Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jason Slaughter, Petitioner v. Delaware

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JASON SLAUGHTER

Petitioner

V.

STATE OF DELAWARE

Respondent

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE

Volume IT

(A145-A242)

Christopher S. Koyste, Esq. (#3017)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste, LLC

709 Brandywine Boulevard

Wilmington, Delaware 19809

(302) 762-5195

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

Jason Slaughter

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE i

vy.

LD. No. 1207010738

JASON SLAUGHTER,

Defendant.

PETITIONER JASON SLAUGHTER’S REPLY TO STATE’S RESPONSE TO

AMENDED MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

AVION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Christopher S. Koyste, Esquire (#3107)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste LLC

Attomey for the Petitioner

709 Brandywine Blvd.

Wilmington, DE 19809

(302) 762-5195

Dated: May |, 2020

AAS”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ...2 00.0000... occ c cece cece. ii

ARGUMENTS. «2.000. cee cece eee ecb b bbb bb bebe cece ecco.

ARGUMENT L MR. SLAUGHTER’S SECOND POSTCONVICTION CLAIM.

ALLEGING THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S WAIVER OF THE 120-DAY JAD TIME

LIMIT WAS INVOLUNTARY AND THEREFORE INVALID, RESULTING IN AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF MR. SLAUGHTER, IS NOT

PROCEDURALLY BARRED OR WAIVED AND IS MERITORIOUS............. ]

ARGUMENT II. THESTATE’S RESPONSE ERRONEOUSLY CONTENDS THAT MR.

SLAUGHTER’S INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS ARE WAIVED AND ARB WITHOUT

EE ae wnt we we Bh BA B.S Bll #1 Ech dcx mee nam wer v x Ps mem BW GEE EM EOE GG 7 oe, 9

CONCLUSION ... 60.0 ncn e eee c ec cec eee ee. 15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

hla

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Federal Cases

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 ( 0) 2, 3, 4.6

Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018) 2... 2, 4, 5, 6, 13

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) .. 2.00000 c eee cceecee eee. 3,4, 6

New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) 2.2... eeeece cee ceee eee 3,8

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (AGT) os ose 5056s 8 ERE Ro emcee wie me SEM ES EMER Hence, 2

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) . 2.2... ooo. 4.6

United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. VORA). cect new ew ewsuenseeeeciuiere. 8

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 CUOT8). os ese ee eb maw amamewswswsuawnnawin., 10

State Cases

Alexander v. State, 2008 WL 4809624 (Del. Nov. 5, 2008)... 0.0.00... 00 00.00..-00000- 002. 4

Benner y. State, 2007 WL 4215005 (Del. Nov. 30, 2007)... 2. eee eee 4

Brunhammer v. State, 2017 WL 991081 (Del. 2017) 20 ccc ccc ence eee 4

Conn v. State, 831 N.B.2d 828 (Ind. 2005)... . 006. c ccc ee cece. 8

Drescher v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148 (Cal. App., 1990) ............... 8

Gann v. State, 2011 WL 4985701 (Del. Oct. 19,2001)... 2.00.2 e oe eee ee. 2

Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989)... 0.0. e eee cece 23

Moore v. Hall, 62 A.3d, 1203 (Del. 2013)... 2. eee 23

People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 744, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1258, 1265 (Cal. App., 1998) ...8

United States Constitution

US. Const. amend. XIV... cence cence cece ccc eceece eee, 2,3

Delaware Constitution

Del. Const. art. § 7... cc ccc nee eee c cee eee cee eee... 2.8

Statutes

LL Del. C. § 2542(a) 0 cece enc n cece e cece eb eceees cee, 10

1] Del. C. § 2543(c) 2... eee. Be ee eee eee ee ence eee 10

ij

Al4 i

ARGUMENT I. MR. SLAUGHTER’S SECOND POSTCONVICTION CLAIM, ALLEGING

THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S WAIVER OF THE 120-DAY IAD TIME LIMIT WAS

INVOLUNTARY AND THEREFORE INVALID, RESULTING IN AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF MR. SLAUGHTER, IS NOT

PROCEDURALLY BARRED OR WAIVED AND IS MERITORIOUS.

The State unpersuasively contends that Mr. Slaughter’ s claims are “unavailing” and therefore

should be dismissed without further proceedings.’ For the reasons explained below, the State is

wrong.

A. This claim is neither procedurally barred nor waived.

The State asserts that claim Ilis procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) and/or Rule 61 (3).

(Response at 18-19). The State asserts that Mr. Slaughter’s claim was already adjudicated by this

Court and to the extent the claim is different, it is barred for failure to raise on appeal. (Response

at 18-19). However, as Mr. Slaughter explained in the Amended Motion, this Court was never asked

to decide, and therefore never ruled upon, the issue of whether Mr. Slaughter’s guilty plea is

unconstitutional because the State no longer had the power to prosecute him at the time of the guilty

plea or whether defense counsel’s waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s LAD right was voluntary despite the

false information given to him by State. As such, this claim cannot be barred as a former

adjudication.”

Relatedly, this claim is not barred for failure to raise on appeal, because, as Mr. Slaughter

explained in the Amended Motion, defense counsel advised Mr. Slaughter that he had waived his

right to appeal the IAD issue via the entering of his guilty plea, and this advice was incorrect.

' February 12, 2020 State’s Response to Defendant’s Amended Motion for Postconviction

Relief at 15, hereinafter cited as “Response at __”.

* Mr. Slaughter’s May 14, 2019 Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief at 36,

hereinafter cited as “Amended at _”.

RAS

(Amended at 36-37). As explained throughout the Amended Motion, as well as below, an issue that

disputes the very power of the State to prosecute is an exception to the general rule that a valid guilty

plea waives all pre-guilty plea issues, even those of constitutional dimension As such, Mr.

Slaughter received ineffective assistance of counsel that caused him to fail to raise the issue on

appeal. Although the State asserts that Mr. Slaughter cannot “demonstrate any actual prejudice

because his IAD claim lacks merit”, for the reasons set forth in the Amended Motion and below, the

State is wrong.

The State also asserts that Mr. Slaughter’s state constitutional claim has been waived. for

failure to discuss and analyze the textural language, legislative history, preexisting state law,

structural differences, matters of particular state interest and/or local concem, state traditions, or

public attitudes in relation to the corresponding United States constitutional provision. (Response

at 20-21). While the State is correct that conclusory claims of a constitutional violation are

insufficient to sustain such an allegation, as Mr. Slaughter noted in the Amended Motion, the

Delaware Supreme Court has held that the phrase “due process of law” as found in the Fourteenth

Amendment and the phrase “law of the land” as found in Article L, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution

are synonymous and both incorporate the concept of fundamental fairness.* (Amended at 30 n.57).

3 Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798, 803 (2018) (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.

21, 30 (1974) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973))) (“The Court noted

that a guilty plea bars appeals of many claims, including some “‘antecedent constitutional

violations” related to events (say, grand jury proceedings) that had “‘occurred prior to the entry

of the guilty plea.””).

* Moore v. Hall, 62 A.3d, 1203, 1208 (Del. 2013); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87

(Del. 1989) (recognizing “fundamental fairness, as an element of due process” under Article I, §

7 of the Delaware Constitution); Gann v. State, 2011 WL 4985701 at *2 (Del. Oct. 19, 2001)

(“[F]undamental requirements of fairness which are the essence of due process govern all judicial

proceedings.”’)).

wo

IAG

Moreover, Mr. Slaughter noted, but for defense counsel's objectively unreasonable waiver

of Mr. Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right, the State would have lost its power to prosecute Mr.

Slaughter on February 6, 2015. (Amended at 31-32). There can be no real question that the

continued prosecution of a defendant against whom the State has lost the power to prosecute is a

violation of federal constitutional due process, and as the Delaware Supreme Court has held that

“due process of law” as found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution is

synonymous with the phrase “law of the land” as found in Article I, § 7 of the Delaware

Constitution,® and it would be fundamentally unfair to prosecute and convict an individual of an

offense that the State is no longer authorized to prosecute and convict, such a violation of federal due

process is likewise a violation of state due process.

As such, the State’s contention that Mr. Slaughter waived his state constitutional claim by

not including a discussion and analysis in the Amended Motion of textural language, legislative

history, preexisting state law, structural differences, matters of particular state interest and/or local

concer, state traditions, or public attitudes in relation to the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution is unpersuasive.

* See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31 (holding that the defendant’s claim was not barred by

his guilty plea, because “the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity”, vindictive

prosecution, “implicates ‘the very power of the State’ to prosecute the defendant”, as “(tlhe very

initiation of the proceedings” against the defendant “operated to deprive him of due process of

law”); see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 and n.2 (1975) (bolding that “a plea of guilty

to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State

may not constitutionally prosecute .. . no matter how validly his factual guilt is established”).

° Moore, 62 A.3d at 1208 (holding that the phrase “due process of law” as found in the

Fourteenth Amendment and the phrase “law of the land” as found in Article L § 7 of the

Delaware Constitution are synonymous and both incorporate the concept of fundamental

fairness); Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87 (recognizing “fundamental fairness, as an element of due

process” under Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution).

3

SO

B. This claim was not waived when Mr. Slaughter knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily entered a guilty plea.

The State alleges that Mr. Slaughter’s reliance on United States Supreme Court precedent

rather than on Delaware Supreme Court precedent, is misplaced; however, the State misunderstands

Mr. Slaughter’s argument, and therefore, the State’s rebuttal is unpersuasive and inapplicable to the

Mr. Slaughter’s postconviction claim. (Response at 21-22).

The State cites to Benner v. State,’ Brunhammer v. State,’ and Alexander v. State,’ in which

the Delaware Supreme Court held that errors which occurred prior to the entry of a voluntary guilty

plea, including a violation of the LAD, are waived and asserts that they are controlling. (Response

at 22). Mr. Slaughter does not dispute that generally, errors which occurred prior to the entry of a

guilty plea are waived, and in fact, acknowledged in the Amended Motion that a knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily entered guilty plea typically waives errors the occurred prior to the entry

of the guilty plea. (Amended at 37, 39, 42). However, what the State’s Response fails to fully take

into account is that Mr. Slaughter is raising a claim that the United States Supreme Court has held

is not waived by the entry of a voluntary guilty plea—specifically, the power of the State to

constitutionally prosecute the admitted conduct.” (Amended at 39-42).

The State acknowledges this in its Response, stating: “[ ] the Court found that Class’s

constitutional claims challenged the Government’s power to criminalize Class’s admitted conduct,

thereby calling into question the Government’s power to constitutionally prosecute him.” (Response

72007 WL 4215005 (Del. Nov. 30, 2007).

$2017 WL 991081 (Del. 2017).

° 2008 WL 4809624 (Del. Nov. 5, 2008).

0 Class, 138 S.Ct. At 801-06; Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31; Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 and

n.2: United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).

4

Hs |

at 25). Nevertheless, the State asserts that this principle—that a voluntarily entered guilty plea does

not waive for appellate purposes a claim that implicates the government or state’s very power to

prosecute the admitted conduct—is inapplicable to Mr. Slaughter’s situation. (Response at 26).

However, as explained in detail in the Amended Motion, this is the very principle at issue in Mr.

Slaughter’s case. As Mr. Slaughter explained, from February 7, 2015 onward, the State no longer

had the power to prosecute Mr. Slaughter, which renders his conviction and sentence

unconstitutional. (Amended at 23, 31, 33, 35, 49-50). As such, Mr. Slaughter’s claim raises the

issue of whether the State had the power to prosecute the admitted conduct at the time of the guilty

plea. Thus, this falls within the scope of the exceptions to the general principle that a valid guilty

plea waives all pre-plea issue as described in Class, Blackledge, Menna, and Broce.

Nevertheless, the State asserts that Blackledge, Menna and Class “are inapplicable to

Slaughter’s situation” because “[nJone of these cases address whether a defendant, by voluntarily

pleading guilty, waives his or her speedy trial rights under the IAD and his or her related ineffective

assistance of counsel claims.” (Response at 25). The State rests it argument in part on the

contention that the IAD is statutory in nature and therefore does implicate constitutional rights.

(Response at 26-27). However. what the State fails to consider is that the United States and

Delaware Constitutions are implicated in this situation, specifically because at the time Mr. Slaughter

pleaded guilty, the State no longer had the power to prosecute him. The 120-day time period had

expired and defense counsel’s waiver of the time period was invalid, due to constitutional

ineffectiveness and/or the involuntariness of the waiver stemming from the multiple

misrepresentations made by the State to defense counsel that induced the implicit waiver. As such,

Mr. Slaughter was convicted of and sentenced for a crime that the State, through its own negligence,

HSL

lost the power to prosecute. It is precisely this that implicates Mr. Slaughter’s constitutional right

to due process and renders his conviction and therefore sentence in violation of the United States and

Delaware Constitutions.'' To the extent this issue has never been considered by the Delaware

Supreme Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court in the

context of the State’s power to prosecute, the issue is one of first impression.

The State’s emphasis on the fact that Mr. Slaughter does not allege his statute of conviction

was unconstitutional is likewise misplaced. (Response at 25). As explained in the Amended

Motion, the language of Class makes clear that the holding of Class, the prior precedent of the

United States Supreme Count, is not limited to cases in which the defendant alleges the statute is

unconstitutional; an allegation that the State did not have the power to prosecute is sufficient.”

The State repeatedly notes that Class did not establish a new principle of constitutional law.

(Response at 25, n.64). Although the State does not explain the importance of this, Mr. Slaughter

assumes the State is implying that this cannot be a means of overcoming a Rule 61 procedural bar.

However, for the reasons explained above, as well as in the Amended Motion, none of Mr.

Slaughter’s claims are procedurally barred. Moreover, the State fails to acknowledge that the fact

Class did not establish a new principle of constitutional actually supports Mr. Slaughter’s third

postconviction claim— that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of the

" See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31 (holding that the defendant’s claim was not barred

by his guilty plea, because “the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity”, vindictive

prosecution, “implicates ‘the very power of the State’ to prosecute the defendant”, as “[t]he very

initiation of the proceedings” against the defendant “operated to deprive him of due process of

law”); see also Menna 423 U.S. at 63 and n.2 (holding that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not

waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not

constitutionally prosecute .. . no matter how validly his factual guilt is established”).

® Amended at 39-41 (citing Class, 138 S.Ct. at 802-06; Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31;

Menna, 423 U.S. at 61-63 and n.2; Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 575-76).

6

AIS 3

IAD motion on the basis that counsel mistakenly believed the claim had been waived by the entry

of the guilty plea—as it demonstrates that defense counsel should have been aware of this principle

at the time of Mr. Slaughter’s guilty plea and sentencing and during the 30-day period in which Mr.

Slaughter had to file an appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court following sentencing.

The State places great emphasis on the fact that defense counsel acknowledged he provided

ineffective assistance of counsel in agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120-day LAD time period

and that defense counsel explained to Mr. Slaughter that the guilty plea would waive his right to

appeal the IAD issue to the Delaware Supreme Court, arguing this “provides credibility to the fact

that he and Ms. Woloshin adequately explained the collateral consequences of Slaughter’s guilty

plea.” (Response at 30). To the State, this indicates that Mr. Slaughter voluntarily, intelligently and

knowingly entered into the guilty plea, which is, the State asserts, the end of the issue. (Response

at 27-30).

However, as explained in the Amended Motion, Mr. Slaughter does not dispute that he

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into the guilty plea; rather, Mr. Slaughter has

asserted that the issue boils down to whether the State had the power to prosecute Mr. Slaughter at

the time of the guilty plea; accordingly, a valid guilty plea would not waive Mr. Slaughter’s right to

appeal the issue to the Delaware Supreme Court. (Amended at 41, 49-50). Consequently, the fact

that defense counsel advised Mr. Slaughter he would be waiving his right to appeal the IAD issue

ifhe pleaded guilty only confirms that defense counsel was incorrect in their legal assessment of Mr.

Slaughter’s ability to appeal the LAD issue and that they provided Mr. Slaughter with incorrect legal

advice. Thus, the State’s argument does nothing to refute Mr. Slaughter’s postconviction claims,

and in fact further supports Mr. Slaughter’s allegation that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to appeal the IAD issue.

C. The State misunderstands the substance of Mr. Slaughter’s claim.

Despite continually asserting that Mr. Slaughter’s claim is either procedurally barred or

waived, the State does briefly address the substantive portions of Mr. Slaughter’s argument, which

is that trial counsel’s waiver of the 120-day time period was not voluntary. (Response at 30-32).

However, the State’s Response appears to misunderstand this argument, believing it to be an

allegation that Mr. Slaughter’s guilty plea was not voluntary. This is incorrect.

As Mr. Slaughter explained in the Amended Motion, defense counsel’s waiver of Mr.

Slaughter’s IAD right did not need to be knowingly or intelligently made; however, it did need to

be voluntarily made.'? (Amended at 42-49). The voluntariness of defense counsel’s waiver has no

bearing on the voluntariness of Mr. Slaughter’s guilty plea, an issue which Mr. Slaughter has not

even disputed, but rather the validity of the waiver itself and therefore, whether the State lost the

power to prosecute Mr. Slaughter after February 6, 2015. Accordingly, the State’s argument is

unresponsive to the claim that the State had lost the power to prosecute Mr. Slaughter at the time of

the guilty plea and that his conviction and sentence was therefore imposed in violation of the United

States and Delaware Constitutions.

8 See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-115 (2000); see also United States v. Lawson,

736 F.2d 835, 839 (2d Cir. 1984); see also People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 744, 67 Cal.

App. 4th 1258, 1265 (Cal. App., 1998) (citing Drescher v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d

1140, 1148 (Cal. App., 1990)) (“Voluntariness [of a statutory right] requires a showing of record

that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced [in the waiver].”); Conn v. State, 831 N.E.2d

828 (Ind. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s failure to object to a trial date outside of the IAD

time limit was not a voluntary relinquishment of his IAD right, as it was prompted by the trial

court’s failure to give timely notice of the trial date to the defendant and defendant’ s counsel)

8

ASS

ARGUMENT II. THE STATE’S RESPONSE ERRONEOUSLY CONTENDS THAT MR.

SLAUGHTER’S INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS ARE WAIVED AND ARE WITHOUT

MERIT.

The State correctly acknowledges that postconviction claims I and II are not procedurally

barred, but erroneously contends that they were waived when Mr. Slaugher entered a guilty plea.

(Response at 33). Additionally, the State’s Response asserts that both of Mr. Slaughter’ s claims of

ineffectiveness of defense counsel “have no merit” and therefore “should be dismissed without

further proceedings because... .” (Response at 18, 33). For the reasons described below, the

State’s assertions are unpersuasive

B. Defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective by non-strategically waiving

Mr. Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right.

As the State concedes, defense counsel admits ineffectiveness in his affidavit. (Response at

38). The State half-heartedly disputes defense counsel's admission by noting that the trial judge

previously stated that the Court believed trial counsel to have been effective with regard to the JAD

issue. (Response at 39). However, trial counsel clearly admits ineffectiveness in his affidavit for

unintentionally waiving Mr. Slaughter’s IAD right and plainly states that he would have not have

agreed to a trial date outside of the 120-day time period if he had known the IAD was applicable to

Mx. Slaughter’s case. Likewise, defense counsel asserts that he would have known that key fact if

he had independently researched the issue rather than relying on the State’s incorrect statement that

this was not an IAD case.

Despite the clear record that defense counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable

in this regard, the State contends that Mr. Slaughter’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim still

fails on the basis that Mr. Slaughter cannot demonstrate prejudice. The State is wrong.

AS

The State argues that Mr. Slaugther’s IAD rights never vested under 11 Del. C. § 2542(a),

because he did not perfect actual delivery. (Response at 40). This is not in dispute. It is for

precisely this reason that Mr. Slaughter does not allege a violation of his IAD rights under §

2542(a),"* triggering the 180-day time period, but rather under 11 Del. C. § 2543(c),” triggering the

120-day time period. The failure to perfect actual notice has absolutely no relevance to the raised

claim, which pertains solely to Mr. Slaughter’s IAD rights under 11 Del. C. § 2543(c).

The State’s Response does not dispute that lodging a detainer plus a Governor’s Warrant

triggered the provisions of 11 Del. C. § 2543(c) and the applicability of Mauro." Rather the State

only asserts that “[t]o the extent the 120-day time limit was triggered here, Slaughter fails to consider

.., that applicable standard does not require Trial Counsel to agree to a trial date outside of the 120-

day time limit.” (Response at 40-41). The State relies entirely on the fact that the Court could have

granted a continuance of trial beyond the 120-day time limit and that this would not have violated

“11 Del. C. § 2542(a) (“Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in

a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the

term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment,

information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner,

the prisoner shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner shall have caused to be

delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's

Jurisdiction written notice of the place of imprisonment and the request for a final disposition to

be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided, that for good cause shown in

open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of

the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”).

11 Del. C. § 2543(c) (“In respect of any proceeding made possible by this section, trial

shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for

good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court

having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”).

'® United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1978) (holding that “whenever the

receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a detainer it has previously lodged

against a state prisoner,” the IAD requires commencement of trial within 120 days of the

defendant's arrival in the receiving State).

10

ASA

the IAD. (Response at 41). The State would be correct, had a party requested a continuance;

neither did.

Had trial counsel refused to waive the 120-day time period. as trial counsel attests he would

have done in his affidavit if had he been aware of the applicability of the IAD, the State would

presumably have requested a continuance and if the Court had found good cause, the Court could

certainly have granted the continuance and set a trial date outside of the 120-day time period.

However, none of those actions occurred. The State is simply asserting retroactively that the Court

could have and would have granted a continuance, without providing any case law to support the

assumption that this type of retroactive analysis is permitted in assessing the merit of an JAD claim.

The State repeatedly asserts that the case could not have been tried within 120-days; however, trial

counsel avers in his affidavit that he would not have agreed to a trial date outside of the 120-day

deadline, and although the State alleges that to be unreasonable, the State is not privy to trial

counsel’s thought processes or how he could have prioritized his case load to make such a trial date

feasible. The proper course of action would have been for the State to have requested a continuance,

at the appropriate time, if it did not believe the case could be tried within 120 days, not for the State

to retroactively assert that trial counsel could not possibly have been prepared for trial within 120

days and therefore, despite the violation of Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial rights, no harm, no foul.

The State also disputes Mr. Slaughter’s contention that his prolonged custody in Delaware

impeded his ability to engage in the appeal process of his Georgia convictons on the basis that Mr,

Slaughter had counsel in Georgia handling his appeal. (Response at 43). However, as explained in

the Amended Motion, not only was Mr. Slaughter impeded in his ability to engage in the appeal

process in Georgia, but his motion for a new trial in Georgia was also delayed pending the resolution

1]

isd

of his proceedings in Delaware. (Amended at 32).

Additionally, the State’s Response alleges that Mr. Slaughter “misapprehends the import of

Brown and Harris”. asserting that they are unhelpful to Mr. Slaughter’s case as the 120-day time

period in Brown had already expired prior to trial counsel agreeing to a trial date outside of the time

period and because the State’s decision to enter anolle prosequi in Harris was unrelated to any IAD

issues. (Response at 43-44). However, the State misunderstands Mr. Slaughter’s references to

Brown and Harris. As Mr. Slaughter explained, the motion to dismiss in Harris was significant,

because it involved the same defense attorney and an almost identical set of facts, and in the motion,

defense counsel admitted ineffectiveness and asserted that had he been aware of the IAD’s

applicability, he would have “sought continuances of his other trials or would have asked the Office

of Conflicts Counsel to appoint different counsel for Mr. Harris” rather than waive Mr. Harris’

speedy trial rights. (Amended at 21-22). Mr. Slaughter referred to Harris to refute the State’s

anticipated argument that Mr. Slaughter’s case could not possibly have been brought to trial within

120 days, because there is no reason to believe that defense counsel would have been unwilling to

take the same course of actions—seeking continuances of other trials or seeking different appointed

counsel—in order to ensure that Mr. Slaughter’s case could be tried within 120 days.

Likewise, Mr. Slaughter cited to Brown in the Amended Motion, because the Superior Court

discussed in Brown the State’s inability “to cite to any case in which a Delaware court has

retroactively determined that ‘good cause’ existed to grant a continuance sought after the expiration

of the applicable UAD time limit.” (Amended at 34). Just as in Brown, the State argues that this

Court should retroactively find that good cause existed to grant a continuance of the IAD time

period. Although in this case defense counsel agreed to a trial date outside the IAD time period

12

Moa

before that time period had expired, the State still cites to no case law supporting its contention that

the Superior Court could have and would have found good cause to grant a continuance if one had

been requested. Likewise, the State fails to consider that defense counsel’s concession to a trial date

outside the IAD time period was, per trial counsel, due to the State’s affirmative misrepresentations

on the manner in which Mr. Slaughter was extradited to Delaware and the applicability of the IAD

to Mr. Slaughter’s case.

cy Defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to file a direct appeal

challenging the denial of the second motion to dismiss.

The State’s Response asserts that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to appeal

the denial of the second motion to dismiss but appears to misunderstand Mr. Slaughter’s argument.

First, the State argues that Mr. Slaughter’s plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, a fact not

disputed by Mr. Slaughter, but one that has no relevance on the question of whether defense counse!

incorrectly advised Mr. Slaughter that he could not appeal the denial of the second motion to

dismiss. (Response at 45). The State also asserts in footnote that Mr. Slaughter is apparently

alleging defense counsel was ineffective for advising him that they would appeal the IAD issue but

then not doing so. (Response at 45 n.118). This is incorrect.

Mr. Slaughter’s argument, as explained in the Amended Motion, is whether trial counsel was

legally incorrect when they advised Mr. Slaughter that his guilty plea waived his right to appeal the

IAD issue. (Amended at 52-54). As Mr. Slaughter acknowledged, no appeal was filed because

defense counsel advised that the issue was waived; however, in light of the holding of Class, and the

precedent upon which Class was based, Mr. Slaughter asserts that he could have appealed the issue,

because it questioned the very power of the State to prosecute Mr. Slaughter at the time of the guilty

13

que

plea. As explained in the Amended Motion and above, this is a type of issue that defies the norm

and is not waived by a valid guilty plea. (Amended at 52-53).

The State also asserts that in any event, Mr. Slaughter cannot demonstrate prejudice, because

defense counsel “admitted on several occasions that this case could not be tried within 120 days.”

(Response at 46). However, the State fails to consider that defense counsel attests that he would not

have agreed to a trial date outside of the 120 day time period if he had known the IAD applied and

overlooks that in Harris, when presented with the same circumstances, defense counsel advised that

he would have sought continuances in his other trial cases and/or would have requested the Office

of Conflict Counsel appoint different counsel to represent the defendant. As such, the State’s

reliance on defense counsel’s prior statements, made before he was aware of the applicability of the

1AD to Mr. Slaughter’s case and therefore before he had evaluated his options and the best course

of action to protect Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial rights, is misplaced.

In light of the aforementioned, the State’ s Response to Mr. Slaughter’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claims is not fully responsive to Mr. Slaughter’s postconviction claims, misunderstands

Mr. Slaughter’s arguments and is unpersuasive in refuting Mr. Slaugher’s claims.

14

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant

all appropriate relief, including withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the indictment with

prejudice.

/s/ Christopher S$. Koyste

Christopher S. Koyste (# 3107)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste LLC

709 Brandywine Blvd.

Wilmington, DE 19809

(302) 762-5195

Dated: May 1, 2020

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE

¥. :

: LD. No. 1207010738

JASON SLAUGHTER, :

Defendant.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1, Christopher S. Koyste, attorney for Jason Slaughter, certify that on May 1, 2020, the

foregoing Reply Brief was served upon:

Cari Chapman, Esquire Prothontary

Phillip Casale, Esquire New Castle County Courthouse

Deputy Attorney Generals 500 North King Street

Department of Justice Wilmington, DE 19801

820 N. French Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

Mr. Jason Slaughter

GDC ID# 1001131002

Phillips State Prison

2989 West Rock Quarry Road

Buford, Georgia 30519

/s/ Christopher S. Koyste

Christopher S. Koyste (# 3107)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste LLC

709 Brandywine Blvd.

Wilmington, DE 19809

(302) 762-5195

m3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JASON SLAUGHTER,

Defendant-Below, : No. 87, 2021

Appellant, :

Court Below: Superior Court of the

V. : State of Delaware in and for New

Castle County

STATE OF DELAWARE, :

Plaintiff-Below, ; Case Below No. 1207010738

Appellee. :

APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

Christopher S. Koyste, Esq. (#3107)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste, LLC

709 Brandywine Boulevard

Wilmington, Delaware 19809

(302) 762-5195

Attorney for Jason Slaughter

Defendant Below-Appellant

Dated: June 10, 2021

uA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS... ........000.0000 000 ccc ccc cece eee eee il

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS........00..000.0 000 ccc cece cece ee ceee 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. ..........0.0 0.00. c cece e eee 4

STATEMENT OF FACTS... 2.2.00... ccc ccc cee cece J

ARGUMENT

I. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN DENYING SLAUGHTER’S CLAIM

THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE

FOR INADVERTENTLY WAIVING SLAUGHTER’S IAD SPEEDY TRIAL

RIGHT TO BE TRIED WITHIN 120 DAYS OF ARRIVAL IN DELAWARE,

BUT FOR WHICH THE INDICTMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF SLAUGHTER’S GUILTY

I. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN DENYING SLAUGHTER’S CLAIM

THAT IF THE COURT FINDS DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTED

REASONABLY IN RELYING ON THE STATE’S REPRESENTATIONS

WITHOUT INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMING THEIR ACCURACY, THEN

DEFENSE COUNSEL’S WAIVER OF THE 120-DAY IAD TIME LIMIT

WAS INVOLUNTARY AND THEREFORE INVALID, RESULTING IN AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF SLAUGHTER.. ........ Es)

fil. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN DENYING SLAUGHTER’S

CLAIM THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY

INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO FILE A DIRECT APPEAL

CHALLENGING THE SUPERIOR COURT’S DENIAL OF THE SECOND

MOTION TO DISMISS.........0...00 00000 ccc ec eee eee eens 41

CONCLUSION... 00... cece een en enns 44

February 16, 2021 Order.... 2.0... eens Exhibit A

CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPEFACE REQUIREMENT

AND TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

H

piu

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Federal Cases

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974)... 0... ......0.005. 19, 22, 23, 31, 32, 39

Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018)... 0.0... ccc eee ee eee passim

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012)... 0.0.0. ec eee cece eee 38

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61(1975). ................ 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 31

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)... 00.00 eee cee eeeee 38

New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000). .... 0.00000 eee ee eee 7,25, 37

Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 1997). 20... cc eee 38

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)............ 16, 17, 24, 29, 38, 41

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 2... cee eee ee 22, 39

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989).........0... 00.005. 20, 21, 22, 23

United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1984)...........0 00.0.5. 34, 37

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). 2... 0... ee eee passim

State Cases

Alexander y. State, Del., No. 337, 2008, Steele, J. (Nov. 5, 2008) (Order) (Fastcase)

Rim nei ERR ERM TER REWER DER BIRR ESSA mea ens 17, 18, 22

Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099 (Del. 2008)........0.0.00000 0.00. eee 18

Conn v. State, 831 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. 2005). .... 0.0.0.0... 0 cee eee ee 37

Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186 (Del. 1996)... 0. ...0.0.00000.00.0.0..0.. 16, 33, 41

Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309 (Del. 1988)..... 00000000. eee 18

Drescher v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140 (Cal. App., 1990)......... 37

Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291 (Del. 2005). ....... 0.000. 0c 34

Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118 (Del. 2001). .........0...000.0000004. 16, 33, 41

Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989)...... 0.0.0.0... 0 cece ee 31

Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229 (Del. 2003)... 0.2... 0.00.00 cee ee eee 18

Moore v. Hall, 62 A.3d 1203 (Del. 2013)...........0.00.000. 00... eee 31,32

Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003).... 0.0.0... eee 34

People v. Jones, 482 N.W.2d 207, 192 Mich. App. 737 (Mich. App., 1992). ... 25

People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1258 (Cal. App., 1998). 37

Pittman vy. State, 301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973)... .....0 00000000 cee eee 30

Potter v. State, 547 A.2d 595 (Del. 1988)... 0.0... eee 31

State v. Brown, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002188, Jurden, P.J. (April 10, 2017)

(Fastcase). 2. eens 28

Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552 (Del. 1990). .. 0.0... ee 38

ill

Pitot

United States Constitution

U.S. Const. amend. VI. 2... cc ee cence bee b beeen. 31

U.S. Const. amend. XIV... 0... eee cece eae 30, 31, 40

Delaware Constitution

Del. Const. art. 1, § 7.0.0.0. 0000 ce eee ee euas 31, 32, 40

Statutes

11 Del. C. § 2542(a). 0. eee eee eee enbbenes 9

11 Del. C. § 2543(c). 0. ee een eee ee eae 11, 29

11 Del. C. § 2544(c). oc eee eens 14, 30

Rules

Del. Super. Ct. R. 61()(3).. 0 eee eee eee ee 38, 39

iv

AIW8

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Slaughter (“Slaughter”) was indicted on July 16, 2012 for one count each

of Murder First Degree and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a

Felony (“PFDCF”). (Docket Entry 1'; Appendix 1). At the time, Slaughter was

awaiting trial for murder in Georgia. (DE9). On August 15, 2013, Slaughter was tried

and convicted in Georgia of Murder First Degree and related charges and sentenced to

life plus thirty years. (A396). On October 9, 2014, Slaughter arrived at James T.

Vaughn Correctional Center. (/d.).

On March 31, 2015, Slaughter filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. (DE34).

Following briefing and a July 30, 2015 hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss

on July 30, 2015. (DE40, 48). A motion for reargument was denied on December 23,

2015. (DES1, 64). On August 23, 2016, Slaughter filed a second motion to dismiss.

(DE69). Following briefing, the court held a hearing on the motion on October 14,

2016. (DE76, 78, 82).

Thereafter, new information was revealed pertaining to the motions to dismiss,

prompting Slaughter to renew the first motion to dismiss on November 14, 2016 and

" The Superior Court Docket Sheets for 1207010738 are attached as A1l-26

and assigned DE #.

* Hereinafter referred to as (A_).

Ae

supplement the second motion to dismiss. (DE89, 90). On December 5, 2016, the

State filed a response to Slaughter’s renewal of the first motion to dismiss, as well as

a response to questions asked by the court during oral argument held on the second

motion to dismiss. (DE95, 96). On January 3, 2017, the court denied both Slaughter’s

renewed first motion and Slaughter’s second motion to dismiss.

On January 18, 2017, Slaughter pleaded guilty to one count of Murder Second

Degree. (DE118). Slaughter filed a pro se motion to withdraw the guilty plea on

February 3, 2017. (DE119). Following a March 16, 2017 hearing on the motion,

independent counsel was appointed to counsel Slaughter on withdrawing his plea.

(DE123). Slaughter proceeded pro se on the motion to withdraw guilty plea, and on

May 25, 2017, following oral argument, the court denied Slaughter’s motion. (DE126).

Slaughter was sentenced on August 4, 2017 to a term of fifty years at Level V,

suspended after twenty years. (DE128). No direct appeal was taken.

Slaughter filed pro se motions for postconviction relief and appointment of

counsel on September 25, 2017, and undersigned counsel was thereafter appointed to

represent Slaughter in his Rule 61 postconviction proceedings. (DE129, 130).

Following a May 14, 2019 Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief, an October 24,

2019 affidavit from defense counsel Patrick Collins, a December 11, 2019 affidavit

from defense counsel Natalie Woloshin, a February 12, 2020 Response from the State

Ato,

and a May 1, 2020 Reply from Slaughter, oral argument was held on November 20,

2020. (DE145, 158, 161, 162, 163). On February 16, 2021, the court issued an order

denying Slaughter’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief.> (DE164). Slaughter

timely appealed to this Court. (DE167).

This is Slaughter’s Opening Brief on Appeal.

~~

> Attached as Exhibit A, hereinafter cited as (“Denial at _”).

3

AY

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The Superior Court erred in denying Slaughter’s claim of ineffectiveness for

defense counsel’s inadvertent waiver of Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right, as the claim

was not waived by Slaughter entering a valid guilty plea and defense counsel’s action

was objectively unreasonable and resulted in actual prejudice to Slaughter, in that but

for counsel’s error, the indictment would have been dismissed with prejudice prior to

entry of the guilty plea.

2. The Superior Court erred in denying Slaughter’s claim that if the court found

defense counsel to have acted reasonably in relying on the State’s representations that

this was a Governor’s Warrant and not IAD case, then counsel’s waiver of the 120 day

time period was involuntary and therefore invalid, as the claim was not waived via the

entry of a valid guilty plea, nor is the claim procedurally barred for failure to raise in

a direct appeal.

3. The Superior Court erred in denying Slaughter’s claim of defense counsel

ineffectiveness for failure to file an appeal, as the court incorrectly found that Slaughter

waived the ability to appeal the IAD issue.

HHIe

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 14, 2007, officers responded to a shooting in Newark, Delaware

involving two victims, Christopher Masters (“Masters”) and Jason Slaughter. (A395).

Upon arrival, Masters was found deceased inside of his residence and Slaughter was

transported to Christiana Hospital for a gunshot wound to the shoulder (/d.).

Slaughter advised officers that he was visiting Masters, and while standing

outside of Masters’ trailer, they were approached by two black males asking whether

they wanted to buy marijuana. (A395). They invited the individuals inside where a

disagreement ensued over money, the two individuals attempted to rob them, and both

Masters and Slaughter were shot. (/d.).

The two individuals were never identified, and Slaughter relocated to Georgia,

moving in with his wife, Donna Slaughter, and a roommate, Michael Haegele

(“Haegel”). (A395). On May 7, 2010, a male body was discovered on a secluded road

in Macon County, Georgia, the victim of an apparent homicide. (/d.). On May 12,

2010, Slaughter contacted police to advise he believed the unidentified body was his

roommate, Haegele. (/d.). During questioning, Donna Slaughter confessed to shooting

Haegele in the back of the head at their shared residence and implicated Slaughter in

the attempted cover up of the crime. (A396).

During the investigation into Haegele’s death, Georgia law enforcement

5

M713

[OCR skipped on page(s) 31-34]

[Read from a scan; the first 30 pages.]