Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Toya Gibson, Petitioner v. Wayfair, Incorporated

Supreme Court briefApr 1, 2022

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

FILED

November 19, 2021

No. 18-20511

Summary Calendar

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

PlaintiffAppellant,

TOYA GIBSON

versus

WAYFAIR, INCORPORATED

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Texas USDC No. 4:17.CV-2059

Before SMITH, STEWART, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Pro se Toya Gibson appeals the district court's grant of

summary judgment against Wayfair, Incorporated (Wayfair). Gibson

sought damages based on Wayfair's alleged violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ofl964, and the Genetic

Information

Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be published and is not

precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIRCUIT RULE 47.5.4.

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No. 18-20511

Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008. The district court granted

summary judgment for Wayfair, whose summary judgment evidence

showed that it terminated Gibson when she accumulated more than

ten (10) attendance points in violation of its no-fault attendance

policy.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de

novo. EEOC P. LHC Grp., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014).

Summary judgment is appropriate if 'the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ' 'Y Id. (quoting FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(a)). We must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the nonmoving party. Ida (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Gibson contends that because a dental problem interfered with

her ability to speak and speaking was necessary for her to perform

her job, the ADA required Wayfair to accommodate absences related

to her dental problem and that Wayfair could not assess attendance

points for them. The "burden-shifting analysis " set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. P. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),

requires that Gibson first establish "a prima facie case of

discrimination." LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 694. Even if Gibson had a

disability for purposes of the ADA, the summary judgment evidence

fails to show that Wayfair treated her adversely on account of her

dental problem. See id. at 695, 697. In other words, the record is

devoid of evidence that Gibson's termination was based on any

discriminatory animus against her because she could not speak. See

Kitchen P. BASF, 952 F.3d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2020). Nor does Gibson

make a prima facie case for failure to accommodate her, as the

summary judgment evidence showed that Gibson ' s purported

disability was not known to Wayfair. See Credeur v. Louisiana

Through Office of Attorney Gen., 860 F.3d 785, 792 (5th Cir. 2017).

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No. 18-20511

Gibson also argues that Wayfair discriminated against her

based on her Christian-based favorable treatment of customers who

returned merchandise. Here, too, we apply the "McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework" under which Gibson "must first

establish a prima facie case of discrimination." Heggemeier v.

Caldwell Cty., 826 F.3d 861, 867 (5th Cir. 2016).

To make a prima facie case, Gibson was required to, among

other things, show that she "was replaced by someone outside [her]

protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly

situated employees outside the protected group. " Morris v. Town of

Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Although Gibson argues that another

employee received favorable treatment with respect to being granted

absences, Gibson has not provided evidence that the employee was

not a Christian or that the employee was similarly situated to

Gibson. See Heggemeier, 826 F.3d at 868. Further, Wayfair's

summary judgment evidence showed it terminated at least seven

other employees at the Texas call center for accumulating more than

1() attendance points. See id.

Gibson argues that Wayfair unlawfully discriminated against

her by creating a hostile work environment after it learned that her

father had a stroke and her mother was mentally ill. Under GINA,

an employer is prohibited from discriminating or taking adverse

actions against an employee "because of genetic information with

respect to the employee." 42 U.S.C. SS 2000ff—1(a)(1); Ortiz v. City

of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 806 F.3d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 2015). Gibson

points to no evidence to overcome the district court's determination

that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her

claim relating to her father's medical condition. See 42 U.S.C. S

Pg- 3

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No. 18-20511

2000ff-6(a)(1); Taylor D. Books A Million, 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th

Cir. 2002). Moreover, Gibson came forward with no evidence that

Wayfair

discriminated against her based on her genetic information as it

related to her mother's mental health. See Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 826-27.

Gibson's contention that the district court's comments at the

initial

hearing reflected judicial bias

against poverty

and

Christianity is unavailing. The district court’s comments, in context,

do not show that it " displayed] a deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Liteky v.

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Also unavailing is Gibson

's argument that the district court was required to fund expert

witnesses and a stenographer. See Pedraza D. Jones, 71 F.3d 194,

196 (5th Cir. 1995).

Gibson has not presented any triable issues of material fact

nor has she shown that the district court was unable to make a fair

judgment regarding her case. We AFFIRM the district court's grant

of summary judgment.

Case: 18-20511Document: 00516148798

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LYLE W. CAYCE

CLERK

TEL.504-310-7700

600 S. MAESTiU PLACE

Suite 115

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

December 29, 2021

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW:

No. 18—20511 Gibson v. Wayfair

USDC No. 4:17-CV-2059

The court has denied an extension of time to file a sufficient petition for

rehearing en banc in this case .

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

Cftju/5U/ha, ftcuctaJl

By:

Christina C. Rachal, Deputy clerk

504-310-7651

Ms . Toy a Gibson

Mr .Nathan Ochsner

Mr Esteban Shardonofsky

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20511

TOYA GIBSON, Document: 00516186202 Date Filed: 01/31/2022

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

WAYFAIR, INCORPORATED,

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CV-2059

Before SMITH, STEWART, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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This panel previously DENIED the motion to file a

petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc

out of time and the motion to recall the mandate. The panel has

considered Appellant's motion for reconsideration.

IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

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§

§

§

§

§

TOYA M. GIBSON,

Plaintiff

United

States

District Court

Southern

District of Texas

ENTERED

June 27, 2018

David J.

Bradley, Clerk

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4: 17-2059

WAYFAIR, INC.

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This employment discrimination case is before the Court on the Motion for

1X0627.1422

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Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") [Doc. # 26] filed by Defendant

Wayfair, .Inc. ("Wayfair"), to which Plaintiff, pro se, Toya M. Gibson filed a

Response [Doc. # 32], and Defendant filed a Reply [Doc. # 36], Also pending

is Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs Motion") [Doc. # 29]

to which Defendant filed a Response [Doc. # 30], and Plaintiff filed a

"Requested, Anticipated and Finally Received Addendum" ("Addendum")

[Doc. # 40]. Having reviewed the full record and applicable legal authorities,

the Court grants Defendant's Motion and denies Plaintiffs Motion.

Plaintiffs Motion.

1.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a Christian with strong faith. She worked for Wayfair in

the Texas call center for just over six months, beginning March 28, 2016,

and ending when her employment was terminated by Defendant on October

10, 2016. During that

IA20J9M*

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Time, Plaintiff processed a high percentage of returns that involved

exceptions to Wayfair' s standard return policy. This included accepting

returns after the expiration of the 30-day return period, and waiving

applicable return shipping costs. Plaintiff, citing the Bible, Ephesians 4:32,

notes in her Response to Defendant's Motion that Christians are commanded

to be kind and compassionate. Plaintiff states that she attempted to follow

that command by being kind to Wayfair customers, particularly the elderly

customers, by accepting their merchandise returns.

Justin Brown was Wayfair's Customer Service Manager and Plaintiffs

supervisor. When Plaintiffs minor daughter was not in school, Plaintiff

requested permission to go home during her lunch break to check on her. In

discussing her request with Brown, Plaintiff mentioned that her mother

could not take care of the daughter because her mother was "mentally ill."

See Plaintiffs Deposition, Exh. D to Defendant's Motion, p. 62. Plaintiff did

not provide to Brown or anyone else at Wayfair additional information

regarding her mother's mental illness. See id at 6566. Plaintiff stated that

Brown allowed her to go home to check on her daughter. See id at 64.

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During her brief employment with Wayfair, Plaintiff was absent from

work thirty-six (36) times. Wayfair's Attendance Policy is included in the

"Sales & Service

Attendance" section of the "Wayfair Employee Guide: Texas Call Center

Addendum," attached as Exhibit E to Defendant's Motion. Plaintiff admits

that she received a copy

and was aware of the Attendance Policy. See Plaintiffs Depo., pp. 40-41. The

Attendance Policy provides for the assessment of points for various

attendance infractions. An employee is assessed one Attendance Point for

every "unplanned absence." See Attendance Policy, Exh. E to Defendant's

Motion, p. 11. An "unplanned absence" is defined as "an absence (other than

a Protected Absence ') that was neither requested nor approved" by

management. See id. at 10. The Attendance Policy provides that any absence

"with less than 48-hour notice will be considered unplanned. "2 Id.

Attendance points are tracked on a rolling basis, and are expunged

from the employee's record after twelve (12) months. See id. at 9. The

Attendance Policy provides for potential termination when an employee is

assessed ten (10) Attendance Points. See id. at 12.

1X0627.1422

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A "Protected Absence" under Wayfair's Attendance Policy is an

absence covered by the Family Medical Leave Act, worker's

compensation laws, disability and other reasonable accommodation

laws.

2 Plaintiff argues that she should not have been assessed Attendance Points

for the days she was absent for dental work in October 2016 because

those absences were "unforeseen." The Wayfair Attendance Policy,

however, does not exclude "unforeseen" absences from its definition of

"unplanned" absences for which Attendance Points are assessed.

There is no evidence that Wayfair doubted Plaintiffs statements

regarding her need for dental work, and Plaintiff admits that she did

not give 48-hour notice of the absences.

17\2059MsSJ.

Plaintiff admits receiving a verbal warning about her attendance in

August 2016, and a written warning in September 2016, See Plaintiffs Depo,

pp. 47-48. Due to a dental problem, Plaintiff was absent from work October

4-7, 2016. 1 On each morning, she contacted Wayfair to advise that she

would be absent that day. None of the absences was with 48-hour advance

notice. After Plaintiff received thirteen (13) Attendance Points, Wayfair

terminated her employment on October 10, 2016. Plaintiff filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

In her Addendum [Doc. 40], Plaintiffpresents evidence that her dental appointment

scheduled for October 7, 2016, was cancelled by the dentist and rescheduled to

October 11, 2016.

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("EEOC"), asserting that she was discriminated against on October 10, 2016

(the date of her termination) on the basis of her religion in violation of Title

VII and on the basis of genetic information in violation of the Genetic

Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"). See EEOC Charge, Exh. 3 to

Complaint [Doc. # 1]. Plaintiff stated in the EEOC Charge that she expressed

her religious beliefs openly and that her manager "was aware of [her]

mother's illness." See id

After receiving the Notice of Rights, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on June

30, 2017. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated

against on the basis of her religion and genetic information when Wayfair

terminated her employment. See Complaint, p, 2.

In her Addendum [Doc. #40],Plaintiff presents evidence that her

dental appointment scheduled for October 7, 2016 was cancelled by the

dentist and rescheduled to October 11, 2016.

1X0627.1422

The parties engaged in discovery, after which each party filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment. The motions have been briefed and are now ripe for

decision.

11.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry

of summary judgment against a plaintiff who fails to make a sufficient

showing of the existence of an element essential to her case and on which

she will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986); Curtis v, Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 2013); Little v. Liquid

Air corp., 37 F,3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Summary judgment

"should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials

on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." FED. R. av. P. 56(a); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Curtis, 710 F.3d at

594.

For summary judgment, the initial burden falls on the movant to

identify areas essential to the non-movant's claim in which there is an

"absence of a genuine issue of material fact." ACE Am. Ins. Coe v. Freeport

Welding & Fabricating, Inc., 699

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F.3d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 2012). The moving party, however, "need not negate

the elements of the nonmovant's case." Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc. v. JP

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 759 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Boudreaux v. swift Transp.

PtVDRJXF.RSSJ l-20i7\2059M*SJ.ft-pd

Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005)), The moving party may meet its

burden by pointing out "the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving

party's case." Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Stults v, Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir.

1996)).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go

beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue of material fact for Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d

131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275

282 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). "An issue is material if its

resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Spring Street PartnersIV* L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 2013), "A dispute as to a

material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." DIRECT TV Inc. v.

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IXOf,27.1422

Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been

created, the court reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn from them in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reaves Brokerage Co v.

Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 2003). A genuine

issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-movant Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764

769 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). '"Conclusional allegations

and

denials,

speculation,

improbable

inferences,

unsubstantiated

assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.'" Pioneer Exploration, LLC.

j v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Oliver v.

Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002); accord Delta & Pine Land Co. v.

Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2008). Instead,

the nonmoving party must present specific facts which show "the existence

of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case." Firman

v. Life Ins. co. of N. Am., 684 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation and

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internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence of any proof, the court will

not assume that the non-movant could or would prove the necessary facts.

Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,

888 (1990)).

The Court may make no credibility determinations or weigh any evidence.

See

Chaney v. Dreyfus Sen. Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing

Reaves Brokerage Co., 336 F.3d at 412-13), The Court is not required to

accept

the

nonmovant's

conclusory

allegations,

speculation,

and

unsubstantiated assertions which are either entirely unsupported, or

supported by a mere scintilla of evidence.

Id. (citing Reaves Brokerage, 336 F.3d at 413); accord, Little, 37 F.3d at

1075. Affidavits cannot preclude summary judgment unless they contain

competent and otherwise admissible evidence, See FED, R, CIV. P. 56(c)(4);

Love v. Nat'l Med.Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 776 (5th Cir. 2000).

Finally, "[w]hen evidence exists in the summary judgment record but

the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for

summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court."

Malacara, 353 F .3d at 405. "Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court

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a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's

opposition to summary judgment." Ida (internal citations and quotations

omitted); Williams v. Valenti, 432 F, App'x 298,

302 (5th Cir. 2011).

111. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIM

Plaintiff alleges that her termination was the result of discrimination

on the basis of her religion. Plaintiff is a Christian. The decision-makers,

Brown and Quick, are also Christians. See Quick Depo., 18; Deposition of

Justin Brown, Exh. L to Defendant's Motion, 10. Where the decision makers

are all members of the same protected class as the discharged employee, it

is less likely that unlawful discrimination on the basis of membership in

that protected class was the reason for the employee's discharge. See Kelly

v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 632 Fed. App'x 779, 783 (5th Cir, 2015); Donald

V. Plus4 Credit Union, 2017 WL 3235659, *9 (S.D. Tex.

July 31, 2017) (Miller,J-)-

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Under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S.

792, 802-04 (1973), Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination.

See Refaei v. McHugh, 624 F. App'x 142, 145 (5th Cir, 2015). To establish a

prima facie case, Plaintiff must present evidence that she "(1) is a member of

a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was

discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and

(4) was replaced by someone outside his protected group or was treated less

favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected

group," Id. (citing McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492

F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)). It is undisputed that Plaintiff is

a Christian, that she was qualified for the call center position, and that she

was discharged.

Regarding the fourth element of the prima facie case, there is no

allegation or evidence that Plaintiff was replaced by a non-Christian.

Therefore, Plaintiff must present evidence that she was treated less

favorably because she is a Christian than were other similarly situated

employees who were not Christians, "under nearly identical circumstances."

Id. (quoting Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009)).

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To satisfy this burden, Plaintiff must present evidence of sufficient

"comparators." See id Employees are similarly situated if: (1) they had the

same job or responsibilities; (2) they worked for the same supervisor or had

employment decisions made by the same person; (3) they had comparable

disciplinary histories; and (4) the comparator employee's conduct was "nearly

identical" but resulted in "dissimilar employment decisions." See Lee, 574

F.3d at 260; see also Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th

Cir. 2017), reh'g denied, (Apr. 27, 2017).

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to identify any non-Christian employee

at Wayfair' s Texas call center who accumulated ten or more Attendance

Points and was not terminated. Defendant's Senior Human Resources

Manager, William Quick, has stated under oath that between April 2016 and

April 2017, Wayfair terminated at least seven other employees at the Texas

call center for accumulating ten or more Attendance Points. See Affidavit of

William Quick, Exh. A to Defendant's Motion, 17.

Plaintiff asserts that she was believes she was terminated because of

her high percentage of returns, for which she gave exceptions because of her

Christian beliefs regarding kindness and compassion. Although the record is

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clear that Plaintiff was terminated for accumulating thirteen Attendance

Points, the Court notes that there is no evidence of non-Christian employees

at the Wayfair Texas call center with a similar percentage of returns with

exceptions who were treated more favorably than Plaintiff. As a result,

Plaintiff would not be able to establish a prima facie case of

M59MsSW8062'.5422

religious discrimination if she was discharged for having a high percentage

of returns that required an exception to Wayfair's standard return policy.

Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of similarly-situated nonChristians who were treated more favorably than she was treated. As a

result, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the

basis of her religion. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this

claim.

IV. DISCRIMINATION CLAIM BASED ON GENETIC INFORMATION

Plaintiff argues that Wayfair's decision to terminate her employment

was the result of discrimination based on genetic information regarding her

father's stroke and her mother's unspecified mental illness. GINA makes it

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illegal for an employer to terminate or otherwise discriminate against an

employee because of the employee's

genetic information. See 42 U-S.C. 2000ff-l(a)(l). Genetic information for

purposes of a GINA discrimination claim is "information about [anl

individual's genetic tests, the genetic tests of family members of such

individuals, and the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members

of such individual." See 42

U.S.C 2000ff(4)(A). GINA is intended to prohibit employers from making a

"predictive assessment concerning an individual's propensity to get an

inheritable genetic disease or disorder based on the occurrence of an

inheritable disease or disorder in [a] family member." Poore v. Peterbilt of

Bristol, LLC, 852 F. Supp. 2d

I':\£mDERS\l)-3M7\2O59MsSJ.590627.1422

727, 730 (WD. Va. 2012); Maxwell v, Verde valley Ambulance co. Inc., 2014

WL 4470512, *16 (D. Ariz. Sept. I 1, 2014). A family member's diagnosis is

not considered "genetic information" for purposes of GINA if "such

information is taken into account only with respect to the individual in which

such disease or disorder occurs and not as genetic information with respect

to any other individual." See Poore, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (quoting H.R. Rep.

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No. 110-28, pt. 2, at 27 (2007); Regulations Under the Genetic Information

Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 75 Fed.

Reg. 68,917 (Nov. 9, 2010)).

As an initial matter, the GINA claim regarding Plaintiffs father is

unexhausted. A plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies applicable to

claims under GINA before pursuing a lawsuit raising that claim. See Brown

v. Metroplex Plumbing, 2017 WL 6466747, *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2017), report

and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6447201 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2017);

Goswami v. Unocal, 2013 WL 5520107, *6 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2013); Huff, DRE

Mgmt., Inc, 2012 WL 3072389, *3 (N.D. Tex.

July 30, 2012); see also Bowie v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys., 2015 WL 1499465,

*5 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2015) ("GINA expressly incorporates Title Vll's

exhaustion requirements for employees covered by Title VH"). Here, Plaintiff

in her EEOC Charge failed to allege any facts relating to her father's stroke.

As a result, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

In connection with Plaintiffs GINA claim relating to her mother's

mental illness, Plaintiff asserts that Wayfair discriminated against her based

on the "manifestation of a disease or disorder" in her family member. Plaintiff

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has cited to no evidence that her mother was diagnosed with a specific mental

disease or disorder, and Plaintiff admits that she did not advise anyone at

Wayfair of a specific diagnosis. Instead, Plaintiff simply remarked that her

mother was "mentally ill" and, therefore, could not take care of Plaintiffs

minor daughter.

There is no evidence that Wayfair discriminated against Plaintiff

because of any genetic information relating to Plaintiff or her mother, or that

it used genetic information when deciding to terminate her employment.

Instead, the uncontroverted evidence is that Wayfair used the very limited

information regarding Plaintiffs mother only in connection with granting

Plaintiffs request to go home during her lunch break to check on her minor

daughter. Evidence that Plaintiff described her mother generally as

"mentally ill" has no predictive value with respect to Plaintiffs genetic

propensity to acquire a specific mental illness, and there is no evidence that

Wayfair viewed it as such. See, e.g., Poore, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 731. As a result,

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs GINA claim'

In her Response to Defendant’s Motion and in her Motion for Summary

4

Judgment, Plaintiff complains that she was harassed when she was not

initially permitted to leave (continued...)

Page | 24

v.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that establishes a prima facie

case of religious discrimination. Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies regarding her GINA claim (whether based on discrimination or

harassment) related to her father's stroke. Plaintiff has failed to present

evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact in support of her GINA

claim related to her mother's unspecified mental illness. Accordingly, it is

hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 29] is

DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 26] is

GRANTED. The Court will issue a separate Final Judgment.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 27th day of June, 2018.

SENIOR

NANCY F. ATLAS

1TE0 STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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4 (.„continued) work early after she learned of her father's stroke. Plaintiff

did not assert a harassment claim under GINA in her EEOC Charge,

in which she identified the "date(s) discrimination took place" as "1010-16." Moreover, Plaintiff did not assert a GINA harassment claim in

her Complaint in this lawsuit.

PAORDERSU/11-2017

180627.1422

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Case 4:17-cv-02059 Document 42 Filed on 06/27118 in TXSD Page 1 of 1

United States District Court

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

June 27, 2018

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS David J. Bradley,Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

TOYA M. GIBSON,

Plaintiff,

WAYFAIR, INC.,

Defendant

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4: 17-2059

FINAL JUDGMENT

For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum and Order, it is

Hereby ORDERED that Defendant Wayfair, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment

[Doc. # 26] is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICL

This is a final, appealable judgment.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, this 22 day of June, 2018.

NANCY F. ATLAS

SENIOR UNITE# STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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PAORDERS/ll-I-2017\2059FJ.wpd 180627.1425

TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE

BENEFITS

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Employer Response to Notice of Application for UI Benefits

■

SSNXXX-XX-9627 TOYA M GIBSON

Claim Date: 01-01-2017 Claim Type: PGM:REG Claim 2017-01-01

Employer: 15-089530-8

WAYFAR LLC

y Correct Last Employer:

Monetarily Eligible:

Source: Internet

Notice Sent: 01-062017

Due: 01-202017

FIRED

Claimant

Separation

Reason:

01-09Responded: 2017

Response Internet Confirmation0109SYS9627

Type:

Employer

FIRED

Separation Reason:

TWC Action: ROUTE ONLY

NOEL GARZA

Current

Investigator:

Employment Information

Date Range Worked: 03-28-2016 10-10-2016 Gross Wages Earned:

Wages In Lieu Of Notice: N

On Temporary Layoff: N

Paid Vacation Days: N

Responder's Name: William Quick

Responder's Title: Human Resources

Contact Person:

Paid Thru:

Recall Date:

Paid Thru •

TWC Account: 150895308

Phone: (617) 532-6100 0975

Phone:

Additional Information Regarding Separation

Page | 29

.

- Work Separation Reason - Fired.

Why Did You Fire The Applicant?

Violation of our No Fault Attendance Policy.

Who Fired The Applicant?

Name: Justin Brown

Title:Service Manager

Phone: (617)880-8576 Ext:

Y Explanation Below:

Was There A Final Incident That Led To Firing?

Employee was absent 10/4 - 10/7 giving her 13 attendance points whereas 10 points is

cause to review for termination.

Explanation Below:

Did You Give The Applicant Prior Warning?

Page: 1

Benefits — Non-Monetary Determinations

Fact Finding

Case Nbr: 4

SSN •. XXX-XX-9627TOYA M GIBSON

Issue Nbr: lType: FRED Reason: FIRED - INTAKE STATEMENT

Taken: 01-05-201710:18:1

Stmt Nbr: lof: 3 Stmt of: Claimant

Name: TOYA M GIBSON Title:

Phone Stmt: Y Claim ID: 2017-01-01 Claim Dt*. 01-01-2017 Rebuttal: N

Footnote: N

Why were you fired? Reason you were given IWAS TOLD THAT I DID

NOT REQUEST THE DAY THAT 1 TOOK OFF.

Name of the person who told you that you were fired: JUSTIN BROWN

Title of the person who told you that you were fired: MANAGER

Did something specific happen that caused you to be fired? Y

Explanation: YES I HAD DENTAL WORK DONE AND I WAS BLEEDING TOO

MUCH TO GO TO WORK 1 HAD DEVELOPED AN ABSECE AND 1

CONTACTED HR AND THEY SAD IT WAS OK AND

A WEEK BEFORE 1 WAS COMENDED ON MY WORK ETHC AND

INTEGRITY. BUT MY MANAGER CAME TO MY DESK AND IN FRONT OF

EVERYONE TOLD ME TO GET MY THINGS LOUDLY AND

CLEAN OUT MY DESK. WALKED ME TO THE DOOR AND AS 1 WAS

LEAVIING HE CALLED MY NAME 1 TURNED AROUND AND HE WAVED

AND SAD BYE BYE. Did you have any warnings related to the reason you were

given for being fired? N

Did you do what you were warned about? _

Page | 30

END

'k'krk

No footnote entered*#*

Page: 2

Benefits — Non-Monetary

Determinations Fact Finding

SSN: XXX-XX-9627TOYA M GIBSON

Case Nbr: 4

Type: FIRED Reason: ABSENT

Issue Nbr: 1

of: 3 Stmt of: EmployerTaken: 01-10-2017

Stmt Nbr: 2

12:26:37 PM

Name: WILLIAM QUICKTitle: I-IR MANAGER

Phone Stmt: Y Claim ID: 2017-01-01 Claim De 01-01-2017 Rebuttal: Y Footnote: N

What was the reason (you/he,she) (was/were) fired? SHE WAS LET GO DUE TO

EXCESSIVE ABSENCES AND VIOLATION OF OUR NO FAULT ATTENDANCE

POLICY.

Name and title of person discharging claimant? JUSTIN BROWN, MANAGER.

Date(s) 1 reason(s) for final absence? SHE HAD TO MISS DUE TO MEDICAL

REASONS FROM A DENTAL PROCEDURE SHE HAD. SHE NUSSED

FROM 100416-100716.

Page: 3

Benefits — Non-Monetary Determinations Fact

Finding

SSN: XXX-XX-9627TOYA M GBSON

Case Nbr: 4

Issue Nbr: 1

Type: FIRED Reason:

ABSENT

Stmt Nbr: 3of: 3 Stmt of: Claimant

Taken: 01-10-2017

PM

Name: TOYA M GIBSON Title:

Phone Stmt: Y Claim ID: 2017-01-01 Claim Dt: 01-01-2017 Rebuttal: YFootnote: Y

What was the reason (you/he,she) (was/were) fired? I UNDERSTAND THAT MY

EMPLOYER IS SAYING THAT I WAS LET GO DUE TO EXCESSIVE ABSENCES.

Name and title of person discharging claimant? JUSTIN BROWN, MANAGER

Date(s) / reason(s) for final absence? 100416-100716, 1 HAD TO MISS WORK DUE

1 DONT HAVE ANY RESTRICTIONS ON MY ABILITY TO LOOK FOR AND ACCEPT FULL TIMEWORK AND

1 HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT A FULL JOB SNCE THE

BEGNNBIG OF MY CLAM PERIOD.

Page | 31

TO MEDICAL REASONS. I WAS HAVING ISSUES WITH AN ABSCESS IN MY

MOUTH.

Date(s) / reasons for prior absences? I AGREE WITH THE DATES THAT MY

EMPLOYER

PROVIDED. THREE OF THOSE ABSENCES WERE DUE TO MEDICAL

REASONS, AND

ONE OF

THEM WAS FOR MY DAD AND HAVING A STROKE. I DON’T HAVE

SPECIFICS.

Prior warnings regarding attendance? If yes, when, by whom, what were warnings

for? 1 DON'T RECALL WHAT THE WARNINGS WERE FOR, BUT I DO AGREE

THAT

I WAS GIVEN PRIOR WARNINGS.

Did (you/he, she) notify the employer (you/they) were going to be absent? If yes, when?

Who did (you/he, she) speak to/title? IDD CALL IN AS PER

POLICY.

What was the call-in policy/rule when absent? TO CALL PRIOR TO SHIFT

STARTING.

Did (you/he,she) follow the policy? YES I DID

Employee was given a final warning on 9/22/16 when she received her 9th point. She

was advised her job was in jeopardy and any further attendance violations could

result in termination.

Inadequate Untimely Employer Response

Employer Name: WAYFAR LLC

Employer D: 15-089530-8

Late or Inadequate Response Total: O

Page | 32

Dates / reasons for prior absences? 1 WOULDN'T KNOW REASONS, BUT SHE

WAS OUT 061616, 062716, 071916, 072016, 080516, 080816, 081016, 090616,

092116 AND 100416 TfmOlJGH 100716.

Prior warnings regarding attendance? If yes, when, by whom, what were

warnings for? WAS GIVEN A FINAL WARNING ON 092116. THIS WAS A

WRITTEN WARNING. SHE ALSO RECEIVED A VERBAL ON 081016. THE

CLAMANT WAS MADE AWARE THAT HER JOB WAS m JEOPARDY ON

BOTH OCCASSIONS.

Did (you/he, she) notify the employer (you/they) were going to be absent? If yes, when?

Who did (you/he, she) speak to/title? SHE NOTIFY US THAT

SHE WAS GOING TO BE OUT AS PER POLICY.

What was the call-in policy/rule when absent? TO CALL TO LET US KNOW

THAT SHE WAS GOING TO BE ABSENT.

Did (you/he, she) follow the policy? YES SHE DID.

•kick

________________________________ END________________________________

No footnote entered kkk

Page | 33

Issue Decision Log

SSN: XXX-XX-9627

Case Nbr: 4

Issue Nbr: 1 of: 1

TOYA M GIBSON

Type: FIRED Reason: HEALTH OR MEDICAL REASONS

Program:REG Claim ID 2017-01-01 Claim Type:IC Claim Dt: 01-01-2017

LEU: 15-089530-8 WAYFAIR

LLC

Charged:

Late LEU Response: N Interested

No

Party: Y

Other Employer:

Decision Date: 01-10-2017

Mailed Date: 01-11-2017

Begin Date: 01-01-2017

Claimant

End

Date:

Failed to Respond: N

Qualified: Y

Weeks Disqualified

Deductible Amount

State

Incident Date

Rationale: PARTIES AGREE; DET CLMT'S FINAL ABSENCE DUE TO MEDICAL

REASONS*, DET FINAL INCIDENT DOESN’T RISE TO LEVEL OF MISCONDUCT.

Conclusion: FIRED-MEDICALLY VERIFIABLE ILLNESS-NOT DISQUALIFIED

Page | 34

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS

Page | 35

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS

From: Houston District Office

To: Toya Gibson

Mickey Leland Building

P.O. Box 11066

1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor

College Station, TX 77842

Houston, TX 77002

On behalf of person(s) aggrieved whose identity is

CONFIDENTIAL (29 CFR 1601(a))

EEOC Representative

EEOC Charge No.

846.2017-01664

DeAnna Brooks-Torres,

investigator

Telephone

(713)6514971

THE EEOC IS CLOSING ITS FILE ON THIS CHARGE FOR THE FOLLOWING

REASON:

The facts alleged in the charge fail to state a claim under any of the statutes

enforced by the EEOC,

Your allegations did not involve a disability as defined by the Americans With

Disabilities Act.

The Respondent employs less than the required number Of employees or is not

otherwise covered by the statutes.

Your charge was not timely filed with EEOC; in other words, you waited too long

after the date(s) of the alleged discrimination to file your charge.

X. The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is

unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This

does not that the respondent is in compliance with the statutes, No finding is as to any other

issues that might be construed ag been raised by this charge.

The EEOC has adopted the findings of fie state or local fait employment practices

agency that investigated this charge

Other (briefly state)

NOTICE OF SUIT RIGHT

(See the additional information attached to this form.)

Page | 36

Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act* the Genetic Information

Nondiscrimination Act, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: This will be the

only notice of dismissal and of your right to sue that we will send yours You may file a

lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or

state court. Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice;

or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost (The time limit for filing suit based

on a claim under state law may be different)

Equal Pay Act (EPA): EPA suits must be filed in federal or state court within 2 years (3

years for willful violations) of the alleged EPA underpayment. This means that backpay

due for any violations that occurred before you file suit may not be collectible.

On behalf of the commission

Marina Guerra March 31, 2017

Rayford O. Irvin/District Director

William Quick

HR Manager-Talent Operations

Dept.

WAYFAIR

3101 University Drive E

Bryan, TX 77802

Lowell Keig, Director

Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights

Division

101 East 15st.

Room 144T

Austin, TX 78778

Page | 37

EEOC Form 5 (11/09)

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION

Charge Presented To:

Agency(ies)

This form affected by the Privacy Act of 1974.See Charge No(s);

Privacy

Statement And other before completing this

846-2017-01664

EEOC

tom

Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division

and EEOC

State or local Agency, if any

Home Phone Ana

Code)

Ms. Toya Gibson

.Street Address

1972

City, State and ZIP code

P.0 Box 11066, College Station TX 77842

Named the Employer; Labor Organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticeship

Committee, or State or Local Government Agency That I Believe Discriminated Against Me

or Others. (If more than two, list under PARTICULARS below.)

Name

No.Employees,

Phone No.

(Include Ana

Members

WAYFAIR

Code)

15 100

(800) 929-3247

Street Address

City* state and ZIP code

3101 University, Bryan, TX 77802

Street Address

No.Employees, Phone No.

(Include

Members

Are a Code)

State and ZIP Code

DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es)

NATIONAL ORIGIN

RETALIATION ' GENETIC Information JX

DATE(S)

DISCRIMINATION TOOK

PLACE

Earliest

Latest

10-10-2016

10-10-2016

Page |

38

CONTINUING

ACTION

OTHER (Specify) X.Religion

THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional paper needed attach extra sheet(s)):

I On March 28, 2016, I began my employment with Wayfair as a Customer Service

Consultant On October 10, 2016. I was

11. On October 10, 2016, Justin Brown, Manager, told me I was terminated for not

submitting my leave request at home through the portal. In the past was

instructed by Justin Brown to contact Human Resources, William Quick, if I

needed additional time that he could not approve. From October 4, 2016 to

October 10, 2016, I texted Justin Brown informing him I would not be in,

emailed William Quick and called the sick line concerning my absence.

Ill I believe I was discriminated against because of my religion, Christian, and

genetics in violation of Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and

Genetic information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008.1 expressed my

religious beliefs openly and my manager was aware of my mother's illness.

Notary-When necessary for State and Local

I want this charge filed with both the EEOC

Agency Requirements____________________

and the State of local Agency, if any. I will

advise the agencies if I change my address or

..I swear or affirm that I have read the

above charge and that it is true to the best

phone number and I will cooperate fully with

of my knowledge, information and belief.

them in the processing of my charge in

SIGNATUREOF COMPLAINANT

accordance with their procedures.__________

I declare under penalty of perjury that the.

Above is true and correct.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE

ME THIS DATE

(month,day, year)

Mar 31, 2017 Toya M. Gibson

Charging party Signature

Page | 39

846*2017*01664

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

INTAKE QUESTIONAIRE

Please immediately the entire form and return it to the U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). REMEMBER, a charge of employment discrimination

must be filed within the time limits imposed by law, generally within 180 days or in places

300 days of alleged discrimination. Upon receipt, this form will be reviewed to determine

EEOC coverage. Answer all questions as completely as possible, and attach additional

pages if needed to complete your responses (s). If you do know the answer to a question,

answer by stating "not known." If a question is not applicable, write "n/a” Please Print.

I Personal information

MI: M

Last Name: GibsonFirst: Toya

Apt Or Unit#:

Street or Mailing Address: P.O. Box 11066

City:

County:

State:

Phone Numbers: Home:713-304 -3092 Work: ( Email

Address: Gibson_toya@hotmail.com

Date of Birth

x: Mate FerruleDo You Have Disability?

No

Please answer each of the next three question. , Are you Hispanic Or Latino? No

ii. What is your Race? Please choose all the apply. X Black or African

iii. What is your Nationality

iii What National Origin (country or origin or ancestry)?

1. Provide the name of a Person we can contact if we are

unable to reach you:

2. I believe that I was discriminated against by following

organization (s)

Organization contact information Wayfair

Organization name: Wayfair

County: Brazos

Address: 3101 University

State: Tx Zip: 7784

City: Bryan

Type of Business: E-Comerce

Human Resources Director or Owner

Phone:

Name:

Page | 40

Number of Employees in the Organization at All Locations: Please check one:

xMorethan500

3. Your Employment Data (Complete as many items as you can) Are you a Federal

Employee? No

Job Title At Hire: Customer Service Consultant

Date hired: 3/28/16

/Cf.ou

Last or Current Pay

Pay Rate When Hired;:

Rate: 14.00

Job Title at time of Alleged Discrimination: Customer Service

Name and Title of immediate Supervisor : Consultants

n

2

If.Job.Applicant Date You applied for job

Job Titled Applied For

4. What is the reason (basis) for your claim of employment discrimination?

FOR EXAMPLE, if you feel that you were treated worse than someone else because of race,

you should check the box next to Race. If you feel you were treated worse for several reasons,

such as your sex, religion, and national origin, you should check all that apply. I you

complained about discrimination, participated in someone else’s complaint, or filed a charge

of discrimination, and a negative action was threatened or taken, you should check the box

next to Retaliation.

Race Sex Age Disability National origin Religion Retaliation Pregnancy Color

Genetic information Genetic testing Family medical history Genetic services

Other reason:

.5. What happened to you that you believe was discriminatory? Include the date (s) of harm,

the actions (s) and the name(s) and titles (s) of the person(s) who you believe discriminated

against you. Please attach additional pages if needed.

A. 10/10/2016 GENETIC, HARRASMENT, RELIGION

6. Why do you believe these actions were discriminatory? Please attach additional pages if

needed.

Page | 41

7 What reasons (s) were given to you for the acts you consider discriminatory? By whom?

His or Hears Job title:

8. Describe who was in the same or similar situation as you and they were treated. For

example, who else applied for the same job you did who else had the same attendance record,

or who else had the same performance? Provide the race, sex, age, national origin, religion,

or disability of these individuals, if known, and if it relates to your claim of discrimination.

For example, if your complaint alleges race discrimination, provide the race of each person;

if it alleges sex discrimination, provide the sex of each person; and so on. Use additional

sheets if needed.

B.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Houston District Office

Mickey Leland Building

1919 Smith Street, 7th Floor

Houston, TX 77002

NOTICE OF CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION

(This Notice replaces EEOC FORM 131)

DIGITAL CHARGE SYSTEM

April 9, 2017

To: William Quick

HR Manager-Talent Operations Dept.

WAYFAIR wquick@wayfair.com

This is notice that a charge of employment discrimination has been filed with the EEOC

against your organization by Toya Gibson, under: Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act (Title Vll)

and The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). The circumstances of the

alleged discrimination are based on Religion and Genetic Information and involve issues of

Discharge that are alleged to have occurred on or about Oct 10, 2016.

The Digital Charge System makes investigations and communications with charging parties

and respondents more efficient by digitizing charge documents. The charge is available for

you to download from the EEOC Respondent Portal, EEOCs secure online system,

Page | 42

Please follow these instructions to view the charge within ten (10) days of receiving this

Notice:

1. Access EEOC's secure online system: https://nxg.eeoc.gov/rsp/login.jsf

2.Enter this EEOC Charge No.: 846-2017-01664

3. Enter this temporaryPassworc^

Once you log into the system, you can view and download the charge, and electronically

submit documents to EEOC The system will also advise you of possible actions or responses,

and identify your EEOC point of contact for this charge.

Preservation of Records Requirement

EEOC regulations require respondents to preserve all payroll and personnel records relevant

to the charge until final disposition of the charge or litigation. 29 CFR 5160214. For more

preserve

records,

see

obligation

to

information

on

your

http://eeoc.gov/employers/recordkeeping.cfm.

Non-Retaliation Requirements

The laws enforced by the EEOC prohibit retaliation against any individual because s/he has filed, a

charge, testified, assisted or participated in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under these

laws. Persons filing charges of discrimination are advised of these Non-Retaliation Requirements

and are instructed to notify EEOC if any attempt at retaliation is made. For more information, see

http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/facts-retal.cfm.

Legal Representation

Although you do not have to be represented by an attorney while we handle this charge, you

have a right, and may wish to retain an attorney to represent you. If you do retain an

attorney, please provide the attorney's contact information when you log in to the online

system.

Please retain this notice for your records.

Page | 43

DENTAL RECORDS AND ADDENDUM

STAGE

R2304Nl1790fi»19

Page I 45

United States Co nils

Southern District of Texas

Filed

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

JUN 1 9 20B

DwW j.

OttrsfCM*

Toya M. Gibson

Civil Action 4:17.cv-02059

Plaintiff

vs.

WayfaiPNC.,

Defendant

Requested, Anticipated and Finally Received Addendum

I,Toya Gibson Pro Se Litigant am submitting copies of the anticipated

addendum and the envelope that received it in, that requested from Texas

Avenue Dental earlier in this year. On today, I received them from the

Westbury United Stated Postal Center in Houston, Texas.

The records will support my claim that my scheduled appointment for October

7, 2016 was cancelled by

Dentist Espinoza and rescheduled for October 11, 2016 that in which I

went to his office. Additionality, this addendum notes that the tooth that

I solicited his office for oral surgery and treatment for was tooth #18, not

#19 as originally and initially noted by mistake of his office,

Page | 46

I have written several times throughout my case that the records were

inaccurate and I have also mentioned that I had contacted his office

numerous times for the records to the point where i had to reach out to

the Texas Dental Association for assistance to finally get them.

It is my prayer that the courts use this record to support my case.

will be appreciated.

Respectl

Submitted,

X

l> H hots

Please know that consideration given

be appreciated.

will

Page | 47

TE

AS AVENUE DENTAL

JASON L. ESPINOZA, DDS

May 24, 2018

Toya M, Gibson

P.O. Box 310341

Houston, TX 77231

Dear Ms. Gibson,

Please see the attached documentation requested of your chart records from

our office. File chart reflects an addendum regarding the proper tooth

diagnosed for treatment on your visit.

Additionally pursuant to your request, I can confirm that your visit to our office

was initially scheduled for Friday, October 7, 2016. On Thursday, October 6,

2016 our office experienced a malfunction with an air compressor and rendered

us not equipped to treat patients. All patients scheduled after 3:30 pm on the

6th and all patients scheduled on the 7th were rescheduled to allow for

equipment repair. Your appointment was postponed and completed on

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Please don’t hesitate to contact me at 979-693-5130 or e-mail me directly at

dtespinoza@texasavedental.com with any questions or further requests.

Best Regards,

Jason L. Espinoza, DDS

Enclosure 2101 Texas Ave S, College Station, 77840 Phone: 979-693-5130

Fax: 979-704-6538 • info@TexasAveDental.com • www.TexasAveDental.com

-o

CTQ

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