Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jason Slaughter, Petitioner v. Delaware

Slaughter argued that because his properly executed IAD paperwork was received by

the State on November 6, 2013 and because he was not tried within 180 days, the

indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice on May 6, 2014. Slaughter

further contended that the July 28, 2014 Governor’s Warrant would have had no force

or effect because by the time is was signed by the appropriate authorities, the charges

should have already been dismissed for failure to bring to trial within 180 days. (A33-

35).

On July 30, 2015, the court held a hearing on the first motion to dismiss. During

the hearing, the State advised the court that before the 180 days had expired, Georgia

had informed the State of Delaware that Georgia would not honor the IAD because it

was a capital murder case, and a Governor’s Warrant would be needed to obtain

custody of Slaughter. (A139, 148, 158, 166). The State informed the court that it did

not know why GDOC took that position, as it did not appear to be legally correct.

(A148).

within 180 days after the prisoner shall have caused to be delivered to the

prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction

written notice of the place of imprisonment and the request for a final disposition to

be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided, that for good cause

shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court

having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable

continuance.”).

10

As

At the end of the hearing, the court made an oral ruling denying the first motion

to dismiss, finding that because Slaughter was brought to Delaware pursuant to a

Governor’s Warrant and not the IAD, the IAD did not apply. (A177). The court

additionally found that Georgia had notified the State of Delaware prior to the

expiration of the 180 days that a Governor’s Warrant was needed to obtain custody of

Slaughter, and that although the State received notice from Slaughter requesting

disposition of the charges pursuant to the IAD, the Superior Court did not receive

actual notice. (A174). Thus, the court concluded, Slaughter’s IAD rights never vested.

Slaughter’s subsequent motion for reargument was denied. (DE64; A211-14).

Slaughter then filed a second motion to dismiss on August 24, 2016, alleging that

under IAD § 2543* and United States v. Mauro,’ the State was required to bring him

to trial within 120 days and failed to do so. (A215-228). Slaughter argued that under

the holding of Mauro, the State triggered the 120 day time limit of IAD § 2543 by

"11 Del. C. § 2543(c) (“In respect of any proceeding made possible by this

section, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in

the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the

prisoner's counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may

grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”).

° United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1978) (holding that

“whenever the receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a

detainer it has previously lodged against a state prisoner,” the [AD requires

commencement of trial within 120 days of the defendant's arrival in the receiving

State).

ll

AT

lodging a detainer followed by a written request for temporary custody via the

Governor’s Warrant. (A219, 221-24). Both the State and defense counsel conceded

that they had previously been unaware of Mauro and had not considered its impact on

Slaughter’s case. (A227, 245, 247, 269, 271-72, 276, 280, 307). As such, they had

also failed to consider whether a detainer plus a Governor’s Warrant implicated IAD

§ 2543. (d.).

The State opposed the motion, arguing that even under Mauro, the 120 day time

period did not begin to run until October 9, 2014, the day Slaughter was returned to

Delaware. (A239). The office conference was held on November 18, 2014, before the

120 days expired, and both parties did not object to a trial date outside of the 120 day

limit. (A87-88). Thus, the State argued, Slaughter had waived his IAD claim. (A240-

41, 243). In response, Slaughter asserted that prior to the office conference, the State

had specifically informed defense counsel that Slaughter was brought to Delaware via

a Governor’s Warrant, prompting counsel to believe the IAD was inapplicable to

Slaughter’s case. (A245-47).

The court held a hearing on the second motion to dismiss on October 14, 2016.

(DE82). The parties essentially agreed that United State v. Mauro applied to

Slaughter’s case and therefore, the 120 day provision of § 2543 began to run the day

iZ

Slaughter arrived in Delaware.'® (A270, 296-97). The main issue of contention was

whether Slaughter had waived the issue by agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120

day time period. The State also argued that the court could retroactively find that good

cause existed to grant a continuance, had one been requested during the November 18,

2014 office conference; thus, the State alleged, any error would be harmless. (A312-

13). Slaughter argued that despite the lack of bad faith, the State misled defense

counsel as to whether this case was a Governor’s Warrant or anIAD case, and it would

not be fair to deem what was said at a routine office conference as a waiver of an IAD

right. (A215-18).

On October 27, 2016, the State filed a letter with the court correcting

misrepresentations it had made during the July 30, 2015 hearing on the first motion to

dismiss. (A335-37). The State disclosed for the first time that it had actually been the

State’s Extradition Supervisor, Ronald Mullen, who had advised GDOC that the IAD

did not apply to Slaughter’s case and that a Governor’s Warrant was needed to obtain

custody. (d.). The GDOC’s April 4, 2014 letter had in fact only been a

memorialization of the information that the GDOC had received from Mr. Mullen.

The State later changed its position on whether a Governor’s Warrant

constitutes a written request for purposes of the IAD and/or Mauro. (A219, 227,

268-69, 296-97; c.f, A353-56).

13

ALS |

(id.). As a result of this newly disclosed information, Slaughter renewed his first

motion to dismiss, arguing that the State did not affirmatively accept Georgia’s offer

of temporary custody of Slaughter within the meaning of IAD § 2544(c),!! and as a

result, the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to IAD § 2544.

(A341). Thus, Slaughter asserted, it was insignificant that the court never received

actual notice of Slaughter’s IAD paperwork, because the State triggered automatic

dismissal by refusing to accept custody. (Jd.).

On January 3, 2017, the court denied both Slaughter’s renewed first motion to

dismiss and Slaughter’s second motion to dismiss. In regard to the renewed first

motion to dismiss, the court found that Slaughter’s rights under IAD § 2544 never

vested, because the court never received actual notice of his IAD paperwork. (A377).

Thus, the State’s alleged refusal to accept Georgia’s offer of temporary custody did not

warrant dismissal of the indictment. In regard to the second motion to dismiss, the

court found that Slaughter had waived the speedy trial protections of IAD § 2543 by

"11 Del. C. § 2544(c) (“If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to

accept temporary custody of the person, or in the event that an action on the

indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been

lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in § 2542 or § 2543 of this

title, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or

complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice,

and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.”).

14

Age

agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120 day time period. (A387-89). The court also

concluded that any error was harmless, because a continuance for good cause would

likely have been requested and granted if the parties had been aware of Mauro at the

time of the scheduling conference. (A391-92).

On January 18, 2017, Slaughter pleaded guilty to one count of Murder First

Degree. (DE118). On February 3, 2017, Slaughter filed a pro se motion to withdraw

the guilty plea. (DE119). Defense counsel determined that they could not support

Slaughter’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, and therefore, independent counsel was

appointed to counsel Slaughter. (A436). After reviewing Slaughter’s file, substitute

counsel found no meritorious bases upon which to argue for withdrawal of the plea

under the applicable legal standard and was permitted to withdraw as substitute

counsel. (DE123). Thereafter, Slaughter argued pro se for the withdrawal of his guilty

plea during oral argument held on his motion. After the conclusion, the court

determined that Slaughter had failed to meet the requisite legal standard for withdrawal

of a guilty plea and denied the motion. (DE126).

Thereafter, Slaughter was sentenced on August 4, 2017 to fifty years at Level V,

suspended after twenty years. (A438-39). No direct appeal was filed.

15

M83

ARGUMENT I. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN DENYING

SLAUGHTER’S CLAIM THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS

CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR INADVERTENTLY WAIVING

SLAUGHTER’S IAD SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED WITHIN 120

DAYS OF ARRIVAL IN DELAWARE, BUT FOR WHICH THE

INDICTMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF SLAUGHTER’S GUILTY PLEA.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Superior Court err in finding Slaughter’s postconviction claim of

ineffective assistance of defense counsel to be waived by pleading guilty and

alternatively, to fail the Strickland’”’ standard for ineffectiveness? This issue was

preserved as it was raised in the Amended Motion and Reply Brief. (A464-483,

595-599).

SCOPE OF REVIEW

> Claims alleging a constitutional

Questions of law are reviewed de novo.'

violation are reviewed de novo.'* As Slaughter alleges he was deprived of his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, this claim is reviewed de novo.

MERITS OF THE ARGUMENT

The Superior Court erred in denying Slaughter’s first postconviction claim—that

° Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

*® Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996).

“ Hall y. State, 788 A.2d 118, 123 (Del. 2001).

16

ALIA

defense counsel Collins was constitutionally ineffective for inadvertently waiving

Slaughter’s IAD right to be tried within 120 days of arrival in Delaware—as the court

erroneously found that Slaughter’s guilty plea waived the claim of ineffectiveness and

erroneously found that alternatively, Slaughter’s ineffectiveness claim failed the

Strickland standard. (Denial at 13-14).

In regard to Slaughter’s alleged waiver of his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim via his valid guilty plea, the Superior Court concluded that Alexander v. State

controls and therefore, Slaughter’s valid guilty plea waived any postconviction claim

ofrelief for errors that occurred prior to entry of the plea. (Denial at 13-14). However,

the court is incorrect.

In Alexander, this Court concluded that “[b]ecause Alexander’s claims of

improprieties under the Uniform Agreement on Detainers implicates alleged errors or

defects occurring prior to the entry of his plea. . . the claim has been waived.”!5 This

Court likewise found that Alexander’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing

to move to dismiss the indictment on the basis of the alleged violation of the UAD was

similarly waived, as it implicated errors or defects occurring prior to entry of his plea.'®

* Alexander v. State, Del., No. 337, 2008, Steele, J., at 3 (Nov. 5, 2008)

(Order) (Fastcase).

6 Td.

17

pays

However, as Slaughter explained in his filings and during oral argument,’ under

United States Supreme Court precedent, Slaughter’s valid guilty plea did not waive his

claim of legal error (postconviction claim two) or of ineffectiveness (postconviction

claims one and three) relating to the [AD under the specific facts of the case. Slaughter

acknowledged in his filings the holdings of Alexander and related cases—that typically,

a voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly entered guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all

alleged errors or defects that occurred prior to entry of the plea.'® However, the court

overlooks that there are some exceptions to this general rule, which were identified

with specificity by the United States Supreme Court in 2018 Class v. United States."

In Class, the Supreme Court was asked to decide the specific question of

whether “a guilty plea bar[s] a criminal defendant from later appealing his conviction

on the ground that the statute of conviction violates the Constitution.””° In concluding

'T A464, 484-490, 499, 587-594, 614-17, 621, 638-640.

* See, e.g., Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003) (citing Downer

v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988) (A voluntary guilty plea constitutes a

waiver of any claims based on alleged errors or defects preceding the entry of the

plea.)); Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099, 1201 (Del. 2008) (“Under Delaware law, a

voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors or defects occurring

prior to the entry of the plea... .”).

” 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018) (holding that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant

from appealing his conviction on the basis that the Government did not have the

power to criminally prosecute him).

*° Id. at 801-02.

18

M8 Le

that it does not, the Court’s analysis articulated quite clearly the rights that are and are

not waived through a guilty plea and identified the issues that may still be challenged

on appeal notwithstanding the entry of a valid guilty plea.”!

In its analysis of the issue in Class, the Supreme Court summarized the

development of its precedent on such issues, beginning with its holding in Blackledge

v. Perry, a case in which a state criminal defendant challenged his conviction on the

basis of an unconstitutional vindictive prosecution. In finding that this claim was not

barred by the defendant’s guilty plea, the Court held that “the nature of the underlying

constitutional infirmity”, vindictive prosecution in this case, “implicates ‘the very

power of the State’ to prosecute the defendant”, as “[t]he very initiation of the

proceedings” against the defendant “operated to deprive him of due process of law.”

The Court then moved on to its holding in Menna v. New York, in which a state

criminal defendant challenged his conviction, after entering a guilty plea, on the basis

of a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”? In finding that this claim was not

waived by the defendant’s guilty plea, the Court held that “a plea of guilty to a charge

does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may

1 Id. at 802-06.

” Id. at 803 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974)).

> Td. at 803 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61(1975)).

19

AM)

not constitutionally prosecute.”"* More specifically, because the defendant’s claim

alleged that “the State may not convict” him “no matter how validly his factual guilt is

established”, the Court held that the guilty plea did not bar his claim.25

The Supreme Court further noted that it has since upheld the aforementioned

decisions in cases such as United States v. Broce, in which the Court held that a guilty

plea does not bar a claim “where on the face of the record the court had no power to

enter the conviction or impose the sentence.” However, the Court also specified in

Broce that the claim must be proven by relying on, and without contradicting, the

existing record.”’

Unlike the claim at issue in Broce, the constitutional claim raised by Class did

not contradict the indictment or his voluntary, intelligent and knowing admission that

he committed the alleged conduct; therefore, his claim could be “resolved without any

need to venture beyond th[e] record.”** Accordingly, the Supreme Court expressly held

that the defendant’s guilty plea did not bar a direct appeal, because his claims, which

challenged the Government’s power to criminalize the conduct to which the defendant

* Class, 138 S.Ct. at 804 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 and n.2).

5 Td.

*° Id. at 804 (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)).

*” Id. at 804 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 576).

°8 Td. at 805.

20

pv

admitted, “call[ed] into question the Government’s power to ‘criminally prosecute’

him”.??

In addition to clarifying which types of claims a guilty plea does not bar, the

Supreme Court also clarified in Class the types of claims that a guilty plea does bar.

As the Court explained, a valid guilty plea: 1) relinquishes the constitutional guarantees

that accompany the right to a fair trial, such as the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination and the right to confront accusers; 2) the right to appeal the

constitutionality of case-related government conduct that occurs before the plea is

entered, such as an unconstitutionally selected grand jury or a Fourth Amendment

search and seizure violation; and 3) relinquishes “any claim that would contradict the

‘admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.””°° None of

Slaughter’s postconviction claims fall into these categories for which a guilty plea bars

an appeal.

Slaughter does not challenge the constitutionality of case-related government

conduct that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea; rather, just as in Class,

Slaughter asserts that based solely upon the existing record, if his claim is successful,

” Class, 138 S.Ct. at 805 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575 (quoting Menna,

423 U.S. at 61-62)).

°° Td.

21

54

it “would extinguish the government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’” him.?!

Likewise, just as in Class, Slaughter does not contradict the indictment or the terms of

the plea agreement or his voluntary, intelligent and knowing admission that he

committed the alleged conduct. Rather, Slaughter alleges, pursuant to Class, that even

if the facts admitted during the plea are taken as true, they do not constitute a

prosecutable offense, because the time for prosecuting them had already expired.

Accordingly, pursuant to Class, Slaughter did not waive his postconviction claim when

he entered the guilty plea.*?

While the Superior Court is correct that Alexander supports the general rule that

a valid guilty plea waives all pre-guilty plea issues, even those of constitutional

dimension, the Superior Court erred in overlooking that pursuant to United States

Supreme Court precedent, an issue that disputes the very power of the State to

constitutionally prosecute the admitted conduct is an exception to the general rule that

a valid guilty plea waives all pre-guilty plea issues.** As explained in Slaughter’s

*' Id. at 806 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 62-

63)).

*” For further support of this position, see Class, 138 S.Ct. at 807, 814,

dissenting, (explaining the exceptions to the rule that a guilty plea waives nearly all

pre-plea conduct, including violations of the Speedy Trial Act, created by the

majority opinion).

* Class, 138 S.Ct. At 803 (citing Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30 (quoting Tollett

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973))) (“The Court noted that a guilty plea

22

Aq

filings, from February 7, 2015 onward, the State, through its own negligence in

misunderstanding the application of the IAD to the facts of the case, no longer had the

power to prosecute Slaughter, which renders his conviction and sentence

unconstitutional.** (A471, 479, 481, 483, 497-98). As such, Slaughter’s claim raises

the issue of whether the State had the power to prosecute the admitted conduct at the

time of the guilty plea. Thus, this falls within the scope of the exceptions to the general

principle that a valid guilty plea waives all pre-plea issue as described in Class,

Blackledge, Menna, and Broce. To the extent this Court has not yet had occasion to

consider this issue in the context of the State’s power to constitutionally prosecute, the

issue is one of first impression.

In reaching an alternative conclusion justifying the denial of Slaughter’s

postconviction claim, the Superior Court also erroneously concluded that Slaughter’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims “lack merit”. (Denial at 16). The court

bars appeals of many claims, including some “‘antecedent constitutional violations’”

related to events (say, grand jury proceedings) that had “‘occurred prior to the entry

of the guilty plea.’”’).

* It should be noted that the language of Class makes clear that the holding of

Class, the prior precedent of the United States Supreme Court, is not limited to

cases in which the defendant alleges the statute of conviction is unconstitutional; an

allegation that the State did not have the power to prosecute is sufficient. (Class,

138 S.Ct. at 802-06; Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31; Menna, 423 U.S. at 61-63 and

n.2; Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 575-76).

23

ANG |

acknowledged that defense counsel Collins believed he did not provide effective

assistance of counsel in relation to the waiver of the 120 day IAD time limit; however,

the court concluded that even if defense counsel had requested a trial date within the

120 day time limit, the court “could have determined on its own that starting the trial

by March 18, 2015 could visit prejudice on Mr. Slaughter.” (Denial at 16). As such,

the court concluded that even if defense counsel Collins was ineffective for

unintentionally waiving Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial rights, Slaughter “cannot show

prejudice” under Strickland. (Denial at 16). The court is incorrect.

As Slaughter explained in his filings, defense counsel Collins non-strategically,

and in fact entirely inadvertently, waived Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right, which

resulted in the State’s continued unconstitutional prosecution of Slaughter, because but

for defense counsel’s objectively unreasonable waiver of Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial

right, the State would have lost its power to prosecute Slaughter on February 6, 2015.

It is clear from the record that defense counsel agreed to a trial date outside of the 120

day time limit imposed by IAD § 2543 without knowing that such action would waive

Slaughter’s IAD right. At the time of the November 18, 2014 scheduling conference,

defense counsel was unaware of the existence of United State v. Mauro and its

applicability to Slaughter’s case, as was the State and the court. (A245, 247, 269, 271-

72, 276). Defense counsel was also unaware at that time that the State had lodged a

24

92

detainer against Slaughter, relying on the State’s representation that this was a

Governor’s Warrant case and understanding it to mean that the IAD was inapplicable

to the case.*> Throughout the pre-plea proceedings, defense counsel repeatedly

acknowledged that he did not intend to waive Slaughter’s IAD claim and because he

was ignorant of Mauro, he had erroneously believed that a Governor’s Warrant did not

implicate any timing issues. (/d.). There can be no genuine dispute over the objective

unreasonableness of a defense attorney accidentally waiving his client’s IAD speedy

trial rights.*°

Moreover, defense counsel advised Slaughter in a March 9, 2017 letter that if he

is convicted at trial and later files a motion for postconviction relief, “that motion

should allege I was ineffective for agreeing to a trial date because I did not know about

the Mauro case. Or alternatively, that I should have not only known about the Mauro

* Defense counsel did not review any extradition materials prior to agreeing

to the April 2016 trial date, and the State did not provide defense counsel with

Slaughter’s IAD paperwork until four months later on March 18, 2015. (A167,

257).

°° See Hill, 528 U.S. at 116, 118 (finding that the defendant had waived his

IAD rights by agreeing to a trial date outside of the time limit before the IAD time

limit at expired); People v. Jones, 482 N.W.2d 207, 211, 192 Mich. App. 737, 745

(Mich. App., 1992) (noting that if the decision to delay trial was made

independently by defense counsel, “the failure of trial counsel to consider the

speedy trial defense presented by the IAD before setting a trial date may implicate

Sixth Amendment guarantees and render the waiver of rights under the IAD invalid

because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”).

25

93

case but also checked to see if there was a detainer against you in addition to the

governor’s warrant.” (A434). Additionally, substitute counsel, who was appointed to

review Slaughter’s file for any meritorious bases for withdrawal of the guilty plea,

advised the court that “.. . . it appears that, based upon defense counsel’s own

admission, there is a serious issue as to whether or not counsel was ineffective in

preserving and litigating the IAD issue.” (A436). Substitute counsel further noted that

“[s]ince the Court would be conducting a hearing with regard to this motion [to

withdraw guilty plea], all of the claims that could otherwise be made in a Rule 61

Motion for Post-Conviction Relief can certainly be litigated at this point as they relate

to the issue of defense counsel’s ineffective assistance and the decisions made by the

defendant predicated upon that ineffective assistance.” (A43 7).

Most notably, defense counsel Collins clearly admits ineffectiveness in his

affidavit for unintentionally waiving Slaughter’s IAD right and plainly states that he

would have not have agreed to a trial date outside of the 120-day time period ifhe had

known the IAD was applicable to Slaughter’s case. (A575-577). Likewise, defense

counsel asserts that he would have known that key fact if he had independently

researched the issue rather than relying on the State’s incorrect statement that this was

not an IAD case. (A576-77).

In light of the aforementioned, it is clear that defense counsel’s accidental waiver

26

94

of Slaughter’s speedy trial IAD right was objectively unreasonable. The court, in

denying Slaughter’s claim of ineffectiveness, does not clearly reach a finding on the

issue of whether counsel’s action was objectively unreasonable but instead concludes

that in any event, Slaughter cannot show prejudice because the court could have

granted a continuance upon request of the State or continued the trial on its own outside

of the 120 day window. (Denial at 16).

As Slaughter explained in his filings, had defense counsel refused to waive the

120 day time period, as defense counsel attests in his affidavit that he would have done

if had he been aware of the applicability of the IAD, the State would presumably have

requested a continuance and if the court had found good cause, the court could certainly

have granted the continuance and set a trial date outside of the 120 day time period.

Yet none of those actions occurred. The court simply asserts retroactively that the

court could have and would have granted a continuance but fails to provide any case

law supporting the assumption that this type of retroactive analysis is appropriate in

assessing the merit of an IAD claim.

Itshould be noted that there is no authority in Delaware to support a conclusion

that the constitutional violations were harmless on the basis of an after-the-fact finding

that a good cause continuance of the deadline would have been granted by the court if

one had been requested. In fact, such an approach was expressly rejected in State v.

27

mas-

Brown.’ The court emphasized in Brown that at the time the State could have

requested a good cause continuance, the applicable IAD time limit had already

expired.** Similarly, for the aforementioned reasons, defense counsel’s waiver of the

120 day time limit was made in violation of Slaughter’s Sixth Amendment right to the

assistance of effective counsel, and by the time the State realized that the [AD was in

fact applicable to Slaughter’s case, the 120 days would have long since expired, as

would the time for requesting a good cause continuance.

Moreover, the court suggests that the case could not have been tried within 120

days; however, defense counsel avers in his affidavit that he would not have agreed to

a trial date outside of the 120 day deadline, and the court fails to consider that counsel

may have sought continuances of his other trials or would have asked the Office of

Conflicts Counsel to appoint different counsel for Slaughter so that the case could be

tried within 120 days or alternatively, that counsel may have determined that it was

strategically in Slaughter’s best interest for the case to proceed expeditiously.

* State v. Brown, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002188, Jurden, P.J., at 18 (April

10, 2017) (Fastcase)

** Td. (Alternatively, the State argues that the Court should find, after-thefact, that ‘good cause’ existed under the UAD to hold trial more than 120 days after

Brown's return to Delaware. But the State is unable to cite to any case in which a

Delaware court has retroactively determined that ‘good cause’ existed to grant a

continuance sought after the expiration of the applicable UAD time limit.”).

28

PAQLe

In light of the aforementioned, it is indisputable that defense counsel did not

make a strategic decision to waive Slaughter’s [AD speedy trial right. Rather, defense

counsel’s reliance on the State’s representation that it was a Governor’s Warrant case

for which the IAD did not apply, failure to independently review the extradition file,

and lack of knowledge of Mauro resulted in an unintentional waiver of Slaughter’s

speedy trial right. Such action is unquestionably objectively unreasonable, as conceded

by defense counsel.

Significantly, because the State’s actions in bringing Slaughter to Delaware

triggered application of 11 Del. C. § 2543(c), the State was required to bring Slaughter

to trial within 120 days of his arrival in Delaware, and when the State failed to meet

this deadline, the IAD required that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice. The

State’s continued prosecution of Slaughter from that point forward violated Slaughter’s

constitutional right to due process. However, defense counsel’s unwitting waiver of

the 120 day deadline legitimized this otherwise unconstitutional prosecution. Thus, but

for defense counsel’s objectively unreasonable waiver of Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial

right, the indictment against Slaughter would have been dismissed and no guilty plea

would have been entered by Slaughter.” In light of the aforementioned, the court’s

* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (holding that prejudice is established by

showing “there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional

29

AF]

conclusion, based upon a retroactive analysis for which there is no supporting case law,

that it could have continued the trial for good cause and therefore Slaughter was not

prejudiced by defense counsel’s action is erroneous.

Since Slaughter arrived in Delaware on October 9, 2014, the State was required

to bring the matter to trial by February 6, 2015. The burden of compliance with the

requirements of the IAD rests with the State.*° The record is clear that the State did

not bring the matter to trial within 120 days nor did the State seek a good cause

continuance to toll the 120 day deadline prior to the expiration of the deadline. Thus,

in the absence of a valid waiver of the 120 time limitation, the IAD required that the

matter be dismissed with prejudice.*1 Accordingly, but for defense counsel’s

objectively unreasonable waiver of Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right, the State would

have lost its power to prosecute Slaughter after February 6, 2015, and the State’s

continued prosecution from that point forward would have violated Slaughter’s

constitutional right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different” with “reasonable

probability” being defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome”).

” Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 514 (Del. 1973) (“The burden of

compliance with the procedural requirements of the IAD rests upon the party states

and their agents”), superseded on other grounds by statute, 11 Del. C. § 2542(g).

“11 Del. C. § 2544(c).

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United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution.2 As such,

the Superior Court’s finding that Slaughter was not prejudiced by any potential error

made by defense counsel is clearly erroneous, as is the court’s finding that Slaughter

waived his ineffectiveness claim by pleading guilty, because it overlooks and/or fails

to distinguish Supreme Court precedent.

Because the waiver of Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right was made in violation

of Slaughter’s right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution,” the

State’s continued prosecution of Slaughter beyond February 6, 2015, the expiration of

the 120 day time period, deprived Slaughter of due process of law under the Fourteenth

” See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31 (holding that the defendant’s claim was

not barred by his guilty plea, because “the nature of the underlying constitutional

infirmity”, vindictive prosecution, “implicates ‘the very power of the State’ to

prosecute the defendant”, as “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against the

defendant “operated to deprive him of due process of law”); see also Menna, 423

U.S. at 63 and n.2 (holding that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim

that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally

prosecute . . . no matter how validly his factual guilt is established”); Moore v. Hall,

62 A.3d 1203, 1208 (Del. 2013); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989)

(recognizing “fundamental fairness, as an element of due process” under Article I, §

7 of the Delaware Constitution).

* Del. Const. art. I, § 7 (providing that a criminal defendant has “a right to be

heard by himself or herself and his or her counsel”); Potter v. State, 547 A.2d 595,

600 (Del. 1988) (holding that a defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the right

to legal representation under Delaware state law).

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Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware

Constitution.” As defense counsel’s constitutionally ineffective actions prevented the

dismissal of the indictment prior to the entry of the guilty plea and resulted in a

violation of Slaughter’s federal and state right to due process of law, the only possible

remedy for the constitutional violation is the withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal

of the indictment with prejudice.

“ Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31; Moore, 62 A.3d at 1208.

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ARGUMENT II. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN DENYING

SLAUGHTER’S CLAIM THAT IF THE COURT FINDS DEFENSE COUNSEL

ACTED REASONABLY IN RELYING ON THE STATE’S

REPRESENTATIONS WITHOUT INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMIN G THEIR

ACCURACY, THEN DEFENSE COUNSEL’S WAIVER OF THE 120-DAY IAD

TIME LIMIT WAS INVOLUNTARY AND THEREFORE INVALID,

RESULTING IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF

SLAUGHTER.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Superior Court err in finding Slaughter’s postconviction claim that

defense counsel’s waiver of Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right was involuntary and

therefore invalid, resulting in an unconstitutional prosecution, to be procedurally

defaulted and alternatively, waived via a valid guilty plea? This issue was preserved

as it was raised in the Amended Motion and Reply Brief. (A484-498, 587-594).

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Questions of law are reviewed de novo.* Claims alleging a constitutional

violation are reviewed de novo.** As Slaughter alleges he was deprived of his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, this claim is reviewed de novo.

MERITS OF THE ARGUMENT

The Superior Court erred in finding that Slaughter’s second postconviction

claim—that if the court found defense counsel Collins’ reliance on the State’s

* Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1190.

“© Hall, 788 A.2d at 123.

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representations that this was a Governor’s Warrant case and not an IAD case to be

objectively reasonable, then counsel’s waiver of the 120 day time period was

involuntary and therefore invalid—to be procedurally barred and alternatively, waived

via the entry ofa valid guilty plea. (Denial at 12). However, for the reasons explained

in Claim I*’ and below, the court is incorrect.

In his filings, Slaughter explained that if the court found defense counsel’s

reliance on the State’s misrepresentations to be objectively reasonable, then counsel’s

waiver could not be considered voluntary, as the record establishes that the waiver was

induced by deceit, albeit unintentional, on the part of the State. A voluntary waiver

“require[s] knowledge of or reason to know the basic fact that gives rise to the IAD

right”.“* Due process further requires that for a waiver to be voluntary, it must be the

“product of a free and deliberate choice[,] rather than intimidation, coercion|[,] or

deception”.” It cannot reasonably be said that defense counsel had knowledge of the

basic fact giving rise to Slaughter’s right to be tried within 120 days of his arrival in

Delaware-that the IAD was applicable to Slaughter’s case.

The record shows that the State made the following representations to defense

*” See supra pp. 17-23.

** United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835, 839 (2d Cir. 1984).

” Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 296 (Del. 2005) (citing Norcross v. State,

816 A.2d 757, 762 (Del. 2003)).

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counsel concerning the manner in which Slaughter was brought to Delaware and the

applicability of the IAD to Slaughter’s case, many of which later proved to be false:

1. This was not an JAD case, because Slaughter was returned to

Delaware pursuant to a Governor’s Warrant (A81, 85, 245-46, 250, 253,

255, 271);

2. The GDOC informed Delaware that it would not extradite Slaughter

on an IAD request, because it was a capital murder case and the IAD

therefore did not apply (A139-40);

3. The only reason Delaware pursued a Governor’s Warrant was because

Georgia relayed that it would not honor an IAD request (A141);

4. The State does not know why Georgia believes the IAD does not

apply to capital murder cases, because that is legally incorrect (A140-41);

5. Ron Mullin, the Delaware Department of Justice’s extradition

supervisor, erroneously advised the GDOC that Slaughter could not

request return under the IAD, and a Governor’s Warrant was necessary

to obtain custody of him (A335);

6. Mauro may apply to Slaughter’s case (A219, 227, 261, 268-69, 296-

97);

7. Mauro does not apply to Slaughter’s case, because a Governor’s

Warrant is not a written request for temporary custody under the IAD

(A353-56).

The aforementioned representations made by the State all misled defense counsel

into believing the IAD was not implicated in Slaughter’s case, and to the extent that

Delaware chose to pursue a Governor’s Warrant for the extradition of Slaughter, it was

in response to the misunderstandings of law made by the Georgia Department of

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Corrections. These representations were all false. However, because the State did not

provide the IAD paperwork to defense counsel until March 18, 2015, four months after

the scheduling conference at which defense counsel unintentionally waived Slaughter’s

speedy trial right, defense counsel relied on the representations made by the State and

assumed their accuracy. (A167, 257). As defense counsel remarked to the court, “.

... | was in no position to acquiesce or not acquiesce [to a trial date outside the IAD

time limit] because it had been represented to me that this was not an IAD case.”

(A285). In fact, defense counsel further stated, “I seriously doubt Ms. Woloshin and

I would not have raised the IAD issue had we not been informed this was a governor’s

warrant case.” (A245).

While clear that the State did not intend to deceive defense counsel, it is also

clear that the lack of deceitful intent is immaterial, as the result was the same—defense

counsel did not, and could not, freely acquiesce to the April 2016 trial date. Defense

counsel’s acquiescence to the April 5, 2016 trial date was made in specific reliance on

critical misrepresentations made by the State. As such, defense counsel’s alleged

waiver of Slaughter’s speedy trial [AD rights was procured by the State’s extremely

significant, despite unintentional, misrepresentations. The State’s conduct has the

consequence of rendering any waiver of a right made in reliance on this false

information involuntary. In the absence of free acquiescence, defense counsel’s waiver

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is unequivocally an invalid waiver. While it is true that a defense attorney can waive

an IAD right on behalf of his/her client, even if the waiver is not knowing or

intelligent,°° courts are in agreement that such a waiver, at a minimum, must be

voluntary.*!

Based on the unusual circumstances of this case, it is clear that defense

counsel’s waiver of Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right was not voluntarily made.

In denying Slaughter’s claim, the Superior Court did not reach a finding on the

above raised issued. Rather, the court simply concluded that Slaughter’s claim was

procedurally barred, both for failure to raise in a direct appeal and by entering a valid

guilty plea. (Denial at 12, 14). The court erred on both counts. For the reasons

explained in Claim I, pursuant to United States Supreme Court precedent, Slaughter’s

claim is not waived simply because he entered a valid guilty plea.©? For the reasons

explained in Claim III,**? defense counsel were constitutionally ineffective when they

*° See, e.g. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114-15.

*' Lawson, 736 F.2d at 839; see also People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740,

744, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1258, 1265 (Cal. App., 1998) (citing Drescher v. Superior

Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148 (Cal. App., 1990)) (“Voluntariness [of a

statutory right] requires a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely

acquiesced [in the waiver].”); Conn v. State, 831 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. 2005) (holding

that the defendant’s failure to object to a trial date outside of the IAD time limit was

not a voluntary relinquishment of his IAD right, as it was prompted by the trial

court’s failure to give timely notice of the trial date to the defendant and defendant’s

counsel).

? See supra pp. 17-23.

°° See infra pp. 42.

at

Aas

provided Slaughter with the incorrect legal advice that he could not appeal the IAD

issues because they were waived when he pleaded guilty. As explained in Claim I,

pursuant to Class, Slaughter’s guilty plea did not waive his right to appeal the IAD

issue; therefore, defense counsel provided Slaughter with incorrect legal advice, which

prompted Slaughter to not file an appeal.

Because it is clearly objectively unreasonable to provide erroneous legal

advice,’ and because Slaughter was prejudiced by this erroneous advice in that he

failed to appeal a meritorious issue of great significance, Slaughter received ineffective

assistance of counsel in respect to the failure to file a direct appeal.°> As the courts

have held, ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for the procedural default

that is required to overcome the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3).°

” See, e.g. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1383-84 (2012) (noting that the

parties all conceded that defense counsel provided deficient performance under the

Sixth Amendment when he informed the defendant of an incorrect legal rule).

* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694.

*° Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(i)(3) (“Any ground for relief that was not asserted in

the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of

this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows (A) [c]ause for relief from

the procedural default and (B) [p]rejudice from violation of the movant’s rights. ”’)

(emphasis added); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), superseded on

other grounds by statute (“If the procedural default is the result of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the

default be imputed to the State, which may not "[conduct] trials at which persons

who face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance"[;]

[iJneffective assistance of counsel, then, is cause for a procedural default.”); Smith

v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Younger v. State, 580 A.2d

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Additionally, Slaughter is able to demonstrate prejudice from violation of his

rights,”’ as the prejudice is readily apparent in that the United States Supreme Court has

found this issue to be of such importance that it is one of the very few exceptions to the

general rule that a valid guilty plea waives all pre-guilty plea issues, even those of

constitutional dimension.°* As such, dismissing Slaughter’s claim as procedurally

defaulted, denies Slaughter the opportunity to be heard on an issue of such importance

that even a valid guilty plea does not waive it, as a direct result of receiving incorrect

legal advice in violation of his federal and state constitutional right to receive the

effective assistance of counsel. Moreover, at the very least, a meritorious issue would

have been presented to this Court, as opposed to no appeal at all.

Accordingly, Slaughter has demonstrated cause for the procedural default and

prejudice from violation of movant’s rights sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule

61(i)(3) for exception to the procedural bar, and the Superior Court erred in concluding

otherwise.

552, 556 (Del. 1990) (“Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does

not constitute ‘cause’ for a procedural default even when that default occurs on

appeal rather than at trial.”).

*’ Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(i)(3).

** Class, 138 S.Ct. at 803 (citing Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30 (quoting Tollett,

411 U.S. at 266-67)) (“The Court noted that a guilty plea bars appeals of many

claims, including some “‘antecedent constitutional violations’” related to events

(say, grand jury proceedings) that had “‘occurred prior to the entry of the guilty

plea.’”).

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