Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Bobby John Kobito, Petitioner v. United States

APPENDIX

United States v. Kobito,

App. A

994 F.3d 696 (4t8 Cir. April 21, 2021)

Mandate, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals App. B

May 13, 2021

United States v. Kobito,

App. C

No. 1:19-CR-00025-NCT-1(M.D.N.C. July 29, 2019)

APPENDIX

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4560

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff — Appellee,

Vv.

BOBBY JOHN KOBITO,

Defendant — Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at

Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:19-cr-00025-NCT-1)

Argued: December 11,2020 Decided: April 21, 2021

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KING and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge

Gregory and Judge King joined.

ARGUED: Lisa S. Costner, LISA S. COSTNER, PA, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,

for Appellant. Ashley E. Waid, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew G.T. Martin, United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North

Carolina, for Appellee.

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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

Bobby Kobito pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing ah unregistered silencer and

was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, He now appeals that sentence, challenging

the district court’s use of two enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

Manual (“USSG”): § 3A1.4 for committing a felony intended to promote terrorism, and

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm with the intent that it be used in connection with

another felony, here “F elony Terroristic Threats.”

Kobito contends that the enhancements shouldn’t apply because he couldn’t be

convicted of the underlying terrorism felonies. But Kobito need not be convicted of a

terrorism felony for § 3A1.4 to apply, and the district court didn’t clearly exr by including

it in Kobito’s Guidelines calculation. As a result, § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) has no impact on the

length of Kobito’s sentence, rendering any alleged error as to its application harmless, We

thus affirm the district court’s judgment.

1.

A.

When Kobito entered a mosque in Raleigh, North Carolina to ask about an

inflammatory video of an Imam that was circulating on social media, a local police officer

took notice. The officer then walked by Kobito’s car and spotted binoculars and shooting

targets inside. A subsequent investigation led to Kobito’s Facebook account, which

included statements such as “One Man’s Terrorist is Another Man’s Patriot” J.A. 62, 131.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) then directed a confidential informant to

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contact Kobito and learn whether he was planning any criminal acts aimed at the mosque.

When the informant messaged him on Facebook, Kobito suggested meeting in person.

The two men met at a restaurant and the informant recorded the conversation.

Kobito told the informant that he believed the state’s fusion center,! located inside the

Terry Sanford Federal Building in Raleigh, was a front for the “National Security

Administration.”* J.A. 18. Kobito explained that he “need[ed] to find the exact floor, [to]

dump shots into the building,” described three positions from which he could fire into the

building, and discussed the measures he would take to cover his tracks, J.A. 19. Kobito

then said:

I’ve been doing this, like I said for about ten years now, hardcore about the

last six. I’ve got my (inaudible) that I’ve sniperized so it’s ten round fed

magazine. And freaking, they call it a solvent trap adapter, this company

makes. And it’s patented, it’s completely legal to own. It frealcing has

threads for, ahh, an oil filter. Poor man’s silencer... Where do youbuy your

silencer? I go down to a fucking auto store... And the shit works. Um, I

used it, I snuck it one time at the range. Because I wanted to verify the other

can that I created .. . It takes a 7.62 x (inaudible) round to where it’s not

much louder than a .22.

JA. 20-21. .

After the meeting, Kobito emailed the informant a photograph of the Terry Sanford

Federal Building and a document titled “Patriots Against Tyrants,” which described

Kobito’s grievances against the government. JA. 21,

' Fusion centers are state-owned and operated hubs where federal, state, local, and

tribal law enforcement agencies share information.

? It appears Kobito meant to refer to the National Security Agency.

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Kobito next met the informant about three weeks later at a gun range. He identified

the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and the Department

of Homeland Security buildings as potential targets. Kobito told the informant, “Evil is

coming and we need to be proactive and try to disrupt the plans.” Jd.

The following day, Kobito texted the informant that he wasn’t sure if he could

personally execute the plan due to his age and health, so the informant should find someone

else to help carry it out. But Kobito reaffirmed that the plan was “something that isneeded”

and stated that he remained willing to assist with planning and training, Id. |

The informant met with Kobito for the final time a few months later and again

recorded their conversation. Kobito told the informant that he still intended to do what

they previously discussed. When the informant expressed concerns about the gun shots

making too much noise, Kobito said:

Where I bought most parts from the guy, that I put on it you know. It just

clamps on like a bayonet would, you know? So instead of that, he got what

he calls a uh, calls it a muzzle-trap or something trap. And it clamps on just

like the bayonet or the muzzle brake.

J.A. 22. The informant asked, “So it’s like a silencer?” Id. Kobito responded: —

No. It’s frickin, just a little clamp thing you screw on a frickin oil filter. ..

So, P’ve got two STPs. Went down to my local, uh, was it NAPA or frickin

AutoZone? I can’t remember which. Frickin that’s where I bought my

silencers for $8 a piece. Frickin drilled a hole, and it . . . takes that big ass

round and drops it below a .22. And that is no shit. So, for me, noise isn’t a

factor utilizing that particular gun.

Id.

A few months later, the informant contacted Kobito and said he was “Ts }till worried

about the noise.” Jd. Kobito replied that his thoughts hadn’t changed. The informant then

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asked whether Kobito still had the “device [they] talked about to help withnoise,” to which

Kobito said, “Yes.” Jd. But when the informant asked to test the silencer, Kobito replied,

“Getting bad vibes man. Told you how it was made & works! Let’s part ways for now. I

wish you the best of luck in all you do! In Liberty, Bob.” J.A. 22-23. Kobito didn’t

respond to further attempts by the informant to contact him.

The government ultimately executed a search warrant at Kobito’s home and found

two silencers made from oil filters.

B.

A federal grand jury indicted Kobito for knowingly possessing an unregistered

silencer in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871.3 Kobito pleaded guilty pursuant

to a plea agreement. The probation officer then prepared a Presentence Investigation

Report and recommended the application of two enhancements.

First, the probation officer applied a twelve-level enhancement under USSG

§3A1.4 for “a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of

terrorism.” A “federal crime of terrorism” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) as an

offense that “is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation

or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct” and is a violation of an enumerated

statute. Here, that statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1363, which punishes anyone who “willfully and

* Under these statutes, it’s unlawful for any person “to receive or possess a firearm

which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record,”

26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and any person in violation may “be imprisoned not more than ten

years,” id. at § 5871. The definition of “firearm” includes “any silencer.” Id. at § 5845(a).

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maliciously destroys or injures any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal

property, or attempts or conspires to do such an act” so long as the property is “within the

special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

Second, the probation officer applied a four-level enhancement under USSG

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm “with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe

that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense,” which she

called “Felony Terroristic Threats.” JA. 134-35.

The enhancements resulted in a Guidelines ‘sentence of 188-235 months’

imprisonment, capped at the statutory maximum of 120 months. Kobito objected to both

enhancements, arguing that he made “no terroristic threat,” did “not commit or plan a

terrorist act,” and “withdrew from any and all conversation with the [informant] prior to

being charged.” J.A. 126. The court overruled Kobito’s objections, but varied downward

and sentenced him to 60 months in prison.

This appeal followed.

IL.

Kobito now expands on his argument that the district court erred by enhancing his

Guidelines range using USSG §§3A1.4 and 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he couldn’t be

convicted of the underlying terrorism felonies. He contends that the government didn’t

prove that the Terry Sanford Federal Building was “within the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1363, and that his

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conduct was mere “hyperbolic talk” rather than an attempt or conspiracy to commit

terrorism or to issue terroristic threats. Appellant’s Br. at 16.

As we explain, we review Kobito’s new jurisdictional argument for plain error and

find none. We also conclude that §3A1.4 applies even if the defendant couldn’t be

convicted of a federal crime of terrorism, and so the district court properly used it to

enhance Kobito’s sentence. This renders harmless any alleged etor in applying

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because, even without that enhancement, the statutory maximum would

cap the Guidelines range.

A.

We review criminal sentences only “to determin[e] whether they are reasonable.”

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (cleaned up). On a challenge to a district

court’s Guidelines calculations, we review legal conclusions de novo, factual findings for

clear error, unpreserved arguments for plain error, United States y. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288,

292 (4th Cir. 2012), and preserved arguments for harmless error, United States v. Lynn,

592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). Before a district court can enhance a defendant’s

Guidelines range, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

enhancement applies. United States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 2013).

B.

We first turn to the § 3A1.4 enhancement. Recall that this enhancement applies

when “the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of

terrorism.” USSG § 3A1.4. And the enumerated crime at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 1363,

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prohibits the “attempt[] or conspir[acy]” to “willfully and maliciously destroy[] or injure[]”

property “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

Kobito argues that the enhancement shouldn’t apply to his sentence because the

government (1) didn’t prove that the Terry Sanford Federal Building was within the special

territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and (2) didn’t and couldn’t have shown that

Kobito attempted or conspired to destroy that building. We disagree.

The special territorial jurisdiction of the United States is defined, in relevant part,

as “[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the

exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). But “{ijt is conclusively

presumed that jurisdiction has not been accepted until the Govemment accepts

jurisdiction,” 40 U.S.C. § 3112(c), “by filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor of

the State or in another manner prescribed by the laws of the State where the land is

situated.” id. at § 3112(b).

Kobito says that the government didn’t prove it had affirmatively accepted

jurisdiction over the Terry Sanford Federal Building. Instead, in response to Kobito’s

objections to the Presentence Investigation Report, the probation officer simply asserted

that the Terry Sanford Federal Building is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United

States, after which the district court referred to the building as “property within the

territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” J.A. 70. Because Kobito never raised this

issue in the district court, plain-etror review applies.

Even assuming the government was required to prove that the Terry Sanford Federal

Building is under the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States—which, as we

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explain, it was not—the district court didn’t err by applying the enhancement, Kobito

doesn’t seriously contest that the building is under federal jurisdiction. And he concedes

that this court could “probably” take judicial notice of federal jurisdiction over the building,

Oral Argument at 14:25-32. As a result, the district court didn’t plainly err in assuming

the same.

Regardless, the government wasn’t obligated to prove that the building is within the

special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, because the § 3A14 enhancement

doesn’t require that a defendant be convicted of a federal crime of tertorisen. Instead, the

enhancement applies whenever a defendant’s offense of conviction or relevant conduct was

“intended to promote” a federal crime of terrorism, even if it didn’t “involve” such a crime.

In reaching this conclusion, “[w]e interpret the Sentencing Guidelines using our

ordinary tools of statutory construction.” United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364, 369 (4th

Cir. 2020). As in all cases of statutory interpretation, “we start with the plain text of

the Guidelines and assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language controls,”

Id. (cleaned up).

Again, § 3A1.4 applies “[i]f the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended

to promote, a federal crime of terrorism.” The word “or” is “almost always disjunctive,

that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings.” Loughrin v, United States,

573 U.S. 351, 357 (2014). The disjunctive phrase in § 3A1.4 thus “makes clear that the

predicate offense must either (1) ‘involve’ a federal crime of terrorism or (2) be “intended

to promote’ a federal crime of terrorism, and that each clause has a separate meaning.”

United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 2010).

The dictionary defines “involve” as “to have within or as part of itself.” Involve,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER, hitps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/involve (last visited

April 20, 2021). The “involve” prong therefore suggests that the predicate offense and

related conduct must include a federal crime of terrorism. See, e.g., United States vy.

Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying the terrorism enhancement to a

defendant convicted of a terrorism offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)); United States

v. Hammoud, 483 F. App’x 865, 867 (4th Cir. 2012) (same).

But the use of the disjunctive means that “the ‘intended to promote’ prong must be

applicable in some circumstances when the ‘involved’ prong is not,ie, where the

defendant’s offense or relevant conduct does not include a federal crime of tetrorism.”

Awan, 607 F.3d at 3 14. The dictionary defines “intend” as “to have in mind as a purpose

or goal.” Intend, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https:/Iwww.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/intend (last visited April 20, 2021). And it defines “promote” as

“to help bring (something, such as an enterprise) into being.” Promote, MERRIAM-

WEBSTER, hittps://www.metriam-webster.com/dictionary/promote (last visited April 20,

2021).

Put together, the ordinary meaning of the “intended to promote” prong is that the

enhancement applies whenever the defendant commits a felony with “a goal or purpose...

to bring or help bring into being a crime listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B),” United

States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004), even if the defendant “has not

necessarily completed, attempted, or conspired to commit the crime,” United States v.

10

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Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 516 (6th Cir. 2001).4 See also United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d

300, 311-13 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying the § 3A1.4 enhancement to the defendant’s

sentence for obstructing an investigation into a terrorism crime listed in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2332b(g)(5)(B)).

That definition of the “intended to promote” prong dooms Kobito’s argument that

he couldn’t be convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1363 because the government didn’t

proffer evidence that the Terry Sanford Federal Building is actually within the special

territorial jurisdiction of the United States (or for that matter, because Kobito couldn’t be

convicted of an attempt or conspiracy to destroy that building). Instead, “‘it is the

defendant’s purpose that is relevant, and if that purpose is to promote a terrorism crime,

the enhancement is triggered.” Mandhai, 375 F.3d at 1248.

More specifically, the district court had to find by a preponderance of the evidence

that Kobito committed the crime of conviction (possessing unregistered silencers) with the

intent to promote “willful[] and malicious[] destr[uction]” of property under federal

jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 1363, and in a manner that was “calculated to influence or affect

the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government

* This interpretation stands in good company. In addition to the Second, Sixth, and

Eleventh Circuits, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have also read the “intended to promote”

prong similarly. See, e.g., United States v. Fidse, 862 F.3d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he

phrase implies that the defendant has as one purpose of his substantive count of conviction

or his relevant conduct the intent to promote a federal crime of terrorism,” (quoting

Graham, 275 F.3d at 516)); United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 1002 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“We find, therefore, that § 3A1.4 must be considered ... when a defendant?s felony

conviction or relevant conduct has as one purpose the intent to promote a federal crime of

terrorism.”).

11

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conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A)—regardless of whether he actually took steps to

destroy federal property. The court did so. See J.A. 70 (“[I]t is pretty obvious from what

took place and what was said, that there was an intent ts influence or affect the conduct of

the government, to retaliate against the government, and it was in a way which would be

to destroy property within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”).

And on this record, the district court’s finding wasn’t clearly erroneous. The court

determined that Kobito intended to promote the destruction of federal property when he

named the Terry Sanford Federal Building as a target. The court also found that Kobito

obtained (and suggested using) his unregistered silencers to facilitate those atiacks, as

established by the conversations recorded by the informant. And the court telied on the

“Patriots Against Tyrants” manifesto and Kobito’s statement that he would “disrupt the

plans” of evil as evidence of his intent to influence by intimidation (or retaliate against) the

government. Because we see no “obvious error or mistake” in the court’ reasoning, we

affirm its application of the § 3A1.4 enhancement. See United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d

188, 191 (4th Cir. 1999),

Cc.

We next turn to the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, which applies when the

defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason

to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.”

A defendant possesses a firearm “in connection with” another offense if the firearm

“facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” Id. atemt. n.1 4(A).

12

se ee eee sage we

The probation officer proposed that the predicate offense be “Felony Terrotistic Threats”

without citing to any statute defining that crime. J.A. 134-35,

The government attempted to provide an alternate predicate offense, contending that

“the enhancement could also be applied on the basis that the defendant’s possession of the

silencers facilitated, or had the potential to facilitate a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1363.” JA.

159 (Gov’t’s Position with Respect to Sentencing Factors), But the district court never

clarified why it applied the enhancement. See J.A. 70 (concluding that Kobito violated 18

U.S.C. § 2332(g)(5), “as well as a couple of those other statutes,” so “both enhancements

are appropriate.”), Reflecting the confusion over the predicate offense, Kobito argues that

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) doesn’t apply because he couldn’t have been convicted of conspiracy or

attempt to violate § 1363, and because his statements don’t qualify as “trae threats” that

are unprotected by the First Amendment or would violate 18 U.S.C. § 2332b.

Fortunately, we need not decide whether the district court emed in applying

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Rather, we may “assume that a sentencing error occurted and proceed

to examine whether the error affected the sentence imposed.” United States v. Hargrove,

701 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 2012).

Here, even if we remove the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement from the calculations,

the Guidelines range would remain the same. Kobito’s offense level would drop from 31

to 27, but his criminal history category would remain a VI, resulting in a range that exceeds

the statutory maximum of 120 months, See USSG ch. 5, pt. A (Sent’g Table). Because

§ 2K2.1(6)(6)(B) has no impact on the Guidelines range, any error in the application of the

enhancement is harmless.

13

DTW, UTE ee he iy erwin

* * *

For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.

14

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FILED: April 21,2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4560

(1:19-cr-00025-NCT-1)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

Vv.

BOBBY JOHN KOBITO

Defendant - Appellant

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in

accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ PATRICIA §. CONNOR, CLERK

APPENDIX

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FILED: May 13, 2021

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4560

(1:19-cr-00025-NCT-1)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

V.

BOBBY JOHN KOBITO

Defendant - Appellant

MANDATE

The judgment of this court, entered April 21, 2021, takes effect today.

This constitutes the formal mandate of this court issued pursuant to Rule

41(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

/s/Patricia S$. Connor, Clerk

APPENDIX

C

‘Offetise Ended

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filed 07/29/19 Page1of8 é

AO 2458 (NCMD Rav, 02/18) Sheet 2 - Imprisonment Page 2 of 8

‘PEFENDANT: BOBBY JOHN KOBITO

CASE NUMBER: 1:19-CR-00025-1

IMPRISONMENT

5 wee defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

months.

ch.

—

Xl The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: that the defendant be designated to a Bureau of Prisons facility

as close as possible to the middle of North Carolina. Further, that the defendant be given a thorough mental and physical examination.

Defendant's VA records should go to the Bureau of Prisons so they can assess his physical and mental health situation in order to maintain the

roper medications for the PTSD and the major depression disorder and to ensure he gets the necessary treatment. In addition, the defendant

a distinguished veteran and the court recommends that he receive every attention this can provide him, see paragraphs 56, 56, 57, 58, and 59

f the presentence report. Further, that the defendant be allowed to participate In the most intensive substance abuse treatment program

tovided by the Bureau of Prisons and that he allowed to participate in any educational and vocational programs of interest to him.

2

OFS

=.

Xl The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

T] The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district.

O at amy/pm on

CI as notified by the United States Marshal,

r] The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

CI before2pmon .

C as notified by the United States Marshal.

C1) as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on to at

, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

BY

DEPUTY UNTED STATES MARSHAL

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filed 07/29/19 Page 2 of 8

N=

AG 2488 (NCMD Ray, 02/18) Sheet 3 - Supervised Release . y Page Jof&

DEFENDANT: BOBBY JOHN KCBITO ;

CASE NUMBER; 1:19-CR-00025-1 . : . ‘

SUPERVISED RELEASE

fon release from imprisonment, you will be on stiipervised release for a term oft three (3) years.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance ; ;

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance, You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release fram

imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court. .

O The above drug tasting condition is suspended based on the court's determination that the defendant poses a low risk of

future substance abuse. (Check, ifappiicable,)

1 You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of

restitution. (check if applicable) “ : ,

You must caoperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (Check, if appltaie,) ;

[1 You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (4U.S.C § 20901, etseq) as

directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which you reside, work, are a

student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense, (Check, if applicable.) .

1 You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (Check, if applicable.)

7

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached

page. - . . : . .

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filed 07/29/19 Page 3 of 8

AG 2458 (NCMD Rey, 02/18) Sheat A - Supervised Ralease

DEFENDANT: ~ BOBBY JOHN KOBITO

¢ASE NUMBER: 1:19-CR-00025-1

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision, These conditfons are Imposed

Hecause they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation

Gfficers to keep Informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition. oo

{. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your release

from imprisonment, unless the probation officer Instructs you to report to a different prabation office or withina different time frame,

2. After initially reporting to the probation offica, you will receive instructions from the court or thé probation officer about how and when you

must report to the probation officer, arid you must report to the probation officer as instructed. ; oe :

$. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court

or the probation officer. De oy ; . ,

4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer, : oe

5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. if you plan to change where you live or anything about your living -

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the

probation officer in advance Is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of

becoming aware of a change or expected change. - . a ; . : re

6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or élsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take

any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or’she observes in plainview. = | ; oo

7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful typé of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing

so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses You from doing

so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your jobbresponsibilities), you must notify

the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to

unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware ofa change or expected change.

4. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged In criminal activity. If you know someorie has been convicted

of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or Interact with that person without first getting the pemission of the probation officer.

if you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer with 72hours. Py

10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, arrimurition, destructive devicé, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was

_ designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or Informant without first

getting the permission of the court, . —

12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (Including an organization), the probation officer may require you

to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm

that you have notified the person about the risk, .

18. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

£0.

J.S. Probation Office Use Only

AUS, probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me witha written copy of this judgment

ontaining these conditions: For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions,

available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature : Date

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filet 07/29/19 Page 4of8

Pagadofa .

‘Ao 2458 (NGMD Rev. 02/18) Sheet 3¢ - imprisanment, Special Coriditions Page 5 of 8

IbEFENDANT: BOBBY JOHN KOBITO

CASENUMBER: —_—_1:19-CR-00025-1 .

; SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION ,

‘The defendant shall abide by the maiidatory and standard conditions of supervised release.

rhe defendant shall cooperatively participate in a mental health evaluation diagnostic treatment program, which may include inpatient treatment,

nd pay for treatment services, as directed by the probation officer.

The defendant shall submit his person, residerice, office, vehicle, or any property under his control to a warlantless search. Such search shail be

gonducted by a United States Probation Officer at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, based upon reasonable suspicion of

ontraband or evidence of a violation of a condition of release. Failure'to submit to such a search may be grounds for revocation; the defendant

hall warn any residents that the premises-may be subject to searches. . ot :

a

0.

nN

i

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filed 07/29/19 Page5of8

“p 2468 (NCMD Rev, 02/19) Sheat 6 ~ Criminal Monetary Penalties Page & of 8

DEFENDANT: BOBBY JOHN KOBITO :

CASE NUMBER: 1:19-CR-00025-1

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

Assessment JVTA Assessment* , Fin Restitution

8

TOTALS $100.00 $.00 ; $.00

The determination of restitution Is deferred until . An Amended Judgment in a@ Criminal Case (AO 248C) will

be entered after such determination. .

[1] The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below,

if the defendant makes a partial payment, each payée shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in

the priotity order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664()), all nonfederal victims must be paid

before the United States is paid. ‘ SO,

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution orfine Is paid in full before the

fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 4 may be subject

1 to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C, § 3612(g). ;

|] The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

€ the interest requirement is waived pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3612((3) forthe D fine O testitution.

O1 the interestrequirement forthe fine 1 restitution Is modified as follows:

Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, . .

* Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Tile 18 for offenses committed on

a after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1998.

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filed 07/29/19 Pageé of 8

AD 2458 (NCMD Rev, 02/18} Sheet 6 » Schedule of Payments raga 1 oo

DEFENDANT: BOBBY JOHN KOBITO

WASE NUMBER: 1:19-CR-00025-1

é5.

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

4

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

A EX Lump sum payment of $ 100,00 due immediately, ‘ ;

C1 not later than or

1 in accordance with Oc, Op, 0 &, or C1 F below; or ;

& C1 Payment to begin Immediately (may be combined with ] c, 1 b, or (1 F below); or

”

*¢ C1 paymentin equal (e.g. weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $ over a period of (e.g., months or years),

to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this Judgment; or

bo Payment in equal __ (e.g. weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $ over a period of

to commence (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after releasé from imprisonment to a term of Supervision; cr

& 0 Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within". (e.g., 30 or 60 days) aller release, from Imprisonment.

The court will set the payment plan based on an asséssment of the defendant's ability to pay at thal time; or

FE] Special instructions regarding the payrnent of criminal monetaty penalties; ,

(e.g., months or years),

The special assessment in the amount of $100.00 is due and payable immediately at such times and In such amounts as

directed by the Federal Bureat of Prisons through the Inmate Financial Resporisibility Program.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties.is due during

imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Buréau of Pisons’ Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program, are to be made to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court for the Middle Distie of North Carolina, 324 West

Market Street, Greensboro, NC 27401-2544, unless. cthérwise directed by the court, thé probation officer, or he United States Attorney.

othing herein shall prohibit the United States Attorney from pursuing collection of outstanding criminal monetary penalties.

‘The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward’ any criminal monetary penalties imposed,

r) Joint and Several 4

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names, Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and

corresponding payee, if appropriate.

-] The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

-] The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s): ;

.

1 The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States: ;

ayments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment; (2) restitution principal; (3) restituifon interest, (4) fine principal, (5)

ine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) JVTA assessment, (8) penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution and court

rosts.

cr

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filed 07/29/19 Page7 of 8

A 2458 (NCMO Rev. 02/18) Sheet 6 - Schedule of Payments Page 3 of 8

KEFENUANT: BOBBY JOHN KOBITO

ASE NUMBER: 4:19-CR-00025-1

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE

The sllencer’s seized shall be destroyed and the firearms seized shall be given to Ronald Wilson at the conclusion of the appeals,

Case 1:19-cr-00025-NCT Document 26 Filed 07/29/19 Page 8 of 8