Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jason Slaughter, Petitioner v. Delaware

Facts Relevant to this Motion

4. The sequence of events giving rise to this motion to dismiss are set forth as

follows:

¢ July 16,2012: A Delaware grand jury indicts Mr. Slaughter in this case!

© July 18, 2012: A Rule 9 Warrant is issued 2 According to the docket, an

Authorization for Extradition was also issued.

© August 15, 2013: Mr. Slaughter is convicted of murder and other charges in

Georgia.

¢ October 4, 2013: the Delaware DOJ lodges a detainer against Mr.

Slaughter, now serving his sentence for the Georgia murder

¢ October 15, 2013: The Georgia Department of Corrections sends to the

Delaware DOJ an Acknowledgement of Detainer as well as Mr. Slaughter’s

duly completed forms I-IV pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on

Detainers. The effective date of the forms is October 11, 2013, according to

the Acknowledgement. +

' Exhibit A.

> Exhibit B,

> Exhibit C.

* Exhibit D.

A?3

® November 5, 2013: The Delaware DOJ acknowledges receipt of the two

sets of forms sent by the Georgia Department of Corrections. The packages

were addressed to Joseph R. Biden, Ill, Esquire, and Detestive Jack

Desmond.5

¢ April 14, 2014: The LAD coordinator from Georgia writes a letter to

Detective Ron Mullin stating, “with his capital murder charge he cannot file

for Interstate Agreement of Detainer. A goveror’s warrant will have to be

used to bring him back to court.” This letter is undated, but Georgia

authorities told the office of the undersigned counsel it was “scanned in” to

their file on April 14, 2014.°

* May 23,2014. The Delaware DOJ seeks an executive agreement between

the governors of the two states pursuant to 11 Del. Code § 2505(a).’

e July 28,2014: The Executive Agreement between the two governors is

signed ®

° Exhibit E.

5 Exhibit F.

* Exhibit G,

* Exhibit H.

® October 6, 2014: The Delaware DOJ sends an Authority to Release Custody

of Offender to the Georgia LAD coordinator. °

* November 18, 2014: Mr. Slaughter is committed to the Delaware

Department of Correction and arraigned on the Delaware charges, '°

Law Applicable to this Motion

5. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is codified in Delaware at 11

Del. Code § 2540 et. seq. It provides a mechanism for the handling of untried

indictments, informations, or complaints in other states {receiving state) while the

prisoner is serving a sentence in any other state (sending state).

6. When a state (e.g., Delaware) lodges a detainer against a prisoner in another

state (e.g. Georgia), the commissioner of corrections must inform the prisoner of

his right to request a final disposition of his untried case in the other state." I¢ the

prisoner seeks disposition of the untried charges, the commissioner from the

sending state is required to send the properly executed forms to the receiving

state.!?,

° Exhibit 1.

0 Exhibit J, DI. 14, 18.

"11 Del. Code § 2542(c).

2 11 Del Code § 2542(d); see, e.g., Exhibit D

ATS”

7. If the untried indictment is not brought to trial within 180 days, the charges

in the receiving state must be dismissed with prejudice."? The 180 days begins

running when the LAD paperwork is received by the receiving state.“

8. The state with the untried charges may also seek delivery of the prisoner

pursuant to the IAD. If the prisoner is actually brought to the receiving state at the

request of the State pursuant to the IAD, the trial must commence within 120 days.

This period can be enlarged for good cause shown, but only after a hearing with

the prisoner and/or his counsel present.'5

9. The IAD law is strictly interpreted and does not provide for de minimis

exceptions. For example, in Bozeman v. Alabama, 533 U.S. 146 (2001), an

Alabama prisoner was brought to Florida pursuant to the IAD for one day to be

arraigned on his Florida firearms charges. But then he was returned to Alabama

while awaiting the Florida trial. This return after one day triggered the “if trial is

not had prior to the prisoner’s being retumed to the original place of

imprisonment” provision in the IAD, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the

dismissal of his charges. The Court held, “the language of the Agreement militates

against an implicit exception, for it is absolute. it Says that, when a prisoner is

S11 Del. Code § 2542(d).

“11 Del. Code § 2542(g).

"11 Dek Code § 2543(d).

ANG

“returned” before trial, the indictment, information, or complaint “shall not be of

any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same

with prejudice. The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily ‘the Janguage of command.’ "6

10. In Delaware, our courts have consistently held that the detainer statute “must

be strictly construed in favor of the prisoner because the State, through its agents

and its control of the procedural aspects of the Interstate Agreement On Detainers,

controls the only ultimate guarantee of performance for the benefit of the

prisoner.!”

ll. The governor’s agreement to extradite is a separate means of obtaining the

presence of a defendant for trial in another state, and is codified in Delaware at 11

Del. Code Chapter 25, Subchapter I. It provides, in relevant part, for two

govemors to cause, by executive agreement, the extradition of a prisoner who is

either awaiting trial or serving a sentence in one state to face his charges in another

state."

'6 Bozeman at 153 (internal citations omitted).

"" Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, $13 (Del.1973). See also, State v. Anthony, 1995 WL 1918899

(Del. Super. Ct.)

811 Del Code § 2505(a).

hy)

12. Nothing in the IAD or the extradition statute provides that a governor’s

agreement trumps the IAD, nor does it provide that a governor’s agreement can

resuscitate charges dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the LAD.

Argument

13. By application of 11 Del. Code § 2542, Jason Slaughter’s indictment should

have been dismissed with prejudice on May 6, 2014. The math is straightforward.

Receipt of the duly executed LAD paperwork occurred on November 6, 2013. Mr.

Slaughter was never brought to Delaware at ail on his LAD request, and obviously

no trial occurred within 180 days. A notice of dismissal should have been sent to

Jason Slaughter on or about May 6, 2014. |

14. The Governors’ Executive Agreement of July 28, 2014 would have been .

sufficient to bring Mr. Slaughter to Delaware to face the charges. However, there

should have been no charges remaining had they been dismissed with prejudice on

May 6, 2014 as they should have by operation of the LAD statute. As such, the

Executive Agreement has no force or effect.

15. _ As the docket reflects, the State was well aware of Mr. Slaughter’s trial in

Georgia. The State put the Court on notice on September 18, 2012 that Mr.

Slaughter would be arrested upon completion of his trial in Georgia. As such, the

State had ample time to circumvent the IAD by presenting to the Governor an

executive agreement would have produced Mr. Slaughter in Delaware to face his

he

16. The undated letter from the Georgia IAD coordinator to Ron Mullin (Exhibit

Ary

17. Ultimately, the timeline ang exhibits presented here establish conclusively

that Jason Slaughter’s indictment Should have been dismissed upon expiration of

the time window, which occurred on May 6, 2014. Mr. Slaughter respectfully

requests that this Court now enter that order of dismissal with prejudice.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Jason Slaughter requests that

this Court dismiss all charges in this case with Prejudice and order that he be sent

back to Georgia 10 serve his sentence.

COLLINS & ROOP

Fopuads

Patrick Collins

716 North Tatmail Street, Suite 300

Wilmington, DE 19801

(302) 655-4600

and

Natalie Woloshin, Esquire

Woloshin, Lynch & Natalie, P_A.

3200 Concord Pike, P.O. Box 7329

Wilmington, DE 19803

As

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE )

)

v. ID No. 1207010738

JASON SLAUGHTER

ORDER

AND NOY, this day of , 2015, the foregoing Motion to

Dismiss having been presented to and considered by the Court,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

The Honorable Eric M. Davis

AS |

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE

v. ID No. 1207010738

Swe Neetu! Nee” Spe

JASON SLAUGHTER

NOTICE OF SERVICE

I, Patrick Collins, attomey for Jason Slaughter, certify that a Motion to

Dismiss was served upon Colleen Norris, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, by

US Mail and/or hand delivery, to the Attomey General’s Office at 820 North

French Street, 7" Floor Wilmington, Delaware 19801.

COLLINS & ROOP

Pan,

Patrick Collins

716 North Tatnall Street, Suite 300

Wilmington, DE 19801

(302) 655-4600

Dated: MAR 3 1 2015

Wiper teins ce a

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE

v.

LD. No. 1207010738

JASON SLAUGHTER,

Defendant.

PETITIONER JASON SLAUGHTER’S AMENDED MOTION FOR

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Christopher S. Koyste, Esquire (#3107)

Law Office of Christopher S. Koyste LLC

Attorney for the Petitioner

709 Brandywine Blvd.

Wilmington, DE 19809

(302) 762-5195

Dated: May 14, 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .......00.0000.0000.00000000 200000000000. il

INTRODUCTION, 20000 nce tence eee ]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY... 2.02200 ccc cece eee. 2

ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 61... 0000 eee 4

LAW APPLICABLE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS...... 5

STATEMENT OF FACTS. «0.0.0 e nee eees 6

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

CLAIMI. MR. SLAUGHTER’S SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW

WERE VIOLATED WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL NON-STRATEGICALLY WAIVED

MR. SLAUGHTER’S IAD SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT, RESULTING IN THE STATE’S

CONTINUED, UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF MR. SLAUGHTER... . 16

CLAIM IL IN THE EVENT THIS COURT FINDS THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTED

REASONABLY IN RELYING ON THE STATE’S REPRESENTATIONS WITHOUT

INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRMING THEIR ACCURACY, THIS COURT CAN

NEVERTHELESS FIND THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL’S WAIVER OF THE 120-DAY

IAD TIME LIMIT WAS INVOLUNTARY AND THEREFORE INVALID, RESULTING

IN AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF MR. SLAUGHTER. ......... 36

CLAIM lil. DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR

FAILING TO FILE A DIRECT APPEAL CHALLENGING THE SUPERIOR COURT’S

DENIAL OF THE SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS.. ..............0..---0.0.. 51

CONCLUSION | 2000 eee 55

EXHIBITS

February 20, 2015 Protective Order... 02.2... eee Exhibit A

State v. Harris, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002195, Jurden, J.P. (April 26, 2017)... .... Exhibit B

May 1, 2017 Motion for Reargument in Staie v. Karl Harris, ID No. 1108002195... .. Exhibit C

State v. Brown, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002188, Jurden, PJ. (April 10, 2017)... .... Exhibit D

State v. Wilson, Del. Super., ID No. 1304003168, Freud, Comm’r (Feb. 14, 2018) (Comm’r Rep. &

ROC) occa ee me nmeme nema ngmamames cheb dmddbmthsher haem shee nmhwew Exhibit E

State v. Cuffee, Del. Super., ID No. 1209013919, Freud, Comm’r (Aug. 7, 2017) (Comm’r Rep. &

AYA

REC) ooo occ ccc eee eee eee cee ee eset ete b eee vbbeesteee ees eeeees Exhibit F

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ASS

TABLE OF CITATIONS

United States Supreme Court Cases

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (A974) ©2002 eee eee 32, 33, 38, 39, 40, 52

Class v. United Siates, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018) 20222 cece passim

Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993) . 000 ees 17

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 2002 eee Lecce ee 5

Johnson ¥. Zerpst, 304. US 458 (1938). << cece cages ek eww rem e sew THE Mew mED 46

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 §.Ct. 1376 (2012) o.oo ccc cette eens 37

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) 2.0000 cc eee 5

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) 2.00. eee 32, 40, 41, 52

Murray. Carrier, 477 US. 478 (1986)... ces cia cere ease crews we eee sere e@entmisewes 3

New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000) ............00..0 02000022000, 8, 17, 20, 25, 42

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 2.0. eee 5

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 200 eee passim

Tolleti v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973)... 0. eee 38

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) .... 20.6 cee 40, 41, 52

United Siates v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978)... 2. ee ce passim

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 US. 5Y0 (2008)... cc2ecnsweneucwse seer yer wew epee ene newew swe 5

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ...... 0.00006 eee 5

Federal Cases

Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332 (Sth Cir.1993) 2.2.0 eee eee 34

Haigler y. United States, 531 A.2d 1236 (1987)... 0.2.0 eee 48

Johnson v. Stagner, 781 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986)... eee 34

Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400 (3d Cir. 1997)....... scm vmnwnmamsaamambme Seen ERIM SWE BE 3

United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830 (3d. Cir. 1975). ..2......0.00...5--. 49

United States v. Eaddy, 595 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1979) 2.0.2 46

United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977). 02 eee 46

United States v. Lawson, 736 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1984)... 0.000022 eee 42, 43

United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1977)... ee 46

State Cases

Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099 (Del. 2008)... . 2.2.2.6 2 6 eee ee eee eee eee eee 3

Bruce y. State, 781 A.2d 544 (Del. 2001)... 2.22 ee eee 25

Commonwealth y. Thurston, 834 A.2d 595 (Pa. Super. Ct., 2003)... ......00020.0.02-.220.5.000.. 49

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 399 Mass. 455, 504 N.E. 2d 1060 (Mass. 1987)................ 26

Conr v: Slate, 831 N-E2d 828 (nd. 2008). a ceca gece gw iw ew rev niews me memumewewamemas 42

Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821 (Del. 1994)... 00 eee 16, 5]

Dillon v. State, 844 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1992)... 00 eee eee 34

Downer vy. State, 543 A.2d 309 (Del. 1988)... 22 ce eee 39

Drescher v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1140 (Cal. App., 1990)... ..............-5. 42

Duross v. State, 494 A.2d 1265 (Del. 1985)... 62 eee 16, 51

iti

Ag

Ex Parte King, 286 $.W. 3d 599 (Tex. App., 2009)... 2000000000. 00eeeeeeeee 26

Gann v. State, 2011 WL 4985701 (Del. Oct. 19, 2001)... eee 30

Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291 (Del. 2005)... cece cece cece eee. 43

Gondolfi v. Clinger, 352. Ark. 156, 98 S.W. 3d 812 (Ark. 2003)... 0.000000 26

Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989) 0000 cece cece ee 30, 32

Miller v, State, 840 A.2d 1229 (Del. 2003) .2 2.20 cc ce ceecee. 39

Moore v. Hall, 62 A.3d, 1203 (Del. 2013)... 202.0 30, 32, 33

Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935 (Del. 715) cra S 53

Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003) 2.00 ce cece cece eee. 43

People v. Allen, 744 P.2d 73, 76 (Colo. 1987) 2.200. 47

People v. Christensen, 465 N.E.2d 93 (IIL 1984).00 000000 eee. 49

People v. Jones, 482 N.W.2d 207, 192 Mich. App. 737 (Mich. App., 1992)........00... 20, 46

People v. Quackenbush, 687 P. 2d 448 (Col. 1984) .. 0.0.0 26

People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1258 (Cal. App., 1998) ......0.... 42

Pitiman y. State, 301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973) 00 ec ce eee 29, 31

Potter v. State, 547 A.2d 595 (Del. 1988) 2.00. e eee. 5, 33

Roberson v. Com., 913 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. 1994) 00 cece cee eee. 46, 47

Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465 (Del. 1999) 00 ccc cece eeeee 5

Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000)... 0 ccc cee cee ee 51, 52, 53

State v. Brown, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002188, Jurden, PJ. (April 10, 2017) Lecce eee 34

State v. Brown, 953 A.2d 1174, 157 N.H. 555 (N.H. 2008)...0. 0220.00. eee 47

State v. Cuffee, Del. Super., ID No. 1209013919, Freud, Comm’r (Aug. 7, 2017) (Comm’ rRep. &

IRGC.) og scone 59909 29 ad amg neue umeveremsymrnmamumumiawsememememousmemewememsmememous 38

State v. Davis, 210 §.W. 3d 229 (Mo. App., 2006)... 02.00. eee eee 26

State v. Dippold, 1992 WL 354081 (Del. Super. Oct. 5, 1992) ........000000..000000. 008. 29

State v. Dorn, 1989 WL 135712 (Del. Super. Nov. 3, 1989) .........00.00000 0000 cee. 29

State v. Hall, 976 S.W. 2d 121 (Tenn. 1998)... eee ee 26

State v. Harris, Del. Super., ID No. 1108002195, Jurden, J.P. (April 26, 2017).......... 21, 22

State v. Nguyen, 419 N.J. Super. 413, 17 A.3d 256 (NJ. Super, 2011) ....0..2.....-2.0.... 25

State v. Roberson, 78 Wash. App. 600, 897 P.2d 443 (Wash. App., 1995)................. 26

State v. Sassoon, 242 8.E.2d 121 (Ga. 1978) 2.00 49

State v. Wilson, Del. Super., ID No. 1304003168, Freud, Comm’r (Feb. 14, 20i8) (Comm’r Rep. &

REC.) once bce ee ete cert eee eeeeee 38

Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552 (Del. 1990)... 0.0 ccc cece eee 37

United States Constitution

U.S. Const. amend. VI... eee eee passim

U.S. Const. amend. XIV... cee 4, 5, 16, 30, 32, 33, 49

Delaware Constitution

Del. Const. art. 5 §.7...00000 000000 cee eee 4, 5, 30, 32, 33, 50, 51

iv

Rules

Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(0)(4) 2 cts 4

Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61()@G) . 2.0.2. ee eee 16, 36, 37, 38, 51

Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61@)(4) .2 22.2 eee 16, 36, 37, 38, 51

Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)Q)) 2 eens 4

Statutes

11 Del. C. § 2542(a) 200 ne eee teens passim

11 Del C.§ 2542(B) ooo ccc cece cece c eee c eevee eee veeeteeeee. 17,31

LI Dek, Ge B2S4B GY. «oe eed EWE EDS OE SER ER EH aE Ee Bde bbe wR Raw wD passim

11 Del. C. § 2544(c) occ ccc cece cece ee ceeeveteeeeees 14, 18, 19, 31,35

Vv

Adee

INTRODUCTION

COMES NOW, Defendant Jason Slaughter (“Mr. Slaughter”), by and through undersigned

counsel, Christopher S. Koyste, hereby moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61(a)(1) to withdraw his guilty plea and grant all appropriate relief, including

dismissal of the indictment with prejudice.

AR

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Slaughter was indicted on July 16, 2012 for one count each of Murder First Degree and

Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”). (Docket Entry 1'). At the

time of the indictment, Mr. Slaughter was awaiting trial in Georgia in a separate murder case.

(DE9). On August 15, 2013, Mr. Slaughter was tried and convicted in Georgia of Murder First

Degree and related charges and was later sentenced to life plus thirty years. (A403). On October

9, 2014, Mr. Slaughter arrived at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Delaware. (/d.).

On March 31, 2015, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, to which the State

responded on May 6, 2015, (DE34, 39). Following the defense’s May 11, 2014 reply and a July 30,

2015 hearing, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. (DE40, 48). A motion for reargument was

filed on August 5, 2015 and was denied by the Court on December 23, 2015. (DE51, 64). On

August 23, 2016, the defense filed a second motion to dismiss the indictment, to which the State

responded on September 21, 2016. (DE69, 76). Following the defense’s September 22, 2016 reply,

the Court held a hearing on the second motion to dismiss on October 14, 2016. (DE78, 82).

After new information was revealed relating to the motions to dismiss, the defense filed a

renewal of Mr. Slaughter’s first motion to dismiss on November 14, 2016, as well as a letter

supplementing the second motion to dismiss. (DE89, 90). On December 5, 2016, the State filed a

response to Mr. Slaughter’s renewal of the first motion to dismiss, as well as a response to questions

asked by the Court during oral argument held on the second motion to dismiss. (DE95, 96). On

January 3, 2017, the Court denied both Mr. Slaughter’s renewed first motion to dismiss and Mr.

Slaughter’s second motion to dismiss.

' The Docket Sheets for Case No. 1501005498 are attached as Al-22 and assigned DE #.

7

Ag

On January 18, 2017, Mr. Slaughter pleaded guilty to one count of Murder Second Degree.

(DE118). Mr. Slaughter filed a pro se motion to withdraw the guilty plea on February 3, 2017.

(DE119). Following a March 16, 2017 hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea, independent

counsel was appointed for the purpose of counseling Mr. Slaughter on the motion to withdraw guilty

plea. (DE123). Mr. Slaughter ultimately proceeded pro se on the motion to withdraw guilty plea,

and on May 25, 2017, after hearing oral argument on the motion, the Court denied Mr. Slaughter’ s

motion to withdraw guilty plea. (DE126). Mr. Slaughter was sentenced on August 4, 2017 to a term

of fifty years at Level V, suspended after twenty years, followed by decreasing levels of supervision.

(DE128).

Mr. Slaughter filed pro se motions for postconviction relief and appointment of counsel on

September 25, 2017, and undersigned counsel was thereafter appointed to represent Mr. Slaughter

in his Rule 61 postconviction proceedings. (DE129, 130).

ww

Ag |

ENTITLEMENT TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 61

Jurisdiction.

Petitioner Jason Slaughter is an inmate seeking to set aside his sentence of fifty years at Level

V. suspended after twenty years, for one count of Murder Second Degree. Mr. Slaughter raises

constitutional claims alleging that his conviction resulted from violations of his right to due process

and his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and under Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution.

None of Mr. Slaughter’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the merit of the claims raised herein, and these claims

are not procedurally barred.” Mr. Slaughter’s motion is made pursuant to Delaware Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61. Mr. Slaughter’s conviction became final on September 3, 2017, thirty days after

he was sentenced by the Superior Court? (DE128). Accordingly, this postconviction motion is

timely.“

> For a specific analysis of the procedural bars as they relate to each individual

postconviction claim, see infra Claim I pp. 16; Claim I pp. 36-42; Claim II pp. 51.

Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1) (“If the defendant does not file a direct appeal,” a

judgment of conviction becomes final for the purpose of Rule 61 “30 days after the Superior

Court imposes sentence”.); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(b)(4) (A motion may not be filed until

the judgment of conviction is final.”).

4 Mr. Slaughter’s pro se Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief was filed on September

25, 2017. (DE129).

AaAd

LAW APPLICABLE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS

The right to counsel, guaranteed by the United States Constitution under the Sixth

Amendment and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, has long been

held to mean the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ The Sixth Amendment right to counsel

has been extended to all critical stages of'a criminal proceeding, including sentencing.® Article L, §

7 of the Delaware Constitution likewise provides that a criminal defendant has “a right to be heard

by himself or herself and his or her counsel.”’ Thus, a defendant in a criminal case is also

guaranteed the right to legal representation under Delaware state law.’

Constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the two-prong

standard established in Strickland v. Washington and its progeny.” To prevail, a petitioner must

show that counsel’s performance both: 1) fell below “an objective standard of reasonableness”’’ and

2) resulted in prejudice.'? Prejudice is established by showing “there is a reasonable probability that

2912

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Reasonable probability has been defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.”7

3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“[T]he right to counsel is the nght

to the effective assistance of counsel.”) (quoting McMann y. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14

(1970)).

6 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); Shelion v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 513 (Del.

1999).

7 Del. Const. art. 1, § 7.

8 Potier v. State, 547 A.2d 595, 600 (Del. 1988).

* Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005).

10 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

4 Td. at 687.

Td. at 694.

374.

A4s

STATEMENT OF FACTS”

Offenses.

On December 14, 2007, law enforcement responded to a shooting in Newark, Delaware

involving two victims. (A402). Upon arrival, officers found Christopher Masters inside of his

residence deceased from a single gunshot wound to the head. (/d.). Another individual, Jason

Slaughter, was transported to Christiana Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound to the shoulder

(Id.).

In speaking with law enforcement, Mr. Slaughter advised that he was visiting his friend

Christopher Masters, and as the two were standing outside of Mr. Masters’ trailer, they were

approached by two black males who asked if they wanted to buy some marijuana. (A384, 402). Mr.

Masters and Mr. Slaughter agreed and invited the two individuals inside. (/d.). Once inside, a

disagreement occurred over the amount of money that was owed, and the two individuals attempted

to rob them, eventually shooting both Mr. Masters and Mr. Slaughter. (A384-85, 402).

‘ 4 protective order was entered in this case on February 20, 2015 ordering that “counsel

for the Defendant shall not disclose to the Defendant, his family, friends or agents, the identity of

the State’s potential civilian witnesses or from sharing with him, his family, friends or agents any

documents, recordings, or transcripts containing the names of such witnesses or any documents,

the content of which would lead to the identification of the civilian witnesses.” (Attached as

Exhibit A). Accordingly, this Motion references only three individuals by name: Mr. Christopher

Masters, Mr. Michael Haegele, and Mrs. Donna Slaughter. As Mr. Masters and Mr. Haegele are

the decedents in Delaware and Georgia respectively, they are clearly not “potential civilian

witnesses.” In regard to Mrs. Slaughter, she is Mr. Slaughter’s wife and his co-defendant in the

Georgia murder case, which is a matter of public record. Additionally, these three names were

repeatedly used by the State and defense counsel in their pre-guilty plea briefing and by this

Court in the decisions on the defense’s motions to dismiss and the State’s motion in /imine.

Accordingly, the identity of these three individuals is outside the scope of the protective order

which encompasses the names and/or identity of “the State’s potential civilian witnesses”. Due

to the fact that the majority of the materials in the Appendix Volumes I-V are governed by the

protective order, a Motion to Seal is filed along with this Amended Motion for Postconviction

Relief.

Aa4

The two individuals were never identified or apprehended, and Mr. Slaughter later relocated

to Georgia, moving in with his wife, Donna Slaughter, and a roommate, Michael Haegele. (A402).

On May 7, 2010, a male body was discovered on a secluded road in Macon County, Georgia, the

victim of an apparent homicide. (/d.). On May 12, 2010, Mr. Slaughter contacted police and

advised that he believed the unidentified body was that of his roommate, Michael Haegele. (Id.).

During questioning, Donna Slaughter confessed to shooting Mr. Haegele once in the back of the head

at their shared residence and implicated Mr. Slaughter in the attempted cover up of the crime.

(A403).

During the ensuing investigation into Mr. Haegele’s death, Georgia law enforcement

uncovered a life insurance policy on Mr. Haegele worth $500,000 that listed Mr. Slaughter as the

beneficiary. (A402-03). The policy had been purchased online through HSBC, a life insurance

company based out of Delaware. (/d.). An HSBC life insurance policy on Mr. Slaughter worth

$25,000 listing Mr. Haegele as the beneficiary was also found; this policy had likewise been

purchased by Mr. Slaughter. (/d.).

During the investigation into these life insurance policies, law enforcement discovered an

HSBC life insurance policy on Christopher Masters worth $250,000 that listed Mr. Slaughter as the

beneficiary. (A403). An HSBC life insurance policy for Mr. Slaughter worth $25,000 with Mr.

Masters as the beneficiary was also found. (/d.). After Georgia law enforcement learned that Mr.

Masters was deceased, they relayed this information to Delaware law enforcement, who thereafter

reopened the investigation into Mr. Masters’ death. (A403).

Mr. Slaughter was subsequently indicted for the first degree murder of Mr. Masters on July

16,2012. (DE1). However, at that time, Mr. Slaughter, along with Mrs. Slaughter, was incarcerated

I

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in Georgia pending trial for the first degree murder of Mr. Haegele. (A403). After being tried for

and convicted of the first degree murder of Mr. Haegele, Mr. Slaughter was transported from Georgia

to Delaware to stand trial for the death of Christopher Masters.

Litigation of IAD Claims.®

The majority of the litigation that occurred in this case focused on the manner in which Mr.

Slaughter had been extradited to Delaware and whether the State had sufficiently complied with the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”),'° also referred to as the Uniform Agreement on

Detainers (“UAD”), such that Mr. Slaughter was not entitled to dismissal of the indictment. The

defense filed two motions to dismiss, as well as a motion for reargument and a motion for renewal

of the first motion to dismiss. The Court held hearings on each of the motions to dismiss.

Complicating matters, however, was the State’s discovery that it had relayed incorrect information

to the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”) regarding the extradition of Mr. Slaughter and

had erroneously informed defense counsel that the JAD was not implicated in Mr. Slaughter’s case.

A time-line of events relating to the legality of Mr. Slaughter’s extradition is set forth below.

° July 16, 2012: Mr. Slaughter is indicted in Delaware on First Degree Murder and

PFDCF charges, and an authorization for extradition is signed by Deputy Attorney

General Norris.

° July 18, 2012: notice that a Rule 9 warrant is issued.

8 Ror ease of reference, this recitation of facts is taken from this Court’s January 3, 2017

order denying Defendant’s Renewed First Motion to Dismiss and Defendant’s Second Motion to

Dismiss, as well as Defendant’s March 31, 2015 Motion to Dismiss. (A353-377; A23-75).

‘6 Delaware codified the IAD at 11 Del. C. §§ 2540-2550; see New York v. Hill, 528 U.S.

110, 111 (2000) (“The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48

States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of

one State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State.”).

8

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, August 15, 2013: Mr. Slaughter is tried and convicted in Georgia of the first degree

murder of Michael Haegele.

? October 4, 2013: The State of Delaware lodges a detainer with the Georgia

Department of Corrections.

* October 15, 2013: GDOC acknowledges the detainer lodged by the State of

Delaware.

* October 24, 2013: Mr. Slaughter requests disposition of the charges underlying the

detainer, pursuant to IAD § 2542, by delivering the appropriate paperwork to the

GDOC Warden.

° October 24, 2013: GDOC sends Mr. Slaughter’s request under the IAD to “The

Honorable Joseph R. Biden, I, Attomey General's Office, State of Delaware,

Wilmington, Delaware” but fails to also send the IAD request to the Delaware

Superior Court. Accompanying the LAD request is Georgia’s offer of temporary

custody and Form VII, “Prosecutor’s Acceptance of Temporary Custody”, which is

to be completed by the State of Delaware and returned to Georgia.

® November 5, 2013: The date stamped on the Delaware Department of Justice’s

receipt of Mr. Slaughter’s request for final disposition/IAD application.

° April 14, 2014: GDOC sends a letter to the Department of Justice informing them

that Mr. Slaughter had been advised the IAD did not apply and that Delaware would

need to use a Governor’s Warrant to extradite him.

® duly 23, 2014: Governor Markell of Delaware signs the Governor’s Warrant.

° July 28, 2014: Governor Deal of Georgia signs the Governor’s Warrant.

@ October 6, 2014: An Authority to Release Custody of Offender is sent by the

Delaware Department of Justice to the Georgia IAD coordinator.

° October 9, 2014: Mr. Slaughter arrives at James T. Vaughn Correctional Institute.”

e November 13, 2014: Patrick Collins is appointed as defense counsel. (A248).

‘7 Although the docket sheet lists the date of Mr. Slaughter’s arrival in Delaware as

November 18, 2014, the date of the office conference, the Court confirmed through the

Department of Corrections that Mr. Slaughter actually arrived in Delaware on October 9, 2014

and that the date listed on the docket sheet is an error. (DE18; A355).

9

AV)

. November 18, 2014: An office conference is held to discuss scheduling. Both the

prosecutor and defense counsel advise the Court that the case cannot be tried within

one year. The Court schedules trial for April 5, 2016 with no objection from either

party.

e November 19, 2015: A joint request is made for a continuance of the April 5, 2016

trial date due to scheduling conflicts. The Court sets a new trial date of January 9,

2017.8 (A249-250).

Motions to Dismiss and Related Hearings.

On March 31, 2015, Mr. Slaughter filed the first motion to dismiss, arguing that the IAD did

in fact apply to his case and that the State had failed to timely extradite him from Georgia and try

him within 180 days, as required by IAD § 2542.'° (A23-75). Mr. Slaughter argued that because his

properly executed LAD paperwork was received by the State on November 6, 2013 and because he

was not tried within 180 days, the indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice on May 6,

2014. Mr. Slaughter further contended that the July 28, 2014 Governor’s Warrant would have had

'® During a November 19, 2015 status conference, defense counsel stated: “Your Honor,

just to put that on the record for today’s conference. We moved this trial to accommodate all

parties, including counsel in the Paladin Club capital murder trial, which has more lawyers and

more parties in it. The decision was made to move this to sometime in January 2016.” (A560).

Thereafter, Mr. Slaughter trial was scheduled to begin January 9, 2017. (A561). The trial date

was later moved to January 24, 2017 during the August 29, 2016 office conference with no

objection from either party. (A566-67).

911 Del. C. § 2542(a) (“Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in

a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the

term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment,

information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner,

the prisoner shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner shall have caused to be

delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's

jurisdiction written notice of the place of imprisonment and the request for a final disposition to

be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided, that for good cause shown in

open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of

the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”).

10

Ag?

no force or effect because by the time is was signed by the appropriate authorities, the charges should

have already been dismissed for failure to bring to trial within 180 days. (A29-3 1).

The State opposed the motion, arguing that because the Court never received actual notice

of Mr. Slaughter’s request for final disposition under the IAD, Mr. Slaughter’s IAD rights never

vested and the 180-day period was never triggered. (A79-80). The State further argued that because

Mr. Slaughter agreed to an April 2016 trial date, he waived his IAD claim. (A80-81). In response,

Mr. Slaughter asserted that he had properly executed his [AD paperwork and should not be held

accountable for an administrative error committed by personnel atthe GDOC. (A93-97). Moreover,

Mr. Slaughter contended that the State was actually aware of his request and failed to act. (A98-99).

Ifthe State had taken action, the Court would have received actual notice of Mr. Slaughter’s request,

as the State would have needed Court certification for Form VII in order to accept Georgia’s offer

of temporary custody. Furthermore, Mr. Slaughter argued he had not waived the issue by agreeing

to a trial date outside of the 180-day time period, because the 180 days had already expired at the

time the trial date was established. (A100-03).

On July 30, 2015, the Court held a hearing on the first motion to dismiss. During the hearing,

the State advised the Court that before the 180 days had expired, Georgia had informed the State of

Delaware that Georgia would not honor the IAD because it was a capital murder case, and a

Governor’s Warrant would be needed to obtain custody of Mr. Slaughter. (A135, 144, 154, 162).

The State informed the Court that it did not know why GDOC took that position, as it did not appear

to be legally correct. (A144). At the end of the hearing, the Court made an oral ruling denying the

first motion to dismiss. The Court ruled that because Mr. Slaughter was brought to Delaware

pursuant to a Governor’s Warrant and not the IAD, the IAD did not apply. (A173). However, the

1]

AQ

Court also made two additional findings: 1) Georgia had notified the State of Delaware prior to the

expiration of the 180 days that a Governor’s Warrant was needed to obtain custody of Mr. Slaughter;

and 2) although the State received notice from Mr. Slaughter requesting disposition of the charges

pursuant to the IAD, the Superior Court did not receive acival notice. (A170). Thus, Mr.

Slaughter’s IAD rights never vested.

On August 5, 2015, Mr. Slaughter filed a motion for reargument seeking to clarify the record

with respect to the issue of notice and seeking reconsideration of the notice issue. (A185-194), The

Court denied the motion for reargument on December 22, 2015. (DE64; A202-05).

Mr. Slaughter then filed a second motion to dismiss on August 24, 2016, alleging that under

IAD § 2543” and United States v. Mauro,” the State was required to bring Mr. Slaughter to trial

within 120 days and failed to do so. (A206-19). Mr. Slaughter argued that under the holding of

Mauro, the State triggered the 120-day time limit of LAD § 2543 by lodging a detainer followed by

a written request for temporary custody via the Governor’s Warrant. (A210, 212-215). Both the

State and defense counsel conceded that they had previously been unaware of Mauro and had not

considered its impact on Mr. Slaughter’s case. (A218, 229, 231, 253, 255-56, 260, 264, 291). As

such, they had also failed to consider whether a detainer plus a Governor’s Warrant implicated IAD

§ 2543. (id).

2°11 Del. C. § 2543(c) (“In respect of any proceeding made possible by this section, trial

shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for

good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court

having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.”).

"| United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1978) (holding that “whenever the

receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a detainer it has previously lodged

against a state prisoner,” the JAD requires commencement of trial within 120 days of the

defendant's arrival in the receiving State).

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The State opposed the motion, arguing that even under Mauro, the 120-day time period did

not begin to run until October 9, 2014, the day Mr. Slaughter was returned to Delaware. (A223).

The office conference was held on November 18, 2014, before the 120 days expired, and both parties

did not object to a trial date outside of the 120 day limit. (A83-84). Thus, the State argued that Mr.

Slaughter had waived his IAD claim. (A224-25, 227). In response, Mr. Slaugher asserted that prior

to the office conference, the State had specifically informed defense counsel that Mr. Slaughter was

brought to Delaware via a Governor’s Warrant, prompting counsel to believe the IAD was

inapplicable to Mr. Slaughter’s case. (A229-31).

The Court held a hearing on the second motion to dismiss on October 14, 2016. (DE82).

The parties essentially agreed that United State v. Mauro applied to Mr. Slaughter’s case and

therefore, the 120-day provision of § 2543 began to run the day Mr. Slaughter arrived in Delaware.”

( A254, 280-81). The main issue of contention was whether Mr. Slaughter had waived the issue by

agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120-day time period. The State also argued that the Court could

retroactively find that good cause existed to grant a continuance, had one been requested during the

November 18, 2014 office conference; thus, the State alleged, any error would be harmless. (A296-

97). Mr. Slaughter argued that despite the lack of bad faith, the State still misled defense counsel

as to whether the case was a Governor’s Warrant or an IAD case, and it would not be fair to deem

what was said at a routine office conference as a waiver of an IAD issue. (A299-302).

On October 27, 2016, the State filed a letter with the Court correcting misrepresentations it

had made during the July 30, 2015 hearing on the first motion to dismiss. (A319-21). The State

2 The State later changed its position on whether a Governor’s Warrant constitutes a

written request for purposes of the IAD and/or Mauro. (A210, 218, 245, 252-53, 280-81; cf

A337-340).

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disclosed for the first time that it had actually been the State’s Extradition Supervisor, Ronald

Mullen, who had advised GDOC that the IAD did not apply to Mr, Slaughter’s case and that a

Governor’s Warrant was needed to obtain custody. (/d.). The GDOC’s April 4, 2014 letter had in

fact only been a memorialization of the information that the GDOC had received from Mr. Mullen.

(Id.). As a result of this newly disclosed information, Mr. Slaughter renewed his first motion to

dismiss, arguing that the State did not affirmatively accept Georgia’s offer of temporary custody of

Mr. Slaughter within the meaning of IAD § 2544(c),? and as a result, the indictment must be

dismissed with prejudice pursuant to IAD § 2544. (A325). Thus, Mr. Slaughter asserted, it was

insignificant that the Court never received actual notice of Mr. Sl aughter’s JAD paperwork, because

the State triggered automatic dismissal by refusing to accept custody. da.).

On January 3, 2017, the Court denied both Mr. Slaughter’s renewed first motion to dismiss

and Mr. Slaughter’s second motion to dismiss. In regard to the renewed first motion to dismiss, the

Court found that Mr. Slaughter’s rights under IAD § 2544 never vested, because the Court never

received actual notice of his IAD paperwork. (A361). Thus, the State’s alleged refusal to accept

Georgia’s offer of temporary custody did not warrant dismissal of the indictment. In regard to the

second mation to dismiss, the Court found that Mr. Slaughter had waived the speedy trial protections

of IAD § 2543 by agreeing to a trial date outside of the 120-day time period. (A371-73). The Court

also concluded that error was harmless, because a continuance for good cause would likely have been

* 11 Del. C. § 2544(c) (“If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept

temporary custody of the person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or

complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the

period provided in § 2542 or § 2543 of this title, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where

the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the

same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.”).

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