Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jason Slaughter, Petitioner v. Delaware

he could not appeal the Court’s previous rulings ifhe pled guilty” and the second being

that Slaughter “waived the ability to appeal those rulings” by pleading guilty, which

would have rendered any appeal “fruitless”. (Denial at 16). However, the court is

incorrect.

As explained in Claim IL,°' defense counsel’s legal advice that Slaughter waived

his ability to appeal the IAD issue by pleading guilty was incorrect, as Class and

related United States Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that the issue is one that

is not waived via the entering of a valid guilty plea. Relatedly, because the issue is

one that could be appealed, and it is a meritorious issue, the court is incorrect that an

appeal would have been “fruitless”.

It should also be noted that the court denied Slaughter’s postconviction claims

I and H, in part, after finding them procedurally barred for failure to raise on direct

appeal; however, the court also denied Slaughter’s postconviction claim II,

ineffectiveness for failure to file an appeal, after finding that an appeal could not have

been filed because claims I and II were waived by entering into a guilty plea. This

inconsistency undermines the court’s reasoning for denying all of Slaughter’s

postconviction claims. In light of the aforementioned, the court’s denial of Slaughter’s

*! See supra pp. 38-39.

*° See supra pp. 17-23.

42

ineffectiveness claim is clearly erroneous.

43

Ads\

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Slaughter respectfully requests that this

Court grant all appropriate relief, including withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal

of the indictment with prejudice.

/s/ Christopher S. Koyste

Christopher S. Koyste (#3107)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste, LLC

709 Brandywine Boulevard

Wilmington, Delaware 19809

Attorney for Jason Slaughter

Defendant Below-Appellant

Dated: June 10, 2021

44

Aa

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JASON SLAUGHTER,

Defendant-Below, : No. 87, 2021

Appellant, :

Court Below: Superior Court of the

Vv. : State of Delaware in and for New

Castle County

STATE OF DELAWARE, :

Plaintiff-Below, : Case Below No. 1207010738

Appellee. :

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

Christopher S. Koyste, Esq. (#3107)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste, LLC

709 Brandywine Boulevard

Wilmington, Delaware 19809

(302) 762-5195

Attorney for Jason Slaughter

Defendant Below-Appellant

Dated: August 16, 2021

Aus

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS, .20c:cucisuscancrsariaee rem ener ime teneree ii

ARGUMENT

I. THE STATE’S ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO SLAUGHTER’S

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM USES AN

ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW, MISUNDERSTANDS THE

ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY SLAUGHTER AND IS FACTUALLY AND

LEGALLY INACCURATE. ... cess cee eee see tae ta 1

ll. THE STATE’S ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO SLAUGHTER’S

POSTCONVICTION CLAIM THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S WAIVER OF

THE IAD TIME PERIOD WAS INVOLUNTARY USES AN ERRONEOUS

STANDARD OF REVIEW, MISUNDERSTANDS THE ARGUMENT PUT

FORTH BY SLAUGHTER AND IS FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY

INACCURATE... . 000. .0 nee ee ea 16

Ul. THE STATE’S ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO SLAUGHTER’S

POSTCONVICTION CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO FILE AN APPEAL USES AN ERRONEOUS

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND IS FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY

IRIADCURAT Es octet Gs ESM PERE ee:

CONCLUSION... 0... ee ee eee 2a}

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPEFACE REQUIREMENT

AND TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

AZIA

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Federal Cases

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)... eee 4, 5, 6, 7, 23

Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018)... 2... 0. ee eee passim

Taglar v. Cooper, 132 SA. La (20 See nse scree staeereme tara 19

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61(1975). 2... ee ee 4,5, 6, 7, 23

New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000)... 0... 2 ee ees 19

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)... 0.0... ce es 19

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989)... 0.2... 0... eee eee 4,5, 6, 7, 23

United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1984)... 0... ee eee 20

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) .............. 0022-2 11, 12, 13

United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1978)...........--...085 7, 8,9

State Cases

Alexander v. State, Del., No. 337, 2008, Steele, J. (Nov. 5, 2008) (Order) (Fastcase)

CREPES MEER BIER MEER EEE RP EE Ee ere ew 2,3

Benner v. State 2007 WL 4215005 (Del. Nov. 30, 2007)...............00005 2

Brunhammer vy. State, 2017 WL 991081 (Del. Mar. 13, 2017)................ 2

Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186 (Del. 1996)...............00.4. 1, 2, 16, 17, 22

Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291 (Del. 2005). 2. ccc rere eee ed 20

Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118 (Del. 2001). ... 2... ee eee 1,2, 16, 17, 22

Norcfas® v. Stata, 816 A.20 TST (Del 2003 )e ee ere enter serie wm 20

People v. Jones, 482 N.W.2d 207, 192 Mich. App. 737 (Mich. App., 1992)...... 9

State v. Brown, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002188, Jurden, P.J. (April 10, 2017)

(Fastcase). 0. ne ene eee ee 13

United States Constitution

U.S. Const, amend, VI... cee ee aE 1, 22

U.S. Const. amend. XIV... 0. ee eee ee 1, 16, 22

Delaware Constitution

Del. Const. art. 1, § 7.0.0... eee 1, 16, 22

Statutes

11 Del. C. 2542(g). oc eee es 10

11 Del. C. § 2543. 0. ee eee eee eee 10, 11, 12

il

Aas

11 Del. C. § 2544. ec e eee e eee e es 10

Rules

Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(()(3)... 0... cece eens 17, 18, 21

Del. Super. Ct. R. 61()(4)... 00 cette aee 17, 18, 21

ill

BYAley

ARGUMENTI. THE STATE’S ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO SLAUGHTER’S

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM USES AN

ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW, MISUNDERSTANDS THE

ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY SLAUGHTER AND IS FACTUALLY AND

LEGALLY INACCURATE.

A. The correct standard of review is de novo.

The State asserts in its Answering Brief (“Answer”) that the applicable standard

of review for Mr. Slaughter’s (“Slaughter’s’’) ineffective assistance of counsel claims

is abuse of discretion.’ However, as noted in Slaughter’s Opening Brief,” this Court

reviews both questions of law’ and claims of a constitutional violation’ de novo.

Slaughter alleged in his Opening Brief that the Superior Court erred in denying

his postconviction claim that he was deprived of the effective assistance of defense

counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution and consequently deprived of due process of law

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution when defense counsel inadvertently waived

Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right to be tried within 120 days of arrival in Delaware,

' State’s July 27, 2021 Answering Brief at 4, 17 (hereinafter cited as “Answer

at’).

* Slaughter’s June 10, 2021 Opening Brief at 16 (hereinafter cited as

“Opening at_”).

3 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).

* Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 123 (Del. 2001).

1

Aan

but for which the indictment would have been dismissed with prejudice prior to the

entry of Slaughter’s guilty plea. As such, Slaughter alleges a claim ofa constitutional

violation that raise questions of law. Therefore, de novo is the appropriate standard of

review.”

B. The State’s Answer does not demonstrate that the Superior Court

correctly found that Slaughter’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was

waived by pleading guilty or that it is without merit.

The State contends that Slaughter waived all claims related to alleged violations

of the IAD, including accompanying ineffective assistance of counsel claims, by

pleading guilty. (Answer at 4). The State further contends that regardless of United

States Supreme Court precedent, the Superior Court correctly denied Slaughter’s claim

based upon Delaware precedent. (Answer at 18). In particular, the State emphasizes

the Superior Court’s reliance on this Court’s holding in Alexander v. State,° as well as

this Court’s holdings in Benner v. State’ and Brunhammer v. State,* to assert that the

Superior Court correctly found Slaughter’s claims to have been waived. (Answer at

18-19). The State further argues that Slaughter’s reliance on United States Supreme

> Id; Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1190.

6 Alexander v. State, Del., No. 337, 2008, Steele, J. (Nov. 5, 2008) (Order)

(Fastcase).

72007 WL 4215005 (Del. Nov. 30, 2007).

$2017 WL 991081 (Del. Mar. 13, 2017).

2

A283

Court precedent is misplaced. To the contrary, in his Opening Brief, Slaughter

acknowledged both the Delaware and United States Supreme Court precedent and

explained how the Superior Court’s reliance on Alexander in spite of the federal case

law was erroneous.

In his Opening Brief, Slaughter acknowledged the holding of Alexander, noting

that this Court concluded that “[b]ecause Alexander’s claims of improprieties under the

Uniform Agreement on Detainers implicates alleged errors or defects occurring prior

to the entry ofhis plea. ...”, as did Alexander’s claim that his counsel was ineffective

for failing to move to dismiss the indictment on the basis of the alleged violation of the

UAD, the claims were waived.’ (Opening at 17). Nevertheless, as noted in the

Opening Brief, there are exceptions, as identified by the United States Supreme Court,

to the general long-standing principle that a valid guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all

alleged errors or defects that occurred prior to entry of the plea. (Opening at 18). In

its Answering Brief, the State acknowledges this, and does not appear to dispute the

applicability of United States Supreme Court precedent to state criminal cases or to

Slaughter’s case specifically but rather argues that the cases themselves are

distinguishable from, and therefore inapplicable to, Slaughter’s case. (Answer at 20-

° Alexander, No. 337, 2008, at 3.

par

Zadhsds

However, the State’s conclusion is a result of the State failing to properly apply

the United States Supreme Court precedent of Class v. United States,'® Blackledge v.

Perry,'' Menna v. New York,!? and United States v. Broce” to the facts of this case.

The State erroneously narrows the holdings of Class, Blackledge, Menna, and Broce

to the specific facts of the individual cases, rather than the broader principle espoused

by the United States Supreme Court.

The State points out that in Class, the defendant argued that the statute of

conviction violated his Second Amendment and due process rights. (Answer at 21-22).

As such, the State argues that Class, as wellas the related cases of Blackledge, Menna,

and Broce, is inapplicable to Slaughter’s case, because Class does not specifically

“address whether a defendant, by voluntarily pleading guilty, waives any speedy trial

rights he may have under the IAD/UAD and any ineffective assistance of counsel

claims concerning the IAD/UAD.” (Answer at 22-23).

However, as explained in the Opening Brief, the Supreme Court in Class was

asked to decide the specific question of whether “a guilty plea bar[s] a criminal

© Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018).

" Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).

® Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61(1975).

3 United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989).

4

A2ZO

defendant from later appealing his conviction on the ground that the statute of

conviction violates the Constitution.”'* (Opening at 18). As Slaughter further

explained, the key question posed in Class—whether, if successful, the claim would

“would extinguish the government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’” the

defendant'’—is wholly applicable to Slaughter’s case. As explained, akin to Class,

Slaughter does not contradict the indictment or the terms of the plea agreement or his

voluntary, intelligent and knowing admission that he committed the alleged conduct but

rather alleges that even if the facts admitted during the plea are taken as true, they do

not constitute a prosecutable offense, because the time for prosecuting them had

already expired. It is this principle, that such a claim is not waived by entering a valid

guilty plea, espoused by Class, Blackledge, Menna, and Broce that translates to the

question posed by Slaughter. The fact that Class is not an IAD case or that Slaughter’s

claim is not a Second Amendment claim is irrelevant, as this overriding principle—that

claims implicating the power of the State to prosecute are not waived by a valid guilty

plea—nevertheless applies.

As Slaughter explained in the Opening Brief, the United States Supreme Court

* Class, 138 S.Ct. at 801-02.

* Id. at 806 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 62-

63)).

AT2\

held in Blackledge that the defendant’s challenge of his conviction, based upon a claim

of an unconstitutional vindictive prosecution, was not waived by pleading guilty,

because, “the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity”, vindictive prosecution

in this case, “implicates ‘the very power of the State’ to prosecute the defendant”, as

“(t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against the defendant “operated to deprive

him of due process of law.”'® Similarly, in Menna, the Supreme Court held that the

defendant’s challenge of his conviction, based upon a claim ofa violation of the Double

Jeopardy Clause, was not waived by a valid guilty plea, because “no matter how

validly his factual guilt is established”, “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a

claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not

constitutionally prosecute.”’’ Furthermore, in Broce, the Court expressly stated that

a guilty plea does not bar a claim “where on the face of the record the court had no

power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence’”,’® so long as the claim is proven

by relying on, and without contradicting, the existing record."

Thus, it is clear that the United States Supreme Court has definitively held that

a valid guilty plea does not waive a claim that challenges the ability of the State to

16 Id. at 803 (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31).

7 Id. at 804 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 and n.2).

18 Id. at 804 (citing Broce, 488 U.S. at 569).

'? Class, 138 S.Ct. at 804 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 576).

6

A722

prosecute for the offense, even if factual guilt has been established, regardless of the

underlying basis for the challenge of the conviction. Class is not limited to Second

Amendment claims just as clearly as Blackledge is not limited to vindictive prosecution

claims or Menna to Double Jeopardy claims. As such, the State’s reliance on the

simple fact that Class, Blackledge, Menna, and Broce are not IAD claims, or that

Slaughter does not challenge his conviction on the same bases as the defendants in

Class, Blackledge, Menna, and Broce is undoubtedly misplaced.

The State’s Answering Brief next turns to disputing whether Slaughter’s claim

amounts to one which challenges the power of the State to constitutionally prosecute

him. (Answer at 23). The State argues that because the IAD is statutory and that this

Court, among other courts, has held that the IAD does not convey constitutional rights

to a defendant, then the holdings of Class, Blackledge, Menna, and Broce are

inapplicable. (Answer at 24). The State also cites to a Third Circuit Court of Appeal

case, United States v. Palmer,”® in which the Third Circuit held that the IAD is a set

of procedural, not constitutional rules, and a violation of which can therefore be waived

through the entering of a valid guilty plea. (Answer at 24).

Slaughter does not dispute that the rights conveyed by the IAD are undoubtedly

20574 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1978).

A223

statutory, not constitutional. However, the State misunderstands Slaughter’ s argument.

Slaughter’s claim is not so simple as the one raised in Palmer, in which the State

violated the defendant’s IAD rights, which would have resulted in dismissal of the

indictment, had the issue been raised prior to the defendant’s guilty plea.

Notably, Slaughter does not claim that the State violated his IAD rights and but

for his guilty plea, he would have been entitled to dismissal of the indictment with

prejudice. Rather, Slaughter claims that but for the constitutional ineffectiveness of

defense counsel, in accidentally waiving Slaughter’s IAD rights, the State’s actions

would have violated the IAD, for which the remedy would have been dismissal of the

indictment with prejudice. If the State maintained its power to prosecute Slaughter

when it failed to bring him to trial within 120 days, this power was maintained directly

as the result of the deprivation ofa constitutional right-namely, Slaughter’s federal and

state constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

As such, although the IAD is unquestionably statutory, not constitutional, in

nature, based upon the unique facts and circumstances of this case, the question of

whether the State had the power to prosecute Slaughter is inextricably intertwined with

a constitutional right—the right to the effective assistance of counsel. The State’s

Answering Brief does not address what the remedy is for a violation of a defendant’s

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel that results in a continued

f\r2z4

prosecution which would otherwise have been impermissible. Moreover, unlike in

Palmer, if not for the violation of Slaughter’s constitutional right to the effective

assistance of counsel, there would have been no guilty plea, as the issue was raised

prior to the entry of Slaughter’s guilty plea but the requested relief—dismissal of the

indictment with prejudice—was denied because of defense counsel’s unconstitutionally

ineffective action in waiving the [AD 120 day deadline.

The State’s Answering Brief next turns to disputing whether defense counsel’s

actions were even ineffective, arguing that Slaughter was aware of defense counsel’s

error in waiving the 120 day time limit, and that defense counsel believed himself to be

ineffective as a result, and yet still pleaded guilty. (Answer at 25-27). The State

further argues that defense counsel’s action in waiving Slaughter’s 120 day speedy trial

right was not ineffective at all, because the trial court did not believe defense counsel’s

handling of the JAD issue to be deficient. (Answer at 35-37).

Although the State acknowledges that defense counsel’s waiver of Slaughter’s

IAD speedy trial right was accidental and wholly unintentional, a fact admitted by

defense counsel, the State offers no explanation as to how the accidental waiver of a

client’s right by an attorney cannot be anything but objectively unreasonable.”’

1 See People v. Jones, 482 N.W.2d 207, 211, 192 Mich. App. 737, 745

(Mich. App., 1992) (noting that if the decision to delay trial was made

0

[225°

(Answer at 36-37). Instead, the State focuses on arguing that defense counsel’s waiver

of the 120 day deadline cannot be defective, because Slaughter’s IAD rights never

vested. (Answer at 38). The State contends that “Slaughter overlooks that he was not

entitled to the UAD’s protections and remedies” and that the Superior Court had found

on multiple occasions that Slaughter’s IAD rights never vested, because he failed to

comply with the notice requirements of 11 Del. C. 2542(g). (Answer at 38). The State

is incorrect. In fact, the State appears to be confusing the separate and distinct 180 day

deadline and 120 day deadline provisions of the IAD.

As the procedural history in this case makes clear, the Superior Court found,

correctly so, that although Slaughter took all the necessary steps to request disposition

under the IAD and invoke the 180 day time period, the Georgia Department of

Corrections made a mistake in the delivery of his paperwork, and the Superior Court

never received actual notice of Slaughter’s request for disposition of the charges.

(Opening at 9-11, 14). Without actual notice, Slaughter’s rights under IAD § 2544

never vested, ie. his right to be tried within 180 days of arrival in Delaware. The

Superior Court never reached such a conclusion as to the 120 day time provision, IAD

independently by defense counsel, “the failure of trial counsel to consider the

speedy trial defense presented by the IAD before setting a trial date may implicate

Sixth Amendment guarantees and render the waiver of rights under the IAD invalid

because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”).

10

A22U

§ 2543, and in fact it would be impossible for the court to do so, as 11 Del. C. § 2543

does not require action on the part of Slaughter for his rights to vest. Instead it is the

actions of the State that trigger the provisions of IAD § 2543.

Next the State argues for the first time on appeal that Mauro is actually

“inapplicable” to Slaughter’s case, contending that Slaughter was brought to Delaware

pursuant to a Governor’s Warrant which “does not act as a written request

contemplated by Mauro and the UAD.” (Answer at 38). The State posits that if the

IAD and Mauro were inapplicable to Slaughter’s case, then it follows that defense

counsel was not ineffective for failing to understand the IAD and Mauro implications

of the case before agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120 day time period. The State

is wrong.

As has been made clear throughout the litigation of the IAD issues in this case,

it is the action of lodging a detainer, followed by a written request for temporary

custody via the Governor’s Warrant, that triggered Mauro and therefore the 120 day

time limit of IAD § 2543.” (Opening at 11-12 (citing A219, 221-24)). In fact, during

2 United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1978) (holding that

“whenever the receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a

detainer it has previously lodged against a state prisoner,” the IAD requires

commencement of trial within 120 days of the defendant's arrival in the receiving

State).

11

A271

the October 14, 2016 hearing on the second motion to dismiss, the State agreed that

United States v. Mauro applied to Slaughter’s case and therefore, the 120 day

provision of § 2543 began to run the day Slaughter arrived in Delaware. (A270, 296-

97). The State later changed its position on whether a Governor’s Warrant constitutes

a written request for custody for the purposes of the IAD and/or Mauro. (A219, 227,

268-69, 296-97; c.f A353-56). However, the issue was never fully briefed and

debated, nor did the Superior Court ever reach a finding on the issue, as the main, and

ultimately dispositive, point of contention was whether defense counsel had waived the

120 day time period by agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120 day time period.

Again, during postconviction proceedings, the State did not dispute that Mauro

was applicable to Slaughter’s case or that lodging a detainer plus a Governor’s Warrant

constitutes a written request for custody for purposes of triggering the provisions of 11

Del. C. § 2543(c) and the applicability of Mauro. Rather, the State focused on arguing

that the 120 day time period was waived when defense counsel agreed to a trial date

outside of the time period and that even if such action did not constitute a waiver, the

trial court could have, and likely would have, granted a good cause continuance. In

addition to the fact that the State is clearly confusing the 180 day and 120 day time

provisions of the IAD and which actions are required to trigger those two separate

provisions, the State cannot now argue for the first time on appeal that Mauro is

12

(\228

inapplicable to Slaughter’s case or that his rights under 11 Del. C. § 2543(c) never

vested.

The State also argues that Slaughter cannot show he was prejudiced by defense

counsel’s failure to comprehend the IAD and Mauro implications when agreeing to a

trial date outside of the 120 day time period, because the trial court would have been

well within its discretion to grant a good cause continuance. (Answer at 39-40).

However, as Slaughter explained in the Opening Brief, there is no authority in

Delaware to support a conclusion that the constitutional violations were harmless on

the basis of an after-the-fact finding that a good cause continuance of the deadline

would have been granted by the court if one had been requested. (Opening at 27-28).

In fact, such an approach was expressly rejected in State v. Brown.”

The State further posits that for “Trial Counsel and Slaughter to now allege

retroactively that they would have been prepared to move forward with trial is wholly

inconsistent with the assertions made at the time of schedule... .” (Answer at 41).

Neither defense counsel nor Slaughter have alleged sucha thing. Rather, what defense

counsel stated was that he would not have agreed to a trial date outside of the 120 day

time period if he had known that doing so would have waived Slaughter’s IAD speedy

3 State v. Brown, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002188, Jurden, P.J., at 18 (April

10, 2017) (Fastcase).

ls

p22

trial right. As Slaughter pointed out in his Opening Brief and postconviction Superior

Court briefing, defense counsel could have, and, based upon his assertions in similarly

situated cases occurring at the same time,”* would have, sought continuances of his

other trials or would have asked the Office of Conflicts Counsel to appoint different

counsel for Slaughter so that the case could be tried within 120 days. (Opening at 28;

A598). Moreover, as Slaughter noted in the Opening Brief, while the 120 day time

period put the defense under a time crunch, it did the same to the prosecution, and

defense counsel may very well have determined that it was strategically in Slaughter’s

best interest for the case to proceed expeditiously rather than request a continuance.

Of course under such a circumstance, the State could have then sought a good cause

continuance, but the fact remains that the State did not and there is no controlling

Delaware or federal case law to support a retroactive finding that a good cause

continuance would have been requested and would have been granted.

For all of the aforementioned reasons, the State’s Answering Brief does not

4 In a motion for re-argument in State v. Harris (ID No. 1108002195),

involving the same defense attorney and an almost identical set of facts, defense

counsel asserted that had he been aware of the IAD’s applicability to the case, he

would have “sought continuances of his other trials or would have asked the Office

of Conflicts Counsel to appoint different counsel for Mr. Harris” rather than waive

Mr. Harris’ speedy trial rights. (A526). There is no reason to suspect defense

counsel would not have done the same in Slaughter’s case.

14

A230

establish that Slaughter waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by pleading

guilty, that his IAD rights never vested, or that defense counsel’s waiver of the 120 day

time period was not deficient or without prejudice. As such, the Superior Court erred

in denying this claim, and the State’s contentions otherwise are unpersuasive.

15

A23\

ARGUMENT II. THE STATE’S ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO

SLAUGHTER’S POSTCONVICTION CLAIM THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S

WAIVER OF THE IAD TIME PERIOD WAS INVOLUNTARY USES AN

ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW, MISUNDERSTANDS THE

ARGUMENT PUT FORTH BY SLAUGHTER AND IS FACTUALLY AND

LEGALLY INACCURATE.

A. The correct standard of review is de novo.

The State incorrectly asserts that the correct standard of review is abuse of

discretion. (Answer at 4, 17). However, as noted in Slaughter’s Opening Brief, this

Court reviews both questions of law” and claims ofa constitutional violation” de novo.

(Opening at 33).

Slaughter alleged in his Opening Brief that the Superior Court erred in denying

his postconviction claim that ifthe court found defense counsel’s reliance on the State’s

representations that this was a Governor’s Warrant case and not an IAD case to be

objectively reasonable and counsel’s actions therefore not constitutionally ineffective,

then counsel’s waiver ofthe 120 day time period was involuntary and therefore invalid,

in violation of Slaughter’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. (Opening

at 33-34). As such, Slaughter alleges a claim of a constitutional violation that raise

°° Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1190.

6 Hall, 788 A.2d at 123.

16

A232

questions of law. Therefore, de novo is the appropriate standard of review.”’

B. The State’s Answer does not demonstrate that the Superior Court

correctly found that Slaughter’s [AD claim was procedurally barred under

Rule 61 or without merit.

The State contends that Slaughter’s freestanding IAD claims are procedurally

barred under Rule 61. (Answer at 4). Although the State acknowledges that the

Superior Court “incorrectly applied Rule 61(i)(3)’s bar’, the State urges this Court to

nevertheless “affirm the court’s alternative holding on grounds . . . [of] Rule 61(i)(4)

..... (Answer at 30). However, the State is incorrect that Rule 61(i)(4) bars

consideration of Slaughter’s claim.

The State contends that “Slaughter’s freestanding UAD claims, including the

issue of whether Def. Counsel #1's waiver was voluntary, has already been effectively

adjudicated by the Superior Court when it decided Slaughter’s motions to dismiss. . .

.”. (Answer at 31). Slaughter did not address the potential implication of Rule 61(4)(4)

in the Opening Brief because it was not a basis for the Superior Court’s denial of

Slaughter’s claim. However, now that the State has raised Rule 61(4)(4) in its

Answering Brief as a potential basis for this Court to find Slaughter’s claim

procedurally barred, Slaughter will address it in turn.

In postconviction briefing in the Superior Court, Slaughter explained that the

27 Id; Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1190.

17

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court’s denial of Slaughter’s two pre-guilty plea motions to dismiss the indictment

based upon the State’s violation of the IAD do not constitute a former adjudication, as

the court was never asked to consider the validity of the guilty plea in terms of whether

the State still had the power to prosecute Slaughter at the time the plea was entered

pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent or whether defense counsel’s

waiver was voluntarily made in light of the significant misrepresentations made by the

State to defense counsel, which induced defense counsel into erroneously believing that

the IAD was not implicated in Slaughter’s case. Accordingly, Slaughter’s

postconviction claim has never been adjudicated by the Superior Court or this Court

and therefore cannot be procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4). (A484, 587).

The State also asserts that to the extent Slaughter raises a claim not formerly

adjudicated, the claim is barred under Rule 61(i)(3) for failure to raise on appeal.

(Answer at 32). However, as Slaughter explained in the Opening Brief, his failure to

file a direct appeal was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, in that defense

counsel advised Slaughter an appeal could not be filed due to his guilty plea. (Opening

at 37-39).

The State acknowledges that ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute

“cause” under Rule 61(i)(3) for failure to raise a claim, but contends that Slaughter

cannot show a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, because he waived

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his right to appeal the issue by pleading guilty and because his IAD claims lack merit.

(Answer at 32). As explained in relation to his first postconviction claim, pursuant to

Class, Slaughter’s guilty plea did not waive his right to appeal the IAD issue; therefore,

defense counsel provided Slaughter with incorrect legal advice, which prompted

Slaughter to not file an appeal. Because it is clearly objectively unreasonable to

provide erroneous legal advice,”* and because Slaughter was prejudiced by this

erroneous advice in that he failed to appeal a meritorious issue of great significance,

Slaughter received ineffective assistance of counsel in respect to the failure to file a

direct appeal.”

The State additionally contends that Slaughter’s assertion that defense counsel’s

waiver of the 120 day time period was involuntary is “unavailing”, arguing that New

York v. Hill’ demonstrates that an IAD waiver need only be done by affirmative

conduct. (Answer at 28-29). The State misunderstands Slaughter’s claim.

Slaughter agrees, and in fact has never disputed, that controlling case law clearly

demonstrates that agreeing to a trial date outside of the requisite time period established

by the IAD, whether 180 or 120 days, is sufficient to constitute a waiver of the IAD

* See, e.g. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1383-84 (2012) (noting that the

parties all conceded that defense counsel provided deficient performance under the

Sixth Amendment when he informed the defendant of an incorrect legal rule).

” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).

*° 528 U.S. 110 (2000).

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time period. What Slaughter has contended in his filings, and the State misunderstands,

is that while a waiver of the IAD time period need not be intelligent or knowing, it

nevertheless must be voluntary. As explained in the Opening Brief, a voluntary waiver

“require[s] knowledge of or reason to know the basic fact that gives rise to the IAD

right”,*’ and that due process further requires that for a waiver to be voluntary, it must

be the “product ofa free and deliberate choice[,] rather than intimidation, coercion], ]

or deception”.*” (Opening at 34).

As explained in Slaughter’s filings, the State made numerous, significant

misrepresentations to defense counsel that led him to believe that IAD did not apply to

Slaughter’s case. (Opening at 35). While it is apparent the State did not intentionally

try to deceive defense counsel, and that in fact the State’s misrepresentations appear

to be the result of the State’s own confusion over the proper application of the IAD,

particularly in relation to the intersection of the IAD with Governor’s Warrants, it is

also nevertheless apparent that it was the State’s misrepresentations that induced

defense counsel to acquiesce to the April 5, 2016 trial date. As defense counsel

remarked to the court, “.... I was in no position to acquiesce or not acquiesce [to a

trial date outside the IAD time limit] because it had been represented to me that this

*! United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835, 839 (2d Cir. 1984).

* Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 296 (Del. 2005) (citing Norcross v. State,

816 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. 2003)).

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was not an IAD case.” (A285). It cannot reasonably be said that defense counsel had

knowledge of the basic fact giving rise to Slaughter’s right to be tried within 120 days

of his arrival in Delaware-that the IAD was applicable to Slaughter’s case. As such,

defense counsel did not, and could not, freely acquiesce to the April 2016 trial date,

and defense counsel’s waiver of the 120 day time period cannot be deemed voluntary

under the requirements of due process.

In light of the aforementioned, the State’s Answering Brief fails to establish that

Slaughter’s postconviction claim is procedurally barred, under either Rule 61 (1)(3) or

Rule 61(4)(4), or that defense counsel’s waiver of Slaughter’s speedy trial was

voluntary. As such, the Superior Court erred in denying this claim, and the State’s

contentions otherwise are unpersuasive.

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ARGUMENT III. THE STATE’S ANSWER IN RESPONSE TO

SLAUGHTER’S POSTCONVICTION CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO FILE AN APPEAL USES

AN ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW AND IS FACTUALLY AND

LEGALLY INACCURATE.

A. The correct standard of review is de novo.

The State incorrectly asserts that the correct standard of review is abuse of

discretion. (Answer at 4, 17). However, as noted in Slaughter’s Opening Brief, this

Court reviews both questions of law® and claims ofa constitutional violation* de novo.

(Opening at 41).

Slaughter alleged in his Opening Brief that the Superior Court erred in denying

his postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file an appeal,

in violation of Slaughter’s due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware

Constitution. (Opening at 41-2). As such, Slaughter alleges a claim ofa constitutional

violation that raise questions of law. Therefore, de novo is the appropriate standard of

review.

3 Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1190.

*4 Hall, 788 A.2d at 123.

°° Id; Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1190.

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B. The State’s Answer does not demonstrate that the Superior Court

correctly found that Slaughter’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for

failing to appeal the denial of the second motion to dismiss was without

merit.

The State contends that Slaughter’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are

without merit, asserting that Slaughter failed to demonstrate that defense counsel was

constitutionally ineffective or that he suffered prejudice from any actions or non-actions

by defense counsel. (Answer at 4). The basis for the State’s conclusion is that the

State’s argument that “the Class line of cases do not assist Slaughter, as they are

inapplicable to Slaughter’s situation”, and therefore, “under controlling Delaware

precedent, trial counsel’s advice was correct.” (Answer at 43). However, for the

reasons explained in relation to Claim I,”° the State is incorrect that Class, Blackledge,

Menna, and Broce are inapplicable to Slaughter’s case, as this United States Supreme

Court precedent establishes that Slaughter’s IAD claims relating to whether the State

still had the power to prosecute him at the time of the guilty plea were not waived when

Slaughter entered his guilty plea. Moreover, for the reasons already outlined,*” the

State is incorrect that Slaughter’s claims are without merit and that an appeal would

therefore have been fruitless.

In his Opening Brief, Slaughter posited that the Superior Court’s conclusions that

°° See supra pp. 3-7.

*” See supra pp. 3-13, 19-21.

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