Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Perry Cousins, aka Pzo, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJan 10, 2022

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PERRY COUSINS, a/k/a Pzo,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at

Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith, Senior District Judge. (4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM1)

Submitted: March 19,2021

Decided: September 10,2021

Before MOTZ, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Perry Cousins, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Perry Cousins appeals the district court’s order denying his motion seeking

reconsideration of its prior order granting in part and denying in part his motion for

reduction of sentence under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,

132 Stat. 5194, 5222.

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we grant Cousins’ motions to amend or correct informal brief and to amend

and clarify the record pertaining to the informal brief, treat those motions as supplemental

informal briefs, deny Cousins’ motion to appoint counsel, and affirm for the reasons stated

by the district court. United States v. Cousins, No. 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM-l (E.D. Va.

July 10, 2020). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

2

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FILED: October 19, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7087

(4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM-1)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

PERRY COUSINS, a/k/a Pzo

Defendant - Appellant

ORDER

The court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge

requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Motz, Judge Floyd, and Judge

Harris.

For the Court

Is! Patricia S. Connor. Clerk

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FILED: September 10, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7087

(4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM-l)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

PERRY COUSINS, a/k/a Pzo

Defendant - Appellant

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court’s mandate in

accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ PATRICIA S. CONNOR, CLERK

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FILED: September 10, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7087,

US v. Perry Cousins

4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM-1

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Judgment was entered on this date in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please

be advised of the following time periods:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI: The time to file a petition for writ

of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed, and

not from the date of issuance of the mandate. If a petition for rehearing is timely

filed in the court of appeals, the time to file the petition for writ of certiorari for all

parties runs from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing or, if the

petition for rehearing is granted, the subsequent entry of judgment. See Rule 13 of

the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States; www.supremecourt. gov.

VOUCHERS FOR PAYMENT OF APPOINTED OR ASSIGNED

COUNSEL: Vouchers must be submitted within 60 days of entry of judgment or

denial of rehearing, whichever is later. If counsel files a petition for certiorari, the

60-day period runs from filing the certiorari petition. (Loc. R. 46(d)). If payment is

being made from CJA funds, counsel should submit the CJA 20 or CJA 30

Voucher through the CJA eVoucher system. In cases not covered by the Criminal

Justice Act, counsel should submit the Assigned Counsel Voucher to the clerk's

office for payment from the Attorney Admission Fund. An Assigned Counsel

Voucher will be sent to counsel shortly after entry of judgment. Forms and

instructions are also available on the court’s web site, www.ca4.uscourts.gov, or

from the clerk's office.

BILL OF COSTS: A party to whom costs are allowable, who desires taxation of

costs, shall file a Bill of Costs within 14 calendar days of entry ofjudgment.

(FRAP 39, Loc. R. 39(b)).

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PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN

BANC: A petition for rehearing must be filed within 14 calendar days after entry

of judgment, except that in civil cases in which the United States or its officer or

agency is a party, the petition must be filed within 45 days after entry of judgment.

A petition for rehearing en banc must be filed within the same time limits and in

the same document as the petition for rehearing and must be clearly identified in

the title. The only grounds for an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing

are the death or serious illness of counsel or a family member (or of a party or

family member in pro se cases) or an extraordinary circumstance wholly beyond

the control of counsel or a party proceeding without counsel.

Each case number to which the petition applies must be listed on the petition and

included in the docket entry to identify the cases to which the petition applies. A

timely filed petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc stays the

mandate and tolls the running of time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. In

consolidated criminal appeals, the filing of a petition for rehearing does not stay

the mandate as to co-defendants not joining in the petition for rehearing. In

consolidated civil appeals arising from the same civil action, the court's mandate

will issue at the same time in all appeals.

A petition for rehearing must contain an introduction stating that, in counsel's

judgment, one or more of the following situations exist: (1) a material factual or

legal matter was overlooked; (2) a change in the law occurred after submission of

the case and was overlooked; (3) the opinion conflicts with a decision of the U.S.

Supreme Court, this court, or another court of appeals, and the conflict was not

addressed; or (4) the case involves one or more questions of exceptional

importance. A petition for rehearing, with or without a petition for rehearing en

banc, may not exceed 3900 words if prepared by computer and may not exceed 15

pages if handwritten or prepared on a typewriter. Copies are not required unless

requested by the court. (FRAP 35 & 40, Loc. R. 40(c)).

MANDATE: In original proceedings before this court, there is no mandate. Unless

the court shortens or extends the time, in all other cases, the mandate issues 7 days

after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing. A timely petition

for rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion to stay the mandate will

stay issuance of the mandate. If the petition or motion is denied, the mandate will

issue 7 days later. A motion to stay the mandate will ordinarily be denied, unless

the motion presents a substantial question or otherwise sets forth good or probable

cause for a stay. (FRAP 41, Loc. R. 41).

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 399 Filed 02/12/20 Page 1 of 3 PagelD# 2926

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Newport News Division

v

FEB 1 2 2020

.

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORFOLK VA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

NO. 4:10cr47-l

PERRY COUSINS,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the Defendant's Motion

for

Consideration

and

Reduction

of

Sentence

Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018

Pursuant

("Motion"),

to

filed on

January 13, 2020. ECF No. 398. The Defendant argues that this court

should reduce his sentence based on the recent passage of the First

Step

Act

of

2018,

Pub.

L.

No.

115-391,

132 Stat. 5194.

The

Defendant also requests that this court appoint counsel to assist

him in this Motion.

There is no right to the appointment of counsel for a motion

to reduce a sentence. United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 729

(4th Cir.

exceptional

2000).

Moreover,

circumstances

assistance of counsel.

in

the

Defendant

this

Accordingly,

case

has

not

that would

alleged any

require

the

the Defendant's request for

court-appointed counsel to assist him in his Motion is DENIED. If

d

future need

for

counsel does

counsel at that time.

arise,

the

court

will

appoint

i

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 399 Filed 02/12/20 Page 2 of 3 PagelD# 2927

Upon consideration of the First Step Act of . 20.18, the Fair

Sentencing

Act

of

2010,

Guidelines,

the United States Attorney's office is DIRECTED to

and

the

United

States

Sentencing

respond to the Defendant's Motion within forty (40) days of the

entry of this Order, indicating whether it intends to oppose the

Defendant's Motion; if the United States does intend to oppose, it

shall include in the response the reasons for its opposition. If

the United States files a response in opposition to the motion,

any reply by the Defendant shall be filed within thirty (30) days

of said response.

The United States Probation Office is DIRECTED, within thirty

(30) days from the date of this order,

to file,

under seal,

a

Worksheet containing the Defendant's original statutory minimum

and maximum,

as

well

as

his

offense

level,

criminal

history-

category, and Guidelines range, as determined at sentencing. The

Worksheet shall also contain the Defendant's current, projected

release

date,

statutory

minimum

and

maximum,

offense

level,

criminal history category, and guidelines range, as calculated byconsidering the effect, if any, of the First Step Act of 2018 on

the Defendant's sentence. Once the Worksheet has been filed bv the

Probation Of flee, the Clerk is DIRECTED to forward a copy of the

Worksheet to the Defendant and to the United States Attorney.

2

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 399 Filed 02/12/20 Page 3 of 3 PageiD# 2928

The Clerk is further DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to

the Defendant/ the United States Attorney at Newport News, and the

United States Probation Office at Newport News.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

M

Rcbccca Beach Smith

Senior United States District Judge

REBECCA BEACH SMITH

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

February ^ , 2020

3

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 411 Filed 05/06/20 Page 1 of 7 PagelD# 3062

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Newport News Division

MAY -6 2020 '

CLERK,. US. DISTRICT COURT

,NORFOLK. VA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 4:10cr47-l

PERRY COUSINS,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the Defendant's motion

i.or Consideration and Reduction of Sentence

Pursuant

to Section

•104 of the First Step Act of 2018 ("Motion"), filed on December 30

2019.

Act

EOF No. 398.

of

2018,

requests

Pub.

•r> he

Motion seeks relief under the First Step

L.

No.

appointment

of

115-391,

counsel

States responded on March 23,

132

and a

2020,

Stall.

5194

hearing.

Id.

(2018) ,

The

a no

United

and the Defendant rep-:eh

Ac il 20, 2020. ECF Nos. 408, 409.

I. History of the Case

On May 12,

One

t h r o u c i;

2011, a jury found the Defendant guilty or Count-

T hi r tee n,

Twenty-Nine or

the

Eighteen,

Superseding

seventeen counts of conviction,

Ilia se

offenses

v i o1a t ion

of

•were

18

Count

U.S.C.

Nineteen,

Indictment.

Twenty-Eight,

ECF Ko. 204.

hi

c. : :

the

the only counts involving cocaine

One,

Racketeering

Conspiracy,

in

Count

Const-'i ran. y

LC

§ 1962(d);

Two,

>

•Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 411 Filed 05/06/20 Page 2 of 7 PagelD# 3063

Distribute and Possess with Intent to Distribute Cocaine Base,

Cocaine,

and

Marijuana,

in

violation

of

21

U.S.C.

§§ 846,

841(a) (1), 841(b) (1) (C), and 841(b) (1) (D); Count Eight, Possession

with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of Cocaine Base,

in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b) (1) (A) (iii); and Count

Eleven, Possession with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of

Cocaine

Base,

in

violation

of

21

U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1)

and

(b)(1)(A)(iii). ECF No. 17.

The jury returned a Special Verdict Form.

ECF No. 204. As

stated on the Special Verdict Form, the jury found that the United

States had proved Racketeering Acts One through Five^ Eight

Fourteen

of

the

Superseding

Indictment.

and

Id. l*Reirevant-^h^?^

cc

Idw ECF

No. 17. The jury also noted on the Special Verdict Form its finding

that the amount of cocaine base that the Defendant possessed with

i

intent to distribute was "50 grams or more" for each of Counts

Eight and Eleven. ECF No. 204.

II. Eligibility for Relief

Under United States v. Wirsinq, a defendant is eligible for

relief under the First Step Act if he is serving a sentence for a

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) (1) (A) (iii) or (B) (iii) . 943 F.3d

175, 185 (4th Cir. 2019) . Because the Defendant was sentenced under

2

'Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 411 Filed 05/06/20 Page 3 of 7 PagelD# 3064

21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b) (1) (A) {iii) on Counts Eight and Eleven, he is

eligible for relief based on those Counts. ECF No. 17. He is not

eligible for relief on Count Two, however, because he was sentenced

on that count under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b) (1) (C) and (D) , not (A) (iii)

or (B) (iii) . See United States v. Duggan, 771 F. App’x 261, 261

(4th Cir.

2019)

(holding that the district court did not have

jurisdiction under the First Step Act to consider a motion to

reduce a sentence imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)).

Finally,

One,

the Defendant is not eligible for relief on Count

the racketeering conspiracy,

either.

The Defendant argues

that he is eligible for relief on this count because one of its

predicate racketeering acts, Racketeering Act Fourteen,

involved

a cocaine base offense. See Motion at 6 n.l. The Government* in

response, argues that a racketeering conspiracy is not a covered

offense

under

determined

by

the

First

18

Step Act,

U.S.C.

because

§ 1963(a),

the

not

penalties

21

are

U.S.C.

§§ 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii) or (B) (iii) .1 Response at 6-7.

^

But even

—the n^f&nHapt- wpre correct that^the First ^Step

Act allows the court to impose a reduced sentence on a racketeering

conspiracy charge on the basis of its predicate racketeering acts,

i

The penalties provided in § 1963(a) do sometimes change

based on the predicate racketeering acts. See 18 U»S.C. § 1963(a)

(providing a term of imprisonment of "not more than 20 years (or

for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for

which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment)").

3

‘Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 411 Filed 05/06/20 Page 4 of 7 PagelD# 3065

the Defendant still would not be eligible fo_r relief on Count One.

None of the racketeering acts that^

fondant was convirtrpii of

were a covered offense. The only racketeering act involving drugs

at

all

was

Racketeering Act

Fourteen/

which

incorporated

the

conduct described in Count Two of the Indictment and thus involved

offenses punishable under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b) f1) (CL-and-JD) . ECF

As

sentence

App'x

discussed,

those

are

not

offenses

uction under the First Step Act

at 261.

Moreover/

the

maximum

eligible

fgs-^a;.

See Duggan/ 771 F.

penalty

for

the

offense

described in Racketeering Act Fourteen was 20 years, so the drug

conspiracy was not responsible for the enhanced penalty on Count

One.

See

18

U.S.C.

§ 1963(a)

(providing

a

maximum

term

of

imprisonment of 20 years for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, "or

for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for

which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment"); 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(b) (1) (C),

(D)

20

years,

years

and

5

(providing maximum terms of imprisonment of

respectively) . ^axher^'^the^Defend'ahX^'sF

tbFotrfe

edicate

^?n^'udTngJmu^er^Sl^abtempte^'~lnuur9e^. ECF No. 204.

III. Merits

The jury found the Defendant guilty of possessing with intent

to distribute "50 grams or more" of cocaine base on each of Counts

4

‘Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 411 Filed 05/06/20 Page 5 of 7 PagelD# 3066

Eight and Eleven. ECF No. 204. After the Fair Sentencing Act of

2010, Pub. L. No.

111-220,

124 Stat. 2372

(2010),

the statutory

maximum for 50 grams of cocaine base is 40 years.2 See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b) (1) (B) (iii); First Step Act § 404. The decision whether to

reduce a sentence, however, still remains in the discretion of the

district

court.

Wirsing,

943

F.3d

at 180.

in'

und—-i

pSTSKHantr11eligible for reTilTf~u ndef*~tK'e~~Fi rst StetTP^arT<3“ftavirTgy

j&Gt\srdered the^*jrf i^ril7gs7u 'the^De'f’eTidan't'"s_~pQstserTfenci~ng ~cohdudtffi

fthe^presentence report, "the advTsory~~Guide 1 ines

t'o rS^ifv^

>—‘U-t

Dxxon—wi tn^xespe;

..a ^T§Z3.553

ftg ^Cou n t s E lghVa n d^El’e

n^.a nd^REDUGES^his/

fsl5'ntence3a-on’;^Co'unTs^Ei,^ht^and-LEle'veh^fr5m—lTiTf'e^~ro'^four^hundre~d7

•^i*gh'tfy*e=‘C4'8O0—mo nth s. impr ison'meht^

In

all

other

respects,

the

Judgment entered on August 11, 2011, remains in full effect.3 ECF

No. 217.

♦

:

t : 2 See First Step Act Amendment Application Worksheet,

No. 401, attached hereto as Exhibit A under seal.

(

ECF

3 To the extent the Defendant is eligible for a sentence

reduction on the other counts of conviction, the court declines to

exercise its discretion to do so. As the record shows, the

Defendant's sentences on those counts were driven by the murder,

attempted murder, and other violent acts committed by the

Defendant. Moreover, the Defendant's convictions and sentences on

Counts Eight and Eleven had no effect on the Guidelines range or

statutory range on any other counts. See Presentence Investigation

Report ("PSR"), Worksheet B, ECF No. 212 at 65-66, refiled at ECF

No. 400.

5

•Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 411 Filed 05/06/20 Page 6 of 7 PagelD# 3067

IV. Appointment of Counsel and Request for Hearing

In his Motion/

the Defendant also requests that the court

appoint counsel and hold a hearing.

There is no right to the

appointment of counsel for a motion to reduce a sentence. United

States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the

Defendant has not alleged any exceptional circumstances in this

*case that would require the assistance of counsel. Accordingly,

the Defendant's request for court appointed counsel to assist him

fin his Motion is DENIED. If a future need for counsel does arise,

•the court will

appoint

counsel

at

that

time.

The

Defendant's

^request for a hearing is also DENIED as a hearing is not necessary

^and would not aid the decisional process. E.D. Va. Crim. R. 47(J).

V. Conclusion

The Defendant's' Motion is GRANTED as to Counts Eight and

Eleven and DENIED as to all other counts. The Defendant's sentences

on Counts Eight and Eleven shall be REDUCED from Life to four

hundred eighty (480) months. In all other respects, the Judgment

entered on August 11, 2011, remains in full force and effect. The

Defendant's

requests

for

appointed counsel

and a

hearing

are

DENIED.

The Clerk

is

DIRECTED

to

forward a

copy of

this Order,

together with sealed Exhibit A, attached hereto, to the Defendant,

6

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 411 Filed 05/06/20 Page 7 of 7 PagelD# 3068

the United States Attorney, the United States Probation Office,

and the Bureau of Prisons.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

M

m

Rebecca Beach Smith

Senior United States District Judge

REBECCA BEACH SMITH

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

May (p , 2020

7

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 415 Filed 07/10/20 Page 1 of 6 PagelD# 3081

n

. >• /

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Newport News Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 4:10cr47-l

PERRY COUSINS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the Defendant's Motion

for

Reconsideration

No. 412.

?May 6,

("Motion"),

filed

on

May 28,

2020.

ECF

The Motion asks the court to reconsider its Order of

2020,

which

granted

in

part

and

denied

in

part

the

Defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step

Act of 2018. See ECF Nos. 398, 411.

I.

On May 12, 2011, a jury found the Defendant guilty of Counts

One

through

Twenty-Nine

Thirteen,

of

the

Eighteen,

Nineteen,

Superseding

Indictment.

Twenty-Eight,

and

ECF

The

No. 204.

Defendant received a total sentence of imprisonment for a term of

Life,

plus

seven

consecutively.

hundred

ECF No. 217.

twenty

(720)

months,

On January 16,

2020,

to

be

served

the Defendant

filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence under the First Step Act

of 2018. ECF No. 398. On May 6, 2020, the court entered an Order

Case 4;10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 415 Filed 07/10/20 Page 2 of 6 Page ID# 3082

granting the motion as to Counts Eight and Eleven and denying the

motion as to the remaining counts. ECF No. 411. That Order reduced

the sentences on Counts Eight and Eleven from Life to four hundred

eighty (480) months. Id.

The

instant Motion

for Reconsideration asks

the court to

reconsider its. Order of May 6, 2020, and to reduce his sentence on

"the remaining counts that are related to the 'covered offenses. / n

Motion at 5.

Specifically,

the Defendant argues that the court

should reduce his sentences on Count One, Racketeering Conspiracy

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Count Two, Drug Conspiracy,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; Count Three, Conspiracy to Commit

Hobbes Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and Count

Nine,

Hobbs

Act

Robbery,

in violation of

18

U.S.C.

§1951(a),

because those counts are "threaded" to the covered offenses in

Counts

Eight

and

Eleven.

For

the

reasons

stated

below,

the

Defendant's arguments on each of these four counts fails.1

II.

:esp

BOl

n.e.A

>ef,en.da)

1 The Defendant's Motion initially asks the court to reduce

his sentence on the "remaining counts," but goes on to discuss

only Counts One, Two, Three, and Nine. Motion at 1. To the extent

the arguments in the Defendant's Motion apply to his other counts

of conviction besides Counts One, Two, Three, and Nine, the court

denies the Motion with respect to those counts, as well, for the

reasons discussed in this Order.

2

%

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 415 Filed 07/10/20 Page 3 of 6 PagelD# 3083

^l3Tl-5t)^me-nt^regaraiess^f^gh^Fi_rAt_S^tepZ,AcT^nvrfe~sy^Unci'g,r,^l-,8^

/u.S.C. §~19'6T(aJ,;/ ajie fendant^sha

impri

" torJISTe^i~£ b)v£

/violation is~based on a~ racketeering activity^for which tile"fnax,imum>

^ypenalty ~ includes"

isonmeri

Id.

In

this

case,

Racketeering Activity Two-murder, in violation of Virginia Code

§ 18.2-322-involves an offense punishable by life imprisonment,

and thus mandates a sentence of life imprisonment on Count One. ^

^WniXe. trie "Defendant jls

coYreut" that

oj

7

^■nclugi-ng^Kaoceteefing^^cts^Four^^Tiyev^anH Fourteen;—invol-vef

^ocaine^gase "in some fprm/j_that_apg_s "not"

he—

CKeteermg Act Two lndepentienTly~"mdndat es, a sentenc

n

rMilie

^Gr-avat'C^igl F.3d

srevTew of a

RICO penaXty st:at:u1 t$^fKilled States v7^7

258,

g^detendant^s "sentence

o

2b4

n.5

Involves a

(4m~ ^Ci';c_20'2ff]---- rvEvgfir"7T"g7

covered

^istri^

s First step Actnnotion cannot avoi<y

ta,tu.to.r v. r e.qui-remen.ts.../)/1.

«

2 Virginia Code § 18.2-32 defines first degree murder, in

part, as "[mjurder, other than capital murder, ... by any

willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" and provides that

first degree murder is punishable as a Class 2 felony. Under

Virginia Code § 18.2-10 (b), Class 2 felonies are punishable by

"imprisonment for life or for any term not less than 20

years . . . ." The jury in this case was instructed on the elements

for first degree murder under Virginia law in the instructions for

Racketeering Act Two, and specifically found that Racketeering Act

Two had been proved. See Transcript of Jury Trial Day Six at 91,

ECF No. 246; Special Verdict Form at 1, ECF No. 204.

3

idht

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 415 Filed 07/10/20 Page 4 of 6 PagelD# 3084

The Defendant is not eligible for relief on Counts^Three and

4

^Nine, because the statutory penalties for those counts were no,t

^modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. Count Three is Conspiracy to

Commit Hobbs Act Robbery and Count Nine is a substantive count of

Hobbs Act Robbery, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). ECF

No. 17 at 11,

15. The penalties in § 1951(a) were not themselves

modified by sections two and three of the Fair Sentencing Act,

^nd, unlike in Count One, the penalties for Counts Three and Nine

do not refer to or otherwise depend on predicate offenses that may

h“ave been modified by the Act. The Defendant argues that he is

nevertheless eligible for relief on Counts Three and Nine because

he committed those robberies in order to obtain the drugs referred

to in Counts Eight and Eleven, which are covered offenses. Motion

at 2.

However,

this analysis goes against the Fourth Circuit's

instruction to consider only the statute of conviction, not the

conduct

involved

in

a

defendant's

particular

violation,

when

determining eligibility for relief under the First Step Act. See

United States v.

Wirsinq,

943 F.3d 175,

185

(4th Cir.

2019).

Moreover, the Defendant's position with respect to Count Three is

contradicted by the Superseding Indictment, which states that the

Defendant

"unlawfully

agree[d]

to

take

and

obtain

personal

property including United States currency, controlled substances,

and

firearms .

.

//

ECF

No. 17

4

at 11.

As

the

Superseding

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 415 Filed 07/10/20 Page 5 of 6 PagelD# 3085

Indictment makes clear, the object of the conspiracy in Count Three

was to obtain not just the cocaine base, but also money and guns.

III.

The

Defendant

is eligible

for

relief on Count Two,

Drug

Conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).

At the time of the court's May 6, 2020, Order, the Fourth Circuit

had concluded,

in an unpublished opinion,

that district courts

lacked jurisdiction to consider a First Step Act motion to reduce

a sentence

imposed under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b) (1) (C).

See United

States v. Duggan, 771 F. App'x 261 (4th Cir. 2019). Subsequently,

however,

that

the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion holding

sentences

imposed

linder

21

U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(C)

were

eligible for reductions under the First Step Act. See United States

v. Woodson,

2020)

F.3d —, 2020 WL 3443925 at *3 (4th Cir. June 24,

Irg^i^end^^SiigiBierf^IiaA^j-under. Woodson^

r*?i

ourt exe

At

sentencing,

the

Defendant's

conviction on Count Two was grouped with the convictions on Counts

Eight and Eleven.

See Presentence Investigation Report

("PSR")

at 51, ECF No. 212.

In the May 6, 2020, Order, the court reduced the sentences on

Counts Eight and Eleven from Life to four hundred eighty

months,

the

maximum

penalty

under

5

the

Defendant's

(480)

amended

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 415 Filed 07/10/20 Page 6 of 6 PagelD# 3086

statutory range. ECF No. 411 at 6. Thus,.,, the Defendant's sentence

of two hundred forty

maximum

under

21

(240)

U.S.C.

months on Count Two

§ 841 (b) (1) (C) ,

is

in

the statutory

line

with

his

sentences on the other drug counts in its group, which were at the

maximum

of

their

respective

statutory

ranges.

Moreover,

his

sentence on Count Two is not above the amended Guidelines range,

which would call for a total sentence of life imprisonment plus

seven hundred twenty (720) months, restricted to two hundred forty

(240) months on Count Two. See PSR at 70; U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 cmt.

n.3.

SL>4***;

la

u&her.e fore^

5SS

IV.

i

The Defendant's Motion is*DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to

forward a copy of this Memorandum Order to the Defendant,

United States Attorney at Norfolk,

the

the United States Probation

Office, and the Bureau of Prisons.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1st

-m

Rebecca Beach Smith

________Senior United States District Judge_______

■ REBECCA BEACH SMITH

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

July jp, 2020

6

-L

FILED: October 19, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7087

(4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM-l)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

PERRY COUSINS, a/k/a Pzo

Defendant - Appellant

ORDER

The court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge

requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 35 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Motz, Judge Floyd, and Judge

Harris.

For the Court

Is/ Patricia S. Connor. Clerk

FILED: October 4, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7087

(4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM-l)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

PERRY COUSINS, a/k/a Pzo

Defendant - Appellant

ORDER

This court's mandate issued 10/04/2021, is recalled for the limited purpose

of considering a timely petition for panel and/or en banc rehearing.

For the Court—By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

*v

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 204 Filed 05/12/11 Page 1 of 5 PagelD# 773

h

H

{

_____

t

-w/

RUED

IN OPEN COUHT

MAY 1 2 2011

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

NORFOLK. VA

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Newport News Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

PERRY COUSINS,

A/K/A “PZO”

CRIMINAL NO. 4:10CR47

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

We, the jury, find the Defendant, PERRY COUSINS:

COUNT 1:

With Respect to Count 1, Racketeering Conspiracy.

CGuiltv

\/^

■ ,Not Guilty^_____

If your answer to Count 1 is “Guilty,” you must answer the following.

Which, if any, of the following acts did defendant PERRY COUSINS agree would be

committed by him or another conspirator:

Racketeering Act One

ar~AtTempted~hiurder,ofAntonio Lewis

Proved

-NotProvecF^3

Racketeering Act Two

VaTMurder ofRashedCaudle-

—^TPro ved

NofProved

Racketeering Act Three

^a?-Attempted’Hobbs-ActTobbery

^-OfT.C;

Proved ■—^—

NotPrpvgd

Racketeering Act Four

arHQbbs Act robbery of A. B.

—--'Proved^—

“'Not-Proved

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 204 Filed 05/12/11 Page 2 of 5 PagelD# 774

«

Racketeering Act Five

^Hob^s ActTobbcry^of Loreiizo'fhomas -~^roved ~

--

NotProved^i

Racketeering Act Eight

(a^Robbeiy^of-RTD r

Proved—

•Not.Proved'i

Proved

NotProved-t

Racketeering Act Fourteen

f arConspiracyto distribute drugs

COUNT 2:

^^ith Respect to Count 2, Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to

/Distribute Cocaine Base, Cocaine, and Marijuana

Guilty

COUNT 3:

With Respect to Count 3, Conspiracy to Obstruct, Delay and Affect Commerce by

Robbery.

Guilty

COUNT 4:

i/

Not Guilty

With Respect to Count 4, Murder in Aid of Racketeering Activity.

Guilty

COUNTS:

Not Guilty_________

\/*

Not Guilty_______

With Respect to^Count 5, Use of a Firearm Resulting in Death.

/

Guilty

V'

Not Guilty_____

With Respect to Count 6, Interference with Commerce by Robbery.

Guilty

/"CrOUNT7_r

With Respect to Count 7, Discharge of Firearm during a Crime of Violence.

Guilty

£

Not Guilty____ _

Not Guilty_____

NOTE: If your answer to Count 7 is “Not Guilty,” do not answer the following question; simply

proceed directly to Count 8. If your answer for Count 7 is “Guilty,” please answer the following

question for Count 7.

With respect to Count 7, mark all that apply in regard to the firearm.

During or in relation to the crime of violence the defendant:

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-JEM Document 204 Filed 05/12/11 Page 3 of 5 PagelD# 775

C

Carried the firearm

/

Brandished the firearm

Discharged the firearm

COUNT 8:

With respect to Count 8, Possession with Intent to Distribute

Cocaine Base, commonly known as “crack” cocaine

Guilty

/

Not Guilty________

NOTE. If your answer to Count 8 is “Not Guilty," do not answer the following question; simply

proceed directly.to Count 9. If-your answer for Count 8 is “Guilty,” please answer the following

question for Count 8.

With Respect to Count 8, mark the total amount of cocaine base you find was

involved in the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute or distribute.

50 grams or more

ok less than 50 grams but at least 5 grams

nit less than 5 grams

(|0PNj3g

With respect to Count 9, Interference with Commerce by Robbery.

Guilty

Not Guilty

COUNTTlfiJ With Respect to Count 10, Use, Carry, and Brandish of Firearm

during a Crime of Violence.

Guilty

Not Guilty

NO IE: If your answer to Count 10 is “Not Guilty,” do not answer the following question; simply

proceed directly to Count 11. If your answer for Count 10 is “Guilty,” please answer the

following question for Count 10.

With respect to Count 10, mark all that apply in regard to the firearm.

During or in relation to the crime of violence the defendant;

Carried the firearm

Brandished the firearm

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS^TEM Document 204 Filed 05/12/11 Page 4 of 5 PagelD# 776

V|'W'

COUNT 11: With respect to Count 11, Possession with Intent to Distribute

Cocaine Base, commonly known as "crack” cocaine

Guilty

Not Guilty_________

NOTE. If your answer to Count 11 is “Not Guilty,” do not answer the following question: simply

proceed directly to Count 12. If your answer for Count 11 is “Guilty,” please answer the

following question for Count 11.

With Respect to Count 11, mark the total amount of cocaine base you find was

involved in the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute or distribute.

x,

5 0 grams or more

»k less than 50 grams but at least 5 grams

4

less than 5 grams

COUNT 12: With respect to Count 12, Interference with Commerce by Robbery.

Guilty

Not Guilty

< COUNT 13: With Respect to Count 13, Use of a Firearm Resulting in Death.

Guilty

i/"

Not Guilty_____

COUNT 18: With Respect to Count 18, Assault Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury in Aid of

; Racketeering.

Guilty

Not Guilty_____

COUNT 19: With Respect to Count 19, Use, Carry and Brandish of Firearm

during a Crime of Violence.

Guilty

Not Guilty

NOTE: If your answer to Count 19 is “Not Guilty,” do not answer the following question; simply

proceed directly to Count 28. If your answer for Count 19 is “Guilty,” please answer the

following question for Count 19.

With respect to Count 19, mark all that apply in regard to the firearm.

During or in relation to the crime of violence the defendant:

Carried the firearm

. ^ Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS^TEM Document 204 Filed 05/12/11 sPage 5 of 5 PagelD# 777

>w

*eal «a Cteto OSm.

/

O

Brandished the firearm

Discharged the firearm

COUNT 28: With Respect to Count 28, Possession of an Unregistered Firearm.

Guilty

Not Guilty

COUNT 29: With Respect to Count 29, Felon in Possession of a Firearm.

Guilty

Not Guilty

UNITED STATES v. PERRY COUSINS

Criminal No. 4:10CR47

£>??-/£-£)ft//

Date

REDACTED COPY

Foreperson’s Signature

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 1 of 14 PagelD# 3021

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ,■

Newport News Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

PERRY COUSINS,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 4:10cr47

\

UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION

TO REDUCE SENTENCE PURSUANT TO THE ETRST STEP ACT OF 2Q18

The United States of America, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States

Attorney, responds to defendant Perry Cousins’ motion as to whether he is eligible for a reduction

in his sentence via Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,132 Stat. 5194,

5222 (2018). ECF 395. That section makes the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,

Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(2), 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), retroactively applicable to certain offenses

involving the trafficking of crack cocaine. As explained below, Cousins’ motion should be denied

because, among other reasons, he is serving multiple concurrent life^sentences for ^non-crackrelated offenses and lowering the statutory penalties for his two “covered offenses” does not alter

his sentence.1

Cousins was a prominent member ofthe "Dump Squad," a criminal enterprise that operated

in Newport News, Virginia. In June 2010, a federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment

charging Cousins and others in multiple counts addressing a wide scope of racketeering activity,

l

Two of these offenses were for VICAR murders committed during the course of the conspiracy

for which Congress determined the statutory penalty for such crime was mandatory life

imprisonment.

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 2 of 14 PagelD# 3022

violent acts and drug trafficking committed by the enterprise over the course of ten years. ECF

17.

After a seven-day jury trial in May 2011, Cousins was convicted of 17 counts, four of

winch are germane to the instant motion: one count of racketeering conspiracy charged under 18

U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count 1), one count of conspiring to traffic marijuana, cocaine and cocaine base

in violation of21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 2) and two counts of possession with intent to distribute 50

grams or more of cocaine base charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(l)(A)(iii) (Counts 8

and 11). See ECF 204 (Special Verdict Form). Cousins was sentenced by this Court to concurrent

multiple life terms on Counts 1, 8 and 11. He received a 240-month concurrent term of

imprisonment on Count 2 (drug conspiracy).2

The United-States Probation Office's (USPOl worksheet concludes that Counts 8 and 11.

both crack cocaine counts, are "covered offengesJ* ECF No. 401. As to the remaining counts—1

thru 7, 9-10, 13, 19, 28-29—the USPO concludes that no sentence reduction is authorized under

FSA 2018, and that regardless of whether the Court affords the defendant relief on Counts 8 and

2 As noted, the other 13 counts of conviction are not germane to the instant motion. Count 3 was

a conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery count charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) for

which he was sentenced to 20 years; Count 4 was a murder in aid of racketeering count charged

under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) for which he was sentenced to life; Counts 5 and 13 were use of

firearm resulting in death counts charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and (j) for which he was

sentenced on each to life; Counts 6, 9 and 12 were interference with commerce by robbery counts

charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) for which he was sentenced on each to 240 months; Count 18

was an assault resulting in serious bodily injury in aid of racketeering count charged under 18

U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(3) and 2 for which he was sentenced to 240 months; Count 28 was a possession

of an unregistered firearm count charged under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a) and (d), and 5871 for

which he was sentenced to 120 months; Count 29 was a felon in possessionof a firearm count that

was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for which he was sentenced to 120 months. These

sentences were ordered to run concurrent with the sentences imposed on Counts 1, 2, 8 and 11.

Counts 7, 10 and 19 were use, carry and brandish firearm during a crime of violence counts that

were charged under 18U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for which he was sentenced to 120 months on Count

7, and 300 months each on Counts 10 and 19, all to be served consecutively to each other and to

all other counts, for an aggregate sentence of life plus 720 months. ECF 217.

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 3 of 14 PagelD# 3023

11, defendant s life sentences on his non-crack related offenses will remain undisturbed. Id. at p.

2.

In his motion, defendant appears to argue that Counts 8 and 11 involve crack cocaine and

carried a statutory maximum of life, and served to increase the statutory range of the RICO count

(Count 1) from 20 years to life. Def. Mot., p. 2. As explained below, defendant's life sentence

on Count 1 was increased to life due to the violent racketeering acts for which the jury found him

guilty, i.e., murder of one individual and the violent robbery of another . The only substantive

drug_autntcharged under the RICO conspiracy was the drug conspiracy charged in Count 2 /see

Racketeering Act 14), which only charged a violation for which the statutory maximum was 20

-

■

—

_

—

years. Furthennorgjgased on a plain reading of the applicable statutes, neither defendant's RICO

or drug conspiracy conviction are "covered offenses” under the First Step Act becausethev are

not among the exclusive "Federal criminal statute [s], the penalties for which were modified by

section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act." See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194,

5222. Notably, Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act only amended certain provisions in

21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 960, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (the "RICO” statute), and 21 U.S.C.

841(b)(1)(C) are not listed. See Pub. Law 111-220, §§ 2-3; 124 Stat. 2372,2372; see also United

States v. Davis, No. 07-CR-245S, 2019 WL 1054554, at *3, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36348, at *6

(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 6 2019)( Underjhe plainlanguage of [this section], whether anjdfense is a_

"covered offense” isdetennined by examining the statute that the defendant violated."), appeal

docketed, No. 19-874 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2019). ■

Count One - Racketeering Conspiracy

In Count 1, Cousins was charged with conspiracy to commit at least two acts of

racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). ECFNo. 17; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), (5).

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS~TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 4 of 14 PageiD# 3024

Count 1, paragraph 8 sets forth 14 discrete racketeering acts arising under §§ 1961 (1) and (5),

with each act applicable to one or more defendants. These acts encompassed felony murder and

attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder; Hobbs Act robberies and attempted robberies,

arson, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, powder cocaine and cocaine base. ECF 17 at pp. 610. Cousins was specifically found by the jury to have committed seven predicate acts:

1) Racketeering Act One: the felony attempted murder of Antonio Lewis on or about February

18, 2003, in violation of Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-32 and 18.2-26; 2) Racketeering Act Two: the

felony murder of Rashed Caudle on or about August 9, 2003, in violation of Va. Code Ann §§

18.2-32 and 18.2-26; 3) Racketeering Act Three: as charged in Count 6, the attempted Hobbs Act

Robbery of T.C. on or about June 11, 2005, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 2; 4)

Racketeering Act Four: as charged in Count 9, the Hobbs Act Robbery of A.B. in July 2005, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); 5) Racketeering Act Five: as charged in Count 12, the Hobbs

Act Robbery of Lorenzo Thomas on or about September 12, 2005, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1951(a) and 2; 6) Racketeering Act Eight the robbery and assault of R.D. on or about in or about

November 2007, in violation of Va. Code Ann.

18.2-58 and 18.2-18;jmd 1) Racketeering Act

Fourteen: as charged in Count 2, conspiring from in or about 2001 and continuing thereafter to

and including May 2010 to traffic marijuana, powder and crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841

and 846. See ECF No. 204.

The criminal penalties applicable to the racketeering offenses for which Cousins was

convicted on Count 1 are found in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a): “Whoever violates any provision of

section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or

for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes

life imprisonment), or both. . . ” Id. (emphasis added). Because at least one of Cousin’s

Case 4:10-cr~00047-RBS~TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 5 of 14 PagelD# 3025

racketeering activities’ triggered a statutory maximum sentence of life, his statutory sentencing

range as to Count 1 was life. See PSR at p. 3, | 1 and p. 34 at f 108. As explained below, as to

the racketeering count, § 404 of the First Step Act has not brought about any change to that

statutory framework today. In other words, today, at least one predicate act continues to trigger a

potential life sentence. That was, and remains today, all that is necessary to maintain the zero

years to life statutory sentencing framework applicable to Count 1.

A.

The statutory penalties for Virginia felony murder and robbery include a potential

sentence of life in prison.

Regardless of any drug trafficking offense addressed within Count 1, Racketeering Act

Two, described that on or about August 9, 2003, Perry Cousins did murder Rashed Caudle in

violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32. ECF 17,

8. Racketeering Act Eight described that in

November 2007, Perry Cousins and a co-conspirator, did commit robbery by an act of violence,

and by putting a person in fear of seriously bodily harm, and by the threat or presenting of a firearm,

and did take jewelry items from the person and presence of R.D., in violation of Va. Code Ann.

§§ 18.2-58 and 18.2-18. These acts were incorporated in Count 1, which charged Cousins and

others with conspiring to engage in a “pattern of racketeering activity” consisting of two or more

of the 14 racketeering acts as set out in paragraph 8 of the indictment. ECF 17,p. 6. “Racketeering

activity” means “any act or threat involving murder,... .robbery,....” which is “chargeable under

State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year....” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

When this Court rendered its initial judgment in this action in 2011, and today, felony

murder and robbery in Virginia has continued to trigger a potential sentence of life in prison. Va.

Code Ann. § 18.2-32 defines murder in pertinent part as

.. other than capital murder, by poison,

lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful, deliberate, premeditated killing ... except

as provided in § 18.2-31, is murder of the first degree punishable as a Class 2 felony.” A Class 2

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 6 of 14 PagelD# 3026

felony in Virginia carries a 20-year minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum of life.' Va.

Code Ann. § 18.2-10. Robbery, as defined in pertinent part at Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-58, “If any

person. . . by assault or otherwise putting a person in fear of serious bodily harm or by threat or

presenting of firearms, or other deadly weapon or instrumentality whatsoever, he shall be guilty of

felony and shall be punished by confinement in a state prison facility for life or any term not less

than five years.”; compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (the defendant may be imprisoned “for life if the

violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life

imprisonment....”

Therefore, notwithstanding any drug trafficking allegations contained within the ambit of

Cousins' racketeering conspiracy in Count 1, or any debate about the relative merits of the

‘indictment controls’ and “offense controls” theories of drug trafficking-related First Step Act

relief, as a matter of law the statutory framework for that count included and continues to

include, zero years to life in prison. For this threshold, and independent reason, Cousins is

ineligible for any reduction below his life sentence as to Count 1.

B.

Disregarding the independent implications of the predicate acts of felony murder

and robbery, the First Step Act did not change the statutory penalties for the drug

trafficking offense contained within Counts 1 and 2.

Again, Count 1 charged racketeering offenses under the statutory scheme set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 1962. ECF 17. The conspiracy charge in Count 1 alleged that Cousins committed two

or more of the predicate acts described in Paragraph 8 of the indictment. Id. at pp. 6-10. Those

acts included Racketeering Act Fourteen, which charged Cousins and others with conspiring to

distribute marijuana, powder and crack cocaine from in or about 2001 up to and including May

2010 in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and (D). Id. at | 8; pp. 10-11. Count

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 7 of 14 PagelD# 3027

2} as a substantive drug conspiracy count, specifically charged Racketeering Act Fourteen. Id. at :

p. 10.

Further, as explained below, notwithstanding the actual quantities of crack cocaine for

which Cousins was deemed responsible, the new Act did not alter the statutory penalty for the

crack-related offenses described in Act Fourteen or Count 2. That statutory penalty range was and

s

--------------- -—------------------- —

remains zero to 20 years for a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and his sentence on Count 2

reflectsjthat he was sentenced under that statutory range. And per § 1963(a), the statutory

maximum sentence for Count 1 remains life in prison based on his most serious underlying

criminal activity—the felony murder and robbery. As such, the revised penalty provisions for

cocaine base trafficking offenses made retroactive by § 404 of the First Step Act have no effect on

the statutory sentencing framework as to Counts 1 or 2. For this independent reason alone as well,

^

Cousins is ineligible for relief.

Furthermore, defendant’s life sentence was not driven by the quantity of drugs that

defendant and his enterprise were responsible for putting onto the streets of Newport News. The

PSR determined that his guideline sentencing range was also life imprisonment based on his most

*

*

serious underlying criminal activity—first degree murder. Guidelines § 2A1.1 establishes a base

offense level of 43 for first degree murder. Cousins’ RICO count was grouped together with

■Counts 3, 12 and 13 and scored under § 2A1.1, resulting in a base offense level of 43. See PSR

Worksheets A, Count lg, Count 3, Counts 12 and 13. With victim-related adjustments under

Guidelines § 3A1.1, Cousins’ adjusted offense level was 45. He received an additional 3-level

increase in his. offense level based on total units for a combined adjusted offense level of 48.

Defendant scored the highest criminal history score of VI, resulting in a sentencing guidelines

range of Life (plus 720 months consecutive for the firearms charges). In the complex calculus of

*

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 8 of 14 PagelD# 3028

Cousins' sentencing guidelines range in 2011, it was the felony murders of Rashed Caudle and the

robbery/murder of Lorenzo Thomas that ultimately drove that calculus, and yet today, he remains

subject to an offense level of 48, a criminal history category of VI and "range" of life in prison.

ECF401 (PSR Worksheet).

And, this Court clearly tied the imposition of Cousins' life sentence to the violence that

defendant inflicted on the community, including murder and other violent crimes:

But obviously the nature and circumstances of these offenses -1 agree with what

one of the victims said, and which has been evident throughout this case, that you

basically terrorized the City of Newport News. Your actions put a community in

fear, and you terrorized and you murdered and you wielded guns, you distributed

So I can’t think of a case — I’ve tried to bring one to mind — that had more

devastating and horrible occurrences all in one case than perhaps your case. I

don't know that I have had a similar case in my career, with this many murders

and this many crimes all in one case, and over what is relatively a short period of

time to have wreaked this kind of havoc and terror on a community.

11/18/2011 Sentencing Tr. at pp. 15-16.

Because the penalty range for Cousins’ RICO and drug conspiracy offenses were not

modified by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, he is not eligible for a sentence reduction on either

count. Even assuming defendant was eligible for a reduction on these counts, which he is not, he

is serving concurrent mandatory life sentences for the two VICAR murders he committed during

the course of the conspiracy (Counts 4 and 13) and any such reduction on these counts would not

provide defendant the relief he seeks.

Turning now to defendant’s “covered offenses” (Counts 8 and 11), the Fourth Circuit in

United States v. Wirsing, held that “[ajll defendants who are serving sentences for violations of 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii), and who are not excluded pursuant to the expressed

limitations in Section 404(c) of the First Step Act, are eligible to move for relief under that Act.”

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 9 of 14 PagelD# 3029

943 F.3d 175, 186 (4th Cir. 2019). Therefore, the binding precedent in this Circuit is that “the

drug quantity charged in the indictment. . . controls whether the defendant is eligible for relief

under the Act.” United States v. Laurey, 791 F. App’x 421, 421 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Wirsing,

943 F.3d at 185-86).

Tke government’s position remains that the drugquantitv to be considered is that which

is^found attributable to the defendant by the court, not merely what was charged in the indictment

The Eleventh Circuit has agreed with the government, reasoning that “the First Step Act modified

_only the relevant drug quantities for triggering the mandatory sentencing scheme in § 841, but did

not modify the process by which the district court imposes a sentence, including its ability to

determine the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes.” United States

v. Means, 787 F. App’x 999 (11th Cir. 2019). Regardless of the metric used, the defendant k

eligible for the court to consider_^sentence reduction on Counts 8 and 11. The PST^attributed the

defendant with 255.15 grams of “crack” cocaine, which is below the new 280-prams fhrp^hnlH

required after the.,Fair iSfinlenomg Act of 2010. Similarly, he was not charged with 280 grams.

However, defendant has merely shown that he is eligible, which does not mean that he is

automatioalhLefltitled to a sentence reduction.

/ 'm/M

^ jM\h ifj-

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'A,

This Court shouldin its discretion, deny a sentence reduction'J

Under § 404, this Court is not required to reduce the defendant’s sentence even if it

concludes that he was convicted of a covered offense. See United States v. Brown, 785 F. App’x

154 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming discretionary denial of relief). Section 404(b) states that the court

that sentenced a defendant “may” impose a reduced sentence as if Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair

Sentencing Act had been in place. And §. 404(c) strongly reinforces;the breadth of this Court’s

decision. Section 404(c) provides, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to

t

i

f

r

r

j

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 10 of 14 PagelD# 3030

reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” (emphasis added). “Congress left the decision as to

whether to grant a sentence reduction to the district court’s discretion.” United States v. Wirsing,

943 F.3d 175,180 (4th Cir. 2019).

This Court should, in its discretion, deny relief. Any reduction in his sentence on the

disputed counts (Counts 8 and 11) would essentially be moot, as defendant was sentenced to

concurrent life sentences on four other counts which are not "covered offenses" for purposes of

the First Step Act and lowering the statutory penalties on his crack counts would not alter his life

sentence on the other counts. ECF 400.

Furthermore, a reduction is not warranted. As the trial judge in this case, the Court is well

aware of defendant's extremely violent conduct, as extensively reviewed in the PSR. And since

being incarcerated, defendant has committed numerous, serious prison infractions. See attached

Disciplinary Record.

Defendant’s criminal history began at age 16, already included assault and battery and

possession of marijuana by 17, and escalated to possession of a stolen firearm at the age of 19.

PSR K 49, 50, 53, and 54. At the age of 20, he was convicted again of assault and battery. PSR

57. That offense was followed by, among other things, possession of marijuana, PSR ^ 59 and 64,

trespassing, PSR ][59, 60, 63, 65, and 66, and assault and battery on a law enforcement officer,

PSR^f 67.

The PSR also recounts defendant’s extremely violent conduct during the course of the

RICO and drug conspiracy for which he now seeks a discretionary sentence reduction. During the

course ofthe conspiracy, defendant was directly responsible for two murders, numerous shootings,

assaults and armed robberies. On August 9,2003, defendant executed Rashed Caudle by shooting

him nine times while Caudle sat in the passenger seat of a vehicle. “When officers arrived on the

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 11 of 14 PagelD# 3031

scene, [Caudle] was deceased, ‘hanging halfway out the open driver’s side door.” PSR ^ 24.

Cousins told a co-conspirator that he killed Caudle "due to an ongoing argument" and "bragged

about not being convicted in state court of the murder.” PSR 124.

On September 12, 2005, defendant and a co-conspirator entered the residence of Lorenzo

Thomas with the intention of robbing him for “crack” cocaine and money. Thomas and his cousin

Stacy Wise were inside the apartment at the time. Cousins and his co-conspirator forced Wise and

Thomas to the floor, and “put a pillow over [Wise’s] head.” PSR

30. After an unsuccessful

search, “Cousins continued to demand the drugs and money from [Thomas]. Cousins killed

[Thomas] by shooting [him] once in the chest and once in the back.” Id.

Defendant also used violence to rob his rivals ofbothmoney and drugs. On June 11, 2005,

defendant attempted to rob a co-conspirator for marijuana. PSR Tf 26. “Cousins pulled out a 9mm

firearm, pointed it at co-conspirator #2 and told [him], “Give it up.” Id. Co-conspirator #2 fled,

and Cousins shot him once in the left shoulder and once in the left arm. Id. In July 2005, “Cousins

contacted co-conspirator #3 ... to purchase ... “crack” cocaine.” PSR f 28. When co-conspirator

#3 arrived, Cousins approached [him] and pulled out a sawed-off shotgun. Cousins pointed the

shotgun at [him] and told him to, “Give it up.” Id.

On another occasion, defendant used a firearm to beat Robert Davis in retaliation for an

earlier gang-related incident. In November 2007, Davis pulled out a handgun and intervened im a

fight that had broken out in a convenience store owned by members of the defendant’s gang. The

next day, Davis returned to apologize.

“As [Davis] exited the store, Rice, [a member of

defendant’s gang], grabbed [Davis] and held him while Cousins beat [Davis] with a Caltech 9

firearm eight or nine times in the face.” PSR ^ 35.

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 12 of 14 PagelD# 3032

In the time since his sentencing-before this Court* defendant has had multiple prison-1

infractions, as the attachment to this response shows. On October 4, 2017, defendant “attempted

to assault a staff member by attempting [to] headbutt him . . . ” On the same day, he assaulted

medical staff while the staff was attempting to perform a medical assessment. He also was found

in possession of a “dangerous weapon” on two separate occasions. Defendant’s behavior has only

showed a continued pattern of violence. In August of 2016, he threatened bodily harm. In June

of 2012, he assaulted another inmate.

Defendant is not entitled to plenary resentencing.

In the instant motion, defendant argues the he is entitled to a full sentencing hearing on the

matter. “Nothing in the language of the First Step Act requires the court to have a hearing.” Wright

v. United States, 2019 WL 6039954 at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2019); see United States v. Wirsing,

943 F.3d 175, 183 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We hold that § 3582(c)(1)(B) is the appropriate vehicle for a

First Step Act motion.”). In the government’s view, a defendant is not eligible for a sentence

reductionwhere the record confrm^Jhat the quantity involved in the offens^satisfres the higher

thresholds oftheFair_Sentencing Act.- But, the Fourth Circuit rejected that view in United States

v. Wirsing, which is binding on this Court. United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2019).

Nevertheless, even if this Court determines that Counts 8 and 11 are “covered offenses,”

the Court should decline to exercise its discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence in light of the

defendant’s extremely violent conduct in this case and his poor conduct while incarcerated. The

above considerations belie any notion that Cousins is due any sentence reduction, even if he were

eligible for a reduction as to one or more counts of conviction. Any contrary result might offend

"the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among" similarly situated offenders under

18 U'S.C. § 3553(a)(6), and the need for a sentence to "reflect the seriousness of the offense,"

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 13 of 14 PagelD# 3033

promote respect for the law," and "provide just punishment for the offense" under §

3553(a)(2)(A). See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 276-79 (2012) (expressing the

importance of consistency in sentencing similarly situated offenders when determining the

retroactive application of a statutory amendment.).

Conclusion

For the reasons previously stated, the United States respectfully requests this Court deny

the defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018.

G. ZACHARY TERWILLIGER

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By:

Is/

Howard J. Zlotnick

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorney for the United States

United States Attorney’s Office

Fountain Plaza Three, Suite 300

721 Lakefront Commons

O

Newport News, VA 23606

Telephone:, (757) 591-4000

Facsimile: (757) 591-0866

Email: howard.zlotnick@usdoi.gov

Case 4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM Document 408 Filed 03/23/20 Page 14 of 14 PagelD# 3034

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 23, 2020,1 electronically filed a copy of the foregoing with the

Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send a notification of such filing to all

counsel of record. I further certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be

mailed to the following non-ECF user:

Perry Cousins, Reg. No. 75726-083

United States Penitentiaxy - Pollock

P.O. Box 2099

Pollock, LA 71467

By: /§/

Howard J. Zlotnick

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorney for the United States

United States Attorney’s Office

Fountain Plaza Three, Suite 300

721 Lakefront Commons

Newport News, Virginia 23606

Telephone: (757)591-4000

Facsimile: (757)591-0866

Email: howard.zIotnick@usdoi.gov

FILED: October 27, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-7087

(4:10-cr-00047-RBS-TEM-1)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

PERRY COUSINS, a/k/a Pzo

Defendant - Appellant

j

MANDATE

The judgment of this court, entered September 10,2021, takes effect today.

This constitutes the formal mandate of this court issued pursuant to Rule

41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

/s/Patricia S. Connor, Clerk

A

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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