Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jason Slaughter, Petitioner v. Delaware

plea], all of the claims that could otherwise be made ina Rule 61 Motion for Post-Conviction Relief

can certainly be litigated at this point as they relate to the issue of defense counsel’s ineffective

assistance and the decisions made by the defendant predicated upon that ineffective assistance.”

(A469).

Significantly, defense counsel also represented a defendant similarly situated to Mr. Slaughter

in State v. Earl Harris whose motion to dismiss was denied, just as in Mr. Slaughter’s case, on the

basis that defense counsel had waived the defendant’s IAD speedy trial right by agreeing to a trial

date outside of the 120-day time period before the 120 days had expired.*? Defense counsel filed a

motion for reargument, asserting that Mr. Harris’ case should be dismissed due to ineffective

assistance of counsel, stating “Counsel admits ineffectiveness. The ineffective assistance in this case

consists of (a) believing the State’s representations that the UAD did not apply; and (b) failing to

conduct an independent review of the extradition file before attending the scheduling conference.’””*!

Detense counsel also noted that he was arguably ineffective for failing to be aware of Mauro but

emphasized that it was ultimately the failure to conduct an independent investigation of the

extradition file prior to the scheduling conference to confirm the prosecutor’ s statements that caused

the harm.” Because the State later dismissed the charges against Mr. Harris, the merits of defense

» Substitute counsel later asked to withdraw from the case after finding no meritorious

bases for withdrawal of the guilty plea but noting that “if any of [Mr. Slaughter’ s] contentions

[are] sound, they wouid be better litigated in the context of a Rule 61 proceeding.” (A472).

* State v. Harris, Del. Super., 1D No. 1108002195, Jurden, J.P., at 19-21 (April 26, 2017)

(attached as Exhibit B).

“ May 1, 2017 Motion for Reargument in State v. Earl Harris, ID No. 1108002195 at

paragraph 16 (attached as Exhibit C).

° Id.

2}

pot

counsel’s motion for reargument were never reached. However, the motion’s significance is

apparent.

The facts of Mr. Slaughter’s case and Mr. Harris’ case, as they relate to extradition, are nearly

identical. More importantly, the basis for denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss was ne ly,

if not entirely, identical, with the Court concluding in both cases that defense counsel’s acquiescence

to a trial date outside of the 120-day IAD time limit constituted a waiver of the defendant’s IAD

right. In both cases, defense counsel failed to independently review the extradition file and check

whether a detainer had been lodged by the State. In both cases, defense counsel relied on the State’s

representations that the IAD did not apply to the case, representations that were ultimately

inaccurate. As there are no discernible differences between the relevant facts and decisions in the

Slaughter and Harris cases, defense counsel’s concession of ineffectiveness in Harris for failure to

review the extradition file, for relying on the State’ s representations, and for being unaware of Mauro

is equally applicable to Mr. Slaughter’s case.

Just as significantly, defense counsel also acknowledged in the Harris motion for reargument

that he would not have suggested a trial date outside of the 120 days if he had been aware of the

IAD’s applicability to the case. Notably, defense counsel stated that he would have instead “sought

continuances of his other trials or would have asked the Office of Conflicts Counsel to appoint

different counsel for Mr. Harris.”“* There is no reason to believe that defense counsel would not

have followed the same course of action in Mr. Slaughter’s case.

* Id. at paragraph 13.

4a Id.

M10

in light of the aforementioned, itis indisputable that defense counsel did not make a strategic

decision to waive Mr. Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial ri ght to prepare for trial or for any reason at all.

Rather, defense counsel’s reliance on the State’s representation that it was a Governor’s Warrant

case for which the IAD did not apply, failure to independently review the extradition file, and lack

of knowledge of Mauro resulted in an unintentional waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial right.

Such action is unquestionably objectively unreasonable, as conceded by defense counsel.

D. Mr. Slaughter was prejudiced by defense counsel’s deficient performance, because

in the absence of a valid waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right, the State’s

continued prosecution of him after February 6, 2015 violated Mr. Slaughter’s

constitutional right to due process under both the federal and state constitutions.

But for defense counsel’s ineffectiveness, the indictment against Mr. Slaughter would have

been dismissed by this Court, with prejudice, prior to the entry of Mr. Slaughter’s guilty plea.

Because the State’s actions in bringing Mr. Slaughter to Delaware tri ggered application of 11 Del.

C. § 2543(c), the State was required to bring Mr. Slaughter to trial within 120 days of his arrival in

Delaware. When the State failed to meet this deadline, the IAD required that the indictment be

dismissed with prejudice, and the State’s continued prosecution of Mr. Slaughter from that point

forward violated Mr. Slaughter’s constitutional right to due process. However, defense counsel’s

unwitting waiver of the 120-day deadline legitimized this otherwise unconstitutional prosecution.

Thus, but for defense counsel’s obj ectively unreasonable waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial IAD

right, the indictment against Mr. Slaughter would have been dismissed and no guilty plea would have

been entered by Mr. Slaughter.*°

® Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (holding that prejudice is established by showing “there is a

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different” with “reasonable probability” being defined as “a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”).

23

LAL

By the plain language of the statute, the State was required to try Mr. Slaughter within 120

days of his arrival in Delaware.“* Mr. Slaughter was indicted in Delaware on July 16, 2012. The

State of Delaware then lodged a detainer with the Georgia Department of Corrections on October

4, 2013. Although Mr. Slaughter requested disposition of the charges pursuant to the JAD, which

ordinarily would have triggered the 180-day time period of 11 Del. C. § 2542(a), the Georgia

Department of Corrections failed to properly send Mr. Slaughter’s paperwork to both the Delaware

Attorney General’s Office and the Delaware Superior Court. (A170, 203, 361-70). Accordingly,

this court determined that Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial rights under 11 Ded. C. § 2542(a) never

vested.

Yet on July 23,2014, Governor Markell, on behalf of the receiving state, signed a Governor’s

Warrant seeking temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter, and on July 28, 2014, Governor Deal, on

behalf of the sending state, signed the Governor’s Warrant. The State of Delaware therefore

obtained temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter via the Governor’s Warrant. Mr. Slaughter then

arrived at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Institute in Delaware on October 9, 2014. Because the

Governor's Warrant used to obtain temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter amounted to a written

request for temporary custody, the 120-day time limitation of 11 Del. C. § 2543(c) and Mauro was

triggered.

“41 Del. C. §2543(c) (“In respect of any proceeding made possible by this section, trial

shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for

good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court

having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”); Mauro,

436 US. at 364 (“[W]henever the receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a

detainer it has previously lodged against a state prisoner,” the IAD requires that trial commence

within 120 days of the defendant’s arrival in the receiving siate.).

24

AV?

During the pre-guilty plea litigation of Mr. Slaughter’s motions to dismiss, the State initially

appeared to concur with the defense that the Governor’s Warrant constituted a written request for

temporary custody under the LAD and Mauro. (A210, 218, 245, 252-53, 280-81 ). The State then

later changed its position. (A337-340). However, the State’s initial understanding of the law on this

issue was the correct one,

A detainer is “a request by the receiving state for the sending state to detain the prisoner or

to send notification when the prisoner is about to be released” A detainer is distinct from a

“written request for temporary custody” under the IAD, which represents “{flurther action [which]

must be taken by the receiving State in order to obtain the prisoner.”*? There is no dispute that the

State lodged a detainer in this case. Itis likewise clear that the Governor’s Warrant, as used in this

case, satisfies the definition of “written request for temporary custody” as explained by the United

State Supreme Court in Mauro, since the Governor’s Warrant constituted the further action that

needed to be taken by Delaware, the receivi ng State, in order to obtain the prisoner, Mr. Slaughter.

It is also significant that under the unique facts of this case, the State, by its own admissi on,

mistakenly believed that a Governor’s Warrant was the only action that it could take in order to

obtain temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter. {A135-37).

While typically a state pursues extradition through a Governor’s Warrant when it wants to

avoid usage of the IAD,” presumably to circumvent the 1 80-day and 120-day time limitations of the

” Bruce v. State, 781 A2d 544, 548 n.3 (Del. 2001); see also Hill, 528 U.S. at 112 (An

TAD detainer is “a request by the State's criminal justice agency that the institution in which the

prisoner is housed to hold the prisoner for the agency or notify the agency when release is

imminent.”).

*® Mauro, 436 US. 358.

® See, e.g., State v. Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413, 17 A.3d 256, 261, 263 (N.J. Super.,

2011) (explaining that a state can extradite a prisoner from another state without being required

25

IAD, this was clearly not the intent of the State of Delaware. To the contrary, the State’s actions

indicate that it fully intended and attempted to extradite Mr. Slaughter through the IAD but missteps

in the State’s execution of the proper IAD procedures resulted in the hybrid situation that occurred

in this case. The State unquestionably lodged a detainer against Mr. Slaughter and received notice

of Mr. Slaughter’s request for final disposition of the charges via the proper IAD forms. The State

also conceded that the only reason it did not submit Form VIL to accept Georgia’s offer of temporary

custody, received by the State from Mr. Slaughter via GDOC, to the Court for its signature was

because “[the State] did not know [of it], the reality is we did not know.” (A130). The State further

acknowledged that this oversight in Mr. Slaughter’s case “has caused the State to revisit its

extradition procedures”, noting that “[they] are not arguing that [they] were perfect in this... .”

(A130).

However, after these initial steps were taken to secure custody of Mr. Slaughter pursuant to

the IAD, the State suddenly realized, incorrectly, that the IAD does not apply to capital cases such

as Mr. Slaughter’s and mistakenly believed that Georgia would therefore not honor the terms of the

IAD. As such, rather than submitting a document bearing the headline “request for temporary

custody” as may be typical in LAD cases, the State made its written request for temporary custody

to comply with the terms of the LAD by using an alternative framework, such as an executive

agreement between governors) (citing Gondolfi v. Clinger, 352 Ark. 156, 98 S.W. 3d 812,

817-18 (Ark. 2003); People v. Quackenbush, 687 P. 2d 448, 450-51 (Col. 1984);

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 399 Mass. 455, 504 N.E. 2d 1060, 1061-65 (Mass. 1987); Staie v.

Davis, 210 $.W. 3d 229, 233-37 (Mo. App., 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1152 (2007); State v.

Hall, 976 S.W. 2d 121, 171-72 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1089 (1999): Ex Parte

King, 286 S.W. 3d 599, 601-04 (Tex. App., 2009); State v. Roberson, 78 Wash. App. 600, 897

P.2d 443, 445, review denied, 128 Wash. 2d 1005, 907 P.2d 298 (Wash. App., 1995); Davis,

210 S.W.3d at 236 (differentiating between extradition pursuant to the LAD and extradition

pursuant to an executive agreement between governors).

20

pil

via a Governor’s Warrant, which was accepted once it was signed by Georgia’s Governor on July

28, 2014.

In the pre-guilty plea briefing on Mr. Slaughter’s motions to dismiss, this Court declined to

address the question of whether a Governor’s Warrant constitutes a written request for temporary

custody pursuant to the LAD and/or Mauro, and the Delaware Supreme Court has never addressed

this issue. (A371). However, there is no reasonable basis for treati ng a Governor’s Warrant and a

written request for temporary custody as distinct requests, if not in all similarly situated cases, then

at the very least in this case based upon the unique facts and circumstances of the manner in which

the State brought Mr. Slaughter to Delaware. It is clear from the plethora of briefing that occurred

in this case and the multitude of LAD and extradition materials, that Delaware’s use of a Governor’ s

Warrant to secure temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter was not a strategic decision made to avoid

triggering the timing provisions of the IAD, as the State could legally have done; rather, the State

simply believed, mistakenly so, that Georgia would not honor any other form of a written request

for temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter. As such, the Governor’s Warrant should be treated as it was

intended by the State of Delaware—a written request for the temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter.

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mauro supports this conclusion. In Mauro,

the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, used to

secure the presence of a state prisoner in federal court, constituted an appropriate “request” for

temporary custody of the prisoner under the [AD.°° In unambi guously holding that it does, the Court

stated “we see no reason to give an unduly restrictive meaning to the term ‘written request for

*° Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343-44.

2)

ALS”

temporary custody.’”*' As the Court explained, “fit matters not whether the Government presents

the prison authorities in the sending State with a piece of paper labeled ‘request for temporary

custody’ or with a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum demanding the prisoner's presence in

federal court on a certain day; in either case, the United States is able to obtain temporary custody

of the prisoner.”*? Such is the case here. It matters not that the State of Delaware requested

temporary custody of Mr. Slaughter with a Governor’s Warrant rather than a piece of paper titled

“request for temporary custody”; Delaware was still able to obtain temporary custody of Mr.

Slaugher, and given that a Governor’s Warrant was not employed as a means of avoiding application

of the LAD, a position never advanced by the State and one that is unsupported by the record, there

is no justifiable reason to treat the phrase “written request for temporary custody” so narrowly.

Doing so flies in the face of the United States Supreme Court’s express holding and clear analysis

in Mauro.

Moreover, the policy considerations raised in Mauro are similarly applicable to Mr.

Slaughter’s case. As the Court stated, “the fact that the prisoner is brought before the district court

by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in no way reduces the need for this prompt

disposition of the charges underlying the detainer. In this situation, it clearly would permit the

United States to circumvent its obligations under the Agreement to hold that an ad prosequendum

writ may not be considered a written request for temporary custody.”*’ Relatedly, the Court held that

“[the Court] view[s] Art. IV(c) as requiring commencement of trial within 120 days whenever the

receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a detainer it has previously lodged

| Id. at 362.

32 Id.

3 Id.

28

All

against a state prisoner. Any other reading of this section would allow the Government to gain the

advantages of lodging a detainer against a prisoner without assuming the responsibilities that the

Agreement intended to arise from such an action.”** Such is the case here.

The State could have chosen to obtain temporary custody of Mr. SI aughter through a

Govemor’s Warrant without ever lodging a detainer,® thereby wholly avoiding application of the

IAD. However the State did not do so, and should not now be permitted to shirk its responsibilities

under the IAD based upon an unreasonably narrow construction of the phrase “written request for

temporary custody” that is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court precedent,

The unique facts of this case set it apart from the norm, as the State’s mistaken beliefs as to

the applicability of the IAD to capital cases caused the State to request temporary custody of Mr.

Slaughter through a Governor’s Warrant after first initiating the IAD’s extradition procedures by

lodging a detainer. Based upon the extensive briefing that has already occurred in this case in

relation to Mr. Slaughter’s extradition to Delaware, it can be reasonably assumed that had the State

™ Id. at 364.

3 State v. Dippold, 1992 WL 354081, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 5, 1992) (“The State never

lodged a detainer against the defendant. Nowhere in the detainer agreement adopted by

Delaware does it state that the prosecution must lodge a detainer against the prisoner.”) (citing

Pittman v. Siate, 301 A.2d 509, 512 (Del. 1973)); see also State v. Dorn, 1989 WL 135712, at *4

(Del. Super. Nov. 3, 1989) (“While the State had a technical right to do this under 1] Del. C. §

2505(a) it is noted that this is a discretionary provision and is not mandatory upon the Attomey

General's Office.”).

* See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 364 n.30 (“In arguing that Congress did not intend the word

‘request’ to encompass writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the dissent refers to legislative

history indicating that the Agreement was not meant to be the exclusive means of effecting a

transfer of a prisoner for purposes of prosecution. Nothing we have said today, however, is

contrary to this intent. As our judgment in No. 76-1596 indicates, zhe Government need not

proceed by way of the Agreement. It may obtain a state prisoner by means of an ad

prosequendum writ without ever filing a detainer; in such a case, the Agreement is inapplicable.

It is only when the Government does file a detainer that it becomes bound by the Agreement's

provisions.”) (emphasis added).

29

MI]

not erroneously believed Georgia would not honor a request for custody made in any form other than

a Govemor’s Warrant, the State would have simply proceeded to make its written request for

temporary custody in the manner it normal ly employs in IAD cases.

it is also significant that this Court previously reached the conclusion that had the GDOC

perfected actual notice of Mr. Slaughter’s properly executed IAD paper requesting final disposition

of the charges, the 180-day time limit of the IAD would have been triggered. (A278, 356, 361-3 70).

As such, it would be inconsistent to now hold that the IAD was applicable to Mr. Slaughter’s case

at that stage of the proceedings because a detainer had been lodged by the State, but was inapplicable

at the later stage of the proceedings, while the detainer was still lodged, simply because a Governor’ s

Warrant had been issued. Moreover, it would be fundamentally unfair” for the State to circumvent

its responsibilities under the IAD simply because it mishandled Mr. Slaughter’s extradition due

miscommunication and intemal errors within the Department of Justice. The State intended to bring

Mr. Slaughter to Delaware through the IAD and took action to do so; it must therefore be held to its

responsibilities under the IAD.

Any impact that the use of a Governor’s Warrant in this case had on the State’s IAD

requirements was inadvertent and caused by the State’s misunderstanding of the application of

Delaware’ s extradition law under the circumstances of Mr. Slaughter’s case. Whether a Governor’ s

* The Delaware Supreme Court has held that the phrase “due process of law” as found in

the Fourteenth Amendment and the phrase “law of the land” as found in Article L, § 7 of the

Delaware Constitution are synonymous and both incorporate the concept of fundamental fairness.

(Moore v. Hall, 62 A.3d, 1203, 1208 (Del. 2013); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del.

1989) (recognizing “fundamental fairness, as an element of due process” under Article I, § 7 of

the Delaware Constitution); Gann v. State, 2011 WL 4985701 at *2 (Del. Oct. 19, 2001)

(“[FJundamental requirements of fairness which are the essence of due process govern all judicial

proceedings.”)).

30

18

Warrant always constitutes a written request for temporary custody pursuant to the LAD in Del aware

is a question that need not be decided in this case, as the unique facts of Mr. Slaughter’s extradition

to Delaware make it clear that the Governor’s Warrant was used in this case to “initiate[] the

disposition of charges underlying a detainer [the State] ha[d] previously lodged against [Mr.

Slaughter]”.** Accordingly, the Govemor’s Warrant constitutes a written request for temporary

custody under the LAD.

Since Mr. Slaughter arrived in Delaware on October 9, 2014, the State was required to bring

the matter to trial by February 6, 2015. The burden of compliance with the requirements of the IAD

rests with the State.” The record is clear that the State did not bring the matter to trial within 120

days nor did the State seek a good cause continuance to toll the 120-day deadline prior to the

expiration of the deadline, Thus, in the absence of a valid waiver of the 120-time limitation, the IAD

required that the matter be dismissed with prejudice.” Accordingly, but for defense counsel’s

objectively unreasonable waiver of Mr. S] aughter’s IAD speedy trial right, the State would have lost

its power to prosecute Mr. SI aughter after on February 6, 2015, and the State’s continued prosecution

from that point forward would violated Mr. Slaughter’s constitutional right to due process of law

*8 Mauro, 436 U.S. at 364.

» Pittman, 301 A.2d at 514 (“The burden of compliance with the procedural requirements

of the IAD rests upon the party states and their agents”), superseded on other grounds by statute,

11 Ded. C. § 2542(g).

* 11 Del. C. § 2544(c) (“[IJn the event that an action on the indictment, information or

complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the

period provided in § 2542 or § 2543 of this title, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where

the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the

same with prejudice ...”).

3]

AUT

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the

Delaware Constitution.”

It is also important to note that in addition to the non-dismissal of the indictment, Mr.

Slaughter was prejudiced in other respects by defense counsel’s unintentional waiver of his speedy

trial rights. Mr. Slaughter’s prolonged custody in Delaware impacted his ability to engage in the

appeal process of his Georgia convictions, and Mr. Slaughter avers that his motion for a new trial

in Georgia was delayed pending the resolution of his proceedings in Delaware. As such, Mr.

Slaughter’s rights to appeal his convictions in Georgia and move for retrial were meaningfully

affected by not being brought to trial in Delaware within 120 days. As the United States Supreme

Court noted in Mauro, the IAD was an attempt to ameliorate some of the disadvantages to the

prisoner caused by the lodging of a detainer and the result of being held in custody.” However,

*' See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding that the defendant’s claim

was not barred by his guilty plea, because “the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity”,

vindictive prosecution, “implicates ‘the very power of the State’ to prosecute the defendant”, as

“[t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against the defendant “operated to deprive him of due

process of law”); see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 and n.2 (1975) (holding that “a

plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that-—judged on its face —the charge is one

which the State may not constitutionally prosecute .. . no matter how validly his factual guilt is

established”), Moore, 62 A.3d at 1208 (holding that the phrase “due process of law” as found in

the Fourteenth Amendment and the phrase “law of the land” as found in Article I, § 7 of the

Delaware Constitution are synonymous and both incorporate the concept of fundamental

fairness), Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87 (recognizing “fundamental fairness, as an element of due

process” under Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution).

° Mauro, 436 U.S. at 353 (quoting H.R Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 3 (1970): S.Rep. No.

91-1356, p. 3 (1970)) (noting that when the IAD legislation was introduced to Congress, both the

House and Senate Reports noted the need for legislation, stating: “[t]he Attorney General has

advised the committee that a prisoner who has had a detainer lodged against him is seriously

disadvantaged by such action. He is in custody, and therefore in no position to seek witnesses or

to preserve his defense. He must often be kept in close custody, and is ineligible for desirable

work assignments. What is more, when detainers are filed against a prisoner, he sometimes loses

interest in institutional opportunities because he must serve his sentence without knowing what

additional sentences may lie before him, or when, if ever, he will be in a position to employ the

32

M26

defense counsel’s unintentional waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial ri ght rendered any such

intended benefit moot.

E. Remedy for the constitutional violation.

Because the waiver of Mr. Slaughter’ s speedy trial IAD right was made in violation of Mr.

Slaughter’s right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution,” the State’s continued

prosecution of Mr. Slaughter beyond February 6, 2015, the expiration of the 120-day time period,

deprived Mr. Slaughter of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. As defense counsel’s constitutionally

ineffective actions prevented the dismissal of the indictment prior to the entry of the guilty plea and

resulted in a violation of Mr. Slaughter’s federal and state ri ght to due process of law, the only

possible remedy for the constitutional violation is the withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of

the indictment with prejudice.

It should also be noted that there is no authority in Delaware to support a conclusion that the

constitutional violations were harmless on the basis of an after-the-fact finding that a good cause

continuance of the deadline would have been granted by the Court if one had been requested. In fact,

education and skills he may be developing”).

Del. Const. art. I, § 7 (providing that a criminal defendant has “a right to be heard by

himself or herself and his or her counsel”): Potier, 547 A.2d at 600 (holding that a defendant in a

criminal case is guaranteed the right to legal representation under Delaware state law)

** Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31 (noting that when the State does not have the power to

prosecute the defendant, “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against the defendant

“operate[s] to deprive him of due process of law”); Moore, 62 A.3d at 1208 (holding that the

phrase “due process of law” as found in the Fourteenth Amendment and the phrase “law of the

land” as found in Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution are synonymous and both

incorporate the concept of fundamental fairness).

33

M2

such an approach was expressly tejected in State v. Brown. The Court emphasized in Brown that

at the time the State could have requested a good cause continuance, the applicable IAD time limit

had already expired. Similarly, for the reasons explained above, defense counsel’s waiver of the

120 day time limit was made in violation of Mr. Slaughter’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance

of effective counsel, and by the time the State realized that the IAD was in fact applicable to Mr.

Slaughter’s case, the 120 days would have long since expired, as would the time for requesting a

good cause continuance,

The State controlled when Mr. Slaughter was brought to Delaware and had an affirmative

duty to abide by the statutory requirements, including requesting a good-cause continuance if Mr.

Slaughter could not be brought to trial within 120 days.” The State did not.* Asa result, the State

% State v. Brown, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002] 88, Jurden, P.J., at 18 (April 10, 2017)

(attached as Exhibit D).

% Ted (“Alternatively, the State argues that the Court should find, after-the-fact, that “good

cause’ existed under the UAD to hold trial more than 120 days after Brown's return to Delaware.

But the State is unable to cite to any case in which a Delaware court has retroactively determined

that ‘good cause’ existed to grant a continuance sought after the expiration of the applicable

UAD time limit.”).

* Johnson v. Stagner, 781 F.2d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 1986).

S11 Del C.§ 2543(c) (establishing five requirements for obtaining a continuance of the

IAD time limit: 1) the court must have competent jurisdiction; 2) the grant of the continuance

must be in open court; 3) the defendant or his attorney must be present; 4) the movant must

demonstrate good cause in open court; and 5) the length of the continuance must be necessary or

reasonable); see also Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1336 (Sth Cir.1993) (“If the speedy triai

period could be tolled by unexplained extensions of continuances simply because the record fails

to attribute them to the prosecution, the speedy trial provision would, in effect, be rendered a

nullity... We believe that such a rule would not only render the explicit continuance

requirements surplusage, but would also encourage prosecutors to obtain ex parte continuances

and “busy district courts” to grant sua sponte continuances. Such clever maneuvering around the

[IAD’s] provisions would thwart the purposes of the [JAD] and chisel away defendants’ rights to

a speedy trial under the agreement.”); Dillon v. State, 844 §.W.2d 139, 142 (Tenn. 1992) (“In

order to effectively toll the 120-day period, the statute requires that the prisoner or his counsel be

present during a judicial determination as to whether good cause has been shown for granting a

continuance.”).

34

Are

lost the power to prosecute Mr. Slaughter on February 7, 2015 . At that point, the 120-day IAD time

limit had expired, with no good cause continuance requested or granted, and defense counsel’s

waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s IAD right was in violation of the Sixth Amendment. As such, the State

no longer had the power to prosecute Mr. Slaughter at the time the guilty plea was entered.

Accordingly, Mr. Slaughter is entitled to withdrawal of the guilty plea, and pursuant to 11 Dei. C.

§2544(c), the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice.

Ud

a

M23

CLAIMIL INTHE EVENT THIS COURT FINDS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTED

REASONABLY IN RELYING ON THE STATE’S REPRESENTATIONS

WITHOUT INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMING THEIR ACCURACY » THIS

COURT CAN NEVERTHELESS FIND THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S

WAIVER OF THE 120-DAY IAD TIME LIMIT WAS INVOLUNTARY AND

THEREFORE INVALID, RESULTING IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

PROSECUTION OF MR. SLAUGHTER.

A. This claim is not procedurally barred.

1. This claim is not barred as a former adjudication.

Neither Rule 61(i)(3)® nor 61(i)(4)” bars Mr. Slaughter’s postconviction claim. As Mr.

Slaughter did not file a direct appeal following his conviction and sentence, this claim was never

presented to the Delaware Supreme Court. Moreover, even though this Court denied Mr. Slaughter’ s

two pre-guilty plea motions to dismiss the indictment based upon the State’s violation of the TAD,

this Court was never asked to consider the validity of the guilty plea in terms of whether the State

still had the power to prosecute Mr. Slaughter at the time the plea was entered pursuant to United

States Supreme Court case law and whether defense counsel’s waiver was made voluntarily.

Accordingly, Mr. Slaughter’s postconviction claim has been adjudicated by neither this Court nor

the Delaware Supreme Court and therefore cannot be procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61 ()(4).

2. This claim is not procedurally defaulted.

Nor is Mr. Slaughter’s claim procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3). Arguably, had a

direct appeal been filed, Mr. Slaughter could have presented this claim to the Delaware Supreme

® Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (“Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is

thereafter barred, unless the movant shows (A) [clause for relief from the procedural default and

(B) [p]rejudice from violation of the movant’s rights.”).

* Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (“Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated,

whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a

postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred.”).

36

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Court. However, because defense counsel advised Mr. Slaughter that he had waived his right to

appeal the IAD issue via his guilty plea, no direct appeal was filed. For the reasons explained

below,” this advice was incorrect. Because it is clearly objectively unreasonable to provide

erroneous legal advice,” and because Mr. Slaughter was prejudiced by this erroneous advice in that

he failed to appeal a meritorious issue of great significance,” Mr. Slaughter received ineffective

assistance of counsel in respect to the failure to file a direct appeal.” As the courts have held,

ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause for the procedural default that is required to

overcome the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(3).”°

Additionally, though Mr. Slaughter must also demonstrate prejudice from violation of his

rights in order to be excepted from the procedural default rule of 61 (i)(3),”* the prejudice is readily

apparent in that the United States Supreme Court has found this issue to be of such importance that

it is one of the very few exceptions to the general rule that a valid guilty plea waives all pre-guilty

” See infra pp. 38-42 for a discussion of Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018).

” See, e.g. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 8.Ct. 1376, 1383-84 (2012) (noting that the parties all

conceded that defense counsel provided deficient performance under the Sixth Amendment when

he informed the defendant of an incorrect legal rule).

™ See A551-552.

™ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see infra Claim I pp. 51-54.

” Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(i3) (“Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is

thereafter barred, unless the movant shows (A) [c]ause Jor relief from the procedural default and

(B) [p]rejudice from violation of the movant’s rights. ”) (emphasis added); Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986), superseded on other grounds by statute (“If the procedural default is

the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that

responsibility for the default be imputed to the State, which may not "[conduct] trials at which

persons who face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance"[:]

[i]neffective assistance of counsel, then, is cause for a procedural default.”); Smith v. Horn, 120

F.3d 400, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990)

(“Attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute ‘cause’ for a

procedural default even when that default occurs on appeal rather than at trial.”).

Del. Super. Ct. R. 61(i)G).

37

Mey

plea issues, even those of constitutional dimension.” As such, should Mr. Slaughter’s claim be

dismissed as procedurally defaulted, he would be denied the opportunity to be heard on an issue of

such importance that even a valid guilty plea does not waive it, as a direct result of receiving

incorrect legal advice in violation of his federal and state constitutional ri ght to receive the effective

assistance of counsel. Moreover, for the reasons set forth below, there is a reasonable probability

that an appeal of this issue would have been successful. At the very least, a meritorious issue would

have been presented to the Delaware Supreme Court, as opposed to no appeal at all.

Accordingly, should this Court find that the procedural default bar of Rule 61(i)(3) is

applicable to Mr. Slaughter’s claim, Mr. SI aughter has demonstrated cause forthe procedural default

and prejudice from violation of movant’s rights sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 61 G3)

for exception to the procedural bar.”

3. This claim was not waived via Mr. Slaughter’s guilty plea.

” Class, 138 S.Ct. at 803 (citing Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30 (quoting Tolleit v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973))) (“The Court noted that a guilty plea bars appeals of

many claims, including some “‘antecedent constitutional violations’” related to events (say,

grand jury proceedings) that had “‘occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.’”).

® Cf. State v. Wilson, Del. Super., ID No. 1304003168, Freud, Comm’r, at 10 (Feb. 14,

2018) (Comm’r Rep. & Rec.) (“In the case at bar, Wilson attempts to show cause for his

procedural default by making merely conclusory assertions of ineffectiveness of counsel.”)

(attached as Exhibit E); State v. Cuffee, Del. Super., ID No. 1209013919, Freud, Comm?’r, at 10

(Aug. 7, 2017) (Comm’r Rep. & Rec.) (“In the case at bar, Cuffee attempts to show cause for his

procedural default by making merely conclusory assertions of ineffectiveness of counsel. In

regards to prejudice, Cuffee makes little if any attempt to show counsel's actions harmed him.”)

(attached as Exhibit F).

38

Ally

it should also be noted preliminarily that Mr. Slaughter did not waive this claim by entering

into the guilty plea. This conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme Court decision in

Class v. United States.

Typically, a voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly entered guilty plea constitutes a waiver

of all alleged errors or defects that occurred prior to the entry of the plea.*” However, there are some

exceptions to this general rule, which were identified with specificity by the United States Supreme

Court in Class v. United States ®!

In Class, the Supreme Court was asked to decide the specific question of whether “a guilty

plea bar[s] a criminal defendant from later appealing his conviction on the ground that the statute

of conviction violates the Constitution.?®? In concluding that it does not, the Supreme Court’s

analysis articulated quite clearly the rights that are and are not waived through a guilty plea and

identified the issues that may still be challenged on appeal notwithstanding the entry of a valid guilty

plea.®

In its analysis of the issue in Class, the Supreme Court summarized its precedent on such

issues, beginning with its holding in Blackledge v. Perry, a casein which a state criminal defendant

challenged his conviction on the basis of an unconstitutional vindictive prosecution. In finding that

138 S.Ct. 798 (2018) (holding that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from appealing

his conviction on the basis that the Government did not have the power to criminally prosecute

him).

* See, e.g, Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003) (citing Downer v. State, 543

A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988) (A voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any claims based

on alleged errors or defects preceding the entry of the plea.)); Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099,

1201 (Del. 2008) (“Under Delaware law, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any

alleged errors or defects occurring prior to the entry of the plea... .”).

*! Class, 138 S.Ct. 798.

® Td. at 801-02.

® Id. at 802-06.

M2 }

this claim was not barred by the defendant’s guilty plea, the Court held that “the nature of the

underlying constitutional infirmity”, vindictive prosecution in this case, “implicates ‘the very power

of the State’ to prosecute the defendant”, as “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against the

defendant “operated to deprive him of due process of law.”™

The Court then moved on to its holding in Menna v. New York, a case in which a state

criminal defendant challenged his conviction, after entering a guilty plea, on the basis of a violation

of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In finding that this claim was not waived by the defendant’s guilty

plea, the Supreme Court held that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged

on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”** More

specifically, because the defendant’s claim alleged that “the State may not convict” him “no matter

how validly his factual guilt is established”, the Court held that the guilty plea did not bar his claim.®”

The Supreme Court further noted that it has since upheld the aforementioned decisions in

cases such as United States v. Broce, in which the Court held that a guilty plea does not bar a claim

“where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the

sentence.”** However, the Court also identified in Broce a significant caveat to this rule, in that the

claim must be proven by relying on, and without contradicting, the existing record.®”

in contrast to the claim in Broce, Class’s constitutional claim did not contradict the

indictment or his voluntary, intelligent and knowing admission that he committed the alleged

* Id. at 803 (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31).

% Td. at 803 (citing Menna, 423 U.S. 61).

% Class, 138 S.Ct. at 804 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 and n.2).

87 Ta.

% Td. at 804 (citing United Siates v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)).

® Td. at 804 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 576).

40

L123

conduct, and his claim could therefore be “resolved without any need to venture beyond th[e}

record.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court expressly held that the defendant’s guilty plea did not

bar a direct appeal, because his claims, which challenged the Government’ s power to criminalize the

conduct to which the defendant admitted, “call[ed] into question the Government’s power to

‘criminally prosecute’ him”.°!

In addition to clarifying which types of claims a guilty plea does not bar, the Supreme Court

also clarified in Class those types of claims that a guilty plea does bar. As the Court explained, a

valid guilty plea: 1) relinquishes the constitutional guarantees that accompany the right to a fair trial,

such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the right to confront accusers; 2) the

night to appeal the constitutionality of case-related government conduct that occurs before the plea

is entered, such as an unconstitutionally selected grand jury or a Fourth Amendment search and

seizure violation; and 3) relinquishes “any claim that would contradict the ‘admissions necessarily

made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.”’°? Mr. Slaughter’s claim is none of these.

Mr. Slaughter is not challenging the constitutionality of case-related government conduct that

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea; rather, just as in Class, Mr. Slaughter asserts that based

solely upon the existing record, if his claim is successful, it “would extinguish the government’ s

power to “constitutionally prosecute’” him.” Likewise, just as in Class, Mr. Slaughter is not

contradicting the indictment or the terms of the plea agreement. Rather, Mr. Slaughter alleges,

pursuant to Class, that even if the facts admitted during the plea are taken as true, they do not

* Id. at 805.

”! Class, 138 S.Ct. at 805 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at

61-62)).

” Id.

* Id. at 806 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575 (quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 62-63)).

4]

M24

constitute a prosecutable offense, because the time for prosecuting them had already expired.

Accordingly, Mr. Slaughter did not waive his postconviction claim when he entered the guilty plea.”

B. Defense counsel’s waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial IAD right was not

voluntarily made.

It is true that defense counsel unknowingly and unintelligently consented to a trial date

outside of the 120-day time limit during the November 18, 2015 office conference.” Itis similarly

true that a defense attorney can waive an IAD right on behalf of his/her client, even if the waiver is

not knowing or intelligent.°° However, the courts are in agreement that such a waiver, ata minimum,

must be voluntary.” Based on the unusual circumstances of this case, it is clear that defense

counsel’s waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s IAD speedy trial right was not voluntarily made.

The November 18, 2015 office conference transcript establishes that after the Court

questioned whether the case was “going to be able to be tried within one year of arrest or one year,

say, from today”, the prosecutor responded with “No”, followed by defense counsel’s response of

“No.” Defense counsel then explained that both he and the prosecutor had a major capital case

* For further support of this position, see Class, 138 S.Ct. at 807, 814, dissenting,

(explaining the exceptions to the rule that a guilty plea waives nearly all pre-plea conduct,

including violations of the Speedy Trial Act, created by the majority opinion).

* See supra Claim J at pp. 19-23; It should also be noted that any joint continuances to

which defense counsel consented followed this Court’s denial of Mr. Slaughter’s first motion to

dismiss. (A7-10).

* See, e.g. Hill, 528 U.S. at 114-15.

” United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835, 839 (2d Cir. 1984); see also People v. Turner,

79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 744, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1258, 1265 (Cal. App., 1998) (citing Drescher v.

Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140, 1148 (Cal. App., 1990)) (“Voluntariness [of a statutory

right] requires a showing of record that the defendant or his attorney freely acquiesced [in the

waiver].”); Conn v. State, 831 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s failure to

object to a trial date outside of the IAD time limit was not a voluntary relinquishment of his IAD

right, as it was prompted by the trial court’s failure to give timely notice of the trial date to the

defendant and defendant’s counsel)

42

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scheduled from September through November 2015 and remarked that because of thi s, “realistically,

we're looking for 2016 dates”. Defense counsel then suggested April 2016, to which the State had

no objection.” (A83-84). While defense counsel did not know that his actions during this office

conference were potentially waiving a right held by Mr. Slaughter, the validity of the implicit waiver

could still be upheld it was voluntary. However, the record establishes that defense counsel’s waiver

was not voluntary, as it was induced by deceit, albeit unintentional, on the part of the State.

A voluntary waiver “require[s] knowledge of or reason to know the basic fact that gives rise

to the IAD right”.” Due process further requires that for a waiver to be voluntary, it must be the

“product of a free and deliberate choice[,] rather than intimidation, coercion[,] or deception”! It

cannot reasonably be said that defense counsel had knowledge of the basic fact giving rise to Mr.

Slaughter’s right to be tried within 120 days of his arrival in Delaware-that the [AD was applicable

to Mr. Slaughter’s case. In actuality, defense counsel was entirely oblivious to this basic fact.

Significantly, defense counsel’s ignorance of this essential fact was the direct result of being misled

by the State, demonstrating that his waiver was not the “product of a free and deliberate choice” but

rather the product of “deception.” It matters not that the State’s deception was unintentional, as it

* During a November 19, 2015 status conference, defense counsel stated: “Your Honor,

just to put that on the record for today’s conference. We moved this trial to accommodate all

parties, including counsel in the Paladin Club capital murder trial, which has more lawyers and

more parties in it. The decision was made to move this to sometime in January 2016.” (A560).

The trial was then scheduled to begin January 9, 2017. (A561). The trial date was then moved to

January 24, 2017 during the August 29, 2016 office conference with no objection from either

party. (A566-67).

® Lawson, 736 F.2d at 839.

™ Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 296 (Del. 2005) (citing Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d

757, 762 (Del. 2003)).

43

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nevertheless lead to defense counsel involuntarily waivi ng a right on behalf of his client thathe never

would have waived had he not been misled by the State into believing it did not exist.

The numerous incorrect assertions made by the State concerning such a key issue are what

set Mr. Slaughter’s case apart from the norm. The record shows that the State made the following

representations to defense counsel concerning the manner in which Mr. SI aughter was brought to

Delaware and the applicability of the IAD to Mr. Slaughter’s case, many of which later proved to

be false:

|. This was not an IAD case, because Mr. Slaughter was returned to Delaware

pursuant to a Governor’s Warrant (A77, 81, 229-30, 234, 237, 23 ). 255);

2. The GDOC informed Delaware that it would not extradite Mr. Slaughter on an

IAD request, because it was a capital murder case and the IAD therefore did not

apply (A135-36);

3. The only reason Delaware pursued a Governor’s Warrant was because Georgia

telayed that it would not honor an JAD request (A137),

4. The State does not know why Georgia believes the [AD does not apply to capital

murder cases, because that is legally incorrect (A136-37);

5. Ron Mullin, the Delaware Department of Justice’s extradition supervisor,

erroneously advised the GDOC that Mr. Slaughter could not request return under the

IAD, and a Governor’s Warrant was necessary to obtain custody of him (A3 19);

6. Mauro may apply to Mr. Slaughter’s case (A210, 218, 245, 252-53, 280-81);

7. Mauro does not apply to Mr. Slaughter’s case, because a Governor’s Warrant is

not a written request for temporary custody under the IAD (A337-340).

The aforementioned representations made by the State all misled defense counsel into

believing that the LAD was not implicated in Mr. Slaughter’s case, and to the extent that Delaware

chose to pursue a Governor’s Warrant for the extradition of Mr. Slaughter, it was in response to the

misunderstandings of law made by the Georgia Department of Corrections. These representations

44

MIL

were all false. However, because the State did not provide the JAD paperwork to defense counsel

until March 18, 2015, four months after the scheduling conference at which defense counsel

allegedly waived Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial right, defense counsel relied on the representations

made by the State and assumed their accuracy. (A163, 241). As defense counsel remarked to the

Court, “.. . . was in no position to acquiesce or not acquiesce [to a trial date outside the LAD time

limit] because it had been represented to me that this was not an IAD case.” (A269). In fact, defense

counsel further stated, “I seriously doubt Ms. Woloshin and I would not have raised the IAD issue

had we not been informed this was a govemor’s warrant case.” (A229).

Based upon the aforementioned misrepresentations that the State made to defense counsel,

it is clear that defense counsel was misled as to the manner in which Mr. Slaughter was extradited

to Delaware and the applicability of the LAD to the case. While it is clear that the State did not

intend to deceive defense counsel, it is also clear that the lack of deceitful intent is ultimately

immaterial, as the result was the same—defense counsel did not, and could not, freely acquiesce to

the April 2016 trial date. Defense counsel’s acquiescence to the April 5, 2016 trial date was made

in specific reliance on critical misrepresentations made by the State. As such, defense counsel’s

alleged waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial IAD rights was procured by the State’s extremely

significant, albeit unintentional, misrepresentations. The State’s conduct has the consequence of

rendering any waiver of a right made in reliance on this false information involuntary. Inthe absence

of free acquiescence, defense counsel’s waiver is unequivocally an invalid waiver.

Though there is minimal Delaware and Third Circuit Court of Appeals case law on this issue,

the decisions of other jurisdictions are instructive on this matter. The Sixth Circuit has held that

because the IAD rights are for the benefit and protection of the prisoner, they can be waived by the

45

M33

prisoner, so jong as the prisoner is aware of and understands his IAD rights and so long as the waiver

is voluntary.'' If the prisoner is not aware of his tights, the Sixth Circuit has held that his rights can

still be waived, so long as there is an affirmative request to be treated in a manner that is contrary

to the procedures prescribed by the IAD." Based on these principles, the Court of Appeals of

Michigan found in People v. Jones that the trial court incorrectly determined that the defendant had

waived his right to be tried within 120 days of his arrival in the Teceiving stated without first

determining whether the defendant participated in or concurred with the decision to delay trial or

whether he affirmatively requested to be treated in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the

IAD.' The Michigan court also noted that if the decision to delay trial was made independently by

defense counsel, “the failure of trial counsel to consider the speedy trial defense presented by the

IAD before setting a trial date may implicate Sixth Amendment guarantees and render the waiver

of rights under the IAD invalid because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.!™ Similarly, Mr.

Slaughter did not participate in or concur with the decision to delay trial; rather the decision was

made independently by defense counsel without consideration of the speedy trial defense presented

by the IAD, albeit in reliance on the State’s misrepresentations.

Similarly, in Roberson v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether

defense counsel’s failure to object to a trial date outside of the IAD time limit constituted a waiver,

when counsel had made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to acquire the IAD documents from the

! United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,

304 US 458 (1938)).

1 Id. at 344-45 (citing United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732, 742 (2d Cir. 1977); United

States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (Sth Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 US 943 (1978)).

®8 Jones, 482 N.W.2d at 210-11, 192 Mich. App. at 744-45.

* 482 N.W.2d at 211; 192 Mich. App. at 745,

46

N34

Commonwealth.’ Based on the record, defense counsel was apparently unaware that the IAD had

been triggered. The Kentucky Supreme Court found no waiver, stating, “we cannot say that the

defendant's acquiescence in the . . . trial date[ ] directly contributed to the speedy trial violation.

Instead, . . . the trial was set beyond the time allowed by statute because the prosecution was unaware

of the precise character of the defendant's speedy trial rights and failed to comply with its obligations

under the Interstate Agreement.”'®° The Court further noted that the defendant had not affirmatively

requested that the court follow a procedure inconsistent with the IAD and “it was not necessary that

he demand the court comply with the IAD, since, as stated previously, the burden of complying with

the IAD is on the Commonwealth.”

Similar to Roberson, defense counsel was unaware that the [AD had been triggered in Mr.

Slaughter’s case, despite questioning the State as to the manner in which Mr. Slaughter was

extradited to Delaware. Likewise, the trial was not set past the 120-day time limit because defense

counsel voluntarily waived Mr. Slaughter’s speedy trial IAD right, but because the State of Delaware

“was unaware of the precise character of the defendant's speedy trial rights and failed to comply with

its obligations under the Interstate Agreement.”!

5 Roberson v. Com., 913 §,W.2d 310 (Ky. 1994) (remanding the case to the trial court

“to determine whether continuing the case beyond the [AD time limitation was for good cause

and was necessary or reasonable”).

6 Td. at 315 (citing People v. Allen, 744 P.2d 73, 76 (Colo. 1987)).

7 Td. at 315.

8 Td: see also Siate v. Brown, 953 A.2d 1174, 157 N.H. 555 (N.H. 2008) (“Here,

although the defendant may have been aware on May 11, 2006, of the possibility that trial could

be moved from September 25 to some later date after the trial court ruled upon the State's motion

to join defendants, the trial court did not grant a continuance at that hearing. Nothing in the

record suggests, nor does the State assert, that the defendant knew that the later date would be

outside the 180-day period or that he waived his [AD speedy trial rights at any time.”).

4]

Mss”

The State’ s misrepresentation that the IAD did not apply in Mr. Slaughter’ s case, necessarily

caused any waiver unintentionally made by defense counsel at the November office conference to

beinvalid. The holding in Haigler v. United States’ supports that conclusion. In Haigier, the trial

court informed the defendant that the LAD was inapplicable to his case because he had not made a

request for final disposition as required under Article Hl(a), the federal counterpart to 1] Del. C. §

2542(a). Consequently, “the goverment, the defense, and the trial court all operated under the

erroneous assumption that [Haigler’s] failure to make a request to be tried pursuant to Article TI

effectively waived his rights under the IAD.” The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

concluded that “even if we could agree (for the sake of argument) that {Haigler’s] efforts were

inadequate to invoke his claim toa speedy trial thereunder, we could not penalize him for failing to

more vigorously pursue rights he was specifically informed he did not have.”!!! Significantly, the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the defendant had not waived his IAD

speedy trial rights because his actions were made in reliance on false information given to him by

the trial court-that the IAD did not apply to his case. There is little practical difference between

Haigler and Mr. Slaughter’s case, as the actions of both defendants, which allegedly waived their

IAD rights, were made in reliance on faulty information given to them by either the trial court or the

prosecution,

The State made affirmative representations to defense counsel that misled defense counsel

into believing that he did not need to assess whether there was an IAD speedy trial defense in Mr.

Slaughter’s capital murder case. Defense counsel did not fail to inquire as to the manner in which

'® 531 A.2d 1236, 124)-42 (1987).

NO Td at 1241.

"0 Td. at 1240.

48

ABU

the State brought Mr. Slaughter to Delaware; rather, the State affirmatively represented that this was

a Governor's Warrant case The burden of compliance with the requirements of the IAD belongs to

the State, not the prisoner, and because the IAD is remedial in nature, courts have held that it should

be liberally construed in favor of the prisoner against whom the detainer has been lodged."

Accordingly, it would be inconsistent with this long-held interpretation of the [AD for the State to

unjustly benefit from an alleged waiver of Mr. Slaughter’s IAD right that was induced by its own

misrepresentations to defense counsel. Because defense counsel’s waiver was made in reliance on

the State’s affirmative misrepresentations, the right was not freely relinquished and the waiver was

involuntary.

C. The required remedy is withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the

indictment with prejudice.

Because the State was required to bring Mr. Slaughter to trial by February 6, 2015 under the

plain language of the statute, and the State failed to do so, the IAD required that the indictment

against Mr. Slaughter be dismissed with prejudice on February 7, 2014. Although a valid waiver of

the 120-day time period would have excused the State’s actions, for the aforementioned reasons,

defense counsel’s waiver was invalid. Accordingly, the State no longer had the power to prosecute

Mr. Slaughter for the alleged conduct at the time the guilty plea was entered, and the indictment

should have been dismissed with prejudice long before the plea colloquy. The very continuation of

proceedings against Mr. Slaughter from February 7, 2015 forward violated Mr. Slaughter’ s right to

due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

? See United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 836 (3d. Cir. 1975); State v.

Sassoon, 242 §.E.2d 121, 122-23 (Ga. 1978); People v. Christensen, 465 NE.2d 93, 96 il.

1984); Commonwealth vy. Thurston, 834 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct., 2003).

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1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. As such, the only remedy now available is the withdrawal of

the guilty plea and dismissal of the indictment with prejudice due to the State’ s clear violation of Mr.

Slaughter’s [AD speedy trial rights and federal and state constitutional right to due process.’

3 While defense counsel noted during the Nov 18, 2015 office conference that the case

could not be tried within 1 year because both he and the prosecutor were involved in another

capital murder case, counsel could have, and likely would have, rearranged his calendar dates

and/or requested that the Office of Conflicts Counsel (“OCC”) appoint new counsel for Mr.

Slaughter. Defense counsel’s emphasis was not on the length of time needed to prepare

specifically for Mr. Slaughter’s case but rather on his current case load, believing that it could not

be tried before April 2016 based upon his current calendar availability. (A83-85). For this

reason, an after-the-fact finding that a good cause continuance would have been granted does not

mitigate the IAD or due process violation, as another defense attorney could have been appointed

by the OCC who had sufficient availability to prepare the case for trial within the 120-day time

period. In the event the State did not have sufficient time to prepare the case, the prosecutor

could have requested a good cause continuance before the 120 days expired in open court in the

presence of either Mr. Slaughter or his attorney; the State failed to do so.

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