Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Clarence Wayne Dixon, Petitioner v. David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry
Supreme Court briefMay 11, 2022
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No.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CLARENCE WAYNE DIXON, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JON M. SANDS
Federal Public Defender
District of Arizona
Amanda C. Bass (AL Bar No. 1008H16R)
Counsel of Record
Assistant Federal Public Defender
850 West Adams Street, Suite 201
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
(602) 382-2816 voice
(602) 889-3960 facsimile
amanda_bass@fd.org
Counsel for Petitioner Dixon
CAPITAL CASE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from executing a prisoner who is
insane. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). After Ford, the Court clarified that
competency to be executed turns on a two-prong test, which requires consideration of
whether: (1) a prisoner suffers from a mental illness and (2) whether that illness
“obstructs a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.” Panetti
v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 956–57 (2007).
(1) Does Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) foreclose a schizophrenic
prisoner from demonstrating that non-bizarre delusions obstruct his rational
understanding of the State’s reason for his execution?
(2) Did the state court contravene and unreasonably apply Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930 (2007), when it failed to consider evidence of non-bizarre
delusions that qualify as “delusions” under the diagnostic criteria in assessing
whether a schizophrenic prisoner is mentally competent to be executed under
the Eighth Amendment?
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to the proceeding are listed in the caption, supra. The petitioner is
not a corporation.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Clarence W. Dixon v. David Shinn et al., 16-99006 (9th Cir. May 10, 2022) (Order
Affirming Denial of Habeas Relief)
Clarence W. Dixon v. David Shinn, et al., CV-14-258-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz.
May 10, 2022) (Order Denying Habeas Relief)
State of Arizona v. Hon. Robert Carter Olson, CV-22-0117-SA (Ariz. May 9, 2022)
(Order Denying Special Action Jurisdiction)
State of Arizona v. Clarence W. Dixon, S1100CR202200692 (Pinal Cnty. Super. Ct.
May 3, 2022) (Order Finding Dixon Competent to be Executed)
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .................................................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .............................................................................. ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS.......................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... iii
APPENDIX.................................................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................... v
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................................................................... 1
OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................................................................... 1
JURISDICTION............................................................................................................. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 2
I.
Introduction.......................................................................................................... 3
II. Procedural History ............................................................................................... 6
III.
Relevant Facts .................................................................................................. 7
a. The evidentiary hearing ................................................................................... 7
b. The state court’s decision ............................................................................... 15
c. The federal court proceedings ........................................................................ 15
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................................................................. 16
I. Panetti does not foreclose a schizophrenic prisoner from demonstrating
that non-bizarre delusions obstruct his rational understanding of the State’s
reason for his execution ........................................................................................... 19
II. The state court contravened and unreasonably applied Panetti when it
failed to consider evidence of non-bizarre delusions that qualify as “delusions”
under the diagnostic criteria in assessing whether a schizophrenic prisoner is
mentally competent to be executed under the Eighth Amendment ...................... 21
III. The state court unreasonably determined Dixon’s competency to be
executed, when the court relied on Dixon’s intelligence, coherence, and
hypothetical relief to determine that Dixon did not prove his beliefs obstruct
his rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution. ...................... 26
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 29
iii
APPENDIX
Order Denying Rehearing En Banc, Dixon v. Shinn, 22-99006
(9th Cir. May 10, 2022) .............................................................................................. A-1
Opinion Affirming District Court’s Judgment, Dixon v. Shinn,
22-99006 (9th Cir. May 10, 2022).............................................................................. A-2
Order Denying Habeas Relief, Dixon v. Shinn, CV-14-258-PHX-DJH
(D. Ariz. May 10, 2022) .............................................................................................. A-3
Order Declining to Accept Jurisdiction, State v. Olson, CV-22-0117-SA
(Ariz. May 9, 2022)..................................................................................................... A-4
Ruling that Defendant is Competent to be Executed,
State v. Dixon, S1100CR202200692 (Pinal Cnty. Super. Ct. May 3, 2022) ............. A-5
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986) ....................................................................................... passim
Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86 (2011) ................................................................................................. 25
Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930 (2007) ....................................................................................... passim
Pirtle v. Morgan,
313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................... 18
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
523 U.S. 637 (1998) ................................................................................................. 5
State Cases
Dixon v. Hon. Robert Carter Olson,
No. CV-22-0117 (Ariz. May 7, 2022) ..................................................................... 15
State v. Dixon,
250 P.3d 1174 (2011) ............................................................................................... 6
State v. Dixon,
No. CR-08-0025-AP (Ariz. Apr. 5, 2022) ................................................................. 6
State v. Dixon,
No. CR-13-0238-PC (Ariz. Feb. 11, 2014) ............................................................... 6
Federal Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ....................................................................................................... 2
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ........................................................................................... 24, 25
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) ..................................................................................... 22, 24, 25
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 2244(b) ........................................ 5
v
State Statutes
A.R.S. § 13-4022(I) a ................................................................................................... 15
Rules
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.23(c) .............................................................................................. 6
Rule 11 ........................................................................................................................ 10
Rule 26.5 ..................................................................................................................... 10
Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution Eighth Amendment .............................................. passim
United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment ................................................ 2
Other Authorities
Applying Panetti’s ....................................................................................................... 23
hearing under A.R.S. § 13-4022 ................................................................................... 7
State v. Dixon,
CR2002-019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2008) .................................. 6
State v. Dixon,
CR2002-019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2006) ................................. 6
State v. Dixon,
CR2002-019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2002) ................................. 6
State v. Dixon,
CR2002-019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2003) ................................... 6
vi
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner Clarence Wayne Dixon, now incarcerated on death row at the
Arizona State Prison Complex, in Florence, Arizona is scheduled to be executed at 10
a.m. on May 11, 2022. Dixon respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari
to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
which affirmed the United States District Court for the District of Arizona’s denial of
his petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for stay of execution.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion affirming the denial of Dixon’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus is included in the Appendix at A-2. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion
affirming the denial of Dixon’s motion for stay of execution is included in the
Appendix at A-2. The Order of the United States District Court denying Dixon’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus is included in the Appendix at A-3. The Order of the
United States District Court denying Dixon’s motion for stay of execution is included
in the Appendix at A-3. The decision of the Arizona Supreme Court declining
jurisdiction of Dixon’s Petition for Special Action, seeking review of the Pinal County
Superior Court’s May 3, 2022 Order finding him mentally competent to be executed
is included in the Appendix at A-4. The Pinal County Superior Court’s Order finding
Dixon competent to be executed is included in the Appendix at A-5.
JURISDICTION
On May 10, 2022, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court’s
denial of Dixon’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for stay of execution.
1
(A-2.) Dixon now timely files this Petition wherein he asks this Court to review the
judgment and order of the Ninth Circuit affirming the denial of habeas relief and
motion for stay of execution. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition is brought by a capital defendant sentenced to death in Arizona
even though under this Court’s precedent he is incompetent to be executed. On May
11, 2022, the State seeks to execute Clarence Wayne Dixon, a 66-year-old Native
American man who has been incarcerated for over 40 years. Dixon has suffered from
untreated schizophrenia for most of his life. Dixon’s severe mental illness first
manifested itself at least a 45 years ago. It has infected every stage of his capital case.
While only Dixon’s present competency is before this Court, his well-documented
mental health history is relevant to the issue. A comprehensive recitation of these
facts will assist the Court in addressing the question at the heart of this case:
2
Whether the Pinal County Superior Court properly considered Dixon’s psychotic
beliefs about the reason for his punishment in its assessment of his competency for
execution.
I.
Introduction
Clarence Dixon is a 66-year-old legally blind man of Native American ancestry
who has long suffered from a psychotic disorder – paranoid schizophrenia. Previously,
an Arizona court determined that he was mentally incompetent and legally insane.
An Arizona Department of Corrections psychologist found that Dixon “operates on an
intuitive feeling level, with much less regard for rationality and hard facts,” and that
he is a “severely confused and disturbed prisoner.” (Hearing Ex. 5 at 1–2.)
For almost thirty years, Dixon has been unable to overcome his psychotically
driven belief that all levels of the state and federal judiciary, including members of
the Arizona Supreme Court, have conspired to deny him relief on a claim that the
Northern Arizona University (“NAU”) police department lacked authority to
investigate, arrest him, and collect his DNA in an unrelated 1985 criminal case. 1
Since 1991, Dixon has prepared an unending stream of pro se filings on this issue,
fired his lawyers in the capital murder case so that he could continue to pursue this
issue, and more recently has filed judicial complaints seeking disbarment of the
Arizona Supreme Court Justices based on his belief that they are involved in an
“extrajudicial killing, an illegal and immoral homicide created in the name [of] and
1 Dixon was never arrested by the NAU police and his DNA was collected by the
Arizona Department of Corrections.
3
for the people of Arizona.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 86; see also Hearing Exhibits 25–
29, 32)
In Ford v. Wainwright, this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits
a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” 477
U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986). In so holding the Court reasoned that it “is no less abhorrent
today than it has been for centuries to exact in penance the life of one whose mental
illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its
implications.” Id. at 417.
The Court clarified Ford’s substantive incompetency standard in Panetti v.
Quarterman where it rejected “a strict test for competency [to be executed] that treats
delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State has identified the
link between his crime and the punishment to be inflicted.” 551 U.S. 930, 960 (2007).
Repudiating a competency standard that focuses on a prisoner’s mere “awareness of
the State’s rationale for an execution,” id. at 959, the Court held that a prisoner must
also have a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution—that is, he
must be able to “comprehend[] the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which
he has been sentenced,” id. at 960 (emphasis added). Because Dixon does not have a
rational understanding of why he is being executed, the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment bars his execution and this Court’s
intervention is required.
This Court has clearly established that a petition for writ of habeas corpus
raising an Eighth Amendment claim of mental incompetency to be executed is unripe
4
until an execution is imminent. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 947 (“[W]e have confirmed
that claims of incompetency to be executed remain unripe at early stages of the
proceedings.”); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 645 (1998) (competency
claim necessarily unripe until state issued warrant of execution). At issue in Panetti
was whether the restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions found in §
2244(b) of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) applied to
“a § 2254 application raising a Ford-based incompetency claim filed as soon as that
claim is ripe.” 551 U.S. at 945. This Court held that it does not. Id. at 947 (“The
statutory bar on ‘second or successive’ applications does not apply to a Ford claim
brought in an application filed when the claim is first ripe. Petitioner’s habeas
application was properly filed, and the District Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate
his claim.”).
In Panetti, following the Texas courts’ scheduling of the petitioner’s execution
date and denial of his mental incompetency claim, he “returned to federal court,
where he filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 and a
motion for stay of execution.” 551 U.S. at 938, 941. The United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas “granted petitioner’s motion[] . . . to stay his
execution[]” while it adjudicated the merits of Panetti’s habeas petition raising the
Eighth Amendment incompetency to be executed claim. Id. at 941. Dixon’s Petition
arrives to the federal district court in the very same procedural posture which
warranted a similar course of action.
5
II.
Procedural History
Dixon was indicted on one count of first-degree murder of Deana Bowdoin and
one count of first-degree rape of Deana Bowdoin for offenses committed on January
7, 1978. Indictment, State v. Dixon, CR2002-019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov.
26, 2002), Doc. 1. The trial court later dismissed the first-degree rape count based on
the running of the statute of limitations. Minute Entry, State v. Dixon, CR2002019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2003), Doc. 78. At trial, Dixon fired his
appointed counsel and represented himself.2 Waiver of Counsel, State v. Dixon,
CR2002-019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2006), Doc. 131. A jury found
Dixon guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him death. Verdict, State v. Dixon,
CR2002-019595 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2008), Doc. 354. The Arizona
Supreme Court denied Dixon’s direct appeal, State v. Dixon, 250 P.3d 1174 (2011),
and petition for review from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. Dixon’s federal habeas petition was likewise denied, Order, State v.
Dixon, No. CR-13-0238-PC (Ariz. Feb. 11, 2014).
On April 5, 2022, the Arizona Supreme Court issued a warrant of execution
scheduling Dixon’s execution date for May 11, 2022. Warrant of Execution, State v.
Dixon, No. CR-08-0025-AP (Ariz. Apr. 5, 2022); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.23(c). On
April 8, 2022, Dixon filed a Motion to Determine Mental Competency to be Executed
in the Pinal County Superior Court wherein he argued that expert evidence
established that he “is presently unable to form a rational understanding of the
2 No competency evaluation occurred at Dixon’s capital trial.
6
State’s reason for his execution rendering him incompetent to be executed[]” under
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Pinal ROA 44, Mot. to Determine
Competency at 4.) That same day, the Superior Court found that Dixon demonstrated
his entitlement to a hearing under A.R.S. § 13-4022, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), and scheduled that
hearing for May 3, 2022. (Pinal ROA 43.)
III.
Relevant Facts
a.
The evidentiary hearing
At the evidentiary hearing on May 3, 2022, Dixon presented the testimony of
Dr. Amezcua-Patino and introduced 30 exhibits in his case-in-chief. (Tr. 05/03/2022
a.m. at 18–88; Hearing Exs. 1–29, 32.) Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified that he has been
a licensed physician and, since 1988, has specialized in psychiatry. (Tr. 05/03/2022
a.m. at 18.) For the last 34 years Dr. Amezcua-Patino has maintained his clinical
psychiatric practice and has 37 years’ worth of experience diagnosing and treating
people with schizophrenia. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 18, 22–23.) Dr. Amezcua-Patino
testified that half of his work has been in the impatient setting, and that he has
worked in “probably every single hospital in the Valley . . . including Arizona State
Hospital.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 18.) In 2012, and again in 2022, Dr. AmezcuaPatino diagnosed Dixon with paranoid schizophrenia. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 36–37.)
Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified that Dixon clearly satisfied the diagnostic
criteria for a schizophrenic illness under the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-V”)—a psychotic illness which derives
7
from a thought disorder characterized by delusions, hallucinations, cognitive
symptoms, paranoia, and lack of emotionality. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 30–32.) He
testified that people with schizophrenia are often intelligent and can “maintain a high
level of sophistication in their thinking.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 33.) In men, “[t]he
full-blown symptoms of schizophrenia usually get manifested in the late teens, early
20s” which, Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified, is when Dixon experienced the onset of that
psychotic disorder. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 34, 42–43.)
Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified that Dixon, as a direct result of his schizophrenic
illness, experiences auditory, visual, and tactile hallucinations. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m.
at 59–60.) He also experiences “paranoia, meaning he’s distrustful and concerned
about what other people are trying to do to him[,]” and delusional grandiosity. (Tr.
05/03/2022 a.m. at 61, 69.) According to Dr. Amezcua-Patino, Dixon “feels that there
is a plot where the judicial system has to protect themselves from his claims because
his claims [related to the Northern Arizona University Police] will be terribly
embarrassing.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 61.) Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified about the
questioning techniques he employed with Dixon over the course of several in-person
evaluations designed to test the rigidity of his delusions:
. . . I had multiple – multitude of techniques in terms of empathic
understanding, empathic questioning, you know, paradoxical intention,
to try to get him to explain to me how it is that despite all of this evidence
that has been provided in front of him about, again, the irrationality of
his request, including from his attorneys, and ne always gets back to the
same point, which is, “They say that they want to kill me because
I killed someone. But I know that they want to kill me because
they don’t want to be embarrassed.”
Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 62–63 (emphasis added).)
8
In order to evaluate Dixon’s mental competency for execution, Dr. AmezcuaPatino testified that he reviewed “about 5,100 pages of documents” that pre-dated
[Dixon’s] incarceration and contained “lifetime type of information.” (Tr. 05/03/2022
a.m. at 26.) That information reflected that “the issue of mental illness and
schizophrenia has been raised long before this last set of meetings with [Dixon].” (Tr.
05/03/2022 a.m. at 27.)
Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified that in order for a person to be mentally
competent to be executed “he needs to be able to not only understand that somebody
wants to kill him, but he needs to understand the reasons for that[,]” including the
societal interests in his execution. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 36, 64.) “And he has to have
enough rationality to develop that understanding.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 36, 64.)
Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified that, in Dixon’s case, “in all the time that I’ve spent
with him, he has not been able to do that.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 64.) This is because,
Dr. Amezcua-Patino explained, when prompted to consider his impending execution,
Dixon “goes back to this same premise of: They’re afraid of me embarrassing them”
because of his claim against the NAU police. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 64.) Dr. AmezcuaPatino testified that while “[t]here have been some different variations over the years
in terms of different wording to the same thing, and going into different explanations,
which is not unusual for people with delusional thinking[,]” the crux of Dixon’s
psychotic delusion “always go[es] back to the same [psychotic delusional] premise,
meaning: They want to execute me because they don’t want to be
embarrassed.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 64–65 (emphasis added).)
9
The superior court questioned Dr. Amezcua-Patino next. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m.
at 13–14.) The court asked Dr. Amezcua-Patino to explain how to reconcile Dixon’s
high intelligence and pro se writings which “seem to suggest, . . . ordered thought”
and “rationality,” with Dr. Amezcua-Patino’s opinion that he does not rationally
understand the State’s reasons for his execution. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 13–14.) Dr.
Amezcua-Patino testified that it was important to view Dixon’s writings “in the
context of an illness[.]” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 15.) “[T]he fact that he knows the law,
and the fact that he knows facts about the law, doesn’t mean that these conclusions
of law are rational[,]” Dr. Amezcua-Patino explained. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 15.) He
added further that “there are a number of factors here so factual knowledge is not the
same as rational understanding.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 15.)
To rebut Dixon’s evidence, the State called Carlos Vega, Psy.D., and entered
two exhibits3 into evidence in rebuttal. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 27–46.) In all, Dr.
Vega’s direct examination consisted of just twenty pages of transcript. (Tr. 05/03/2022
p.m. at 27–47.) Dr. Vega testified that he received his doctorate in psychology and
works primarily with the courts to conduct Rule 11 prescreens and competency
assessments pursuant to Rule 26.5 of Arizona’s Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tr.
05/03/2022 p.m. at 27–29.) He stated that he has testified as an expert in the Pinal
County Superior Court in “[m]ostly in DCS cases.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 29.) Dr.
3 Those exhibits consisted of Dr. Vega’s report (Hearing Ex. 31) and CV (Hearing
Ex. 30).
10
Vega testified that in that context, he generally interviews the subject of his
evaluation “one time.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 30.)
In Dixon’s case, Dr. Vega testified that he reviewed “a number of evaluations,
a number of court documents” and conducted a 70-minute evaluation of Dixon by
video. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 32.) He testified that Dixon denied receiving
psychotropic medications and appeared to have “above average intellect.” (Tr.
05/03/2022 p.m. at 34–35.) They talked about politics and, according to Dr. Vega,
Dixon’s reference to President Biden as a “lukewarm leader” indicated that he “is
acutely aware of reality.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 36.) Dr. Vega testified that Dixon
said his DNA had been obtained illegally, he had no memory of the murder, and, in
response to a hypothetical question from Dr. Vega about “what if all of a sudden you
have a recollection that you did kill [the victim], and he said . . . you know, if I killed
her, if I have memories of killing her, on my way to execution, I would feel relief.” (Tr.
05/03/2022 p.m. at 39–40.)
Dr. Vega testified that Dixon could not be delusional because “in order for there
to exist, a delusion, in order for there to be a delusion, you it is impossible for it to
happen.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 42.) When asked by the State, “does what Dixon’s
specific diagnosis is, ultimately affect your opinion about whether he has a rational
understanding of the State’s reason for his execution?” Dr. Vega testified, without
hesitation, “Yeah, of course it does.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 43.) Dr. Vega stated he
diagnosed Dixon with “antisocial personality disorder[.]” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 43.)
11
Dr. Vega testified that even if Dixon held the delusional belief about the courts
conspiring to reject his NAU claim in order to protect government actors from
embarrassment, he is nonetheless mentally competent to be executed based on factors
found insufficient in Panetti: because “it doesn’t affect the connection between I
murdered her or I don’t remember murdering her. I may have murdered her. And I
am being executed.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 44–45.) Ignoring the fact that Dixon’s
competency to represent himself was never evaluated pre-trial, Dr. Vega testified
further that Dixon’s mental competency for execution is supported by the fact that he
“was never found incompetent to represent himself.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 45.)
According to Dr. Vega, Dixon’s writings also reflect that he “is not delusional.” (Tr.
05/03/2022 p.m. at 46.)
On cross-examination, Dr. Vega admitted that he has never previously
evaluated a person’s mental competency for execution, (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 47) is
not a medical doctor and has no experience treating people with schizophrenia, (Tr.
05/03/2022 p.m. at 47–48) “did a little bit, very little” research into the standards for
assessing competency for execution, (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 101) and intentionally
destroyed the audio recording of his interview with Dixon (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 49.)
Dr. Vega testified that he found Dixon cognitively intact because “of motions
that he writes and stuff.]”4 (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 50.) When asked how that finding
could be reconciled with Dixon’s prior neuropsychological test scores showing
4 Dr. Vega later testified that he “didn’t read” and “just barely, you know, looked at”
Dixon’s writings. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 93.)
12
“significant cognitive impairments[,]” Dr. Vega dissembled, claiming that because an
MRI of [Dr. Vega’s] own brain showed “significant” pathologies, validated
neuropsychological “test results . . . don’t say a lot to me.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 51.)
He then added “and of course I am not all completely there.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at
51.) Then in an about-face, Dr. Vega reported finding that Dixon showed “cognitive
distortions.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 61–62.) Dr. Vega admitted that information
Dixon provided about his weight, reason for weight loss, and the number of days until
his execution were all incorrect (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 53–55) but denied that this
was evidence of confusion (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 56). He also admitted that
impending execution “may affect [Dixon’s] memory here and there.” (Tr. 05/03/2022
p.m. at 56.)
Dr. Vega agreed that Dixon’s “beliefs about his NAU argument and about why
it has been consistently denied is a fixed belief that is not amenable to change in light
of conflicting evidence[.]” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 70.) This is the very definition of a
delusional belief incidental to a schizophrenia diagnosis in the DSM-V. (Hearing Ex.
36.) Defying reason and common sense, let alone professional diagnostic standards,
Dr. Vega insisted the DSM-V definition of delusional thinking was wrong and that
his own personal standard should be applied. Objecting to the DSM-V definition of
“delusion,” he claimed that only bizarre delusions qualify as “delusions” for a
schizophrenia diagnosis and the DSM-V failed to “define[] it correctly.” (Tr.
05/03/2022 p.m. at 70–77.) Eventually, Dr. Vega was forced to admit that: (1) Dixon
satisfied each and every one of the DSM-V criteria for a diagnosis of paranoid
13
schizophrenia; and (2) that this diagnosis squared with Dixon’s longstanding
documented history of that psychotic illness. Then, in total disregard of recognized
professional diagnostic standards, he denied that Dixon suffers from that psychotic
disorder. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 77–85.) Dr. Vega topped it off with an assertion that
Dixon has antisocial personality disorder, and of course he made this diagnosis by
refusing to apply the DSM-V criteria for the diagnosis. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 87–
91.)
Dr. Vega testified that his evaluation of Dixon’s competency to be executed
focused on assessing what transpired related to the murder and whether Dixon was
involved. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 96.) He confirmed that the extent of his inquiry
consisted of asking Dixon whether he knew the murder victim, recalled the murder,
and Dixon’s statements that he would not be executed if he lived in a state without
the death penalty, did not recall the crime and could not bring the victim back, and
would feel relief if he were to hypothetically regain his memory. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m.
at 96–97.) With respect to the claim that Dixon expressed “relief” in response to Dr.
Vega’s hypothetical, Dr. Vega admitted that those were not Dixon’s exact words and
he asked no follow up questions. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 98–100, 109–10.) Dr. Vega
also testified that he never asked Dixon the question “why do you believe that you
are being executed” because “I didn’t have to. I really didn’t have to ask him what he
believed. I mean it was – it was obvious.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 100–01.)
14
b.
The state court’s decision
The Pinal County Superior Court found that Dixon failed to prove either by a
preponderance or by clear and convincing evidence that he is mentally incompetent
to be executed under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Pinal ROA 8.)
The superior court held that the question of whether Dixon proved he lacks a rational
standing of the State’s rationale for his execution under a preponderance of the
evidence “is a much closer question.” (Pinal ROA 8.) Dixon received the complete
transcript of the hearing on May 5, 2022. On May 7, 2022, Dixon filed pursuant to
A.R.S. § 13-4022(I) a petition for special action review of the superior court’s denial
of his Ford claim in the Arizona Supreme Court. Petition for Special Action, Dixon v.
Hon. Robert Carter Olson, No. CV-22-0117 (Ariz. May 7, 2022). On May 9, 2022, the
Arizona Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over Dixon’s petition. Order, Dixon v.
Hon. Robert Carter Olson, No. CV-22-0117 (Ariz. May 9, 2022).
c.
The federal court proceedings
On May 10, 2022, the United State District Court for the District of Arizona
denied habeas corpus relief and denied a stay of execution. (Dist. Ct. ECF No. 97.)
The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief
and stay of execution. (Ninth Cir. ECF No. 15-1) The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing
en banc. (Ninth Cir. ECF Nos. 18, 19.)
This petition for writ of certiorari follows.
15
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
In Ford v. Wainwright, this Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
states from executing those who are mentally incompetent. 477 U.S. 399, 409–10
(1986). Subsequently, in Panetti v. Quarterman, the Court reaffirmed the basic
premise of Ford, noting that “today, no less than before, we may seriously question
the retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has
been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.” 551 U.S. 930, 957
(2007) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 409–10). Ford and Panetti recognized that the
retributive purpose of capital punishment is called into question where an
individual’s mental state is so distorted “that his awareness of the crime and
punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by
the community as a whole.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959.
In Panetti, this Court articulated a two-step test under the Eighth Amendment
for determining whether a person is mentally incompetent to be executed. That test
requires asking, first, whether a prisoner suffers from a mental illness; and second,
whether a prisoner’s mental illness “obstructs a rational understanding of the State’s
reason for his execution.” 551 U.S. at 956–57. The Court explained that where a
“prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by mental illness that his awareness of the
crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts
shared by the community as a whole,” then the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment bars his execution. Id. at 957–59.
16
Importantly, this Court in Panetti rejected an incompetency test predicated on
a prisoner’s awareness that he committed murder; his awareness that he will be
executed; and his awareness that “the reason the State has given for the execution is
his commission of the crimes in question.” Id. at 956. Such an awareness standard,
the Court held, is “too restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections granted by the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 956–58; see also id. at 959 (finding that a prisoner may
be incompetent even though he “can identify the stated reason for his execution,” and
stating that for purposes of determining competency to be executed, a prisoner’s
“awareness of the crime and punishment” is not merely a “prisoner’s awareness of
the State’s rationale for an execution,” but rather encompasses, at a minimum, “a
rational understanding of it[]”).
Application of the Panetti standard to the evidence and testimony in this case
clearly and convincingly establishes that Dixon is not competent to be executed. First,
the evidence unequivocally demonstrated, and the superior court found, that Dixon
suffers from a longstanding psychotic disorder—namely, paranoid schizophrenia.
(Pinal ROA 8 at 2.) Dr. Vega’s testimony to the contrary was indefensible and
bordered on making a mockery of the proceedings. He agreed the diagnostic criteria
for a psychotic illness are present, but idiosyncratically refused to apply them in
defiance of professionally recognized standards. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 77–85.) He
then applied an antisocial personality diagnosis that was unsupported by requisite
diagnostic criteria. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 87–91.)
17
Step two in Panetti asks whether a prisoner’s mental illness “obstructs a
rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.” 551 U.S. at 956–57.
Both Dr. Vega and Dr. Amezcua-Patino agreed that Dixon fixates on a belief
qualifying as “delusional” under the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria that all levels of the
judiciary are working together to deny his NAU claim, not because they believe it to
be legally incorrect, but because they believe it to be meritorious but deny it anyway
to protect state agencies from exposing “politically disastrous, [] dark embarrassment
that for many years a law enforcement entity has operated without statutory
authority.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 69–70; Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 22, 78–79.) The only
question left for the superior court to resolve was whether Dixon’s fixation on that
delusional belief obstructs him from forming a rational understanding of the State’s
reasons for his execution. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956 (“The legal inquiry concerns
whether these delusions can be said to render him incompetent.”). The superior court
failed to undertake that constitutionally mandated inquiry. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313
F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of
Supreme Court law if the state court identifies the correct legal standard but applies
it in an unreasonable manner to the facts before it.”).
Dr. Vega is unequivocally disqualified from credibly answering this question.
He engaged in a discreditable, arbitrary, and capricious diagnostic process, in
defiance of professional standards, to find Dixon does not suffer from a psychotic
disorder, when in fact, as the Superior Court found, Dixon does. (Pinal ROA 8 at 2.)
Dr. Vega is therefore in no position to address step two, the causation prong in the
18
Panetti analysis: whether Dixon’s serious mental illness impairs his rational
understanding of the State’s reasons for his execution.5 Only Dr. Amezcua-Patino is
able to reliably address this question. And he did.
Dr. Amezcua-Patino explained how Dixon’s paranoid schizophrenia and the
delusions that contaminate his thought process prevent him from understanding that
he is going to be executed as an expression of the State’s outrage at the murder he
was convicted of carrying out, and instead lead him to believe that government actors
“want to execute me because they don’t want to be embarrassed.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m.
at 64–65.)
I.
Panetti does not foreclose a schizophrenic prisoner from
demonstrating that non-bizarre delusions obstruct his rational
understanding of the State’s reason for his execution
Panetti’s two-step test under the Eighth Amendment for determining whether
a person is mentally incompetent to be executed requires (1) a mental illness and (2)
that the mental illness obstruct a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his
execution. 551 U.S. at 956–57. To establish a mental illness in Panetti, the petitioner
proffered evidence that he suffered from a mental illness “indicative of schizoaffective disorder” that “result[ed] in a genuine delusion involving his understanding
of the reason for his execution.” Id. at 954. Under Panetti, regardless of the content
of the delusion, “the legal inquiry concerns whether these delusions can be said to
render [the Petitioner] incompetent.” Id. at 956.
Dr. Vega also testified that his ultimate opinion about whether Dixon has a
rational understanding of the State’s reasons for his execution is dependent on his
ASPD and non-diagnosis of schizophrenia, which the Superior Court made a factual
finding was incorrect. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 43.)
5
19
Although the state’s experts in Panetti “resisted the conclusion that
petitioner’s stated beliefs were necessarily indicative of incompetency, particularly in
light of his perceived ability to understand certain concepts and, at times, to be clear
and lucid,” Panetti’s experts testified that this should be reconciled as follows:
Well, first, you have to understand that when somebody is
schizophrenic, it doesn’t diminish their cognitive ability. . . . Instead, you
have a situation where—and why we call schizophrenia thought
disorder[—]the logical integration and reality connection of their
thoughts are disrupted, so the stimulus comes in, and instead of being
analyzed and processed in a rational, logical, linear sort of way, it gets
scrambled up and it comes out in a tangential, circumstantial, symbolic
. . . not really relevant kind of way. That’s the essence of somebody being
schizophrenic[.]
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 955 (emphasis added). Thus, a delusion, stemming from
schizophrenia, may render a subject’s perception of reality distorted because, in
response to certain stimulus, a thought gets “scrambled up and it comes out in a
tangential, circumstantial, symbolic . . . not really relevant kind of way.” This
distortion is not dependent on its bizarre nature. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954; compare
DSM-V at 87 (“Delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not
understandable to same-culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life
experiences.”), with id. “delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change
in light of conflicting evidence.”
Panetti’s description of “severe” delusions or “gross” delusions is not a
characterization of the bizarre nature of the delusion, but commentary on the extent
to which those delusions scramble the thought process. The court must look to the
20
consequence of the delusion to determine its severity and impact on a person’s
rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.
II.
The state court contravened and unreasonably applied Panetti when
it failed to consider evidence of non-bizarre delusions that qualify as
“delusions” under the diagnostic criteria in assessing whether a
schizophrenic prisoner is mentally competent to be executed under
the Eighth Amendment
Although it acknowledged Panetti’s standard, the superior court contravened
and unreasonably applied it. (Pinal ROA 8 at 2–4.) The superior court found that
Dixon proved by clear and convincing evidence that he has paranoid schizophrenia.
(Pinal ROA 8 at 2.) However, it failed to consider the unrefuted medical evidence of
Dixon’s psychotic delusional thought process resulting therefrom as only “arguably
delusional” and merely reflective of Dixon’s “favored legal theory.” (Pinal ROA 8 at
2–3.) This was objectively unreasonable. Once the superior court determined Dixon
suffered from schizophrenia, by definition, it was required to also conclude that
Dixon, in fact, experiences delusional thinking attendant to that psychotic illness. See
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 955-56.
Both experts agreed that Dixon’s fixation on his belief that all levels of the
judiciary have conspired to deny his NAU claim not because it is legally incorrect, but
because it is meritorious but would cause grave embarrassment to state agencies
meets the DSM-5 definition of delusion. (Tr. 05/03/2022 at 70-71.) Dr. Vega however
testified that this belief is not a delusion because the DSM-5 definition of delusion is
21
wrong and “watered down,” compared to his own “40 years of working in this field.”6
(Tr. 05/03/2022 at 72, 77.) The superior court’s finding that Dixon did not establish
that he suffers from delusions ignores the uncontested testimony by both experts that
Dixon’s belief about why his NAU claim has been repeatedly denied meets the DSM5 definition for delusion. It demonstrates that the superior court relied on Dr. Vega’s
more restrictive personal definition of delusion, contravening generally accepted
medical definitions as described in the DSM-5. The superior court’s adoption of Dr.
Vega’s incorrect and unsubstantiated definition of “delusions” was objectively
unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Dr. Amezcua-Patino has explained that, in the context of Dixon’s paranoid
schizophrenic thought disorder, his “unshakeable” belief that the judicial system and
actors in it have all conspired to wrongly deny his NAU claim to shield government
entities from embarrassment qualifies as a delusion under the diagnostic criteria and
prevents him from developing the rationality of thought necessary to understand the
meaning and purpose of his execution. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 27–28; Hearing Ex.
36.) This evidence was not refuted by Dr. Vega, whose contrived opinions conflict with
generally accepted diagnostic criteria.7
6 As discussed previously, Dr. Vega also testified that is not a medical doctor, has no
experience diagnosing or treating schizophrenia, has no patients, and rarely sees
subjects more than once because his work is exclusively court-ordered evaluations.
Dr. Vega explained that he “do[es not] do any treatment at all” because he would
“probably go crazy if I did, so I just do the [evals].” (Tr. 05/03/2022 at 47.)
7 The superior court’s finding also disregarded points on which both experts agreed:
Dr. Vega conceded that Dixon’s “beliefs about his NAU argument and why it has
been consistently denied is a fixed belief that is not amenable to change in light of
conflicting evidence[,]” thus qualifying as a delusion under the DSM-V definition.
(Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 70.) Dr. Vega even acknowledged that Dixon “could very well
22
Dixon’s “favored legal theory” begs the relevant question: whether that theory
is grounded in a serious mental illness which impairs Dixon’s rational understanding
of the reasons for his execution. Panetti required the superior court to focus on that
question.
The superior court should have assessed Dixon’s mental competency within the
framework of his schizophrenic illness and the psychotic delusions to which it
characteristically gives rise. Id. at 960 (“The beginning of doubt about competence in
a case like petitioner’s is not a misanthropic personality or an amoral character. It is
a psychotic disorder.”). Applying Panetti’s framework here, the superior court failed
to assess how Dixon’s favored legal theory is inextricably linked to his delusional,
psychotic-driven belief that “[t]hey say that they want to kill me because I killed
someone. But I know that they want to kill me because they don’t want to be
embarrassed” that the NAU police in 1985 acted without statutory jurisdiction by
arresting him in an unrelated criminal case, investigating, and collecting his DNA.
(Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 62–65; see also Hearing Ex. 31, Vega Report at 6.) Under
Panetti, “the legal inquiry concerns whether these delusions can be said to render
[Dixon] incompetent.” Id. at 956. The evidence before the superior court shows it does,
and the similarities between Panetti’s and Dixon’s Ford claims cannot be ignored.
Panetti suffered from mental illness “indicative of schizo-affective disorder”
that “result[ed] in a genuine delusion involving his understanding of the reason for
have had delusional disorder” and “[a]bsolutely” be on the “schizophrenic
spectrum.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 65–66, 86.)
23
his execution.” Id. at 954. Like Dixon, Panetti believed that “the stated reason is a
sham.” Id. 954–55. Just as Panetti believed that “the State in truth wants to execute
him to stop him from preaching[,]” id., Dixon’s mental illness has had parallel effects.
He believes that “[t]hey say they want to kill me because I killed someone. But I know
that they want to kill me because they don’t want to be embarrassed” by his exposé–
–an exposé that is entirely constructed on his delusional belief––that the NAU police
acted without statutory jurisdiction. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 62–63.)
The district court recognized that “[t]here is no doubt that Dixon’s ‘concept of
reality,’ is flawed by his delusional belief that the courts have denied relief on his
claimed legally valid NAU issue for reasons unrelated to its merits.” (A-3 at 22.)
However, the superior court ruled that Dixon had not demonstrated that he
experienced delusions, instead characterizing Dixon’s belief as “arguably delusional,”
or simply his belief of judicial “bias.” (A-5 at 3.) As the district court recognized “there
is no doubt” that Dixon holds a “delusional belief that the courts have denied relief
on his claimed legally valid NAU issue for reasons unrelated to its merits.” (A-3 at
22.) This finding demonstrates that the superior court’s contrary finding that Dixon
had not proved his beliefs are delusional is an unreasonable determination of facts.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). It also demonstrates that the superior court failed to
consider the question of Dixon’s rational understanding within the context of the
symptoms of his mental illness, as required by Panetti. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The superior court’s adoption of Dr. Vega’s more restrictive personal definition of
delusion, contravening generally accepted medical definitions as outlined in the
24
DSM-5, was objectively unreasonable. No fair-minded jurist could disagree that the
superior court’s adoption of Dr. Vega’s diagnostically incorrect and unsubstantiated
definition of “delusions” was flatly unsupported by the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Cf. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (“A state court’s determination that
a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004))).
Replicating the mistakes of the state’s experts in Panetti, the superior court
found that Dixon failed to demonstrate that he is mentally incompetent to be executed
by relying on statements from Dr. Amezcua-Patino’s interviews with Dixon reflecting
his awareness that the State seeks to execute him “for murder[,]” as well as indicia
of Dixon’s above-average intelligence and pro se writings that reflected
“sophistication, coheren[ce], and organized thinking, and fluent language skills[.]”
(Pinal ROA 8 at 4.)
In sum, the superior court contravened and unreasonably applied Panetti by
failing to consider as part of its competency inquiry evidence in the record before it
demonstrating that Dixon experiences delusions as a result of his paranoid
schizophrenic illness that prevent him from rationally understanding why he is being
executed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The United States District Court and Ninth Circuit
panel erred when they concluded otherwise.
25
III.
The state court unreasonably determined Dixon’s competency to be
executed, when the court relied on Dixon’s intelligence, coherence,
and hypothetical relief to determine that Dixon did not prove his
beliefs obstruct his rational understanding of the State’s reason for
his execution.
The superior court found that Dixon proved both by a preponderance and clear
and convincing evidence “that [he] has a mental disorder or mental illness of
schizophrenia.” (Pinal ROA 8 at 2.) But with respect to whether Dixon’s psychotic
illness prevents him from rationally understanding the State’s reasons for his
execution, the superior court determined that the evidence presented at the hearing
was “conflicting and ambiguous.” (Pinal ROA 8 at 3.) Yet Dr. Amezcua-Patino is the
only expert who assessed Dixon’s mental competency under the appropriate
standard, and he testified unequivocally that Dixon lacks a rational understanding
of the meaning and purpose of his execution. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 36, 64.) Dr.
Amezcua-Patino is also the only expert who asked Dixon why he believes he is being
executed. (Compare Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 58–59, 62–63 (Dr. Amezcua-Patino
testifying about the various techniques he used to probe Dixon’s beliefs about his
execution), with Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 100–01 (Dr. Vega testifying that he never
asked Dixon the question “why do you believe that you are being executed”).)
The superior court relied on evidence that Dixon made “reflective observations”
in prior writings, has high-average intelligence, and has “shown sophistication,
coherent and organized thinking, and fluent language skills in pleadings and motions
that he drafted” in order to “reject[]” the assertion that Dixon’s fixation over the NAU
26
issue “is dispositive” of the competency question. (Pinal ROA 8 at 3.) This was
objectively unreasonable.
The superior court’s reliance on indicia of intelligence to support its finding
that Dixon failed to demonstrate that he is mentally incompetent to be executed is
refuted by the medical evidence. Intelligence does not minimize the effect of a serious
psychotic illness such as paranoid schizophrenia. No evidence presented at the
hearing
shows otherwise. Dr. Amezcua-Patino testified that
people with
schizophrenia are often intelligent and can “maintain a high level of sophistication in
their thinking.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 33.) It is not counterintuitive: intelligence
does not relieve the sufferer of paranoid schizophrenia from auditory and visual
hallucinations or psychotic delusions. As Dr. Amezcua-Patino explained, Dixon’s
intellectual abilities must not be confused for mental competency because, as
someone with paranoid schizophrenia, Dixon’s writings are rooted in psychotic
delusions which have no basis in reality. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 13–21.) Dixon’s
writings thus needed to be understood “in the context of an illness[.]” (Tr. 05/03/2022
p.m. at 15.)
It must follow from the above that there is nothing in the nature of “coherence”
and “sophistication” in writings driven by psychotic delusions. This is plainly evident
from nearly all Dixon’s writings but especially two handwritten letters from Dixon to
the Arizona Judicial Commission in April 2022 where he demands that the members
of the Arizona Supreme Court be disbarred based on purely conspiratorial and
delusional beliefs pertaining to his impending execution. (Tr. 05/03/2022 a.m. at 83–
27
89; Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 94; Hearing Exs. 25–29.) There, Dixon embraced the
irrational belief that––no matter what the State’s stated rationale for his execution–
–his execution “will result in an extrajudicial killing that would merit disbarment of
those who are unconcerned with their unprofessional reason for being even after the
12th hour.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 117.) The evidence is clear and convincing: as a
result of his paranoid schizophrenic illness, Dixon “has had a consistent delusion for
a long time and that delusion can terminate his ability to be rational about what is
happening to him.” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 20.)
Rather than rely on the uncontroverted medical evidence, the court deemed
“persuasive” Dr. Vega’s claim that Dixon said he would feel “relief” if he were to
hypothetically regain his memory. (Pinal ROA 8 at 4.) Such evidence is neither
persuasive nor relevant. Dixon’s hypothetical imaginary beliefs are not a substitute
for understanding Dixon’s real-time psychotically driven belief: that state officials
have conspired to unlawfully execute him to avoid embarrassment. Moreover, Dr.
Vega’s claim is undermined by his intentional destruction of this evidence and
defeated by his admission that those were not Dixon’s exact words, the context was
omitted, and he asked no follow up or clarifying questions. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at
98–100, 109–10.)
The superior court’s reliance on Dr. Vega’s observation that Dixon has a
rational understanding of the State’s reasons for his execution is also unreasonable
because Dr. Vega testified that Dixon’s “specific diagnosis [] ultimately affect[s his]
opinion about whether he has a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his
28
execution[]” (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 43), but the superior court found Dr. Vega’s nondiagnosis of schizophrenia erroneous (Pinal ROA 8 at 2). By Dr. Vega’s own
admission, if his non-diagnosis of schizophrenia was erroneous, then his related
opinion about whether Dixon rationally understands the State’s reasons for his
execution cannot be relied upon. (Tr. 05/03/2022 p.m. at 43.)
Furthermore, as explained above, Dr. Vega’s opinions were untethered from
diagnostic norms and bordered on the farcical. See Statement of the Case, supra. Dr.
Vega evaluated Dixon for only 70 minutes over video and openly admitted that he did
“very little” research into the standards for evaluating a person’s mental competency
to be executed, based his medically unfounded opinions substantially on Dixon’s
statements and, knowing that, intentionally destroyed the audio recording of Dixon’s
actual statements prior to the hearing. Dr. Vega also admitted that he never asked
Dixon why he believes he is being executed, capriciously refused to apply the DSM-V
diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, delusions, and persecutory delusions, and failed
to apply the DSM-V diagnostic criteria to his own diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder. See Statement of the Case, supra.
CONCLUSION
Dixon respectfully requests that this Court grant his petition for writ of
certiorari and reverse the order and judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirming the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
29
Respectfully submitted:
May 10, 2022.
JON M. SANDS
Federal Public Defender
District of Arizona
Amanda C. Bass
Counsel of Record
Assistant Federal Public Defender
850 West Adams Street, Suite 201
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
(602) 382-2816 voice
(602) 889-3960 facsimile
amanda_bass@fd.org
Counsel for Petitioner Dixon
s/ Amanda C. Bass
Counsel of Record
30
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.