Petition for Rehearing — Kenneth A. Pruitt, Petitioner v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 5, 2022

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 21-562

). r" ; •

i-f

Ebe

imprente Court of tije Ziniteb 6tate5

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

Kenneth A. Pruitt,

Petitioner,

v.

JAN 0 5 2022

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., acting alone, or in concert, in a

purported official capacity; John Forbes Kerry, acting alone

or in concert, in a purported official capacity; United States

(U.S.) Department of Treasury, acting alone, or in concert;

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, acting alone, or in

concert; U.S. National Institute of Environmental Health

Sciences; acting alone, or in concert; Michael Regan, head of

EPA; Richard Woychik, head of NEIHS, and Janet Yellen,

head of USDT; Heads of USDT, EPA, and NIEHS unnamed

for 2021 and later due election transition, said heads named

individually in his/her official capacity and when not acting in

his/her official capacity but acting ultra vires, acting either

alone or with unknown and unnamed other persons

improperly causing violations of U.S. domestic law referenced

within 2006 U.S. entry to 2003-31-OCT MERIDA UNITED

NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION

(UNCAC) and/or violate UNCAC,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review denial

by Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

of a colorable constitutional claim

PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER OF

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se

Trailer Village RV Park

16580 N. US Hwy 59

Garrison, Texas 75946

(936) 714-3811

kap8063@yahoo. corn

1

BASIS FOR THIS PETITION FOR

REHEARING:

RULE 44.2

Extraordinary new outcome-determinative

recent release by Respondents is now available to

the Court as new information post-docketing that

provides Rule 44.2 substantial grounds that

Petitioner could not have previously presented:

"Memorandum of Law Subject: Circular 175:

Request for authority to sign and accept the Paris

[Climate] Agreement" [PCA] ("175-Memo"),

Said 175-Memo, new Exhibit 7 hereto, was

hidden from this Court and Petitioner by

Respondent Government. 175-Memo was published

only after third party Freedom of Information Act

action forced recent release by Respondent

Government.

Petitioner requests Rule 201(c)(2) Judicial

Notice of Adjudicative Facts of said 175-Memo.

175-Memo states (quote):

"Importantly, there is no legal obligation

[imposed by Paris [Climate] Agreement"

[PCA1 on USA] to either achieve or

implement emissions targets" [Pg 2, para

2, lines 6-7]

"The core of the [PCA] Agreement is not

legally binding, i.e. there is no legal

obligation on Parties to either achieve or

implement their emissions targets

11

(`nationally determined contributions')". [Pg 4,

last 3 lines]

"There is no legal requirement regarding

the type/stringency of Parties' targets."

[Pg 4, last line, to Pg 5 line 1]

Above Respondents' words alone are

sufficient basis to grant this Petition for Rehearing.

However, on rehearing, this Court will find

said 175-Memo contains fundamental "dead wrong

part". Detailed basics are below in "Reasons for

Granting this Petition".

In summary, said "dead wrong part" of 175Memo is a subterfuge.

That "dead wrong part" is a deceit as a "work

around" to achieve PCA signing first and then later

PCA compliance indirectly by Executive Orders and

other mandates without Cst. Art. II, Sec. 2 Senate

two-thirds concurring.

In particular:

175-Memo says PCA is not binding for

emissions reductions.

PCA calls for 'nationally determined

commitments' ("NDC"), thus creates an oxymoron if

and when PCA commitments do not bind.

111

United Nations states, contrary to 175Memo, that PCA is a binding treaty. See Certiorari

Petition Appendix 5 Items 1 and 3.

175-Memo then improperly sets out 'work

around' path by false pretense for Executive Branch

mandates or for expanded regulation to cause PCA

compliance by USA, without Art II Sec 2 Senate

involvement.

Said 175-Memo "work around" creates 'false

pretense' based mandates having "domestic force in

USA courts without [further] legislation" in clear

violation of Medellin v Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)

and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,343 U.

S. 579 (1952).

Those mandates expand scope of well-aged

laws and regulations, which at passage, never

contemplated any new objectives remotely akin to

PCA compliance or massive energy and economic

transitions of US$ Trillions flow from Treasury

caused by PCA.

175-Memo previously hidden from this Court

by Respondents directly impacts answers to

Question Eight presented by Certiorari Petition to

(1) resolve PCA related Questions for need to

ascertain Respondents' scope of PCA

authority, if any and (2) restrain ultra vires

acts and (3) provide remedy for injury to

Petitioner's rights in fossil fuel property interests.

iv

A rehearing is needed for this Court to fashion

a remedy to protect Petitioner from Respondent

ultra vires actor (RUVA) caused harm as pleaded:

"...where a specific duty is assigned by law,

and individual rights depend upon the

performance of that duty, it seems equally

clear that the individual who considers

himself injured has a right to resort to the

laws of his country for a remedy. Marbury v

Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803)"

Respondents' own 175-Memo words above

show true justification for granting this Petition for

Rehearing.

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

Basis for this Petition for Rehearing:

Rule 44.2

i

Table of Contents

v

Table of Authorities

vi

Reasons for Granting this Petition

1

Conclusion, Prayer for Relief

9

Certificate

14

Appendix:

Exhibit 7: "Memorandum of Law"

Subject: Circular 175: Request for authority to sign

and accept the Paris [Climate] Agreement" [PCA]

("175-Memo").

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

page

Constitutional Provisions

Article II, Section 2

ii, 3, 5, 10

Fifth Amendment

10

Fourteenth Amendment

10

Federalist No. 75

11

"The Treaty Making Power of the

Executive", Library of Congress

https://guides.loc.gov/federalist- papers/text71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper- 25493467

Treaties, International Arrangements

1992 United Nations Framework

7, 8

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

2003-31-OCT MERIDA UN

11

CONVENTION AGAINST

CORRUPTION (UNCAC)

Paris Climate Accord, including —195

passim

(Intended) Nationally Determined

Contributions (PCA)

Cases

Foster & Elam v. Neilson,

27 US (2 Pet.) 253 (1829)

Marbury v Madison,

5 U.S. 137 (1803)

Medellin v Texas,

552 U.S. 491 (2008)

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,

343 U. S. 579 (1952)

US Senate Records

Exhibit 3 of Certiorari Petition

Senate Resolution (S. Res. 98).

9

iii, 10

iii, 6, 9

iii, 11

vii

https://www.congress. gov/bill/105th-congress/senateresolution/98

Exhibit 3: 1997 Senate Resolution 98 (with 'yea'

votes by Biden and by Kerry)

US Government Publication

(recent FOIA release)

"Memorandum of Law"

Subject: Circular 175: Request for

authority to sign and accept the Paris [Climate]

Agreement" [PCA] ("175-Memo").

Judicial notice of adjudicative fact

Rule 201, Federal Rule of Evidence at 201 (a)

governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact and (b)

fact that can be accurately and readily determined

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.

Rule 201(c)(2) requires that the Court "must take

judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is

supplied with the necessary information".

Petitioner requests Rule 201(c)(2) judicial notice of

said "Memorandum of Law" Exhibit 7 (175-Memo)

published by Respondent Government

1

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

On rehearing review, this Court will find said

175-Memo contains previously hidden-from-public

legal 'warning' which 175-Memo used as a 'false

pretense':

"Importantly, there is no legal obligation

[imposed by Paris [Climate] Agreement"

.[PCA] on USA] to either achieve or

implement emissions targets" [Pg 2, para

2, lines 6-7]

"The core of the WCA] Agreement is not

legally binding, i.e. there is no legal

obligation on Parties to either achieve or

implement their emissions targets

(`nationally determined contributions')". [Pg 4,

last 3 lines]

"There is no legal requirement regarding

the type/stringency of Parties' targets."

[Pg 4, last line, to Pg 5 line 1]

Contrast the above 175-Memo to Certiorari

Petition Appendix Exhibit 5 items extracts:

(a) Exhibit 5 Item 1 UN:

"The Paris Agreement is a legally binding

international treaty on climate change."

issued by Secretariat of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change, via

https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-parisagreement/the-paris-agreement

(b) Exhibit 5 Item 3 UN):

2

"A new instrument of acceptance of the Paris

Agreement by the US, expressing its consent to be

bound by the Agreement, was deposited with the

Secretary-General, later in the day"

issued by the United Nations, via

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082602

(c) Exhibit 5 Item 6 (whitehouse.gov):

Q And just a follow-up on that, perhaps, for

Secretary Kerry: How do you assure

international partners that the U.S. will stick

to whatever you propose after having seen the

Trump administration take the U.S. out of the

Paris Accord?

SECRETARY KERRY: That's precisely why

we're going to stick by it, and I think our word is

strong.

issued by Respondent Government, via

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/pressbriefings/2021/01/27/press-briefing-by-presssecretary-jen-psaki-special-presidential-envoy-forclimate-john-kerry-and-national-climate-advisorgina-mccarthy-january-27-2021/

Haunts of "sometimes binding, sometimes not"

words of Medellin supra echo back to this Court.

PCA is not binding on USA for emissions

reductions and this case enables this Court to so

declare and alert the United Nations and others.

However worse, 175-Memo has obvious

horrible legal errors that enable misuse of influence,

manipulation and ultra vires conduct.

3

175-Memo (i) leverages 'not binding' to avoid

Art II Sec 2 Senate concurrence check-and-balance

to (ii) then set out an excuse for Executive Branch to

sign PCA.

The Executive Branch alone then can create

PCA `nationally determined commitments" for USA

under PCA.

The 'nationally determined commitments" are

not determined by an Art II Sec 2 Senate.

175-Memo then states twisted excuse for USA

compliance with PCA "ND C" commitments by

Executive Orders, regulations and other mandates

without Congressional concurrence.

175-Memo has been, and is now, applied

improperly by RUVA to the detriment of Petitioner

and others; such ultra vires conduct is within scope

of Petitioner's Complaint, various Motions and

Appeals.

There is a strong need for definitive resolution

by this Court at this stage.

Unless this Court grants Rehearing and

resolves this case in a precedential manner,

Executive Order mandates related to PCA

climate change will remain a matter of great

national importance and of valid public concern

for sources of abuse and injustice and looting of USA

Treasury.

4

Unilateral Executive Branch mandates

improperly leverage PCA non-binding "nationally

determined commitments" to justify and cause

unprecedented and momentous energy and economic

transformations.

Those transformations take or waste private

fossil fuel assets such as Plaintiff's without due

process and compensation and without Senate checkand-balance.

Absent a hearing, such mandates will have

been effectively resolved as energy paths forward for

the country as a whole and will impose massive

economic detriments and takings without due

process, compensation and Senate check-andbalance.

This Court instead should be the final arbiter

of these 'sometimes binding, sometimes not' matters

through a definitive ruling to avoid prohibition of

Medellin supra.

175-Memo has fundamental errors of law and

is inconsistent with proper answers to legal

questions of Certiorari Petition, in particular factors

of Certiorari Petition Question Eight.

175-Memo disguises improper conduct.

If 175-Memo is allowed to stand without

challenge, then errors of law and ultra vires acts by

Respondent ultra vires actors (RUVA) will

propagate.

5

If not restrained, RUVA within Executive

Branch will purport to make 'nationally determined

commitments' and to cause domestic compliance

with PCA emissions reductions by unilateral

mandate. Art II Sec 2 must be met.

RUVA, who cannot bind USA to a climate

treaty for emissions reduction, instead corruptly act

for fraudulent facade as if USA were bound.

These are serious words but are true

damnation of RUVA who taunt other countries about

their failure to comply with PCA when RUVA know

USA is not bound to PCA emissions reductions.

Petitioner prays that this Court fashions order

to RUVA to not transform non-binding self-made

emissions reduction 'nationally determined

commitments' of PCA to domestic law by executive

branch mandates which avoid proper Article II Sec

2 Senate two thirds concurring.

Petitioner asks rehearing for this Court to

correct "dead wrong part" of 175-Memo which is a

subterfuge.

That "dead wrong part" is a deceit as a "work

around" to achieve PCA signing and compliance

indirectly by Executive Orders and mandates

expanding scope of well-aged laws and regulations

which at passage approval never contemplated new

objectives akin to PCA.

175-Memo "work around" gives Executive

Orders made for PCA compliance "domestic force in

6

USA courts without [further] legislation" in violation

of Medellin supra.

That "dead wrong part" RUVA hopes this

Court looks away and does not act and denies this

Petition.

175-Memo Details: 'dead wrong parts':

On rehearing this Court is asked to find that

said 175-Memo has 'dead wrong parts', for example:

"Just because an agreement [UNFCCC] was

approved by the Senate does not mean that

any [PCA] agreement thereunder needs to be

a treaty; it depends upon its form and

content." [Pg 17, 7th para]

"The fact that the Senate has already

approved an agreement [UNFCCC] can, as in

this [PCA] case, actually provide support for

the conclusion of an executive agreement

[PCA] because the subsequent agreement is

within the scope of, and advances the object

and purpose of, the original agreement

[UNFCCC]." [Pg 17, 7th para]

175-Memo part above wrongly failed to

point out continuing restrictions imposed by

Senate regarding UNFCCC by 1997 S. Res 98.

See Petitioner's Exhibit 3: 1997 S. Res 98

(with 'yea' votes by Biden and by Kerry, Petition A3).

Respondents Government, Biden and Kerry

knew such 175-Memo 'dead wrong parts' were wrong

at PCA signing(s).

There is clear, undeniable evidence.

Respondents' knowledge is evidenced by 'yea'

votes to the contrary of 175-Memo by Biden and by

Kerry, found in Senate records1997 S. Res 98

Exhibit 3.

There can be no doubt Respondents knew of

1997 Senate Resolution specific climate agreements

relating to UNFCCC were contrary to 'dead wrong

parts' of 175-Memo.

Contrast, please, new information from 175Memo against Certiorari Petition "Jurisdiction"

paragraph B.6.:

"... [1997] Senate imposed conditions, 'then and

thereafter', on USA becoming a signatory to

any international agreement on greenhouse

gas emissions under UNFCC:

"... United States should not be a

signatory to any protocol to, or other

agreement regarding, [1992 (UNFCCC)] at

negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997 or

thereafter which would:

(1) mandate new commitments to limit

or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the

Annex 1 Parties, unless the protocol or other

agreement also mandates new specific

scheduled commitments to limit or reduce

greenhouse gas emissions for Developing

8

Country Parties within the same compliance

period; or

(2) result in serious harm to the U.S.

economy"

and

"6.

Respondents Biden and Kerry are well

aware (because both voted 'yea' for below cited

`S. Res 98') that, during 1997, the Kyoto

Protocol:

was proposed via 1992 United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC). and that protocol

suggested "developed countries" have greater

responsibility to act and greater financial

burden than "developing countries", and

was rejected in 1997 by US Senate

resolution 'S. Res 98' by Yea-Nay Vote. 95-0.

This Court may also find 'dead wrong part'

includes other parts of 175-Memo, parts at Pg 5 and

Pg 9 "Mitigation" stating that:

o "Neither sentence of [PCA] Article 4.2 creates

a legal obligation to achieve of implement an

ND C"

In the first sentence, it is clear from the

phrase "it intends to achieve" that there is no

legally binding obligation to achieve

mitigation targets. (The United States

proposed this language early on in the

process, and it was widely disliked precisely

because it made so clear that the targets were

not legally binding.)

9

The second sentence requires a Party to

pursue mitigation measures, but without any

requirement to pursue particular mitigation

measures or to implement or to implement or

achieve the target.

"The obligation in the second sentence of

Article 4.2, "to pursue domestic mitigation

measures" can be implemented by the

Executive Branch under existing authorities"

[Pg 5 Mitigation]

The obligation in Article 7.9 to engage in

adaptation planning, processes and

implementation of action is discretionary ("as

appropriate"). [Pg 9 Mitigation]

Contrast above 175-Memo with Medellin supra

where Chief Justice Roberts writes these thoughts:

"But the responsibility for transforming an

international obligation arising from a nonself-executing treaty into domestic law falls

to Congress, not the Executive." citing Foster

& Elam v. Neilson ,27 US (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).

CONCLUSION, PRAYER FOR RELIEF

175-Memo says PCA is not binding for

emissions reductions.

PCA calls for 'nationally determined

commitments' ("NDC"), thus creates an oxymoron if

and when PCA commitments do not bind.

10

UN above cited (App. 5 Items 1 and 3) calls

PCA a binding treaty.

175-Memo then improperly sets out path to

cause PCA compliance by USA with Executive

Branch making PCA 'national determined

commitments' having effect of laws (not just setting

policies), and without Art II Sec 2 Senate

involvement.

Petitioner prays that this Court orders RUVA

to not change non-binding PCA emissions reduction

commitments (not binding on USA) to domestic law

by executive branch mandates to avoid proper checks

and balances for treaty of Art. II Sec 2 Senate two

thirds concurring.

Questions presented and challenges of

corruption causing injury to Petitioner are questions

of law for this Court, not 'political questions'.

But where a specific duty is assigned by

law, and individual rights depend upon

the performance of that duty, it seems

equally clear that the individual who

considers himself injured has a right to

resort to the laws of his country for a

remedy. Marbury supra

Improper corrupt PCA related acts avoiding

Art. II Sec 2, and Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments, are not merely "only politically

examinable."

The making by Executive Branch of PCA

`national determined commitments' having effect of

11

laws (not just setting policies) also violate

Youngstown Sheet supra.

Petitioner pleas this Court fashion a remedy

for injury to him caused by RUVA, mindful of UN

Convention Against Corruption and of Federal ethics

rules cited in Certiorari Petition Exhibit 4, Sec 101

"Principles of Ethical Conduct", para 1:

"Public service is a public trust, requiring

employees to place loyalty to the Constitution,

the laws, and ethical principles above private

gain."

In particular, Hamilton's 1788 Federalist No.

75 "Treaty Making Power of the Executive" spoke

more than 230 years ago to concerns of Petitioner's

Complaint, Appeal and Certiorari Petition, [See

Library of Congress, https://guidesloc.gov/federalistpapers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493467], for

example this excerpt:

"However proper or safe it may be in

governments where the executive magistrate is

an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the

entire power of making treaties, it would be

utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that

power to an elective magistrate of four

years' duration."

"But a man raised from the station of a

private citizen to the rank of chief

magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender

fortune, and looking forward to a period not very

remote when he may probably be obliged to

return to the station from which he was

taken,night sometimes be under temptations

12

to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it

would require superlative virtue to withstand."

"An avaricious man might be tempted to

betray the interests of the state to the

acquisition of wealth."

"An ambitious man might make his own

aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign

power, the price of his treachery to his

constituents."

"The history of human conduct does not

warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue

which would make it wise in a nation to commit

interests of so delicate and momentous a

kind, as those which concern its intercourse

with the rest of the world, to the sole

disposal of a magistrate created and

circumstanced as would be a President of the

United States."

"It must indeed be clear to a demonstration

that the joint possession of the power in

question, by the President and Senate, would

afford a greater prospect of security, than

the separate possession of it by either of

them."

175-Memo contradicts above wise limitations

set out in Federalist No. 75.

175-Memo contradicts also Art. II, Sec 2,

instead 175-Memo contains obvious horrible legal

errors that enable misuse of influence, manipulation

and ultra vires conduct.

The 'nationally determined commitments" of

PCA are not determined by an Art II Sec 2 Senate.

13

175-Memo (i) leverages 'not binding warning'

aspects of PCA to avoid Art II Sec 2 Senate

concurrence check-and-balance for signing (ii) then

sets out a false pretense as excuse for Executive

Branch mandates.

The Executive Branch alone then erroneously

mandate PCA 'nationally determined commitments"

for USA and unilaterally mandate compliance by

Executive Orders having same effect as making

domestic law, violating Youngstown Sheet supra.

Petitioner prays for this Supreme Court to

admonish and restrain Respondents' ultra vires

conduct, with restraint consistent with above with

Federalist No. 75 cautions and current USA legal

principles of trust, loyalty, and ethics.

In closing, by signing below, Petitioner

assures this Court that his Petition contains his

concerns which raise serious Constitutional

questions and his concerns are not frivolous.

Petitioner attaches signed Rule 44 certificate.

Respectfully submitted,

/ s / Kenneth A. Pruitt,

Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se

Trailer Village RV Park

16580 N. US Hwy 59

Garrison, Texas 75946

(936) 714-3811

kap8063@yahoo.com

January 4, 2022

14

RULE 44 CERTIFICATE OF PETITIONER,

PRO SE

I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing is

presented in good. faith and not for delay, and that it is

restricted to the grounds specified in Supreme Court

Rule 44.2 for intervening circumstances of a substantial

or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not

previously presented..

Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se

Trailer Village RV Park

16580 N. US Hwy 59

Garrison, Texas 75946

(936) 714-3811

kap8063@yahoo.com

January 4, 2022

No. 21-562

In The

ipupreme Court of ttje

iptatet

Kenneth A. Pruitt,

Petitioner,

v.

Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., acting alone, or in concert, in a

purported official capacity; John Forbes Kerry, acting alone

or in concert, in a purported official capacity; United States

(U.S.) Department of Treasury, acting alone, or in concert;

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, acting alone, or in

concert; U.S. National Institute of Environmental Health

Sciences; acting alone, or in concert; Michael Regan, head of

EPA; Richard Woychik, head of NEIHS, and Janet Yellen,

head of USDT; Heads of USDT, EPA, and NIEHS unnamed

for 2021 and later due election transition, said heads named

individually in his/her official capacity and when not acting in

his/her official capacity but acting ultra vires, acting either

alone or with unknown and unnamed other persons

improperly causing violations of U.S. domestic law referenced

within 2006 U.S. entry to 2003-31-OCT MERIDA UNITED

NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION

(UNCAC) and/or violate UNCAC,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review denial

by Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

of a colorable constitutional claim

APPENDIX

Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se

Trailer Village RV Park

16580 N. US Hwy 59

Garrison, Texas 75946

(936) 714-3811

kap8063@yahoo.com

APPENDIX

Exhibit 7: Respondents' "Memorandum of Law"

Subject: Circular 175: Request for authority to sign

and accept the Paris [Climate] Agreement" [PCA]

("175-Memo").

App. 1

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Subject: Circular 175: Request for authority to sign

and accept the Paris Agreement

The accompanying memorandum from the

Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change

(SECC) requests authority to sign and deposit an

instrument of acceptance to join the Paris

Agreement ("Agreement"), a multilateral agreement

negotiated under the UN Framework Convention on

Climate Change ("the Convention"). The United

States is a party to the Convention, having been one

of the first States to submit its instrument of

ratification. The Agreement will be open for

signature as of April 22, 2016, at UN Headquarters

in New York. In addition to signing, the United

States would subsequently deposit its instrument of

acceptance in order to join the Agreement. For the

reasons below, I conclude that there is no legal

objection to signing the Agreement and depositing

an instrument of acceptance (i.e., meaning that the

Agreement may be concluded as an executive

agreement).

The Agreement, among other things:

establishes a long-term temperature goal of "well

below" 2 degrees Celsius, as well as a corresponding

greenhouse gas emissions aim of global peaking as

soon as possible;

provides mechanisms to promote achievement of

the goal and aim, including, e.g., a collective

stocktake every five years of progress in

implementing the Agreement and the subsequent

App. 2

submission by Parties of their next round of

emissions targets;

provides for Parties' emissions targets to be

"nationally determined," as opposed to negotiated or

allocated through some kind of agreed formula;

raises the profile of adaptation to climate change

impacts;

approaches "differentiation" among Parties in a

manner that stands in marked contrast to the Kyoto

Protocol , which contained commitments only for the

so called "Annex I" Parties (largely developed

countries); and

establishes a robust transparency framework that

improves upon the existing system, including by

being substantively more rigorous in terms of

developing country reporting on emissions

inventories, reporting on implementation, and

review.

Legal Nature of the Agreement

As a whole, the Paris Agreement is a "treaty"

within the meaning of that term in international

law. This international law conclusion, however,

does not answer the separate question, addressed

later in this Memorandum, of whether joining the

Agreement would require the advice and consent of

the Senate. The individual provisions of the

Agreement are of a mixed legal nature. While some

provisions are legally binding, many are not , and

some (such as those in which the Parties "recognize "

X or "are encouraged " to do Y) read more like

recommendations or exhortations found in a UN

resolution than the provisions of an international

agreement. (As an example, the entire adaptation

App. 3

article (Article 7) contains only one provision setting

forth a legally binding obligation on Parties.)

This "hybrid" approach was necessary to bring all

countries on board and was actively supported by the

United States, including where legally binding

obligations would have been impossible for the

United States to fulfill without additional

legislation.

As ultimately adopted, the Agreement does

contain certain legally binding obligations that

would apply to the United States. As discussed

below, most involve the submission of information

(reporting, communicating) or are otherwise within

the control of the Executive Branch (such as

accounting for the emissions target). Some are

already U.S. obligation s under the Convention (such

as finance). Importantly, there is no legal obligation

to either achieve or implement emissions targets.

The United States strongly supported this approach,

in the interest of promoting both greater ambition

(which might be suppressed by targets of a legal

nature) and broad participation, including that of

major developing countries. (China and India would

not have accepted legally binding targets.) The

approach was in stark contrast to the approach

taken when negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, an

agreement also under the Convention but one that

included emissions targets that were both legally

binding and not applicable to developing countries.

Relationship to the Convention

According to the negotiating mandate agreed

by the Convention's Conference of the Parties in

Durban, South Africa, in 2011 (known as the

App. 4

"Durban Platform"), the resulting agreement was to

be adopted "under the Convention." Paragraph 1 of

the cover decision used to adopt the Agreement

reiterates this point.

While there is no definition of "under the

Convention," the Convention contains three

provisions of relevance to any "related legal

instrument," a phrase that would include the

Agreement:

Article 2 of the Convention, which sets forth the

Convention's objective, provides that the objective

applies to any related legal instrument. Consistent

with that directive, Article 2 of the Agreement sets

out a global temperature goal ("[h]olding the

increase in the global average temperature to well

below 2°C") that gives greater specificity to the

Convention objective's reference to avoiding

"dangerous anthropogenic interference with the

climate system."

Article 7 .2 of the Convention provides that the

Conference of the Parties ("COP") is to "keep under

regular review" the implementation of any related

legal instrument it may adopt. As this directive

applies to the Convention's COP, it did not need to

be reflected in the Agreement.

Article 14 of the Convention, related to dispute

settlement, provides that its provisions apply to any

related legal instrument, unless that instrument

provides otherwise. While it was not legally

necessary to reference the Convention's dispute

settlement procedures in the Agreement in order for

them to apply, the Agreement nevertheless expressly

provides in Article 24 for their application mutatis

mutandis to the Agreement.

App. 5

Beyond the three provisions noted, the

Convention does not address the terms of any legal

instrument thereunder. Some Parties asserted that

an agreement "under the Convention" required, for

example, the use of the Convention's Annexes (which

set forth lists of Parties responsible for certain

commitments) or a bifurcated approach to the

provisions of the agreement (e.g., that "developed

country Parties" have different commitments from

"developing country Parties"). Such assertions were

strongly opposed by many other Parties, particularly

the United States, and were unsuccessful. The

Agreement contains no references to the Annexes

and, with the exception of the provisions related to

financial support, does not take a bifurcated

approach to commitments.

It should also be noted, while there was an

effort to call the Agreement a "protocol" and to adopt

it expressly pursuant to Article 17 of the Convention,

this effort was not successful. The instrument is

titled "Agreement," and the authority of the

Convention's COP for its adoption is unspecified. In

the U.S. view, the COP's authority was provided in

Article 7 .2(m) of the Convention, which accords the

COP residual authority necessary to achieve the

objective of the Convention.

There was also an effort at one stage,

principally by China, to call the agreement an

"implementing agreement" under the Convention.

China noted that the U.S. proposal for an agreement

in 2009 was called an "implementing agreement,"

and they hoped to use that term for the agreement to

be adopted in Paris. This approach, which the

United States opposed, was not adopted. Thus,

while, as noted below, the legally binding provisions

App. 6

of the Agreement can be traced to, and elaborate,

various provisions of the Convention, it is not, as a

formal matter, an "implementing agreement" under

the Convention.

Domestic Form of the Agreement

The Supreme Court has consistently

recognized the authority of the President to conclude

international agreements without the advice and

consent of the Senate where the President's own

constitutional authority, authority derived from

Congressional action, or some combination of them,

provides support for the President 's actions. See

Weinberger v. Rossi, 256 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982);

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682-83

(1981); Belmont v. United States, 301 U.S. 324 , 33031 (1937); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224

U.S. 588,60 1 (1912). As detailed below, the

President's independent authority under Article II,

Section 2 of the Constitution, together with the

authority given to him by statute, treaty, and other

indicia of Congressional support , as well as past

practice concerning similar agreements, provide the

President with ample authority to conclude the

Agreement as an executive agreement. If approved,

the Department of State will deposit an instrument

of acceptance signed by the Secretary of State to join

the Agreement; it would enter into force for the

United States, according to the Agreement's terms ,

thirty days after at least 55 States representing 55%

of global greenhouse gas emissions (as counted in

accordance with paragraph 104 of the decision

accompanying the Agreement) have deposited their

instruments.

App. 7

1. Authority to Implement U.S. Obligations

under the Agreement

All U.S. legal obligations under the

Agreement can be implemented under existing

authority. As elaborated below, nearly all of them

can be implemented pursuant to the President's

constitutional authority, as exercised by the

Secretary of State. Most obligations involve the

communication of information and discretionary

actions related to domestic action ( e.g., adaptation

planning) or international cooperation ( e.g., public

education, technology). For those that require

legislative authority for implementation, such

authority already exists.

The core of the Agreement is not legally

binding, i.e., there is no legal obligation on Parties to

either achieve or implement their emission targets

("nationally determined contributions"). There is also

no legal requirement regarding the type/stringency

of Parties' targets.

The Agreement's provisions that are legally

binding on the United States are as follows:

Mitigation:

Article 4.2 requires each Party to prepare,

communicate, and maintain successive nationally

determined contributions ("ND Cs" i.e., emissions

targets) over the course of the Agreement.

Article 4.2 also requires Parties to "pursue

domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of

achieving the objectives" of their NDCs.

o Neither sentence of Article 4.2 creates a legal

obligation to achieve or implement an NDC.

In the first sentence, it is clear from the phrase "it

intends to achieve" that there is no legally binding

App. 8

obligation to achieve mitigation targets. (The United

States proposed this language early on in the

process, and it was widely disliked precisely because

it made so clear that the targets were not legally

binding.)

The second sentence requires a Party to pursue

mitigation measures, but without any requirement

to pursue particular mitigation measures or to

implement or achieve the target.

Article 4.8 requires each Party to provide the

information necessary for clarity, transparency, and

understanding, when communicating its NDC.

Article 4.9 requires each Party to communicate an

NDC every five years.

o Because the provision states that such

communication shall be made "in accordance with"

the decision of the Parties taken in Paris, paragraph

25 of the adopting decision, in which the Parties

decide that Parties "shall submit" future NDCs nine

to twelve months in advance of the relevant meeting

of Parties , is also legally binding.

Article 4.13 requires Parties to account for their

NDCs so as to promote environmental integrity and

avoid double counting.

Article 4.15 requires Parties to take into

consideration in the implementation of the

Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies

most affected by the impacts of response measures.

Adaptation:

Article 7.9 requires each Party, as appropriate, to

engage in adaptation planning processes and the

implementation of actions.

App. 9

Support:

Article 9.1 requires developed country Pa lties to

provide financial resources to assist developing

country Parties with both mitigation and adaptation,

in "continuation of their existing obligations under

the Convention." (This commitment is a "collective"

one, as was made clear in the memorandum of law to

sign the Convention, as well as the transmittal

package to the Senate. Further, in the Convention

context, it has consistently been interpreted by the

United States and other Parties as a collective, not

individual , commitment.)

Article 10.2 requires Parties (collectively) to

strengthen cooperative action on technology

development and transfer. Article I 0.2, as well as

Article 12 described below, are obligations to

cooperate and thus are indeterminate obligations for

which Parties cannot be held to specific results.

Reporting/Review:

Article 13. 7 requires each Party to regularly

provide a greenhouse gas inventory and the

information necessary to track progress in

implementing and achieving its nationally

determined contributions.

Articles 9.5, 9.7, and 13.9 require developed

country Parties to communicate various types of

information concerning financial, technology

transfer, and capacity-building support.

Article 11.4 requires all Parties to regularly report

on any actions or measures they take to enhance the

capacity of developing countries to implement the

Agreement.

Article 13.11 requires each Party to participate in

a facilitative, multilateral consideration of, inter

App. 10

alia, the implementation/achievement of its

mitigation target.

Other:

Article 12 requires Patties (collectively) to

cooperate to enhance climate education, training,

public awareness, public participation , and public

access to information. As is the case with Article 10.2

described above, this is an indeterminate obligation.

The United States would be in a position to

implement each of these legally binding obligations

under the Agreement under existing domestic

authority:

Eight of the obligations (Article 4.2, sentence one;

Article 4.8; Article 4.9; Article 11 .4; Article 13. 7;

Article 9.5, Article 9.7; Article 13.9) are procedural

and involve the repotting/submission/communication

of information by the Executive Branch. These

obligations do not require legislative authority but

rather can be carried out under the President 's

authority to conduct foreign affairs under Article II

of the Constitution, as exercised by the Secretary of

State under 22 U.S.C. 2656.

o The United States already has substantial

reporting requirements under the Convention, as

elaborated by decision s of the Convention 's

Conference of the Parties. Article 12 of the

Convention in particular requires reporting, inter

alia, on mitigation (greenhouse gas inventories,

mitigation policies and measures) and on actions

taken with respect to finance and technology support

to developing countries. One example of reporting

under Article 12 is the recently submitted 2016 U.S.

Biennial Report. The Agreement 's reporting

requirements elaborate upon these

App. 11

existing obligations.

The United States would implement any additional

reporting requirement s under the Agreement

pursuant to the same authorities.

The obligation in the second sentence of Article

4.2, to "pursue domestic mitigation measures," can

be implemented by the Executive Branch under

existing authorities. o This obligation is already

being implemented , given that it is an existing

U.S. obligation under Article 4.1(b) of the

Convention. ("All Parties ... shall. .. [f]ormulate ,

implement , publish and regularly update

national. .. programmes containing measures to

mitigate climate change .... ")

Statutory authorities include, e.g., the Clean Air

Act ( 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.) and the Energy Policy

and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6291-6317) , and

regulations thereunder.

There is ample existing regulatory authority to

pursue mitigation measures, as evidenced by the

numerous regulatory actions that have already been

taken to control U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,

including, e.g.:

Under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.

7521), EPA adopted standards controlling CO2,

N20, and CH4 for light-duty vehicles for model

years 2012-2025 and for heavy-duty vehicles for

model years 2014-2018.

Acting pursuant to its authority in 49 U.S.C.

32902, the Department of Transportation has

adopted fuel economy standards for passenger cars

and light trucks, as well as for medium- and

heavy- duty vehicles. The authority to regulate the

former types of vehicles was provided in the Energy

Policy and Conservation Act (1975) and to regulate

App. 12

the latter types was provided in the Energy

Independence and Security Act (2007).

Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42

U.S.C. 629 1-6317), the Department of Energy has

finalized multiple measures addressing building

sector emissions, including energy conservation

standards for 29 categories of appliances and

equipment.

Under Section 612 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.

767 1k), through the Significant New Alternatives

Policy program (SNAP), EPA has approved more

climate-friendly alternatives to ozone depleting

substances for use in lieu of high global warming

potential HFCs in certain applications . Further, it

has listed certain high GWP HFCs as unacceptable

in specific applications.

Similar to the repolting obligations, the obligation

in Article 4.13 to "account" for NDCs so as to

promote environmental integrity/avoid double

counting (e.g., count emissions/removals in specified

ways) can be carried out by the Executive Branch

without the need for additional authority. As under

the Convention, the Executive Branch will submit

periodic reports on the progress the United States is

making towards achieving its emissions target. It

will include /exclude emissions and removals of

greenhouse gas in a manner that is reflective of any

binding rules agreed pursuant to this provision.

The obligation in Article 4.15 to take into

consideration the concerns of Parties with economies

most affected by the impacts of response measures,

particularly developing country Parties, is

discretionary and can be implemented by the

Executive Branch without the need for additional

authority.

App. 13

This obligation is nearly the same as existing U.S.

obligations under Articles 4.8 and 4.10 of the

Convention:

Article 4.8 of the Convention provides: "In the

implementation of the commitments in this Article ,

the Parties shall give full consideration to what

actions are necessary under the Convention,

including actions related to funding, insurance and

the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs

and concern s of developing country Parties arising

from ... the impact of the implementation of response

measures ... . "

Article 4.10 of the Convention provides: "The

Parties shall...take into consideration ... the

situation of Parties, particularly developing country

Parties, with economies that are vulnerable to the

adverse effects of the implementation of measures to

respond to climate change."

The obligation in Article 7.9 to engage in

adaptation planning processes and implementation

of actions is discretionary ("as appropriate"). It can

be implemented by the Executive Branch under

various existing statutory and Executive Branch

authorities, e.g., the Coastal Zone Management Act

(Pub. L. 92-583); the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.

1251 et seq.); E.O. 13653: Preparing the United

States for the Impacts of Climate Change; E.O.

13690: Establishing a Federal Flood Risk

Management Standard and a Process for Further

Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input ; E.0 .

13689: Enhancing Coordination of Federal Efforts in

the Arctic; and E.O. 13677: Climate-Resilient

International Development.

This obligation is nearly the same as the existing

U.S. obligations under Article 4.1 of the Convention.

App. 14

Article 4.1 (b) of the Convention provide s: "All

Parties ... shall ... formulate, implement, publish and

regularly update national and, where appropriate,

regional programmes containing ... measures to

facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change .... "

Article 4.1(e) of the Convention provides: "All

Parties ... shall ... [c]ooperate in preparing for

adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop

and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for

coastal zone management, water resources and

agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation

of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought

and desertification, as well as floods .... "

Article 9 .1 provides: "Developed country Parties

shall provide financial resources to assist developing

country Parties with respect to both mitigation and

adaptation in continuation of their existing

obligations under the Convention." This obligation is

not only unquantified but, as noted above, applies

collectively to developed country Parties (i.e., not

individually to the United States). While not

required, U.S. support will be carried out through a

variety of means, including, e.g., direct bilateral

foreign assistance and contributions to various

multilateral trust funds managed by international

financial institutions. Legal authority for such

support varies depending on the specifics of the

support, but may include relevant appropriations

acts and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

o By linking the provision of financial resources to a

continuation of "existing obligations under the

Convention," the provision makes clear that the

obligation of the United States (which, as noted, is

part of a collective obligation) goes no fuilher than

App. 15

existing U.S. financial obligations under the

Convention.

o Existing financial obligations under the

Convention are contained in Articles 4.3, 4.4, and, to

an extent, 4.5.

Article 4.3 of the Convention provides: "The

developed country Parties ... shall provide new and

additional financial resources to meet the agreed full

costs incurred by developing country Parties in

complying with [certain reporting obligations]. They

shall also provide such financial resources ... needed

by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed

full incremental costs of [certain mitigation

measures]."

Article 4.4 of the Convention provides: "The

developed country Parties ... shall also assist the

developing country Parties that are particularly

vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in

meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects."

Article 4.5 of the Convention provides: "The

developed country Parties ... shall take all

practicable steps to promote, facilitate, and finance,

as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to,

environmentally sound technologies and know-how

to other Parties .... "

The obligation in Article 13.11 to participate in a

facilitative, multilateral consideration of the

implementation/achievement of its nationally

determined contribution can be implemented by the

Executive Branch pursuant to the President's

constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs, as

exercised by the Secretary of State.

The obligations in Articles 10.2 and 12 involve

unspecified collective "cooperation" with respect to

technology and public education, etc., respectively,

App. 16

and can be implemented by the Executive Branch

under existing authorities, e.g., Section 204 of the

International Cooperation in Global Change

Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-606 (Title II);

Section 102 (e) of the Global Change Research Act of

1990, Pub. L. 101-606; National Climate Program

Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2904 (d); the Marine

Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 USC

Sections 1442 (a) and (b); Section 103 of the Clean

Air Act, as amended, and Section 102(2)(F) of the

National Environmental Policy Act (which authorize

EPA to engage in and support various cooperative

technology transfer activities); the Coastal Zone

Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq. (which

provides NOAA authority to conduct a program of

technical assistance and management-oriented

research in coastal zone management in connection

with possible sea-level rise); and the Weather

Bureau Act, 15 U.S.C. 313a (which authorizes the

development of an international basic meteorological

reporting network in the Westrn Hemisphere and

the Arctic, including cooperative programs in and

with other countries).

It should be noted that the Agreement

includes several provisions that, while written in

mandatory teams ("shall "), do not apply to Parties

(either individually or collectively). Some apply to

institutions, e.g., directions to the Warsaw

Institutional Mechanism (Article 8), to the

Secretariat (Article 4.12), or to the COP meeting as

the Parties to the Paris Agreement (throughout).

Others are written to provide an assurance in one

article that a particular issue is addressed in one or

more other articles, e.g. , Artic le 4.5 ("[s]upport shall

be provided ... ").

App. 17

2. Statutory and Congressional Support

In addition to the President's constitutional

authority, his authority to conclude the Agreement

as an executive agreement derives support from

statute and other Congressional actions. As

discussed above, multiple statutes provide the

authority necessary to implement many of the

obligations contained in the Agreement. In addition,

Congress has expressed support for international

engagement on environmental protection and on

climate change in a number of laws and other

actions detailed below.'

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

contains a specific directive from Congress that, "to

the fullest extent possible," "all agencies of the

Federal Government ... shall recognize the

worldwide and long-range character of

1 Congressional authorization for the President's conclusion of

an international agreement may be either explicit or implicit.

As observed by a leading Congressional study of treaties and

international agreements conducted by the Congressional

Research Service for the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations , "Congress has enacted statutes providing authority

in advance for the President to negotiate with other nations on

a particular matter. This authority may be explicit, or, in the

case of agreements concluded in conformity with a generally

enunciated congressional policy, implied from the terms of the

enactment. " Treaties and Other International Agreements:

The Role of the United States Senate , 106th Con., 2d Sess., S.

Prt. 106-7 1 (2001), at 69. Sec also Restatement (Third) of

Foreign Relations Law, Section 303, cmt. E (Congress may

enact legislation that requires. or fairly implies the need for an

agreement to execute the legislation ."); Dames & Moore v.

Regan, 453 U.S. 654 , 668 ( 1981 )( When the President acts

pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress,

he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by

Congress." )

App. 18

environmental problems and , where consistent with

the foreign policy of the United States, lend

appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and

programs designed to maximize international

cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline

in the quality of mankind 's world environment." 42

U.S.C. 4332(2)(F).

The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987

(amended in 1993), expresses strong Congressional

support for U.S. international engagement on

climate change, including, e.g., that U.S. policy

should seek to "work toward multilateral

agreements."

The Senate unanimously approved the Convention

in 1992. The Paris Agreement was adopted under

the Convention, and its purpose is directly linked to

the Convention. Specifically, Article 2 of the

Agreement makes clear, as an overarching matter ,

that the Agreement is "enhancing the

implementation of the Convention , including its

objective." Further, the specific provisions of the

Agreement are substantially similar to (in some

cases, extending Convention provisions that apply

only to developed countries to all countries),

elaborate, and/or cross-reference various provisions

in the Convention:

o Article 4.2 of the Agreement, which calls for the

periodic communication of nationally determined

contributions (i.e., mitigation targets or other

measures), is substantially similar to Articles 4.1(b)

and 4.2(a) of the Convention . Article 4.1 (b) calls for

all Parties to formulate, implement, publish, and

regularly update, mitigation measures. Article

4.2(a), which applies only to developed country

Parties , calls for adopting mitigation measures and

App. 19

communicating detailed information on such

measures.

Article 4.8 of the Agreement calls for all Parties to

provide clarity in communicating their mitigation

targets /other measures. Article 4.2(b) and Article 1

2.2(a) of the Convention, which apply only to

developed country Parties, call for a "detailed"

description of such measures.

Article 4.9 of the Agreement calls for all Parties to

communicate their mitigation targets /measures

every five years. This makes more specific the

obligation in Article 4.2 of the Convention (which

applies only to developed countries) to "periodically "

communicate their mitigation measures.

Article 4.13 of the Agreement , which calls for

Parties to account for their mitigation targets

/measures, elaborates Articles 4.2(b) and 12.2 of the

Convention, which calls for developed country

Parties to communicate detailed information on their

mitigation measures.

As explained above, Article 4.15 of the Agreement

is substantially similar to Articles 4.8 and 4.10 of the

Convention.

As explained above, Article 7.9 of the Agreement is

substantially similar to Articles 4.1(b) and 4. 1(e) of

the Convention.

As explained above, Article 9.1 of the Agreement ,

which calls for financial support from developed

country Parties , by its terms goes no further than

existing financial obligations under Article s 4.3, 4.4,

and 4.5 of the Convention.

Article 10.2 of the Agreement, which calls for

Parties to strengthen cooperative action on

technology development and transfer, is

substantially similar to Article 4.5 of the

App. 20

Convention, which calls for developed country

Parties to take all practicable steps to promote the

transfer of technologies, as well as to support the

development of technologies of developing countries.

Article 11.4 of the Agreement , which calls for all

Parties that are enhancing the capacity of

developing country Parties to communicate on these

actions, is substantially similar to Article 12.3,

which calls for developed country Parties to

communicate details of measures taken into

accordance with Alticle 4.5 (which includes

developing the capacity of developing countries). •

Article 12 of the Agreement, which calls for Palties

to cooperate in relation to climate change education

and public awareness, is substantially similar to

Articles 4.1 (i) and 6 of the Convention, which,

respectively, call for Parties to promote and

cooperate on education, training , and public

awareness related to climate change, and lay out

specifics with respect to the implementation of

Article 4.1 (i).

Article 13.7 of the Agreement , which calls for all

Parties to regularly provide information on their

greenhouse gas inventories and on their progress in

implementing and achieving their mitigation targets

/measures , is substantially similar to Articles 4.1 (a)

and 12.1 (a) of the Convention (which call for the

communication of greenhouse gas inventories) and

Articles 4.2(b) and Article 12.2 (which, for developed

country Parties, call for the communication of

information on the implementation of mitigation

measures).

Articles 9.5, 9.7, and 13.9 of the Agreement, which

call for developed country Parties to communicate

information on their provision and mobilization of

App. 21

support to developing country Parties, elaborate

Article 12.3 of the Convention, which calls for

developed country Parties to communicate details of

measures taken to implement Articles 4.3, 4.4, and

4.5 (which address financial and other forms of

support to developing country Parties).

o Article 13.11 of the Agreement, which calls for

Parties to participate in a facilitative, multilateral

consideration of its implementation, elaborates

Article 10 of the Convention, which provides for the

Subsidiary Body on Implementation's consideration

of information communicated by developed country

Pa lties concerning their implementation of

mitigation measures.

Finally, it should be noted that, while the

presence of legally binding emission targets would

not necessarily trigger the need for Senate advice

and consent (e.g., the Administration's proposal in

2009 for an agreement with binding targets was

made in the context of having the U.S. international

target track the domestic emissions cap under the

anticipated Waxman-Markey bill), the absence of

legally binding targets here is significant. The legal

character of emission targets was at the heall of the

Senate's consideration of the Convention in 1992.

The Senate sought reassurance from the Executive

Branch that the emissions "aim" in the Convention

was not legally binding and expressed the view that

any future decision of the Convention's Conference of

the Parties that included legally binding "targets

and timetables" would need to be submitted to the

Senate for advice and consent (Exec. Rept. 1 02-55, p.

14). During the ratification process, the Executive

Branch stated, in response to a question whether it

App. 22

would submit a "protocol" with "targets and

timetables" (understood in that context to mean

legally binding targets) to the Senate , that it

"expected " to send to the Senate any future

agreement with such targets and timetables (S.

HRG. 102-973 , p. 106).

While this ratification history would not

legally compel Senate advice and consent even if the

Paris Agreement did contain legally binding target s,

the history indicates that the Senate had a

particular focus in terms of its role vis-a-vis future

agreements under the Convention. This focus is

bolstered by the complete absence of calls from the

Senate to have a role in the approval of the

Copenhagen Accord, which contained non-legally

binding targets. The fact that the Agreement does

not contain legally binding targets - and this does

not appear to be contested, even by those advocating

Senate approval - supports the appropriateness of

concluding the Agreement as an executive

agreement.

3. Past Practice/Precedent

The President's authority to conclude the

Agreement as an executive agreement finds further

support in past practice with respect to similar

agreements. The Supreme Court has cited Congress'

acquiescence in the President's entry into prior

agreements as executive agreements as a relevant

consideration establishing his authority to enter into

subsequent similar agreements. See Dames & Moore,

453 U.S. at 682 ; American Insurance Assn. v.

Garamendi , 539 U.S. 396, 45 (2003).

App. 23

In terms of past climate agreements, the

Executive Branch sent the Convention to the Senate

for its advice and consent to ratification. (The

memorandum of law in the Circular 175 package to

sign the Convention declares that the Convention

will be concluded in this manner, but without

analyzing whether Senate approval was legally

necessary.) The Executive Branch did not send the ,

Kyoto Proto co 1 to the Senate after its adoption

because of, inter alia, the absence of commitments

for developing countries. (Even if the Executive

Branch had sent the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate, it

would be distinguishable from the Paris Agreement ,

given, among other things, the highly legally binding

nature of the Protocol, including its legally binding

emission targets.) The Copenhagen Accord, a

political rather than legal instrument, was not sent

to the Senate.

There are numerous examples of international

environmental agreements with legally binding

obligations - including obligations similar to those

contained in the Paris Agreement- having been

concluded as executive agreements, including, e.g

the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air

Pollution ("LRTAP"); the NOx Protocol to LRTAP;

the Heavy Metals Protocol to LRTAP; the MultiPollutant Protocol to LRTAP ; the U.S.-Canada Air

Quality Agreement; the OECD Decision of 2001 on

the control of transboundary movements of

hazardous wastes , and, most recently, the

Minamata Convention on Mercury:

o There is no perfectly analogous precedent to the

Paris Agreement. Among other things (such as that

the Agreement elaborates an existing treaty, as

App. 24

discussed above), the precedents actually contain far

more substantive commitments than does the Paris

Agreement.

In contrast to the Agreement, the LRTAP

Protocols, the Air Quality Agreement, and the

Minamata Convention all contain legally binding

constraints on emissions.

The LRTAP Protocols contain specific, legally

binding emission limits on pollutants, as well as

legally binding obligation s with respect to, e.g.,

research, technology, and monitoring.

The Air Quality Agreement contains specific,

legally binding reduction targets for emissions of

sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, as well as

legally binding obligations with respect to,

e.g., environmental impact assessment and

compliance monitoring.

The Minamata Convention contains not only

legally binding limits on mercury emissions but also

legally binding obligation s with respect to, inter

alia, the mining of mercury, the import and export of

mercury , the manufacture of mercury, and the

treatment of mercury waste.

The OECD Decision contains legally binding

obligations regarding the export and import and ,

specified hazardous waste.

o As noted above, the main obligations in the Paris

Agreement (setting aside those that repeat

Convention obligations or call for unspecified

forms of cooperation) involve reporting. The above

agreements all contain legally binding reporting

requirements , e.g., Article 21 of the Minamata

Convention, Article VII of the Air Quality

Agreement, and Article 7 of the LRTAP MultiPollutant Protocol.

App. 25

While there are several examples of

environmental agreements having gone to the

Senate, many are distinguishable in terms of the

nature of their legally binding provisions and/or the

need for new legislation to implement U.S.

obligations. For example, the Basel Convention on

Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes

and their Disposal, the Rotterdam Convention on the

Prior Informed Consent Procedures, and the

Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic

Pollutants all contained extensive substantive legal

obligations and required new legislative authority to

carry out U.S. obligations. Moreover, unlike the

Paris Agreement, these agreements were not

concluded under existing treaties to which the

Senate had already given its advice and consent.

In sum, there is ample precedent for treating

an agreement such as the Paris Agreement as an

executive agreement. Congress' acquiescence in this

past practice provides further support for the

President's authority with respect to entering into

the Paris Agreement.

4. Counter-Arguments on Domestic Form

The arguments that have been advanced in

support of the necessity for Senate approval are

unpersuasive:

It has been argued, for example, that the inclusion

of any legally binding provisions in an agreement

means it requires Senate approval.

o This is of course erroneous. There is no

constitutional basis for the assertion and, in fact, the

Executive has routinely entered into executive

App. 26

agreements with legally binding provisions

throughout U.S. history.

It has been argued that the Agreement sets up an

expectation that the United States will undertake

more and more ambitious targets indefinitely and

that, even if such expectation is not legally binding ,

the Senate should be a part of the decision to create

such an expectation.

Political expectations are often set in motion by

instruments that do not require Senate approval,

e.g., the Helsinki Accords, the Copenhagen

Accord, and the Washington Nuclear Security

Summit Communique.

It has been argued that Article 4.3 of the

Agreement legally binds Parties to take on more and

more ambitious targets over time, which in turn

requires the Agreement to get Senate approval.

Article 4.3 provides: "Each Party's successive

nationally determined contribution will represent a

progression beyond the Party's then current

nationally determined contribution and reflect its

highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but

differentiated responsibilities and respective

capabilities, in the light of different national

circumstances."

The provision in question is not legally binding.

While the United States sometimes uses the verb

"will" in its practice to signify a binding obligation

and seeks to avoid its use in non-binding situations

to avoid confusion, there was no intent in this case to

create a binding obligation.

Not only do most countries generally consider

"will" to be non-binding, but, in this particular

context, the negotiating States were almost

uniformly opposed to a legally binding obligation.

App. 27

They were confused about the exact meaning of

"progression," which made them nervous about what

they would be undertaking; in addition, they were

concerned that a binding obligation to "progress"

targets over time would result in suppression of

ambition. We do not have to reach the issue here

whether a legally binding provision to "progress"

targets would affect the need for Senate approval.

It has been asserted that the Executive Branch

committed to send up any future agreement with

"targets and timetables."

As noted above, the phrase "targets and

timetables" had the meaning at the time of legally

binding targets. Further, as noted, the

Administration at the time did not commit to

sending up a future agreement, even it if had been a

"protocol" that contained "targets and timetables."

It has been asserted that the Convention was

approved by the Senate and that, therefore, this

Agreement needs to be a treaty as well.

This is not accurate as a matter of law. Just

because an agreement was approved by the Senate

does not mean that any agreement thereunder needs

to be a treaty; it depends upon its form and content.

The fact that the Senate has already approved an

agreement can, as in this case, actually provide

support for the conclusion of an executive agreement

because the subsequent agreement is within the

scope of, and advances the object and purpose of, the

original agreement.

Conclusion

Based on the above, there is no legal objection

to signature of the Agreement. Further, the United

App. 28

States may join the Agreement as an executive

agreement (as opposed to a treaty requiring the

Senate's advice and consent) as a matter of domestic

legal form. If approved, the Department of State

would deposit an instrument of acceptance to join

the Agreement. It would enter into force for the

United States, according to Alticle 21 of the

Agreement, on the thirtieth day after 55 Parties to

the Convent ion accounting in total for at least an

estimated 55% of total global GHG emissions have

deposited their instruments of ratification,

acceptance, approval, or accession.

/s/ Brian J.Egan

Legal Advisor

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.