Petition for Writ of Certiorari — William F. Kaetz, Petitioner v. Educational Credit Management Corporation, et al.

No.

-8026

3fn tje Supreme Court of tfje fintteti States!

__JSED

WILLIAM F. KAETZ — Petitioner

vs.

EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP

EXPERIAN

TRANSUNION

EQUIFAX INC

— Respondents

On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari To

To the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit Case No. 20-2592

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

William F. Kaetz

437 Abbott Road

Paramus, NJ., 07652

201-753-1063

Pro se Petitioner

Page 1 of 28

MAf 2 4 2022

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QUESTION

Is the statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) void for vagueness therefore

unconstitutional?

Page 2 of 28

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

CONTENTS

QUESTION

2

OPINIONS BELOW

7

JURISDICTION

8

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED....8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

9

11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) is Unconstitutional for being Void for Vagueness

11

This Court’s Holdings Supports 11 U.S.C. §523(A)(8) Being

Unconstitutional for Being Void for Vagueness

18

The Absurd and Discriminatory Outcome of the Vagueness of Statute

11 U.S.C. §523(A)(8)

22

Conflict with the lstAmendment with Content and Viewpoint

Discriminations

23

RELIEF

25

CONCLUSION

26

Page 3 of 28

CERTIFICATION

26

PROOF OF SERVICE

27

Cases

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 5 L Ed 257 (1821)

15

Connallyv. Gen. Const. Co. 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed

332 (1926)

19

Doddv. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 162 L. Ed. 2d

343 (2005)

18

Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (U.S. June 17, 2019)

20

Giacciov. Pennsylvania 382 U.S. 399, 402 15 L. Ed. 2d 447, 86 S. Ct.

518 (1966)

19

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725, 198 L.

Ed. 2d 177 (2017)

18

Iancu v. Brunetti. 139 S. Ct. 2294. 2302 (2019)

25

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 629 (2015)

20

Lamiev. United States Trustee 540 U.S. 526, 530-38, 124 S. Ct. 1023,

157 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (2004)

17

Page 4 of 28

Leonen v. Johns - Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.J. July 5 1989)

20

Parachristouv. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 - 63, 31 L. Ed 2d

110 92 S. Ct. 839 (1975)

19

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015,)

24

Rosenbergerv. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) ..24

Sessionv. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 at 1212

19

Tenn. Student Assistant Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (U.S. May 17,

2004)

12, 14, 16, 23

Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. FCC 512 U.S. 622 (1994)

23

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 2323, 204 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2019)

19

United Student Aids Funds Inc., v. Francisco J. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260

(2010)

12, 13, 16

Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489,

498, 71 L. Ed 2d 362, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982)

20

Statutes

11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)

passim

28 U. S. C. § 1254(1)

8

Page 5 of 28

Other Authorities

3 W. Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice

14 '

Rules

Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6)

10, 15, 16, 17

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60

12, 13

Constitutional Provisions

11th Amendment

12

14th Amendment

9, 20, 23

1st Amendment

8, 23

5th Amendment

9, 20, 23

Art. II, § I, cl, 8

21

Art. VI, cl. 3

21

Page 6 of 28

No.

3fn tlje Supreme Court of tfje ®ntteb States:

WILLIAM F. KAETZ — Petitioner

vs.

EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP

EXPERIAN

TRANSUNION

EQUIFAX INC

— Respondents

On Writ of Certiorari To

To the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit Case No. 20-2592

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in

this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States Court of Appeals appears at

Appendix PA-1 to PA-2. The opinion of the United States District Court

appears at Appendix PA-3 to PA-8. The order of the United States

Page 7 of 28

Court of Appeals denying Petition for Rehearing appears at PA-9 to PA10. The District Court order and opinion denying my reconsideration

motion appears at PA-11 to PA-16. The District Court order dismissing

the case appears at PA-17 to PA-18. The District Court opinion

dismissing the case appears at PA-19 to PA-31.

JURISDICTION

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my

case was 4/04/2022. A copy of that order and opinion appears at

Petitioner’s Appendix, PA-1 to PA-2. The date on which the United

States District Court decided my case was 9/30/2019. A copy of that

order appears at Appendix PA-17 to PA-18. A petition for rehearing was

timely filed in my case. A timely petition for rehearing was denied by

the United States Court of Appeals on 5/20/2022. The order denying

rehearing appears at Appendix PA-9 to PA-10. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(l).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Constitution Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right

Page 8 of 28

of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Constitution Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise

infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a

Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of

War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for

the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;

nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property be

taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV

Section 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I sued the defendants for illegal debt collection and illegal credit

reporting and contempt of a bankruptcy court order. I was deemed

indigent in my bankruptcy case several times. I was prose in the

bankruptcy case, I fought tooth and nail to get it done. After I received

Page 9 of 28

discharge from all debts, the defendants came after me and started

collection on $13,000 student loans for 5 years and took away my “fresh

start”. They claimed I was required by law to do an adversary

proceeding to get an undue hardship determination and go through

undue hardship tests. All these things are not written in the

bankruptcy statutes and rules.

The statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) only states^

“unless excepting such debt from discharge under this

paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor

and the debtor’s dependents”.

There is no direction to do an adversary proceeding to get an undue

hardship determination and go through undue hardship tests.

Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6) only list what an adversary proceeding can be

used for and states “a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a

debt”. The word “debt” is not the same as “undue hardship”. An “undue

hardship determination” is not the same as “determine the

dischargeability of a debt”. The words “undue hardship determination”

in the bankruptcy statutes and rules do not exist. Requirements upon

debtors claimed by the respondents do not exist in the statutes or rules.

Page 10 of 28

11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) is Unconstitutional for being Void for Vagueness

The language of the statute written by legislators, 11 U.S.C. §523

(a)(8) says^

11 U.S. Code § 523 - Exceptions to discharge

(a) “A discharge under 727, 1141, 1192, 1228(a), 1228(b) or

1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual

debtor from any debt...

(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this

paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the

debtor and the debtor’s dependents, for—

(A) (i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan

made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental

unit, or made under any program funded in whole

or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit

institution; or

(ii) an obligation to repay funds received as an

educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend; or

(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified

education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the

Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor

who is an individual;

How I understand the statute, there is a condition, a requirement,

that the exception from discharge must not impose undue hardship,

therefore there is a presumption of discharge for an indigent person like

me and a requirement upon the creditors not to impose undue hardship.

Page 11 of 28

There is no language or direction to a requirement upon debtors to do

anything.

There’s no adversary proceeding requirement or undue hardship

determination or undue hardship test requirement, or how to do it, or

who must do it and when to do it. There is no more to the statute.

There is no language or direction to another statute or rule or

court case. There is a presumption for discharge if collecting the debt

imposes undue hardship, that would be me, an indigent person.

However, there is disputed non-binding obiter dicta being added

and read into the statute used by the defendants and the lower courts,

and this Court that says the opposite.

There are obiter dicta from two Supreme Court cases that are

misapplied as “stare decisis” authority for bankruptcy and student

loans' United Student Aids Funds Inc., v. Francisco J. Espinosa, 559

U.S. 260 (2010), and Tenn. Student Assistant Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S.

440 (U.S. May 17, 2004).

The Hood case, the subject matter of the case was 11th

Amendment State Immunity. The Espinosa case, the subject matter of

the case was Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60 motions.

Page 12 of 28

In the Hood and Espinosa cases obiter dicta about student loans

and bankruptcy existed and were read into the language of 11 U.S.C.

§523(a)(8) and bankruptcy rules that are not in the bankruptcy statutes

and rules.

The obiter dicta were not part of the holdings and not part of the

subject matter of the Hood and Espinosa cases, they are classic obiter

dicta and not legally binding. I have been disputing the obiter dicta.

A side comment in the Rule 60 Espinosa case, footnote 13, was

incorrectly used as binding stare decisis, and read into the statute, the

disputed obiter dicta in the footnote says“This is essential to preserve the distinction between

Congress’ treatment of student loan debts in §523(a)(8) and

debts listed elsewhere in §523. Section 523(a)(8) renders

student loan debt presumptively nondischargeable “unless” a

determination of undue hardship is made. In contrast, the

debts listed in §523(c), which include certain debts obtained

by fraud or “willful and malicious injury by the debtor,”

§523(a)(6), are presumptively dischargeable “unless” the

creditor requests a hearing to determine the debt’s

dischargeability. The Court of Appeals’ approach would

subject student loan debt to the same rules as the debts

specified in §523(c), notwithstanding the evident differences

in the statutory framework for discharging the two types of

debt”

I challenged the courts’ obiter dicta above, specifically the quote“Section 523(a)(8) renders student loan debt presumptively

Page 13 of 28

nondischargeable “unless” a determination of undue hardship is made.”

I claimed that it is not binding on my case and is one of the same points

I presented for decision in my case. I argued the presumption of non­

dischargeability was rebutted by my indigence that was determined by

the bankruptcy court; my undue hardship was determined, and undue

hardship is being imposed in violation of the statute. I argued the

statute has a presumption of discharge. I argued the student loan was

accredited through misrepresentations and the educational benefit was

unsustainable, it lost its acreditability to be a student loan under 11

U.S.C. §523(a)(8) it was fraud.

In the State Immunity Hood case, the obiter dicta used is“unless debtor affirmatively secures a hardship

determination, the discharge order will not include a student

loan debt. Norton § 47:52 at 47-137 to 47-138.”

This is not from congress, it is not from the text of the statute, it is

from a textbook “3 W. Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice”. It may be

from old, rescinded laws, but still, it is content and viewpoint

discrimination from the authors of the Norton Book, it is not law from

legislation and it certainly not in the statutory language of 11 U.S.C.

§ 523(a)(8) or the bankruptcy rules.

Page 14 of 28

It is content and viewpoint discrimination in the form of obiter

dicta that the lower courts and this Court used to read language into

the statute that is not there that discriminates debtors of student loans.

And it is a usurpation of legislative power to make law.

I have been arguing the very same points the obiter dicta have

been controlling. What the courts claim in obiter dicta that is non­

binding and disputed, is not in the statute or court rules. This conflicts

with the U.S. Supreme Court’s maxim of law in Cohens v. Virginia, 19

U.S. 264, 399 5 L Ed 257 (1821) at Page 399 to 400, that held:

“It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general

expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection

with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go

beyond the case, they may be respected, buy ought not to

control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very

point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is

obvious. The question actually before the Court is

investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.

Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are

considered in their relation to the case decided, but their

possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely

investigated.”

Congress did not include an undue hardship determination

requirement; it is not in the statute or court rules. In Bankruptcy Rule

7001 the word “debt” is not equivalent to “undue hardship”, how can the

courts say a “determination of a debt” is equal to an “undue hardship

Page 15 of 28

determination”. It is arbitrary and is a demonstrably erroneous

interpretation of law, an abuse of discretion.

This court has read language into the statute that is not there

with obiter dicta, the lower 3rd circuit court claimed*

“Section 523(a)(8) renders student loan debt presumptively

nondischargeable ‘unless’ a determination of undue hardship

is made.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559

U.S. 260, 277 n.13 (2010).

“the Bankruptcy Rules require a party seeking to determine

the dischargeability of a student loan debt to commence an

adversary proceeding by serving a summons and complaint

on affected creditors.” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 268-69.

See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6) (providing that adversary

proceedings include “a proceeding to determine the

dischargeability of a debt”)

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, Adv. Committee Notes (stating the

rules govern procedural aspects of litigation involving

matters referred to in Rule 7001); see also Tennessee

Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 451-52

(2004) (discussing the filing of an adversary proceeding

under the Bankruptcy Rules to discharge student loan debt).

Even if an undue hardship determination could have been

made in Kaetz’s bankruptcy case outside of an adversary

proceeding, a finding of indigence is not the same as an

undue hardship determination under § 538(a)(8). See In re

Faish, 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding bankruptcy

courts within the Third Circuit must apply the undue

hardship test in Brunnerv. New York State Higher

Educational Services Corporation, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.

1987) (per curiam)); see also Hood, 541 U.S. at 450 (“Unless

Page 16 of 28

the debtor affirmatively secures a hardship determination,

the discharge order will not include a student loan debt.”).

These claims above are not in the statute or court rules, they are

from obiter dicta that no one would find in the language of the statute

or court rules. Reading the statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) and rules as it

is written, is void of all the above claims. There is nothing in the

bankruptcy statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) or rules guiding a debtor of

student loans to rule 7001 adversary proceedings or to undue hardship

determinations or to undue hardship tests.

Lest any doubt remains, Lamie v. United States Trustee should

settle the matter. There this Court refused to “read an absent word into

[a] statue” despite “an apparent legislative drafting error” that “renders

the statute” awkward, and even ungrammatical”, 540 U.S. 526, 530-38,

124 S. Ct. 1023, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (2004). “With a plain, non-absurd

meaning in view, we need not proceed in this way” this Court said,

noting their longstanding “unwillingness to soften the import of

congress chosen words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh

outcome” Id at 538. As in my case now before this court, the

respondents and the lower courts should not have read an absent word

into 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) or rule 7001.

Page 17 of 28

The way “we read statutes today” ... “that [the] legislature says...

what it means and means...what it says”” Henson v. Santander

Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725, 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017) ...

(Quoting Doddv. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357, 125 S. Ct. 2478, 162

L. Ed. 2d 343 (2005). “In other words, [a]s Justice Kagan recently

stated, “we are all textualist now.”

These court-made laws, language read into the statute, constitute

discriminatory enforcement of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) with the use of

obiter dicta that is not in the statute or rules, this was done because the

statute itself is void for vagueness and that opened the door for abuse of

student loan debtors with arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement

and with content and viewpoint discrimination.

This Court’s Holdings Supports 11 U.S.C. §523(A)(8) Being

Unconstitutional for Being Void for Vagueness

I am challenging the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) and

claim it is unconstitutional for being void-for-vagueness, it fails to

provide adequate notice of its scope and sufficient guidelines for its

application and is being seriously arbitrarily discriminatorily enforced

against debtors.

Page 18 of 28

There is a succession of this Court’s holdings that support my

claim- “The Constitutional ban on vague laws is intended to invalidate

statutory enactments which fail to provide adequate notice of their

scope and sufficient guidelines for their application.” Parachristou v.

City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 - 63, 31 L. Ed 2d 110 92 S. Ct.

839 (1975). “The Supreme Court has long held that overly vague laws

are unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fifth and

fourteenth amendments.” See e.g. Connallyv. Gen. Const Co. 269 U.S.

385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed 332 (1926) “succinctly, “[i]n our

constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all””, United States v.

Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 2323, 204 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2019). The void for

vagueness doctrine “guarantees that ordinary people have fair notice of

the conduct a statute proscribes [and] guards against arbitrary or

discriminatory law enforcement by insisting that the statute provide

standards to govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries,

and judges”. Session v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 at 1212 “[T]he void-forvagueness doctrine is applicable to civil as well as criminal laws.”

Giacciov. Pennsylvania 382 U.S. 399, 402 15 L. Ed. 2d 447, 86 S. Ct.

518 (1966). "... the degree of vagueness tolerated under the constitution,

Page 19 of 28

however, will depend in part on the nature of the enactment, and the

determination of vagueness must be made in light of the contextual

background of the particular law, with a firm understanding of its

purpose. Village ofHoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, 455

U.S. 489, 498, 71 L. Ed 2d 362, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982); (from Leonenv.

Johns — Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.J. July 5 1989). “A

statute is thus void for vagueness only if it wholly ... is so standardless

that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 629 (2015).

Incorporating all the above, the Statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) is an

overly vague law and is unconstitutional under the due process clause

of the 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment, it is no law at all. It fails to

provide adequate notice of its scope and sufficient guidelines for its

application and is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages

seriously discriminatory enforcement of court-made law from obiter

dicta that conflicts with Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (U.S.

June 17, 2019) Justice Thomas explained“When faced with a demonstrably erroneous

precedent, my rule is simple- we should not follow it. This

view ... follows directly from the Constitution Supremacy

over other sources of law - including our own precedents.

Page 20 of 28

That the Constitution outranks other sources of law is

inherent in its nature, ... The Constitutions Supremacy is

also reflected in its requirement that all judicial officers,

executive officers, congressmen and state legislators take an

oath to “support this Constitution”, Art. VI, cl. 3, see also

Art. II, § I, cl, 8...”

“I am aware of no legislative reason why a court may

privilege a demonstrably erroneous interpretation of the

Constitution over the Constitution itself’ ... “the same

principle applies when interpreting statutes and other

sources of law; if a prior decision demonstrably erred in

interpreting such a law, federal judges should exercise the

judicial power - not perpetuated a usurpation of legislative

power — and correct the error. A contrary rule would permit

judges to “substitute their own pleasure” for the law....”

Pursuant to S. Ct. Justice Thomas in Gamble federal courts

should fix demonstrably erroneous interpretations of law, not

perpetrate a usurpation of power - not make law — and adhere to the

Constitution. Reading words into the bankruptcy statutes and rules

using disputed non*binding obiter dicta is a demonstrably erroneous

interpretation of law, a perpetration of usurpation of power, it is

unconstitutional, it is an absurd result, it is an abuse of discretion, and

this court is obligated to correct it, not just for me, for the nation.

Page 21 of 28

The Absurd and Discriminatory Outcome of the Vagueness of Statute

11 U.S.C. §523(A)(8)

Statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) fails to provide a person of ordinary

intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and is so standardless that

it authorizes and encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement as

evidenced in the disputed non-binding obiter dicta used to add content

and viewpoints to the statute discriminating debtors of student loans

that led to subjecting debtors of student loans to alleged adversary

hearing requirements and required undue hardship determinations and

tests that are nowhere to be found in the bankruptcy code, and the debt

became automatically excluded from discharge without assessing the

credibility of the educational institutions’ credibility and sustainability

of the educational benefit, allowing educational institutions to commit

fraud and making the student pay for it. Although a loan may have

been accredited to start a government guaranteed loan, many do not

hold that status for long, therefore become not a debt under 11 U.S.C.

§523(a)(8) and unsustainable to pay the loan back at no fault of the

debtor. The creditor has automatic exemption due to the disputed obiter

dicta, they can commit fraud and discriminate the debtor, as in my case.

This fraud and discrimination originate from the vagueness of 11 U.S.C.

Page 22 of 28

§523(a)(8) and the disputed non-binding obiter court dicta used as law

to correct Congress’s error. The courts have been making law reading

language into the law using the discriminating disputed non-binding

obiter court dicta that is content and viewpoint discriminations against

student loan debtors to validate the statute and control the debate

about student loans and bankruptcy, and that conflicts with all the

Supreme Court Cases quoted herein and the Constitution itself, the 1st,

5th, and 14th Amendments.

Conflict with the lstAmendment with Content and Viewpoint

Discriminations

The District court and this court’s panel decision overlooked the

void-for-vagueness of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8) and read language into the

statutes and rules to avoid the issue, and doing so, added content and

viewpoint discriminations, the disputed non-binding obiter dicta from

the Hood and Espinosa cases, to suppress the void-for-vagueness of 11

U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8) argument and chill this legal argument from being

argued, these actions are in conflict with the 1st Amendment.

It is established in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc, v. FCC 512

U.S. 622, 641 (1994) Content-based restrictions "are subject to the 'most

exacting scrutiny,'... because they 'pose the inherent risk that the

Page 23 of 28

Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to

suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public

debate through coercion rather than persuasion."' Id. (quoting Turner

Broadcasting; 512 U.S. At 641-642). Viewpoint discrimination is

"[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but particular views

taken by speakers on a subject." Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &

Visitors ofUniv. ofVa. 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) "Viewpoint

discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination." Id.

(quoting Rosenberger; 515 U.S. at 829). "The government must abstain

from regulating speech [the Constitution] when the specific motivating

ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for

the restriction." Id. (quoting Rosenberger; 515 U.S. At 829). 'Viewpoint

discrimination' is forbidden." Id. (citing Rosenberger; 515 U.S. at 830831). In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he First

Amendment [the Constitution] guards against laws 'targeted at specific

subject matter,' [a] form of speech [the Constitution] suppression known

as content-based discrimination." Id. at 1765-1766 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155. 169 (2015,)

"This category includes a subtype of laws that go further, aimed at the

Page 24 of 28

suppression of 'particular views ... on a subject."1 Id. (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829) (alteration in

original). "A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint is an

'egregious form of content discrimination,1 which is ’presumptively

Unconstitutional."’ Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger,

515 U.S. At 829-830). "A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint

is an 'egregious form of content discrimination,’ which is ’presumptively

Unconstitutional.'" Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-830). Therefore,”[t]he Court’s finding of

viewpoint bias end[s] the matter." Iancuv. Brunetti. 139 S. Ct. 2294.

2302 (2019)

The language read into the statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8) is content

and viewpoint bias, and that should end this matter of using the

disputed non-binding obiter dicta to save statute 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)

from being void-for-vagueness, it is unconstitutional. This is an abuse of

discretion and a good cause to grant this Petition.

RELIEF

Petitioner prays this Court find 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)

unconstitutional for being void for vagueness.

Page 25 of 28

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted or a

summary reversal as an alternative remedy.

CERTIFICATION

I, William F. Kaetz, plaintiff/appellant, with my signature below,

swear under penalty of perjury all statements herein are true.

Respectfully Submitted...

Date'

By:

William F. Kaetz

437 Abbott Road

Paramus, New Jersey,

07652

201-753-1063

kaetzbill@gmail.com

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