
years old, engaging in explicit sexual acts with
an adult male. Agents traced the files to
Boyle’s Decatur home. Boyle admitted that he
was the man in the images and had livestreamed his sexual abuse of the girl. A search
of Boyle’s cell phone revealed 100 images and
videos of other children being sexually abused
and exploited. The eight-year-old stated that
the sexual abuse started when she was five.
Boyle pled guilty in state court to predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child and was
sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. In
federal court, Boyle pled guilty based on his
production and distribution of visual
depictions of that abuse. His Guidelines range
was life imprisonment, subject to the
cumulative statutory maximum of 230 years.
The district court sentenced Boyle to 50 years’
imprisonment, consecutive to his state
sentence because the sexual assault “was a
separate course of conduct” from the
production and possession. The court
acknowledged the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)
sentencing objectives and the horrors of
Boyle’s own background but stated that Boyle
sentenced the child “to a lifetime of
nightmares” and immortalized her trauma by
live-streaming it. The Seventh Circuit
Gary Boyle challenges a 50-year federal
sentence he received for producing and
possessing child pornography. The district
court ran the time consecutive to a 40-year
state sentence Boyle had already received for
similar conduct. The district court was well
aware of the length and gravity of the 90-year
cumulative sentences. What mattered most,
however, was the atrocity of Boyle's offense
conduct—his sexual assault of an eight-yearold girl on a video livestreamed to other child
sexual predators. We affirm.
I
Gary Boyle's legal trouble began in February
2019, when Kik Messenger—a smartphone
application that allows users to send texts,
pictures, and videos—flagged images and
videos of suspected child pornography for law
enforcement officials. Agents investigated and
confirmed
[28 F.4th 800]
that the images and videos depicted a young
girl, about eight years old, undressing and
engaging in explicit sexual acts with an adult
male.
-1-
United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)
Law enforcement traced the files to Gary
Boyle's home in Decatur, Illinois. After
agreeing to speak with the agents, Boyle
admitted not only that he was the man in the
images, but also that he used the flagged Kik
account to receive and share child
pornography. He told agents that on February
4, 2019 he sexually abused the child and "livestream[ed] his sexual abuse ... to the other
members in his Kik group." A subsequent
search of Boyle's cell phone revealed 100
images and videos of children other than the
victim being sexually abused and exploited.
The eight-year-old told a family member that
the sexual abuse started when she was five.
The government asked for a stiff sentence.
Emphasizing the gravity of Boyle's conduct, it
urged the district court to sentence him to
230 years—the statutory maximum 30-year
sentence on each of the seven production
counts plus the maximum 20-year sentence
on the possession count. And based on its
view that the creation of each picture and
video inflicted distinct and incremental harm
on Boyle's victim—harm wholly separate from
the traumatic abuse itself—the government
asked the court to run those sentences both
consecutively to one another and to Boyle's
40-year state sentence. Defense counsel
acknowledged that "the Court c[ould] fashion
any sentence it wishe[d]" within the
"thousands of months" it had to work with,
but reiterated Boyle's position that running
any and all federal time concurrent with the
40-year state sentence would achieve the
sentencing aims of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
State and federal charges quickly followed. In
July 2020 Boyle pled guilty in state court to a
single count of predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child. The count charged that the
sexual assault occurred between October 10,
2010 and February 3, 2019. The state court
sentenced Boyle to 40 years' imprisonment.
The district court also heard at sentencing
from Boyle's victim and her mother. The
child, 10 at the time, appeared in court and
submitted a written statement for the
prosecutor to read aloud. She described how
Boyle's sexual abuse had filled her with "ugly
thoughts and feelings" that made her angry,
sad, and scared—and left her feeling, at times,
like she "shouldn't be alive." She told the
district judge that, although she felt like the
abuse she suffered was her own fault, she
remained determined (with the help of
others) not to allow Boyle's wrongdoing to
destroy or define her.
Boyle's federal case was different. It focused
not on the sexual abuse itself but on his
production and distribution of visual
depictions of that abuse. Seven of the eight
federal charges stemmed from the videos and
images Boyle created on February 4, 2019—
the day he livestreamed the sexual assault to
other members of the Kik messenger group.
The eighth count charged possession of child
pornography. The district court accepted
Boyle's guilty plea to all eight charges in
October 2020.
After hearing from both parties at sentencing
and resolving Boyle's two objections to the
presentence investigation report, or PSR, the
district court adopted the PSR's calculation of
a total offense level of 43 and a criminal
history category of IV. Those totals resulted in
an advisory Guidelines range of life
imprisonment, subject to the cumulative
statutory maximum of 230 years for all
offenses of conviction.
When it came her turn, the child's mother
expressed her own overwhelming guilt for not
keeping her daughter safe. She told
[28 F.4th 801]
the district judge that Boyle had stolen "her
[daughter's] childness, her innocence, her
dreams, self-esteem, and self-worth" and that
her daughter had become fearful, distrustful,
isolated, and uncomfortable with physical
affection. In her view, "no amount of prison
-2-
United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)
time will ever be enough" for making the
young girl "a statistic" and creating images
and videos of her abuse that would never go
away.
nightmares and self-doubt" through his abuse
but also immortalized her trauma by
livestreaming it over Kik to others. And the
court pledged to protect the victim and her
mother from Boyle for the rest of their lives—
hence the decision to ensure, through the 50year consecutive sentence, that Boyle would
face combined federal and state sentences of
"of 90 years or nearly 90 years."
After hearing these statements, considering
all other information presented by the parties,
and applying the factors in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a), the district court sentenced Boyle to
50 years' imprisonment. The court imposed
30-year sentences on each of the seven
production counts, stating that each of those
sentences would run concurrent with one
another because Boyle's conduct "occur[ed] ...
over the course of the same day." On top of
those 30-year sentences, however, the district
court imposed a 20-year sentence on the
possession count. The court explained that
the child pornography possession charge was
a "completely different count on a completely
different day and a completely different time
period," and subjected children other than
Boyle's victim "to the perverted and distorted
and sick nature" of individuals seeking out
child pornography on the internet.
Boyle timely appealed.
II
"Federal criminal sentences must be both
procedurally
sound
and
substantively
reasonable," and Boyle attacks his sentence
on both fronts. United States v. Morgan , 987
F.3d 627, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2021).
We review sentencing challenges not
presented to the district court only for plain
error. See United States v. Roush , 2 F.4th
616, 618 (7th Cir. 2021). If the district court
properly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, we review the ultimate sentence
deferentially under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S.
38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
Finally, the district court announced that
Boyle's cumulative 50-year federal sentence
would run consecutive to his 40-year state
sentence because "there could be no
question" that the conduct at the heart of
Boyle's state conviction—the sexual assault,
itself—"was a separate course of conduct"
from the production and possession offenses
at issue in his federal prosecution.
A
Boyle first contends that the district court
committed two procedural errors in
calculating the advisory Guidelines range of
life imprisonment. He sees what he calls
In imposing Boyle's sentence, the district
court expressed his understandable disgust at
the conduct before him. The court recognized
that Boyle did not need to be sentenced to
230 years' imprisonment to accomplish the
objectives of federal sentencing in § 3553(a).
And so, too, did the court acknowledge in
mitigation that the horrors of Boyle's own
background contributed, at some level, to the
sexual abuse he inflicted on the victim. In
weighing everything, though, the district
judge underscored that Boyle not only
effectively sentenced the child "to a lifetime of
[28 F.4th 802]
double- or even triple-counting in the district
court's determination of his offense level and
criminal history category. Boyle also insists
that the district court overlooked key
guidance in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 requiring the
imposition of a concurrent (not consecutive)
federal sentence. Both errors, Boyle presses,
require resentencing.
-3-
United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)
Boyle is right that a district court's failure to
correctly calculate a defendant's Guidelines
range constitutes procedural error. See
Rosales-Mireles v. United States , ––– U.S. –
–––, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904, 201 L.Ed.2d 376
(2018). How closely we review alleged errors,
however, turns on whether Boyle preserved
his objections to the Guidelines calculations
in the district court. A defendant waives an
objection if he "intentionally relinquishes or
abandons" an argument below. United States
v. Oliver , 873 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted). In those circumstances, we
will not entertain the objection for the first
time on appeal. See id. But if there is no
"strategic justification" for the defendant's
failure to make the objection in the district
court, and he "merely fail[ed] to raise an
argument due to accident or neglect," we treat
the argument as forfeited, not waived. Id. ;
see also United States v. Anderson , 604 F.3d
997, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2010). To overcome
forfeiture, the defendant must show that the
district court committed plain error that
affected both his substantial rights and the
fairness or integrity of the proceedings. See
United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 735–
36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) ;
Oliver , 873 F.3d at 607.
strategic reasons why a criminal defendant
will elect to pursue one sentencing argument"
instead of another but warning that "when the
defendant selects as a matter of strategy, he
also waives those arguments he decided not
to present").
Nor is it difficult to "conceive of [a] strategic
reason" for counsel's decision to forgo the
argument Boyle now presses on appeal.
Oliver , 873 F.3d at 607. Not only is double
counting "generally permissible unless ...
expressly prohibit[ed]," but the Guidelines
provisions at issue here specifically permit the
double counting Boyle now challenges.
United States v. Vizcarra , 668 F.3d 516, 519
(7th Cir. 2012) ; see also U.S.S.G. §
2G2.2(b)(5) & app. notes 1 & 5 (clarifying that
a defendant's prior conviction accounted for
as part of a "pattern of activity involving the
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor" is
"not excluded from consideration of whether
that conviction receives criminal history
points"); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) & app. note 4
(explaining that "[a]n occasion of prohibited
sexual conduct may be considered ... without
regard to whether the occasion" occurred
during the commission of the federal offense
or resulted in a conviction).
1
2
We see nothing to Boyle's objection that the
district court, in determining the advisory
Guidelines range, engaged in double counting
by "conflat[ing] offense characteristics,
relevant conduct, and criminal history score."
Boyle's second argument requires more
unpacking. He points to
[28 F.4th 803]
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2) which, he says,
required the district court to run the 50-year
sentence concurrently to the remainder of his
40-year state sentence—a 40-year difference
in his total term of incarceration. But Boyle
forfeited this point by not raising it in the
district court, leaving us to review only for
plain error.
Foremost, Boyle waived the contention by
failing to raise the point in the district court.
We can infer that Boyle's trial counsel made a
"knowing and intentional decision" not to do
so because counsel raised two other (albeit,
unsuccessful) objections to the PSR and
ultimately agreed at sentencing that the
offense level and criminal history category
calculations were correct. United States v.
Jaimes-Jaimes , 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.
2005) (acknowledging there "may be sound
On the merits, we see no error. Explaining
why requires us to get into the weeds of the
applicable Guidelines.
-4-
United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)
The beginning point is § 5G1.3(b) itself. If a
defendant has an undischarged term of
imprisonment, and that sentence "resulted
from another offense that is relevant conduct
to the instant offense of conviction" then "the
sentence for the instant offense shall be
imposed to run concurrently to the remainder
of the undischarged term of imprisonment."
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). In "any other case
involving
an
undischarged
term
of
imprisonment," the district court has the
discretion to run the federal sentence
"concurrently, partially concurrently," or, as
here, "consecutively to" the defendant's state
sentence. Id. § 5G1.3(d).
to his federal convictions for producing
sexually exploitative images and possessing
child pornography.
Two of the three possible "types" of relevancy
can be ruled out based on the chronology of
events: the conduct at the heart of Boyle's
state charge occurred on or before February
3, 2019, but his federal conviction captured
conduct from February 4, 2019 onward. The
abuse underpinning his state conviction was
therefore not committed "during the
commission of" his federal offenses, nor can
Boyle's earlier sexual abuse of the victim
reasonably be characterized as conduct
committed "in preparation for" his federal
offenses. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1). And because the
state conduct occurred before the federal
conduct, Boyle's state conviction does not
encompass "harm that resulted from" his
federal conduct either. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(3).
Applying the direction from those provisions
requires the threshold determination of
whether Boyle's state offense constituted
"relevant conduct" to his federal offense. To
answer that question, we need to follow the
cross reference in § 5G1.3(b) to the
Guidelines' definition of "relevant conduct" in
§ 1B1.3. Section 5G1.3(b) only draws on some
parts of § 1B1.3's definition, however. By the
terms of the cross reference, a defendant's
state conviction is "relevant conduct" only if it
encompasses: (1) acts or omissions
committed by the defendant that occurred
during the commission of or in preparation
for the federal crime; (2) acts or omissions
that were part of the "same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan" as the federal
conviction; or (3) harm that resulted from the
federally-charged
conduct.
U.S.S.G.
§
5G1.3(b) (framing the inquiry as whether the
state offense is relevant conduct "under the
provisions of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or
(a)(3) of § 1B1.3"); id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)–(3). The
"same course of conduct" and "common
scheme or plan" tests apply only if the federal
count of conviction may be grouped under §
3D1.2(d) of the Guidelines. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
These conclusions narrow the pertinent
inquiry. Boyle's state conviction is only
"relevant conduct" for § 5G1.3(b) purposes if
the sexual abuse was part of the "same course
of conduct" or a "common scheme" as his
production or possession of images and
videos of child sexual abuse. At this point,
however, yet another Guidelines cross
reference comes into play because
[28 F.4th 804]
the definition of relevant conduct in §
1B1.3(a)(2) applies "solely with respect to
offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d)
would require grouping of multiple counts."
And by following that cross reference to §
3D1.2(d), we learn that Boyle's seven counts
of
conviction
for
producing
child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
cannot be grouped. Id. § 3D1.2(d) (explaining
that "[s]pecifically excluded from the
operation of this subsection" are offenses
covered by § 2G2.1, which includes violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) ).
The Sentencing Commission's direction finds
straightforward application on the record
before the district court. Boyle's state court
offense conduct—a single act of sexually
assaulting a child—is not "relevant conduct"
-5-
United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)
That leaves only Boyle's conviction for
possession of child pornography. Possession
offenses may be grouped under § 3D1.2(d).
Id. (stating that offenses covered by § 2G2.2,
including violations of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B), "are to be grouped"). Boyle's
state conviction may therefore qualify as
relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2) if the
sexual abuse of the minor victim was part of
the "same course of conduct" or "common
scheme or plan" as his possession of child
pornography.
***
"For two or more offenses to constitute part
of a common scheme or plan," the Guidelines
explain, "they must be substantially
connected to each other by at least one
common factor, such as common victims,
common accomplices, common purpose, or
similar modus operandi. " Id. § 1B1.3 app.
note 5(B)(i). Alternatively, offenses may be
deemed part of the "same course of conduct"
if they are sufficiently related as to constitute
"part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing
series of offenses." Id. § 1B1.3 app. note
5(B)(ii).
That leaves Boyle's challenge to the
substantive reasonableness of his 50-year
federal sentence. Our review is deferential, as
we will "presume that a within-guidelines
sentence is reasonable." Morgan , 987 F.3d at
632 (cleaned up).
In sum, because Boyle's state offense was not
"relevant conduct" to his federal offense
within the meaning of § 5G1.3(b), the district
court did not err in imposing his 50-year
federal sentence to run consecutive to his 40year state sentence. Neither of Boyle's alleged
procedural errors therefore warrants remand
for resentencing.
B
Everyone recognizes that Boyle's 50-year
federal sentence—which he will only begin to
serve after finishing his 40-year state
sentence—effectively amounts to a life
sentence. "Barring proceedings that vacate"
part of Boyle's sentences, "he will die in
prison" and "death in prison is not to be
ordered lightly." United States v. Nania , 724
F.3d 824, 841 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted); see also United States v. Patrick ,
707 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[A]
sentence of death in prison is notably harsher
than a sentence that stops even a short period
before.").
Against this backdrop, we conclude that
Boyle's state sexual abuse conviction is
neither part of a "common scheme or plan"
nor part of the "same course of conduct" as
his federal child pornography possession
conviction. The two offenses involved
different victims, constituted materially
different conduct, and were at least somewhat
separated in time.
[28 F.4th 805]
Boyle's challenge to the length of his sentence
blends substantive and procedural concerns
but, at bottom, rests on his belief that the
district court inadequately justified its
decision to impose a consecutive federal
sentence. To our eye, however, three
interrelated and permitted considerations
stand out in the district court's remarks at
sentencing:
Viewed from a high enough level of
generality, Boyle's offenses of possessing
child pornography and sexually abusing a
child are undoubtedly related: both involve
the sexual exploitation of children. But the
Sentencing Guidelines demand a more
particular comparison of the conduct at issue,
and Boyle's state offense is not "relevant
conduct" under either the "common scheme"
or "same course of conduct" test prescribed
by the Guidelines.
• Gravity of Offense Conduct :
Faced with conduct that defense
-6-
United States v. Boyle, 28 F.4th 798 (7th Cir. 2022)
counsel
conceded
was
"abhorrent" and "terrible and
damaging and tragic," the
district court emphasized that
Boyle "deserve[d] the same
sentence" that he imposed on
his victim—"a lifetime of
nightmares and self-doubt"—so
he "can consider what [he] did
wrong."
On this record, we have no doubt the district
court adequately considered the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. The district court selected
and structured a sentence to recognize,
perhaps above all else, that the "senseless
acts" of Boyle and offenders like him "damage
children for the rest of their lives." Nania ,
724 F.3d at 842. The court could have
imposed a longer federal sentence but chose
to reach the same result by running Boyle's
federal sentence consecutive to his state
sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d). That was
not an abuse of discretion.
• Victim Protection : The court
was resolute in its desire to
impose a sentence that would
protect the victim and her
mother from Boyle. In short, the
district court selected a sentence
sure to prevent Boyle from
abusing or even "shar[ing] the
same air as [the victim]" ever
again.
Because the district court properly calculated
Boyle's advisory Guidelines range and did not
abuse its discretion in imposing a consecutive
50-year federal sentence, we AFFIRM.
• Punishing Distinct Crimes :
The district court saw Boyle's
federal offense conduct as
distinct from his state offense
conduct. Indeed, it saw the
production and livestreaming of
the video of his sexual assault of
the child as acts reflecting
incremental wrongdoing. As the
court put it, Boyle decided that
the abuse itself was "not
enough" and that he instead
"needed to stream his own
sexual abuse" of the victim for
others to see, thereby producing
enduring images of that abuse
that would follow the child
forever. And Boyle's possession
of child pornography—conduct
he engaged in "on a completely
different day and a completely
different time period"—further
"subject[ed] other young people
who have been abused to the
perverted and distorted and sick
nature of those seeking the
internet for their satisfaction."
-7-
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