Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Toya Gibson, Petitioner v. Wayfair, Incorporated
Supreme Court briefApr 1, 2022
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Page: 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
FILED
November 19, 2021
No. 18-20511
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
PlaintiffAppellant,
TOYA GIBSON
versus
WAYFAIR, INCORPORATED
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Texas USDC No. 4:17.CV-2059
Before SMITH, STEWART, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Pro se Toya Gibson appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment against Wayfair, Incorporated (Wayfair). Gibson
sought damages based on Wayfair's alleged violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ofl964, and the Genetic
Information
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be published and is not
precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIRCUIT RULE 47.5.4.
Page: 2
No. 18-20511
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008. The district court granted
summary judgment for Wayfair, whose summary judgment evidence
showed that it terminated Gibson when she accumulated more than
ten (10) attendance points in violation of its no-fault attendance
policy.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de
novo. EEOC P. LHC Grp., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014).
Summary judgment is appropriate if 'the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ' 'Y Id. (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(a)). We must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party. Ida (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Gibson contends that because a dental problem interfered with
her ability to speak and speaking was necessary for her to perform
her job, the ADA required Wayfair to accommodate absences related
to her dental problem and that Wayfair could not assess attendance
points for them. The "burden-shifting analysis " set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. P. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),
requires that Gibson first establish "a prima facie case of
discrimination." LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 694. Even if Gibson had a
disability for purposes of the ADA, the summary judgment evidence
fails to show that Wayfair treated her adversely on account of her
dental problem. See id. at 695, 697. In other words, the record is
devoid of evidence that Gibson's termination was based on any
discriminatory animus against her because she could not speak. See
Kitchen P. BASF, 952 F.3d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2020). Nor does Gibson
make a prima facie case for failure to accommodate her, as the
summary judgment evidence showed that Gibson ' s purported
disability was not known to Wayfair. See Credeur v. Louisiana
Through Office of Attorney Gen., 860 F.3d 785, 792 (5th Cir. 2017).
Page: 3
No. 18-20511
Gibson also argues that Wayfair discriminated against her
based on her Christian-based favorable treatment of customers who
returned merchandise. Here, too, we apply the "McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework" under which Gibson "must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination." Heggemeier v.
Caldwell Cty., 826 F.3d 861, 867 (5th Cir. 2016).
To make a prima facie case, Gibson was required to, among
other things, show that she "was replaced by someone outside [her]
protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly
situated employees outside the protected group. " Morris v. Town of
Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Although Gibson argues that another
employee received favorable treatment with respect to being granted
absences, Gibson has not provided evidence that the employee was
not a Christian or that the employee was similarly situated to
Gibson. See Heggemeier, 826 F.3d at 868. Further, Wayfair's
summary judgment evidence showed it terminated at least seven
other employees at the Texas call center for accumulating more than
1() attendance points. See id.
Gibson argues that Wayfair unlawfully discriminated against
her by creating a hostile work environment after it learned that her
father had a stroke and her mother was mentally ill. Under GINA,
an employer is prohibited from discriminating or taking adverse
actions against an employee "because of genetic information with
respect to the employee." 42 U.S.C. SS 2000ff—1(a)(1); Ortiz v. City
of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 806 F.3d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 2015). Gibson
points to no evidence to overcome the district court's determination
that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her
claim relating to her father's medical condition. See 42 U.S.C. S
Pg- 3
Page: 4
No. 18-20511
2000ff-6(a)(1); Taylor D. Books A Million, 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th
Cir. 2002). Moreover, Gibson came forward with no evidence that
Wayfair
discriminated against her based on her genetic information as it
related to her mother's mental health. See Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826-27.
Gibson's contention that the district court's comments at the
initial
hearing reflected judicial bias
against poverty
and
Christianity is unavailing. The district court’s comments, in context,
do not show that it " displayed] a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Also unavailing is Gibson
's argument that the district court was required to fund expert
witnesses and a stenographer. See Pedraza D. Jones, 71 F.3d 194,
196 (5th Cir. 1995).
Gibson has not presented any triable issues of material fact
nor has she shown that the district court was unable to make a fair
judgment regarding her case. We AFFIRM the district court's grant
of summary judgment.
Case: 18-20511Document: 00516148798
Page | 5
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK
TEL.504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTiU PLACE
Suite 115
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
December 29, 2021
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW:
No. 18—20511 Gibson v. Wayfair
USDC No. 4:17-CV-2059
The court has denied an extension of time to file a sufficient petition for
rehearing en banc in this case .
Sincerely,
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
Cftju/5U/ha, ftcuctaJl
By:
Christina C. Rachal, Deputy clerk
504-310-7651
Ms . Toy a Gibson
Mr .Nathan Ochsner
Mr Esteban Shardonofsky
Page | 6
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-20511
TOYA GIBSON, Document: 00516186202 Date Filed: 01/31/2022
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
WAYFAIR, INCORPORATED,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CV-2059
Before SMITH, STEWART, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Page | 7
This panel previously DENIED the motion to file a
petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc
out of time and the motion to recall the mandate. The panel has
considered Appellant's motion for reconsideration.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
TOYA M. GIBSON,
Plaintiff
United
States
District Court
Southern
District of Texas
ENTERED
June 27, 2018
David J.
Bradley, Clerk
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4: 17-2059
WAYFAIR, INC.
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This employment discrimination case is before the Court on the Motion for
1X0627.1422
Page | 8
Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") [Doc. # 26] filed by Defendant
Wayfair, .Inc. ("Wayfair"), to which Plaintiff, pro se, Toya M. Gibson filed a
Response [Doc. # 32], and Defendant filed a Reply [Doc. # 36], Also pending
is Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs Motion") [Doc. # 29]
to which Defendant filed a Response [Doc. # 30], and Plaintiff filed a
"Requested, Anticipated and Finally Received Addendum" ("Addendum")
[Doc. # 40]. Having reviewed the full record and applicable legal authorities,
the Court grants Defendant's Motion and denies Plaintiffs Motion.
Plaintiffs Motion.
1.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Christian with strong faith. She worked for Wayfair in
the Texas call center for just over six months, beginning March 28, 2016,
and ending when her employment was terminated by Defendant on October
10, 2016. During that
IA20J9M*
Page | 9
Time, Plaintiff processed a high percentage of returns that involved
exceptions to Wayfair' s standard return policy. This included accepting
returns after the expiration of the 30-day return period, and waiving
applicable return shipping costs. Plaintiff, citing the Bible, Ephesians 4:32,
notes in her Response to Defendant's Motion that Christians are commanded
to be kind and compassionate. Plaintiff states that she attempted to follow
that command by being kind to Wayfair customers, particularly the elderly
customers, by accepting their merchandise returns.
Justin Brown was Wayfair's Customer Service Manager and Plaintiffs
supervisor. When Plaintiffs minor daughter was not in school, Plaintiff
requested permission to go home during her lunch break to check on her. In
discussing her request with Brown, Plaintiff mentioned that her mother
could not take care of the daughter because her mother was "mentally ill."
See Plaintiffs Deposition, Exh. D to Defendant's Motion, p. 62. Plaintiff did
not provide to Brown or anyone else at Wayfair additional information
regarding her mother's mental illness. See id at 6566. Plaintiff stated that
Brown allowed her to go home to check on her daughter. See id at 64.
Page | 10
During her brief employment with Wayfair, Plaintiff was absent from
work thirty-six (36) times. Wayfair's Attendance Policy is included in the
"Sales & Service
Attendance" section of the "Wayfair Employee Guide: Texas Call Center
Addendum," attached as Exhibit E to Defendant's Motion. Plaintiff admits
that she received a copy
and was aware of the Attendance Policy. See Plaintiffs Depo., pp. 40-41. The
Attendance Policy provides for the assessment of points for various
attendance infractions. An employee is assessed one Attendance Point for
every "unplanned absence." See Attendance Policy, Exh. E to Defendant's
Motion, p. 11. An "unplanned absence" is defined as "an absence (other than
a Protected Absence ') that was neither requested nor approved" by
management. See id. at 10. The Attendance Policy provides that any absence
"with less than 48-hour notice will be considered unplanned. "2 Id.
Attendance points are tracked on a rolling basis, and are expunged
from the employee's record after twelve (12) months. See id. at 9. The
Attendance Policy provides for potential termination when an employee is
assessed ten (10) Attendance Points. See id. at 12.
1X0627.1422
Page | 11
A "Protected Absence" under Wayfair's Attendance Policy is an
absence covered by the Family Medical Leave Act, worker's
compensation laws, disability and other reasonable accommodation
laws.
2 Plaintiff argues that she should not have been assessed Attendance Points
for the days she was absent for dental work in October 2016 because
those absences were "unforeseen." The Wayfair Attendance Policy,
however, does not exclude "unforeseen" absences from its definition of
"unplanned" absences for which Attendance Points are assessed.
There is no evidence that Wayfair doubted Plaintiffs statements
regarding her need for dental work, and Plaintiff admits that she did
not give 48-hour notice of the absences.
17\2059MsSJ.
Plaintiff admits receiving a verbal warning about her attendance in
August 2016, and a written warning in September 2016, See Plaintiffs Depo,
pp. 47-48. Due to a dental problem, Plaintiff was absent from work October
4-7, 2016. 1 On each morning, she contacted Wayfair to advise that she
would be absent that day. None of the absences was with 48-hour advance
notice. After Plaintiff received thirteen (13) Attendance Points, Wayfair
terminated her employment on October 10, 2016. Plaintiff filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
In her Addendum [Doc. 40], Plaintiffpresents evidence that her dental appointment
scheduled for October 7, 2016, was cancelled by the dentist and rescheduled to
October 11, 2016.
Page | 12
("EEOC"), asserting that she was discriminated against on October 10, 2016
(the date of her termination) on the basis of her religion in violation of Title
VII and on the basis of genetic information in violation of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"). See EEOC Charge, Exh. 3 to
Complaint [Doc. # 1]. Plaintiff stated in the EEOC Charge that she expressed
her religious beliefs openly and that her manager "was aware of [her]
mother's illness." See id
After receiving the Notice of Rights, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June
30, 2017. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated
against on the basis of her religion and genetic information when Wayfair
terminated her employment. See Complaint, p, 2.
In her Addendum [Doc. #40],Plaintiff presents evidence that her
dental appointment scheduled for October 7, 2016 was cancelled by the
dentist and rescheduled to October 11, 2016.
1X0627.1422
The parties engaged in discovery, after which each party filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. The motions have been briefed and are now ripe for
decision.
11.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry
of summary judgment against a plaintiff who fails to make a sufficient
showing of the existence of an element essential to her case and on which
she will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986); Curtis v, Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 2013); Little v. Liquid
Air corp., 37 F,3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Summary judgment
"should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." FED. R. av. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Curtis, 710 F.3d at
594.
For summary judgment, the initial burden falls on the movant to
identify areas essential to the non-movant's claim in which there is an
"absence of a genuine issue of material fact." ACE Am. Ins. Coe v. Freeport
Welding & Fabricating, Inc., 699
Page | 13
F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 2012). The moving party, however, "need not negate
the elements of the nonmovant's case." Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc. v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 759 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Boudreaux v. swift Transp.
PtVDRJXF.RSSJ l-20i7\2059M*SJ.ft-pd
Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005)), The moving party may meet its
burden by pointing out "the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving
party's case." Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Stults v, Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir.
1996)).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go
beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d
131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275
282 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). "An issue is material if its
resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Spring Street PartnersIV* L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 2013), "A dispute as to a
material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party." DIRECT TV Inc. v.
Page | 14
IXOf,27.1422
Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been
created, the court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn from them in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reaves Brokerage Co v.
Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). A genuine
issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-movant Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764
769 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). '"Conclusional allegations
and
denials,
speculation,
improbable
inferences,
unsubstantiated
assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.'" Pioneer Exploration, LLC.
j v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Oliver v.
Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002); accord Delta & Pine Land Co. v.
Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2008). Instead,
the nonmoving party must present specific facts which show "the existence
of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case." Firman
v. Life Ins. co. of N. Am., 684 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation and
Page | 15
internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence of any proof, the court will
not assume that the non-movant could or would prove the necessary facts.
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
888 (1990)).
The Court may make no credibility determinations or weigh any evidence.
See
Chaney v. Dreyfus Sen. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
Reaves Brokerage Co., 336 F.3d at 412-13), The Court is not required to
accept
the
nonmovant's
conclusory
allegations,
speculation,
and
unsubstantiated assertions which are either entirely unsupported, or
supported by a mere scintilla of evidence.
Id. (citing Reaves Brokerage, 336 F.3d at 413); accord, Little, 37 F.3d at
1075. Affidavits cannot preclude summary judgment unless they contain
competent and otherwise admissible evidence, See FED, R, CIV. P. 56(c)(4);
Love v. Nat'l Med.Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 776 (5th Cir. 2000).
Finally, "[w]hen evidence exists in the summary judgment record but
the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for
summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court."
Malacara, 353 F .3d at 405. "Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court
Page | 16
IKlKi27.]422
Page | 17
a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's
opposition to summary judgment." Ida (internal citations and quotations
omitted); Williams v. Valenti, 432 F, App'x 298,
302 (5th Cir. 2011).
111. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Plaintiff alleges that her termination was the result of discrimination
on the basis of her religion. Plaintiff is a Christian. The decision-makers,
Brown and Quick, are also Christians. See Quick Depo., 18; Deposition of
Justin Brown, Exh. L to Defendant's Motion, 10. Where the decision makers
are all members of the same protected class as the discharged employee, it
is less likely that unlawful discrimination on the basis of membership in
that protected class was the reason for the employee's discharge. See Kelly
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 632 Fed. App'x 779, 783 (5th Cir, 2015); Donald
V. Plus4 Credit Union, 2017 WL 3235659, *9 (S.D. Tex.
July 31, 2017) (Miller,J-)-
Page | 18
Under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S.
792, 802-04 (1973), Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
See Refaei v. McHugh, 624 F. App'x 142, 145 (5th Cir, 2015). To establish a
prima facie case, Plaintiff must present evidence that she "(1) is a member of
a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was
discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and
(4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group or was treated less
favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected
group," Id. (citing McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492
F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). It is undisputed that Plaintiff is
a Christian, that she was qualified for the call center position, and that she
was discharged.
Regarding the fourth element of the prima facie case, there is no
allegation or evidence that Plaintiff was replaced by a non-Christian.
Therefore, Plaintiff must present evidence that she was treated less
favorably because she is a Christian than were other similarly situated
employees who were not Christians, "under nearly identical circumstances."
Id. (quoting Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Page | 19
To satisfy this burden, Plaintiff must present evidence of sufficient
"comparators." See id Employees are similarly situated if: (1) they had the
same job or responsibilities; (2) they worked for the same supervisor or had
employment decisions made by the same person; (3) they had comparable
disciplinary histories; and (4) the comparator employee's conduct was "nearly
identical" but resulted in "dissimilar employment decisions." See Lee, 574
F.3d at 260; see also Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th
Cir. 2017), reh'g denied, (Apr. 27, 2017).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to identify any non-Christian employee
at Wayfair' s Texas call center who accumulated ten or more Attendance
Points and was not terminated. Defendant's Senior Human Resources
Manager, William Quick, has stated under oath that between April 2016 and
April 2017, Wayfair terminated at least seven other employees at the Texas
call center for accumulating ten or more Attendance Points. See Affidavit of
William Quick, Exh. A to Defendant's Motion, 17.
Plaintiff asserts that she was believes she was terminated because of
her high percentage of returns, for which she gave exceptions because of her
Christian beliefs regarding kindness and compassion. Although the record is
Page | 20
clear that Plaintiff was terminated for accumulating thirteen Attendance
Points, the Court notes that there is no evidence of non-Christian employees
at the Wayfair Texas call center with a similar percentage of returns with
exceptions who were treated more favorably than Plaintiff. As a result,
Plaintiff would not be able to establish a prima facie case of
M59MsSW8062'.5422
religious discrimination if she was discharged for having a high percentage
of returns that required an exception to Wayfair's standard return policy.
Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of similarly-situated nonChristians who were treated more favorably than she was treated. As a
result, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the
basis of her religion. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this
claim.
IV. DISCRIMINATION CLAIM BASED ON GENETIC INFORMATION
Plaintiff argues that Wayfair's decision to terminate her employment
was the result of discrimination based on genetic information regarding her
father's stroke and her mother's unspecified mental illness. GINA makes it
Page | 21
illegal for an employer to terminate or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because of the employee's
genetic information. See 42 U-S.C. 2000ff-l(a)(l). Genetic information for
purposes of a GINA discrimination claim is "information about [anl
individual's genetic tests, the genetic tests of family members of such
individuals, and the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members
of such individual." See 42
U.S.C 2000ff(4)(A). GINA is intended to prohibit employers from making a
"predictive assessment concerning an individual's propensity to get an
inheritable genetic disease or disorder based on the occurrence of an
inheritable disease or disorder in [a] family member." Poore v. Peterbilt of
Bristol, LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d
I':\£mDERS\l)-3M7\2O59MsSJ.590627.1422
727, 730 (WD. Va. 2012); Maxwell v, Verde valley Ambulance co. Inc., 2014
WL 4470512, *16 (D. Ariz. Sept. I 1, 2014). A family member's diagnosis is
not considered "genetic information" for purposes of GINA if "such
information is taken into account only with respect to the individual in which
such disease or disorder occurs and not as genetic information with respect
to any other individual." See Poore, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (quoting H.R. Rep.
Page | 22
No. 110-28, pt. 2, at 27 (2007); Regulations Under the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed.
Reg. 68,917 (Nov. 9, 2010)).
As an initial matter, the GINA claim regarding Plaintiffs father is
unexhausted. A plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies applicable to
claims under GINA before pursuing a lawsuit raising that claim. See Brown
v. Metroplex Plumbing, 2017 WL 6466747, *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2017), report
and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6447201 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017);
Goswami v. Unocal, 2013 WL 5520107, *6 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2013); Huff, DRE
Mgmt., Inc, 2012 WL 3072389, *3 (N.D. Tex.
July 30, 2012); see also Bowie v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., 2015 WL 1499465,
*5 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2015) ("GINA expressly incorporates Title Vll's
exhaustion requirements for employees covered by Title VH"). Here, Plaintiff
in her EEOC Charge failed to allege any facts relating to her father's stroke.
As a result, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
In connection with Plaintiffs GINA claim relating to her mother's
mental illness, Plaintiff asserts that Wayfair discriminated against her based
on the "manifestation of a disease or disorder" in her family member. Plaintiff
Page | 23
has cited to no evidence that her mother was diagnosed with a specific mental
disease or disorder, and Plaintiff admits that she did not advise anyone at
Wayfair of a specific diagnosis. Instead, Plaintiff simply remarked that her
mother was "mentally ill" and, therefore, could not take care of Plaintiffs
minor daughter.
There is no evidence that Wayfair discriminated against Plaintiff
because of any genetic information relating to Plaintiff or her mother, or that
it used genetic information when deciding to terminate her employment.
Instead, the uncontroverted evidence is that Wayfair used the very limited
information regarding Plaintiffs mother only in connection with granting
Plaintiffs request to go home during her lunch break to check on her minor
daughter. Evidence that Plaintiff described her mother generally as
"mentally ill" has no predictive value with respect to Plaintiffs genetic
propensity to acquire a specific mental illness, and there is no evidence that
Wayfair viewed it as such. See, e.g., Poore, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 731. As a result,
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs GINA claim'
In her Response to Defendant’s Motion and in her Motion for Summary
4
Judgment, Plaintiff complains that she was harassed when she was not
initially permitted to leave (continued...)
Page | 24
v.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that establishes a prima facie
case of religious discrimination. Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies regarding her GINA claim (whether based on discrimination or
harassment) related to her father's stroke. Plaintiff has failed to present
evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact in support of her GINA
claim related to her mother's unspecified mental illness. Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 29] is
DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 26] is
GRANTED. The Court will issue a separate Final Judgment.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 27th day of June, 2018.
SENIOR
NANCY F. ATLAS
1TE0 STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page | 25
4 (.„continued) work early after she learned of her father's stroke. Plaintiff
did not assert a harassment claim under GINA in her EEOC Charge,
in which she identified the "date(s) discrimination took place" as "1010-16." Moreover, Plaintiff did not assert a GINA harassment claim in
her Complaint in this lawsuit.
PAORDERSU/11-2017
180627.1422
Page | 26
Case 4:17-cv-02059 Document 42 Filed on 06/27118 in TXSD Page 1 of 1
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
June 27, 2018
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS David J. Bradley,Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
TOYA M. GIBSON,
Plaintiff,
WAYFAIR, INC.,
Defendant
§
§
§
§
§
§
.§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4: 17-2059
FINAL JUDGMENT
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum and Order, it is
Hereby ORDERED that Defendant Wayfair, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment
[Doc. # 26] is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICL
This is a final, appealable judgment.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 22 day of June, 2018.
NANCY F. ATLAS
SENIOR UNITE# STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page | 27
PAORDERS/ll-I-2017\2059FJ.wpd 180627.1425
TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE
BENEFITS
Page | 28
Employer Response to Notice of Application for UI Benefits
■
SSNXXX-XX-9627 TOYA M GIBSON
Claim Date: 01-01-2017 Claim Type: PGM:REG Claim 2017-01-01
Employer: 15-089530-8
WAYFAR LLC
y Correct Last Employer:
Monetarily Eligible:
Source: Internet
Notice Sent: 01-062017
Due: 01-202017
FIRED
Claimant
Separation
Reason:
01-09Responded: 2017
Response Internet Confirmation0109SYS9627
Type:
Employer
FIRED
Separation Reason:
TWC Action: ROUTE ONLY
NOEL GARZA
Current
Investigator:
Employment Information
Date Range Worked: 03-28-2016 10-10-2016 Gross Wages Earned:
Wages In Lieu Of Notice: N
On Temporary Layoff: N
Paid Vacation Days: N
Responder's Name: William Quick
Responder's Title: Human Resources
Contact Person:
Paid Thru:
Recall Date:
Paid Thru •
TWC Account: 150895308
Phone: (617) 532-6100 0975
Phone:
Additional Information Regarding Separation
Page | 29
.
- Work Separation Reason - Fired.
Why Did You Fire The Applicant?
Violation of our No Fault Attendance Policy.
Who Fired The Applicant?
Name: Justin Brown
Title:Service Manager
Phone: (617)880-8576 Ext:
Y Explanation Below:
Was There A Final Incident That Led To Firing?
Employee was absent 10/4 - 10/7 giving her 13 attendance points whereas 10 points is
cause to review for termination.
Explanation Below:
Did You Give The Applicant Prior Warning?
Page: 1
Benefits — Non-Monetary Determinations
Fact Finding
Case Nbr: 4
SSN •. XXX-XX-9627TOYA M GIBSON
Issue Nbr: lType: FRED Reason: FIRED - INTAKE STATEMENT
Taken: 01-05-201710:18:1
Stmt Nbr: lof: 3 Stmt of: Claimant
Name: TOYA M GIBSON Title:
Phone Stmt: Y Claim ID: 2017-01-01 Claim Dt*. 01-01-2017 Rebuttal: N
Footnote: N
Why were you fired? Reason you were given IWAS TOLD THAT I DID
NOT REQUEST THE DAY THAT 1 TOOK OFF.
Name of the person who told you that you were fired: JUSTIN BROWN
Title of the person who told you that you were fired: MANAGER
Did something specific happen that caused you to be fired? Y
Explanation: YES I HAD DENTAL WORK DONE AND I WAS BLEEDING TOO
MUCH TO GO TO WORK 1 HAD DEVELOPED AN ABSECE AND 1
CONTACTED HR AND THEY SAD IT WAS OK AND
A WEEK BEFORE 1 WAS COMENDED ON MY WORK ETHC AND
INTEGRITY. BUT MY MANAGER CAME TO MY DESK AND IN FRONT OF
EVERYONE TOLD ME TO GET MY THINGS LOUDLY AND
CLEAN OUT MY DESK. WALKED ME TO THE DOOR AND AS 1 WAS
LEAVIING HE CALLED MY NAME 1 TURNED AROUND AND HE WAVED
AND SAD BYE BYE. Did you have any warnings related to the reason you were
given for being fired? N
Did you do what you were warned about? _
Page | 30
END
'k'krk
No footnote entered*#*
Page: 2
Benefits — Non-Monetary
Determinations Fact Finding
SSN: XXX-XX-9627TOYA M GIBSON
Case Nbr: 4
Type: FIRED Reason: ABSENT
Issue Nbr: 1
of: 3 Stmt of: EmployerTaken: 01-10-2017
Stmt Nbr: 2
12:26:37 PM
Name: WILLIAM QUICKTitle: I-IR MANAGER
Phone Stmt: Y Claim ID: 2017-01-01 Claim De 01-01-2017 Rebuttal: Y Footnote: N
What was the reason (you/he,she) (was/were) fired? SHE WAS LET GO DUE TO
EXCESSIVE ABSENCES AND VIOLATION OF OUR NO FAULT ATTENDANCE
POLICY.
Name and title of person discharging claimant? JUSTIN BROWN, MANAGER.
Date(s) 1 reason(s) for final absence? SHE HAD TO MISS DUE TO MEDICAL
REASONS FROM A DENTAL PROCEDURE SHE HAD. SHE NUSSED
FROM 100416-100716.
Page: 3
Benefits — Non-Monetary Determinations Fact
Finding
SSN: XXX-XX-9627TOYA M GBSON
Case Nbr: 4
Issue Nbr: 1
Type: FIRED Reason:
ABSENT
Stmt Nbr: 3of: 3 Stmt of: Claimant
Taken: 01-10-2017
PM
Name: TOYA M GIBSON Title:
Phone Stmt: Y Claim ID: 2017-01-01 Claim Dt: 01-01-2017 Rebuttal: YFootnote: Y
What was the reason (you/he,she) (was/were) fired? I UNDERSTAND THAT MY
EMPLOYER IS SAYING THAT I WAS LET GO DUE TO EXCESSIVE ABSENCES.
Name and title of person discharging claimant? JUSTIN BROWN, MANAGER
Date(s) / reason(s) for final absence? 100416-100716, 1 HAD TO MISS WORK DUE
1 DONT HAVE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON MY ABILITY TO LOOK FOR AND ACCEPT FULL TIMEWORK AND
1 HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT A FULL JOB SNCE THE
BEGNNBIG OF MY CLAM PERIOD.
Page | 31
TO MEDICAL REASONS. I WAS HAVING ISSUES WITH AN ABSCESS IN MY
MOUTH.
Date(s) / reasons for prior absences? I AGREE WITH THE DATES THAT MY
EMPLOYER
PROVIDED. THREE OF THOSE ABSENCES WERE DUE TO MEDICAL
REASONS, AND
ONE OF
THEM WAS FOR MY DAD AND HAVING A STROKE. I DON’T HAVE
SPECIFICS.
Prior warnings regarding attendance? If yes, when, by whom, what were warnings
for? 1 DON'T RECALL WHAT THE WARNINGS WERE FOR, BUT I DO AGREE
THAT
I WAS GIVEN PRIOR WARNINGS.
Did (you/he, she) notify the employer (you/they) were going to be absent? If yes, when?
Who did (you/he, she) speak to/title? IDD CALL IN AS PER
POLICY.
What was the call-in policy/rule when absent? TO CALL PRIOR TO SHIFT
STARTING.
Did (you/he,she) follow the policy? YES I DID
Employee was given a final warning on 9/22/16 when she received her 9th point. She
was advised her job was in jeopardy and any further attendance violations could
result in termination.
Inadequate Untimely Employer Response
Employer Name: WAYFAR LLC
Employer D: 15-089530-8
Late or Inadequate Response Total: O
Page | 32
Dates / reasons for prior absences? 1 WOULDN'T KNOW REASONS, BUT SHE
WAS OUT 061616, 062716, 071916, 072016, 080516, 080816, 081016, 090616,
092116 AND 100416 TfmOlJGH 100716.
Prior warnings regarding attendance? If yes, when, by whom, what were
warnings for? WAS GIVEN A FINAL WARNING ON 092116. THIS WAS A
WRITTEN WARNING. SHE ALSO RECEIVED A VERBAL ON 081016. THE
CLAMANT WAS MADE AWARE THAT HER JOB WAS m JEOPARDY ON
BOTH OCCASSIONS.
Did (you/he, she) notify the employer (you/they) were going to be absent? If yes, when?
Who did (you/he, she) speak to/title? SHE NOTIFY US THAT
SHE WAS GOING TO BE OUT AS PER POLICY.
What was the call-in policy/rule when absent? TO CALL TO LET US KNOW
THAT SHE WAS GOING TO BE ABSENT.
Did (you/he, she) follow the policy? YES SHE DID.
•kick
________________________________ END________________________________
No footnote entered kkk
Page | 33
Issue Decision Log
SSN: XXX-XX-9627
Case Nbr: 4
Issue Nbr: 1 of: 1
TOYA M GIBSON
Type: FIRED Reason: HEALTH OR MEDICAL REASONS
Program:REG Claim ID 2017-01-01 Claim Type:IC Claim Dt: 01-01-2017
LEU: 15-089530-8 WAYFAIR
LLC
Charged:
Late LEU Response: N Interested
No
Party: Y
Other Employer:
Decision Date: 01-10-2017
Mailed Date: 01-11-2017
Begin Date: 01-01-2017
Claimant
End
Date:
Failed to Respond: N
Qualified: Y
Weeks Disqualified
Deductible Amount
State
Incident Date
Rationale: PARTIES AGREE; DET CLMT'S FINAL ABSENCE DUE TO MEDICAL
REASONS*, DET FINAL INCIDENT DOESN’T RISE TO LEVEL OF MISCONDUCT.
Conclusion: FIRED-MEDICALLY VERIFIABLE ILLNESS-NOT DISQUALIFIED
Page | 34
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS
Page | 35
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS
From: Houston District Office
To: Toya Gibson
Mickey Leland Building
P.O. Box 11066
1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor
College Station, TX 77842
Houston, TX 77002
On behalf of person(s) aggrieved whose identity is
CONFIDENTIAL (29 CFR 1601(a))
EEOC Representative
EEOC Charge No.
846.2017-01664
DeAnna Brooks-Torres,
investigator
Telephone
(713)6514971
THE EEOC IS CLOSING ITS FILE ON THIS CHARGE FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASON:
The facts alleged in the charge fail to state a claim under any of the statutes
enforced by the EEOC,
Your allegations did not involve a disability as defined by the Americans With
Disabilities Act.
The Respondent employs less than the required number Of employees or is not
otherwise covered by the statutes.
Your charge was not timely filed with EEOC; in other words, you waited too long
after the date(s) of the alleged discrimination to file your charge.
X. The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is
unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This
does not that the respondent is in compliance with the statutes, No finding is as to any other
issues that might be construed ag been raised by this charge.
The EEOC has adopted the findings of fie state or local fait employment practices
agency that investigated this charge
Other (briefly state)
NOTICE OF SUIT RIGHT
(See the additional information attached to this form.)
Page | 36
Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act* the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: This will be the
only notice of dismissal and of your right to sue that we will send yours You may file a
lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or
state court. Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice;
or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost (The time limit for filing suit based
on a claim under state law may be different)
Equal Pay Act (EPA): EPA suits must be filed in federal or state court within 2 years (3
years for willful violations) of the alleged EPA underpayment. This means that backpay
due for any violations that occurred before you file suit may not be collectible.
On behalf of the commission
Marina Guerra March 31, 2017
Rayford O. Irvin/District Director
William Quick
HR Manager-Talent Operations
Dept.
WAYFAIR
3101 University Drive E
Bryan, TX 77802
Lowell Keig, Director
Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights
Division
101 East 15st.
Room 144T
Austin, TX 78778
Page | 37
EEOC Form 5 (11/09)
CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION
Charge Presented To:
Agency(ies)
This form affected by the Privacy Act of 1974.See Charge No(s);
Privacy
Statement And other before completing this
846-2017-01664
EEOC
tom
Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division
and EEOC
State or local Agency, if any
Home Phone Ana
Code)
Ms. Toya Gibson
.Street Address
1972
City, State and ZIP code
P.0 Box 11066, College Station TX 77842
Named the Employer; Labor Organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticeship
Committee, or State or Local Government Agency That I Believe Discriminated Against Me
or Others. (If more than two, list under PARTICULARS below.)
Name
No.Employees,
Phone No.
(Include Ana
Members
WAYFAIR
Code)
15 100
(800) 929-3247
Street Address
City* state and ZIP code
3101 University, Bryan, TX 77802
Street Address
No.Employees, Phone No.
(Include
Members
Are a Code)
State and ZIP Code
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es)
NATIONAL ORIGIN
RETALIATION ' GENETIC Information JX
DATE(S)
DISCRIMINATION TOOK
PLACE
Earliest
Latest
10-10-2016
10-10-2016
Page |
38
CONTINUING
ACTION
OTHER (Specify) X.Religion
THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional paper needed attach extra sheet(s)):
I On March 28, 2016, I began my employment with Wayfair as a Customer Service
Consultant On October 10, 2016. I was
11. On October 10, 2016, Justin Brown, Manager, told me I was terminated for not
submitting my leave request at home through the portal. In the past was
instructed by Justin Brown to contact Human Resources, William Quick, if I
needed additional time that he could not approve. From October 4, 2016 to
October 10, 2016, I texted Justin Brown informing him I would not be in,
emailed William Quick and called the sick line concerning my absence.
Ill I believe I was discriminated against because of my religion, Christian, and
genetics in violation of Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and
Genetic information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008.1 expressed my
religious beliefs openly and my manager was aware of my mother's illness.
Notary-When necessary for State and Local
I want this charge filed with both the EEOC
Agency Requirements____________________
and the State of local Agency, if any. I will
advise the agencies if I change my address or
..I swear or affirm that I have read the
above charge and that it is true to the best
phone number and I will cooperate fully with
of my knowledge, information and belief.
them in the processing of my charge in
SIGNATUREOF COMPLAINANT
accordance with their procedures.__________
I declare under penalty of perjury that the.
Above is true and correct.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE
ME THIS DATE
(month,day, year)
Mar 31, 2017 Toya M. Gibson
Charging party Signature
Page | 39
846*2017*01664
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
INTAKE QUESTIONAIRE
Please immediately the entire form and return it to the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). REMEMBER, a charge of employment discrimination
must be filed within the time limits imposed by law, generally within 180 days or in places
300 days of alleged discrimination. Upon receipt, this form will be reviewed to determine
EEOC coverage. Answer all questions as completely as possible, and attach additional
pages if needed to complete your responses (s). If you do know the answer to a question,
answer by stating "not known." If a question is not applicable, write "n/a” Please Print.
I Personal information
MI: M
Last Name: GibsonFirst: Toya
Apt Or Unit#:
Street or Mailing Address: P.O. Box 11066
City:
County:
State:
Phone Numbers: Home:713-304 -3092 Work: ( Email
Address: Gibson_toya@hotmail.com
Date of Birth
x: Mate FerruleDo You Have Disability?
No
Please answer each of the next three question. , Are you Hispanic Or Latino? No
ii. What is your Race? Please choose all the apply. X Black or African
iii. What is your Nationality
iii What National Origin (country or origin or ancestry)?
1. Provide the name of a Person we can contact if we are
unable to reach you:
2. I believe that I was discriminated against by following
organization (s)
Organization contact information Wayfair
Organization name: Wayfair
County: Brazos
Address: 3101 University
State: Tx Zip: 7784
City: Bryan
Type of Business: E-Comerce
Human Resources Director or Owner
Phone:
Name:
Page | 40
Number of Employees in the Organization at All Locations: Please check one:
xMorethan500
3. Your Employment Data (Complete as many items as you can) Are you a Federal
Employee? No
Job Title At Hire: Customer Service Consultant
Date hired: 3/28/16
/Cf.ou
Last or Current Pay
Pay Rate When Hired;:
Rate: 14.00
Job Title at time of Alleged Discrimination: Customer Service
Name and Title of immediate Supervisor : Consultants
n
2
If.Job.Applicant Date You applied for job
Job Titled Applied For
4. What is the reason (basis) for your claim of employment discrimination?
FOR EXAMPLE, if you feel that you were treated worse than someone else because of race,
you should check the box next to Race. If you feel you were treated worse for several reasons,
such as your sex, religion, and national origin, you should check all that apply. I you
complained about discrimination, participated in someone else’s complaint, or filed a charge
of discrimination, and a negative action was threatened or taken, you should check the box
next to Retaliation.
Race Sex Age Disability National origin Religion Retaliation Pregnancy Color
Genetic information Genetic testing Family medical history Genetic services
Other reason:
.5. What happened to you that you believe was discriminatory? Include the date (s) of harm,
the actions (s) and the name(s) and titles (s) of the person(s) who you believe discriminated
against you. Please attach additional pages if needed.
A. 10/10/2016 GENETIC, HARRASMENT, RELIGION
6. Why do you believe these actions were discriminatory? Please attach additional pages if
needed.
Page | 41
7 What reasons (s) were given to you for the acts you consider discriminatory? By whom?
His or Hears Job title:
8. Describe who was in the same or similar situation as you and they were treated. For
example, who else applied for the same job you did who else had the same attendance record,
or who else had the same performance? Provide the race, sex, age, national origin, religion,
or disability of these individuals, if known, and if it relates to your claim of discrimination.
For example, if your complaint alleges race discrimination, provide the race of each person;
if it alleges sex discrimination, provide the sex of each person; and so on. Use additional
sheets if needed.
B.
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Houston District Office
Mickey Leland Building
1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor
Houston, TX 77002
NOTICE OF CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION
(This Notice replaces EEOC FORM 131)
DIGITAL CHARGE SYSTEM
April 9, 2017
To: William Quick
HR Manager-Talent Operations Dept.
WAYFAIR wquick@wayfair.com
This is notice that a charge of employment discrimination has been filed with the EEOC
against your organization by Toya Gibson, under: Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act (Title Vll)
and The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). The circumstances of the
alleged discrimination are based on Religion and Genetic Information and involve issues of
Discharge that are alleged to have occurred on or about Oct 10, 2016.
The Digital Charge System makes investigations and communications with charging parties
and respondents more efficient by digitizing charge documents. The charge is available for
you to download from the EEOC Respondent Portal, EEOCs secure online system,
Page | 42
Please follow these instructions to view the charge within ten (10) days of receiving this
Notice:
1. Access EEOC's secure online system: https://nxg.eeoc.gov/rsp/login.jsf
2.Enter this EEOC Charge No.: 846-2017-01664
3. Enter this temporaryPassworc^
Once you log into the system, you can view and download the charge, and electronically
submit documents to EEOC The system will also advise you of possible actions or responses,
and identify your EEOC point of contact for this charge.
Preservation of Records Requirement
EEOC regulations require respondents to preserve all payroll and personnel records relevant
to the charge until final disposition of the charge or litigation. 29 CFR 5160214. For more
preserve
records,
see
obligation
to
information
on
your
http://eeoc.gov/employers/recordkeeping.cfm.
Non-Retaliation Requirements
The laws enforced by the EEOC prohibit retaliation against any individual because s/he has filed, a
charge, testified, assisted or participated in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under these
laws. Persons filing charges of discrimination are advised of these Non-Retaliation Requirements
and are instructed to notify EEOC if any attempt at retaliation is made. For more information, see
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/facts-retal.cfm.
Legal Representation
Although you do not have to be represented by an attorney while we handle this charge, you
have a right, and may wish to retain an attorney to represent you. If you do retain an
attorney, please provide the attorney's contact information when you log in to the online
system.
Please retain this notice for your records.
Page | 43
DENTAL RECORDS AND ADDENDUM
STAGE
R2304Nl1790fi»19
Page I 45
United States Co nils
Southern District of Texas
Filed
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JUN 1 9 20B
DwW j.
OttrsfCM*
Toya M. Gibson
Civil Action 4:17.cv-02059
Plaintiff
vs.
WayfaiPNC.,
Defendant
Requested, Anticipated and Finally Received Addendum
I,Toya Gibson Pro Se Litigant am submitting copies of the anticipated
addendum and the envelope that received it in, that requested from Texas
Avenue Dental earlier in this year. On today, I received them from the
Westbury United Stated Postal Center in Houston, Texas.
The records will support my claim that my scheduled appointment for October
7, 2016 was cancelled by
Dentist Espinoza and rescheduled for October 11, 2016 that in which I
went to his office. Additionality, this addendum notes that the tooth that
I solicited his office for oral surgery and treatment for was tooth #18, not
#19 as originally and initially noted by mistake of his office,
Page | 46
I have written several times throughout my case that the records were
inaccurate and I have also mentioned that I had contacted his office
numerous times for the records to the point where i had to reach out to
the Texas Dental Association for assistance to finally get them.
It is my prayer that the courts use this record to support my case.
will be appreciated.
Respectl
Submitted,
X
l> H hots
Please know that consideration given
be appreciated.
will
Page | 47
TE
AS AVENUE DENTAL
JASON L. ESPINOZA, DDS
May 24, 2018
Toya M, Gibson
P.O. Box 310341
Houston, TX 77231
Dear Ms. Gibson,
Please see the attached documentation requested of your chart records from
our office. File chart reflects an addendum regarding the proper tooth
diagnosed for treatment on your visit.
Additionally pursuant to your request, I can confirm that your visit to our office
was initially scheduled for Friday, October 7, 2016. On Thursday, October 6,
2016 our office experienced a malfunction with an air compressor and rendered
us not equipped to treat patients. All patients scheduled after 3:30 pm on the
6th and all patients scheduled on the 7th were rescheduled to allow for
equipment repair. Your appointment was postponed and completed on
Tuesday, October 11, 2016
Please don’t hesitate to contact me at 979-693-5130 or e-mail me directly at
dtespinoza@texasavedental.com with any questions or further requests.
Best Regards,
Jason L. Espinoza, DDS
Enclosure 2101 Texas Ave S, College Station, 77840 Phone: 979-693-5130
Fax: 979-704-6538 • info@TexasAveDental.com • www.TexasAveDental.com
-o
CTQ
-""TREATMENT RECORD***''
4^
oo
WTE
PROVIDER
TREATMENT RENDERED
WuAu
'for fJDS\f?ynij fn&
ffi.
djd rinxt_ Byg^-trJnmjrmf.
ffr'-bhah lues npfialte
&hnrfan<?
r
&cc>h C rvy\aU gv. pyTl
■VUfl.jY\P n~)i^l lUrA-l. Ok ^yry.ir^^l-frhir^^VvW
I___
H-----1
qg> ui_r v^t _r ACpr^kxj.
t
W,
0>r\
•
.
W\<> ^
Par
3kAQ\- nr i^nrip \nrg. n rn\Ard3£?^.rrrj irr
r^Vqcji.u \P n v*\<
aUAI
sggyQ . ^Ju^Pr-#
h
4*
! o~v'^
ig'-*
^fr
*|
/» oUvfr"’
2
S-ZH-tQ
cjLg.
ftUjt.’Uy
^/vqh****
I
i
}•
29*
Y<g^v. J~uJi>svr>s
■..*£.NT NAME:
*
vCfiirfq.
k*~} g
fi-Of
•**—-»
WW—><1
^
kftwg
A
r~*c^ge-^>
\fS~cS
$
l%«**
y^f Co*» »va><&t; *
Pv A* /x^.
<4f(tr
t>(- rtf’* iiwh ? ra’J-^-*‘y»A
;* * z'/w^fe
tUrf
:s
t»o*k
s&le
Q/* k Aq\j?
i_
cigdt»y o/»
4-a»iU /*€&**»&*&£
tA/qf
yl'SCt"*
k<»
it 0*1 &
/off jWSf'jt' fl/8 If f£<
Ar erhyeh*0*. /<
T
q
lz*)
0 |(v
tc~if'{6>
obJ
/
DATE
TREATMENT RENDERED
PROVIDER
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.