Opposition Brief — Justin Herrera, Petitioner v. Theresa Cleveland, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 22, 2022

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No. 21-771

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

JUSTIN HERRERA,

Petitioners,

v.

THERESA CLEVELAND, ET AL.,

Respondents.

__________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

__________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

__________

KIMBERLY M. FOXX

COOK COUNTY STATE’S

ATTORNEY

CATHY MCNEIL STEIN

JESSICA M. SCHELLER*

JONATHON D. BYRER

500 Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 603-6934

jessica.scheller@cookcountyil.gov

*Counsel of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C),

an amendment that “changes the party or the naming

of the party against whom a claim is asserted” relates

back to the date of the original pleading only if the

party being brought in by that amendment “knew or

should have known that the action would have been

brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the

proper party’s identity.” A “mistake” for purposes of

this rule is “an error, misconception, or

misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.” Krupski v.

Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 548 (2010)

(cleaned up). As a result, “making a deliberate choice

to sue one party instead of another while fully

understanding the factual and legal differences

between the two parties is the antithesis of making a

mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Id. at

549.

The question presented is: does an amendment

relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) when the plaintiff

made no mistake in his original complaint, but

instead deliberately named three fictitious John Doe

defendants?

i

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED ..........................................i

STATEMENT ............................................................ 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 6

I.

This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For The Question

Presented. ......................................................... 7

II.

The Supposed Conflict Is Not Sufficiently

Developed To Warrant Review. ..................... 10

III.

The Question Presented Is Not Sufficiently

Important To Warrant Review....................... 14

IV.

The Judgment Below Is Correct. ................... 17

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 23

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Amchem Prods. v. Windsor,

521 U.S. 591 (1997) .......................................... 22

Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T & K.West R. Co.,.,

148 U.S. 372 (1893) ............................................ 8

Balle v. Cnty. of Nueces,

952 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2017) ...................... 12, 15

Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio,

446 U.S. 478 (1980) .......................................... 16

Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters.,

498 U.S. 533 (1991) .................................... 18, 20

California v. Rooney,

483 U.S. 307 (1987) .......................................... 21

Ceara v. Deacon,

916 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2019) .........................10-11

Everett v. Prison Health Servs.,

412 Fed. App’x 604 (4th Cir. 2011) .................. 11

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros.,

240 U.S. 251 (1916) ............................................ 8

iv

Heglund v. City of Grand Rapids,

871 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2017) ............................ 11

Hogan v. Fischer,

738 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2013) ........................ 15, 16

Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.,

560 U.S. 538 (2010) .................................. passim

Minor v. Bostwick Labs.,

669 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 2012) .......................... 11

Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t,

493 U.S. 120 (1989) ........................................ 22

Plumley v. Austin,

135 S. Ct. 828 (2015) ...................................... 11

Presnell v. Cnty. of Paulding,

454 Fed. App’x 763 (11th Cir. 2011) .............. 15

Riveros-Sanchez v. City of Easton,

861 Fed. App’x 819 (3d Cir. 2021) .................. 15

Smith v. City of Akron,

476 Fed. App’x 67 (6th Cir. 2012) .................... 11

Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown,

511 U.S. 117 (1994) ............................................ 8

v

Va. Military Inst. v. United States,

113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993) ........................................ 9

Wadis v. Norristown State Hosp.,

617 Fed. App’x 133 (3d Cir. 2015).................... 12

Winzer v. Cnty. of Kaufman,

916 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................ 12

Zlatev v. Millette,

2015 IL App (1st) 143173 ................................. 17

STATUTES & RULES

28 U.S.C. § 1292 .......................................................... 4

Ala. R. Civ. P. 9 ......................................................... 16

Ala. R. Civ. P. 15 ....................................................... 16

Ark. Code 16-56-125 .................................................. 16

Cal. Code Civ. P. 474 ................................................. 16

Fed. R. App. P. 28 ...................................................... 11

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 ............................................... passim

N.Y. Civ. P. Law § 1024 ............................................ 16

Ohio Civ. R. 3............................................................. 16

vi

Ohio Civ. R. 15........................................................... 16

Sup. Ct. R. 10............................................................. 13

OTHER SOURCES

Stephen M. Shapiro, et al., Supreme Court Practice

(10th ed. 2013) ........................................................... 10

Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 883

(1996) ......................................................................... 21

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

__________

No. 21-771

__________

JUSTIN HERRERA,

Petitioner,

v.

THERESA CLEVELAND, ET AL.

Respondents.

__________

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

__________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

__________

STATEMENT

On September 19, 2018, Herrera, acting pro se,

filed his complaint in the district court, alleging

violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. R. 1.1 In that complaint, Herrera claimed that,

on October 26, 2016, he had been assaulted by other

inmates while at the Cook County Jail, and that the

correctional officers on duty failed to protect him from

that assault. R. 9 at 4-5. Herrera did not name any of

We cite the district court record as “R. ___,” the Seventh

Circuit record as “7th Cir. R. ___,” and the audio recording of

the oral argument in the Seventh Circuit as “7th Cir. Arg. ___.”

1

2

these correctional officers, or provide their identifying

information (e.g., appearance, gender, build, race), but

instead listed each defendant as a “John Doe.” Id. at

2. Herrera also did not identify the inmate whom he

claimed had initiated the assault.

Over a year later, on October 3, 2019, Herrera –

now acting through counsel – filed an amended

complaint identifying the inmate who had assaulted

him as Fernando Little and identifying two of the Doe

defendants as Teresa Cleveland and Samuel Diaz. R.

34. The third defendant was still designated “John

Doe,” a “correctional officer” with the Cook County

Jail. Id. ¶ 10. Herrera later filed a second amended

complaint identifying that third Doe defendant as

Enrique Martinez. R. 42.

The defendants moved to dismiss Herrera’s

complaint. R. 47. As defendants explained, his claim

was governed by Illinois’ two-year statute of

limitations, and that limitations period had expired

shortly after Herrera filed his initial complaint, on

October 26, 2018. Id. at 3-4.

In his response, R. 49, Herrera made two

arguments against dismissal. First, Herrera argued

that his amendments related back to his original

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) because

“inadequate knowledge [is] a type of mistake.” Id. at 5

(quotation marks omitted). As a result, he said, the

only question was whether the defendants had

3

received adequate notice of the suit, which Herrera

claimed was provided when notice was served on the

Cook County Sheriff. Id. at 6-7. Second, he argued, the

limitations period was equitably tolled during the

administrative grievance process, while the district

court conducted a preliminary evaluation of his

complaint, and while he awaited appointment of

counsel. Id. at 7-9.

The district court denied the motion to dismiss.

Pet. App. 13a-19a. Although the court acknowledged

that the Seventh Circuit “has held that Rule 15’s

‘mistake’ requirement is not satisfied if the plaintiff

simply lacks knowledge concerning, or is ignorant of,

the identity of the prospective defendant,” it

concluded that Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560

U.S. 538 (2010), overruled that precedent. Pet. App.

17a. Under Krupski, the court concluded, relation

back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) depended on what the

newly added defendants knew about the plaintiffs’

suit before they were added. Id. at 18a. Because

information regarding such knowledge will rarely be

before the district court on a motion to dismiss, the

court explained, “dismissal on that basis is rare.” Ibid.

Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to

dismiss for lack of any information in the pleadings

regarding the defendants’ knowledge, explaining that

the denial of the motion to dismiss on that ground

made it unnecessary to address equitable tolling. Id.

at 18a-19a & n.1.

4

The district court certified its ruling for

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),

Pet. App. 22a, and the Seventh Circuit accepted the

appeal for consideration, id. at 21a. On appeal, an

amicus for Herrera argued that his complaint would

have related back even absent a “mistake” for

purposes of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). 7th Cir. R. 14-2 at 22-23.

According to that amicus, Rule 15(c)(1)(A) allows

relation back whenever allowed under the state law

providing the applicable limitations period, and the

Illinois law providing that limitations period allows

relation back when a plaintiff is unable to identify a

defendant due to a lack of knowledge. Id. at 23-26. But

at oral argument, defendants explained that this

argument was waived because Herrera had never

raised it in the district court or in his response brief

on appeal. 7th Cir. Arg. 20:21-20:36.

The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. 1a-12a.

As the court of appeals explained, Krupski defined a

“mistake” for purposes of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “as an error,

misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous

belief,” or “a misunderstanding of the meaning or

implication of something; a wrong action or statement

proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate

knowledge, or inattention; an erroneous belief; or a

state of mind not in accordance with the facts.” Pet.

App. 8a (cleaned up). As a result, under Krupski, a

deliberate but mistaken choice to sue a particular

defendant does not entirely foreclose an amendment

from relating back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), because the

5

plaintiff might misunderstand that defendant’s status

or role. Ibid. But Krupski “made clear that a plaintiff’s

deliberate choice to sue one party over another while

‘fully understanding factual and legal differences’

between them is ‘the antithesis of making a mistake

concerning the proper party’s identity.’” Ibid. (quoting

560 U.S. at 549).

As a result, “naming a John Doe defendant does

not constitute a ‘mistake’” under Krupski, for three

reasons. Pet. App. 9a. First, “naming a defendant as

John Doe in the complaint is not based on an error,

misconception, misunderstanding, or erroneous

belief.” Ibid. “Rather, it is a deliberate choice,”

because “the plaintiff names a John Doe defendant

knowing full well the factual and legal differences

between the nominal defendant and the proper

defendant. Such an intentional and informed decision

cannot amount to a mistake.” Ibid.

Second, “a John Doe case and Krupski are

different in kind.” Pet. App. 9a. “While the plaintiff in

Krupski had no idea she lacked knowledge of the

proper defendant’s identity, Herrera sued John Doe

defendants fully aware that he lacked adequate

information to ascertain the correctional officers’

identities.” Ibid. “Put differently, the plaintiff in

Krupski did not know what she did not know; Herrera

did know what he did not know.” Ibid.

Third, while Krupski defined a “mistake” to

6

include “a wrong action or statement” resulting from

“inadequate knowledge,” that does not mean that

“inadequate knowledge” and a “mistake” are the same

thing. Pet. App. 10a. Rather, “it is the ‘wrong action’

stemming from ‘inadequate knowledge’ that amounts

to a mistake.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Using a Doe

designation “is not a wrong action proceeding from

inadequate knowledge; it is a proper action on account

of inadequate knowledge.” Ibid.

“In sum,” the Seventh Circuit concluded, “suing a

John Doe defendant is a conscious choice, not an

inadvertent error.” Pet. App. 10a. And because

Herrera’s amended complaints did not relate back

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C), they were untimely. Id. at 11a.

But, the court cautioned, “Herrera’s case does not

necessarily end here. As he argued in the district court

and does so again on appeal, the doctrine of equitable

tolling may apply.” Ibid. And while “equitable tolling

is rare,” the court concluded, “it remains available

here. Whether Herrera satisfies this test is a factual

inquiry beyond the scope of this interlocutory appeal,

so we leave this issue for the district court to consider

on remand.” Ibid.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The petition for certiorari should be denied. This

case reached the Seventh Circuit not on appeal from

a final judgment, but on appeal of an interlocutory

ruling denying a motion to dismiss. And as the

7

Seventh Circuit recognized when remanding this

matter to the district court for further proceedings,

Herrera’s complaint might still proceed even though

it does not relate back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In

addition, the issue presented is of only marginal

importance – under Rule 15(c)(1)(A), the state law

providing the applicable limitations period provides

the default rule for relation back in civil rights cases,

and several states allow relation back of Doe

designations. Illinois is one of those states, but

Herrera waived any argument for relation back under

Rule 15(c)(1)(A) by failing to raise that issue in the

proceedings below. Furthermore, the split of authority

Herrera relies upon is not sufficiently developed to

warrant this Court’s review – indeed, the only postKrupski decision Herrera can identify on his preferred

side of that split is an unpublished decision that does

not bind even the court in which it was issued. Finally,

the court of appeals correctly recognized that using a

Doe designation is not a mistake allowing relation

back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).

I.

This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For The

Question Presented.

This case is a poor vehicle for the question

presented because it involves the review of an

interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss.

Generally, this Court will not grant certiorari to

review an issue when “it is not clear that [its]

resolution of [that issue] will make any difference” to

8

the petitioner. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S.

117, 122 (1994) (per curiam). As a result, because

“many orders made in the progress of a suit become

quite unimportant by reason of the final result, or of

intervening matters,” certiorari review of an

interlocutory order is inappropriate “unless it is

necessary to prevent extraordinary inconvenience and

embarrassment in the conduct of the cause.” Am.

Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U.S.

372, 384 (1893); accord, e.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe

Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (“except in

extraordinary cases, the writ is not issued until final

decree”).

This case directly implicates the concerns

underlying that longstanding rule. As the court of

appeals explained below, even though Herrera’s

complaint did not relate back, his “case does not

necessarily end here” because “equitable tolling may

apply.” Pet. App. 11a. But because the applicability of

equitable tolling “is a factual inquiry beyond the scope

of this interlocutory appeal,” the court “le[ft] this issue

for the district court to consider on remand.” Ibid. As

a result, there is still a chance that Herrera’s suit may

be allowed to proceed, even if it does not relate back

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Indeed, Herrera argued

precisely that before the Seventh Circuit. See 7th Cir.

R. 12 at 4 n.1 (“even if this Court were to reverse and

remand, the motion to dismiss could still be denied on

[equitable tolling] grounds”).

9

Herrera does not come to grips with the

interlocutory nature of the ruling he seeks to

challenge, so he does not claim that this case involves

any extraordinary circumstance justifying this

Court’s immediate intervention. Nor could he.

Nothing about equitable tolling – involving only

questions of whether it is fair and equitable to hold

Herrera to the normal limitations period – is even

conceivably a matter of great embarrassment. Nor

does merely being asked to present argument and

evidence in the district court on the issue of equitable

tolling entail any extraordinary inconvenience. Much

to the contrary, if the district court resolves that issue

in Herrera’s favor, it would actually spare Herrera a

great deal of inconvenience unnecessarily litigating

the question presented to this Court.

This

case

involving

no

extraordinary

circumstances warranting this Court’s immediate

review of an interlocutory issue, the best course is to

allow the district court to address in the first instance

whether equitable tolling would allow Herrera’s suit

to proceed. If that issue is not resolved in Herrera’s

favor, he can seek this Court’s review again, this time

with a final judgment in hand that will ensure that

this Court’s review of the question he presents is not

for naught. See Va. Military Inst. v. United States, 113

S. Ct. 2431, 2432 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in

denial of certiorari). And if that issue is resolved in

Herrera’s favor, then there is no need for this Court’s

review of the question presented.

10

II. The Supposed Conflict Is Not Sufficiently

Developed To Warrant Review.

This Court should deny certiorari for the

additional reason that the conflict of authority

identified in the petition is not yet sufficiently

developed to warrant this Court’s review.

According to Herrera, the courts of appeals have

been divided “for nearly three decades” over the

proper interpretation of Rule 15(c)(1)(C), Pet. 11, but

any conflict between the circuits that predates this

Court’s decision in Krupski cannot warrant certiorari

review, see Stephen M. Shapiro, et al., SUPREME

COURT PRACTICE 248 (10th ed. 2013) (“A conflict with

a decision that has been discredited or that has lost

all weight as authority by reason of intervening

decisions of the Supreme Court . . . will not be an

adequate basis for granting certiorari.”).

As a result, the appropriate question here is

whether the supposed conflict among the circuits

persists in Krupski’s wake, after the courts of appeals

have had adequate opportunity to examine its effect

on their prior decisions. On this subject, Herrera

declares it “readily apparent” that Krupski “will not

align” the courts of appeals. Pet. App. 23. But this is a

drastic overstatement – in the decade-plus since this

Court decided Krupski, only five courts of appeals

have addressed its effect on relation back following a

Doe designation. Pet. App. 1a-12a; Ceara v. Deacon,

11

916 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2019); Heglund v. City of Grand

Rapids, 871 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2017); Smith v. City of

Akron, 476 Fed. Appx. 67 (6th Cir. 2012); Everett v.

Prison Health Servs., 412 Fed. Appx. 604 (4th Cir.

2011). Of those, the only one to allow relation back

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) of an amendment following a

Doe designation was an unpublished opinion of the

Fourth Circuit that discusses Krupski only in a

footnote. Everett, 412 Fed. Appx. at 606 n.3.

Far from indicating an entrenched circuit split,

that lone post-Krupski decision indicates that the

Fourth Circuit has not yet foreclosed reconsidering its

pre-Krupski interpretation of Rule 15(c)(1)(C). To

the contrary, the discussion of Krupski in an

unpublished opinion is strong indication that the

Fourth Circuit intended to “preserve[ ] its ability to

change course in the future,” Plumley v. Austin, 135

S. Ct. 828, 831 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari), by including that discussion in an

unpublished opinion that is “not binding” on future

Fourth Circuit panels, Minor v. Bostwick Labs., Inc.,

669 F.3d 428, 433 n.6 (4th Cir. 2012). It is readily

apparent why the Fourth Circuit hoped to keep that

option open – Krupski was brought to the Everett

court’s attention in a “letter” submitted “[a]fter all

briefs were filed,” 412 Fed. Appx. at 606 n.3, and, by

rule, such letters may be no more than 350 words long,

Fed. R. App. P. 28(j).

Perhaps

recognizing

that

the

unpublished

12

decision in Everett offers no real support for his claim

of an “entrenched” split of authority post-Krupski,

Herrera attempts to reinforce that claim with the

Third Circuit’s unpublished decision in Wadis v.

Norristown State Hosp., 617 Fed. Appx. 133 (3d Cir.

2015). Pet. 20. But Wadis says absolutely nothing

about how the Third Circuit reads Krupski – indeed,

it does not even mention Krupski, let alone discuss

Krupski’s effect on relation back after a Doe

designation. Nor was there reason for the Third

Circuit to discuss that issue, since the plaintiff in

Wadis “did not seek to substitute a named defendant

for a John Doe defendant.” 617 Fed. Appx. at 136. As

a result, the Third Circuit’s entire discussion of

relation back after a Doe designation is confined to a

single, fleeting sentence of dicta. Id.

Herrera also notes that the Fifth Circuit has

“continued to follow its precedent barring relation

back for Doe substitutions, without any discussion of

Krupski,” Pet. 23 (citing Winzer v. Kaufman County,

916 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2019); Balle v. Cnty. of Nueces,

952 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2017)), but those decisions offer

no support for his claim of an entrenched split, either.

Because neither Winzer nor Balle discuss Krupski,

they cannot be read to stake a position regarding

Krupski’s effect on relation back following a Doe

designation. Indeed, a review of the briefs in those

cases reveals that it was never argued to the Fifth

Circuit that Krupski required it to take a different

position – the briefs in Winzer never even mentioned

13

Krupski, and the appellant’s opening brief in Balle

made only a passing reference to Krupski, for an

unrelated point.

Unable to identify any appellate authority

evincing an entrenched split post-Krupski, Herrera

falls back on the “dozens of decisions from district

courts” he claims agree with his position. Pet. 18. But

the existence of those decisions – many of which have

since been overruled – offers no support for certiorari

here. Under this Court’s rules, only splits of binding

appellate authority will support a grant of certiorari.

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) & (b). It is thus simply irrelevant for

present purposes whether the district courts disagree

(or agree, for that matter) with the courts of appeals

regarding the proper interpretation of Krupski.

In sum, there is no evidence of an “entrenched”

split of authority regarding whether a Doe

designation is a “mistake” under Krupski. To the

contrary, all indications are that the majority of the

courts of appeals have not yet had sufficient

opportunity to conclusively address that issue. As a

result, this Court’s review would be premature, and

certiorari should be denied for that reason alone.

14

III. The Question Presented Is Not Sufficiently

Important To Warrant Review.

Herrera claims that the question whether Rule

15(c)(1)(C) allows relation back after a Doe

designation “is exceptionally important” in civil rights

suits such as his, Pet. 34 – a claim echoed by his amici,

see Howard Amici 8; Jailhouse Lawyer Amici 5 – but

this fundamentally misunderstands Rule 15(c)(1)(C),

which is designed to play only a limited role in civil

rights cases, as well as any other cases that derive

their limitations periods from state law. Indeed, Rule

15(c)(1)(C) might not have been of any importance to

Herrera himself but for his counsel’s decision to rely

solely on that rule in the proceedings below.

To understand why this is so, it must be

remembered that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is but one of three

alternative, sufficient grounds for allowing the

relation back of an amendment. An amendment also

relates back when either (1) “the law that provides the

applicable statute of limitations allows relation back,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A); or (2) “the amendment

asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or

attempted to be set out—in the original pleading,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). As a result, a court need

address relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) only if

neither of the two other grounds for relation back are

available.

15

Of particular significance for present purposes is

Rule 15(c)(1)(A). As the Rules’ drafters explained

when adding that provision in 1991, their intent was

“to make it clear that the rule does not apply to

preclude any relation back that may be permitted

under the applicable limitations law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15, Notes of Advisory Committee on 1991

amendments. “Generally, the applicable limitations

law will be state law,” even in cases where “federal

jurisdiction is based on a federal question.” Ibid.

“Whatever may be the controlling body of limitations

law, if that law affords a more forgiving principle of

relation back than the one provided in this rule, it

should be available to save the claim.” Ibid.

Recognizing the rules’ drafters’ clear intent to

allow relation back to the full extent permitted by the

state law that provides the controlling limitation

period, the courts of appeals agree that an

amendment in a section 1983 case relates back so long

as the state law providing the limitations period

would allow that amendment to relate back. E.g.,

Riveros-Sanchez v. City of Easton, 861 Fed. Appx. 819,

823 (3d Cir. 2021): Balle, 952 F.3d at 557; Hogan v.

Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013); Presnell v.

Cnty. of Paulding, 454 Fed. Appx. 763, 767 (11th Cir.

2011). These rulings are clearly correct – in the

comments to the 1991 amendments that added Rule

15(c)(1)(A), the rules’ drafters’ chosen example of a

federal-question case in which relation back would be

governed by state limitations law was a civil rights

16

case arising under section 1983. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15,

Notes of Advisory Committee on 1991 amendments

(citing Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)

(explaining that the statute of limitations for claims

under section 1983 is derived from state law)).

As a result, if the state law providing the

limitations period for a plaintiff’s section 1983 claim

would allow relation back of an amendment after a

Doe designation, that amendment relates back under

Rule 15(c)(1)(A) as well, making it irrelevant whether

that amendment would also relate back under Rule

15(c)(1)(C). In Hogan, for example, because the New

York law that provided the statute of limitations for

the plaintiff’s section 1983 claim “permit[s] John Doe

substitutions nunc pro tunc,” the plaintiff’s

amendment of a Doe designation related back to his

original complaint under Rule 15(c)(1)(A), 738 F.3d at

518-20, regardless of its failure to relate back under

Rule 15(c)(1)(C), id. at 518.

Properly understood, then, whether Rule

15(c)(1)(C) allows relation back after a Doe

designation is an issue of only limited, secondary

importance in federal civil rights litigation. For civil

rights plaintiffs in a number of states, that issue is of

no consequence because those states’ limitations laws

expressly allow relation back. E.g., Ala. R. Civ. P.

9(h) & 15(c)(4); Ark. Code § 16-56-125; Cal. Code Civ.

P. § 474; N.Y. Civ. P. Law § 1024; Ohio Civ. R. 3(A) &

15(D). And that issue could have been of no

17

consequence to even Herrera himself – under Illinois

law, “a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge regarding a

party’s identity” may constitute a mistake allowing

relation back, Zlatev v. Millette, 2015 IL App (1st)

143173, ¶ 4, but Herrera eschewed reliance on Rule

15(c)(1)(A) below, choosing instead to argue only that

his amendment related back under the narrower

language of Rule 15(c)(1)(C).

Because the question whether a Doe designation

relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is an issue of no

consequence to civil rights litigants in the states that

allow relation back after a Doe designation, and might

have been of no consequence to Herrera himself had

he not waived any reliance on the more favorable

language of Rule 15(c)(1)(A), this Court’s review of

that issue is not warranted.

IV. The Judgment Below Is Correct.

This Court’s review is also unnecessary because

the court of appeals correctly recognized that a Doe

designation is not a “mistake” allowing relation back

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).

The inquiry into the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)

begins, and ends, with its plain language. The Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure must be given their plain

meaning, so the primary question when analyzing a

given rule is whether its language is unambiguous; if

so, the judicial inquiry is over, and the rule must be

18

applied as written. Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic

Communs. Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 541 (1991). Here, the

language of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) could not be more

unambiguous – under that rule, an amendment

relates back only if the defendant “knew or should

have known that the action would have been brought

against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper

party’s identity.”

This Court interpreted that language in Krupski,

explaining that a “mistake” is commonly understood

as “an error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an

erroneous belief” or “a misunderstanding of the

meaning or implication of something, a wrong action

or statement proceeding from faulty judgment,

inadequate knowledge, or inattention; an erroneous

belief; or a state of mind not in accordance with the

facts.” 560 U.S. at 548-549 (cleaned up). Thus, this

Court explained, the only question under Rule

15(c)(1)(C) is “whether [the defendant] knew or should

have known that it would have been named as a

defendant but for an error.” Id. at 548 (emphasis

added).

This analysis from Krupski forecloses any

argument that Herrera’s complaint relates back

under Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Herrera does not claim that he

used a Doe designation in his initial complaint as the

result of a factual error regarding the proper

defendants’ identity – he does not claim, for example,

that he believed the defendants were all actually

19

named “John Doe” – but admits that he did so

deliberately, “[b]ecause he did not know the officers’

names.” Pet. 8. Nor does Herrera claim that he

misunderstood the legal effect of his use of a Doe

designation; rather, he admits that such a designation

“plainly signals” that he “lack[ed] the necessary

knowledge” to name an actual person. Id. at 25. As

this Court explained in Krupski, such a deliberate

choice “is the antithesis of making a mistake

concerning the proper party’s identity.” 560 U.S. at

549. Absent such a mistake, it was impossible for the

defendants to actually or constructively know that

they would have been originally named in Herrera’s

complaint but for a mistake. As a result, Herrera’s

amendment does not relate back under Rule

15(c)(1)(C).

Herrera’s arguments to the contrary are wholly

misplaced. Herrera repeatedly insists that it should

be irrelevant that his actions were deliberate because

“Rule 15(c)(1)(C) focuses on the defendant’s

knowledge, not the plaintiff’s state of mind,” Pet. 26;

accord id. at 24-25, but Krupski flatly rejected that

notion, explaining that “[i]nformation in the plaintiff’s

possession is relevant” so long as “it bears on the

defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff

made a mistake regarding the proper party’s

identity.” 540 U.S. at 548. As a result, it is perfectly

appropriate to ask whether the plaintiff “ma[de] a

deliberate choice to sue one party instead of another

while fully understanding the factual and legal

20

differences between the two parties,” since such a

deliberate choice conclusively shows that the plaintiff

made no “mistake concerning the proper party’s

identity.” Id. at 549. Tellingly, Herrera does not even

acknowledge these statements from Krupski, let alone

explain how they can be reconciled with his

understanding of Rule 15(c)(1)(C).

Herrera also claims that the proper inquiry under

Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is simply whether the defendant

“underst[ood] that he was the proper party to the

claims.” Pet. 24; accord id. at 26. But had the Rule’s

drafters intended for that to be the entirety of the

relevant inquiry, they would have simply said so.

Instead, they specified that an amendment relates

back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) only if the defendant

actually or constructively knew he would have been

named “but for a mistake.” That choice of the drafters

must be respected, by applying the Rule as it actually

reads, not as Herrera wishes it would read. See Bus.

Guides, 498 U.S. at 541.

Trying to get around this problem, Herrera claims

that the use of a Doe designation is a “mistake” under

Rule 15(c)(1)(C) because a plaintiff who uses such a

designation “name[s] the wrong defendant due to

inadequate knowledge.” Pet. 25; see id. at 27 (claiming

that “listing ‘John Doe’ as the defendant when that is

not the defendant’s name is just as wrong as any other

misidentification”). This is nonsense – a Doe

designation does not name or identify a defendant at

21

all, it merely uses a fictitious name to indicate that

the defendant’s name is unknown. E.g., Carol M.

Rice, Meet John Doe, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 885 n.4

(1996) (explaining that “John Doe” is “a name used in

law courts, legal papers, etc. to refer to any person

whose name is unknown”) (cleaned up); accord Pet. 27

(“‘John Doe’ is a convention that helpfully signals the

plaintiff’s inadequate knowledge to the court”). Thus,

a plaintiff’s use of a Doe designation to indicate that

he does not know the identity of the proper defendant

is no more “wrong” or “mistaken” than it would be to

use “Unknown Defendant” or “Unidentified

Defendant.” Unless Herrera means to take the

strange position that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) treats a

plaintiff’s use of “John Doe” more favorably than the

use of “Unknown Defendant,” despite both meaning

the exact same thing, the mere fact that one is

technically a “name,” and the other is not, is a

distinction without a difference.

Herrera’s remaining arguments are easily set

aside. Herrera accuses the court of appeals of

mischaracterizing the facts in Krupski, Pet. 26-27, but

that would be irrelevant for present purposes even

were it true, since this Court reviews judgments, not

statements in opinions, California v. Rooney, 483 U.S.

307, 311 (1987) (per curiam). Herrera also insists that

it would be “nonsensical” if a complaint cannot relate

back after a Doe designation but can relate back if the

plaintiff simply “misidentif[ies] the defendant so that

relation back remains an option.” Pet. 28. This

22

argument rests on a faulty premise – intentionally

misidentifying a defendant merely to leave the door

open to relation back is just as much of a deliberate

choice as using a Doe designation, and therefore does

not constitute a “mistake” for purposes of Rule

15(c)(1)(C).

Finally, Herrera offers a lengthy discussion of

how he thinks the Rule’s “purposes” and

“administrability” might be better served, and more

sensical “incentives” provided to litigants. Pet. 28-32.

But because the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is plain on its

face, these are, at most, arguments for its

amendment, and this Court has been clear that

“[c]ourts are not free to amend a rule outside the

process Congress ordered.” Amchem Prods. v.

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). This is true even if

the amendments would, as Herrera believes, better

serve the rule’s purposes, because a court’s “task is to

apply the text, not to improve upon it.” Pavelic &

LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120,

126 (1989).

23

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted,

KIMBERLY M. FOXX

COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY

CATHY MCNEIL STEIN

JESSICA M. SCHELLER*

JONATHON D. BYRER

500 Richard J. Daley Center

Chicago, IL 60602

(312) 603-6934

jessica.scheller@cookcountyil.gov

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

February 22, 2022

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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