Petition for Writ of Certiorari — LeAndre Jordan, Petitioner v. Ohio

No. ______

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________________________

LEANDRE JORDAN, PETITIONER

V.

THE STATE OF OHIO, RESPONDENT

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAW OFFICE OF THE HAMILTON COUNTY

PUBLIC DEFENDER

Sarah E. Nelson, Esq.

Assistant Public Defender

(Counsel of Record)

Raymond T. Faller, Esq.

Hamilton County Public Defender

Christine Y. Jones, Esq.

Appellate Director

230 East Ninth Street, Second Floor

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

(513) 946-3665 voice

(513) 946-3840 fax

snelson@hamiltoncountypd.org

Attorneys for Petitioner,

Leandre Jordan

FLOWERS & GRUBE

Louis E. Grube, Esq.

Paul W. Flowers, Esq.

Melissa A. Ghrist, Esq.

Terminal Tower, 40th Floor

50 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44113

(216) 344-9393

leg@pwfco.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A:

Supreme Court of Ohio, Judgment Entry and Opinion

State v. Jordan, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3922, dated

November 9, 2021 .................................................................. App. 1-33

Appendix B:

Ohio Court of Appeals for the First Appellate District,

Judgment Entry and Opinion, State v. Jordan, Nos. C180559, C-180560, dated February 28, 2020, .................... App. 34-44

Appendix C:

Judgment Entry of the Court of Common Pleas for

Hamilton County, Ohio dated September 24, 2018, State

v. Jordan, No. B-1607185-A ................................................ App. 45-47

Appendix D:

Judgment Entry of the Court of Common Pleas for

Hamilton County, Ohio dated September 24, 2018, State

v. Jordan, No. B-1702130-A ................................................ App. 48-51

Appendix E:

Judgment Entry of the Court of Common Pleas for

Hamilton County, Ohio, Overruling Defendant’s Motion

to Suppress dated April 2, 2018, State v. Jordan, Nos. B1607185, B-1702130-A .............................................................. App. 52

Appendix F:

Excerpt from Transcript of Proceedings dated March 7,

2018 ...................................................................................... App. 53-56

Appendix G:

Ohio Revised Code § 2935.03 .............................................. App. 57-76

ii

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

FILED NOV 9, 2021

CLERK OF COURT

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

State of Ohio

Case No. 2020-0495

v.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

Leandre Jordan

APPEAL FROM THE

COURT OF APPEALS

This cause, here on appeal from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,

was considered in the manner prescribed by law. On consideration thereof, the

judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, consistent with the opinion rendered

herein.

It is further ordered that mandates be sent to and filed with the clerks of the

Court of Appeals for Hamilton County and the Court of Common Pleas for Hamilton

County.

(Hamilton County Court of Appeals; Nos. C180559 and C180560)

s/ Maureen O’Connor

Maureen O’Connor

Chief Justice

The official case announcement, and opinion if issued, can be found at

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/

APPENDIX A

App. 1

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

State v. Jordan, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3922.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made

before the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-3922

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE v. JORDAN, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as State v. Jordan, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3922.]

Criminal law—Warrantless arrest—R.C. 2935.04—Neither a showing of

exigent circumstances nor a showing of the impracticability of

obtaining an arrest warrant is necessary to sustain the

constitutionality of a warrantless arrest under either the United

States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution—Court of appeals’

judgment affirmed.

(No. 2020-0495—Submitted March 31, 2021—Decided November 9, 2021.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County,

Nos. C-1800559 and C-1800560, 2020-Ohio-689.

_____________________

APPENDIX A

App. 2

O’CONNOR, C.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, LeAndre Jordan, challenges the constitutionality of his

warrantless arrest, which ultimately led to his convictions for multiple drug offenses.

He asks this court to hold that a police officer is constitutionally required to secure

an arrest warrant before conducting an arrest anytime the circumstances

demonstrate that it is practicable to do so.

{¶ 2} R.C. 2935.04, Ohio’s felony-arrest statute, authorizes a warrantless

arrest “[w]hen a felony has been committed, or there is reasonable ground to believe

that a felony has been committed” and there is “reasonable cause to believe” that the

person being arrested is guilty of the offense. This court has held, consistently with

United States Supreme Court precedent, “A warrantless arrest that is based upon

probable cause and occurs in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment”

to the United States Constitution. State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55,

2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66, citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,

96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Today, we reiterate that holding and further hold

that neither a showing of exigent circumstances nor a showing of the impracticability

of obtaining an arrest warrant is necessary to sustain the constitutionality of a

warrantless arrest under either the United States Constitution or the Ohio

Constitution.

Facts and procedural background

{¶ 3} This appeal stems from Jordan’s convictions in the Hamilton County

Court of Common Pleas for various drug offenses, but Jordan’s drug charges arose as

APPENDIX A

App. 3

a result of his arrest for an unrelated crime with which he was ultimately not charged.

The investigation of that unrelated offense is the focus of our analysis.

{¶ 4} On December 12, 2016, someone broke into James and Emiko Locke’s

Cincinnati home through a bedroom window and stole a safe that contained $40,000.

Cincinnati Police Detective Mark Longworth, who investigated the burglary,

characterized it as “unusual in that really only the safe was taken,” as only a few

people knew of the safe’s location and contents. James Locke told Detective

Longworth that other than Locke and his wife, only his son Michael and godson

Demarco knew about the safe.

{¶ 5} The Lockes suspected that Michael had been involved in the burglary.

They told Detective Longworth that they had thrown Michael out of the house but

that he had “recently come back around.” They were suspicious of Michael because

he had telephoned them around the time of the burglary to determine whether they

were home. Michael then arrived at his parents’ home shortly after they discovered

the burglary, “fishing around for information about what had happened” and what

they knew. When a neighbor stopped by and reported that he had seen a suspicious

vehicle—a cream-colored Chrysler 300—parked near the Lockes’ house around the

time of the burglary, Michael became upset and told the neighbor to leave.

{¶ 6} The Lockes believed that the vehicle the neighbor had described belonged

to Michael’s friend “Dre”—appellant, LeAndre Jordan—whom they described to

Detective Longworth and characterized as “trouble.” They told Detective Longworth

that Jordan worked at a barbershop near the Kroger store on Warsaw Avenue.

APPENDIX A

App. 4

Detective Longworth located a cream-colored Chrysler parked in the Kroger parking

lot, across the street from the barbershop; it was registered to Jordan’s mother.

{¶ 7} Detective Longworth interviewed Michael a couple of days after the

burglary, and Michael confirmed that Jordan drove the car that Detective Longworth

had located in the Kroger parking lot. Michael’s cell-phone call log confirmed calls to

his parents at 4:23 p.m. and 4:29 p.m. on December 12, 2016, shortly before the

burglary, as well as multiple calls between Michael and Jordan around the time of

the burglary.

{¶ 8} As a result of his investigation, Detective Longworth believed that Jordan

was involved in the burglary. For several days, he observed Jordan coming and going

between the cream-colored Chrysler, parked in the Kroger parking lot, and the

barbershop. On December 20, eight days after the burglary, Detective Longworth and

another officer arrested Jordan as he exited a cell-phone store.

{¶ 9} At the time of his arrest, Jordan was carrying his girlfriend’s

identification and keys that had an apartment number on them. Detective Longworth

determined that Jordan was staying with his girlfriend at that apartment. Based on

that information, Detective Longworth obtained a warrant to search the apartment

for evidence related to the burglary. The search did not uncover evidence that could

be definitively linked to the burglary, but officers found and seized approximately

$2,100 in cash, as well as heroin, cocaine, an electronic scale, and a handgun. Jordan’s

drug charges stemmed from the evidence seized.

APPENDIX A

App. 5

{¶ 10} Jordan filed a motion to suppress. He argued that his arrest was

unconstitutional and that the evidence should be suppressed as the fruit of that

constitutional violation. Jordan admitted in his motion, “An arrest without a warrant

is constitutionally valid if, at the moment the arrest is made, the arresting officer has

probable cause to make it,” but he argued that his arrest was not supported by

probable cause. At the suppression hearing, Jordan’s attorney primarily repeated the

argument that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Jordan, but he also stated

more broadly that “there was no warrant,” even though eight days had elapsed during

which Detective Longworth could have obtained one.

{¶ 11} The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the case proceeded

to a jury trial. Jordan was convicted of trafficking in heroin, aggravated trafficking

in drugs, possession of heroin, aggravated possession of drugs, and possession of

cocaine. After merging allied offenses, the trial court sentenced Jordan to an 11-year

prison term and imposed a driver’s license suspension.

{¶ 12} Jordan appealed his convictions to the First District Court of Appeals,

challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The First District held

that the trial court did not err by denying Jordan’s motion to suppress, and it affirmed

his convictions. 1 It rejected Jordan’s argument that the information known to

Detective Longworth at the time of Jordan’s arrest did not establish probable cause.

It also rejected Jordan’s argument, which Jordan had not raised in

1 The court of appeals did, however, remand the case to the trial court for a nunc pro

tunc entry to correct a clerical error in the sentencing entry with respect to the length

of the imposed license suspension

APPENDIX A

App. 6

his motion to suppress, that his arrest was unlawful because there were no exigent

circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶ 13} This court accepted a discretionary appeal to consider a single

proposition of law: “Under R.C. 2935.04, once probable cause is established, a

warrantless arrest is unconstitutional if there is unreasonable delay in effecting the

arrest. Whether the delay is reasonable depends upon the circumstances surrounding

the delay and the nature of the offense.” Jordan frames his proposition of law in terms

of unreasonable delay, but he also variously casts his argument in terms of a

requirement of exigent circumstances or of the impracticability of securing an arrest

warrant. Essentially, he asks this court to hold that a police officer is constitutionally

required to secure an arrest warrant before conducting an arrest whenever the

circumstances demonstrate that it is practicable to do so.

Analysis

{¶ 14} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio

Constitution contains virtually identical language. With respect to felony cases, this

court has interpreted Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution as providing the

same protections as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 12, citing State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163,

APPENDIX A

App. 7

2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 10, fn. 1. 2 Although the Ohio Constitution may

provide greater protections than the United States Constitution, we have

“harmonize[d] our interpretation” of Article I, Section 14 with the Fourth Amendment

“unless there are persuasive reasons” for not doing so. State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio

St.3d 234, 239, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). Jordan offers no basis for treating the

provisions differently here. We therefore review and address Jordan’s arguments

through the lens of the Fourth Amendment.

A warrantless arrest based on probable cause and conducted in public

is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment

{¶ 15} Jordan frames his proposition of law as presenting a constitutional

question that arises upon application of R.C. 2935.04, which states: “When a felony

has been committed, or there is reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been

committed, any person without a warrant may arrest another whom he has

2 The dissent cites State v. Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, 39 N.E.3d

496, to claim that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution affords greater

protections than the Fourth Amendment, but that case involved an unauthorized

arrest for a minor misdemeanor. We held, “A traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor

made outside a police officer’s statutory jurisdiction or authority violates the

guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures established by Article I,

Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.” Id. at ¶ 26. And we based that holding on our

prior statement that “ ‘Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides greater

protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against

warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 21, quoting

State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, ¶ 22. Not only

have we never found greater protection regarding felony arrests under the Ohio

Constitution than that provided by the United States Constitution, but Jordan does

not ask us to do so here.

APPENDIX A

App. 8

reasonable cause to believe is guilty of the offense, and detain him until a warrant

can be obtained.”

{¶ 16} Contrary to the premise of the proposition of law this court accepted,

the dissent reasons that R.C. 2935.04 is a citizen’s-arrest statute that does not apply

to law-enforcement officials who are acting within the course and scope of their

duties. Rather, it states that the only statutory authority afforded to law-enforcement

officers to conduct warrantless arrests is found in R.C. 2935.03, a statute that neither

Jordan nor the state has cited in their merit briefs. While R.C. 2935.03 admittedly

cloaks law-enforcement officers with authority to conduct warrantless arrests in

certain situations, that authority does not diminish the applicability of R.C. 2935.04

to law-enforcement officers. Indeed, this court has cited R.C. 2935.04 in numerous

cases that involved warrantless arrests conducted by law-enforcement officers. See,

e.g., State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 38-39;

State v. Wac, 68 Ohio St.2d 84, 88, 428 N.E.2d 428 (1981); State v. Timson, 38 Ohio

St.2d 122, 127, 311 N.E.2d 16 (1974). Yet never once have we articulated the

concern—one that ignores the statute’s plain application to “any person”—that the

dissent raises here.

{¶ 17} R.C. 2935.04 authorizes warrantless arrests for felony offenses. But

statutory authority to make an arrest does not mean that the arrest passes

constitutional scrutiny. We must therefore determine whether a warrantless arrest

made in accordance with R.C. 2935.04 is consistent with the protections afforded by

the Fourth Amendment.

APPENDIX A

App. 9

{¶ 18} “ ‘[T]he underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that

searches and seizures be reasonable.’ ” Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931, 115

S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337,

105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). An arrest is “ ‘quintessentially a seizure,’ ” that

is subject to the Fourth Amendment and that must be reasonable. Payton v. New

York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), quoting Watson, 423

U.S. at 428, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (Powell, J., concurring).

{¶ 19} The constitutionality of an arrest depends on whether, at the moment

the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it. Beck v. Ohio, 379

U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Probable cause is “defined in terms

of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the

[suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” (Brackets added in

Gerstein.) Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-112, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975),

quoting Beck at 91. When a warrantless arrest is challenged on constitutional

grounds, the court must determine whether the facts known to the officers at the time

of the arrest would “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that an offense

has been committed.” Beck at 96, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162,

45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). An arrest that is based on probable cause is a

reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Robinson, 414

U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), whereas an arrest that is not

supported by probable cause constitutes an unreasonable seizure, Donovan v.

Thames, 105 F.3d 291, 297-298 (6th Cir.1997), citing Beck at 90-91.

APPENDIX A

App. 10

{¶ 20} The use of probable cause as the standard for making an arrest

“represents a necessary accommodation between the individual’s right to liberty and

the State’s duty to control crime.” Gerstein at 112. It “is a practical, nontechnical

conception [that affords] the best compromise * * * for accommodating * * * often

opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow

less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or

caprice.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879

(1949).

{¶ 21} In Gerstein, the United States Supreme Court stated, “To implement

the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and

privacy, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a

neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible.” Id. at 112. That does not,

however, mean that an arrest warrant is necessary in all circumstances. Even though

requiring that a neutral and detached magistrate review in advance a police officer’s

factual justification for an arrest would ensure maximum protection of individual

rights, the Supreme Court noted that “it has never invalidated an arrest supported

by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant.” Id. at 113,

citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), Draper v.

United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), and Trupiano v.

United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948). But when a

police officer’s assessment of probable cause provides the justification for a

warrantless arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt, postarrest, judicial

APPENDIX A

App. 11

determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of the

arrestee’s liberty. 3 Id. at 113-114, 125.

{¶ 22} The United States Supreme Court returned to the issue of warrantless

felony arrests in Watson, in which it upheld, as consistent with the Fourth

Amendment, a warrantless arrest that was based on probable cause and that was

made in public. See 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598. The court stated that

nothing in its precedent indicated that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant to

make a valid felony arrest, and “[i]ndeed, the relevant prior decisions are uniformly

to the contrary.” Id. at 416-417. It characterized that precedent as “reflect[ing] the

ancient common-law rule” that a police officer may make a warrantless arrest for a

felony when the officer has reasonable grounds for making the arrest. Id. at 418. In

light of that longstanding rule, the court declined to transform a judicial preference

for arrest warrants into a constitutional requirement. Id. at 423.

{¶ 23} Watson does not, however, stand for the proposition that the police have

unlimited authority to effect a warrantless felony arrest as long as they have probable

cause. Other circumstances might compel the police to take additional steps in order

to ensure the arrest will survive constitutional scrutiny. For example, several years

after Watson, the United States Supreme Court considered whether and under what

circumstances an officer could enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest

in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 100

3 Jordan has not challenged the postarrest proceedings in his case, and we need not

address them here.

APPENDIX A

App. 12

S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. In Payton, the court recognized that “ ‘physical entry of

the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is

directed,’ ” id. at 585-586, quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407

U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972), and that unlike a warrantless

seizure conducted in a public place, a warrantless seizure conducted inside a home is

presumptively unreasonable, id. at 586-587. It concluded that “the Fourth

Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house” that “may not

reasonably be crossed without a warrant” unless exigent circumstances exist. Id. at

590. Because Jordan was arrested in public, the rule announced in Payton is

inapplicable here. Instead, Watson controls.

Neither exigent circumstances nor the impracticability of obtaining a

warrant is required to justify a warrantless felony arrest that is

supported by probable cause and that is conducted in public

{¶ 24} Jordan no longer argues that the arresting officers did not have probable

cause to believe that he was involved in the burglary of the Lockes’ home. Rather, his

proposition of law concerns the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest “once

probable cause is established.”

{¶ 25} In support of his position that a police officer is constitutionally required

to obtain an arrest warrant any time it is practicable under the circumstances to do

so, Jordan relies on State v. Heston, 29 Ohio St.2d 152, 280 N.E.2d 376 (1972), in

which this court stated:

“Under certain circumstances, a warrant need not be

obtained in order to render an arrest valid. The arresting

APPENDIX A

App. 13

officer must have probable cause to believe that a felony

was committed by defendant, and the circumstances must

be such as to make it impracticable to secure a warrant.

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92

L.Ed 436 (1948)]; Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499,

500 [78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)]; Chapman v.

United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 [81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d

828 (1961)].”

Id. at 155, quoting State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 20, 215 N.E.2d 568 (1966). But

Heston is factually distinguishable from this case. The arrest challenged in Heston

was not conducted in public. Rather, the police arrested Heston inside private

property, based on information that Heston had committed a felony, that he intended

to leave town to evade apprehension, and that one of Heston’s alleged accomplices

had already fled. Id. Each of the cases that the United States Supreme Court cited in

Heston in support of an impracticability requirement likewise involved nonpublic

searches or seizures. See Johnson at 16-17; Jones at 495; Chapman at 610.

{¶ 26} Jordan argues that the trial court and the First District should have

followed Heston’s lead and determined whether the circumstances surrounding his

arrest made it impractical for the officers to have secured an arrest warrant, but that

argument ignores the innate difference between a warrantless arrest that occurs in

public and a warrantless entry into private property for the purpose of making a

felony arrest. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence consistently accords lawenforcement officers greater latitude when they exercise their duties in public places.

Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565, 119 S.Ct. 1555, 143 L.Ed.2d 748 (1999). In this

context, “although a warrant presumptively is required for a felony arrest in a

suspect’s home, the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests in public places

APPENDIX A

App. 14

where an officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has occurred.” Id., citing

Watson, 423 U.S. at 416-424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598.

{¶ 27} Even if indistinguishable on its facts, Heston’s remaining precedential

value is, at best, questionable with respect to warrantless arrests in public because it

predates Watson, in which the United States Supreme Court refused to require the

government to obtain a warrant for a public arrest even though there was

“concededly” time to do so. 423 U.S. at 414, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598. While Jordan

has suggested that we should read Watson narrowly, as applying only to cases

involving exigent circumstances, that reading of Watson is directly contrary to the

broad language the Supreme Court employed. The Supreme Court expressly held in

Watson that the Fourth Amendment does not require exigent circumstances or

impracticability of obtaining a warrant before police may conduct a warrantless

public arrest upon probable cause. Id. at 423-424. It noted, “[T]he judgment of the

Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on

probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation

with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to

get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like.” Id.

{¶ 28} Since Watson was decided, this court has held, clearly and without

qualification, “A warrantless arrest that is based upon probable cause and occurs in

a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55,

2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, at ¶ 66, citing Watson. And when evaluating a

constitutional challenge to a warrantless public arrest in State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio

APPENDIX A

App. 15

St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 38, we considered only whether there

was probable cause to support the arrest; because the police had probable cause, we

rejected the defendant’s challenge, id. at ¶ 40-41. We have never held that something

more than probable cause is required to render constitutional a felony arrest

conducted in public. And we decline to do so today. The First District appropriately

followed precedent in affirming the denial of Jordan’s motion to suppress.

{¶ 29} Contrary to the First District’s decision in this case, the Second District

Court of Appeals has held, albeit inconsistently, that not only must a warrantless

arrest be supported by probable cause to pass constitutional muster, but “it must also

be shown that obtaining an arrest warrant beforehand was impracticable under the

circumstances, i.e., that exigent circumstances exist.” State v. VanNoy, 188 Ohio

App.3d 89, 2010-Ohio-2845, 934 N.E.2d 413, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 183

Ohio App.3d 839, 2009-Ohio-4606, 919 N.E.2d 252, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), citing Heston, 29

Ohio St.2d 152, 280 N.E.2d 376, at paragraph two of the syllabus, and Woodards, 6

Ohio St.2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 568. But see State v. Short, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27712,

2018-Ohio-3202, ¶ 18, quoting Brown at ¶ 66 (“ ‘[a] warrantless arrest that is based

upon probable cause and occurs in public does not violate the Fourth Amendment’ ”).

For the reasons already stated in this opinion, we reject the Second District’s holding

in VanNoy as contrary to precedent from both this court and the United States

Supreme Court.

{¶ 30} Finally, even accepting that the existence of probable cause generally

makes a public felony arrest constitutionally permissible, Jordan argues that the

APPENDIX A

App. 16

general rule should not apply when there is an unreasonable delay between the

establishment of probable cause and the arrest itself. That argument, however,

amounts to nothing more than a repackaging of the previously rejected argument

that a warrantless felony arrest made in public is reasonable only if there are exigent

circumstances that make it impractical for the police to obtain an arrest warrant.

{¶ 31} Jordan likens the probable cause necessary to justify an arrest to that

required to justify a search for evidence, and he unpersuasively suggests that any

probable cause to believe that he was involved in the burglary of the Lockes’ home

had gone stale by virtue of the eight-day delay between the burglary and his arrest.

Probable cause to support the issuance of an arrest warrant does not grow stale in

the same ways as the probable cause that is necessary to support a warrant to search

for particular evidence in a particular place. Watson, 423 U.S. at 432, 96 S.Ct. 820,

46 L.Ed.2d 598, fn. 5 (Powell, J., concurring). Probable cause to believe that particular

objects exist in a particular place does not last indefinitely because delay in acting

upon such probable cause affords opportunities for the evidence to be moved, hidden,

or destroyed. On the other hand, there is nothing inherent in a delay that would make

a suspect’s involvement in a criminal offense less probable. See United States v.

Haldorson, 941 F.3d 284, 292 (7th Cir.2019) (“It is the rare case where ‘staleness’ will

be relevant to the legality of a warrantless arrest. When there is a reasonable belief

that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does not make the existence of

that fact any less probable” [footnote deleted]). Further investigation or

circumstances could discredit information that supports the belief that the suspect

APPENDIX A

App. 17

has committed a felony, but Jordan has identified no facts that came to light between

the time of the burglary and the time of his arrest that would have discredited the

information that formed the basis of the officers’ probable cause for believing that he

was involved in the burglary. Accordingly, the short delay in this case did not affect

the existence of probable cause so as to render Jordan’s arrest unreasonable.

Conclusion

{¶ 32} In accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, we again

hold that a warrantless arrest, conducted in public and with probable cause to believe

that the arrestee has committed a felony, is reasonable and does not violate the

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of the

Ohio Constitution. We further hold that neither the United States nor the Ohio

Constitution requires a showing of exigent circumstances or of the impracticability of

obtaining an arrest warrant to justify a warrantless public arrest supported by

probable cause. Because Jordan does not contest the lower courts’ determinations

that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that he had committed a

felony when they arrested him in public, we conclude that the arrest was

constitutionally valid. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the First District Court

of Appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.

DONNELLY, J., concurs in judgment only.

STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J.

APPENDIX A

App. 18

STEWART, J., dissenting.

_________________

{¶ 33} The majority opinion concludes that law-enforcement officers are

statutorily authorized to conduct warrantless arrests pursuant to R.C. 2935.04. With

that conclusion forming the basis for its analysis, the majority then goes on to hold

that warrantless arrests based on probable cause do not violate either the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio

Constitution. I disagree and therefore dissent.

{¶ 34} As a preliminary matter, the language of R.C. 2935.04, when read in

pari materia with other provisions of R.C. Chapter 2935, reveals that R.C. 2935.04 is

a citizen’s-arrest statute. As such, it does not authorize law-enforcement officers to

conduct warrantless arrests. Although law-enforcement officers do have statutory

authority to conduct warrantless arrests, the authority derives from R.C. 2935.03,

not R.C. 2935.04, and it is limited to the statutorily enumerated scenarios contained

therein. Accordingly, the foundation upon which the majority builds its analysis is

flawed.

{¶ 35} Nevertheless, the language of both R.C. 2935.03 and 2935.04 indicates

a requirement that an arrest warrant be obtained prior to an arrest unless doing so

is impracticable. Because the facts in this case demonstrate that the officers had

ample time to secure a warrant before arresting appellant, LeAndre Jordan, I

conclude that the officers acted outside of their statutory authority to arrest and in

violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. See State v. Brown, 143

Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, 39 N.E.3d 496, ¶ 23 (“Article I, Section 14 of the

APPENDIX A

App. 19

Ohio Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment against

searches and seizures conducted by members of law enforcement who lack authority

to make an arrest”).

R.C. 2935.04 is a Citizen’s-Arrest Statute

{¶ 36} R.C. 2935.04 states:

When a felony has been committed, or there is

reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been

committed, any person without a warrant may arrest

another whom he has reasonable cause to believe is guilty

of the offense, and detain him until a warrant can be

obtained.

Although R.C. 2935.04 states that “any person” may arrest, it is unclear from the

language of the enactment whether the term “any person” was meant to include lawenforcement officials acting within the normal course and scope of their duties. When

read in pari materia with other provisions of R.C. Chapter 2935, however, it becomes

clear that R.C. 2935.04 was not meant to apply to law-enforcement personnel acting

in their official capacity. This is because R.C. 2935.03 specifically authorizes the

police, and other types of law-enforcement officials, to conduct warrantless arrests in

certain circumstances.

{¶ 37} Under R.C. 2935.03(A)(1), members of law enforcement are authorized

to arrest without a warrant “a person found violating” a law within the limits of the

political subdivision in which they are appointed, employed, or elected. This court has

interpreted the phrase “found violating” to mean that law enforcement are authorized

to arrest when they view the commission of a crime. See State v. Lewis, 50 Ohio St.

179, 189, 33 N.E. 305 (1893) (interpreting the precursor statute to R.C. 2935.03(A)(1)

APPENDIX A

App. 20

and stating: “Section 7129, Rev[ised] St[atutes], provides for the arrest of persons

‘found violating’ a law or ordinance. Found by whom? The statute does not expressly

declare, but when the rules of the common law upon this subject are considered, it is

clear that the legislature meant, found by the officer who attempts to make the

arrest”); 1940 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 1940-2735 (equating the term “found violating”

with the term “on view” by the officer); State v. Henderson, 51 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 554

N.E.2d 104 (1990) (discussing the facts and holding from Lewis and using the term

“in the officer’s presence”). We have also interpreted R.S. 7129, the precursor statute

to R.C. 2935.03, as authorizing law enforcement to execute a warrantless arrest when

law enforcement may not have viewed the commission of a crime but nevertheless

have probable cause to believe the person subject to arrest is presently in the act of

committing a crime. Ballard v. State, 43 Ohio St. 340, 1 N.E. 76 (1885), paragraph

two of the syllabus (interpreting R.S. 7129 to permit an officer “without warrant, to

arrest a person found on the public streets of the corporation carrying concealed

weapons contrary to law, although he has no previous personal knowledge of the fact,

if he acts bona fide, and upon such information as induces an honest belief that the

person arrested is in the act of violating the law” [emphasis added]); Houck v. State,

106 Ohio St. 195, 198-199, 140 N.E. 112 (1922) (same holding as in Ballard); Porello

v. State, 121 Ohio St. 280, 284, 168 N.E. 135 (1929) (same holding as in Ballard). 4

4 In Ballard, this court did not explicitly equate probable cause with “acts bona fide,

and upon such information as induces an honest belief that the person arrested is in

the act of violating the law,” id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. However, we later

made that connection in Houck when we noted that the magistrate found that the

“evidence tended to show the good faith of the marshal and that he was acting upon

APPENDIX A

App. 21

The officer’s authority to conduct a warrantless arrest based on the officer’s

observation of the commission of the offense or reliable information that supports a

bona fide belief that a person is presently engaging in the commission of a crime even

if not based on the officer’s own observations—i.e., probable cause—extends to both

felonies and misdemeanors, see R.C. 2935.03(A)(1) (authorizing warrantless arrest

for violations of “a law of this state, an ordinance of a municipal corporation, or a

resolution of a township”).

{¶ 38} By contrast, R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) limits an officer’s warrantless arrest

authority to when the officer has “reasonable ground to believe” that an offense has

been committed within the officer’s jurisdiction—that is, that the commission of the

offense has already occurred—and “reasonable cause to believe” that the person

subject to arrest is guilty of committing the offense—that is, information that may

not have resulted from the officer directly observing the crime but is nonetheless

sufficient and reliable information giving rise to the belief that the person to be

arrested is the offender. In such instances, a police officer still may arrest without a

warrant but only if the offense is one of the following: an offense of violence, the

offense of criminal child enticement as defined in R.C. 2905.05, the offense of public

indecency as defined in R.C. 2907.09, the offense of domestic violence as defined in

R.C. 2919.25, the offense of violating a protection order as defined in R.C. 2919.27,

probable cause,” id. at 198. Thus, all that was left to determine in Houck was whether

the marshal needed to obtain a warrant prior to executing a search and arrest, when

the marshal had probable cause to believe that the person was presently committing

a crime. Applying the holding in Ballard, we determined that the marshal did not

need a warrant. Houck at 200.

APPENDIX A

App. 22

the offense of menacing by stalking as defined in R.C. 2903.211, the offense of

aggravated trespass as defined in R.C. 2911.211, a theft offense as defined in R.C.

2913.01, or a felony drug-abuse offense as defined in R.C. 2925.01. R.C. 2935.03(B)(1).

Thus, it can be said that an officer’s more limited authority to arrest in instances in

which the commission of the offense is a fait accompli extends only to those offenses

for which there may be a high risk that the suspect poses an immediate threat to an

individual, the public, or himself or that evidence or stolen property will be lost if the

suspect is not apprehended straightaway—i.e., offenses of violence, 5 some of the more

serious misdemeanor offenses, and theft and felony drug-abuse offenses.

{¶ 39} Concluding, as the majority does, that R.C. 2935.04 authorizes police

officers to arrest without a warrant when any felony has been committed and there

is reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested is guilty of the offense

renders the felony-arrest limitations in R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) wholly superfluous. This

cannot be countenanced. It is our duty when interpreting statutes to ensure that

related and coexisting statutes are harmonized and that each be given full application

except in the rare event that “they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict.” United

Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643 N.E.2d 1129 (1994); see also

5 R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) defines “offense of violence” and lists the offenses falling under

this category. Most of these offenses are felony offenses. Included within the list is

R.C. 2911.12, burglary, the offense for which Jordan was arrested although not

ultimately prosecuted. Thus, based solely on the offense type, the police would have

been authorized under R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) to arrest Jordan without first obtaining a

warrant. However, and as explained in greater detail below, the police exceeded their

authority by failing to seek an arrest warrant when they had more than enough time

to do so, there was no apparent reason to believe that Jordan would abscond, and

there was no other evident exigency.

APPENDIX A

App. 23

R.C. 1.51 (when there is a conflict between a general and a special provision, the

provisions shall be construed to give effect to both if possible; if not possible, the

special provision prevails unless the general provision is enacted later in time and it

is the manifest intent of the legislature for the general provision to prevail); State v.

Chippendale, 52 Ohio St.3d 118, 120, 556 N.E.2d 1134 (1990) (“It is a well-established

principle of statutory construction that specific statutory provisions prevail over

conflicting general statutes. In recognition of this principle, the General Assembly

enacted R.C. 1.51 * * *”). 6 The majority’s interpretation of the law places R.C. 2935.03

6 R.C. 2935.04 has remained unchanged since it was enacted in 1929. See Am.S.B.

No. 8, 113 Ohio Laws 123, 140 (codifying the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ohio and

showing the language of G.C. 13432-2, which is the same as present-day R.C. 2935.04);

see also Am.H.B. No. 1, 125 Ohio Laws 7 (recodifying the entire General Code into the

Ohio Revised Code in 1953). By contrast, R.C. 2935.03—specifically the provisions of

subdivision (B)—has undergone numerous changes since 1953. Subdivision (B) did

not exist in 1953 when the General Code was recodified into the Revised Code, let

alone in 1929 when the language of R.C. 2935.04 was first introduced. Many of the

provisions of R.C. 2935.03(B) were first enacted in the 1970s, with significant

revisions continuing through the 1980s and 1990s. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 29, 132 Ohio

Laws, Part II, 2124; Part I, 959; see also Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws 1866,

1990; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 300, 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2311, 2331; Am.Sub.H.B. No.

835, 137 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3524, 3532; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 588, 137 Ohio Laws, Part

II, 3011, 3015; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 355, 138 Ohio Laws 1179; Sub.H.B. No. 129, 140 Ohio

Laws, Part I, 2060, 2066, 2075; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 321, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1192,

1215; Sub.S.B. No. 33, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 23; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 356, 141 Ohio

Laws, Part I, 967, 970, 992; Am.H.B. No. 284, 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3101, 3109,

3112; Sub.H.B. No. 231, 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2635, 2706, 2952; Am.Sub.H.B. No.

261, 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3100, 3110, 3126; Sub.H.B. No. 708, 142 Ohio Laws, Part

III, 4853, 5007, 5176; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 82, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 879, 886; Sub.H.B.

No. 42, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2837, 2740; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 335, 145 Ohio Laws,

Part III, 5451, 5474. Accordingly, there can be no debate that the provisions of R.C.

2935.03(B) were adopted at a date in time later than those contained in R.C. 2935.04.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that the legislature manifested an intent that the

general provisions in R.C. 2935.04 prevail over the more specific provisions of R.C.

2935.03(B). It would make no sense for the legislature to spend time painstakingly

amending the provisions of R.C. 2935.03(B) if R.C. 2935.04 already gives law-

APPENDIX A

App. 24

and 2935.04 in direct conflict and, worse still, renders the more specific provisions of

R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) largely ineffective. To avoid this result, we should interpret R.C.

2935.04 as authorizing only private citizens and those not acting under color of law

as law-enforcement officials to make warrantless arrests, when there is reasonable

cause to believe that the person to be arrested is guilty of having committed a felony

offense.

{¶ 40} The majority justifies its decision not to engage in any critical analysis

of the two statutes by stating first that the parties did not raise this issue to this court

and second that this court has applied R.C. 2935.04 to police officers in other cases.

While these statements are true, they certainly do not preclude the majority from

analyzing the statutes now. In Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E.

Roark Cos., Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993), we stated:

As a general rule, this court will not consider

arguments that were not raised in the courts below. See

State v. 1981 Dodge Ram Van (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 168,

170, 522 N.E.2d 524, 526. The waiver doctrine, however, is

not absolute. Id. at 169-170, 522 N.E.2d at 526; In re M.D.

(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286. When an issue

of law that was not argued below is implicit in another

issue that was argued and is presented by an appeal, we

may consider and resolve that implicit issue. To put it

another way, if we must resolve a legal issue that was not

raised below in order to reach a legal issue that was raised,

we will do so.

In the recent past, when we have encountered a predicate question that, as a practical

matter, should be answered before the question presented by the proposition of law

enforcement officials carte blanche to arrest without a warrant when there are

reasonable grounds to believe that any felony, regardless of type, has been committed.

APPENDIX A

App. 25

is considered, we have taken appropriate measures to address the predicate question.

See State v. Jones, 162 Ohio St.3d 542, 2020-Ohio-4031, 166 N.E.3d 1096, ¶ 3

(declining to resolve the proposition of law accepted for review and instead remanding

to the court of appeals to address the predicate question of whether defendant’s

waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary); see also State v. Harper,

160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248 (overruling our void-sentence

cases even though the parties did not raise a facial challenge to the void-sentence

doctrine on appeal).

{¶ 41} The question presently before the court presumes that R.C. 2935.04

applies to law-enforcement personnel but then goes on to ask whether the United

States or Ohio Constitutions require law-enforcement officials to obtain an arrest

warrant if possible. Before answering this question, however, we need to determine

whether the presumption on which it relies is correct. This court has never addressed,

let alone reconciled, the provisions of R.C. 2935.03 as compared to those in R.C.

2935.04. And given the prime opportunity to do so here, the court conveniently

declines. As pointed out in this dissent, when R.C. 2935.03 and 2935.04 are read in

pari materia, one cannot help but conclude that R.C. 2935.04 does not authorize police

action at all. That this court may have previously taken for granted that R.C. 2935.04

applies to the police does not absolve us of our obligation to correct that mistake now

that the issue has been brought to our attention.

Neither R.C. 2935.03 nor R.C. 2935.04 Authorizes a Warrantless Arrest if an

Arrest Warrant Could Have Been Obtained; Arresting Without Authority to

APPENDIX A

App. 26

Arrest Violates the Constitution

{¶ 42} R.C. 2935.04 does not authorize police to conduct a warrantless arrest.

Rather, law enforcement’s authority to arrest without a warrant derives solely from

the more limited terms of R.C. 2935.03. But both statutes contain an additional

constraint on the authority to arrest beyond simply requiring probable cause to do

so 7—one that the officers in this case completely ignored. When there is reasonable

cause to believe that a person has committed an offense, both R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) and

2935.04 authorize a warrantless arrest and detention of that person “until a warrant

can be obtained.” This clause, “until a warrant can be obtained,” certainly stands for

the fact that the person executing the arrest must, within a reasonable amount of

time after the arrest, secure a warrant that authorizes the continued arrest and

detention. Compare R.C. 2935.05 (“When a person named in section 2935.03 of the

Revised Code has arrested a person without a warrant, he shall, without unnecessary

R.C. 2935.03(B)(1) and 2935.04 embrace the federal and state constitutional

requirements that arrests be supported by probable cause, by authorizing

warrantless arrests only when “there is reasonable ground to believe” that an offense

has been committed and “reasonable cause to believe” that the person to be arrested

is guilty of the offense. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93

L.Ed. 1879 (1949), quoting McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881) (“ ‘The

substance of all the definitions’ of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of

guilt’ ”); see also State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207, 857 N.E.2d

547, ¶ 38-39 (equating the phrases “reasonable ground to believe” and “reasonable

cause to believe,” found in R.C. 2935.04, with probable cause). Although in Elmore we

correctly found R.C. 2935.04’s “reasonable belief” language to be synonymous with

probable cause, we nevertheless applied R.C. 2935.04 to a warrantless arrest made

by law-enforcement officers—like the majority opinion does in this case. However,

just like the majority opinion here, this court in Elmore did not address how R.C.

2935.04 can apply to police when the statute is read in pari materia with R.C.

2935.03.

7

APPENDIX A

App. 27

delay, take the person arrested before a court or magistrate having jurisdiction of the

offense, and shall file or cause to be filed an affidavit describing the offense for which

the person was arrested”) and R.C. 2935.06 (“A private person who has made an

arrest pursuant to section 2935.04 of the Revised Code or detention pursuant to

section 2935.041 of the Revised Code shall forthwith take the person arrested before

the most convenient judge or clerk of a court of record or before a magistrate, or

deliver such person to an officer authorized to execute criminal warrants who shall,

without unnecessary delay, take such person before the court or magistrate having

jurisdiction of the offense. The officer may, but if he does not, the private person shall

file or cause to be filed in such court or before such magistrate an affidavit stating

the offense for which the person was arrested”) with R.C. 2935.08 (“Upon the filing of

an affidavit or complaint as provided in sections 2935.05 or 2935.06 of the Revised

Code such judge, clerk, or magistrate shall forthwith issue a warrant to the peace

officer making the arrest, or if made by a private person, to the most convenient peace

officer who shall receive custody of the person arrested. All further detention and

further proceedings shall be pursuant to such affidavit or complaint and warrant”);

see also Crim.R. 4(E)(2); State v. Gedeon, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29153, 2019-Ohio3348, ¶ 36 (defendant entitled to a prompt judicial determination of probable cause

in the wake of warrantless arrest); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-114, 95 S.Ct.

854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).

{¶ 43} But importantly, regarding the question now before the court, the

language “until a warrant can be obtained” also presupposes that there was not time,

APPENDIX A

App. 28

or that it was otherwise impracticable, to obtain an arrest warrant prior to the arrest.

Our case law has long supported this understanding and indeed could not be clearer.

In our discussion of R.S. 7129 and 7130—precursors to present-day R.C. 2935.03 and

2935.04, respectively—we stated:

Nor do we deny the power of officers, and even

private persons, to arrest criminals, under some

circumstances, without warrant or charge on oath or

affirmation. This power is recognized in our statutes (66

Ohio L. 291; 74 Ohio L. 317; Rev. Stats. §§ 7129, 7130), has

long existed, and is not prohibited by any constitutional

provision. But these statutes provide, in effect, that the

person so arrested can only be detained “until a legal

warrant can be obtained,” and such warrant can only be

issued on oath or affirmation. In other words, such power

to detain without warrant exists to the end that there may

not be a failure of justice through the escape of criminals,

and the power is measured by, and ends with, the necessity

on which it is based.

(Emphasis added.) Eichenlaub v. State, 36 Ohio St. 140, 143-144 (1880). In Leger v.

Warren, we made similar pronouncements:

The right to make arrests without warrant is

conferred by the statute in order to prevent the escape of

criminals where that is likely to result from delay in

procuring a writ for their apprehension; and it was not the

purpose to dispense with the necessity of obtaining such writ

as soon as the situation will reasonably permit. To afford

protection to the officer or person making the arrest, the

authority must be strictly pursued; and no unreasonable

delay in procuring a proper warrant for the prisoner’s

detention can be excused or tolerated. Any other rule would

leave the power open to great abuse and oppression.

(Emphasis added.) 62 Ohio St. 500, 508, 57 N.E. 506 (1900); see also Munzebrock v.

State, 10 Ohio Dec.Rep. 277, 278, 1886 WL 2635 (C.P.1886) (“An arrest without a

APPENDIX A

App. 29

warrant has never been lawful except in such cases as is expressly authorized by

statute, on the ground that public security required it under certain circumstances”).

{¶ 44} In this case, the police acted outside of their authority to execute a

warrantless arrest when they had ample time to procure a warrant prior to Jordan’s

arrest but failed to do so. There was no exigency that justified their conduct.

{¶ 45} There were eight days between when the burglary offense was

committed on December 12, 2016, and when the police arrested Jordan without a

warrant on December 20, 2016. All information available to the police, which the

lower courts concluded amounted to probable cause, was known to the officers within

a couple of days after the burglary.

{¶ 46} On the day of the burglary, the victims recounted to Detective

Longworth the reasons that they suspected their son Michael and his friend “Dre”—

later determined to be Jordan—had been responsible for the burglary. They also told

the detective exactly where Jordan worked and what type of car he drove. Detective

Longworth was able to locate a vehicle fitting the description provided by the victims

parked outside of Jordan’s workplace and observed Jordan leaving his work and

getting into that vehicle. A couple of days later, while interviewing Michael, Detective

Longworth learned that Michael and Jordan were together on the day of the burglary.

From phone records, Detective Longworth learned that Michael had made several

calls to Jordan around the time of the offense. Detective Longworth testified that he

then spent several days simply observing Jordan getting in and out of the car near

his place of employment until finally, the officers decided to execute a warrantless

APPENDIX A

App. 30

arrest as Jordan was leaving a cell-phone store on December 20, 2016. It is important

to note that nothing happened during these several days that would have justified

law enforcement’s failure to get a warrant. The commission of the burglary was long

over and nothing about Jordan’s behavior would have indicated to the police that he

was then engaged in any criminal activity or that he would be likely to flee in the

time it might have taken to get a warrant. In fact, Jordan’s behavior of showing up

to work and leaving around the same time each day, tended to show the opposite—

that he was not then engaged in criminal activity and had responsibilities associated

with his employment that required him to maintain a steady schedule. And because

the police knew where he worked and understood his schedule, the police would have

known exactly where to find him once they obtained an arrest warrant. It is clear

that under the circumstances, the police had ample time to submit the information

they had to a neutral and detached judicial officer and if that judicial officer found

the information sufficient to issue an arrest warrant, secure one to make the arrest.

No exigency existed at the time of Jordan’s arrest that required it be made without a

warrant. The officers therefore completely bypassed the protections afforded citizens

by the law requiring arrest warrants and acted outside of their statutorily prescribed

warrantless-arrest authority when they arrested Jordan.

{¶ 47} In State v. Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, 39 N.E.3d 496,

¶ 23, we recognized that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution protects against

searches and seizures conducted by members of law enforcement who lack authority

to make an arrest. Specifically, we noted our precedent that “[a]n arrest made in

APPENDIX A

App. 31

violation of a statute limiting the police officer’s authority to make the arrest

infringes on ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures’ as guaranteed by

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting Ohio Constitution,

Article I, Section 14. Under our decision in Brown, it is clear that in acting outside of

their arrest authority, the police here violated the rights conferred to Jordan under

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Today’s majority opinion not only

sanctions this constitutional violation; it also eliminates the need for police officers to

ever obtain an arrest warrant. Whereas before today’s decision, the police were

required to submit evidence of a suspected crime to a neutral and detached judicial

officer for a determination whether the information satisfied the constitutional

requirements for an arrest warrant to issue, the police can now bypass this judicial

review without reason or exigent circumstance and need only wait until a person who

is suspected of committing a crime leaves his home or otherwise ventures into the

public sphere. Once in public, that person can be arrested under this newly created

type of “lawful” arrest, regardless of the quantity or the quality of the information the

police officers have, and the person arrested can then be subjected to all other lawenforcement procedures, some of which are extremely invasive, that flow from an

arrest.

Conclusion

{¶ 48} For the foregoing reasons, I find that the police acted outside of their

statutory authority when they made a warrantless arrest of Jordan even though they

APPENDIX A

App. 32

had ample time to secure an arrest warrant. In doing so, the police violated Article I,

Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the

court of appeals.

BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R.

Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson,

Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Ron O’Brien, former Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L.

Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio

Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Patrick T. Clark, Assistant Public

Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender.

_________________

APPENDIX A

App. 33

THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO

APPEAL NOS. C-180559

C-180560

TRIAL NOS. B-1702130

B-1607185A

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LEANDRE JORDAN,

JUDGMENT ENTRY

Defendant-Appellant.

ENTERED FEB 28 2020

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, the briefs, and arguments.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and cause remanded for the

reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date.

Further, this court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,

allows no penalty, and orders that costs are taxed under App. R. 24.

The court further orders that 1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the

Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and 2) the mandate be sent to the trial

court for execution under App. R. 27.

To The Clerk:

Enter upon the Journal of the Court on February 28, 2020 per Order of the

Court.

By: s/ R J Mock

APPENDIX B

App. 34

Presiding Judge

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO

APPEAL NOS. C-180559

C-180560

TRIAL NOS. B-1702130

B-1607185A

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LEANDRE JORDAN,

OPINION.

Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENTED TO THE CLERK

OF COURTS FOR FILING

FEB 28 2020

COURT OF APPEALS

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Please

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 28, 2020

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Melynda J. Machol,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson,

Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.

ENTERED

FEB 28 2020

APPENDIX B

App. 35

CROUSE, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant LeAndre Jordan appeals his convictions for

aggravated trafficking in drugs. In two assignments of error, he argues that the trial

court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and in failing to document a three-year

license suspension in its sentencing entry. For the following reasons, Jordan's first

assignment of error is overruled and his second assignment of error is sustained.

Factual Background

{¶2} The majority of the relevant facts revolve around a burglary that Jordan

was accused of committing, but the cases before us relate to drugs and other evidence

seized from Jordan's residence after police executed a search warrant looking for

evidence related to the burglary.

{¶3} Shortly after 4:30 p.m. on December 12, 2016, James and Emiko Locke

returned home to find that their home had been burglarized. The only item missing

was a safe containing $40,000 in cash. Cincinnati Police Detective Mark Longworth

investigated the burglary. Longworth determined that the burglar's entry and exit

point was a broken window in the back of the house. Since there was only one entry

and exit point, and no valuables missing besides the safe, Longworth determined that

it was likely that the burglar knew what he was looking for when he entered the

house.

{¶4} Longworth testified that the burglary was believed to have occurred

between 4:15 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. when no one was at home. Longworth testified that

the Lockes informed him that only two other people knew what was inside the safe

APPENDIX B

App. 36

and where it was hidden: their son Michael and their godson Demarco Daniels.

Michael had been "kicked out" of the house by his parents, and had "just recently

come back around." The Lockes informed Longworth that Michael had called them

on the phone a couple of times around the time of the burglary, trying to determine

whether they were home. Longworth testified that the Lockes were "very suspicious"

of Michael's attempts to determine if they were home. With Michael's permission,

Longworth looked at Michael's phone call history and discovered that he had called

his parents at 4:23 p.m. and 4:29 p.m.

{¶5} Longworth testified the Lockes told him that after they discovered the

burglary, Michael came to the house and was "kind of fishing around for information

about what had happened, what they knew." A neighbor came over and told the

Lockes that he had seen a suspicious crème-colored Chrysler 300 parked near their

house around the time of the burglary. When the neighbor told the Lockes about the

Chrysler, Michael became upset and "yelled at [the neighbor] and told him to get out."

Longworth testified that the car's movements, as described by the neighbor, raised

his suspicion that it may have been involved in the burglary. Longworth testified that

the Lockes informed him that as soon as the neighbor described the car, they knew

that it was "Dre's" car. They told Longworth that Michael had been hanging out with

Dre lately, and that they thought Dre was trouble.

{¶6} Dre is LeAndre Jordan. The Lockes informed Longworth that Jordan

worked at a barbershop on Warsaw Avenue by a Kroger store. Longworth located a

crème-colored Chrysler in the parking lot of the Kroger, by the barbershop.

APPENDIX B

App. 37

Longworth described the car as "unique," and discovered that the car was registered

to Jordan's mother. He took photographs of the car and confirmed with Michael that

it was Jordan's car. Michael also confirmed that he was friends with Jordan, and that

he had been with Jordan the day of the burglary. Upon further review of Michael's

phone call history, Longworth discovered that on the day of the burglary Michael had

called Jordan at 4:36 p.m. and 4:49 p.m., and Jordan had called Michael at 5:03 p.m.

{¶7} Longworth placed Jordan under surveillance. Jordan parked the Chrysler

in the same spot every day—in the Kroger parking lot across from the barbershop.

Police watched him come and go from the car and barbershop for several days. Eight

days after the burglary, Longworth arrested Jordan, without a warrant, as Jordan

walked to a different car he was driving that day, a black Lexus. Following the arrest,

police searched Jordan and discovered keys to his residence. Longworth obtained a

search warrant for the residence. When officers searched the residence, they found

$2,907, heroin, cocaine, a scale, and an inoperable pistol.

Motion to Suppress

{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Jordan argues that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment.

Specifically, Jordan argues that his arrest was illegal because it was not based on

probable cause and was made without a warrant. Jordan contends that all evidence

seized from his residence must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

APPENDIX B

App. 38

{¶9} "Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact." State v. Olagbemiro, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170451 and C-170452, 2018Ohio-3540, ¶ 9. "We defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by

competent and credible evidence, but we review de novo the court's application of the

law to those facts." Id.

{¶10} "A warrantless seizure is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one

of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Pies, 140 Ohio

App.3d 535, 539, 748 N.E.2d 146 (1st Dist.2000). One such exception is a warrantless

arrest in a public place, which does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police

officer had probable cause to believe that the person committed or was committing a

felony. State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St. 3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 66,

citing United States v. Watson 423 U.S. 411, 427, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976);

R.C. 2935.04.

{¶11} The test for establishing probable cause to arrest without a warrant is

"whether the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge were sufficient to

warrant a prudent individual in believing that the defendant had committed or was

committing an offense." State v. Deters, 128 Ohio App.3d 329, 333, 714 N.E.2d 972

(1st Dist.1998). "Probable cause is a lesser standard of proof than that required for a

conviction, which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Probable cause only requires

the existence of circumstances that warrant suspicion." State v. Hackney, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-150375, 2016-Ohio-4609, ¶ 26. It "requires only a probability or

substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." State

APPENDIX B

App. 39

v. Thorton, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170586 and C-170587, 2018-Ohio-2960, ¶ 21,

quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), fn. 13.

Probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical concept." Gates at 287. It does not require

officers to rule out an innocent explanation for suspicious facts. Thorton at ¶ 22.

{¶12} Jordan first argues that the trial court erred by relying on facts learned

by police post-arrest in finding that probable cause existed for the arrest. When a

court relies on post-arrest evidence in its denial of a motion to suppress, this court

must disregard that evidence to determine if the remaining evidence gave the officer

probable cause to arrest. See City of Washington Court House v. Wagner, 12th Dist.

Fayette No. CA91-01-001, 1991 WL 149551, *2 (Aug. 5, 1991); State v. Johnson, 11th

Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-210, 2005- Ohio-2077, ¶ 13-16.

{¶13} When the trial court overruled Jordan's motion to suppress, it based its

decision, in part, on the fact that "Mr. Jordan himself acknowledge[d] the fact that he

drove both cars." Jordan did admit that the Chrysler was his mother's and that he

drove it from time to time, but those admissions were made during the post-arrest

interview, and so were not known to police at the time of the arrest. Therefore, it was

error for the court to rely on Jordan's admissions when ruling on the motion to

suppress. The state concedes this error, but argues that other evidence established

probable cause to arrest Jordan even without Jordan's post-arrest statements.

{¶14} Jordan argues that after discounting the post-arrest admissions, the

remaining evidence relied upon by the court in overruling the motion to suppress was

subjective and unreliable. He points to the lack of certain evidence, such as the license

APPENDIX B

App. 40

plate number of the Chrysler. But, the test is not about what evidence was missing;

rather it is about what evidence was before the court.

{¶15} Longworth is a 19-year veteran of the police department. He testified

that he determined there was probable cause to arrest Jordan based on "the phone

records, the interview with Michael Locke, the interview with the family, the

interview with the neighbor, the observations that I made that corroborated those

things."

{¶16} It is clear that the Lockes did not like Jordan and thought he was trouble,

but their suspicions of Jordan were not based solely on their dislike of him or pure

speculation. Rather, once the neighbor told them he had seen a suspicious crèmecolored Chrysler near the house around the time of the burglary, they told Longworth

that Jordan drove that kind of car, and that Michael (who they suspected was

involved in the burglary based on his knowledge of the safe and the phone calls) had

been hanging out with Jordan recently.

{¶17} Although the court's consideration of Jordan's post-arrest admissions

was error, once we excise the admissions, we are left with evidence sufficient to cause

a prudent person to believe that a burglary had been committed, and that Jordan was

involved in the burglary.

{¶18} Next, Jordan argues that police failed to obtain an arrest warrant, and

that no exigency existed to excuse that requirement. Jordan cites to a Second District

case, State v. VanNoy, 188 Ohio App. 3d 89, 2010-Ohio-2845, 934 N.E.2d 413, ¶ 23

(2d Dist.), for the proposition that Longworth should have obtained an arrest warrant

APPENDIX B

App. 41

even though he made the arrest in a public place and with probable cause. In VanNoy,

the court held that "in order for an officer to lawfully perform a warrantless arrest in

a public place, the arrest must not only be supported by probable cause, it must also

be shown that obtaining an arrest warrant beforehand was impracticable under the

circumstances, i.e., that exigent circumstances exist." Id., citing State v. Heston, 29

Ohio St.2d 152, 280 N.E.2d 376 (1972), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶19} However, the proposition in VanNoy and Heston is at odds with Ohio

Supreme Court precedent. "A warrantless arrest that is based upon probable cause

and occurs in a public place does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Brown, 115

Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, at ¶ 66, citing Watson, 423 U.S. at

427, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598.

{¶20} As stated by State v. Taylor, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-7, 2019-Ohio2018, ¶ 14, the Second District's position in VanNoy is a minority position. There is

even dispute within the Second District as to VanNoy's viability. See State v.

Armstead, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26640, 2015-Ohio-5010, ¶ 40, 50 N.E.3d 1073

(Welbaum, J., dissenting) (explaining that Heston has been discredited by Watson

and Brown, and exigent circumstances or an undue delay requirement cannot be

imposed on warrantless arrests made with probable cause).

{¶21} This court follows the majority approach. See State v. Evans, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-080129, 2009-Ohio241, ¶ 13, citing Watson at 427 ("a warrantless

arrest of a person is proper if it is supported by probable cause"). Therefore, the state

was not required to show that exigent circumstances existed when it arrested Jordan.

APPENDIX B

App. 42

Jordan's arrest occurred in a public place and Longworth had probable cause to

believe that Jordan had committed a felony. Because Jordan's arrest did not violate

the Fourth Amendment, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

Jordan's first assignment of error is overruled.

License Suspension

{¶22} In Jordan's second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred where it announced a three-year license suspension at the sentencing hearing,

but imposed a five-year license suspension in its sentencing entry. The state concedes

the error.

{¶23} The five-year license suspension in the judgment entry is clearly a

clerical error, as the record shows that the trial court imposed a three-year license

suspension at the sentencing hearing. We sustain Jordan's second assignment of

error, and remand this cause to the trial court to make an entry nunc pro tunc

correcting the clerical error in the sentencing entry so that the entry reflects a threeyear license suspension. See Crim.R. 36; State v. Cooper, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C180401, 2019-Ohio-2813, ¶ 1.

Conclusion

{¶24} We sustain Jordan's second assignment of error and remand this cause

for a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the license-suspension portion of his sentence.

We overrule Jordan's first assignment of error, and the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

Judgment affirmed and cause remanded.

APPENDIX B

App. 43

MYERS, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

APPENDIX B

App. 44

THE STATE OF OHIO, HAMILTON COUNTY

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

date: 09/17/2018

ENTERED SEP 24 2018

code: GJC

s/ Gorman, J.

judge: 23

Judge: Robert Gorman

STATE OF OHIO

Case Nos. B 1607185-A

VS.

JUDGMENT ENTRY: COSTS

LEANDRE K JORDAN

Defendant was present in Open Court with Counsel RODNEY J HARRIS on the

17th day of September 2018 for sentence.

The court informed the defendant that, as the defendant well knew, after defendant

entering a plea of not guilty and after trial by jury, the defendant has been found

guilty of the offense(s) of:

count 1: TRAFFICKING IN HEROIN, 2925-03A2/ORCN,F3

count 2: AGGRAVATED TRAFFICKING IN DRUGS, 2925-03A2/ORCN,F3

count 3: POSSESSION OF HEROIN, 2925-11A/ORNC,F4

count 4: AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF DRUGS, 2925.11A/ORCN,F5

The Court afforded defendant’s counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the

defendant. The Court addressed the defendant personally and asked if the

defendant wished to make a statement in the defendant’s behalf, or present any

information in mitigation of punishment.

APPENDIX C

App. 45

It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the Court that the defendant pay Costs of

this prosecution, for which execution is awarded:

COUNTS #1, #2, #3, AND #4 ARE MERGED WITH COUNRT #2 IN CASE B

1702130 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SENTENCING

FURTHER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RC 2901.07, THE DEFENDANT IS

REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A DNA SPECIMEN WHICH WILL BE

COLLECTED AT THE PRISON, JAIL, CORRECTIONAL OR DETENTION

FACILITY TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SENTENCED. IF THE

SENTENCE INCLUDES ANY PERIOD OF PROBATION OR COMMUNITY

CONTROL, OR IF ANY TIME THE DEFENDANT IS ON PAROLE,

TRANSITIONAL CONTROL OR POST-RELEASE CONTROL, THE

DEFENDANT WILL BE REQUIRED, AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION,

COMMUNITY CONTROL, PAROLE, TRANSITIONAL CONTROL OR POSTRELEASE CONTROL, TO SUBMIT A DNA SPECIMEN TO THE

PROBATION DEPARTMENT, ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY, OR OTHER

AUTHORITY AS DESIGNATED BY LAW. IF THE DEFENDANT FAILS OR

REFUSES TO SUBMIT TO THE REQUIRED DNA SPECIMEN

COLLECTION PROCEDURE, THE DEFENDANT WILL BE SUBJECT TO

ARREST AND PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATING THIS CONDITION OF

APPENDIX C

App. 46

PROBATION, COMMUNITY CONTROL, PAROLE, TRANSITIONAL

CONTROL OR POST-RELEASE CONTROL.

APPENDIX C

App. 47

THE STATE OF OHIO, HAMILTON COUNTY

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

date: 09/17/2018

ENTERED SEP 24 2018

code: GJEI

s/ Gorman, J.

judge: 23

Judge: Robert Gorman

STATE OF OHIO

Case Nos. B 1702130

VS.

JUDGMENT ENTRY:

LEANDRE K JORDAN

SENTENCE: INCARCERATION

Defendant was present in Open Court with Counsel RODNEY J HARRIS on the

17th day of September 2018 for sentence.

The court informed the defendant that, as the defendant well knew, after defendant

entering a plea of not guilty and after trial by jury, the defendant has been found

guilty of the offense(s) of:

count 2: POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITH SPECIFICATION #1, 292511a/ORCN,F1

count 1: TRAFFICKING IN COCAINE WITH SPECIFICATION #1, 292503a2/ORCN,F1, JUDGMENT ENTRY OF ACQUITAL

The Court afforded defendant’s counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the

defendant. The Court addressed the defendant personally and asked if the

APPENDIX D

App. 48

defendant wished to make a statement in the defendant’s behalf, or present any

information in mitigation of punishment.

Defendant is sentenced to be imprisoned as follows:

count 2: CONFINEMENT ON M.D.O. SPECIFICATION: 11 Yrs

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION: 5 Yrs

COUNT #2 IS MERGED WITH M.D.O. SPECIFICATION #1 TO COUNT #2

AND WITH COUNTS #1, #2, #3, AND #4 IN CASE B1607185-A.

THE TOTAL AGGREGATE SENTENCE IS ELEVEN (11) YEARS IN THE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

THE DEFENDANT IS TO RECEIVE CREDIT FOR ONE HUNDRED

SEVENTY (170) DAYS TIME SERVED

MANDATORY FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,000.00 IS REMITTED

FURTHER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RC 2901.07, THE DEFENDANT IS

REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A DNA SPECIMEN WHICH WILL BE

APPENDIX D

App. 49

COLLECTED AT THE PRISON, JAIL, CORRECTIONAL OR DETENTION

FACILITY TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SENTENCED. IF THE

SENTENCE INCLUDES ANY PERIOD OF PROBATION OR COMMUNITY

CONTROL, OR IF ANY TIME THE DEFENDANT IS ON PAROLE,

TRANSITIONAL CONTROL OR POST-RELEASE CONTROL, THE

DEFENDANT WILL BE REQUIRED, AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION,

COMMUNITY CONTROL, PAROLE, TRANSITIONAL CONTROL OR POSTRELEASE CONTROL, TO SUBMIT A DNA SPECIMEN TO THE

PROBATION DEPARTMENT, ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY, OR OTHER

AUTHORITY AS DESIGNATED BY LAW. IF THE DEFENDANT FAILS OR

REFUSES TO SUBMIT TO THE REQUIRED DNA SPECIMEN

COLLECTION PROCEDURE, THE DEFENDANT WILL BE SUBJECT TO

ARREST AND PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATING THIS CONDITION OF

PROBATION, COMMUNITY CONTROL, PAROLE, TRANSITIONAL

CONTROL OR POST-RELEASE CONTROL.

AS PART OF THE SENTENVE IN THIS CASE, THE DEFENDANT SHALL

BE SUPERVISED BY THE ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY AFTER

DEFENDANT LEAVES PRISON, WHICH IS REFERRED TO AS POSTRELEASE CONTROL, FOR FIVE (5) YEARS.

APPENDIX D

App. 50

IF THE DEFENDANT VIOLATES POST-RELEASE CONTROL

SUPERVISION OR ANY CONDITION THEREOF, THE ADULT PAROLE

AUTHORITY MAY IMPOSE A PRISON TERM, AS PART OF THE

SENTENCE, OF UP TO NINE (9) MONTHS, WITH A MAXIMUM FOR

REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF FIFTH PERCENT (50%) OF THE STATED

PRISON TERM. IF THE DEFENDANT COMMITS A NEW FELONY WHILE

SUBJECT TO POST-RELEASE CONTROL, THE DEFENDANT MAY BE

SENT TO PRISON FOR THE REMAINING POST-RELEASE CONTROL

PERIOD OF TWELVE (12) MONTHS, WHICHEVER IS GREATER. THIS

PRISON TERM SHALL BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY TO ANY PRISON

TERM IMPOSED FOR THE NEW FELONY OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT

IS CONVICTED

APPENDIX D

App. 51

THE STATE OF OHIO

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

CRIMINAL DIVISION

State of Ohio,

Case Nos. B1607185

v.

B1702130

Leandre Jordan

(Judge Luebbers)

(Judge Gorman)

ENTRY OVERRULING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

SUPPRESS

This matter came on upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, and the Court

being fully advised in the premises after a hearing, overrules the motion.

s/ Gorman, J.

Robert H. Gorman, Judge

Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

ENTERED APRIL 02 2018

APPENDIX E

App. 52

EXCERPT FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

OF PROCEEDINGS FOR APPEAL

APPENDIX F

App. 53

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

Volume 13 of 19

)

STATE OF OHIO,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

LEANDRE JORDAN,

)

CASE NO: B1702130(A)

)

B1607185

)

APPEAL NO: C1800559

)

)

Defendant.

)

(Pages: 149 thru 235)

COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR APPEAL

--APPEARANCES:

SETH TIEGER, ESQ.

On behalf of the Plaintiff.

RODNEY HARRIS, ESQ.

On behalf of the Defendant.

APPENDIX F

App. 54

BE IT REMEMBERED that upon the hearing of this cause, on March 7th,

2018, before the Honorable Robert Gorman, a said visiting judge of the said court,

the following proceedings were had.

***

THE COURT: All right, thank you. I find that, based upon the evidence that

I've heard this morning from Detective Longworth, that he did have probable cause

based upon the report of a burglary, his conversations with the Lockes and with

Michael Locke, the telephone conversations on his cell phone, and the fact that Mr.

Jordan himself acknowledges the fact that he drove both cars, which there may be a

question as to which car was being used on that day.

But based upon the information that he had on the 12th, from the witness

who saw the car and described the car on the street, and the fact that Mr. Jordan

did acknowledge the fact that it was the white Chrysler or cream-colored Chrysler

was his mother's, and that he drove it from time to time, I find that there's probable

cause to justify a warrantless search at the time. And I have no information as far

as suppression of the warrant other than whether or not there was -- the search

warrant, other than that there was probable cause to make it, which I find, and this

is ^assumed from my finding as to the warrantless arrest. So the motion to

suppress is overruled.

MR. HARRIS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And I appreciate counsel's presentation and the arguments

in this case, both of you.

APPENDIX F

App. 55

Do you want me to set this case for trial?

MR. HARRIS: I would, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We'll give you a date.

***

CERTIFICATE

I, Tracy Coleman, RMR, CRR, the undersigned, an Official Court Reporter for

the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, do hereby certify that at the same

time and place stated herein I recorded in stenotype and thereafter transcribed the

within 87 pages, and that the foregoing transcript of proceedings is a true, complete,

and accurate transcript of my said stenotype notes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 2nd day of January,

2019.

s/ Hope for Tracy C.

Tracy Coleman, RMR, CRR

Official Court Reporter

Court of Common Pleas

Hamilton County, Ohio

APPENDIX F

App. 56

Ohio Revised Code § 2935.03

Authority to arrest without warrant – pursuit outside jurisdiction

(A)(1) A sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, municipal police officer,

township constable, police officer of a township or joint police district, member of a

police force employed by a metropolitan housing authority under division (D) of

section 3735.31 of the Revised Code, member of a police force employed by a

regional transit authority under division (Y) of section 306.35 of the Revised Code,

state university law enforcement officer appointed under section 3345.04 of the

Revised Code, veterans' home police officer appointed under section 5907.02 of the

Revised Code, special police officer employed by a port authority under section

4582.04 or 4582.28 of the Revised Code, or a special police officer employed by a

municipal corporation at a municipal airport, or other municipal air navigation

facility, that has scheduled operations, as defined in section 119.3 of Title 14 of the

Code of Federal Regulations, 14 C.F.R. 119.3, as amended, and that is required to

be under a security program and is governed by aviation security rules of the

transportation security administration of the United States department of

transportation as provided in Parts 1542. and 1544. of Title 49 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, as amended, shall arrest and detain, until a warrant can be

obtained, a person found violating, within the limits of the political subdivision,

metropolitan housing authority housing project, regional transit authority facilities

or areas of a municipal corporation that have been agreed to by a regional transit

authority and a municipal corporation located within its territorial jurisdiction,

APPENDIX G

App. 57

college, university, veterans' home operated under Chapter 5907. of the Revised

Code, port authority, or municipal airport or other municipal air navigation facility,

in which the peace officer is appointed, employed, or elected, a law of this state, an

ordinance of a municipal corporation, or a resolution of a township.

(2) A peace officer of the department of natural resources, a state fire marshal law

enforcement officer described in division (A)(23) of section 109.71 of the Revised

Code, or an individual designated to perform law enforcement duties under section

511.232, 1545.13, or 6101.75 of the Revised Code shall arrest and detain, until a

warrant can be obtained, a person found violating, within the limits of the peace

officer's, state fire marshal law enforcement officer's, or individual's territorial

jurisdiction, a law of this state.

(3) The house sergeant at arms, if the house sergeant at arms has arrest authority

pursuant to division (E)(1) of section 101.311 of the Revised Code, and an assistant

house sergeant at arms shall arrest and detain, until a warrant can be obtained, a

person found violating, within the limits of the sergeant at arms's or assistant

sergeant at arms's territorial jurisdiction specified in division (D)(1)(a) of section

101.311 of the Revised Code or while providing security pursuant to division

(D)(1)(f) of section 101.311 of the Revised Code, a law of this state, an ordinance of a

municipal corporation, or a resolution of a township.

APPENDIX G

App. 58

(4) The senate sergeant at arms and an assistant senate sergeant at arms shall

arrest and detain, until a warrant can be obtained, a person found violating, within

the limits of the sergeant at arms's or assistant sergeant at arms's territorial

jurisdiction specified in division (B) of section 101.312 of the Revised Code, a law of

this state, an ordinance of a municipal corporation, or a resolution of a township.

(B)(1) When there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense of violence, the

offense of criminal child enticement as defined in section 2905.05 of the Revised

Code, the offense of public indecency as defined in section 2907.09 of the Revised

Code, the offense of domestic violence as defined in section 2919.25 of the Revised

Code, the offense of violating a protection order as defined in section 2919.27 of the

Revised Code, the offense of menacing by stalking as defined in section 2903.211 of

the Revised Code, the offense of aggravated trespass as defined in section 2911.211

of the Revised Code, a theft offense as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised

Code, or a felony drug abuse offense as defined in section 2925.01 of the Revised

Code, has been committed within the limits of the political subdivision,

metropolitan housing authority housing project, regional transit authority facilities

or those areas of a municipal corporation that have been agreed to by a regional

transit authority and a municipal corporation located within its territorial

jurisdiction, college, university, veterans' home operated under Chapter 5907. of the

Revised Code, port authority, or municipal airport or other municipal air navigation

facility, in which the peace officer is appointed, employed, or elected or within the

APPENDIX G

App. 59

limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the peace officer, a peace officer described in

division (A) of this section may arrest and detain until a warrant can be obtained

any person who the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe is guilty of the

violation.

(2) For purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, the execution of any of the

following constitutes reasonable ground to believe that the offense alleged in the

statement was committed and reasonable cause to believe that the person alleged in

the statement to have committed the offense is guilty of the violation:

(a) A written statement by a person alleging that an alleged offender has committed

the offense of menacing by stalking or aggravated trespass;

(b) A written statement by the administrator of the interstate compact on mental

health appointed under section 5119.71 of the Revised Code alleging that a person

who had been hospitalized, institutionalized, or confined in any facility under an

order made pursuant to or under authority of section 2945.37, 2945.371, 2945.38,

2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401, or 2945.402 of the Revised Code has escaped from the

facility, from confinement in a vehicle for transportation to or from the facility, or

from supervision by an employee of the facility that is incidental to hospitalization,

institutionalization, or confinement in the facility and that occurs outside of the

facility, in violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code;

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(c) A written statement by the administrator of any facility in which a person has

been hospitalized, institutionalized, or confined under an order made pursuant to or

under authority of section 2945.37, 2945.371, 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401,

or 2945.402 of the Revised Code alleging that the person has escaped from the

facility, from confinement in a vehicle for transportation to or from the facility, or

from supervision by an employee of the facility that is incidental to hospitalization,

institutionalization, or confinement in the facility and that occurs outside of the

facility, in violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code.

(3)(a) For purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a peace officer described in

division (A) of this section has reasonable grounds to believe that the offense of

domestic violence or the offense of violating a protection order has been committed

and reasonable cause to believe that a particular person is guilty of committing the

offense if any of the following occurs:

(i) A person executes a written statement alleging that the person in question has

committed the offense of domestic violence or the offense of violating a protection

order against the person who executes the statement or against a child of the

person who executes the statement.

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(ii) No written statement of the type described in division (B)(3)(a)(i) of this section

is executed, but the peace officer, based upon the peace officer's own knowledge and

observation of the facts and circumstances of the alleged incident of the offense of

domestic violence or the alleged incident of the offense of violating a protection

order or based upon any other information, including, but not limited to, any

reasonably trustworthy information given to the peace officer by the alleged victim

of the alleged incident of the offense or any witness of the alleged incident of the

offense, concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offense of

domestic violence or the offense of violating a protection order has been committed

and reasonable cause to believe that the person in question is guilty of committing

the offense.

(iii) No written statement of the type described in division (B)(3)(a)(i) of this section

is executed, but the peace officer witnessed the person in question commit the

offense of domestic violence or the offense of violating a protection order.

(b) If pursuant to division (B)(3)(a) of this section a peace officer has reasonable

grounds to believe that the offense of domestic violence or the offense of violating a

protection order has been committed and reasonable cause to believe that a

particular person is guilty of committing the offense, it is the preferred course of

action in this state that the officer arrest and detain that person pursuant to

division (B)(1) of this section until a warrant can be obtained.

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If pursuant to division (B)(3)(a) of this section a peace officer has reasonable

grounds to believe that the offense of domestic violence or the offense of violating a

protection order has been committed and reasonable cause to believe that family or

household members have committed the offense against each other, it is the

preferred course of action in this state that the officer, pursuant to division (B)(1) of

this section, arrest and detain until a warrant can be obtained the family or

household member who committed the offense and whom the officer has reasonable

cause to believe is the primary physical aggressor. There is no preferred course of

action in this state regarding any other family or household member who committed

the offense and whom the officer does not have reasonable cause to believe is the

primary physical aggressor, but, pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section, the

peace officer may arrest and detain until a warrant can be obtained any other

family or household member who committed the offense and whom the officer does

not have reasonable cause to believe is the primary physical aggressor.

(c) If a peace officer described in division (A) of this section does not arrest and

detain a person whom the officer has reasonable cause to believe committed the

offense of domestic violence or the offense of violating a protection order when it is

the preferred course of action in this state pursuant to division (B)(3)(b) of this

section that the officer arrest that person, the officer shall articulate in the written

report of the incident required by section 2935.032 of the Revised Code a clear

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App. 63

statement of the officer's reasons for not arresting and detaining that person until a

warrant can be obtained.

(d) In determining for purposes of division (B)(3)(b) of this section which family or

household member is the primary physical aggressor in a situation in which family

or household members have committed the offense of domestic violence or the

offense of violating a protection order against each other, a peace officer described in

division (A) of this section, in addition to any other relevant circumstances, should

consider all of the following:

(i) Any history of domestic violence or of any other violent acts by either person

involved in the alleged offense that the officer reasonably can ascertain;

(ii) If violence is alleged, whether the alleged violence was caused by a person acting

in self-defense;

(iii) Each person's fear of physical harm, if any, resulting from the other person's

threatened use of force against any person or resulting from the other person's use

or history of the use of force against any person, and the reasonableness of that fear;

(iv) The comparative severity of any injuries suffered by the persons involved in the

alleged offense.

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(e)(i) A peace officer described in division (A) of this section shall not require, as a

prerequisite to arresting or charging a person who has committed the offense of

domestic violence or the offense of violating a protection order, that the victim of the

offense specifically consent to the filing of charges against the person who has

committed the offense or sign a complaint against the person who has committed

the offense.

(ii) If a person is arrested for or charged with committing the offense of domestic

violence or the offense of violating a protection order and if the victim of the offense

does not cooperate with the involved law enforcement or prosecuting authorities in

the prosecution of the offense or, subsequent to the arrest or the filing of the

charges, informs the involved law enforcement or prosecuting authorities that the

victim does not wish the prosecution of the offense to continue or wishes to drop

charges against the alleged offender relative to the offense, the involved prosecuting

authorities, in determining whether to continue with the prosecution of the offense

or whether to dismiss charges against the alleged offender relative to the offense

and notwithstanding the victim's failure to cooperate or the victim's wishes, shall

consider all facts and circumstances that are relevant to the offense, including, but

not limited to, the statements and observations of the peace officers who responded

to the incident that resulted in the arrest or filing of the charges and of all

witnesses to that incident.

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App. 65

(f) In determining pursuant to divisions (B)(3)(a) to (g) of this section whether to

arrest a person pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section, a peace officer described

in division (A) of this section shall not consider as a factor any possible shortage of

cell space at the detention facility to which the person will be taken subsequent to

the person's arrest or any possibility that the person's arrest might cause,

contribute to, or exacerbate overcrowding at that detention facility or at any other

detention facility.

(g) If a peace officer described in division (A) of this section intends pursuant to

divisions (B)(3)(a) to (g) of this section to arrest a person pursuant to division (B)(1)

of this section and if the officer is unable to do so because the person is not present,

the officer promptly shall seek a warrant for the arrest of the person.

(h) If a peace officer described in division (A) of this section responds to a report of

an alleged incident of the offense of domestic violence or an alleged incident of the

offense of violating a protection order and if the circumstances of the incident

involved the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or any person involved in the

incident brandished a deadly weapon during or in relation to the incident, the

deadly weapon that was used, threatened to be used, or brandished constitutes

contraband, and, to the extent possible, the officer shall seize the deadly weapon as

contraband pursuant to Chapter 2981. of the Revised Code. Upon the seizure of a

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App. 66

deadly weapon pursuant to division (B)(3)(h) of this section, section 2981.12 of the

Revised Code shall apply regarding the treatment and disposition of the deadly

weapon. For purposes of that section, the "underlying criminal offense" that was the

basis of the seizure of a deadly weapon under division (B)(3)(h) of this section and to

which the deadly weapon had a relationship is any of the following that is

applicable:

(i) The alleged incident of the offense of domestic violence or the alleged incident of

the offense of violating a protection order to which the officer who seized the deadly

weapon responded;

(ii) Any offense that arose out of the same facts and circumstances as the report of

the alleged incident of the offense of domestic violence or the alleged incident of the

offense of violating a protection order to which the officer who seized the deadly

weapon responded.

(4) If, in the circumstances described in divisions (B)(3)(a) to (g) of this section, a

peace officer described in division (A) of this section arrests and detains a person

pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section, or if, pursuant to division (B)(3)(h) of this

section, a peace officer described in division (A) of this section seizes a deadly

weapon, the officer, to the extent described in and in accordance with section 9.86 or

2744.03 of the Revised Code, is immune in any civil action for damages for injury,

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App. 67

death, or loss to person or property that arises from or is related to the arrest and

detention or the seizure.

(C) When there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of division (A)(1), (2),

(3), (4), or (5) of section 4506.15 or a violation of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code

has been committed by a person operating a motor vehicle subject to regulation by

the public utilities commission of Ohio under Title XLIX of the Revised Code, a

peace officer with authority to enforce that provision of law may stop or detain the

person whom the officer has reasonable cause to believe was operating the motor

vehicle in violation of the division or section and, after investigating the

circumstances surrounding the operation of the vehicle, may arrest and detain the

person.

(D) If a sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, municipal police officer,

member of a police force employed by a metropolitan housing authority under

division (D) of section 3735.31 of the Revised Code, member of a police force

employed by a regional transit authority under division (Y) of section 306.35 of the

Revised Code, special police officer employed by a port authority under section

4582.04 or 4582.28 of the Revised Code, special police officer employed by a

municipal corporation at a municipal airport or other municipal air navigation

facility described in division (A) of this section, township constable, police officer of a

township or joint police district, state university law enforcement officer appointed

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under section 3345.04 of the Revised Code, peace officer of the department of

natural resources, individual designated to perform law enforcement duties under

section 511.232, 1545.13, or 6101.75 of the Revised Code, the house sergeant at

arms if the house sergeant at arms has arrest authority pursuant to division (E)(1)

of section 101.311 of the Revised Code, or an assistant house sergeant at arms is

authorized by division (A) or (B) of this section to arrest and detain, within the

limits of the political subdivision, metropolitan housing authority housing project,

regional transit authority facilities or those areas of a municipal corporation that

have been agreed to by a regional transit authority and a municipal corporation

located within its territorial jurisdiction, port authority, municipal airport or other

municipal air navigation facility, college, or university in which the officer is

appointed, employed, or elected or within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of

the peace officer, a person until a warrant can be obtained, the peace officer, outside

the limits of that territory, may pursue, arrest, and detain that person until a

warrant can be obtained if all of the following apply:

(1) The pursuit takes place without unreasonable delay after the offense is

committed;

(2) The pursuit is initiated within the limits of the political subdivision,

metropolitan housing authority housing project, regional transit authority facilities

or those areas of a municipal corporation that have been agreed to by a regional

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App. 69

transit authority and a municipal corporation located within its territorial

jurisdiction, port authority, municipal airport or other municipal air navigation

facility, college, or university in which the peace officer is appointed, employed, or

elected or within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the peace officer;

(3) The offense involved is a felony, a misdemeanor of the first degree or a

substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, a misdemeanor of the second degree

or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, or any offense for which points

are chargeable pursuant to section 4510.036 of the Revised Code.

(E) In addition to the authority granted under division (A) or (B) of this section:

(1) A sheriff or deputy sheriff may arrest and detain, until a warrant can be

obtained, any person found violating section 4503.11, 4503.21, or 4549.01, sections

4549.08 to 4549.12, section 4549.62, or Chapter 4511. or 4513. of the Revised Code

on the portion of any street or highway that is located immediately adjacent to the

boundaries of the county in which the sheriff or deputy sheriff is elected or

appointed.

(2) A member of the police force of a township police district created under section

505.48 of the Revised Code, a member of the police force of a joint police district

created under section 505.482 of the Revised Code, or a township constable

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appointed in accordance with section 509.01 of the Revised Code, who has received a

certificate from the Ohio peace officer training commission under section 109.75 of

the Revised Code, may arrest and detain, until a warrant can be obtained, any

person found violating any section or chapter of the Revised Code listed in division

(E)(1) of this section, other than sections 4513.33 and 4513.34 of the Revised Code,

on the portion of any street or highway that is located immediately adjacent to the

boundaries of the township police district or joint police district, in the case of a

member of a township police district or joint police district police force, or the

unincorporated territory of the township, in the case of a township constable.

However, if the population of the township that created the township police district

served by the member's police force, or the townships and municipal corporations

that created the joint police district served by the member's police force, or the

township that is served by the township constable, is sixty thousand or less, the

member of the township police district or joint police district police force or the

township constable may not make an arrest under division (E)(2) of this section on a

state highway that is included as part of the interstate system.

(3) A police officer or village marshal appointed, elected, or employed by a municipal

corporation may arrest and detain, until a warrant can be obtained, any person

found violating any section or chapter of the Revised Code listed in division (E)(1) of

this section on the portion of any street or highway that is located immediately

APPENDIX G

App. 71

adjacent to the boundaries of the municipal corporation in which the police officer or

village marshal is appointed, elected, or employed.

(4) A peace officer of the department of natural resources, a state fire marshal law

enforcement officer described in division (A)(23) of section 109.71 of the Revised

Code, or an individual designated to perform law enforcement duties under section

511.232, 1545.13, or 6101.75 of the Revised Code may arrest and detain, until a

warrant can be obtained, any person found violating any section or chapter of the

Revised Code listed in division (E)(1) of this section, other than sections 4513.33

and 4513.34 of the Revised Code, on the portion of any street or highway that is

located immediately adjacent to the boundaries of the lands and waters that

constitute the territorial jurisdiction of the peace officer or state fire marshal law

enforcement officer.

(F)(1) A department of mental health and addiction services special police officer or

a department of developmental disabilities special police officer may arrest without

a warrant and detain until a warrant can be obtained any person found committing

on the premises of any institution under the jurisdiction of the particular

department a misdemeanor under a law of the state.

A department of mental health and addiction services special police officer or a

department of developmental disabilities special police officer may arrest without a

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warrant and detain until a warrant can be obtained any person who has been

hospitalized, institutionalized, or confined in an institution under the jurisdiction of

the particular department pursuant to or under authority of section 2945.37,

2945.371, 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401, or 2945.402 of the Revised Code and

who is found committing on the premises of any institution under the jurisdiction of

the particular department a violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code that

involves an escape from the premises of the institution.

(2)(a) If a department of mental health and addiction services special police officer

or a department of developmental disabilities special police officer finds any person

who has been hospitalized, institutionalized, or confined in an institution under the

jurisdiction of the particular department pursuant to or under authority of section

2945.37, 2945.371, 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401, or 2945.402 of the Revised

Code committing a violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code that involves an

escape from the premises of the institution, or if there is reasonable ground to

believe that a violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code has been committed

that involves an escape from the premises of an institution under the jurisdiction of

the department of mental health and addiction services or the department of

developmental disabilities and if a department of mental health and addiction

services special police officer or a department of developmental disabilities special

police officer has reasonable cause to believe that a particular person who has been

hospitalized, institutionalized, or confined in the institution pursuant to or under

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App. 73

authority of section 2945.37, 2945.371, 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401, or

2945.402 of the Revised Code is guilty of the violation, the special police officer,

outside of the premises of the institution, may pursue, arrest, and detain that

person for that violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code, until a warrant can

be obtained, if both of the following apply:

(i) The pursuit takes place without unreasonable delay after the offense is

committed;

(ii) The pursuit is initiated within the premises of the institution from which the

violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code occurred.

(b) For purposes of division (F)(2)(a) of this section, the execution of a written

statement by the administrator of the institution in which a person had been

hospitalized, institutionalized, or confined pursuant to or under authority of section

2945.37, 2945.371, 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401, or 2945.402 of the Revised

Code alleging that the person has escaped from the premises of the institution in

violation of section 2921.34 of the Revised Code constitutes reasonable ground to

believe that the violation was committed and reasonable cause to believe that the

person alleged in the statement to have committed the offense is guilty of the

violation.

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App. 74

(G) As used in this section:

(1) A "department of mental health and addiction services special police officer"

means a special police officer of the department of mental health and addiction

services designated under section 5119.08 of the Revised Code who is certified by

the Ohio peace officer training commission under section 109.77 of the Revised Code

as having successfully completed an approved peace officer basic training program.

(2) A "department of developmental disabilities special police officer" means a

special police officer of the department of developmental disabilities designated

under section 5123.13 of the Revised Code who is certified by the Ohio peace officer

training council under section 109.77 of the Revised Code as having successfully

completed an approved peace officer basic training program.

(3) "Deadly weapon" has the same meaning as in section 2923.11 of the Revised

Code.

(4) "Family or household member" has the same meaning as in section 2919.25 of

the Revised Code.

(5) "Street" or "highway" has the same meaning as in section 4511.01 of the Revised

Code.

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App. 75

(6) "Interstate system" has the same meaning as in section 5516.01 of the Revised

Code.

(7) "Peace officer of the department of natural resources" means an employee of the

department of natural resources who is a natural resources law enforcement staff

officer designated pursuant to section 1501.013 of the Revised Code, a forest-fire

investigator appointed pursuant to section 1503.09 of the Revised Code, a natural

resources officer appointed pursuant to section 1501.24 of the Revised Code, or a

wildlife officer designated pursuant to section 1531.13 of the Revised Code.

(8) "Portion of any street or highway" means all lanes of the street or highway

irrespective of direction of travel, including designated turn lanes, and any berm,

median, or shoulder.

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App. 76