Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Chuck Duckworth, Petitioner v. Illinois

Supreme Court briefFeb 22, 2022

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APPENDIX

NOTICE

This Order was filed under

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is

not precedent except in the

limited circumstances allowed

under Rule 23(e)(1).

2021 IL App (4th) 180740-U

NO.4-18-0740

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

FILED

August 27, 2021

Carla Bender

4~h District Appellate

Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

CHUCK DUCKWORTH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Champaign County

No. 16CF443

Honorable

Roger B. Webber,

Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING NSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.

Justice Steigmann specially concurred.

•i)'

¶1

I~e~c1: (1) On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to three of defendant's nine

convictions, the convictions are upheld as they were proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.

(2) As the State concedes, one of the convictions for theft of services is reduced

from a felony to a Class A misdemeanor.

(3) Defendant has not established the trial court committed plain error when it

privately reviewed an audio recording of defendant's sworn statements from a

bankruptcy proceeding.

(4)Defendant has not established he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel when his sentencing counsel failed to challenge restitution ordered for

debts discharged in bankruptcy.

(5) The restitution order to Phoenix Insulation, Inc., is vacated as defendant was

found not guilty of theft of property from Phoenix Insulation, Inc.

¶2

After a bench trial, defendant, Chuck Duckworth, was convicted of multiple

counts of both theft of services (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a)(West 2014)) and theft of property

exceeding $500(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A)(West 2014)) and one count of theft of property

exceeding $10,000(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A)(West 2014)). Defendant was sentenced to

probation and ordered to pay restitution to the victims of those offenses. Defendant appeals,

arguing(1) multiple convictions must be vacated as the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt;(2)his conviction for theft of property over $500 from Contractor Services of

Illinois, count VIII, must be reduced to misdemeanor theft as the State failed to prove the value

of the taken property;(3)defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of his trial was

violated by the trial court's private listening to an audio recording of bankruptcy proceedings;

(4)he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel, at sentencing, failed

to argue the restitution order was improper as those debts were discharged in federal bankruptcy

proceedings; and (5)the restitution order to Phoenix Insulation, Inc., should be vacated as

defendant was acquitted of the count involving that business. We affirm as modified, vacate in

part, and remand with directions.

¶3

¶4

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2013, defendant purchased a building located at 114 North

Kentucky Avenue in downtown Rantoul, Illinois (Kentucky Building). The Kentucky Building

was an old brick building, formerly housing a hardware store on the first floor and unfinished

storage space on the second floor. Defendant intended to renovate the Kentucky Building with a

storefront on the first floor and residential space on the second floor.

¶5

In July 2014, defendant acquired a "microloan" from the Village of Rantoul for

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$50,000. The Village of Rantoul crea

ted the Village of Rantoul Microloan

the rehabilitation of downtown Ran

toul by providing low-cost funding

Program to assist in

to small businesses for

real estate improvement. The max

imum amount a debtor could acquire und

er the program was

$50,000.

¶6

To complete the renovation of the Ken

tucky Building, defendant hired mult

contractors. Beginning in late summer

iple

or early fall 2014 and continuing thr

ough approximately

March 2015, various contractors worked

on renovating the Kentucky Building.

Multiple

contractors submitted defendant invo

ices that defendant did not pay.

¶7

In June 2015, defendant petitioned for

States Bankruptcy Code (Bankruptcy

bankruptcy under.Chapter 7 of the Uni

ted

Code)(11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.(2014)

). A few months

later, the bankruptcy court discharg

ed defendant's debts to his creditors, incl

uding the

contractors involved in the rehabilitati

on of the Kentucky Building.

¶8

The State, in March 2016, charged def

endant with 14 counts of theft of proper

or services related to the renovation of the

Kentucky Building: count I, theft of serv

ices having a

value exceeding $300 from Waters Elec

trical Contracting, Inc.(720 ILCS 5/1

2014)); count II, theft of property having

6-3(a)(West

a value exceeding $10,000 from Wat

ers Electrical

Contracting, Inc.(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)

(A)(West 2014)); count III, theft of serv

ices having a

value exceeding $300 from Davis Flo

or Sanding and Refinishing(720 ILC

S 5/16-3(a)(West

2014)); count IV,theft of property hav

ing a value exceeding $500 from Pho

enix Insulation, Inc.

(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A)(West 201

4)); count V, theft of services having

$300 from Good Vibes Sound,Inc.(72

a value exceeding

0 ILCS 5/16-3(a)(West 2014)); count

property having a value exceeding $50

VI, theft of

0 from Good Vibes Sound,Inc.(720 ILC

- 3-

5/16-1(a)(2)(A)(West 2014)); count VII, theft of services having a value exceeding $300 from

New Age Home Itnproviement, Inc.(720 ILCS S/16-3(a)(West 2Q~.4)); count VIII, theft of

property having a value exceeding $~00 from Contrac~r Se ices of Illinois (720 ILCS 5/161(a)(2)(A)(West 2014)); count IX,theft of property having a value exceeding $500 from Hen

Kids, Inc., d/b/a/ Classic Granite and Marble (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A)(West 2014)); count X,

theft of services having a value exceeding $300 from Victor Treat and Sons, Inc,(720 ILCS

5/16-3(a)(West 2014)); count XI, theft of services having a value exceeding $300 from ServPro

of Clinton (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a)(West 2014)); count XII, theft of services having a value

exceeding $300 from Miracle Method (720 ILCS 5/16-3(a)(West 2014)); count XIII, theft of

property having a value exceeding $500 from Custom Flooring (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A)(West

2014)); and count XIV, theft of property having a value exceeding $10,000 from Lanz Heating

and Cooling(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A)(West 2014)).

¶9

¶ 10

A. Defendant's Trial

A bench trial was held in Apri12017. Below is a summary of the evidence

regarding the charges at issue in this appeal. We note defendant was acquitted of counts I, II, IV

(the count pertaining to Phoenix Insulation, Inc.), XII, and XIII.

¶ 11

¶ 12

1. Countlll,~avisFlooz Sanclmg anaRe£iYi~sli~ng

Danny Lee Davis testified he met defendant on November 24, 2014, at the

Kentucky Building. Defendant wanted the floors on the entire second floor refinished. Defendant

told Davis that payment would be through a village loan; defendant mentioned no other source of

payment. Davis provided an estimate to defendant. Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing did not

begin working on the Kentucky Building after the initial estimate.

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¶ 13

Davis and defendant mgt a second time on January 19, 2015. Defendant's plans

for refinishing the floors changed, leading to a more expensive estimate. When Davis informed

defendant of the increased cost, defendant said "that was no problem because he had $31,000 set

aside for floor work." For the work to the scale of defendant's request, Davis would have

considered requiring a deposit. Davis did not do so for the Kentucky Building because defendant

told him that he had $31,000 set aside for flooring. After the work was completed, defendant did

not pay Davis.

¶ 14

¶ 15

2.CoUntsV &Vl,GooclVibesSouncl,Znc.

Michael Roy, a manager at Good Vibes Sound, Inc.(Good Vibes), testified

defendant entered his store in September 2014, wanting some audio and video work done on the

Kentucky Building. Initially, defendant stated he wanted to rehab a second floor for living

quarters and a first floor for retail space. Defendant wanted in-ceiling speakers with an audio

receiver. Generally, Good Vibes requested money before such an installation. Good Vibes did

not do so for defendant, however, because defendant said he procured a loan through the Village

of Rantoul for $50,000 to cover the installation and equipment Good Vibes would provide.

¶ 16

Good Vibes invoiced defendant in January 2015 for $1403.92 worth of

equipment. At that time, defendant was not billed for services as billing for services would occur

when the job was completed.

¶ 17

Roy testified the second round of equipment and installation included a speaker

selector, television mounts, a subwoofer, and some wiring (see Exhibit 17B). In April 2015, Roy

invoiced defendant for the labor. Around this time, defendant also ordered another receiver and a

speaker placement on the mezzanine level. At this point, Roy became concerned about payment.

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On May 10, 2015, Roy contacted the Village and the Bank of Rantoul. He learned no money

was

available.

¶ 18

Steve Suderman, the owner of Good Vibes, testified he went to the Kentucky

Building on May 10, 2015,to attempt to repossess equipment they installed. After

he could not

enter the building, he contacted the number on file for defendant. He spoke to a person

identifying himself as defendant, who stated he would allow them to reclaim the equipme

nt and

walk away from the ,installation. They agreed to do so at the end of that week or the next week.

However, defendant later called back and said he was unwilling to do so.

¶ 19

¶ 20

3. CountVll,l~ew [~gellomelmpro~ement

Ryan Stitt, formerly a general contractor and sole proprietor of New Age Home

Improvement(New Age), testified he worked on the Kentucky Building from June

or July

through December 2014. New Age performed framing work, installed drywall, built

stairs,

performed metal installation and demolition, and repaired flooring. Stitt testified defenda

nt found

him online, asking for a quote on putting in an upstairs balcony. The two discusse

d how

payments would be made. Stitt would deliver invoices "and he would—I don't know if

funded through the—through the City of Rantoul or if they signed off with the

it was

bank, but he

would have to take the invoice." Defendant mentioned the source of payment was

a microloan

fund. Defendant did not mention he expected to receive an inheritance or insuran

ce settlement.

Defendant also mentioned he received some money from his father. Stitt did not rememb

details from the conversation: For his early work, through August 2014, Stitt was

Stitt was not paid for an invoice dated October 6, 2014, for "hanging, finishing,

drywall." The invoice did not separate charges for labor and materials. The

paid promptly.

sanding,

two were treated the

same on the invoice. Stitt and defendant had an arrangement for payment of that invoice.

Defendant paid for the material, which was drywall and insulation. He made a partial payment

for labor. Stitt was to receive the rest of the payment at the end of the job. Stitt believed he would

be paid from the village loan fund. Defendant initialed and dated the outstanding balance.

¶ 21

According to Stitt, defendant failed to pay the December 18, 2014, invoice. When

Stitt gave defendant the invoice, defendant first said he paid for the work and refused to give Stitt

more money. Then, defendant said he had no more money to give him. Stitt testified he would

not have extended services on credit to defendant had it not been for the village loan fund.

¶ 22

¶ 23

4. CovnfV111,Contzactoc Services ofZ~~inois

Arlyn Rudin, a partner and subcontractor for Contractor Services of Illinois

(Contractor Services), testified Contractor Services installed whole house, central vacuum

systems; closet organizers; shower glass; mirrors; and bath accessories. Defendant called

Contractor Services in late November 2014 seeking to have a central vacuum system installed in

the Kentucky Building. Rudin met defendant at the job site. Later, defendant discussed having

closet organizers installed. When Rudin asked defendant how to invoice him, defendant said he

was getting money from a grant from the Village of Rantoul. It was important for Rudin to

establish how payment would be made as defendant was not a contractor they worked with

regularly. Rudin wanted to know how defendant would pay for the work. Because defendant said

the money was coming from the Village of Rantoul, Contractor Services did not require payment

in advance. Defendant mentioned no other source for payment.

¶ 24

Rudin testified installation was difficult, as the building was old. Contractor

Services charged defendant $2250 for installation of the' central vacuum system. Contractor

Services charged defendant $3895.85 for installation of the closet organizers. Defendant paid for

neither.

¶ 25

¶ 26

5. Coun~X,V ictoz Twat & Sons,lnc.

Victor Treat testified defendant approached him in September 2014 to install

drywall on three levels of the Kentucky Building. At that time, the building was "in pretty sad

shape." Treat provided an estimate of $16,750. Defendant did not accept that estimate. In

January 2015, defendant contacted Treat again to ask for a new estimate. By that point, the

building "looked a lot better." A good portion of the drywall had been installed. Defendant told

Treat he and his brother had installed the drywall. Defendant said his brother, however, had other

obligations and could not complete the work. Treat provided an estimate. Treat initially told

defendant he would need half of the money as a down payment. Defendant told Treat he could

not do that. Treat asked how he would be paid. Defendant responded he would pay Treat from "a

grant or something through the [Village] of Rantoul." Treat was a little skeptical about the source

of payment. He talked to some of his other customers in town and confirmed defendant had

received a loan through the Village of Rantoul. Treat did not know the amount ofthe loan.

¶ 27

Treat testified he put a finish coat on the existing drywall and installed drywall in

areas that were not completed. The price for this work was $8250. Treat sent defendant a

February 9, 2015, invoice for this work. Defendant responded by telling him the Village of

Rantoul performed an inspection and wanted more work done on the first floorl before it would

release the funds. Treat agreed to perform additional work, installing drywall in a small

bathroom. Treat sent defendant an April 13, 2015, invoice for $850 for the additional work.

Defendant did not pay Treat.

¶ 28

¶ 29

6. CountXl,SeYv1'zo of C1~nton

Richard Roth, owner of ServPro of Clinton (ServPro), testif

ied defendant

contacted his business to perform work on the Kentucky

Building. Roth met defendant on May

19, 2015. At that time, the second floor, "[o]ther than being dusty

When one walked up the stairs, there was a bedroom and

*** was a beautiful setup."

a bathroom. To the right was a sliding

barn door that opened to a great room with a kitchen, living

room, and dining room. Televisions

had been hung. There was also a "dumbwaiter type of elevator

system." Defendant hired ServPro

to do a postconstruction cleanup, specifically cleaning the dust

from the floor that had been

sanded. Defendant told Roth the flooring company had agreed

to pay for the cleanup once

ServPro sent them the bill. According to defendant, the floori

ng company wanted to see the bill

to determine whether it would pay out of pocket or submit a

claim to their insurance company.

On May 21,2015, a contract was signed and ServPro began

work on the Kentucky Building. The

total cost for the work was $4445.30. Defendant did not pay

ServPro. Defendant identified no

other source of payment other than the flooring company.

¶ 30

7. CountIX,Classic Gzari~ie & Mazb\e

¶ 31

Richard Herr, owner of Classic Granite &Marble, testified defen

dant entered his

showroom in the summer of 2014, asking about kitchen counte

rtops to be installed in the

Kentucky Building. Defendant contracted with Classic Granite

&Marble in December 2014. The

amount of the bid agreed upon by defendant was $8255. Genera

lly, Classic Granite &Marble

required a 50% deposit. That was "whited out" on the contra

ct, as defendant had a loan through

the Village of Rantoul. Hen testified defendant told him the

work had to be done first and then

the Village would inspect the work and issue a check "in full."

Defendant told Hen the Village

would not issue a partial payment. Defendant identified no other source of payment.

¶ 32

Herr explained he visited defendant at the Kentucky Building during the fall of

2014 and noticed the cost of the work done exceeded $50,000. Hen said the Kentucky Building

"was a very nice place." When they stopped at the middle level, defendant told him it was going

to be a theater room. Hen said,"you obviously didn't do this for $50,000." Defendant responded

Herr was correct. Defendant assured Herr "he saved the $50,000 for the flooring and the

countertops [because] he felt like those were the two most expensive things that he was doing."

Defendant mentioned no other source of income for the granite work. Herr noted defendant did

say he had a cleaning business.

¶ 33

Defendant was sent an invoice for the granite work in March 2015. Defendant

told Herr he submitted the bill to the Village, which was in the process of"doing the

collections." At some point, Hen received a call from defendant. Defendant told him there was

to be a report on the news about some contractors not being paid and the Village had revoked his

loan. Defendant further told Herr he was the victim of identity theft.

¶ 34

On cross-examination, Hen testified Classic Granite &Marble had earlier

completed work on a house defendant owned in Rantoul. Defendant paid for that work.

¶ 35

¶ 36

8. CountXlV ,Laz~zl~eating and Cooing

Jacob Farmer, a comfort consultant for residential sales for Lanz Heating and

Cooling, testified defendant, in 2014, called the Lanz Heating and Cooling sales coordinator to

make an appointment to discuss improvements at the Kentucky Building. On August 22, 2014,

Farmer met defendant at the Kentucky Building. Defendant wanted to make the second floor of

the building a residential space. For the mezzanine level, defendant was considering office space.

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10a

Lanz Heating and Cooling installed two ductless units. On the second floor, defendant wanted a

system for the great room with a family area and a kitchen as well as a system for the bedroom,

master-suite area. On August 26, 2014, Farmer presented the plan to defendant. At that time,

they discussed payment. Defendant told Farmer about the loan he was getting from the Village of

Rantoul. He further told Farmer about the other projects defendant had completed. The two

looked at video of the other projects.Defendant told Farmer the Village of Rantoul was giving

him a loan for his work as he was restoring an older historical building.

¶ 37

The first invoice was sent to defendant on September 19, 2014, after 90°/a of the

work had been completed. Lanz Heating and Cooling requested 90% of the payment for that

work. The total for the project was $28,120.

¶ 38

Normally all proposals from Lanz Heating and Cooling require a down payment

of 50%with the rest due upon completion. In this case, Farmer did not require the down payment

"[b]ecause [defendant] had mentioned the Village of Rantoul loan." Farmer also stated:

"[Defendant] had mentioned that he had done this before, and it seemed like a very noble cause I

thought at that time. And then on top of that, I was required to meet another time with what 1

expected to be two gentlemen from the Bank of Rantoul. They had me walk through and show

them exactly what we were going to do before the work was even begun." The two men wanted

to know about the scope of the work. This meeting occurred the week before work began, in

September 2014. Defendant further told Farmer the bank would not release funds until the work

was completed.

¶ 39

According to Farmer, defendant identified no other source of funds for payment.

Defendant had mentioned he owned a cleaning business in the context of scheduling meetings

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and installation. Defendant signed the August 27, 2014, estimate for $28,120. In October and

early November, Lanz Heating and Cooling did plumbing work for defendant, amounting to

$6525. By this point, 90% of the work was completed. All of the work was to be done by

December 1, 2014. Defendant told Farmer "there had to be a final walkthrough from the bank

after all of the work was done before they would pay."

¶ 40

Troy Lanz, owner of Lanz Heating and Cooling, testified Lanz Heating and

Cooling did not require a deposit for work at the Kentucky Building because of the involvement

ofthe Bank of Rantoul. In January or February 2015, defendant said he would give Lanz $2000,

but defendant did not do so. No payment was made by defendant to Lanz Heating and Cooling.

Lanz testified his business lost $5109 in labor charges and $26,724 in equipment charges.

¶ 41

¶ 42

9.V i»age of Rantoul

Daniel Culkin, the director of the inspection deparhnent for the Village of

Rantoul, testified he was asked in July 2014 to oversee and verify expenditures of the $50,000

loan to defendant. This process involved the owner of the property delivering a bill or statement

for work that was being done. Culkin would then go to the property, verify the work was

completed, and initial the statement or bill or contact the bank officials to authorize payment.

Gulkin's role did not include approving whether expenditures were appropriate. Vendors did not

need to wait until the project was finished to submit an invoice for payment. They could perform

the work in phases.

¶ 43

According to Culkin, when he first visited the Kentucky Building to oversee

defendant's expenditures, the building was, zoning-wise, a commercial district property. The

property was in "rough condition." It was not finished above the first floor. Culkin had regular

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12a

contact with defendant. Defendant submitted an invoi

ce from New Age, which Culkin approved.

For that invoice, Culkin contacted the bank representa

tive to authorize payment. When Culkin

was shown two other invoices for work performed

by New Age, Culkin testified defendant did

not submit those invoices for payment.

¶ 44

Culkin testified defendant had not submitted invoi

ces for Contractor Services,

Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing, Classic Grani

te and Marble, Lanz Heating and Cooling,

Custom Flooring, ServPro, Victor Treat and Sons, Good

(Phoenix Insulation), Waters Electrical Contractin

¶ 45

or Miracle Method of Central Illinois.

Around September 2014, Culkin became concerned

left in the loan fund. A large payment had been

about the amount of money

made to Roto-Rooter and "something like

$12,000" remained. This concerned Culkin because

he knew other bills were coming due,

including an estimate provided from Lanz Heating and

¶ 46

Vibes, Phoenix Insulation, Inc.

Air Conditioning for around $28,000.

On cross-examination, Culkin testified the Bank of

after receiving verification from Culkin. Culkin did not

Rantoul made the payments

know how the bank dispersed the

payments. He did not see any of the checks.

¶ 47

¶ 48

10.Bank of Rantoul

Craig Rogers, a commercial loan officer for the Bank

of Rantoul, described the

process of the microloan program. Under the prog

ram, the Village approved loans to individuals

and the Bank of Rantoul serviced the loans. The Villa

ge's loan funds were tracked via "paper

trail." According to Rogers,"The village would give

us a check for a dollar amount. After

disbursements to the customer *** or person, we woul

d then take the remaining funds into

another cashier's check until the next draw request."

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13a

Rogers agreed "instead of having numbers

on a computer account, you physically draft a cashier's check for the balance and then replace

with a new one each time there is a disbursement" because the money was not the bank's money

and that was how the bank kept track ofthe remaining amount left on the loan.

¶ 49

Rogers testified the bills would go to either the Village of Rantoul or to himself If

Rogers received a bill, the Village would sign off on the bill before funds were disburs

ed. If the

bills went to the Village, the Village would contact the bank and tell them to disburs the

funds.

Culkin was the contact with the Village. Rogers was not aware of any disbursement

made

without defendant's and the Village's approval.

¶ 50

According to Rogers, defendant's loan was for $50,000. Each time a disbursement

was made, Rogers confirmed the outstanding balance with defendant. A State's

the balance of the loan was $50,000 when it was new as of July 9, 2014.

exhibit shows

As of September 3,

2014, only $17,500 remained. As of October 7, 2014, only $8170.70 remaine

d available to

defendant. Three days later, approximately $3700 remained. By January 16,

2015, that number

was approximately $900. At no point did Rogers receive an invoice for paymen

t for Custom

Flooring, Hesterberg Electric, Good Vibes, Miracle Method of Central Illinois,

Victor

Sons, Davis Flooring Sanding and Refinishing, Phoenix Insulation, Contractor

Electric Contracting, Lanz Heating and Cooling, Classic Granite and

¶ 51

Treat and

Services, Waters

Marble, or ServPro.

Dennis Long, chairman of the board of the Bank of Rantoul, testified he sat

committee that reviewed and approved loans through the Village of Rantoul

on the

Microloan Program.

Defendant applied for the loan in 2014 after he acquired the Kentucky

Buildin

g. The Kentucky

Building was the old Litchfield Hardware building. Defendant wanted

to do extensi

remodeling with plans to rent the first floor as commercial space and reside

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14a

on the second floor.

Defendant requested a loan for $50,000, the maximum amount allowed

under the program. The

loan was "closed-end credit," meaning the loan would not be readvanced.

¶ 52

In the course of applying for the loan, defendant informed Long of his sources

income. Defendant's tax returns showed income from a cleaning busines

s. Defendant also

received disability income from social security. The funds from the microl

oan were to be spent

on rehabilitating structural issues within the Kentucky Building. At no point

during the

conversations regarding defendant's income did defendant mention anticip

ating an

inheritance or

insurance settlement. He also did not mention a payment related to achild-support

obligation.

¶ 53

Long testified defendant had rehabilitated an old church in Rantoul. Defendant

sold that property, and the committee understood the proceeds from that sale

went to purchase

the Kentucky Building and rehabilitation of that building.

¶ 54

Long testified regarding an incident where he received a phone call from a

pluming contractor inquiring as to the availability of funds to be paid on work

he had done for

defendant. Long told the contractor the funds were available at that time. Defendant

Long the next day. Defendant was "rather irate" Long had told the man funds

approached

were available. On

September 3, 2014, a $17,500 payment was issued to Roto-Rooter.

~j 55

¶ 56

11.~efenaant'sTesti~mony

Defendant testified he had lived in Rantoul since 2010. He owned a cleaning

business, which did janitorial work for offices and factories. At the time of his testimo

ny,

defendant's cleaning business had no employees.

¶ 57

Defendant had building and renovation experience. In 2001, he and his then-wife

constructed a house. For that project, defendant acted as a general contractor and

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hired multiple

contractors. The contractors were paid for their work. Defendant and his wife

resided there for

five years until they divorced. Defendant then purchased a church in Rantou

l and renovated the

building into a residence. He hired contractors to complete the project and lived

there for three

years before selling it in 2013.

¶ 58

When defendant purchased the Kentucky Building in December 2013, he had

plan in place to pay for the renovation. Defendant used $84,000 in proceed

s from the sale ofthe

church to purchase the building. He intended to use proceeds from that sale

to purchase materials

such as appliances, toilets, lights, and drywall. To further help finance the renovat

ion, defendant

applied for a microloan from the Village of Rantoul. His intent was to use

microloan proceeds

for brick work, plumbing, and some materials. Defendant's renovation plans

he believed he would receive from his father's estate. Defendant's father

included $175,000

told defendant he

would leave him $175,000 upon his death. Defendant's father died in Decemb

er 2012. As of the

date of his testimony, defendant had not received any money from his father's

estate. Defendant

believed he was going to, as his "grandmother was to distribute it to [him]

for the purchase of

another property." Defendant intended to use that $175,000 for the larger

jobs, such as floor

sanding, insulation, countertops, air conditioning, and electrical work.

¶ 59

Defendant testified regarding the rules of receiving the microloan. At the June

2014 meeting regarding his loan, defendant took notes. Defendant was

told he had to hire

licensed contractors and inform the contractors that he had been approv

ed for the microloan.

Defendant told everyone about the loan because he was instructed to

do so. The microloan

appeared in the newspaper in 2014. More than half of the contract

ors contacted defendant after

the information was published in the paper, including Stitt from New Age.

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Defendant could not

name other contractors who initiated contact with him. There were "so many people," about six.

Defendant denied telling any of the contractors they would receive payment from the loan.

Defendant told the contractors he would pay them from the inheritance.

¶ 60

In November 2014, a television producer contacted defendant, asking him if he

would be interested in doing a reality show rehabbing commercial properties into homes. The

producer saw some photos on Facebook. The two reached an agreement. Defendant told all of

the contractors about the reality show, some of whom were interested in participating.

Specifically, defendant identified Davis and Hess as having been recorded for the show. The

show had not been produced, but defendant wanted to pursue it.

¶ 61

Defendant testified regarding the $175,000 he expected to receive from his father.

He had several conversations with his mother, stepmother, and grandmother about the money.

He and his stepmother, Lisa Brown, had multiple conversations in December 2014. Lisa wrote

defendant a letter explaining she had health issues and would contact defendant's grandmother to

try to take care of things in a timely manner. Defendant's grandmother visited defendant four

times at the Kentucky Building. The first time was in December 2013, shortly after defendant

purchased the property. She returned in November 2014 to see the progress. His grandmother

wanted to follow his father's wishes to continue with defendant's project. Defendant first

suspected a problem with the money in Apri12015. Defendant's grandmother stopped returning

his calls. His uncle would not allow him to see her. In March 2016, defendant learned his

grandmother was in a nursing home. He visited her there. She did not recognize him. Defendant

knew he was not going to receive the money from his father.

¶ 62

Contractors began to file liens against the property. After a news story appeared

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on television regarding the Kentucky Building

, a lawyer called defendant and recommended he

file for bankruptcy.

¶ 63

On June 17, 2015, defendant filed a voluntary petit

ion for bankruptcy under

Chapter 7 ofthe Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101

et seq.(2008)). In his petition, he estimated

his assets as valued between $0 and $50,000 and

his liabilities between $100,001 to $500,000.

On September 28,2015, defendant was granted a

discharge in bankruptcy. On the back ofthe

order was a general summary ofthe bankruptcy

discharge. The order specifically stated that

"most fines, penalties, forfeitures, or criminal[-]restit

ution obligations" were not debts

discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.

¶ 64

On cross-examination, defendant testified he was

present when his father signed a

will leaving him $l 75,000. Defendant was told the mone

y was in bonds, which were kept in a

safe at his grandmother's house. Defendant's name

was on the bond. When asked why he did not

gain possession of the bonds upon his father's death

, defendant said it was his grandmother's

intent to honor his father's wishes. The money woul

d be used toward the purchase of another

property.

¶ 65

At no point during the process of applying for the

lenders about the inheritance "because (he] had

contractors the loan was his only source to pay

¶ 66

not received it." Defendant denied telling

them.

In January 2014, defendant's grandmother gave

home for him to reside in. In 2008 or 2009, his

microloan did defendant tell the

him $10,000 to purchase a mobile

grandmother gave him $30,000 to purchase a

vehicle.

¶ 67

On examination by the trial court, defendant testi

fied he did not know if the will

18a

had been probated. Defendant testifie

d he paid his grandmother back for

him for the car. Defendant affirmed he

contractors he had the loan; he did not

the $30,000 she gave

was required by the microloan commit

tee to tell

have to tell them they would or wou

ld not be paid from

the loan.

¶ 68

¶ 69

12.Rebuttal~cviaence

The State called multiple wifiesses in

a bell" about the possibility of a reality

rebuttal. Davis testified it did "kind of ring

television show. Davis, however, test

ified at no point was

it agreed part of his compensation cam

e from the exposure he would get on

Davis reported defendant told him he

the television show.

would be paid through the loan. Accord

ing to Davis,

defendant also stated,"When you're don

e the bank will come in and inspect the

work's done and

you'll be paid."

¶ 70

On examination by the trial court, Dav

is testified he did not agree to be filmed

interviewed for the television show, stat

ing "[t]hat was not even discussed." He

did not believe

he was video recorded.

¶ 71

Long testified, during his two or three

applying for the microloan, he did not tell

conversations with defendant regarding

defendant contractors had to be told of

the loan. Long was aware of no such requ

the existence of

irement and he was present at every meet

ing of the

loan committee that defendant attended

. Long did not hear any member of

the committee tell

defendant of such a requirement. Althou

gh he could not recall every conversation

defendant, Long testified he would have

requirement as "it's so unusual, I would

¶ 72

remembered a conversation involving

with

the alleged

remember if I did it."

Rogers and Culkin also testified of not

- 19-

19a

being aware of any such requirement.

¶ 73

The State sought to enter into evidence an audio recording of defendant's sworn

statements during bankruptcy proceedings. The proceeding was a meeting of the creditors and

defendant's statements were made under oath. After defense counsel agreed to the trial court

listening to the nearly hour-long recording in chambers, and afour-week adjournment of the

trial, the trial court listened to the audio recording.

¶ 74

At the bankruptcy proceeding, defendant testified to the following: He received a

letter dated February 24, 2015, signed by his stepmother Lisa. Earl Brown was defendant's

biological father. He died in August 2012. Earl had an insurance policy he promised defendant

would receive. Lisa was listed as the beneficiary. Defendant was not listed as a beneficiary.

Defendant stated he was to receive half of the funds or $150,000. There was nothing in writing.

Defendant had not seen the insurance policy. Defendant did not know why he had not received

the money. He did not know if he would. Whenever he asked Lisa about the money, she would

"break down" or say,"I've been busy." Defendant testified he had not seen a will. He believed

there was no will. He did not know if probate proceedings were started in Ohio upon Earl's

death. Lisa told defendant she had not received any money.

¶ 75

Defendant testified he believed he would receive his inheritance. Defendant said

the only way he could cover the payments to the contractors was with that money. Earl had eight

children. None of the other children were promised any proceeds from the life insurance. Lisa

knew defendant bought the Kentucky Building and planned to renovate the building. Defendant

stated the Kentucky Building property was worth $34,000.

¶ 76

Defendant testified he received $160,000 from the sale of the church property. He

believed $42,000 to $45,000 remained on the mortgage. There were no other liens or secured

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loans. Defendant paid $35,000 for the Kentucky Building.

¶ 77

Work had been done on the first floor ofthe Kentucky Building, includ

ing

demolition work and removing plaster from the walls. Molina

work from the microloan. Hesterberg Electric installed some

Masonry had been paid for the

electrical conduit but was not paid

for the work. The only other work done at the time of the bankru

ptcy proceedings was painting

by "Brad." Defendant paid "Brad"'a "couple hundred dollars" from defenda

nt's cleaning

business proceeds. Later, however, defendant stated Brad had not yet

¶ 78

started painting.

Defendant was living in the building at the time of the bankruptcy procee

dings.

He denied receiving letters from the Village of Rantoul telling him

he could not live in the

residence. Defendant made payments on his mortgage. When told the constru

ction permit for the

Kentucky Building expired, defendant stated he no longer needed one

as there was no work left

to be done.

¶ 79

¶ 80

B. Verdict

The trial court found no dispute defendant received the goods and services as

alleged in the complaint and he failed to pay fully for all of them. The court

"clearly intended to permanently deprive the respective owners of the

use

found defendant

or benefit of the

property." The court thus noted the sole issue in dispute was "wheth

er [defendant] knowingly

obtained these goods and services by deception." The court found the reason

ableness of any

belief defendant would obtain anything from his father in terms of inherit

ance "was fading by the

fall of 2014 when the bulk of the project, at least that part that is subject

to the 14 counts of the

complaint in this case, was alleged to have taken place." The court further

defendants testimony the funds from his previous rehab project were to

- 21 -

21a

found incredible

be used. The court noted

it listened to the audio recording of defendant's testimony from the bankruptcy proceedings,

when defendant was questioned "thoroughly" regarding "the disposition of the funds from the

sale" and defendant's explanation "was confusing and vague at best." The court addressed each

count individually and found defendant not guilty of a number of counts upon finding no

evidence in those counts to show defendant obtained those goods or services through deception.

This included count N,by which the State alleged defendant committed theft of property

exceeding $500 in value from Phoenix Insulation, Inc. The court found defendant guilty of

counts III, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX,X, XI, and XIV.

¶ 81

¶ 82

C. Sentence

At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a prison sentence offive years and

an order of restitution in the case. Defense counsel began argument by stating he was saddened

by the State's request for five years. Counsel argued the following;

"I said from the onset, you know,[defendant] should be

held liable in terms of, you know, paying these contractors back.

But right now we have a criminal justice that has 2.3 million

people incarcerated, your Honor, and if there is anyone deserving

of the opportunity to not go inside of a prison or a jail, it's

[defendant]. Prison doesn't get you better. ***

[Defendant] goes away for five years, the building is gone.

No one has it, right? It's absolutely gone."

Counsel further argued,"I would hope that even the contractors themselves don't want to see this

man go to prison. Yeah, they want to be paid back, but to see him go to prison?"

- 22-

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'~ 83

The trial court sentenced defendant to probation. On counts

which were convictions for theft of services having a value

of over $300, defendant was

sentenced to 12 months' probation. For counts VI, VIII, and

exceeding $500, defendant was sentenced to 30 months'

III, V, VII, X,and XI,

IX, convictions for theft of property

probation. On count XIV, defendant

was sentenced to 48 months' probation. The trial court also

ordered defendant to pay $95,331.10

in restitution. Of this amount,$3322 was ordered to be paid

to Phoenix Insulation.

¶ 84

This appeal followed.

¶ 85

II. ANALYSIS

¶ $6

A. Sufficiency ofthe Evidence

¶ 87

Defendant first challenges his convictions for counts III, VII, and

VIII, alleging

the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he knowi

ngly obtained services or products

by deception. Defendant's conviction on count III was for theft of

services having a value

exceeding $300; defendant's convictions on counts VII and VIII were

for theft of property

having a value exceeding $500.

¶ 88

Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support crimin

conviction, this court considers the evidence "in the light most

favorable to the prosecution" and

determines whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt."Ieople ~.~N aza, 215 Ill. 2d

317, 322, 830 N.E.2d 556, 559

(2005). In this undertaking, we examine the record as a whole

and

supporting the State's theory of the case. See i'eo~1e v .~Tlhee~er,

N.E.2d 728, 742(2007).

¶ 89

1. CountIlZ,T~ieft of Sez~ices

- 23 -

23a

essential elements of the

not simply the evidence

226 Ill. 2d 92, 117-18, 871

¶ 90

As to count III, defendant was convicted of theft of services

from Davis Floor

Sanding and Refinishing (see 720 ILCS S/16-3(a)(West 2014))

. Under section 16-3(a)(720

ILCS 5/16-3(a)(West 2014)), one "commits theft when he or

she knowingly obtains the

temporary use of *** services of another which are available only

deception or knowing that such use is without the consent of

for hire, by means of threat or

the person providing the ***

services." "Deception" is defined as to do the following "knowingly

"(a) Create or confirm another's impression which is false

and which the offender does not believe to be true; or

(b) Fail to correct a false impression which the offender

previously has created or confirmed; or

* **

(e)Promise performance which the offender does not

intend to perform or knows will not be performed. Failure to

perform standing alone is not evidence that the offender did not

intend to perform." 720 ILCS 5/15-4(a),(b),(e)(West 2014).

Defendant cites case law establishing the offense oftheft-by-d

eception requires proof the

defendant acted with "specific intent to defraud." Seel'eo~~e~.Rei

c~i, 241 Ill. App. 3d 666, 667,

670,610 N.E.2d 124, 125, 126-27(1993')(citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987,

ch. 38,¶ 16-1(b)(1)). The

State does not contradict defendant's conclusion regarding the

offense here, as theft of services

based on deception (see 720 ILCS 5/16-3(a)(West 2014)) also

requires proof defendant acted

with specific intent to defraud Davis Floor Sanding and Refini

shing.

¶ 91

Defendant argues there was no evidence the services of Davis

- 24-

24a

Floor Sanding and

Refinishing were provided as a result of deception or defendant specifi

cally intended to defraud

the company. Defendant emphasizes, while Davis's testimony establi

shed defendant told Davis

he would pay him from the proceeds of the microloan in November,

when the decision was made

to provide the services in January 2015, defendant said he had $31,00

0 set aside to pay for the

refinishing but did not state those funds would come from the microl

oan. Defendant further

emphasizes his testimony he believed he was to receive funds from

intended to pay Davis Floor Sanding and Refinishing from those

¶ 92

his father's estate and he

funds.

We find the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosec

ution,

sufficiently establishes defendant had the specific intent to defraud

Refinishing. That the microloan was not mentioned specifically in

Davis Floor Sanding and

January 2015 does not render

this element unproved. The testimony establishes on November 24,

2014, defendant told Davis

the floors would be paid for through a village loan. He mentioned no

other source of payment.

When the two met again, less than two months later, he said $31,000 was

set aside for floor

work. Defendant did not tell Davis the flooring would be paid for throug

h any other financial

source. The failure to "correct a false impression which the offender previo

usly has created"

sufficiently establishes deception. 720 ILCS 5/15-4(b)(West 2014). While

intended to pay for these services through an inheritance, the trial court

defendant testified he

plainly did not believe

him. This conviction is upheld.

¶ 93

¶ 94

2. CountVll,'Treft of Setv~ces

Defendant next argues the evidence was insufficient to establish he intend

ed to

deceive Stitt and New Age and, therefore, his conviction for count VII was improp

er. Defendant

emphasizes Stitt's decision not to require a deposit was not the product of decept

ion. He focuses

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25a

on the fact defendant paid Stitt's invoices and performed his part ofthe agreement until the loan

fund was nearly exhausted.

¶ 95

We disagree. The evidence establishes Stitt would not have agreed to perform the

services had he not been told ofthe microloan fund. That defendant paid part of the invoices

does not lead to the conclusion defendant intended to pay Stitt fully and, therefore, was not

acting to deceive him. Instead, in the light most favorable to the State, this conduct shows

defendant wanted New Age to continue working on the Kentucky Building. New Age performed

work over several months. The July 24, 2014, invoice for "Site Work week 1," in the amount of

$3500, was paid. The August 1, 2014, invoice for $1500 was also paid. New Age continued to

work on the Kentucky Building, performing framing work, installing drywall, and building

stairs. When presented with the October 6,2014, invoice, defendant did not pay the entire

invoice. Stitt and defendant worked out an agreement. Defendant paid for the materials and

would pay for the labor when the work was completed. New Age continued to work. Defendant

then refused to pay the December 18, 2018, invoice, totaling $5100, asserting no money was left.

As defendant continued to have Stitt work for him, the microloan funds were dwindling and he

was acquiring debt to other contractors, such as Contractor Services. As of October 10, 2014,

when the agreement with Stitt was renegotiated, approximately $3700 of the microloan

remained. The evidence sufficiently established the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt

defendant intended to deceive Stitt and New Age to acquire services from them.

¶ 96

3. Coun~VZ11,T~iefti of4Yo~ez~y

¶ 97

a. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 98

Defendant next argues the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

- 26-

26a

doubt of theft of property from Contractor Services. Defendant argues there was no fraudulent

representation on his part and no evidence the products Contractor Services provided were given

as a result of that deception or that he had the specific intent to defraud Contractor Services.

Defendant emphasizes Rudin, an owner of Contractor Services, stated, regarding the deposit, he

"assumed that it would be taken care of."

¶ 99

Defendant's emphasis on he "assumed that it would be taken care of is

misleading as Rudin expressly testified he would not have provided the property had he not been

informed of the microloan and, after he asked how defendant "was getting the money,"

defendant said he was getting money from the Village of Rantoul. There is sufficient evidenc

from which it may be determined the misrepresentation was the reason Rudin and Contractor

Services entered into the agreement with defendant and installed their equipment.

¶ 100

In addition, there is ample evidence defendant had the specific intent to defraud

Rudin. As of November 2014, when defendant first contacted Contractor Services to contract for

over $6000 of goods and services, less than $3700 remained in the microloan. Defendant had

failed to pay at least one other contractor(New Age in October 2014), and defendant continued

to gain services and products from other contractors. There is ample evidence undermining

defendant's alleged belief he would receive funds from his father's estate. No contractor stated

defendant mentioned the inheritance as the means of paying for services. Earl died in December

2012, and defendant had not yet received funds from his father's estate. Testimony from the trial

and the bankruptcy proceedings was inconsistent as to whether Earl had a will and whether the

funds were from insurance proceeds or bonds. Given these inconsistencies, the trial court

reasonably did not believe him.

-27-

27a

¶ 101

¶ 102

b. Misdemeanor

Defendant argues, in the alternative, his conviction for count VIII should be

reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor because the State failed to establish he stole property

valued at more than $500, an element of the offense. Defendant acknowledges the exhibits

introduced by the State show Contractor Services performed work on the Kentucky Building but

emphasizes those exhibits fail to differentiate between the value of the property defendant was

convicted of taking and the services provided. Defendant reasons, because there was no proof of

the value of the property taken, an element of the offense, his conviction for theft of property

exceeding $500 cannot stand and must be reduced.

¶ 103

Theft of property under section 16-1(a)(2) ofthe Criminal Code of2012(720

ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(West 2014))is a Class 3 felony if the value of the property taken exceeds

$500 but is less than $10,000(720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(4)(West 2014)). However, if the value

not exceed $500 and the theft of property does not occur "from the person," then the theft

does

is a

Class A misdemeanor. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(1)(West 2014).

¶ 104

The State concedes no evidence was presented to show the property involved in

the installation of the vacuum system and shelving exceeded $500 and defendant's convictio

should be reduced to a Class A misdemeanor. While evidence demonstrated the total owed

Contractor Services approached $6000, there was no division of the parts and labor.

¶ 105

We accept the State's concession the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt defendant committed theft of property over $500. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2),

(b)(4)(West 2014). We further accept both parties' concession the evidence is sufficient

establish misdemeanor theft. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2),(b)(1). We therefore reduce

- 28

28a

defendant's

conviction from theft of property exceeding $500 to misdemeano

r theft and remand the cause to

the trial court for resentencing on the lesser charge. Seei'eop~e

~.Rowe», 229 Ill. 2d 82, 101,

890 N.E.2d 487,498 (2008)(reducing the conviction from felony

retail theft to misdemeanor

retail theft and remanding for resentencing).

¶ 106

B. Defendant's Right to Be Present

¶ 107

Defendant next argues plain error occurred when his right to be presen

t at all

critical stages of trial was violated. Defendant contends the trial

audio recording of the bankruptcy proceeding, even with trial

court's private listening to an

counsel's consent, denied him a

fair trial. Defendant acknowledges the issue was not preserved for

4eop~e v .Lucas,2019 IL App (1st) l 60501, 14 l N.E.3d 341,

our review but asserts, under

should reverse under the

plain-error doctrine.

¶ 108

Under the plain-error doctrine, a clear or obvious error forfeit

ed below maybe

remedied on appeal if(1)the evidence was closely balanced

or(2) the error was sufficiently

grave it affected the fairness of the trial and challenged the integri

ty of the judicial process.

People v .T~om~Qson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613, 939 N.E.2d 403,

413 (2010). The first task in

plain-error analysis is consideration of whether a clear or obviou

s error occurred.Id. The burden

of proving such error falls on defendant.~eo~~e v .Keizon, 215

Ill. 2d 167, 187, 830 N.E.2d 467,

479-80 (2005).

¶ 109

The clear or obvious error complained of allegedly occurred when

upon defense counsel's express agreement, listened to an audio

the trial court,

recording of defendant's

testimony during the bankruptcy proceeding. A defendant's genera

l right to be present at all

critical stages of criminal proceedings, from arraignment to

- 29-

29a

sentencing, is guaranteed by both the

Illinois and United States Constitutions.4eop~ev.Z.inclsey, 201 Ill. 2d 45,55, 772 N.E.2d 1268,

1275 (2002). Case law shows the analysis of whether a defendant has been denied the right

generally involves two considerations:(1) whether the criminal proceeding at issue is a "critical

stage" and (2) whether defendant's denial of that right is an error for which reversal is required.

See id.(considering whether the jury waiver was a critical stage of proceedings); see also Lucas,

2019 IL App (1st) 160501,¶¶ 5, 14(evaluating whether defendant was denied her right to be

present when a video of her arrest was viewed during trial outside her presence). Here, the

parties do not dispute the trial court's listening to an audio recording of defendant's testimony

occurred during a critical stage of proceedings. We note such an argument could reasonably have

been made. See4eo~Q~e v . Groebe, 2019 IL App (1st) 180503, ¶¶ 51-52, 145 N.E.3d 411 (finding

the defendant's presence at the trial court's in cameza viewing of a traffic stop and arrest during

trial was not at a critical stage of the proceedings as the officer testified to the events and

accuracy of the video and the defendant was able to cross-examine the officer and argue

regarding the contents of the video);4eople v .R~c~iazasoq 2021 IL App (1st) 190821, ¶¶ 2, 61

(finding the defendant was not denied his right to be present when the trial court viewed

videotaped evidence ~n cameza during a pretrial hearing upon concluding the viewing did not

occur at a critical stage of proceedings);I'eop~e v .Young, 2013 IL App (4th) 120228, ¶¶ 24-25,

996 N.E2d 671 (same); cf.lucas, 2019 IL App (1st) 160501, ¶ 5 (distinguishingYoung on the

basis the in cameza viewing ofthe video was for the purposes of establishing admissibility at trial

and not the "actual offer as substantive evidence"). However, because such argument was not

raised or countered and the matter may be readily resolved based on consideration of whether

defendant was denied a fair trial, we make no determination on this ground.

- 30-

30a

¶ 110

The Supreme Court of Illinois has held "even where a defendant has the general

right to be present because the proceeding is a `critical' stage, a defendant's absence is not a

fez se constitutional violation" and "a defendant's absence from such a proceeding will violate

his constitutional rights only if the record demonstrates that defendant's absence caused the

proceeding to be unfair or if his absence resulted in a denial of an underlying substantial right."

ti~nasey, 201 Ill. 2d at 57. The question of whether the fairness of the trial was affected by the

defendant's absence from part of the trial, must be considered based on the record as a whole.lcl.

We note defense counsel cannot waive a defendant's right to be present on the defendant's

behalf. See4eople~.Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 66, 740 N.E.2d 782, 797 (2000).

¶l1l

Defendant contends, under Lofton, reversible error is established when the record

as a whole shows "the defendant's presence at the proceeding would have contributed to his

opportunity to defend himself against the charges."Id. at 67. Defendant maintains his presence at

the listening to the audio recording would have unquestionably allowed him to contribute to his

defense.

¶ 112

Defendant's argument is based on a misapplication ofLoftioz~. In Lofton, the court

was asked to determine whether defendant was denied his right to be present during a hearing

conducted pursuant to section 115-10(b)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963(725

ILCS 5/115-10(b)(1)(West 1996)), a hearing to determine whether to admit an out-of-court

statement by an alleged victim of predatory sexual assault. SeeLofto~,, 194 Ill. 2d at 62-64. The

I.,oftion court considered whether "the defendant's presence at the proceeding would have

contributed to his opportunity to defend himself against the charges" in deciding whether the

hearing at issue occurred during a "critical stage." See id. at 73. After finding defendant's

- 31-

31a

presence would have contributed to his opportunity to defend

himself, the court then turned to

the question of whether defendant was denied a fair trial: "By

the time trial began and [the)

defendant was present to defend against the charges, it was

admissibility of[the alleged victim's) hearsay statements,

too late for him to protest the

damaging in the extreme to his

defense."Id. at 72. The court found reversal warranted after

not only finding the defendant's

presence would have contributed to his opportunity to defend

himsel

f but also after finding due

process was denied:

"Because the record indicates that defendant's presence at the

section 115-10 hearing would have contributed to the fairness of

the criminal proceeding against him and that a fair and just hearin

was thwarted by his absence, we conclude that the section 115-10

hearing was a stage critical to the outcome of the criminal

proceeding at which defendant had a right to be present. Hence we

are brought to the conclusion that defendant's absence resulted in

his being denied a fair and just trial, thereby violating his due

process right of presence."(Emphasis added.)Id. at 72-73.

¶ 113

Contrary to defendant's contention,Lofton shows defendant, to prevai

l, must

establish both the alleged error occurred during a critical stage

of proceedings, as defendant's

presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procee

ding, and he was denied a fair and

just trial. We thus turn to the question of whether defendant has

established he was denied a fair

trial when the trial court listened to the audio recording in defend

ant's absence.

¶ 114

In his appellant briefs, defendant relies heavily on the decision

- 32 -

32a

in Lucas to support

his claim he was denied the right to a fair trial. InZ.ucas, a bench

trial was held on the charges

the defendant committed, among other offenses, driving under the

influence of alcohol and

misdemeanor resisting a peace officer.Lucas, 2019 IL App (1st) 16050

1, ¶¶ 1, 4. Before

witnesses were called, the State sought to publish a video of the

defendant's traffic stop captured

by an officer's squad car.Id.¶ 5. The parties stipulated to the authen

ticity of the video.ld. The

trial court then addressed the defendant, telling her, because the

courtroom did not have video

capabilities, he would view the video in chambers in the presence

of the attorneys.lcl. The court

asked the defendant if she understood and the defendant replied she

recessed the proceedings to watch the video in chambers.la.¶¶

¶ 115

did.lcl. The court then

5-6.

On appeal inlucas, the majority found the defendant's right to be presen

t was

denied as the fairness of the proceedings was undermined when the defend

ant was unable to

view the evidence against her and aid in her own defense.1c1. ¶ 14.

Notably, the court highlighted

the fact the defendant could not hear or see the evidence presented

in chambers and the evidence

did not show the defendant "viewed the video before trial."la.¶ 16.

The court further found the

defendant's absence impacted a fundamental right; the right to testify

on her own behalf.la.

¶ 19. Because "[t]he violation of[the defendant's] right to be presen

t had a cascading impact on

fundamental rights," the majority found second-prong plain error and

reversed the defendant's

convictions.Ia. ¶ 21.

¶ 116

In this case, there are marked differences in the underlying facts render

ing the

defendant's reliance onZ,Ucas unpersuasive. First, the video inZ.oc

as captured (1)an interaction

between the defendant and a police officer and (2)the events leadin

g to an arrest for driving

while under the influence—events recorded from a point of view not

- 33-

33a

shared by the Lucas

defendant. Thelucas defendant may not have obser

ved events contained in the video recording

and, because ofthe under the influence charges, may

not have fully recalled or remembered

others. In contrast, here, the audio recording was

of defen

dant's sworn statements during a

bankruptcy proceeding—an event of which defendant

indication he was "under the influence" at the time

had firsthand knowledge and there is no

of the recording. Second, in Lucas,the record

establishes the defendant learned of the trial court's decis

ion to view the video recording in

chambers immediately before it was to be viewed outsi

de of her presence.Ia. ¶ 5. Here,

however, defendant had over four weeks between the

notice that the audio recording would be

heard outside his presence and the day the trial court listen

ed to the audio recording. At the trial,

on Apri] 11, 2017, during the State's presentation of rebuttal

evidence, the State indicated it

would introduce the audio recording from the bankruptcy proce

eding. The record shows the

audio recording was produced during discovery. Defen

se counsel agreed to the State's

stipulation the audio recording was a true and accurate

recording of defendant's testimony at the

bankruptcy proceeding. When the trial resumed on May 10,

listened to the audio recording the night before. The

2017, the trial court indicated it

record demonstrates the audio recording was

provided during discovery, defendant was present durin

g these discussions, and defendant had

ample opportunity to revisit his sworn testimony, of which

he had firsthand knowledge, to aid in

his defense.

¶ 117

Given the record, we find defendant has not shown the

denial of the right to be

present resulted in an unfair trial or impeded another const

itutional right, such as the right to aid

in his defense or to choose not to testify on his own

behalf. Defendant has not established he was

denied a fair trial and thus, we find no clear error occur

red.

- 34-

34a

¶ 118

C. The Effect of the Bankruptcy Discharg

¶ 119

Defendant next argues his defense coun

sel was ineffective for failing to challeng

the restitution order. Defendant argu

es the bankruptcy discharge ofthe debts

contractor-creditors prevented the trial

he owed to the

court from ordering defendant to pay rest

itution to those

contractors for their losses. Defendant

main

tains the case lies at the intersection of bank

ruptcy

law and criminal-sentencing law and the

disc

harge of his debts, the debts for which resti

tution

was ordered, barred the trial court from orde

ring restitution in this case. Thus, defense

counsel

was ineffective for not challenging the resti

tution award.

¶ 120

The case law establishes atwo-part test to

denied the effective assistance of counsel. A

determine whether a defendant was

defendant must prove(1) his or her counsel'

representation fell below an objective stan

dard of reasonableness and (2) there exists a

reasonable probability the proceeding's outc

ome, absent counsel's error, would have been

different.Peoplev.Young, 341 Ill. App. 3d 379,

proving ineffectiveness falls on defendant.

383, 79 N.E.2d 468,472 (2003). The burden

See Sfz~cklancl v .~N as~ci~ngton, 466 U.S. 668,

(1984)((holding "the defendant must s~io

w that

687

counsel's performance was deficient" and "the

defendant must s1~ow that the deficient perf

ormance prejudiced the defense")(Empha

ses

added.)). The failure to prove either prong of

ineffective.4eoplev.McGatih, 2017 IL App

¶ 121

this test precludes a finding counsel was

(4th) 150608, ¶ 37,83 N.E.3d 671.

In this case, defendant has not met his burd

en of establishing the first prong of his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as he

has not established the Bankruptcy Code's

discharge precludes this State's courts fro

m imposing restitution orders during sentenci

ng to

compensate victims for debts unlawfully obta

ined. To support his argument, defendant

- 35 -

35a

cites

multiple cases regarding the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but he cites only two

cases that have considered whether a trial court can order restitution following a conviction in a

criminal proceeding for a debt discharged in bankruptcy. Defendant cites ~ri~tea States v .

Cazson, 669 F.2d 216(5th Cir. 1982), andUri~ted States v . A~exancler, 743 F.2d 472(7th Cir.

1984). Neither supports defendant's claim.

¶ 122

In both Carson and A~exanaet, the courts found restitution orders could be made

following a conviction in a criminal proceeding for debts discharged in bankruptcy. In CaYson,

the defendant secured a loan through false pretenses. Cazson, 669 F.2d at 217. In 1979, that debt

was discharged in bankruptcy, but in 1980 the defendant was convicted of making a false

statement to secure that loan and then ordered, as a condition of probation, to provide restitution

to the victim of his crime.la. The court observed the defendant's claim the bankruptcy's

discharge of the debt precluded the order of restitution "rciigllt have some appeal" if the primary

goal "ofthe probation condition were to make the bank whole."(Emphasis added.)ld. The court

found the probation condition of restitution served a rehabilitative purpose "by strengthening the

individual's sense of responsibility."(Internal quotation marks omitted.)la. at 218. The court

further noted that"`conditioning probation on making restitution also protects the community's

interests in having the victims of crime made whole.'"Id.(quotingiluggetty .Skate, 266

N.W.2d 403,407(Wis. 1978)). The Cazson court concluded the discharge of the defendant's

debt to the victim did not foreclose the district court from conditioning probation on restitution.

Id.

¶ 123

In Alexanclez, the defendant was ordered to pay restitution for a debt incurred

under a scheme to defraud as a condition of his sentence of probation. A~exanaez, 743 F.2d at

- 36-

36a

473-74. The Seventh Circuit, while not "in

result "eminently correct."Id. at 480. The

Congress intended to preventjudges from

full agreement" with the analysis in Cars

on, found its

court concluded the following, finding no

indication

ordering restitution in sentencing:

"The trial judge specifically noted `that resti

tution is a critical

element of the rehabilitation process that

I think has to occur in this

case.' Although imposition of a fine may

have the same pecori~ary

effect as restitution on the probationer,

the re~iabilitati~e effect. may

well be augmented by the act of making one'

s victims whole. We

discern nothing in the bankruptcy code that

evinces a

congressional intent to prevent sentencing judg

es from imposing

such potentially rehabilitative probation cond

itions."(Emphases in

original.)Id.

¶ 124

Thus, the only two cases relied upon by defe

ndant show the Bankruptcy Code

should not be read so broadly as to limit cour

ts from imposing restitution.

¶ 125

Defendant argues, however, Alexander sho

ws restitution is permissible only when

the purpose of the restitution is rehabilitative.

Defendant contends the trial court did not

make a

finding the restitution ordered in this case serv

ed that purpose and highlights language show

ing

the court ordered restitution, despite question

ing the State about the application of the

Bankruptcy Code, to make the victims whole:

"[O]ne of my goals in sentencing in a case such

this is to see that any contractors or other vict

ims are made whole to the—to the extent that

possible." Defendant argues this is an end-run

¶ 126

that's

around the bankruptcy judgment.

We disagree that A~exanaer should be read

- 37 -

37a

so narrowly. Alexanclez does not hold

restitution may be ordered only when the trial court specifies the purpose of the imposition of

restitution is rehabilitative. Instead, the court's analysis, like that in Cazson(see Caison., 669 F.2d

at 218), shows restitution is by nature rehabilitative. The Alexander court pointed to the trial

judge's language stating "restitution is a critical element of the rehabilitation process that I think

has to occur in this case" and observed "the Yehabi~i~ative effect may well be augmented by the

act of making one's victims whole."(Emphasis in original.) A~exanaec, 743 F.2d at 480. The

court also found "nothing in the bankruptcy code that evinces a congressional intent to prevent

sentencing judges from imposing such potentially rehabilitative probation conditions."1d.If

restitution has a rehabilitative effect, then it follows a trial court's comment it seeks to make the

victims whole does not negate that effect and the cases relied upon by defendant thus support a

finding the Bankruptcy Code does not bar the order mandating restitution to the wronged

contractors.

¶ 127

The authority relied upon by defendant permits the action which he argues is

barred. Defendant has thus not shown the discharge barred the order of restitution and, therefore,

cannot prove counsel provided ineffective assistance by not challenging the order in the trial

court.

¶ 128

¶ 129

D. Restitution for Debt to Phoenix Insulation

Defendant next asks this court to vacate the restitution order to Phoenix Insulation

as he was acquitted of committing theft from Phoenix Insulation. Defendant acknowledges this

error was not raised below but contends we may correct the error as plain error or by finding

counsel's failure to raise the issue to be a denial of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

¶ 130

The State urges this court to deny the relief defendant seeks, arguing defendant

38a

invited the error to occur. The State contends defense counsel argued at sentencing restitution

should be ordered to all contractors to avoid a prison sentence. The State, citing 4eo~~e v .

Racci~zez, 2013 IL App (4th) 121153, ¶ 79, 996 N.E.2d 1227, emphasizes "invited errors are not

subject to plain-error review."

¶ 131

We are not convinced defendant invited this alleged error. The State made a

similar argument in response to defendant's contention the restitution order was barred by the

discharge.of his debts under the Bankruptcy Code. As to that issue, the State maintained

defendant should not have been permitted to agree to restitution, when the trial court showed

concern about the effect ofthe bankruptcy discharge, in an attempt to avoid imprisonment and

then be allowed on appeal to have the restitution order vacated. Had we not rejected defendant's

claim due to his failure to show error, this argument would likely have carried weight in the

analysis of that claim. See generally In re V ik,45 B.R. 64,69(N.D. Iowa 1984)("An individual

on the one hand, should not be allowed to avoid incarceration by agreeing to make restitution

and then on the other, seek to avoid a significant portion of his penal obligations merely by filing

bankruptcy.").

¶ 132

As to this issue, however, the record does not show defendant invited the error of

a criminal sentence of restitution on a count for which he was acquitted. Unlike the

discharge/bankruptcy argument, there is no indication the trial court or the parties were aware a

sentence of restitution was proposed or being imposed despite the absence of a crime against

Phoenix Insulation. In addition, it is unlikely counsel decided to include the restitution for the

debt to Phoenix Insulation, in the amount of $3322, in his attempt to avoid imprisonment when

over $90,000 in restitution would be ordered. The general invitation to impose restitution as to

- 39-

39a

all contractors to avoid a prison sentence was not an invitation to impose restitution on offenses

defendant did not commit.

¶ 133

Turning to defendant's argument, under the plain-error doctrine, sentencing errors

are reviewable though raised for the first time on appeal if(1)the evidence is closely balanced or

(2)the error is sufficiently grave it deprived defendant of a fair sentencing hearing.4eople v .

~Ni~l~ams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 16, 99 N.E.3d 590. Defendant carries the burden of

establishing the docfine applies.Id.

¶ 134

The first step in plain-error analysis is determining whether clear error occurred.

4eo~Q~ev.4ia~kowsk~, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403,410-11 (2007). Here, we find clear

error occurred."`It is well established that a court may not impose restitution for charges upon

which a defendant is acquitted.' "~eo~Q1e v . C~ause~~, 385 Ill. App. 3d ]079, 1081, 904 N.E.2d

108, 110(2008)(quoting4eop~e~.Owens, 323 Ill. App. 3d 222, 234, 753 N.E.2d 513, 523

(2001)). It was error for the trial court to order restitution to Phoenix Insulation when Phoenix

Insulation was not the victim of a crime for which defendant was convicted.

¶ 135

We further agree with defendant the second prong of the plain-error doctrine

applies. It is difficult to imagine a more serious threat to the fairness of a sentencing hearing than

to allow the imposition of a criminal sentence when no conviction occurred. We therefore vacate

the order of restitution to Phoenix Insulation.

¶ 136

¶ 137

III. CONCLUSION

We reduce defendant's conviction on count VIII to misdemeanor theft, affirm

defendant's other convictions, vacate the restitution order to Phoenix Insulation, and remand for

resentencing on count VIII.

-40-

40a

¶ 138

Affirmed as modified and vacated in part.

¶ 139

Cause remanded with directions.

¶ 140

NSTICE STEIGMANN,specially concurring:

¶ 141

I completely agree with my distinguished colleagues in the majority regarding

their analysis of a defendant's right to be present at all critical stages of trial. I specially concur

only because the matter at issue in this case—namely,the trial judge's private listening to an

audio recording of the bankruptcy proceedings—did not constitute a critical stage of trial.

Indeed, the trial judge's doing so constituted no hearing at all.

¶ 142

A fundamental difference exists between this case, on the one hand, and Lucas

and all the other cases defendant cites, on the other. That difference is that in the present

the trial judge was considering evidence that had a~reacly been aaili~tted, as opposed

case,

to all of the

other cases in which the defendant was not present (for whatever reason) at a time the evidence

was pzesentea.

¶ 143

Especially given that this was a bench trial, a defendant has no right to be present

when the trial judge considers and evaluates (as trier offact) evidence that had already been

admitted, such as the audio of the bankruptcy proceedings in this case. After all, under these

circumstances, there is no possibility that defendant's presence or absence could in any way

affect the trial judge's consideration of the admitted evidence.

¶ 144

Even in Lucas, the case defendant primarily relies upon, the First District

correctly quotes the United States. Supreme Court in l~.en~vcky v.StinceY, 482 U.S. 730(1987),

that"`a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceedi

that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.'

- 41

41a

(Emphasis omitted.) Lucas,2019 IL App (1st) 160501,¶ 12(quoting Stincez, 482 U.S. at 745).

TheZ.ucas court then goes on to write that "[w]hether a defendant's absence affects the trial's

fairness depends on an assessment of the whole record; analysis `turn[sJ on the nature of the

hearing from which the defendant ha[s] been excluded.'"1d.¶ 13 (quoting~eople v .1,ofto~c~,

194 Ill. 2d 40,68, 740 N.E.2d 782,798 (2000)).

¶ 145

Technically speaking, no "hearing" ever occurred in the present case from which

defendant had been excluded; a trial judge's consideration of already admitted evidence does not

constitute a "hearing." This is in addition to the earlier point that there is no chance that

defendant's presence or absence could possibly affect the fairness of the procedure.

¶ l46

Perhaps another way of considering this point is to imagine a scenario (possibly it

,could have happened even in this case, given all of the evidence about how the proposed

remodeling was supposed to have come about) in which the State offered 160 pages of

documents pertaining to the proposed remodeling project. Assume in this scenario that the

defendant in this bench trial did not bother to challenge the foundation of the documents

(because doing so would have been fruitless) and stipulated that the judge as trier of fact could

consider all of them in reaching his decision as to defendant's guilt. Assume further that the trial

judge then decided to either(1)review the documents in chambers with his feet up while

drinking a cup of coffee or(2) to take the matter under advisement, during which time the judge

would review these documents at his leisure and then ultimately announce his decision.

¶ 147

Under the foregoing scenario, an argument that the defendant was denied his

right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings—namely, when the judge was

considering this admitted evidence—would simply make no sense at all. Yet, that is essentially

- 42-

42a

what happened in this case. After all, the audio recording of

been admitted into evidence, and the parties even agreed

the bankruptcy proceedings had

the judge could consider the recording

in chambers. Even absent this agreement to do so, the judge

acted entirely appropriately by

reviewing the audio recording in chambers.

¶ 148

And what sense does it make to claim that a defendant has a right

to be present

while the trial judge, sitting as trier of fact, reviews already admit

ted evidence? Going back to

the scenario I just posed, could anyone really argue that a defen

dant had a constitutional right to

be present at this so-called "critical stage of the trial" so defen

dant could watch the judge as he

reviews these 160 documents on the bench?

¶ 149

Last, I believe that the First District decision inlucas was

Although the proposed Rule 23 order does a good job of distin

wrongly decided.

guishing it (see supra ¶ 116), I

agree with Justice Lavin's dissent in Lucas.

- 43 -

43a

~....

,~~oi~ e

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

200 East Capitol Avenue

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701-1721

(217) 782-2035

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE

160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor

Chicago, IL 60601-3103

(312)793-1332

TDD:(312)793-6185

November 24, 2021

In re:

Peopie State of Illinois, respondent, v. Chuck Duckworth,

petitioner. Leave to appeal, Appellate Court, Fourth Distri

ct.

127723

The Supreme Court today DENIED the Petition for Leav

e to Appeal in the above

entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate

Court on 12/29/2021.

Very truly yours,

~~~~~ ~~~

Clerk of the Supreme Court

44a

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH NDICIAL CIRCU

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY,ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiffs,

-vs-

No. 2016-CF-443

CHUCK DUCKWORTH,

Defendant.

SENTENCING ORDER

The People appear by Assistant State's Attorney, Joel Fletche

The Defendant appears personally and by counsel, Jarntt

Adams and Shavonna Hunter.

OCT~0201~

~i~LL O~S

GN COUMY.

THE COURT having previously fund that the Defendant

committed the C1~Rs A misdemeanor ~ffensev ~fTheft ofService

s As get

forth in Counts 3,5, 7, l0,and 11,as amended this date;

the Class 3 offense of Theft ofProperty Exceeding $500,as set forth

Counts 6, 8, and 9; and the Class 2 offense ofTheft of

Property Exceeding $10,000 is value, as sei forth in Count 14.

The October

20, 2017,judgment of acquittal stands as to Counts 1,

2,4, 12, and 13.

The Court having considered the presentence report, the

evidence presented, the recommendations of the attorneys, and

the

statement of the defendant, the factors in aggravation

and mitigation as set forth in sections 5/5-3.2 and S/5-3.1 ofthe Unified

Code

ofCorrections as well as those set forth in section S/6-1 of

such code, hereby orders that:

JUDGMENT

Judgment is entered on counts 3,5,6, 7,8,9, 10, 11,

and 14 in favor of the People and against the Defendant on finding of

s guilt

and for costa. The Defendant is hereby ordered to:

PROBA O

204

Serve a period of 12 months Probation on Counts 3,5,7, 10, and 11;

30 months of probation on Counts 6,8, and 9;

and 48 months of robation on Count 14. All robation sentences

are to be served concurrentl .

subiect to the followine standard rules and conditions of probation:

a. that the Defendant not violate any criminal statute of anyjurisdi

ction

b. that the Defendant report in person to the Champaign County Court

Services Department twice per month or

more or less often or in a different fashion, as that department

might direct in writing

c. that the Defendant refrain from possessing a firearm or other

dangerous weapon

d. that the Defendant not leave the State without the consent of

the Court or,in circumstances in which the reason

for the absence is of such an emergency nature that Prior ennsrnt

~f the C'rnirt is nit po~.4ihic, withnnt the prig

notification ofthe Defendant's Probation Officer

e. that the Defendant pernut the Probation Officer to visit him at

his home or elsewhere to the extent necessary to

discharge his duties

f. that the Defendant advise the Probation Officer immediately writing

ofany change ofresidence,school, or

employment

g. that the Defendant refrain from possessing or having in his body the

presence ofany alcohol or illicit drug

prohibited by the Carmabis Control Act, the Controlled Substances Act

or the Methamphetamine Control and

Community Protection Act, unless prescribed by a physician and submit

to random bodily fluid and/or breath

testing at the request of his Probation Officer

h. that the Defendant attend and participate in such counseling, treaune

nt or educational programs as mey be

directed in writing by a Probation Officer and abide by all rules, regulat

ions and directions ofany such program

i. that the Defendant support his dependents

j. that the Defendant, if not employed, obtain and maintain employment

k. Sign all authorizations for release of information requested by

the Court Services Department to enable said

agency to monitor compliance with terms ofprobation

FINANCIAL QBLIOATIONS

All financial obligations shall be paid to the Champaign

County Circuit Clerk within 42 months, in monttily installments to be

determined by the Court Services Department. Any bond posted

is to be applied first to any court ordered bond assignment on

file and then to all restitution ordered and then to all financi

al obligations in this case. Any remaining bond shall be discharged to

the individual who posted the bond. The Defendant shall

pay all fines, fees and costs as authorized by statute.

~~~~~,,.~~t

45a

801

Pa a local and-crime Crime SW

852

Pa a Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act fee.

800

Pa a Probation service fee fixed in the amount of$15 er month.

302

Defendant is to pay a total of595,331.10 in restitution. Payments are to be distributed on a pro rata basis, when

received, as follows:

$20,195.00 - Davis Floor Sanding end Refinishing, 1727 County Road 1550 N,Urbana,

Illinois 61802

rs assessment fce of $10.00.

$3322.00 - Phoenix Insulation, LLC,PO Box 6148, Champaign, Illinois 61826

56964.95 -Good Vibes, Inc., 1501 North Prospect, Champaign,Illinois 61820

$5100.00 -Ryan Stitt, 333 Birch Lane, Oakwood,Illinois 61858

56145.85 -Contractor Services for Illinois, LLC, 1 l5 West Palls, Paxtoq Illinois 60957

$8225.00 -Classic Granite and Marble, 1901 West Springer Drive, Champaign,Illinois 61821

$9100.00 -Victor Treat and Sons,Inc., 1908 East Airport Road, Urbana,Illinois 61802

$4445.30 -Richard Roth, 19541,East Via Park Street, Queen Cceek, Arizona 85142

$31 833.00 -Lanz Heatin & Coolin Inc. 2718 Hundman Drive C

854

Illinois 61822

Pay a genetic marker grouping analysis fee of$250.00,in accordance with 730 ILCS S/5-4-3(j), unless Defendant

has ahead done so.

BLIt3ATl NS

S00

Submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue to the Illinois Department of State Police in accordance with 730 ILCS

5/3~-2 unless the Defendant has ahead done so.

209

Perform 200 hours of public service work under the supervisiop of We Champaign County Court Services Department,

within the first 30 months ofsentence. The Defendant is to be given credit on Public Service'Work for any hours

completed in education, treatment, aftercare, sobriety based self-help group mcetings, Victim Impact Panel, and G.E.D.

classes.

403

Obtain an evaluation for alcohol and drug abuse within 60 days from an agency or agent recommended by the Court

Services D artmen and follow an recommendations contained therein as to treatment and/or counselin .

402

Obtain a mental health evaluation within 60 days from an agency or agent recommended by the Court Services

D artmen and follow an recommendations contained therein as to treatment and/or counselin .

Make reasonable efforts to obtain a GED or hi

school di loma.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

804

Date

The Defendant has been advised ofthe rights ofa Defendant under Supreme Court Rule 605 and the court finds that the

Defendant understands those rights.

/~ - ~0 - I

Entered

46a

~~T

4 tt~~i.+tF~"~

47a

Page

Date 1/03/2019

Time 11/32/20

$20,195.00

$9,100.00

$8,225.00

DAVIS FLOOR SANDING AND REFINI

1727 COUNTY ROAD 1550 N

URBANA

IL 61802-0000

VICTOR TREAT AND SONS, INC

1908 EAST AIRPORT

URBANA

IL 61802-0000

CLASSIC GR1\NITE AND MARBLE

1901 WfiST SPRINGER DRIVE

CHAMPAIGN

IL 61821-0000

002

003

009

$31,833.00

LANZ HEATING AND COOLING, INC

2718 HDNDMAN DRIVE

CHAMPAIGN

IL 61822-0000

001

Amount

$97,223.10

TOTAL

Restitution Payments

$95,331.10

$15.00

$25.00

$15.00

$100.00

$25.00

$50.00

$90.00

$18.00

$1Q.00

$10.00

$720.00

$90.00

$250.00

$5.00

$89.00

$100.00

$90.00

$15.00

$90.00

$135.00

5110

5310

6707

5200

5220

5240

5320

5280

5283

5480

5279

5450

5452

5532

5317

5800

5501

6703

6704

5314

5422

Amount

$.00

Payments

$97,223.10

$95,331.10

$15.00

$25.00

$15.00

$100.00

$25.00

$50.00

$40.00

$18.00

$10.00

$720.00

$90.00

$250.00

$5.00

$89.dQ

$100.00

$90.00

$15.00

$90.00

$135.00

Balance

Hond Original..

$.00

Hond Transfers.

$.00

Bond Total.....

$.00

Bond Applied...

$.00

Bond Refund....

$.00

Hond Balance...

$.00

Agency=268 CHAMPAIGN COUNTY SHE

Class: 2 Fine: 9 Manual Calculation

Seq

•RESTITUTION AMOUNT

DOCUMENT STORAGE

E-CITATION

AUTOMATION

CIRCUIT CLERK FEE

COURT SfiC[JRITY

COURT FT_NANCE FEE

STATES ATTORNEY

STATES ATTORNEY AUTOMATION

CRIME STOPPERS

ARRESTEE'S MEDICAL

PROBATION MONITORING FfiES

PROBATION O,PER ASSISTANCE

.STATE OPf~i~?DER DNA ID SYSTEM

DRUG COURT PROGRAM

FOREIGN SERVICE

VIOLENT CRIME VICTIMS ASSISTAN

ST POLICE SERVICES FUND

ST POLICE OP&RATIONS ASSISTANC

CLERK OP & ADMIN FUND

CR/TR SLR $15/$40

002

003

004

005

006

007

008

O11

012

013

014

017

018

027

034

043

052

083

089

093

102

Account

Account Description

Fine Amount:

No.

Def: DUCKWORTH CHUCK

114 N KENTUCKY

RANT'OUL

IL 61866-0000

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

Disposition #

Case#

2016-CF-000443 Criminal Complaint

Date: 10/10/2018

CSP314RG

~~j

ryRCU~~RT

~~~'y

3o Ct{gMpq;GN CGUNn.~~0~

DEC 3 1 2018

C403

'4 ~'

I~~i'

~~~~~~ :;

,~~

~~~

48a

GOOD VIBES, INC

1501 NORTH PROSPECT

CHAMPAIGN

IL 61820-0000

CONTRACTOR SERVICES FOR ILLINO

115 WEST PELLS

PAXTON

IL 60957-0000

STIT"T RYAN

333 BIRCH LANE

OAKWOOD

ROTH RICHARD

19541 EAST VIA PARK STREfiT

QUEEN CREEK

AZ 85142-0000

PHOENIX INISUI,ATION, LLC

PO BOX 6148

CHAMPAIGN

IL 61826-0000

005

006

007

008

009

IL 61858-0000

RestitLtion Payments

Fine Amount

Seq

Def: DUCKWORTH CHUCK

114 N KENTUCKY

RANTOUL

IL 61866-0000

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

Disposition #

Case#

216-CF-000443 Criminal Complaint

Date: 10/10,/2018

CSP314RG

Date 1/03/2019

Time 11/32/20

$3,322.00

$4,445.30

$5,100.00

$6,145.85

$6,964.95

Amount

$.00

Bond Original..

$.00

Bond Transfers.

$.00

Bond Total... _ .

$.00

Hond Applied...

$.00

Bond Refund....

$.00

Hond Balance...

$.00

AgenCy:268 CHAMPAIGN COUNTY SHE

Class: 2 Fine: 9 Manual Calculation

Page

C404

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE SIXTH NDICIAL CIRCUIT

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY,ILLINOIS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE

OF ILLINOIS

PLAINTIFF

CHUCK DUCKWORTH,

DEFENDANT

)

l6-CF-443

)

2e~

.~U~. ~ 9 1~f8

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S POST TRIAL MOTIONS

COMES NOW,the People ofthe State of Illinois, in response to Defendant's Post-Trial

Motion, filed on October 25, 2017 ("First Motion"), and Supplemental Motion for New Trial,

filed June 12, 2018 ('`Second Motion"), argues as follows:

1. Defendant is charged with a series of thefts arising from his conduct in hiring several

contractors to install equipment or perform services on a building he owned in

doHmtown Rantoul. The State presented evidence at trial Defendant misled several of

these contractors into performing work, principally by informing them that they

would be paid from a fund created from a loan from the Village of Rantoul ("Loan

Fund"), at a time when that fund had already been depleted.

2. In the First Motion, Defendant argues the Court erred by not recognizing federal

preemption ofthe matter in question by Federal Bankruptcy. This argument is

without merit.

a. While this case was pending, Defendant obtained a discharge of the debt

associated with these contractors' work in United States Bankruptcy CouR,

Central District of Illinois Case No. 15-90643.

b. Defendant has not clearly stated the nature of this defense.

Defendant's discovery answer asserts "federal preemption of the bills in

question by Federal Bankruptcy"; and "exoneration". It appears Defendant

is arguing, in broad terms, that the Federal bankruptcy discharge is a bar to

this State prosecution, though the procedural nature of that bar is never

explicitly stated.

49a

C338

pu s

ii.

Defendant only asserts "Federal preemption" in his motion for a new vial.

Claims not raised both in a post-trial motion and at trial are forfeited.

People v. Enoch, 122 I11.2d 176, 185-86, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129-30

(1988)(subject to exceptions not pertinent here). The State is hereby

asserting, and not waiving, any such forfeiture here. However, because of

the odd manner in which this defense has been raised in this matter, the

State is still attempting to identify and respond to Defendant's broader

claim in case this Court deems any ofthese arguments to be fairly within

the scope of the issues presented in the post-trial motion.

....

"!'~:~ records submitted by Defendant in support of this claim are.not clear.

For instance, Defendant submitted a form discharge order, but that form

categorically excludes from the discharge debts the bankruptcy court

specifically decided were not discharged; and debts subject to a

reaffirmation agreement. Nothing in the discharge order submitted by

Defendant specifically lists the dischazged debts.

c. The filing of a petition for bankruptcy does not provide a defense to the

prosecution of criminal proceedings for criminal conduct. See People v.

Gildewell, 251 tll. App.3d 312, 318, 621 N.E.2d 924, 928(1993). Because

Defendant's crime was complete at the time of the transactions, his later

bankruptcy filing does not absolve him oFany criminal culpability. See People v.

Mitchell. 50 I(l. App.3d 124, 365 N.E.2d 185(1977). For instance, in American

Cyanamid Co. v. Ro ere. 21 III. App.3d 152, 314 N.E.2d 679{1974), the Fourth

District held that a debtor was in criminal contempt of court for failing to make

payments toward a civil judgment, notwithstanding his later declazation of

bankruptcy. The Court noted the bankruptcy judgment "would have been

impotent to absolve the deFendant from pur►ishment for criminal contemptuous

conduct antedating the adjudication in bankruptcy and subsequent discharge".

American Cyanamid, 21 III. App.3d at 156, 314 N.E. 2d at b82. A later discharge

50a

C339

in bankruptcy has been said to have "no bearing on the determination of[guilt) or

innocence''. See People v. Rigs 8 tll.2d 78, 85, 132 N.E.2d 519, 522(195b).

This is consistent with precedent from our Federal Circuit. See U.S. Vt

Alexander, 743 F.2d 472 (7'~ Cir. 1484}.

d. A bankruptcy proceeding and a criminal prosecution are fundamentally different

proceedings, both in purpose and procedure, and the cause of action resolved by

each are totally different. U.S. v. Pepper,51 F.3d 4b9,473 (5~' Cir. 1995); U'$• v•

alum 943 F.2d 370, 381-82(4~h Cir. 1991),

This di(~'erence in purpose is reflected in several provisions of the

Bankruptcy Code:

A)Criminal prosecutions are exempted from the automatic bar►lcruptcy

stay and may proceed as if the debtor never filed bankruptcy. See 11

USCA 362(b}(1).

B) Pre-existing criminal restitution judgments cannot be discharged in

bankruptcy. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 3b, 107 S.Ct. 353 (1986)

(Chapter 7 proceedings); 11 USCA Sec. I328(a)(3) (Chapter 13

proceedings).

ii.

The bankruptcy code is lazgely unconcerned with criminality, and the

discharge may occur regardless of how the debtor incurred his debts.

Alexander. 743 F.2d at 480.

iii.

On the other hand, the goal of a criminal restitution order is not just to

make the defendant's victims whole, but also to rehabilitate the defendant.

"Restitution can aid an offender's rehabilitation by

strengthening the individual's sense of responsibility. The

probationer may learn to consider more carefully the

consequence of his or her actions. One who successfully

makes restitution should have a positive sense of having

earned a fresh start and wilI have tangible evidence of his

or her capacity to alter old behavior patterns and lead a law

abiding life. Conditioning probation on making restitution

51a

C340

also protects the community's interest in having victims of

crime made whole." U.S. v. Carson,669 F.2d 216,218~(5~'

Cir. 1982).

See also Alexander. 743 F.2d at 480("While the imposition of a

fine may have the same pecuniary effect as restitution on the

probationer, the rehabili~u~ive effect of a sentencing order may well

be augmented by the act of making one's victims whole"

(Emphasis in original))

iv.

Given the difference in purposes of the two proceedings, a bankruptcy

discharge has been held not to bar a later state criminal prosecution and

i mposition of a restitution order. See I'_ Boner, S 1 F.3d 469; lexander 743

F.2d 472; Cazson,669 F.2d 216; Cabla v. State. 6 S.W.3d 543(TX 1999)

(collecting cases). This is true even where, as here, the victims did not

object to the discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding. U.S. v. Roberts. 783

F.2d 767, 770 {9~h Cir. 1985); Miller v. Indiana, 5.02 N.E.2d 92,95-96

{Indiana 1986)(collecting cases).

e. Defendant frames his argument in terms of preemption. Specific applications of a

statute (in this case, specific bills) are not preempted. State statutes are. More

specifically, state statutes are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code where ttie sole

emphasis in the statute is one of providing leverage for collection of damages. _Perez

v. Campbell,402 U.S. 637,646, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1710(1971). A state statute which

frustrates the full effect ofFederal bankruptcy law may also he invalid, even if that is

not its sole purpose. Perez. 402 U.S. at 651-52, 91 S.Ct. at 17l 2.

i. For instance, in Perez, a state law was deemed preempted when it required

uninsured motorists who had not satisfied judgments against them, or who had

failed to pay settlements after accidents to prove their financial responsibility

before the state would license them to drive again, even if the debt at issue had

been discharged in bankruptcy.

ii.

Howevec, in pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has

52a

C341

z .

legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, the Court is to

start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States -ere not

superseded by Federal law unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress. Medtronic. Inc. v. Lohr~ 518 U.S. 470,485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250

(1996).

iii.

There is nothing in the Criminal Code here which would undermine the core

purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. See Alexander, 743 F.2d at 480("We discern

nothing in the bankruptcy code that evinces a.congressional intent to prevent

sentencing judges From imposing such potentially rehabilitative probation

conditions [as a restitution judgment}").

As stated in Paragraph 2.d, above, the Criminal Code and the Bankruptcy

Code serve fundamentally different purposes.

The Criminal Code targets transactions which are entered with criminal

intent. The intent of Congress to accommodate this type of prosecution in

the Bankruptcy Code is apparent in:

The fact criminal prosecutions are exempted from the automatic

bankruQtcy stay and may proceed as if the debtor never filed

bankruptcy. See i l USCA 362(b)(1). The legislative history of

this provision states:

"The bankruptcy taws are not a haven for criminal

offenders, but are designed to give relief from

financial overextension. Thus,criminal actions and

proceedings may proceed in spite of bankruptcy."

House Report No. 595, 95th Conk. l st Sess. 3~2, reprinted in 1978

U.S.Cade Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 5299.

The fact a debt may not be discharged in bankruptcy if:

a) [t is apre-existing criminal restitution judgment. See Kelly v,

Robinson,474 U.S. 36, 107 S.Ct. 353 (1986)(Chapter 7

proceedings); 11 USCA Sec. 1328(a)(3)(Chapter 13

53a

C342

proceedings).

b) It is a debt for money, property, services, or credit~obtained by

false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud. See 11

USCA Sec. 523{a)(2)(A)(subject to an exception not pertinent

here).

c) It is a debt for embezzlement or larceny. See 11 USCA Sec.

523{a)(4).

f. Defendant's argument is also defective if framed in terms of principles ofclaim

preclusion. Resjudicata does not bar a criminal prosecution here for the simple

reason that the State was not a party to the bankruptcy action. See U.S. v. Fraidin,

63 F.Supp. 271, 283(Dist. Ct. Md. 1945); Douchan v. U.S., 136 F.2ci 144, 14S

{b~' Cir. 1943); U.S. v. Shannon, 304 F.Supp. 374, 37S (E,D. Wis. 1969).

g. Our Federal Circuit has rejected the argument that criminal prosecution relaring to

the- underlying debt is barred by the bankruptcy dischazge injunction of 1 ] USCA

524(aj. See Alexander. 743 F.2d 472.

An older line of cases has asked whether the principal motivation for the

specific prosecution at issue appears to be the collection ofa debt that

would otherwise be barred. See 1n re Price. 383 B.R. 4!1 (N.D. Ohio,

2007); In re Evans. 245 BR 852(W.D. Ark. 2000).

A)A litmus test in applying ttus framework is•whether the public health,

safety and welfare are appreciably implicated, and whether the

prosecutorial office has alleged more than a failure to pay a debt as the

basis of its complaint. See Price, 383 B.R. at 413-14.

B) The Court asks whether the debtor's conduct is morally reprehensible,

and whether the purpose of the prosecution is to punish the criminal

54a

C343

conduct of the debtor and deter others. See In re Evans. 245 BR 852,

857(WD Ark. 2000).

C) Where there is a legitimate motivation, the prosecution will not be

enjoined because bankruptcy courts "were not created as a haven for

criminals". See Barnette v. Evans.673 F.2d 1250, 1251 (11~' Cir.

1982). "The fresh start afforded debtors in bankruptcy does not

include a release from jail." In re Gruntz. 202 F.3d 1074, 1087(9'~

Cir. 2000).

ii.

Amore modem trend is to examine the injunction in light of Federal

preemption principles. The Court is to examine whether:(1)the party

requesting the injunction is without adequate remedy at law;(2)the party

stands to suffer irrepazable injury that is both great and immediate;(3)the

threatened injury relates to his federa!!y protected rights and cannot be

eliminated by his criminal defense; and (4) there are bad Faith or other

unusual circumstances over and above the cost, anaciety, and

inconvenience of defending the criminal case, which justify the bar. See

In re Fussell, 928 F.2d 712, 715 (5~' Cir. 1991); see also In re Zervoudis,

246 B.R. 470(D.Mass 2000).

iii.

Regardless of which of the above standards applies, Pkaintiff has failed to

demonstrate this prosecution should be barred.

Defendant has presented no evidence this prosecution was brought

(either primarily or in bad faith) as a means ofcollecting a private

debt, and it is cleazly supported by strong policy interests

appropriately considered when making prosecutorial decisions.

1) There is a strong public interest in this prosecution,

independent of the losses to the individual victims.

Defendant's conduct involves the misuse of a public program

55a

C344

't ~ t w

to defraud contractors. The integrity of the public Loan

Program is affected by Defendant's conduct.

2) The State has proven more than a mere failure

to pay a debt,

but rather a persistent, ongoing pattern ofdeceptive behav

ior

that is morally reprehensible.

3) This case was prosecuted by information filed

the State, not

by a complaint filed by any ofthe Defendant's victims.

4) The named victims of the counts corresponding with

the

convictions testified credibly that they were not expec

ting to

actually recover any funds from Defendant, regaz

dless ofthe

outcome of this case.

Defendant has pointed to no special circumstances in

this case that

would warrant the bar.

Defendant has no federally-protected right to the discharge

that

cannot be adequately protected by the criminal proce

eding. As the

exceptions stated in Paragraph 2.e.iii demonstrate,

the discharge

does not typically apply to debts accrued as a result ofcri

minal

conduct such as this.

iv.

The State seeks restitution for Defendant's victims. The

Illinois

Constitution recognizes victims' right to restitution. See

Ill. Const. 1970,

Art. I, Sec. 8.1. A simple desire by the State to obtain resti

tution for

victims of crime is not itself evidence of bad faith.

See Fussell, 928 F.2d

at 717-18. Nonetheless, the State stands ready to foreg

o.a restitution

judgment if-- and only if --necessary to proceed to sentencing

in this

matter.

56a

C345

APPEAL TO THE ILLINOIS FOURTH APPELLATE COURT

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHAMPAIGN COUNTY SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Tnal Court No

2016 CF 000443

)

Chuck Duckworth

) Tnal Judge

Hon Roger Webber

9(TM J~I

NOV 0 5 2 18

Nonce of Appeal

An appeal is taken from the order or judgment descnbed below

(1) Court to which appeal ~s taken

~oo

RCUiT

~L ~~ ~'"`—

Appellate Court of Ill~no~s Fourth Jud~c~al Circuit

CHAMP~AGNCOUNTYI ILLINOIS

(2) Name of Appellant and address to which notices shall be sent Use additional sheet of paper if necessary

Name

Chuck Duckworth

Address

114 N Kentucky ,Rantoul,IL 61866

(3) Name and address of Appellant s Attorney on appeal

Name

Office of the State Appellate Defender

Address

400 W Monroe Suite 303

Springfield IL 62705

Email Address

(4) Date of~udgment or order

October 20 20.17

(5) Offense of wtuch convicted

Theft/L~brary Material >$300

(6) Sentence

Ematl Address

48 months probation 200 hours public service work, Fines and costs

(7) If appeal is not from a cnmuial conviction nature of order appealed from Final judgment sentencing and

conviction

(8)If appeal is from a judgment of a circuit court holding unconstitutional astatute ofthe United States or ofthis

state a copy of the court s finduigs made in compliance with Rule 18 shall be appended to tivs Notice of Appeal

Chuck Duckworth

Defendant Appellant

Stgned

~i~~~~~

Clerk ofthe C►rcuit Court

Champaign County Illinois

57a

C392

SIXTH .TUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF ILLINOIS

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL

SIXTM J DI IAL~1RCUIT 40

IdOV p 5 2018

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

~~i ~~~

2016 CF 000443

Chuck Duckworth

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY COURT

ILLINOIS

It appeanng to the Court that the above named defendant desires to appeal from the order entered by

the Court on October 20 2017 and that the defendant is indigent and requests the appointment of

counsel

It ~s therefore ordered that

James E Chadd

Office of the Appellate Defender

400 W Monroe Suite 303

Springfield IL 62705 5240

is hereby appointed to represent the above named Defendant for purpose of appeal

It ~s further ordered that the Clerk ofthis Court shall prepare and file a nonce of appeal on behalfof the

above named defendant and shall send a copy ofthe notice of appeal to the defendant s counsel

It ~s further ordered that the Official Court Reporter of this Court shall

a Transcribe an original and a copy of all the notes taken of the proceedings in the above entitled

cause

b Without charge to the defendant and w~thm forty mne days from the date the notice of appeal is

filed file the original of the report of proceedings and one copy with the Clerk of this Court

It ~s further ordered that the Clerk ofthis Court shall

a Send a copy of this order to the defendant s counsel and the Clerk ofthe Appellate Court

b Prepare and certify the record on appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 324 and 608

c File the record on appeal m the reviewing Court within sixty three days from the date the nonce

of appeal is filed or send the record on appeal to the defendant s counsel pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 325 which provides for filing of the Certificate in Lieu of Record

d Furnish the defendant s counsel with a copy ofthe report of proceedings

Date

11/05/2018

Entered

58a

Hon Roger Webber

C393

n~ inm~t.~ r.,.,.. ~vnena~

United States Bankruptcy Court

ValuntarY Petition

Central District ofIllinois

Namc of Debwr(if individual, rnta Last, First, MWdle);

Name ofJoint DeAwr(Sponsc)(Lest, First, Middlc):

Duckworth, Chuckle Dwayne

A!1 Othcr Names ustd by the Dcb~m in the last 8 years

(includc married, maiden,end bade mmcs):

All Other Name uud by the Joint Debtor in the last 8 years

(include maftied, rnaidrn,sad ~!c noma):

Ldct four disils ofSoc. Sec.a IndividualTax~yer I.D.(1TlN~Complac EfN

1 st fourdigi~s o Soc. Sec.a

cum u,.~ ~.urn rn

xxx•xx-2223

r~r~ u~~wu,~U

Susa Address of Ueblor(No.end Strecb City, arui S1au};

5pcct Address of oint

1260 Aspen

Rantoul, IL

ividue

aupaycr I.Q.(ITIN} No1~Compkte EIN

or(No, and Svicet, qty, and 'tale):

21P Code

Caunry of Residence or of We Principol Place of Busincas:

21P Code

ounty of R

Champaign

Moiling Addms of Debtor(if ditTerrnt fivm svee~ addras):

rnce or oC

rarcipa Place p Huamas:

ailing Addraa o Joint Dcb~or{ d~ erau rom sneer a rcss):

Zli' Code

ZIP Code

Location oC Principal Assets of8us6►as Ocb~or

(iCdilTeRnt from strcct address abavc);

Type of Ucbtor

Nature of Bpiincss

(Form of Org~ntulion) (puck ooe box)

Chapter of 8arkruptey Code Under 1Vhlca

(Cheek one box)

~ individual (includes Joint Ucbtors)

Sre F.~hrblr D on pagr: ojrhtr john.

includes LLC and LLP)

D GoT~tion!

O Partncnhip

❑ Other pf dobtor Ia nog ooe of the above rniuie~.

el~eek phis box and stale type ofentity Debw.)

Q Hmt1h Cnrc Business

❑Sin (c Asset Reu)FsU11e as defined

in 11 U.S.C. ¢ 101(S 18)

O ~►~road

~ Stockbroker

Q Commodity Broker

Q Clearing $ank

Cbaptcr 15 Dcbton

Counay of deb~or~ cem« of main imeresu:

~ ~~

Tax-Eiempt Eattry

(Chak box, if ~pplioabk►

~ ~bor ie a tax•exemp~ organization

uadu Title I6 of the Unhed States

Code(Uu lntemsl Revenue Cadet.

C•ach country in whiel~ a foreign proceeding

by.rcgaMiny.or ~painal debtor is Dmding:

F711pg Fec Check oec box)

Pull Filing Fec ottscbcd

Q Elting Fee a be paid in intuU~nmu(~pptiubk a individwl~ only). Muu

mach agned pp~lics~iao for the Gouda cansFdera~ion centfying that the

debwr is unable a puy fee acept in imullmenia. Rule 1006(b~ See Official

Form 3A.

~ Filing Fa waiver rcques~eJ (opp

e w el~y+kr 7 lodividnals only). Mast

aturcl~ signed opplieatian for 14e court's considerotioo. See OtTieial Portn 3D.

StatislicaVAdministra/hoc tnformattoa

~ Chapta 7

Ch°~Q

Q ~~

a911

❑ ~P~'~2

~ C~MQ i3

1•

SO~

a1(10-

❑200-

~s9

SIOO.ODI ro

5100.00D

Sf00.001

mil

mitlim

■

SSO4UD0

a1.000s.000

~ ~I~ ~ S Petition for Raognifion

ofa Foreign Main Procerd"mg

O Chap~a 1S PMition for Recognition

ofa Foreign TJanmairt Proceoding

Natnn of Debts

(Cbect ooe box)

~ Dabu ue primnily mtisumu deals.

drllned !n 11 U.S.C.¢ 101@)m

`incurred by as iadevldinl primarily fm

w pasonel.family.a 6ourehoW purpose.'

❑ Deb1c ate primatiFy

brslaev debts.

laplcr 1 f I)eMore

Check one box:

Q Debtor's ~ patll Cosiness debtor u defined in I 1 U.S.C.f 101(51 d).

0 ~btm la not i tmap business deWm as defined ie 1!U.S.C.§ 101(31D).

Qieck iF

~ ~btm'~ a~reQae noatontingent

li~ldoted debt(uclnding debu owed b

erc ktt than(2,490925(amoanr suMed w ud/rc*Irotaf on IA7!/16 am!a~eq'insiders w aR1ltms)

U~m yea►r d+cngAtr)

Qiak dl spplieebk boRn:

~ ~ plan !a being filed whb

Wes petuioo.

~ ~n~~~

of the plan were wlklta! pnpetitioh Bom oue a mope classes of criednors,

in ~eeoMetrce wiUi 11 U.S.C. 4 1126(b1.

TI11S SPACC IS fOR COURT US60NLY

❑ Debtor estimotes tlwt funds wiU be ovailabk fm disrcibution to unsecured creditors.

~ Debtor cslimales elmt, after any uempt property is excluded and administrative czpcnca paid,

thus will be no funds available Tor diatribuiinn W unsecured creditors,

Lstimatal Number ofCreditors

■

Ibe Petition Is tilled {Check one box)

❑5.001- o

IO.DO!-

23.001-

a50.001• o

dVER

~000n

ss.aou

SI.000.001

wSto

m7Gon

510.000.001

iot3o

mUtion

SSO,pOp,001 U

SIOO.000.0U1 1lOO.000,ODI Abethn

ro 3100

aS500

wf16iU'an Slhphm

~cillian

~dllion

as1

minim

mslo

etiUim

aSSo

m01im

wsloo

mitlinn

u+i3o0

minim

asl6iuim slbipio.

so.oao

~0000n

i~.nnu

~. ~r.~ ~$-1 ~

~;t c

~, + -~~~ :.

Fsumaecct Asset

•

530,000

SSOA01 b

SIOO,OnO

~stitna~ed Liabilities

fNt,000

sIW,D00

59a

:i~

`~ ~}~"

i/ ?

'-,~{~,~1~;,'

C~O~

Al !Af(~einl Ferm iVOd/131

Voiuntary Petition

(This page nrr~sl be conrpleled a►tdJt/cQ fn ever} case)

Location

Whcrc Filed: .None -

,.-.•

Namc of Dcbtor(s):

Duckwortfi, Chuckle Dwayne

All Prfor Bnnkruptcy Cases Fped Within Les18 Yaars {If

mare than rivo, attach edditianal shcct}

Case Number:

Dnte Filcd:

Lncation

Where FiMd:

Case Number.

Date Filed:

Pendins Baokraptcy C~sc Filed by an Spouse, Partner, or AflUtste

of tbEs Debtor (lf mac than onc, anech additional shccl)

Namc of Debtor.

Cesc Numbcr.

Datc Pilcd:

None

bistrict:

Relationship:

Judge:

Exhibit A

(To be completed if debtor is required to fik periodic reports (e.g.,

forms IOK and !UQ) with the Securities anc! Exchange Commission

pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of tht Securities Exchange Act of 1934

and is requesting relief under chapter 1 1.)

O Exhbit A is attached and made a port of this petition.

Exhlbfl H

(to be eompkted if debtor is ~n iidividwl whose debts ore primanly

cowumer debu.)

1, the anomey for the pctitioaer named in the foregoing petition, dcclais

have infornud the petitioner ibat [he a shed may procesd unJer chapt~~ ~hnt t

7.11,

12. o* ~3 of Ulle 11, Uoiled Smta Code, and have acplabKd the

relief availabk

under a►eh arch chapter. t fiu~hercertify that 1 ddiversd

to the debtor the notice

required y 1 U

{b).

ig~wture of

KeWn R. Schneider 6313921

~ 7~l

(Dale)

Exhibit C

Roos the debtor own or have possession of any ptopcny that poses or is alleged to

pose a threat of imminent and identifiabk halm so public health or aafely7

Q Yes, and F.xhbit C is adached and merle a pan ofthis petitan.

~ No.

Exhibit b

(To be completed by every individual dcl~tar. If a joint petition is filed, each spouse

must complete end attach a sepnrnle Exhibit D.)

■ Ezhib3t D completed and signed by the debtor is annched and made

a pan of this petition.

If this is a joint petition:

D Fachibit b also completed and si~tted by the joint debtor is attached and made a

part of this petition.

■

❑

Information Regarding 16e Debtor - Venpe

(Check any applicoblc box)

Debtor has barn domiciled or has had a residrncc, principal place of business

, or principal assets in this District far 180

days immediately preceding the date of This petition or for a bnger part

of such 180 days Ihnn in any other District

There is a bankruptcy case concerning debtor's a~lie~c, general portner, or partners

hip pending in this District

Debtor is a debtor in a foreign proceeding and has its principal place of business

or principal assets in the United States in

this District, or has no principal place of business or assets in the United

Swtes but is a defendant in an action or

proceeding [in a fedtrnl or stoic court] in this District, or the interests of the

patties wiq be served in regard to the relief

sought in this District

Cert[tication by a Debtor Who Restdcs os a TeAant of Residential Propert

(Check ell applicable boxes)

Landlord hus a judgment against the debtor for possession of debtor's residenc

e.(If bo,e d►akcsl, complete die folbwing.)

{Name of landloni that obmincd juJgmcnq

~Ad~ircss of larxlloid)

Debtor claims that under applicable nonbankruptcy law, there me circumstuncas

the entire moncmry defouN that gave rise to the judgment for possession, after theunder which the debtor would be permitted to cure

judgtrtrn► for possession was entered, end

Debtor has included wish this petition the deposit with the couR of any rent that

would

become due during the 30-day period

after the filing of the ~ctitioo.

Dcbtar certifies that he/she has served the I.ondlord with this certification. (11

U.S.C. § 3G2(i)).

E208

60a

oluntary Petition

DuckwoRh, Chuckie Dwayne

nnu'1 be complcled acrdfiled in e~~ery

Signatures) o~ Debtor(s)(Indivtduul/Joint)

1 declurs undo penalty of perjury that the information provided in phis

petition is we Dort coned.

(if pclitioner is an individual w}wse debts arc primarily consumer debts and

I~os chosa~ to file undo chapter 7j I am aware that!may proceed undo

chapter 7, I I, 12,a 17 oftitle 1 I.Ilnhed State Codc,undersmod the rclid

available ander each such chapter,aad cboosc to proceed under chapter 7.

[If no ariomcy represents me ~J no bankruptcy petition ptepo[er si{pu the

petilionJ 1 have obtained and read the notice required by 11 U.S.C. §342(b).

!request relief in accordance with the chaQtcr oftitle I I.United S~atee Cnde,

~cciGed in this petition.

~~.

Sl~netarc ofs Foreign Represcntativc

i dectarc under penalty of perjury tl+at the info~tion provWed in phi: pditian

is we and co~rcct, shat 1 om the foteiIIn iepraenmtivc ofa debtor in a forcfgn

pmccodmg,and That i em aulhnrized to file this ~xdtion.

(CAeck only one box)

(

]

1 rcquesl rcliof in ucordanee with chap~a t S oftitle I I. Uohed Slates Code.

Caiified copies of the documaus required by 1 i U.S.C. g 1 St5 ere ■dachal.

[] Pursuant to !I U.S.C. ~ 1SIi,Irequact relief in acconiance wah the cha~ger

of title 1l specitKd in this petition. A certifiai copy of t?te order grrnti~

recognition of the foreiIIn main proceeding g anached.

Signature of Fonign Rcpresentativc

Signoture of Debtor Chuckle Dwayne Duckworth

Printed Name of Foreign Rcpresenmtivc

Signature of toter Debtor

Date

Telephone Number (]f not represented by adomcy)

~ Wiz-- i~-'

Si~aatierc o!Non-Attorney Bankruptcy Petition Preperer

declare undo penalty of perjury that (1) i am a bank~untcy petition

pr~arer ua defined in 11 U.S.C. ¢ 110; (2~ t prepared this docwornt f~

comprnsatioe and have providod the debtor with a copy oClhis docwnmt

aral the notices and infw~rwtion roqubod undo 11 U.S.C. ~¢ 110(b).

110(h), and 342{b); and, (31 if ~vla or g~cidelixs have been promulgated

ptusuant to 1I U.S.C. ~ 110(h) sUting ~ maximum fee fa servkes

chargnbk by banlwptcY petition prcpaters.l have giva~ Uu debtor notice

of the maximum artio~ml before paring any document for filing for e

debtor or accepting any fa from the debtor, os required in that section.

Official Form 19 u atuchod.

Date

tore atAttorney'~

Signature of Ariorney far Deblor(s)

KevEn R. Schneider 8313921

Printed Nnme of Adomey for Dcbtor(s)

Hatch Law Firm, P.~.

Firm Namc

115 N. Nett Streat

Suite 31S

Champaign, IL 61820

E'rinted Namo and title, if any, of Bankruptcy Petition Prepurer

Social-Security number (If the benkrut~►cy petition preparcr is not

an individual, sia~e the Social Security number of the ofTicer,

principal, responsible person or partner of the bnnkruptcy petition

preparerxRequired by Ii U.S.C. § IlOJ

Address

Email: whatch~hatchlawflrm.com

6217) 356-2577 Faz: (2173 351-1771

Telephone Number

ate

'In a case in which § 707(b)l4)(D) 0pptics, this cianasture alw consiituta a

catificntion 1ha1 the anomey has no knowledge after an inquiry that the

infonnatian in the schtdulrs is incorrect.

Address

Date

Signature

i declart under penalty of perjury Ihat the inlortnolwn ryrovided in this

petition is true and correct, and dot I have barn authorized to file this pctitian

on behalf of rho debtor.

'Ihc debtor requests relief in accordance with the chapter of title II,Uni1cJ

States Code, spxified is this paition.

SiQnnturc of bankruptcy paition prgmrer or office, principal, re~ons~'bte

person,or partner whose Sceial Saurlry number is provided above.

IJomes anti Socio[•Security numbers of all other individmk wbo prepared or

assisted m preparing this documrnl unless the banlwptcy petition perparcr it

not an individual:

5ignaturc of Authorized Individual

If more ilian ore person prcpnred this doeumrnt, auacb ndditiotrr) sheets

conforming to the opproprinte olTtcial form for each person.

Printed Nnme of Authorized Individual

A bonAruEucy petition prcperer r jalhrrc to comply ~r1d~ ~hc prorlsfans of

rGle !I and the Federal Rules ojBonArvp►ev Procedarr mar retnk !n

freer or fmprisonmcnr or both. !1 U.S.C. ~!lOt 18 U.S.0 x/36

Title of Authorized Individual

Dote

61a

E209

B i D(O!t'~cial Fam f,Ezlflbi~ D)(12109)

United States Bankruptcy Court

Ceptral DlsMct ofIll[nois

In re

Chuckle Dwavne Duckworth

bebtor~s)

Casc No.

Chapter

EXHIBIT D - WDNIDUAL DEBTOR'S STATEMENT 4F COMPLIANCE WITH

CREDIT COUNSELING REQUIREMENT

Warning: Yon must be able to check truthfully one ofthe five statements regardi

ng credit

counseling listed below. If you cannot do so, you are not eligible to file a bankruptcy

case, and the court

can dismiss any case you do flle. If that happens, you wttl lose whatever ailing fee you

paid, and your

creditors wIil be able to resume collection activities against you.If your case[s dismiss

ed and you file

another bankruptcy case later, you may be required to pay a second filing fee snd

you may have to take

extra steps to stop creditors' collection act~vitics.

Every indii~idual debtor mustfile this Exhibit D.Ifajoint petition isfiled, each spouse must

complete

urrdfile a separate Exhibit D. Check ooze ofthefi>>e statements below and attach any docume

nts as directed.

■ l.Within the 180 days before the tiling of my bgnkruptcy case,l received a briefing

from a credit

counseling agency approved by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator that

outlined the

opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted me in performing a related budget analysis

, and I have

a certificate from the agency describins the servic.~s provided to me.Attach a copy ofthe ce~•tific

ate and a copy

ojany debt repayment plan developed through the agency.

D 2. Within the l 80 days before the tiling of my bankruptcy case, I received a briefing

from n credit

counseling agency approved by the United States tcvstee or bankruptcy administrator that outlined

the

opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted me in performing a related budget

analysis, but I do

not have a certificate from the agency describing the services provided to me. Yoii mustfile a

copy ofa

certificatefront tl~e agency describing the services provided to you and a copy oja~zy debt

repaymentpla~r

developed through the agency no later• than 14 days der your• bankruptcy case isfiled.

❑ 3. I cerkify that I requested credit counseling services from an approved agency but was unable

obtain the services during the seven days from the time I made my request, and the following

exigent

circumstances merit a temporary waiver of the credit counseling requirement so I can file my bankrup

tcy case

now. Summarize exige~it circumstances 1:ere.J

If your certification is satisfactory to the court, you must stlll obtain the credit counseling

briefing

within the first 30 days after you file your bankruptcy petition and promptly Cie a certific

ate from the

agency that provided the counseling, together wi#h a copy of any debt management plan develop

through the agency.Failure to fulfill these requirements may result in dismissal of your case.

Any

extension of the 30-day deadline can be granted only for cease and is limited to a maxim of

um IS days.

Your case may also be dismissed if the court is not satisi~ed with your reasons for filing your

bankruptcy

case wjthout first receiving a credit counselIag brIeflng.

O 4.1 am not required to receive a credit counseling briefing because of:[Check tl~e applicable

statenrent.J Must be accompanied by a motio~rfor deternrinarion by fire courl.J

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E210

B 1 D(Official Forth 1, 6ciu'bi1 D)(IZ/09)- Cont.

p~ ~

O Incapacity.(Defined in I 1 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) as impaired by reason of mental

illness or

mental deficiency so as to be incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with

respect to

financial responsibilities.;

O Disability.(Deftncd in l 1 U.S.C. § ]09(h)(4)as physically impaired to the extent

ofbeing

unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in a credit caunselin~ briefing in person, by

telcphone, or

through the Internet.);

D Active military duty in a military combat zone.

O 5. The United States trustee or banlm~ptcy administrator has determined that the credit

counseling

requirement of l l U.S.C. § l 09(h)does not apply in this district.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the Information provided above is true and correct.

Signature ofDebtor:

Date:

~.1 .(~,~

~r ~~~' ~i~`'~

Dwayne Duckworth

gat Cue Beeknipty

63a

E211

B7(OflTcint Form 7)(04%13)

United States Bankruptcy Court

Central District ofIllinois

!n n

Chuckle Dwayne Quckworth

Debtors)

Cesc No.

Chapter

STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

This statement is to be completai by evcry debtor. Sponscs ding sjoint petition mey fcle e single s~atcmcnt on which the information for

both spauscs is combined ittht cacc is filed under chapter 12 a chapter 13, a married debtor must furnish infmmntion for both spauscs whether or

not e joint petition is filed, unless the spouses arc separated and a joint edition is not filed M individual debtor rngagcd in businrss as a sole

proprietor, partner, fomity former, or self employed proCcssionai, should provide the information rtquestal on this sla~ement concerning alt such

ectivitia as well es the individual's personal affairs. To indicate payments, transfers and the like Io mina children, state the child's initiais end the

rwme and address ofthe child's parent ar guardian,such as"A.B.,a minor child, by John Doe,guardian." Do not disclose the child's name. Sce, i

U.S.C. ~ 112; Fed. R. Hnnkr. P. I007(m).

Questions 1 -18 are to be compined by ull debtors. Debtors that arc or have been in business, es damned below,also must coanplete

Questions 19 - 25. If the answer to an applicable questtoa is "None," mark the box labeled "None." If additional space is needed for the answer

to any qucsaon, use and attach e separate sheet properly idmtifed with the case name,case number(if known), end the number ofthe question.

D~F'/NITIONS

"/n business."A ddxor is "in bnsinas" for the purpose of this form if the debtor is e corporation a pnrinaship. M individual debtor is "in

business" for the purpose of this farm if the debtor is or has bca~. within six years immediately prxeding the filing of this bankruptcy case, any of

the following: nn officer. director, managing executive, or owner of5 perc~ent or more ofthe voting or equity seswrities ofa co~paatian;o partner,

other than a limited punncr,ofa pannecship; a sole proprietor or self-employal full-time apart-time. An individual debtor also may be "in business"

for the purpose of this loan if the debtor rngoges in a trade, business, or other activity, ot)tcr than as an employee, to supplement income from the

dcbto~'F primary employmrnt.

"insider."The ~ertn "insider" includes but is not limited to: relatives ofthe debtor; general partners ofthe debtor and their relatives

corpornlions of which the debtor is on oflticer, director, or person in control; oRcers, directors, end any persons in control ofe corporate debtor end

their relatives; aftiliotes of'the dcbtw and insiders ofsuch af7iliates; and any managing egrnt of the debtor. i! U.S.C. § 101(2),(31).

I.income from emplaymcat or operetian of business

None

Stetc the dross amount ofincome the debtor has rcceivod from employma~t,trade, m profession, or from operation of the debtors

business, includingpart-time activities either as an employee or in inde~xndent trade or business, from the beginn(ng ofthis calendar

year to the date this case was commenced. State also the gross amounts rec;cived daring the two year: immcdiatcly ~xxeding this

calendar year.{A debtor that maintains, or has maintained, financial records on the basis ofa fisenl rather than e calrndar year may

report £seal year income. Identify the beginning and ending dates of the dcblor's fiscal year.) if ajant petition is filed, state income for

each spouse scperatcly.(Married debtors filing under chapter 12 or chapter 13 must state income ofboth spouses whether or not e joint

petition is filed, unless the spouses are scpnra~od and e joint petition is not tiled.)

AMOUNT

50.00

SOURCE

Debtor earned 610475 fn 2013 from self employment running A B and C Janitorial

Services. Debtor earned 5104751n 2044 from self employment running A B and C

JanttoNal Services.

Debtor earned 56000 YTD 2015 from self employment running A B and C

Janitwtal Services.

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H~ ~om~;oi ~drn,~~ car~a~

2,lecomc other than tram empbymcat or operat

ion of business

State the amount ofincome received by the debtor

other than from anploymcnt,ttndc~ professiar►,

m operetion of the debtor's business

during the twa years immediately precoding the comme

nc~xnent of this cnse, Give ~niculars. if a joint

each spouse separately. (Marrisd debta~s filins ender

petition is filed, stage income fac

chnp~er 12 or chapter 13 must state income

for each spouse whether m not a joint

petition is filed, unless the spouses arc separated and

a joint petition is not filed.)

AMOUNT

50.00

SOURCE

Debtor has received S Y1'D 2073 from SSI.

Debtor has received 510,308 in 2014

from SSI. Debtor has received 55250 YTD

2015 from SSI.

3. Payments to creditors

Nom

■

Con~pla~e a. orb., es approprlole, pnd c

a individual orJofnt debror(s) a~tth pNmarrly conr~

merdebu: List ell payments on loans, installment

purchase of goods or services,

and other debts to any rneditor made within 90 days

immediately ping the commenccmrnt of this

case unless the e~regate value

of ali property that constitutes or is aPfeded by such transfe

r is Iess than 5600. lndice~s with an estcrisk (•)

eny paymrnts that were

made to a creditor on account of e domestic support

obligation a es part of en aiternotivc repayment sched

ule under e pion by an

approved nonprofit budgeting and crr~t counseling

agency. (Married debtors filing under chapter 12

or chapter 13 muu include

payments by either or both spouses whether or not a

joint petition is filal, unless the spouses an separa

ted and a joint petition is na

filed.)

NAME AND ADDRESS

OF CREDITOR

None

■

DATES OF

PAYMEN7'S

AMOUNT PAID

AMOUNT STILL

OWING

b. Debtor ►s/rose debts arc not primarily ronsrrmer

debts: Lisp

immediately preceding the commencement of the case unless each payment or other transfer to any creditor made within 90 days

the a~gregute value of all prapecty that canstitates or

is affected 6y r~uch

aansfcr is less than S6?~'. If the debts is an individual,

indicate with en asterisk {•) any payments that were made

to a creditor an

accouru of n domestic support obligation or as pan of on oltcrna

tivc r+epaymrnt schedule under a plan by an appmv

od nonprofit

budgeting and crodit counseling agency. (Marred debtors

filing under chepta 12 or chapter t3 must include

payments and dher

trnnsfers by eitha~ or both spoetaa whether or not a joint petitio

n is filed, unless the spouses are sepnrn~ed and a joint

position is not

r~~a.~

DATES OF

PAYMENT51

TRANSFERS

NAME AND ADDitESS OF Cii.EDITOR

None

■

AMOUNT

PAID OR

VALUE OF

?R,ANSFERS

1~D~T STILL

OWING

c. A!! debtors: List aQ pnymenu made within one year

immed

creditors who arc or were insides. (Married debtors filing under iately ping the commcnccmrn~ of this case to or for the benefit of

cha}»er !2 a chapter 13 must include payments by either

spouses whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless the

orboth

spouses arc separnted and a joint petition is not filed.)

NAME AND ADAitESS OF CREDITOR AND

AMOUNT STILL

RELATIONSHIP TO bEBTOR

DATE OF PAYMENT

AMOUNT PAID

OWING

4. Suits and admla(atrative proceedlaga, executions,

geralshmenta end pnAchmeots

None

@, List sll suits and administrative pro«edings

to which the debtor is or was o party within one year immed

iately preceding tho filing of

this bsinkruptcy case. (Martied debtors filing under chapte

r 12 a chapter 13 must include informstion conc.~ming either

or both spouses

whether or not e joint petition is filed, unless the spouscs'are

separa~cd and a joint petition is not filed)

CAP'T'ION OF SUIT

AND CASE NUMBER

15 CH 93 Davis v. Duckworth

NATURE OF

PROCEEDING

Chancery (being

amended to LM

case)

Amount subject to adjr~stntent oar 4/0//16, anti ch~cry d~rce years

COURT OR AGENCY

AND LOCATION

Champaign County Circuit Court,

Champaign, IL

STA'NS OR

DISPOSITIDN

Pending

thernnf}cr ivlth mspcc! to cotes commenced on or aJ1er

1Jre date ojadjttsbrtenl.

saMware ceoKw~u (a) ,99s•so,a g~s~ ceu., uc. wwv,.bera.e.c

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~~.3e e.n►rupur

e~ comet Fom,~~ coai~s>

None

■

b, Describe aII property that has beet► nttachcd, garnished or seized under ony legal or cquitoblc

preceding the commcncanrnt of this case. {Married debtors filing under chapter 12 or chapter proccxs within one year immcdiuteiy

property of either or both spouses whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless the spouus arc must include infornwlion concerning

sepornted and a joint petition is not

filed.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON FOR WHOSE

BENEFIT PROPEit7Y WAS SEIZED

RATE OF SEIZURE

D~SCR1PTiON AND VALUE OF

PROPERLY

5. Repossessions, toreclosur~ and returns

None

List all property that has been rcpossesscd by n croditor, sold at a foroclosurc sale, transferred thmugh

a doal in lieu of foroclowrc or

r+cturned to the aellcr. within oae year immediately praxding the commencement of this case. {Mcmcd

oc chapter 13 must include information eonceming property of either or bath spouses whether or na debtors filing under chapter 12

e joint petition is filed, unless the

spouses are separated and a jaim pctitioo is not filed.)

~A'TE OF REPOSSESSION,

FORECLOSURE SALE,

TRAlVSfER OR RETURTI

0312015

NAME AND ADDRESS OF

CREDITOR OR SELLER

Honda Financial Services

P.O. Box 70252

Phtl~ielphla, PA 19176

DESCRIPTION AND VALUE OF

PROPERTY

2013 Honda Accord with 22,000 tulles, worth

approxEmately 115,000.

6. Asaienments and receiverships

None

■

a. Describe any assignment of property for d~c benefit of creditors made within 120 days immediately precafing the

commencement of

this case. (Married de6tor~ tiling u~dcr chapter 12 a chapter 13 must include any essignn►ent by either a bwh

spcwsa whether or not a

joint petition is filed, unless the spouses enc scpnrntod and a joint petition is not ftledJ

DATE OF

ASSIGNMENT

NAME AND ADDRESS OF ASSIGNEE

Noiu

■

TERMS OF ASSIGTlMENT OR SETTLEMENT

b. List ell propet7y which has been in the hands of o custodian, rsceiva, orcourt-appointed ofliciel within one year immediately

procoding the commencement of this cose. (Married debtors filing under chopter 12 or chepta 13 must include

infomwtion cancaning

property of either or both spouses whctl►er or not a joint petition is film, unless the spouses are separated end a joint

petition is not

filed.)

NAME AND ADDRESS

OF CUSTODIAN

NAME AND LOCATION

QF COURT

CASE TITLE &NUMBER

DATE OF

ORDER

DESCR1PTlON AND VALUE QF

PROPERTY

7. Cltts

NflM

■

List all gifts or charitable contributions made within one year immediately preceding the commencement of this cue

except ordinary

and usual gifts to family members aggregating less than $200 in value per individual family member end charitable contribution

e~regating less than S100 per recipient (Married debtors fling under chapter 12 a chapter 13 must include gifts or contribution

either or both spouses whether or not n joint petition is fated, unless the spouses arc separated and o joint petition is not filed.) s by

NAME AND ADDRESS OF

PERSON OR ORGANIZA?'lON

RELATIONSHIP TO

QEBTOR, tF ANY

DATE OF GiFI'

DESCR1PT101V AND

VALUE OF GIFT

8. Losses

None

■

List all losses from fire, theft, other casualty or gombiing within one year immediately preceding the commencement of

this case or

since the commencement of this case. (Married debtors filing under chopter l2 m eliaptet 13 ~i~st include losses by either

or both

spouses whether or not a joint petition is filed, unless the spouses arc separated and a joint petition is not filed.)

DESCR1PT10N AND VALUE

OF PROPERTY

DE5CR1PT10N OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND, IF

LOSS WAS COVERED 1N WHOLE QR IN PART

9Y IAlSURANCE~ GIVE PARTICULARS

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DATE OF LOSS

L9ejl~Me 9enkn~ptcY

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B7(Official Fmm 7)(04/13)

9. Payments rrlated to debt counseling or bankruptcy

NO"~

List nll paymrnts made or property transferred by or on l~half ofthe debtor

to any persons, including attomrys,for consulmtion

concerning debt consolidation relief under the bankruptcy law or preparati

on of~hc petition in bankruptcy within one year immediately

preceding the cc~nmenccmrnt ofthis case.

DATE 0~ PAYMEPI'T,

NAMEOF PAYER(F OTHER

THAN DEBTOR

5H2N5

NAME AND ADDRESS

OF PAYfiE

Hatch Law Flrm~ P.C.

115 N. NeU St.

SuNe 315

Champaign,IL 69820

AMOUNT OF MONEY

OR DESCRIPTION AND VALUE

OF PROPERTY

;

715

10. Other transfers

None

■

a, Lisl all other property, other than property trensfcaed in the

ordinary course o£ the business or financal e8'airs ofthe debtor,

dansfecr~d either absolutely or as 9ccurity within two years immediately

preceding the

filing anderchapter i2 or chapter l3 must include transfers by either or both spouses commencement ofthis case.(Married debtors

whetlxr or na a joint petition is filed, unless the

spouses ere sejwrated end ojoint petition is not filed.)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF TiLANSFEREE,

RELATIONSHIP TO DEBTOR

■

DATE

bESCRIBE PROPERTY TRANSFERRED

AND VALUE itECEIVED

b. List t►11 property trans!'erred by the debtor within ten yerrs immcdintdy precedin

g the commencement of this case to a self-settle!

trust or similar device of which the debtor is a beneficiary.

NAME OF TRUST OR 07HER

DEVICE

DA'TE(S) OF

TRANSFERS)

AMOUNT OF MONEY OR DESCRIPTION AND

VALUE OF PROPERTY OR DEBTOR'S INTEREST

IN PROPERTY

11. Closed tioanclat aceouats

■

List all finunciol nccourns end instruments held in the name of the debtor or far the

brnefit of the debtor which were closed, sold, or

otherwise transferred within one year immediately preceding the commemm~ent

of this c~sc. lncludc checking, wings, or othex

financial accounts, certificates of deposit, or other insdumen~s; shares acid share accounts

hdd in banks, ardit unions, pension funds,

cooperatives, essociationa, brokerage houses and other financial institutions. (Married

debtors

filing under chapter 12 or charier 13 must

include information concerning accounts or instrumenu held by or for either

of both spouses whethtr a not e joint petition is filed,

unless the spouses ere separated and a joint petition is not Bled.)

TYRE OF ACCOUNT, LAST FOUR

D1G1TS OF ACCOUNT NUMBER,

AND AMQUNTOF FINAL BALANCE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF 1NSTI'1'U770N

AMOUNT AND DATE OF SALE

OR Ci.OSiNG

12. Safe deposit boxes

None

■

(,;st each safo deposit or other box m depository in which the debtor has a had securities

, cash, or other valuables within one year

immcdiatcly preceding the commencement of this case. (Married debtors filing

under chaplet 12 or clwpta t3 must include boxes a

depositories of either or both spouses whether or not a joint petition is filer!, unless

t1~c spouses are separated and a joint petition is not

filed.)

~tAME AND ADDRESS OF $ANK

OR OTHER DEPOSITORY

NAMES AND ADDRESSES

OF THOSE WITH ACCESS

TO BQX OR DEAOSITpRY

DESCR1PT10N

OF CONTEN'T'S

DATE OF TRANSFER OR

SURRENDER. IF ANY

13. Setoffs

None

■

List ell setotTs made by any creditor, including a bank, ugoinst a debt or deposit of

commencement of this case. (Martial debtors fiEing under chapter 12 or chapter the debtor within 90 days priming the

13 roust include infomwtion concerning either or both

spouses whether ornot s joint petition is filed, unless the spouses an se~arnted end a

joint petition is not filed,)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF CREDITOR

DATE OF SETOFF

AMOUNT OF SETOFF

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67a

67{OlTcial Fomt 7)(04/13)

t4. Property held for another person

NP"~

■

List all property awnrd by anothcr ~crso~ that the debtor holds or controls.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER

DESCRiPT10N AND VALUE OF PROPERTY

LOCATION OF PROPERTY

l5. Prior address of debtor

Nonc

if the dcbtor has moved within three years immediatcly procaling the commenccment

ofthis cagc, list all premises which the dc6tor

occupied during that pcciod and vacated prior to the commencement ofthis cast. ifn joint

petition is filed, report also any separatc

address ofeithcr sExwse.

ADDRESS

127 W.Campbell Ave. Rantoul,lL 61886

NAME USED

DATES OF OCCUPANCY

08!10-10/13

]6.Spouses end Former Spouses

N""~

■

If the dcbtor residcs or resided in a community property stntc, commonwealth,or territory (including

Alaskc, Arizona,Califomin, Idaho,

l~uisiena, Nevado,New Mexico, F'ueno Rico,Testes, Washington or Wisconsin)

within eight yearn immediatcly prcceding the

commencemrnt ofthe case, identify the name of the debtor's spouse and ofany former spouse

who resides or resided with the debtor in

the communiy property stale.

NAME

l7. Envlronmeatal lnformetlon.

Fcx the purpose ofthis question, the following definitions apply:

"Environmental Law" means any federal, sw~e,or local statute a regulation regulating pollution,

contamination,releases ofha7nrdous

or toxic substances, wastes or matcriol into the air, land, soil, surface water,groundwater,or

other medium,including, but not limited ~o,

statutes or regulations regulating the cleanup o!'these substances, wastes, or ma~crial.

"Site" means any location, facility, or property as defined under any Envircmmentnl Law, whether

or not presently or formcr(y owned or

operated by the debtor,including, but not limited to,disposal sites.

"Hazardous Material" means anything definai ns a hazardous waste, hazardous substance, toxic

substance, hn~ardous material,

pollutant, or contaminant or similar term under an Enviraamental Law

Nana

■

a List the name and address ofevery si c for which the debtor has received notice In wriring

by a governmental unit that it may be liable

a potentially liable under or[n violation of an Environmental Law. Indicate the govemmrntat

unit, the dote ofthe notice. and, if{crown,

the Environmental Law:

SITE NAME AND ADDRESS

Nano

■

DATE OF

NOTICE

ENYIRONMEN'CAI.

LAW

b. List the name end address ofevery site for which the debtor provided notice to a governmental

unit of a release of Hazardous

Material. lndiatte the govcrnmrntal unit to which the notice was sent anti the date ofthe notice.

SITE NAME AND ADDRESS

None

■

NAME AND ADDRESS OF

GOVERNMENTAL UNIT

NAME AND ADDRESS OF

GOVERNMEN'T'AL UNIT

DATE OF

NO'T'ICE

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW

e. List all judieia) or administrntive procecciings, including settlements m orders, under any Environmen

tal Low with respoct to which

the debtor is or was a porty. lndicele the n~rr►c anti address of the govemmentol unit ghat is or was

a party to the prc~cixding, and the

docket number.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF

GOVERNMENTAL, UNIT

DOCKET NUMBER

Sohw~ro Copyr{pM (c) t 99&20118w1Gse. LLC • www.6estuse.00m

68a

STATUS OR DISPOSITION

~st~e B~nkrwuy

B7(ORciai Form 7)(64113)

18.Nature,locntlon and name of business

a 1jtHe deblor is an !ndlvidnol, list the rwmes,addresscs, taxpaycr identification numbers, nature

of~hc busincsscs, and bcginning and

rnding delta otall businesscc in which the dcbtor was en ofTicer, director, pnrtncr, or manasing

acccutive ofa cor~wra~ian, partncr in a

partnership, sole proprietor, or was self-employed in a trade, pmfcasion, or other activity either

full- or pats-time within cix years

immediately pmcding the commencement of this ease, or in which the debtor owned S

percent or more ofthe voting or equity securities

within dx yenta immediately preceding the commrncanent ofthis case,

ljthc debtor Ls a partnership. list the homes, addresses, taxpayer ida~tification numbers,

nature of the businesses,and beginning and

ending dates of ull businesses i~ which the debtor was a partner or owned 5 percent or more

ofthe voting or acuity socurilies, within ~Ix

years immediately preceding the commencemrnt of this case.

fdie debtor is a corporn~ion, list the names, addresses,taxpayer identification numbers, nature ofthe

businesses,and beginning end

ending data of el! businesses in which the debtor was a partner or owned 5 percait or

mare ofthe voting or equity securities within six

years immediately preceding the commencement of this case

NAME

A B and C JanttoNal

LAS'C FOUR DIGITS OF

SOCIAL-SECURITY OR

OTHER MDIVIDUAL

TAXPAYER-1.A. NO.

(iTIN~ COMPLETE EIN ADARESS

2223

1260 Aspen

Rantoul, IL 81866

NAT{JRE OF BUSMESS

Janiiortal Services

None

■

b. identify any busir►css iFstcd in response to subdivision a., above, that is "single asset real estate" as defined

NAME

ADDRESS

BEG[NNtNG AND

ETVDMG DATES

02198

in I1 U.S.C. § 101.

The foFlowin~ questions are to be completed by every debtor that is a corporation or partnership and by any individual

been, within atx years immediately preceding the commencement of this ease, any of the following: an officer, director, debtor who is a has

owner of more than S percent of the voting or equity securities of a corporation; e partner, other than a fimi~ed nartna, managing acecusive, or

of a partnership, a sole

proprietor, or self-employed in u trade, profession, or other activity, either fu11- or part-time.

(An individual orJoint debtor sheer/d conrplele t/itsponlon of the statement an/~~ ~jj'the debtor is or has been !n btalncss,

as dcJlned

aboti~c, »~thia

sixyears lmmedlale/ypreceding the comn~encenrent oflIris case. A debtor who hos not been in business nithrn these

siryeors s/wuldga directly to

the sfgnuiure page.)

l9.800ks, retard: and SAaoclal stotemeats

Np~

■

e. List all bookkeepers and axountan~s who within two yeah immediately precodin~ the filing of

this bankruptcy case kept ar

supervised the kceping of books of account and rzcorc{s of the debtor.

NAME AND ADDRESS

None

■

b. List al! firms or individuals who within the two years immedimely preceding the fling of this bankruptcy case have audited

the books

of account and records, or prepared a financial statement of the debtor.

NAME

None

■

BATES SERVICES RENDERED

ADDRESS

DATES SERVICES RENDERED

c. List all fvms m individuofs who at the time of the commcnccmcnt of this cast were in possession of the books of

of the debtor. if any of the books of account and records are not available, explain.

NAME

None

■

account and records

ADDRESS

d. [.ist all financiol institutions, creditors and other panics, including mercantile and trade agencies, ~o whom

n financial stotcmcnt was

issued by the debtor within two years immediately preceding the commencement of this case.

NAME ANb ADDRESS

DATE ISSUED

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69a

~'(~se 6aMn+alcY

B7(Of1'kial Form 7){04/13)

20. lnventortes

■

a List the dates of the Iast two inventories taken of your propcKy, the name ofthe pczson

who supervisal the taking ofeach inventory,

and the dollar amount and basis ofeach invernory.

DATE OF 1NVENT~RY

None

■

DOLLAR AMOUNT OF INVENTORY

{Specify cost, murkel or other basis)

INVENTORY SUPERVISOR

b. List the name and address of the person hnvins possession of the records ofeach of

the inventories tsported in e., above.

NAME AND ADDRESSES OF CUSTODIAN OF INVENTORY

RECORDS

DATE OF INVENTORY

21.Cunen[ Partners,Offfars, Directors and Shareholders

None

■

a If the debtor is a partnership, list the nature and percentage of pormaship interest of each member

NAME AND ADDRESS

None

■

NATiIRE OF INTEREST

ofthe partnership.

PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST

b, If the debtor is o corporation, list all officers end diroclors of the corporation, end wd~ stockholder

who directly or indircetly owns,

controls, or holds S percent or more ofthe voting or equity securities oftha co~ndon.

NAME ANU AdDRESS

TITLE

NA'T'URE AND PERCENTAGE

OF STOCK OWNERSHIP

2Z.Former partners, otRcer~, directors aed abxrel~oiders

Nono

■

a. if the debtor is a pArmersbip, list each member who withdrew from the pArmership within oae year immediatel

y precoding the

commcncemrnt ofthis case.

NAM E

None

■

ADDRESS

AA'I'E OF WITHDRAWAL

b. If the debtor is a corporation, list all officers, or dimctors whose relationship with the corpors~~ion terminated

within oae year

immediately prccedins the commenccmcnt of this case.

NAME AND ADDRESS

TITLE

DATE OF TERMiNA7ION

23.W[thdraN~sls from w pertnerchip or dtsiribuNons by A corparatton

None

■

Jf the dcbtar is a partnership ar corporation, list n11 withdrnwais or distributions credited a given to an insider,

including compensation

in any fwm,bonuses,loans,stock redemptions, options exercised end any athcr perquisite during one year

immcdinicly procading the

commencement ofthis case.

NAME &ADDRESS

OF RECIPIENT,

RELA7'IOiVSHIP TO DEBTOR

DATE AND PURPOSE

OF WITHDRAWAL

AMOUNT OF MONEY

OR DESCRIPTION AND

VALUE OF PROPER'iY

24.Tax ConsolideNon Group.

None

■

~f the dcb~or is a corporntior~, list the name and federnl ta~cpayer identification number ofthe parent cory~orotion

of any

getup for tax purposes of which tht debtor has bcen n member ut any time within als yeah itnmedintely preceding consolid:►ted

the commencement

of the case.

NAME OF PARENT CORPORATION

TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (EIN)

SoMwee CopyriyM (e) 1998-201 Beat Gse. LLC • wvw.paslcs~a.eom

70a

~tl~e 9enkruplcy

B7(Official Forth 7)(M/13)

25. Pension Funds.

Nonr

■

~f the debtor is not on individunt, list the name and federal taxpaycr

-idcntitication number ofany prnsion fund to which the dcbtor,

employer, has been responsible for contributing nt any time within

us an

slx yeah immodiatcly prccoding the commencemrnt ofthe

case.

NAME OF PENSION FUND

TAXPAYER IDENTIFlCATION NUMBER(EfN)

•....:

DECLARATION UNDER PEiVAI.TY OF PERJURY BY

INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR

1 declare under penalty ofperjury that I have read the answers contoin

od in the foregoing statement offinancial etTairs and any attachm

cnls thereto

and that they are true and correct

Date

L~~~~ 1

Signature

Chuckle Dwayne Duckworth

Debtor

Pertatryjor maki~ ajals~ s~atemcnt:F7ne ojup to ES00,000 or GroprLsonment

for up to S yeors, or bo~H. 18 U.S.C. F(~ I32 end 3371

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71a

s BaM~ngtcy

N6 Summery(ORcid farm b - Snmmury)li2j14)

United States Bankruptcy Court

Central District of Illinois

In re

Chuckle Dwayne Duckworth

Case No.

Debtor

Chapter_

SUMMARY OF SCHEDULES

Indicate es to each schedule whether that schedule is attached and sm~c the number

of pages in each. Report the totals from Schedules A,

B,D,E,F,1,and J in the boxes provided. Add the amounts from Schedule

Add the amounts of all claims from Schalutes D,E,and F to determine s A and B to determine the low)amount ofthe debtor's assets.

also complete the "Statistical Summary of Certain Liabilities and Rololedthe total amount ofthe debtor's liabilities. Individual debtnrs must

Dale" ifthey file a case under chapter 7,11, or 13.

A7TACWED

(YES/NO)

NO.OF

SHEETS

A -Real Property

Yss

34,264.00

B -Personal Propcny

Yes

5,826.00

C -Property Claimed as Exempt

Yes

A -Creditors Holding Secured Claims

Yap

61,440.00

E -Creditors Holding Unsecured

Priority Claims tr~wore~~senear~~t

Yes

0.00

~ -Creditors t{olding Unsecured

Nonprioriry Claims

Yes

225,598.75

G -Executory Conhacts and

Unexpired Leases

Yes

H - Coclebtars

Yes

I - Current Income of Individual

D+ebtor(s)

Yes

J -Current Expendimres ofindividual

Dcbtor(s)

yeS

NAME OF SC1.IEDUI.E

Total Number of Sheets of ALL Schedules

ASSTS

OTHER

2,075.00

1,996.99

Total Assets

40,190.00

Towl Liabilities

Soltwaro CopyA9tN 4c) t498-2014 - Besl Gaa,LLC- wvw.bosleax.eom

LIABILITIES

72a

277,fl38.75

E220

Bast Caee 6~nrcupEof

86 Summary(O~cfnl Form 6 - Srmmary)(12~i4)

United Staten Bankruptcy Conn

Central District of Illinois

Inn

Chuckle Dwayne Duckworth

Cast No.

Debtor

Chapter

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF CERTAIN LIABILITIES AND RELATED DATA {28 U.S.C.§ 159)

if you erc an individual debtor whosc debts are primarily consumcr debts, es dafincd in § 101(8)of the Bankruptty Codc

(i I U.S.C.§ 101(8) filing

a case under chapter 7, 11 or 13, you must report all informotion requested below.

p Check this box if you nre an individual debtor whose debts arc NOT primarily consumer debts. You an not required to

repaK any information hire.

Tbis informatbn is far stetisdcsl purposes Daly ander 28~ US.C.§ 159.

Summarize the folinwin` types of IiabtUtks, es reported io the Schedules,and fatal them.

T~pc of Lipbplty

Amount

Aomsstfa Support Obligations(from Schedule E)

p,pp

Taxes and Certain Other Debra Owed W Govcmrtunlal Units

(fiom Schedule E)

0.00

Ctairtu for Death m Personal Injury While Debtor Wes intoxicalcc!

(frflm Schedule E}(whether disputsd or undisputed)

0.00

Studcn~ Loan Obligations(from Schedule F)

0.00

Domestic Support. Separation Agreement,snd Divmse Decree

Obligations Not Re~wned ort Sehedule E

Q.O~

Obligations ~o Pension or Profit-Sharing, pad Other Similar Obligations

(from Schedule F)

0.00

'TOTAL

0.00

Slate the following:

Avsr~ge lncoroc(from Schedule F, Line 12)

2,075.00

Average Expcttsa(from Schedule J. Line 22}

1,996.89

Current Monthly Income(ftom Potm ~A-1 Lme 11;OR,

Forte 22B Line 14;OR,Form 22C-1 Lice 14)

1,200.00

State the foUowlags

i.Tomi from Schedu~c b,•UNSECURED PORTION,iF ANY'

column

13,777.00

2.Total from Schedule E,"AMOUNT C-NTiTLED 70 PRIORIT'"

colwru~

3.Total from Schedule E,'AMOUNT NOT ~TITITLED TO

PRIOR(i'Y,if ANY" column

0.00

4.Tomi from Sehcdulc F

225,598.75

S. Total of non•prioriry unsecured debt(sum of 1,3,and 4)

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239,375.75

73a

E221

..-~ ^--- ..--. _._._.

86A {O~cial Form 6A)(1Y~07)

In re

Chuckle Dwayne Duckworth

Case No.

Debtor

SCHEDULE A -REAL PROPERTY

Exctpt as directed below, list all rca!~roperty in which the dcbtor has any Icgnl, equitable, or future inicrcst, including eq pro~erry

colcnan4 community property, or in which the debtor has a fife estetc. Include any property in which the debtor holds rights and powers owned as a

exercisable for

the debtor's own benefit. lEthe debu►r is married, stmt whether husband, wife, both, or the marital community own the property by

placing en "H," "W,"

"J" or "C" in the column labeled "Husband, Wifc, Joint, or Community." if the debtor holds no interest in rcoi property, write 'None"

under

"Description end Location of Property."

Do not include interests la ezeculory contracts end unexptred Moses on this scdedale. Llst them In Schedule G - E:ccutory

Coutraets Bpd

Unczplred Leases.

if an enliry claims to have a lien or hold a secured interest in any properly, state the amount of the secured efaim, See Seh¢dule D.

If no entity

claims to hold A secured interest in the {~mpccty, write "None" in the column labeled "Amount of Secured Claim." !f the debar is

on individual or

if a jofnl petition is filed, state the amount of any exemption claimed in the property only in Schedule C -Property Cleirned

as Exempt.

Description and Location of Property

Oebtor owns a storefront bullding with 1 bedroom

loft.

Location: 1260 Aspen, Rantoul IL 61866

Nature of Aebtors

]nlercst in Property

Fee sFmple

continuation sheets etwchcd to the Schedule of RcAI Property

Software CopyrlOM (c) 7946-201 • Basl Case. LLC • wwwbeslrase.mm

Current Value of

Husband,

Debtors

Wifc,

p~m~Interest

µ,~~o~~in

Joint, or

any Secured

Community p~ucting

C~e~ or Facemption

74a

Amaunl of

Secured Claim

34264.00

47,000.00

Sub-Yowl >

34,264.00

(Total of this page)

Total >

3x,264.00

{Repoli also nn Summary of

Schedulc~222

Besl Casa B~nknmkv

f36B (Ofl'rciai Form 681(12107)

In re

Chuckle tlwayne Duckworth

Case No.

Debtor

SCHEDULE B -PERSONAL PROPERTY

Except as dircctcd below, list all personoi property ofthe debtor of whateve

r kind, ifIhr debtor has no properly in one or more

nn "x" in the appropriate position in the column labeled "None."!faddition

al space is needed in any category, anach e separate ofthe catcgorics, place

with the exec name,case number,and the number of the category.

properly identified

the debtor is marticd.state whether husband, wife, bath,orchest

the marital co~nunity

own the property by plocing an "H,""W,""J," or "C" in the columniflabeled

"Husband, Wifc, Joint, m Community." If the debtor is an individua

petition is fled, sta~c the amount ofany exemptions claimed only in Schedul

l or e joint

Do not Ii:t Interests in executory contracts and unexp(red lcasec on thin -Property Claimed os EzempG

schedule. List them to Schedule G -Executory Contnets

Unexpired L.cascs.

and

If the properly is being held for the debtor by someone else, ata~e that F►erson's

name

and

address under "Dascriplion and l,acation of Property."

If the property is being held fa a minor child, simply sm~c the child's

initials and the name end address of the child's purcnt or guardian

"A.H.. a minor child, by Sohn Doe, guardian." Do not disclose the child's

name. Sec, II U.S.C. § 112 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. I(f(}7(m). , such as

Husband,

Curtsnt Value of

Type of Property

Description and Location of Property

Debtors Interest in Prc~erty.

H'~fe~

Joint,

without Deducting any

Commaniry Secured Claim or Exemption

1. Cash on hand

Debtor has approximately S201n cash on hand

20.00

2. Checking, savings of ocher financin!

Debtor has cheeking account with Heartland Bank

50.00

accounts, ceRificates of deposit, or

and Trust account number ending In 4944 with

shares in banks, savings and loan,

approxlmataly :50.

thrift, building and loan, and

homestead associations, or credit

bebtar has savings aceount used by daughter with

unions. brokerage houses, or

25.00

Heartland Bank account number ending In 1365

cooperatives.

with approximately =50.

Security deposiu with public

utilities, telephone companios,

landlords, and others.

4. Household goods and furnishings,

including audio, video, end

computer equipment.

Debtor has approximately 5540 In household goods

and furnlsh(ngs In storefront loft at

Loeatlon: 1260 Aspen, Rantoul IL 69866

Books, pictures and other art

objects, antiques, smmp,coin,

record, tape, compost disc, and

other collections or collcctiblcs.

Wearing apparel.

Furs and jewelry.

Firearms and sports, photographic,

and other hobby egttipmrnt.

lntcrosts in insurnncc policies.

Numr insurance company of each

policy and itemize surnnder or

refund value ofcnch.

10. Annuities. Itemize and name each

issuer.

500.00

Debtor has approximately S25 in wearing apparel.

Sub-Total >

(Totol of this page)

25.00

624.00

continuation sheets atwched to the Schedule of Personal Property

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75a

E223

Best Csse Buiknrntn

eee rom~~t Foy bob t tzro~~ - ca,~

In rc

Chuckle Dwayne Duckworth

Case No.

Debtor

SCHEDULE B -PERSONAL PROPERTY

(Continuation Shcct)

Type of Pro~rty

1. lntcrests in an education IRA as

defined in 26 U.S.C.§ 530(bxl)or

under a qualified Stole tuition plan

as defined in 26 U.S.C. p 529(bxl).

Qivc particulars. (File separetcly the

records)of eny such interest(s).

i i U.S.C. § 521i~)•)

12. Interests in IR.A, ERISA,Keogh,or

other pension or profit sharing

plans. Give particulars.

13. Stock and intcresu in incomoratcd

and unincomorated businesses.

Itcmiic.

14. Interests in partnerships or joint

ventures. Itemize.

1 S. Government and corjwratc bonds

and other negotiable and

nonnegotiable inswments.

i6. Accounts rccaivablc.

17. Alimony, maintenance,support,and

property actticments w which ehc

debtor is or may be entitled. Give

particulars.

1 8. Other liquidated debu owed to debtor

including tax refunds. Give porticulars.

bcscription and Locution of Property

Husband,

Curtrnt Value of

W~fc,

Debtors Inlcrest in Proneny,

Sant,or

without Deducting arty

Community Secured Claim or Exemption

Debtor has 112 accumulated interest to expected tax

return of 51600.

9. Equimble or future interest, life

estates, and rights or powers

cxet~isnble for the bencfU ofthe

debtor other than those toted in

Schedule A - Ree! Property.

2d. Contingent and noncontingent

interests in estate ofa decedent,

death benefit plan. life insurance

policy, or trust.

21. Other contingent and unliquidatcd

claims ofevery nature, including

mx refunds, counterclaims ofthe

debtor, end rishts to setoff claims.

Give estimated value ofeach,

Sub-Total >

('1'otel of this page)

Shcct 1 of 2 continuation sheets attnchec~

to the Schedule of Personal Property

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76a

900.00

900.60

E224

B6fl(Oflkinl Farm 6B)(1T~07)•Com.

In m

Chuckta Dwayne Duckworth

Case No.

Debtor

SCHEDULE B -PERSONAL PROPERTY

(Continuation Shect)

1~I

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.