Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Larry Lowery, Jr., Petitioner v. United States

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Larry LOWERY, JR.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

G. ALAN DUBOIS

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JACLYN L. TARLTON

ASSISTANT FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Counsel of Record

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

150 Fayetteville St.

Suite 450

Raleigh, N.C. 27601

(919) 856-4236

jackie_tarlton@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether North Carolina breaking or entering is categorically broader

than generic burglary and cannot be a violent felony under the Armed

Career Criminal Act when it can be committed by breaking into vehicles

and structures that house only property and no people and thus does not

present the necessary risk of violent confrontation.

2. Whether North Carolina breaking or entering and breaking or entering a

place of worship are categorically broader than generic burglary and

cannot be violent felonies under the ACCA because entry is not a required

element of either offense.

it

LIST OF ALL DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:

United States v. Lowery, No. 20-4458 (4th Cir. Jan.7, 2022)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina:

United States v. Lowery, No. 7:18-CR-120-D (E.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2020)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......ccccssssesseessseeecscarsrsrsescsesesesescnessseseneuceeseaeseeseversteneeeaseeetes i

LIST OF ALL DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS 0.0... ccsesesssseesesseeeseeeeeseeeee ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES o.oo. cesensssseesceeseeeeseeesecseceesesesaesessisasasecaeaeseeeesanenees iv

OPINIONS BELOW ...0...cccccceecseeeseeeerenseseesesesessnesssenessucsceceasacacasacececesasasesesssecacasseaeee 1

TURISDICTION......cccccccssssssssssscsesssssesesescecacacecassesescscseacacscseessesesenesasenasaraeeceescasavseseeeeeees 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...0..... cc cccceseeeesececeseeeeeseseesesenesseseaseseacasienens 1

INTRODUCTION 0... cccccececcssccccesscsssesssnscscsssscsneesesseecessesessesecareaeeeeeseasnessseenessenseseeeanees 3

STATEMENT 0.0... cccsesesssssssessecceesesssesesessssssevevenerseseseassessssecssssussssensnanenasarasacaeeesataeeseees 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION... .escessescsseseseceseseeeeeeeseseeeseseeseesnesees 8

I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS WRONG AND CONTRAVENES

THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN STITT, TAYLOR, AND MATHIS BECAUSE

IT COUNTS AS A VIOLENT FELONY A BREAKING OR ENTERING

STATUTE THAT INCLUDES BREAKING INTO STRUCTURES AND

VEHICLES THAT HOUSE PROPERTY AND NO PEOPLE... ceccceeeeeeees 8

A. The Fourth Circuit ignored the clear command of this Court's

PLECEMENLS..... ce ececeeceeseceeeeeaeeeeeaeeceeeseeeteeseaeessesenaeesaneresens 10

B. The Fourth Circuit's decision departs markedly from how other

federal courts of appeals analyze burglary offenses under the

ACCA post SEIEE. .cicccccsevecsscssccscesecavccuccetsausnesseueesscectusereness 14

Il. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONTRAVENES TAYLOR FOR

ANOTHER REASON, NAMELY THAT IT COUNTS AS VIOLENT

iii

FELONIES STATUTES THAT DO NOT REQUIRE ENTRY, AN

ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF GENERIC BURGLARY..........ccsccesseeeereeneves 18

Tl. THIS ISSUE IS IMPORTANT AND RECURS FREQUENTLY........ccccce 24

IV. THIS iS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO DECIDE THE QUESTIONS

PRESENTED... cccceccccsseecsceeeneeeeeeeeeeeeee nessa eens eeea nese eeea seen enseaeeseaees 26

V. EVENIF THIS COURT BELIEVES PLENARY REVIEW IS

UNWARRANTED, IT SHOULD SUMMARILY REVERSE. ........cesecesereenees 27

CONCLUSION... eeeesccseeesesseceneesecseeseeseeeccaceseeseceesesessecseessesseceesesesseeensenssseeereeseats 28

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Jan. 7,

QODQ) ..ececcccseecsessssssssecesescsescscassesesesescsesceessesscecceseccersvsvsnsessesssesesesesatasataceusssnsescensnecers la

APPENDIX B: Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North

Carolina (Sept. 1, 2020)......ccccccesscscscscscsssesssevesscsescssecsusnessssssnecsssssessesesssssssesssaavans 4a

APPENDIX C: Sentencing Transcript (Aug. 20, 2020)... eeesessceseseresecsecescensenes lla

APPENDIX D: Arraignment Transcript Gan. 30, 2020) oo. cccccecesesesessessseseeeseeess 81a

APPENDIX E: Superseding Indictment (Nov. 27, 2019) .ccccccscscscssssssccscssscscescsseees 68a

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Begayv. United States,

BBS US. 137 (2008) eseeeesecsesessesscsssesssesessesesseesssesscsessesessesessesceasscsussesessssneaesseseeaeeseees 19

Commonwealth v. Cotto,

752 N.E.2d 768 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) cccccccccccssccssssssscssssscsesssevorscecsrsersnseseceecaees 21

Descampsv. United States,

B70 U.S. 254 (2018) oeeecescscessssssseceesesssssseseesssnsseeseseesssaesesacsesuescseaveseaessenseanereeerseess 5, 19

Grady v. North Carolina,

B75 U.S. B06 (2015) oe eceescccecsesssssessesscsscsscsvcsscssssesessesssavessesucsesseesecassussseaseaneenseneesses 27

Greer v. United States,

938 F.3d 766 (6th Cir, 2019) ...ccececssesssssesessecseseceeseeseenessseescsssesseassesseseeassnersesesetass 16

In re Whitley,

577 F. App’x 212 (4th Cir, 2014) ....ecessessessesssssessnsssessesecsesscasesssseseesessessecsessesuseaseseeses 4

Jamesv. United States,

BBO U.S. 192 (2007) .erececescesssssesessesssscsscsnssesessesnssesseanssesesseeessseseeseessseeesseesesneseees 19, 22

Johnson v. United States,

559 U.S. 183 (2010) veccccccccscsssscecscsscssscscscsssscssessscscaceacscassacscessacsoecsacseacecertaveceeees 4,5

Johnsonv. United States,

B76 U.S. 5Q1 (2015) oeeccescssesseesesseeseesessesssssesssesessesssssssesecsssseaesseeseeseeseeseescsscens 4, 9, 22

Jones. United States, .

550 U.S. 192 (2007) vceececcscssscccscscsesssssecsccessvsvsvssssscscscsesesososevsvssesvevevevseseseaeenseeeaceaes 9

Martinez v. Illinois,

572 U.S. 883 (OVA) vececcccccccccssscscsccsssscscscssssssscsvecevevevsvavavavsvavacecnescensuaaneversacacaeasaees 27

Maryland vy. Kulbicki,

186 S. Ct. 2 (QO15) veeccccccccsssssssesesecsesrssssscececececevsvsssvassesesessssesestsssessssssscessesesesessaves 27

Mathis v. United States,

186 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) w.eeccccscsscscssssesssssssscscscssssssssssssssescsssssssssescssseersvasevavsesees passim

People v. Austin,

799 P.2d 408 (Colo. App. 1990) ..cccccccccsessssccsssescessesessecscecececececseseeesessesesessesssecseatanss 21

Quarlesv. United States,

139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019) oecccccccccscsescssscssesesccssssscscscscscssesssescerssavssensssssassssenseeners 9, 19

Rehaifv. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) oooeccccccccsssescssessssssseesecsssescassesessescscsessesesesvsnsesscssseseseeseaseneaees 6

Robinson vy. United States,

140 S. Ct. 129 (2019). .cecccscccsssssssecscsccssscscsssessescsssececsccssessesssesssesserseesescsssessessenterees 25

Shepardv. United States,

B44 U.S. 18 (2005) coececcccscccscsesesescsesescsesesssesesesesesessessecesessssssssseseaaeaeseaescasseeeseacaesesess 19

State v. Batts,

617 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) o.ccecccescesssssesesssseseesssssesessensessesessensnseseseenenes 13

State v. Bost,

286 8.E.2d 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982). .o.cccecccccccsssssessssssescesssssesescecssesesescecseeseseeeeeenees 13

State v. Ison,

744 P.2d 416 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) ..cccccscssscsscesesesesesescsescscsesesensessssssssseceeseesesesnees 22

State v. Jones,

157 S.E.2d 610 (N.C. 1967) cccccccscscccscsesssesssesesescscseseresceeresescsescarsescseseseseeseeeeessateseees 19

State v. Lucas,

758 S.E.2d 672 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) vcccececesesesesssescseseseseseseseseseseseseesesssssseeeseeeesens 20

State v. McCurdy,

487 P.2d 764 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1971) vieccccccccscseceseescsssesescsesesesessssstsesssssseesessessesesees 22

State v. Myrick,

291 S.E.2d 577 (N.C. 1982) w.ccccccscsssesssssesssscscsssesssssersescscsescsesssesvsnssscetesseececeessaeecees 19

State v. Nichols,

150 S.H.2d 21 (N.C. 1996) ooecciccccccccccessseseescsccssecscseesessesssecscecsesscscsessesesesssseseseseseeenss 21

State v. Taylor,

428 §.E.2d 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) c.ccccccccssccsssssssseesesceessssesssseesesseseseensssseneseceseses 13

State v. Watkins,

720 S.E.2d 844 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) ooocccceccccccccscssssssessessssssseeceteseseseseeteessseseeteseeees 20

Taylorv. United States,

4O5 U.S. 575 (1990) vcecscssssessssssesesescscssssssssssssesesesssesesssssscsssesecssaseceesescsesesesees passim

vi

United States v. Alexis,

697 F. App’x 239 (4th Cir. 2017)... ccccccccccsccssssscseesescscsesessescecssseescacecsesessescatsessansaveves 26

United States v. Atkinson,

Fourth Cir. No. 17-4589 (docketed Sept. 18, 2017)...ccccccscccscscsscssssssssssssssssssseseees 25

United States v. Beatty,

702 F. App’x 148 (4th Cir, 2017)... cccscsssssssssssssscnesecsssesessessesseesseresssceseenesceeaessssseess 26

United States v. Boddie,

Fourth Cir. No. 20-4307 (docketed Jun. 5, 2020)....ccccccccssssssceccessseesccscescessseeessessecs 25

United States v. Davidson,

802 F. App’x 800 (4th Cir. 2020)... ccscsssssesessesessssssesesseseesesessesesseecsssseesssnssssessessssees 25

United States v. Denton,

778 F. App’x 184 (4th Cir. 2019)... ccccccccsscscssessesssecsssesssvsssssseevesasssssstansessenesveveases 25

United States v. Dodge,

963 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2020) ...ccccccccccsseccsscsccssesssssssssscsssssssesesssavavsesesnsecauceereneeres passim

United States v. Dunlow,

884 F. App’x 47 (4th Cir, 2021)... ccccccccscccssscscssssscssssscecevecscscacsessesecesesesestsnsnessseeesens 25

United States v. Enyinnaya,

Fourth Cir. No. 18-4400 (docketed Jun. 11, 2018) ......ececcccscssceccecescescecesseseesesevacees 25

United States v. Evans,

924 F.8d 21 (2d Cir. 2019) iccccccssscscscscsessssscssscsvsvevevevecevsvsvsvscesaesececesesestsnensvecanees 23

United States v. Fayson,

834 F. App’x 48 (4th Cir, 2021)... eseeceeceessesessssveseeseesessessessssscansssesecscasessesscsasanecseess 25

United States v. Goins,

Fourth Cir. No. 21-4686 (docketed Dec. 16, 2021) ...cccccscssccscssesesecceceseseseesereseses 25

United States v. Hill,

TTL FE. App’x 195 (4th Cir, 2019) .cccccccccscscssssssscssecesesecsvscscsvscesnesesecesesesestsvevevenseees 25

United States v. Ingram,

597 F. App’x 151 (4th Cir, 2015) ..cccccccccscssscssssscecscevevecevscsvseacsvsnssecececesestsvsvsveneeseees 25

United States v. Ingram,

758 F. App’x 382 (4th Cir, 2019)....cccessessessessessessessessssessessecsesseascsecsesecsscercereentsessecess 25

vii

United States v. Jones,

669 F. App’x 110 (4th Cir. 2016)... ececsesessesesessssssssseeseesssesesssssseeseneeseneesenesseesenses 26

United States v. Jones,

951 F.8d 1188 (Oth Cir, 2019) o.cccsecsessessssssssseseeseessssesssssseeseeseesessesseeseneesessecees 15, 16

United States v. Joy,

771 F. App’x 807 (4th Cir. 2019)... ccccesssssssssssseessssssessssessesecsesececssseesssssssessssenensess 25

United States v. Livingston,

442 F.8d 1082 (8th Cir, 2006) oo. ecescessessessessessessssssesecsecssserssssssnceresecsecsessssscsecsesses 21

United States v. Lockamy,

613 F. App’x 227 (4th Cir. 2015). .cccccsesssessssessesessessesessesessesesscsesseessessesessesessesseneesees 26

United States v. Lowery,

No. 20-4458, 2022 WL 72724 (4th Cir. 2022)... ccssescscssessscssessecsecssecsceseeracersecees 25

United States v. Maham,

767 F. App’x 582 (4th Cir, 2019)... cccccsscssssssssssessessesecsessessessessecseseesecscsscssceesseesessecees 25

United States v. Marion,

821 F. App’x 264 (4th Cir, 2020) .....ceececsessesssessssessessessssssescesssesssseestsscsessscsscsessessesess 25

United States v. Martinez,

954 F.2d 1050 (Sth Cir, 1992) oo. ccecsescsssssccccsssssscscssssecevecevevevecacacacacacecaceeentaraneacars 23

United States v. McNatt,

727 F. App’x 68 (Ath Cir. 2018)...cscesessessessessessesssssssseessssecsessesvesecsesasercseeseceecsneseseacans 25

United States v. Molette,

No, 18-4209, 2022 WL 568256 (4th Cir. 2022) ooo ccscssscecsseseessessecseescerscereeeees 25

United States v. Montgomery,

974 F.3d 587 (Sth Cir. 2020) ...ccecccssssesesessecssssssssesssssssesserscsvacasacsessatsaacacsererees 17, 18

United States v. Mungro,

754 F.8d 267 (Ath Cir, 2014) ccccccccccssesesssssccsssessesssscscscsensevsvseseesvaveeseceeesaeasses passim

United States v. Robinson,

T14 FB. App’x 275 (4th Cir, 2018)... ccecsccecscessscsssccccscecececcerserseesescssestacsssavscsensesses 25

United States v. Sims,

933 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2019) o.ccccccscsssccccsssscsescssessssescecssasavavsecseaeevecencucacavevssensees 17

vill

United States v. Smith,

645 F.8d 998 (8th Cir. 2OLL) woe cecccccccccsesessesessesescsssesssssassnscsssssssavsecseseaveseseeneavevsates 23

United States v. Solomon,

694 F, App’x 186 (4th Cir, 2017) .ccccccccccscessssccssscsesscscssevsesssssatsssessesesvavsesecneavencases 26

United States v. Stitt,

189 S. Ct. 899 (2018) o.eeecccccssscsessesescssescsesseesescevsesecscscevsessvsvassnsessssestessuavoneaves passim

United States v. Strahl,

958 F.2d 980 (LOth Cir. 1992) oocccceccescssescstscssssssssssvsvsecscssevsesessesecesssecaeeeeucecaesesee 23

United States v. Street,

756 F. App’x 310 (4th Cir. 2019)... ccccsccccsessssccsscsssecsssssssssecsessseecsssecssvsvsveseneereneaes 25

United States v. Thomas,

2 F.8d 79 (4th Cir, 1993) ooccecccccssccccscccccccsssssvessssssssesscsessvsessecrsavsecersucersecaeseeeesecanseees 23

United States v. Thompson,

615 F. App’x 160 (4th Cir. 2015) ...ccececcccccssscscessssscsssescececevsesssssecscsessessscstscevsneatanses 26

United States v. Wright,

Fourth Cir. No. 18-4215 (docketed Apr. 9, 2018) ....ccccsssscssssccsssscssercestsescseeeensees 25

Van Cannonv. United States,

890 F.8d 656 (7th Cir. 2018) occccccccccsscssssssesesscssscsesssescscseecersvssesececucacacaesecececeessene 23

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) oecccccsccssssesessesessessecesscsrssssssstsssssscsssscsesaeeccessesacavsessvsassucecsesecsecensesaeeass 4

18 U.S.C. § 924 (0)... eeccccccessesescsssessssssscscssevsscscsesussesssosesesnensessvsseensessesasucacacanseseaesatareeess 7

18 U.S.C. § S24 C])CL) aeceecccccessscessessscssssseeccursccersscscsucstsssstssesteneaesesenseeececatsavenseceeseeees 4, 24

18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(Q)(B) ooececccccecsessessssesscsscecssssesscsesassesscssstsuescsecaseesesereausucacsucatseeataaeaveaes 4

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) GI)... cececcscssessessesecscsscsesecsecstsecstsscstsssstsessesecesecenstvetsecensaceds 14, 23

2B U.S.C. § 12541) oecceececccccscscssescssecescsvsscscsvsssssecsessaveveecsesessvacacausestcacaususasssatansessensaesaes 1

2B U.S.C. § L291 ceccccccssesssssssseesssessscssssnesssacseseesscensucersecersusacsucassessesecuesecersecaesecarsussucees 1

Ark. Stat. Ann, § 5-39-202(a) ..ccccccscsssscsssesssscsssssscescseseccsesesecessecacaracacacaeasncuans 20, 21

Calif. Pen. Code Ann. § 459.0... cccccccsccsssssesscsseeeceecsscsssssscnsesssssscceeessssssssisssssssesesssees 19

Fla. Stat. § 777.041). ccccesscsessesessessssesesssssesessesnessaessecseesseeeesseesssessssessescenescensssassesssceres 22

Fla. Stat. § 810.0201)... csscsessessssesessessssssesessestesessssecseeeesseessesassssessssnsscacensessesscersenseceses 22

Towa Code Ann. § 718.1 oo. ceeccsssssssssssssssesccssesesazseescsscnesecsscsesaseceacsneaesssssseecessesseecsss 20

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54. iccccccsscsssscseccsnccsseccseccescssevsssusescsssasssscosssseseecsncesseesresnsonse 26

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 (a). ecccesessssessssesesseaneseesseessenesssssseseessssesssneessesscssess 6, 7, 14, 19

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5406) oe eccccecccscsssssssseseseseeneseseenescseecsnesescssscsnssascscscssessessasees 6, 12, 18

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54. 1a). ccecccccsssssesesssnssesscssesescenssesescenssesesessecsnsusseasesseseescecavees 6, 19

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54,10D).cccessesessecesesesssssssesscsnsseenssessssecessecsesssecsesecasesescsesseesssscess 6

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

ULS.S.G § ABL ACD) oe cecessesessesesncsesnesessesnssesusscsusseeseessserssesseseesssesessssnsussesscssseeesseeees 4, 24

U.S.S.G § ABLACC) oc ececsececcnssessesseessssessessecnscsccssasecsessesuesassesseesesscsseescarececsesseeacesensse 4, 24

OTHER SOURCES

N.C. Judicial Branch, Felony Case Activity Report FY 2019-2020 (2020). 0.00... 25

N.C. Judicial Branch, Felony Case Activity Report FY 2020-2021 (2021)... 24

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

LARRY LOWERY, JR.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Larry Lowery respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion is not reported. Pet. App. 1a-3a. The District

Court’s judgment is available at Pet. App. 4a-10a.

JURISDICTION

The District Court entered final judgment on September 1, 2020. Pet. App. 4a-

10a. The Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and entered

judgment on January 7, 2022. Pet. App. la-3a. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 924{e)(2)(B) (2006) provides, in pertinent part, that a “violent felony”

under the Armed Career Criminal Act is:

Any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year

** * that—

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another;

or

(i) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 (2013) defines breaking or entering as follows:

(a) Any person who breaks or enters any building with intent to

commit any felony or larceny therein shall be punished as a Class H

felon.

(al) Any person who breaks or enters any building with intent to

terrorize or injure an occupant of the building is guilty of a Class H

felony.

(b) Any person who wrongfully breaks or enters any building is guilty

of a Class 1 misdemeanor.

(c) As used in this section, “building” shall be construed to include any

dwelling, dwelling house, uninhabited house, building under

construction, building within the curtilage of a dwelling house, and any

other structure designed to house or secure within it any activity or

property.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54.1 (2005) defines breaking or entering a place of worship

as follows:

(a) Any person who wrongfully breaks or enters any building that is a

place of religious worship with intent to commit any felony or larceny

therein is guilty of a Class G felony.

(b) As used in this section, a “building that is a place of religious

worship” shall be construed to include any church, chapel,

meetinghouse, synagogue, temple, longhouse, or mosque, or other

building that is regularly used, and clearly identifiable, as a place for

religious worship.

INTRODUCTION

North Carolina’s breaking or entering and breaking or entering a place of

worship statutes are categorically broader than generic burglary in the Armed

Career Criminal Act. For starters, breaking or entering criminalizes breaking into

buildings and vehicles designed to store property and no people. Under this Court's

decisions in United States v. Stitt, 189 S. Ct. 399 (2018), Mathis v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 2248 (2016), and Taylorv. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), such a

statute does not present the requisite risk of violent confrontation and thus is

categorically overbroad. And both North Carolina statutes are categorically

overbroad for another reason: They do not even require entry, a key element of

generic burglary as defined in Taylor. This Court and six courts of appeals that

have considered analogous attempted burglary statutes have held they are

categorically broader than generic burglary.

In the face of this precedent, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless upheld its prior

decisions, United States v. Dodge and United States v. Mungro, in which it held

that North Carolina breaking or entering is a violent felony under the ACCA. In

Dodge, the court recognized “tension” with this Court’s precedents but refused to

resolve it.

This Court’s guidance is sorely needed to clarify that state breaking or entering

crimes that do not categorically present a risk of violent confrontation and do not

even require entry cannot be used to dramatically increase a defendant’s mandatory

minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

This Court should grant certiorari and reverse. But even if this Court believes

plenary review is unwarranted, it should summarily reverse in light of St/tt,

Mathis, and Taylor.

STATEMENT

A. Statutory Background

The Armed Career Criminal Act has drastic consequences for criminal

defendants. Although violations of the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g), are normally subject to a maximum penalty of ten years of imprisonment

and no mandatory minimum, the Act provides that district courts must sentence

defendants with three prior convictions for “violent felonies” to a term of at least

fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Such persons are also subject to an increased

offense level and criminal history category under the Guidelines. U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.4(b),(@).

A violent felony under the ACCA includes any crime punishable by more than

one year that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another” or is “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or]

involves the use of explosives.” Jd. § 924(e)(2)(B). These provisions are known as

the “force clause” and the “enumerated-offense clause.” A third clause, the residual

clause, has been struck down as unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United

States, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015). Because North Carolina’s breaking or entering

statutes do not categorically require the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another,” see Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.

183, 140 (2010), they are only violent felonies if they qualify under the enumeratedoffense clause as generic “burglary.”

To determine whether a crime qualifies as a predicate felony under the ACCA,

courts apply the “categorical approach,” which focuses on “the fact of conviction and

the statutory definition of the prior offense.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. Under that

approach, the court “focus[es] solely on whether the elements of the crime of

conviction sufficiently match the elements of generic burglary, while ignoring the

particular facts of the case.” Mathis, 186 S. Ct. at 2248. The prior state conviction

is a proper ACCA predicate only if it is defined more narrowly than, or has the same

elements as, the generic federal crime. Descampsv. United States, 570 U.S. 254,

261 (2013). If, however, the prior offense sweeps more broadly than the generic

crime, it cannot serve as a predicate regardless whether the defendant actually

committed the offense in its generic form. Jd.

At issue in this case is whether North Carolina breaking or entering and

breaking or entering a place of worship are a categorical match for generic burglary.

Because the ACCA does not define “burglary,” this Court in Taylor determined that

generic burglary has “the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or

remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor, 495

USS. at 599. In United States v. Stitt, this Court explained that generic burglary

encompasses only statutes that criminalize “burglary of a structure or vehicle that

has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation” because such

statutes “more clearly focus upon circumstances where burglary is likely to present

a serious risk of violence.” 139 S. Ct. 399, 407 (2018).

North Carolina breaking or entering encompasses “breakling] or enterling] any

building with the intent to commit any felony or larceny.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

54(a). The statute defines “building” as “any dwelling, dwelling house, uninhabited

house, building under construction, building within the curtilage of a dwelling

house, and any other structure designed to house or secure within it any activity or

property.” Jd. § 14-54(c).

North Carolina breaking or entering a place of worship encompasses “wrongfully

breakling] or enterling] any building that is a place of religious worship with intent

to commit any felony or larceny therein.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54.1(a). The statute

defines “a building that is a place of religious worship” as including “any church,

chapel, meetinghouse, synagogue, temple, longhouse, or mosque, or other building

that is regularly used, and clearly identifiable, as a place for religious worship.” Jd.

§ 1454.1).

B. Facts and Procedural History

In July 2018, Larry Lowery was indicted for possessing a firearm after having

been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year. A superseding indictment was filed in November 2019, to make conforming

changes in response to this Court’s decision in Rehaifv. United States, 139 S. Ct.

2191 (2019). Pet. App. 638a-65a. Mr. Lowery pleaded guilty, without a written plea

agreement, and the District Court sentenced him as an armed career criminal

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). It reached that conclusion based solely on prior

convictions for breaking or entering and breaking or entering a place of worship

under North Carolina law. Pet. App. 16a, 25a.

Mr. Lowery objected to his designation as an armed career criminal, both in the

presentence report and at sentencing, arguing that the North Carolina breaking or

entering statutes under which he was convicted are categorically broader than

generic burglary and thus are not violent felonies. See Pet. App. 16a.

The District Court sentenced Mr. Lowery as an armed career criminal because it

felt constrained by the Forth Circuit’s prior decisions in United States v. Mungro,

754 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Dodge, 963 F.3d 379, 385

(4th Cir. 2020). Pet. App. 14a-15a. In Mungro, decided before this Court’s decisions

in Mathis and Stitt, the Fourth Circuit purported to hold that North Carolina

breaking or entering, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a), was not broader than generic

burglary and therefore qualified as an ACCA predicate. Mungro, 754 F.3d at 272.

The Mungro court focused only on whether North Carolina breaking or entering

was broader than generic burglary because it does not require an unprivileged

entry. Jd. at 270.

In Dodge, the Fourth Circuit panel acknowledged that “Mungro did not explicitly

consider § 14-54(a)’s ‘building’ element,” the basis of Mr. Dodge’s argument on

appeal. 963 F.3d at 383. The panel further acknowledged that after Mungro was

decided, this Court’s decisions in Mathis, 186 S. Ct. 2248, and United States v. Stitt,

139 S. Ct. 399, cast doubt on the continued validity of Mungro’s holding. Dodge, 963

F.3d at 383-384. The panel recognized that Mungro “could be read as being in

tension with intervening Supreme Court reasoning.” Jd. at 384. But it explained

that “as a three-judge panel, we are precluded from overruling Mungro,” and

because Mungro stated broadly that North Carolina breaking or entering qualified

as an ACCA predicate, the panel viewed itself as “bound to follow” that decision. Jd.

at 381, 384-385.

Mr. Lowery was sentenced to 192 months of imprisonment, to be followed by

three years of supervised release, a sentence that was possible only because he was

deemed to be an armed career criminal. Pet. App. 5a-6a: 27a.

Mr. Lowery appealed, renewing his challenge to his armed career criminal

designation and arguing that the discretionary conditions of supervised release

orally announced by the district court were inconsistent with those listed in the

written judgment and required a plenary resentencing. The panel affirmed Mr.

Lowery’s designation as an armed career criminal, explaining that “Mungro and

Dodge foreclose” his challenges, but vacated and remanded his case for resentencing

to address the court’s error regarding supervised release conditions. Pet. App. 2a-

3a.

This timely petition followed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

IL THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS WRONG AND

CONTRAVENES THIS COURT’S DECISIONS IN STITT, TAYLOR, AND

MATHIS BECAUSE IT COUNTS AS A VIOLENT FELONY A

BREAKING OR ENTERING STATUTE THAT INCLUDES BREAKING

INTO STRUCTURES AND VEHICLES THAT HOUSE PROPERTY AND

NO PEOPLE

The touchstone of generic burglary’s locational element is whether committing

the offense in a particular vehicle or structure “presentls] a serious risk of violence”

to another person, Szztt, 139 S. Ct. at 407; see Quarles, 139 S. Ct. at 1879

(“Congress ‘singled out burglary’ because of its ‘inherent potential for harm to

persons.’ ”) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588); Jones v. United States, 550 U.S. 192,

208 (2007), overruled by Johnson, 576 U.S. 591 (“The main risk of burglary arises

not from the simple physical act of wrongfully entering onto another’s property, but

rather from the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a

third party—whether an occupant, a police officer, or a bystander—who comes to

investigate.”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588 (“The fact that an offender enters a building

to commit a crime often creates the possibility of a violent confrontation between

the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some other person who comes to

investigate.”).

For that reason, in Stitt, the Court held that generic burglary “includes burglary

of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight

accommodation” precisely because breaking into such structures “runs a similar or

greater risk of violent confrontation.” Stitt, 189 S. Ct. at 403-404, 406. By contrast,

the statutes analyzed in Mathis and Taylor were categorically overbroad because

they included burglary of structures and vehicles that are “ordinary boats and

vessels * * * (and railroad cars often filled with cargo, not people)” (Taylor) and

vehicles that are “used for storage or safekeeping” (Mathis), which did not present

the same risk of violent confrontation. S#rtt, 139 S. Ct. at 407.

10

By entrenching its pre-Stitt and Mathis-precedent, the Fourth Circuit ignored

the clear command of those cases and failed to wrestle with the fact that North

Carolina breaking or entering—like the statutes at issue in Taylor and Mathis—

includes breaking into structures and vehicles that house property and no people.

Its conclusion that Mathis and Stité do not represent “superseding contrary

decisions” of this Court that require reconsideration of prior precedent contravenes

those decisions and diverges from the holdings of its sister circuits, who have

faithfully applied Stitt, Mathis, and Taylor to arrive at the conclusion that statutes

that allow for conviction based on burglary of structures and vehicles that house

only property and no people are categorically broader than generic burglary and are

not violent felonies.

A. The Fourth Circuit ignored the clear command of this Court’s precedents.

Time and again, this Court has explained that burglary, for purposes of the

ACCA, cannot be committed just anywhere. In Taylor, the Court defined burglary

as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other

structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 597 (emphasis

added). And it went on to note that state burglary statutes were broader than this

generic definition if they included “places, such as automobiles and vending

machines, other than buildings.” Jd. at 599. Indeed, in Mathis, the Court noted

that the Iowa burglary statute at issue “cover[ed] more conduct than generic

burglary does” because it “reachel[d] a broader range of places’—namely, “any

il

building, structure, /or/ land, water, or air vehicle’—than what Taylor's definition

would allow. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2250.

In Stitz, this Court clarified that generic burglary’s locational element is not

limited to “building|[s]” in the ordinary sense. Instead, the Court held that generic

burglary also includes “burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is

customarily used for overnight accommodation.” Stitt, 189 S. Ct. at 403-404.

Generic burglary encompasses certain vehicles, the Court reasoned, because

“breakling] into a mobile home, an RV, a camping tent, a vehicle, or another

structure that is adapted for or customarily used for lodging” runs the same risk of

“violent confrontation” between the intruder and potential occupants that prompted

Congress to include burglary among the ACCA’s enumerated offenses in the first

place. Jd. at 406.

Illustrating this focus on the risk of “violent confrontation,” the Court reaffirmed

that the Missouri statute at issue in Taylor was “beyond the scope” of the ACCA

because the law “criminalized breaking and entering ‘any boat or vessel, or railroad

car’ ” and thus included “ordinary boats and vessels, often at sea (and railroad cars

often filled with cargo, not people).” Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 407. The Court also

reasserted that the Iowa burglary statute in Mathis was similarly overbroad

because it covered “ordinary vehicles” and other structures that were used “for the

storage or safekeeping of anything of value.” Jd. Yet unlike these two statutes, the

one at issue in Stitt was no broader than generic burglary, the Court noted, because

it was limited to burglaries of vehicles or other structures “customarily used or

12

adapted for overnight accommodation” and was therefore “more clearly focusled]

upon circumstances where burglary is likely to present a serious risk of violence.”

Id.

Thus, in confirming that the scope of generic burglary’s “building or other

structure” element hinges on the risk of violent confrontation with another person,

Stitt also clarified that this same element does not necessarily include burglaries

committed in any building or vehicle—especially those where the likelihood of

violent confrontation is virtually nonexistent. See id. (explaining that the burglary

statute at issue in Taylor was broader than generic burglary because its scope was

not limited to “circumstances where burglary is likely to present a serious risk of

violence”).

Given this clear rule, the Fourth Circuit should have recognized that Stitt and

Mathis superseded its decision in Mungro. See Mungro, 754 F.3d at 272 (holding

that North Carolina breaking or entering “sweeps no more broadly than generic

burglary” without addressing the scope of the statute’s building element). Indeed,

North Carolina’s breaking or entering statute suffers from the very same flaws that

rendered those in Taylor and Mathis fatally overbroad. Like the Missouri breaking

and entering statute in Taylor, North Carolina’s covers “any dwelling, dwelling

house, uninhabited house, building under construction, building within the

curtilage of a dwelling house, and any other structure designed to house or secure

within it any activity or property,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(c) (emphasis added), and

KK

“nowhere restricts] its coverage [only] to vehicles or structures customarily

13

used or adapted for overnight accommodations.” See Stitt, 189 S. Ct. at 407 (noting

that the Missouri statute’s “usel] [of] the word ‘any’ ” rendered it broader than

generic burglary). And just like the Iowa statute in Mathis, which was overbroad

for encompassing structures and vehicles used “for the storage or safekeeping of

anything of value,” #d., North Carolina’s breaking or entering statute expressly

covers structures that are “designed to house or secure within it any activity or

property,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(c) (emphasis added); see State v. Bost, 286 S.E.2d

632, 684 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (breaking into a storage trailer for tools and

equipment on a construction site); State v. Batts, 617 S.E.2d 724, at *2-*3 (N.C. Ct.

App. 2005) (breaking into a permanent, locked storage facility used to transport

musical equipment); State v. Taylor, 428 S.E.2d 273, 274 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)

(breaking into a travel trailer temporarily made “an area of repose”).

But the Fourth Circuit below believed it was bound by its prior holdings in

Mungro and Dodge. It did so even though Mungro never addressed North Carolina

breaking or entering’s capacious locational element and did not assess whether that

element “clearly focusles] upon circumstances where burglary is likely to present a

serious risk of violence,” Stitt, 189 S. Ct. at 407, flouting Stzt?s clear command in

the process. And it did so even though Dodge acknowledged the evident tension

between Mungro and this Court’s decisions in Mathis and Stitt. Dodge, 963 F.3d at

384 (noting that “[tlhere is * * * explanatory language in Stitt suggesting, but not

holding, that the locational element of generic burglary might not encompass

structures intended for the storage of property rather than for occupancy”). Dodge

14

even acknowledged Stit#’s rule that “generic federal burglary is concerned with

violent confrontations that might arise when people are present, whether in

buildings, structures, or vehicles.” Jd. But it then mischaracterized Stitfs holding

as “limited to the vehicle context” alone and therefore not “directly applicable” to

Mungro, entrenching its prior precedent. Jd. (“At bottom, we conclude that Mathis

and Stitt do not overrule our prior holding in Mungro that a conviction under N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a) qualifies as an ACCA predicate conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)Gi).”).

In sum, the Fourth Circuit below felt bound by its outdated and under-reasoned

decision in Mungro not because that case remains good law—post- Stitt, it decidedly

does not—but instead because it felt obligated to do so given the Fourth Circuit’s

rules regarding prior precedent. See Dodge, 963 F.3d at 384-385 (observing that

accepting Petitioner's argument would demand that the Fourth Circuit “no longer

follow [Mungro's] holding” but noting that a three-judge panel is “precluded from

overruling” a prior decision). But that sense of obligation has now led to the

entrenchment of a lower court decision that contravenes this Court’s precedents.

Accordingly, this Court should intervene so that the Fourth Circuit, freed from its

reliance on erroneous prior precedent, can properly apply Stitt, Mathis, and Taylor

moving forward.

B. The Fourth Circuit’s decision departs markedly from how other federal courts

of appeals analyze burglary offenses under the ACCA post- Stitt.

The Fourth Circuit’s failure to analyze whether North Carolina breaking or

entering’s locational element encompasses only those structures in which burglary

15

presents a “risk of violent confrontation,” see Stitt, 189 S. Ct. at 406, also represents

a marked departure from how other courts of appeals compare state offenses to

generic burglary under the ACCA post- Stzt¢.

Start with United States v. Jones, 951 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2019). There, the

Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s prior Colorado conviction for second degree

burglary of a dwelling was a predicate offense under the ACCA because it “coverled]

only conduct within the generic offense of burglary as defined by the Supreme Court

in Stitt.” Id. at 1141. The court made clear that the burglary conviction at issue

was no broader than generic burglary only because the defendant had been

specifically convicted of the standalone offense of burglarizing a dwelling, and a

“dwelling” was limited by state law to include only “buildingls] which [are] used,

intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation.” Jd. Because

second degree burglary of a dwelling was so limited, it could not cover a structure

used only “for the storage or safekeeping’ of property,” and therefore was not

overbroad. Jones, 951 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 407). The

habitation requirement ensured that the statute solely encompassed structures in

which the likely presence of an occupant enhanced the “risk of violent

confrontation.” Stztt, 189 S. Ct. at 406.

The court made plain it would have reached the opposite conclusion had the

defendant instead been convicted of general second degree burglary, which state

law defined in relevant part as “break[ing] an entrance into, or enterling], or

remainling] unlawfully in a building or occupied structure.” Jones, 951 F.3d at

16

1140 (emphasis added). Because the statutory definition of “building,” includes

“structures that are designed to shelter only property,” it covered “significantly

more than the generic [burglary] element of ‘building or other structure.” Jd. at

1141.

Consider next Greer v. United States, 938 F.3d 766 (6th Cir. 2019). In that case,

the Sixth Circuit held that an Ohio aggravated burglary statute that “coverled] an

expansive array of structures” nonetheless aligned with the generic definition of

burglary because the additional statutory requirement that a person either be

“present” or “likely to be present” in the burglarized structure “restrictled] the

statute's scope to only those structures that carry an increased risk of a violent

encounter between perpetrator and occupant.” Jd. at 775, 779. The Sixth Circuit

cited this Court’s decisions in Stitt, Mathis, and Taylor for the proposition that a

“burglary statute is broader than generic burglary if it (1) covers a multitude of

location types, including vehicles, and (2) does not limit its coverage to even

remotely residential uses.” Jd. at 776. It then noted that this proposition could be

explained in large part by Stit¢'s focus on “circumstances where burglary is likely to

present a serious risk of violence.” Jd. at 777 (quoting Stitt, 189 S. Ct. at 407). And

because it extended “only to habitations ‘in which at the time [of the burglary] any

person is present or likely to be present,’ ” the Ohio statute at issue targeted the

“core of the generic offense of burglary” and those instances, as emphasized in Stitt,

“where the risk of violence is the greatest.” Jd.

17

The Highth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Sims, 933

F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2019), one of the two cases this Court addressed in Stitt, On

remand, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the fact that an Arkansas burglary

statute “might cover a car in which a homeless person occasionally sleeps” meant

that it swept more broadly than generic burglary. Jd. at 1013 (quoting Stitt, 139 S.

Ct. at 407-08). Relying on “Stit?’s straightforward focus on the potential for violent

confrontation,” the court decided that the Arkansas statute did not. See id. at 1013,

1015 (holding that the statute matched generic burglary and therefore qualified as

a violent felony under the ACCA). The Eighth Circuit emphasized that, “as Stitt

recognizes, a statute that prohibits breaking and entering into any vehicle does not

qualify as generic burglary.” Jd. at 1014 (emphasis in original). Such a statute, the

court noted, would encompass vehicles and other structures that merely stored

property, thus moving beyond generic burglary’s ambit. See id. (highlighting the

distinction between Arkansas’s residential burglary statute, which matched generic

burglary, and its more expansive breaking and entering statute that encompassed

structures “not used for residential purposes”). But the Arkansas burglary statute

at issue was more limited: It “applie[d] only to vehicles in which someone lives or

that are customarily used for overnight accommodation,” and therefore, in

accordance with Stitt, “addresseld] the risk of violence that concerned Congress

when it passed the ACCA.” Jd. at 1015.

And then there is United States v. Montgomery, 974 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2020). In

that case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that Louisiana simple burglary

18

of an inhabited dwelling “coverled] more places than does the ‘building or structure’

definition of generic burglary.” Jd. at 592-598. To the contrary, the court suggested,

the Louisiana statute at issue was “arguably narrower than generic burglary”

because it required that the building or structure where the offense occurred be

“used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode.” /d. at 593. Put another way,

“because the place burglarized must be one where a person lives,” the statute

targeted offenses where there was a “greater ‘possibility of a violent confrontation

between the offender and an occupant’ than in a generic burglary.” Jd. (quoting

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588). And given this focus on the risk of violence, the parallels

to Stité could not be clearer. See Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 406-407 (recognizing that

burglary is an “inherently dangerous crime” because of the likelihood of “violent

confrontation”).

In sum, these cases collectively demonstrate that, when comparing an offense to

generic burglary, other courts of appeals faithfully apply Stit/s command by

considering whether an offense’s locational element “focusles] upon circumstances

where burglary is likely to present a serious risk of violence.” Stitt, 189 S. Ct. at

407. The Fourth Circuit’s failure to do the same contravenes Stitt, Taylor, and

Mathis, and cries out for this Court’s intervention.

II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONTRAVENES TAYLOR FOR

ANOTHER REASON, NAMELY THAT IT COUNTS AS VIOLENT

FELONIES STATUTES THAT DO NOT REQUIRE ENTRY, AN

ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF GENERIC BURGLARY

North Carolina breaking or entering and breaking or entering a place of worship

are distinct from generic burglary in yet another way: They can be completed

19

without entry. In Taylor, this Court defined generic burglary as having “the basic

elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or

structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. This

understanding of generic burglary has been repeatedly reaffirmed since then. See

Mathis, 186 S. Ct. at 2248 (noting that generic burglary consists of “unlawful or

unprivileged entry into * * * a building or other structure, with intent to commit a

crime.” (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17

(2005) (same); James, 550 U.S. at 197 (same); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,

145 (2008) (same); Sttt, 189 S. Ct. at 405 (same); Quarles, 139 S. Ct. at 1875, 1877

(same). And this Court has further explained that if a statute permits conviction

without requiring an entry, it cannot be a match for generic burglary. See

Descamps, 570 U.S. at 277 (“Because generic unlawful entry is not an element, or

an alternative element, of [California Penal Code Ann.] § 459, a conviction under

that statute is never for generic burglary.”). To qualify as generic burglary, a

statute must require entry.

But North Carolina breaking or entering can be completed by breaking alone.

The plain text of Sections 14-54(a) and 14-54.1(a) permit conviction on a finding of

either breaking or entering. And the North Carolina Supreme Court has explained

that “by the disjunctive language of [14-54(a)], the state meets its burden by

offering substantial evidence that defendant either ‘broke’ or ‘entered’ the building

with the requisite unlawful intent.” State v. Myrick, 291 S.E.2d 577, 579 (N.C.

1982). See also State v. Jones, 157 S.E.2d 610, 611 (N.C. 1967) (per curium) (holding

20

that breaking a window with the intent to commit a felony “therein completes the

offense even though the defendant is interrupted or otherwise abandons his purpose

without actually entering the building”).

North Carolina courts of appeals continue to permit breaking or entering

convictions based solely on a finding of breaking. See State v. Watkins, 720 S.E.2d

844, 850 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (vacating a first-degree burglary conviction and

entering judgment on the lesser included offense of breaking or entering because

the State presented evidence of breaking but not of entry); State v. Lucas, 758

S.E.2d 672, 678 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (‘Although * * * the State failed to prove that

either Defendant actually entered the home * * * the entry of judgment on felonious

breaking or entering is appropriate.”). North Carolina courts do not require proof of

entry to satisfy felonious breaking or entering. Because conviction under North

Carolina breaking or entering and breaking or entering a place of worship do not

require proof of entry, they are broader than generic burglary.

North Carolina’s breaking or entering statutes permitting conviction solely on

proof of breaking, while rare, are not unique. Arkansas and Iowa also have statutes

whose text can be satisfied by proof of breaking alone. See Ark. Stat. Ann § 5-39-

202(a) “A person commits the offense of breaking or entering if for the purpose of

committing a theft or felony he or she breaks or enters into any [enumerated

structure or vehicle].”); Iowa Code Ann. § 713.1 (“[Ol]r any person having such intent

[to commit a felony, assault, or theft therein] who breaks an occupied structure,

commits burglary.”). These statutes have been deemed categorically broader than

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