Opposition Brief — Justin Herrera, Petitioner v. Theresa Cleveland, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 22, 2022
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No. 21-771
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
JUSTIN HERRERA,
Petitioners,
v.
THERESA CLEVELAND, ET AL.,
Respondents.
__________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
__________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
__________
KIMBERLY M. FOXX
COOK COUNTY STATE’S
ATTORNEY
CATHY MCNEIL STEIN
JESSICA M. SCHELLER*
JONATHON D. BYRER
500 Richard J. Daley Center
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 603-6934
jessica.scheller@cookcountyil.gov
*Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C),
an amendment that “changes the party or the naming
of the party against whom a claim is asserted” relates
back to the date of the original pleading only if the
party being brought in by that amendment “knew or
should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the
proper party’s identity.” A “mistake” for purposes of
this rule is “an error, misconception, or
misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.” Krupski v.
Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010)
(cleaned up). As a result, “making a deliberate choice
to sue one party instead of another while fully
understanding the factual and legal differences
between the two parties is the antithesis of making a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Id. at
549.
The question presented is: does an amendment
relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) when the plaintiff
made no mistake in his original complaint, but
instead deliberately named three fictitious John Doe
defendants?
i
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ..........................................i
STATEMENT ............................................................ 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 6
I.
This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For The Question
Presented. ......................................................... 7
II.
The Supposed Conflict Is Not Sufficiently
Developed To Warrant Review. ..................... 10
III.
The Question Presented Is Not Sufficiently
Important To Warrant Review....................... 14
IV.
The Judgment Below Is Correct. ................... 17
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 23
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997) .......................................... 22
Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T & K.West R. Co.,.,
148 U.S. 372 (1893) ............................................ 8
Balle v. Cnty. of Nueces,
952 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2017) ...................... 12, 15
Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 U.S. 478 (1980) .......................................... 16
Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters.,
498 U.S. 533 (1991) .................................... 18, 20
California v. Rooney,
483 U.S. 307 (1987) .......................................... 21
Ceara v. Deacon,
916 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2019) .........................10-11
Everett v. Prison Health Servs.,
412 Fed. App’x 604 (4th Cir. 2011) .................. 11
Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros.,
240 U.S. 251 (1916) ............................................ 8
iv
Heglund v. City of Grand Rapids,
871 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2017) ............................ 11
Hogan v. Fischer,
738 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2013) ........................ 15, 16
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,
560 U.S. 538 (2010) .................................. passim
Minor v. Bostwick Labs.,
669 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 2012) .......................... 11
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t,
493 U.S. 120 (1989) ........................................ 22
Plumley v. Austin,
135 S. Ct. 828 (2015) ...................................... 11
Presnell v. Cnty. of Paulding,
454 Fed. App’x 763 (11th Cir. 2011) .............. 15
Riveros-Sanchez v. City of Easton,
861 Fed. App’x 819 (3d Cir. 2021) .................. 15
Smith v. City of Akron,
476 Fed. App’x 67 (6th Cir. 2012) .................... 11
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown,
511 U.S. 117 (1994) ............................................ 8
v
Va. Military Inst. v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993) ........................................ 9
Wadis v. Norristown State Hosp.,
617 Fed. App’x 133 (3d Cir. 2015).................... 12
Winzer v. Cnty. of Kaufman,
916 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................ 12
Zlatev v. Millette,
2015 IL App (1st) 143173 ................................. 17
STATUTES & RULES
28 U.S.C. § 1292 .......................................................... 4
Ala. R. Civ. P. 9 ......................................................... 16
Ala. R. Civ. P. 15 ....................................................... 16
Ark. Code 16-56-125 .................................................. 16
Cal. Code Civ. P. 474 ................................................. 16
Fed. R. App. P. 28 ...................................................... 11
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 ............................................... passim
N.Y. Civ. P. Law § 1024 ............................................ 16
Ohio Civ. R. 3............................................................. 16
vi
Ohio Civ. R. 15........................................................... 16
Sup. Ct. R. 10............................................................. 13
OTHER SOURCES
Stephen M. Shapiro, et al., Supreme Court Practice
(10th ed. 2013) ........................................................... 10
Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 883
(1996) ......................................................................... 21
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
__________
No. 21-771
__________
JUSTIN HERRERA,
Petitioner,
v.
THERESA CLEVELAND, ET AL.
Respondents.
__________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
__________
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
__________
STATEMENT
On September 19, 2018, Herrera, acting pro se,
filed his complaint in the district court, alleging
violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. R. 1.1 In that complaint, Herrera claimed that,
on October 26, 2016, he had been assaulted by other
inmates while at the Cook County Jail, and that the
correctional officers on duty failed to protect him from
that assault. R. 9 at 4-5. Herrera did not name any of
We cite the district court record as “R. ___,” the Seventh
Circuit record as “7th Cir. R. ___,” and the audio recording of
the oral argument in the Seventh Circuit as “7th Cir. Arg. ___.”
1
2
these correctional officers, or provide their identifying
information (e.g., appearance, gender, build, race), but
instead listed each defendant as a “John Doe.” Id. at
2. Herrera also did not identify the inmate whom he
claimed had initiated the assault.
Over a year later, on October 3, 2019, Herrera –
now acting through counsel – filed an amended
complaint identifying the inmate who had assaulted
him as Fernando Little and identifying two of the Doe
defendants as Teresa Cleveland and Samuel Diaz. R.
34. The third defendant was still designated “John
Doe,” a “correctional officer” with the Cook County
Jail. Id. ¶ 10. Herrera later filed a second amended
complaint identifying that third Doe defendant as
Enrique Martinez. R. 42.
The defendants moved to dismiss Herrera’s
complaint. R. 47. As defendants explained, his claim
was governed by Illinois’ two-year statute of
limitations, and that limitations period had expired
shortly after Herrera filed his initial complaint, on
October 26, 2018. Id. at 3-4.
In his response, R. 49, Herrera made two
arguments against dismissal. First, Herrera argued
that his amendments related back to his original
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) because
“inadequate knowledge [is] a type of mistake.” Id. at 5
(quotation marks omitted). As a result, he said, the
only question was whether the defendants had
3
received adequate notice of the suit, which Herrera
claimed was provided when notice was served on the
Cook County Sheriff. Id. at 6-7. Second, he argued, the
limitations period was equitably tolled during the
administrative grievance process, while the district
court conducted a preliminary evaluation of his
complaint, and while he awaited appointment of
counsel. Id. at 7-9.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss.
Pet. App. 13a-19a. Although the court acknowledged
that the Seventh Circuit “has held that Rule 15’s
‘mistake’ requirement is not satisfied if the plaintiff
simply lacks knowledge concerning, or is ignorant of,
the identity of the prospective defendant,” it
concluded that Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560
U.S. 538 (2010), overruled that precedent. Pet. App.
17a. Under Krupski, the court concluded, relation
back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depended on what the
newly added defendants knew about the plaintiffs’
suit before they were added. Id. at 18a. Because
information regarding such knowledge will rarely be
before the district court on a motion to dismiss, the
court explained, “dismissal on that basis is rare.” Ibid.
Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to
dismiss for lack of any information in the pleadings
regarding the defendants’ knowledge, explaining that
the denial of the motion to dismiss on that ground
made it unnecessary to address equitable tolling. Id.
at 18a-19a & n.1.
4
The district court certified its ruling for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
Pet. App. 22a, and the Seventh Circuit accepted the
appeal for consideration, id. at 21a. On appeal, an
amicus for Herrera argued that his complaint would
have related back even absent a “mistake” for
purposes of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 7th Cir. R. 14-2 at 22-23.
According to that amicus, Rule 15(c)(1)(A) allows
relation back whenever allowed under the state law
providing the applicable limitations period, and the
Illinois law providing that limitations period allows
relation back when a plaintiff is unable to identify a
defendant due to a lack of knowledge. Id. at 23-26. But
at oral argument, defendants explained that this
argument was waived because Herrera had never
raised it in the district court or in his response brief
on appeal. 7th Cir. Arg. 20:21-20:36.
The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. 1a-12a.
As the court of appeals explained, Krupski defined a
“mistake” for purposes of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “as an error,
misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous
belief,” or “a misunderstanding of the meaning or
implication of something; a wrong action or statement
proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate
knowledge, or inattention; an erroneous belief; or a
state of mind not in accordance with the facts.” Pet.
App. 8a (cleaned up). As a result, under Krupski, a
deliberate but mistaken choice to sue a particular
defendant does not entirely foreclose an amendment
from relating back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), because the
5
plaintiff might misunderstand that defendant’s status
or role. Ibid. But Krupski “made clear that a plaintiff’s
deliberate choice to sue one party over another while
‘fully understanding factual and legal differences’
between them is ‘the antithesis of making a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.’” Ibid. (quoting
560 U.S. at 549).
As a result, “naming a John Doe defendant does
not constitute a ‘mistake’” under Krupski, for three
reasons. Pet. App. 9a. First, “naming a defendant as
John Doe in the complaint is not based on an error,
misconception, misunderstanding, or erroneous
belief.” Ibid. “Rather, it is a deliberate choice,”
because “the plaintiff names a John Doe defendant
knowing full well the factual and legal differences
between the nominal defendant and the proper
defendant. Such an intentional and informed decision
cannot amount to a mistake.” Ibid.
Second, “a John Doe case and Krupski are
different in kind.” Pet. App. 9a. “While the plaintiff in
Krupski had no idea she lacked knowledge of the
proper defendant’s identity, Herrera sued John Doe
defendants fully aware that he lacked adequate
information to ascertain the correctional officers’
identities.” Ibid. “Put differently, the plaintiff in
Krupski did not know what she did not know; Herrera
did know what he did not know.” Ibid.
Third, while Krupski defined a “mistake” to
6
include “a wrong action or statement” resulting from
“inadequate knowledge,” that does not mean that
“inadequate knowledge” and a “mistake” are the same
thing. Pet. App. 10a. Rather, “it is the ‘wrong action’
stemming from ‘inadequate knowledge’ that amounts
to a mistake.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Using a Doe
designation “is not a wrong action proceeding from
inadequate knowledge; it is a proper action on account
of inadequate knowledge.” Ibid.
“In sum,” the Seventh Circuit concluded, “suing a
John Doe defendant is a conscious choice, not an
inadvertent error.” Pet. App. 10a. And because
Herrera’s amended complaints did not relate back
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), they were untimely. Id. at 11a.
But, the court cautioned, “Herrera’s case does not
necessarily end here. As he argued in the district court
and does so again on appeal, the doctrine of equitable
tolling may apply.” Ibid. And while “equitable tolling
is rare,” the court concluded, “it remains available
here. Whether Herrera satisfies this test is a factual
inquiry beyond the scope of this interlocutory appeal,
so we leave this issue for the district court to consider
on remand.” Ibid.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The petition for certiorari should be denied. This
case reached the Seventh Circuit not on appeal from
a final judgment, but on appeal of an interlocutory
ruling denying a motion to dismiss. And as the
7
Seventh Circuit recognized when remanding this
matter to the district court for further proceedings,
Herrera’s complaint might still proceed even though
it does not relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In
addition, the issue presented is of only marginal
importance – under Rule 15(c)(1)(A), the state law
providing the applicable limitations period provides
the default rule for relation back in civil rights cases,
and several states allow relation back of Doe
designations. Illinois is one of those states, but
Herrera waived any argument for relation back under
Rule 15(c)(1)(A) by failing to raise that issue in the
proceedings below. Furthermore, the split of authority
Herrera relies upon is not sufficiently developed to
warrant this Court’s review – indeed, the only postKrupski decision Herrera can identify on his preferred
side of that split is an unpublished decision that does
not bind even the court in which it was issued. Finally,
the court of appeals correctly recognized that using a
Doe designation is not a mistake allowing relation
back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
I.
This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For The
Question Presented.
This case is a poor vehicle for the question
presented because it involves the review of an
interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss.
Generally, this Court will not grant certiorari to
review an issue when “it is not clear that [its]
resolution of [that issue] will make any difference” to
8
the petitioner. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S.
117, 122 (1994) (per curiam). As a result, because
“many orders made in the progress of a suit become
quite unimportant by reason of the final result, or of
intervening matters,” certiorari review of an
interlocutory order is inappropriate “unless it is
necessary to prevent extraordinary inconvenience and
embarrassment in the conduct of the cause.” Am.
Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U.S.
372, 384 (1893); accord, e.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe
Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (“except in
extraordinary cases, the writ is not issued until final
decree”).
This case directly implicates the concerns
underlying that longstanding rule. As the court of
appeals explained below, even though Herrera’s
complaint did not relate back, his “case does not
necessarily end here” because “equitable tolling may
apply.” Pet. App. 11a. But because the applicability of
equitable tolling “is a factual inquiry beyond the scope
of this interlocutory appeal,” the court “le[ft] this issue
for the district court to consider on remand.” Ibid. As
a result, there is still a chance that Herrera’s suit may
be allowed to proceed, even if it does not relate back
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Indeed, Herrera argued
precisely that before the Seventh Circuit. See 7th Cir.
R. 12 at 4 n.1 (“even if this Court were to reverse and
remand, the motion to dismiss could still be denied on
[equitable tolling] grounds”).
9
Herrera does not come to grips with the
interlocutory nature of the ruling he seeks to
challenge, so he does not claim that this case involves
any extraordinary circumstance justifying this
Court’s immediate intervention. Nor could he.
Nothing about equitable tolling – involving only
questions of whether it is fair and equitable to hold
Herrera to the normal limitations period – is even
conceivably a matter of great embarrassment. Nor
does merely being asked to present argument and
evidence in the district court on the issue of equitable
tolling entail any extraordinary inconvenience. Much
to the contrary, if the district court resolves that issue
in Herrera’s favor, it would actually spare Herrera a
great deal of inconvenience unnecessarily litigating
the question presented to this Court.
This
case
involving
no
extraordinary
circumstances warranting this Court’s immediate
review of an interlocutory issue, the best course is to
allow the district court to address in the first instance
whether equitable tolling would allow Herrera’s suit
to proceed. If that issue is not resolved in Herrera’s
favor, he can seek this Court’s review again, this time
with a final judgment in hand that will ensure that
this Court’s review of the question he presents is not
for naught. See Va. Military Inst. v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2431, 2432 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari). And if that issue is resolved in
Herrera’s favor, then there is no need for this Court’s
review of the question presented.
10
II. The Supposed Conflict Is Not Sufficiently
Developed To Warrant Review.
This Court should deny certiorari for the
additional reason that the conflict of authority
identified in the petition is not yet sufficiently
developed to warrant this Court’s review.
According to Herrera, the courts of appeals have
been divided “for nearly three decades” over the
proper interpretation of Rule 15(c)(1)(C), Pet. 11, but
any conflict between the circuits that predates this
Court’s decision in Krupski cannot warrant certiorari
review, see Stephen M. Shapiro, et al., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 248 (10th ed. 2013) (“A conflict with
a decision that has been discredited or that has lost
all weight as authority by reason of intervening
decisions of the Supreme Court . . . will not be an
adequate basis for granting certiorari.”).
As a result, the appropriate question here is
whether the supposed conflict among the circuits
persists in Krupski’s wake, after the courts of appeals
have had adequate opportunity to examine its effect
on their prior decisions. On this subject, Herrera
declares it “readily apparent” that Krupski “will not
align” the courts of appeals. Pet. App. 23. But this is a
drastic overstatement – in the decade-plus since this
Court decided Krupski, only five courts of appeals
have addressed its effect on relation back following a
Doe designation. Pet. App. 1a-12a; Ceara v. Deacon,
11
916 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2019); Heglund v. City of Grand
Rapids, 871 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2017); Smith v. City of
Akron, 476 Fed. Appx. 67 (6th Cir. 2012); Everett v.
Prison Health Servs., 412 Fed. Appx. 604 (4th Cir.
2011). Of those, the only one to allow relation back
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) of an amendment following a
Doe designation was an unpublished opinion of the
Fourth Circuit that discusses Krupski only in a
footnote. Everett, 412 Fed. Appx. at 606 n.3.
Far from indicating an entrenched circuit split,
that lone post-Krupski decision indicates that the
Fourth Circuit has not yet foreclosed reconsidering its
pre-Krupski interpretation of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). To
the contrary, the discussion of Krupski in an
unpublished opinion is strong indication that the
Fourth Circuit intended to “preserve[ ] its ability to
change course in the future,” Plumley v. Austin, 135
S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari), by including that discussion in an
unpublished opinion that is “not binding” on future
Fourth Circuit panels, Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc.,
669 F.3d 428, 433 n.6 (4th Cir. 2012). It is readily
apparent why the Fourth Circuit hoped to keep that
option open – Krupski was brought to the Everett
court’s attention in a “letter” submitted “[a]fter all
briefs were filed,” 412 Fed. Appx. at 606 n.3, and, by
rule, such letters may be no more than 350 words long,
Fed. R. App. P. 28(j).
Perhaps
recognizing
that
the
unpublished
12
decision in Everett offers no real support for his claim
of an “entrenched” split of authority post-Krupski,
Herrera attempts to reinforce that claim with the
Third Circuit’s unpublished decision in Wadis v.
Norristown State Hosp., 617 Fed. Appx. 133 (3d Cir.
2015). Pet. 20. But Wadis says absolutely nothing
about how the Third Circuit reads Krupski – indeed,
it does not even mention Krupski, let alone discuss
Krupski’s effect on relation back after a Doe
designation. Nor was there reason for the Third
Circuit to discuss that issue, since the plaintiff in
Wadis “did not seek to substitute a named defendant
for a John Doe defendant.” 617 Fed. Appx. at 136. As
a result, the Third Circuit’s entire discussion of
relation back after a Doe designation is confined to a
single, fleeting sentence of dicta. Id.
Herrera also notes that the Fifth Circuit has
“continued to follow its precedent barring relation
back for Doe substitutions, without any discussion of
Krupski,” Pet. 23 (citing Winzer v. Kaufman County,
916 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2019); Balle v. Cnty. of Nueces,
952 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2017)), but those decisions offer
no support for his claim of an entrenched split, either.
Because neither Winzer nor Balle discuss Krupski,
they cannot be read to stake a position regarding
Krupski’s effect on relation back following a Doe
designation. Indeed, a review of the briefs in those
cases reveals that it was never argued to the Fifth
Circuit that Krupski required it to take a different
position – the briefs in Winzer never even mentioned
13
Krupski, and the appellant’s opening brief in Balle
made only a passing reference to Krupski, for an
unrelated point.
Unable to identify any appellate authority
evincing an entrenched split post-Krupski, Herrera
falls back on the “dozens of decisions from district
courts” he claims agree with his position. Pet. 18. But
the existence of those decisions – many of which have
since been overruled – offers no support for certiorari
here. Under this Court’s rules, only splits of binding
appellate authority will support a grant of certiorari.
Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) & (b). It is thus simply irrelevant for
present purposes whether the district courts disagree
(or agree, for that matter) with the courts of appeals
regarding the proper interpretation of Krupski.
In sum, there is no evidence of an “entrenched”
split of authority regarding whether a Doe
designation is a “mistake” under Krupski. To the
contrary, all indications are that the majority of the
courts of appeals have not yet had sufficient
opportunity to conclusively address that issue. As a
result, this Court’s review would be premature, and
certiorari should be denied for that reason alone.
14
III. The Question Presented Is Not Sufficiently
Important To Warrant Review.
Herrera claims that the question whether Rule
15(c)(1)(C) allows relation back after a Doe
designation “is exceptionally important” in civil rights
suits such as his, Pet. 34 – a claim echoed by his amici,
see Howard Amici 8; Jailhouse Lawyer Amici 5 – but
this fundamentally misunderstands Rule 15(c)(1)(C),
which is designed to play only a limited role in civil
rights cases, as well as any other cases that derive
their limitations periods from state law. Indeed, Rule
15(c)(1)(C) might not have been of any importance to
Herrera himself but for his counsel’s decision to rely
solely on that rule in the proceedings below.
To understand why this is so, it must be
remembered that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is but one of three
alternative, sufficient grounds for allowing the
relation back of an amendment. An amendment also
relates back when either (1) “the law that provides the
applicable statute of limitations allows relation back,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A); or (2) “the amendment
asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). As a result, a court need
address relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) only if
neither of the two other grounds for relation back are
available.
15
Of particular significance for present purposes is
Rule 15(c)(1)(A). As the Rules’ drafters explained
when adding that provision in 1991, their intent was
“to make it clear that the rule does not apply to
preclude any relation back that may be permitted
under the applicable limitations law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1991
amendments. “Generally, the applicable limitations
law will be state law,” even in cases where “federal
jurisdiction is based on a federal question.” Ibid.
“Whatever may be the controlling body of limitations
law, if that law affords a more forgiving principle of
relation back than the one provided in this rule, it
should be available to save the claim.” Ibid.
Recognizing the rules’ drafters’ clear intent to
allow relation back to the full extent permitted by the
state law that provides the controlling limitation
period, the courts of appeals agree that an
amendment in a section 1983 case relates back so long
as the state law providing the limitations period
would allow that amendment to relate back. E.g.,
Riveros-Sanchez v. City of Easton, 861 Fed. Appx. 819,
823 (3d Cir. 2021): Balle, 952 F.3d at 557; Hogan v.
Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013); Presnell v.
Cnty. of Paulding, 454 Fed. Appx. 763, 767 (11th Cir.
2011). These rulings are clearly correct – in the
comments to the 1991 amendments that added Rule
15(c)(1)(A), the rules’ drafters’ chosen example of a
federal-question case in which relation back would be
governed by state limitations law was a civil rights
16
case arising under section 1983. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15,
Notes of Advisory Committee on 1991 amendments
(citing Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)
(explaining that the statute of limitations for claims
under section 1983 is derived from state law)).
As a result, if the state law providing the
limitations period for a plaintiff’s section 1983 claim
would allow relation back of an amendment after a
Doe designation, that amendment relates back under
Rule 15(c)(1)(A) as well, making it irrelevant whether
that amendment would also relate back under Rule
15(c)(1)(C). In Hogan, for example, because the New
York law that provided the statute of limitations for
the plaintiff’s section 1983 claim “permit[s] John Doe
substitutions nunc pro tunc,” the plaintiff’s
amendment of a Doe designation related back to his
original complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(A), 738 F.3d at
518-20, regardless of its failure to relate back under
Rule 15(c)(1)(C), id. at 518.
Properly understood, then, whether Rule
15(c)(1)(C) allows relation back after a Doe
designation is an issue of only limited, secondary
importance in federal civil rights litigation. For civil
rights plaintiffs in a number of states, that issue is of
no consequence because those states’ limitations laws
expressly allow relation back. E.g., Ala. R. Civ. P.
9(h) & 15(c)(4); Ark. Code § 16-56-125; Cal. Code Civ.
P. § 474; N.Y. Civ. P. Law § 1024; Ohio Civ. R. 3(A) &
15(D). And that issue could have been of no
17
consequence to even Herrera himself – under Illinois
law, “a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge regarding a
party’s identity” may constitute a mistake allowing
relation back, Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st)
143173, ¶ 4, but Herrera eschewed reliance on Rule
15(c)(1)(A) below, choosing instead to argue only that
his amendment related back under the narrower
language of Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Because the question whether a Doe designation
relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is an issue of no
consequence to civil rights litigants in the states that
allow relation back after a Doe designation, and might
have been of no consequence to Herrera himself had
he not waived any reliance on the more favorable
language of Rule 15(c)(1)(A), this Court’s review of
that issue is not warranted.
IV. The Judgment Below Is Correct.
This Court’s review is also unnecessary because
the court of appeals correctly recognized that a Doe
designation is not a “mistake” allowing relation back
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
The inquiry into the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
begins, and ends, with its plain language. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure must be given their plain
meaning, so the primary question when analyzing a
given rule is whether its language is unambiguous; if
so, the judicial inquiry is over, and the rule must be
18
applied as written. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communs. Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 541 (1991). Here, the
language of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) could not be more
unambiguous – under that rule, an amendment
relates back only if the defendant “knew or should
have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.”
This Court interpreted that language in Krupski,
explaining that a “mistake” is commonly understood
as “an error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an
erroneous belief” or “a misunderstanding of the
meaning or implication of something, a wrong action
or statement proceeding from faulty judgment,
inadequate knowledge, or inattention; an erroneous
belief; or a state of mind not in accordance with the
facts.” 560 U.S. at 548-549 (cleaned up). Thus, this
Court explained, the only question under Rule
15(c)(1)(C) is “whether [the defendant] knew or should
have known that it would have been named as a
defendant but for an error.” Id. at 548 (emphasis
added).
This analysis from Krupski forecloses any
argument that Herrera’s complaint relates back
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Herrera does not claim that he
used a Doe designation in his initial complaint as the
result of a factual error regarding the proper
defendants’ identity – he does not claim, for example,
that he believed the defendants were all actually
19
named “John Doe” – but admits that he did so
deliberately, “[b]ecause he did not know the officers’
names.” Pet. 8. Nor does Herrera claim that he
misunderstood the legal effect of his use of a Doe
designation; rather, he admits that such a designation
“plainly signals” that he “lack[ed] the necessary
knowledge” to name an actual person. Id. at 25. As
this Court explained in Krupski, such a deliberate
choice “is the antithesis of making a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.” 560 U.S. at
549. Absent such a mistake, it was impossible for the
defendants to actually or constructively know that
they would have been originally named in Herrera’s
complaint but for a mistake. As a result, Herrera’s
amendment does not relate back under Rule
15(c)(1)(C).
Herrera’s arguments to the contrary are wholly
misplaced. Herrera repeatedly insists that it should
be irrelevant that his actions were deliberate because
“Rule 15(c)(1)(C) focuses on the defendant’s
knowledge, not the plaintiff’s state of mind,” Pet. 26;
accord id. at 24-25, but Krupski flatly rejected that
notion, explaining that “[i]nformation in the plaintiff’s
possession is relevant” so long as “it bears on the
defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff
made a mistake regarding the proper party’s
identity.” 540 U.S. at 548. As a result, it is perfectly
appropriate to ask whether the plaintiff “ma[de] a
deliberate choice to sue one party instead of another
while fully understanding the factual and legal
20
differences between the two parties,” since such a
deliberate choice conclusively shows that the plaintiff
made no “mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” Id. at 549. Tellingly, Herrera does not even
acknowledge these statements from Krupski, let alone
explain how they can be reconciled with his
understanding of Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Herrera also claims that the proper inquiry under
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is simply whether the defendant
“underst[ood] that he was the proper party to the
claims.” Pet. 24; accord id. at 26. But had the Rule’s
drafters intended for that to be the entirety of the
relevant inquiry, they would have simply said so.
Instead, they specified that an amendment relates
back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) only if the defendant
actually or constructively knew he would have been
named “but for a mistake.” That choice of the drafters
must be respected, by applying the Rule as it actually
reads, not as Herrera wishes it would read. See Bus.
Guides, 498 U.S. at 541.
Trying to get around this problem, Herrera claims
that the use of a Doe designation is a “mistake” under
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) because a plaintiff who uses such a
designation “name[s] the wrong defendant due to
inadequate knowledge.” Pet. 25; see id. at 27 (claiming
that “listing ‘John Doe’ as the defendant when that is
not the defendant’s name is just as wrong as any other
misidentification”). This is nonsense – a Doe
designation does not name or identify a defendant at
21
all, it merely uses a fictitious name to indicate that
the defendant’s name is unknown. E.g., Carol M.
Rice, Meet John Doe, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 885 n.4
(1996) (explaining that “John Doe” is “a name used in
law courts, legal papers, etc. to refer to any person
whose name is unknown”) (cleaned up); accord Pet. 27
(“‘John Doe’ is a convention that helpfully signals the
plaintiff’s inadequate knowledge to the court”). Thus,
a plaintiff’s use of a Doe designation to indicate that
he does not know the identity of the proper defendant
is no more “wrong” or “mistaken” than it would be to
use “Unknown Defendant” or “Unidentified
Defendant.” Unless Herrera means to take the
strange position that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) treats a
plaintiff’s use of “John Doe” more favorably than the
use of “Unknown Defendant,” despite both meaning
the exact same thing, the mere fact that one is
technically a “name,” and the other is not, is a
distinction without a difference.
Herrera’s remaining arguments are easily set
aside. Herrera accuses the court of appeals of
mischaracterizing the facts in Krupski, Pet. 26-27, but
that would be irrelevant for present purposes even
were it true, since this Court reviews judgments, not
statements in opinions, California v. Rooney, 483 U.S.
307, 311 (1987) (per curiam). Herrera also insists that
it would be “nonsensical” if a complaint cannot relate
back after a Doe designation but can relate back if the
plaintiff simply “misidentif[ies] the defendant so that
relation back remains an option.” Pet. 28. This
22
argument rests on a faulty premise – intentionally
misidentifying a defendant merely to leave the door
open to relation back is just as much of a deliberate
choice as using a Doe designation, and therefore does
not constitute a “mistake” for purposes of Rule
15(c)(1)(C).
Finally, Herrera offers a lengthy discussion of
how he thinks the Rule’s “purposes” and
“administrability” might be better served, and more
sensical “incentives” provided to litigants. Pet. 28-32.
But because the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is plain on its
face, these are, at most, arguments for its
amendment, and this Court has been clear that
“[c]ourts are not free to amend a rule outside the
process Congress ordered.” Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). This is true even if
the amendments would, as Herrera believes, better
serve the rule’s purposes, because a court’s “task is to
apply the text, not to improve upon it.” Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120,
126 (1989).
23
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
KIMBERLY M. FOXX
COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY
CATHY MCNEIL STEIN
JESSICA M. SCHELLER*
JONATHON D. BYRER
500 Richard J. Daley Center
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 603-6934
jessica.scheller@cookcountyil.gov
Attorneys for Respondents
*Counsel of Record
February 22, 2022
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.