Petition for Rehearing — Kenneth A. Pruitt, Petitioner v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 5, 2022
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No. 21-562
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
Kenneth A. Pruitt,
Petitioner,
v.
JAN 0 5 2022
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., acting alone, or in concert, in a
purported official capacity; John Forbes Kerry, acting alone
or in concert, in a purported official capacity; United States
(U.S.) Department of Treasury, acting alone, or in concert;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, acting alone, or in
concert; U.S. National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences; acting alone, or in concert; Michael Regan, head of
EPA; Richard Woychik, head of NEIHS, and Janet Yellen,
head of USDT; Heads of USDT, EPA, and NIEHS unnamed
for 2021 and later due election transition, said heads named
individually in his/her official capacity and when not acting in
his/her official capacity but acting ultra vires, acting either
alone or with unknown and unnamed other persons
improperly causing violations of U.S. domestic law referenced
within 2006 U.S. entry to 2003-31-OCT MERIDA UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
(UNCAC) and/or violate UNCAC,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review denial
by Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
of a colorable constitutional claim
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF ORDER OF
DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se
Trailer Village RV Park
16580 N. US Hwy 59
Garrison, Texas 75946
(936) 714-3811
kap8063@yahoo. corn
1
BASIS FOR THIS PETITION FOR
REHEARING:
RULE 44.2
Extraordinary new outcome-determinative
recent release by Respondents is now available to
the Court as new information post-docketing that
provides Rule 44.2 substantial grounds that
Petitioner could not have previously presented:
"Memorandum of Law Subject: Circular 175:
Request for authority to sign and accept the Paris
[Climate] Agreement" [PCA] ("175-Memo"),
Said 175-Memo, new Exhibit 7 hereto, was
hidden from this Court and Petitioner by
Respondent Government. 175-Memo was published
only after third party Freedom of Information Act
action forced recent release by Respondent
Government.
Petitioner requests Rule 201(c)(2) Judicial
Notice of Adjudicative Facts of said 175-Memo.
175-Memo states (quote):
"Importantly, there is no legal obligation
[imposed by Paris [Climate] Agreement"
[PCA1 on USA] to either achieve or
implement emissions targets" [Pg 2, para
2, lines 6-7]
"The core of the [PCA] Agreement is not
legally binding, i.e. there is no legal
obligation on Parties to either achieve or
implement their emissions targets
11
(`nationally determined contributions')". [Pg 4,
last 3 lines]
"There is no legal requirement regarding
the type/stringency of Parties' targets."
[Pg 4, last line, to Pg 5 line 1]
Above Respondents' words alone are
sufficient basis to grant this Petition for Rehearing.
However, on rehearing, this Court will find
said 175-Memo contains fundamental "dead wrong
part". Detailed basics are below in "Reasons for
Granting this Petition".
In summary, said "dead wrong part" of 175Memo is a subterfuge.
That "dead wrong part" is a deceit as a "work
around" to achieve PCA signing first and then later
PCA compliance indirectly by Executive Orders and
other mandates without Cst. Art. II, Sec. 2 Senate
two-thirds concurring.
In particular:
175-Memo says PCA is not binding for
emissions reductions.
PCA calls for 'nationally determined
commitments' ("NDC"), thus creates an oxymoron if
and when PCA commitments do not bind.
111
United Nations states, contrary to 175Memo, that PCA is a binding treaty. See Certiorari
Petition Appendix 5 Items 1 and 3.
175-Memo then improperly sets out 'work
around' path by false pretense for Executive Branch
mandates or for expanded regulation to cause PCA
compliance by USA, without Art II Sec 2 Senate
involvement.
Said 175-Memo "work around" creates 'false
pretense' based mandates having "domestic force in
USA courts without [further] legislation" in clear
violation of Medellin v Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)
and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,343 U.
S. 579 (1952).
Those mandates expand scope of well-aged
laws and regulations, which at passage, never
contemplated any new objectives remotely akin to
PCA compliance or massive energy and economic
transitions of US$ Trillions flow from Treasury
caused by PCA.
175-Memo previously hidden from this Court
by Respondents directly impacts answers to
Question Eight presented by Certiorari Petition to
(1) resolve PCA related Questions for need to
ascertain Respondents' scope of PCA
authority, if any and (2) restrain ultra vires
acts and (3) provide remedy for injury to
Petitioner's rights in fossil fuel property interests.
iv
A rehearing is needed for this Court to fashion
a remedy to protect Petitioner from Respondent
ultra vires actor (RUVA) caused harm as pleaded:
"...where a specific duty is assigned by law,
and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, it seems equally
clear that the individual who considers
himself injured has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy. Marbury v
Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803)"
Respondents' own 175-Memo words above
show true justification for granting this Petition for
Rehearing.
V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
Basis for this Petition for Rehearing:
Rule 44.2
i
Table of Contents
v
Table of Authorities
vi
Reasons for Granting this Petition
1
Conclusion, Prayer for Relief
9
Certificate
14
Appendix:
Exhibit 7: "Memorandum of Law"
Subject: Circular 175: Request for authority to sign
and accept the Paris [Climate] Agreement" [PCA]
("175-Memo").
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
page
Constitutional Provisions
Article II, Section 2
ii, 3, 5, 10
Fifth Amendment
10
Fourteenth Amendment
10
Federalist No. 75
11
"The Treaty Making Power of the
Executive", Library of Congress
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist- papers/text71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper- 25493467
Treaties, International Arrangements
1992 United Nations Framework
7, 8
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
2003-31-OCT MERIDA UN
11
CONVENTION AGAINST
CORRUPTION (UNCAC)
Paris Climate Accord, including —195
passim
(Intended) Nationally Determined
Contributions (PCA)
Cases
Foster & Elam v. Neilson,
27 US (2 Pet.) 253 (1829)
Marbury v Madison,
5 U.S. 137 (1803)
Medellin v Texas,
552 U.S. 491 (2008)
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,
343 U. S. 579 (1952)
US Senate Records
Exhibit 3 of Certiorari Petition
Senate Resolution (S. Res. 98).
9
iii, 10
iii, 6, 9
iii, 11
vii
https://www.congress. gov/bill/105th-congress/senateresolution/98
Exhibit 3: 1997 Senate Resolution 98 (with 'yea'
votes by Biden and by Kerry)
US Government Publication
(recent FOIA release)
"Memorandum of Law"
Subject: Circular 175: Request for
authority to sign and accept the Paris [Climate]
Agreement" [PCA] ("175-Memo").
Judicial notice of adjudicative fact
Rule 201, Federal Rule of Evidence at 201 (a)
governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact and (b)
fact that can be accurately and readily determined
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
Rule 201(c)(2) requires that the Court "must take
judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is
supplied with the necessary information".
Petitioner requests Rule 201(c)(2) judicial notice of
said "Memorandum of Law" Exhibit 7 (175-Memo)
published by Respondent Government
1
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION
On rehearing review, this Court will find said
175-Memo contains previously hidden-from-public
legal 'warning' which 175-Memo used as a 'false
pretense':
"Importantly, there is no legal obligation
[imposed by Paris [Climate] Agreement"
.[PCA] on USA] to either achieve or
implement emissions targets" [Pg 2, para
2, lines 6-7]
"The core of the WCA] Agreement is not
legally binding, i.e. there is no legal
obligation on Parties to either achieve or
implement their emissions targets
(`nationally determined contributions')". [Pg 4,
last 3 lines]
"There is no legal requirement regarding
the type/stringency of Parties' targets."
[Pg 4, last line, to Pg 5 line 1]
Contrast the above 175-Memo to Certiorari
Petition Appendix Exhibit 5 items extracts:
(a) Exhibit 5 Item 1 UN:
"The Paris Agreement is a legally binding
international treaty on climate change."
issued by Secretariat of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, via
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-parisagreement/the-paris-agreement
(b) Exhibit 5 Item 3 UN):
2
"A new instrument of acceptance of the Paris
Agreement by the US, expressing its consent to be
bound by the Agreement, was deposited with the
Secretary-General, later in the day"
issued by the United Nations, via
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082602
(c) Exhibit 5 Item 6 (whitehouse.gov):
Q And just a follow-up on that, perhaps, for
Secretary Kerry: How do you assure
international partners that the U.S. will stick
to whatever you propose after having seen the
Trump administration take the U.S. out of the
Paris Accord?
SECRETARY KERRY: That's precisely why
we're going to stick by it, and I think our word is
strong.
issued by Respondent Government, via
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/pressbriefings/2021/01/27/press-briefing-by-presssecretary-jen-psaki-special-presidential-envoy-forclimate-john-kerry-and-national-climate-advisorgina-mccarthy-january-27-2021/
Haunts of "sometimes binding, sometimes not"
words of Medellin supra echo back to this Court.
PCA is not binding on USA for emissions
reductions and this case enables this Court to so
declare and alert the United Nations and others.
However worse, 175-Memo has obvious
horrible legal errors that enable misuse of influence,
manipulation and ultra vires conduct.
3
175-Memo (i) leverages 'not binding' to avoid
Art II Sec 2 Senate concurrence check-and-balance
to (ii) then set out an excuse for Executive Branch to
sign PCA.
The Executive Branch alone then can create
PCA `nationally determined commitments" for USA
under PCA.
The 'nationally determined commitments" are
not determined by an Art II Sec 2 Senate.
175-Memo then states twisted excuse for USA
compliance with PCA "ND C" commitments by
Executive Orders, regulations and other mandates
without Congressional concurrence.
175-Memo has been, and is now, applied
improperly by RUVA to the detriment of Petitioner
and others; such ultra vires conduct is within scope
of Petitioner's Complaint, various Motions and
Appeals.
There is a strong need for definitive resolution
by this Court at this stage.
Unless this Court grants Rehearing and
resolves this case in a precedential manner,
Executive Order mandates related to PCA
climate change will remain a matter of great
national importance and of valid public concern
for sources of abuse and injustice and looting of USA
Treasury.
4
Unilateral Executive Branch mandates
improperly leverage PCA non-binding "nationally
determined commitments" to justify and cause
unprecedented and momentous energy and economic
transformations.
Those transformations take or waste private
fossil fuel assets such as Plaintiff's without due
process and compensation and without Senate checkand-balance.
Absent a hearing, such mandates will have
been effectively resolved as energy paths forward for
the country as a whole and will impose massive
economic detriments and takings without due
process, compensation and Senate check-andbalance.
This Court instead should be the final arbiter
of these 'sometimes binding, sometimes not' matters
through a definitive ruling to avoid prohibition of
Medellin supra.
175-Memo has fundamental errors of law and
is inconsistent with proper answers to legal
questions of Certiorari Petition, in particular factors
of Certiorari Petition Question Eight.
175-Memo disguises improper conduct.
If 175-Memo is allowed to stand without
challenge, then errors of law and ultra vires acts by
Respondent ultra vires actors (RUVA) will
propagate.
5
If not restrained, RUVA within Executive
Branch will purport to make 'nationally determined
commitments' and to cause domestic compliance
with PCA emissions reductions by unilateral
mandate. Art II Sec 2 must be met.
RUVA, who cannot bind USA to a climate
treaty for emissions reduction, instead corruptly act
for fraudulent facade as if USA were bound.
These are serious words but are true
damnation of RUVA who taunt other countries about
their failure to comply with PCA when RUVA know
USA is not bound to PCA emissions reductions.
Petitioner prays that this Court fashions order
to RUVA to not transform non-binding self-made
emissions reduction 'nationally determined
commitments' of PCA to domestic law by executive
branch mandates which avoid proper Article II Sec
2 Senate two thirds concurring.
Petitioner asks rehearing for this Court to
correct "dead wrong part" of 175-Memo which is a
subterfuge.
That "dead wrong part" is a deceit as a "work
around" to achieve PCA signing and compliance
indirectly by Executive Orders and mandates
expanding scope of well-aged laws and regulations
which at passage approval never contemplated new
objectives akin to PCA.
175-Memo "work around" gives Executive
Orders made for PCA compliance "domestic force in
6
USA courts without [further] legislation" in violation
of Medellin supra.
That "dead wrong part" RUVA hopes this
Court looks away and does not act and denies this
Petition.
175-Memo Details: 'dead wrong parts':
On rehearing this Court is asked to find that
said 175-Memo has 'dead wrong parts', for example:
"Just because an agreement [UNFCCC] was
approved by the Senate does not mean that
any [PCA] agreement thereunder needs to be
a treaty; it depends upon its form and
content." [Pg 17, 7th para]
"The fact that the Senate has already
approved an agreement [UNFCCC] can, as in
this [PCA] case, actually provide support for
the conclusion of an executive agreement
[PCA] because the subsequent agreement is
within the scope of, and advances the object
and purpose of, the original agreement
[UNFCCC]." [Pg 17, 7th para]
175-Memo part above wrongly failed to
point out continuing restrictions imposed by
Senate regarding UNFCCC by 1997 S. Res 98.
See Petitioner's Exhibit 3: 1997 S. Res 98
(with 'yea' votes by Biden and by Kerry, Petition A3).
Respondents Government, Biden and Kerry
knew such 175-Memo 'dead wrong parts' were wrong
at PCA signing(s).
There is clear, undeniable evidence.
Respondents' knowledge is evidenced by 'yea'
votes to the contrary of 175-Memo by Biden and by
Kerry, found in Senate records1997 S. Res 98
Exhibit 3.
There can be no doubt Respondents knew of
1997 Senate Resolution specific climate agreements
relating to UNFCCC were contrary to 'dead wrong
parts' of 175-Memo.
Contrast, please, new information from 175Memo against Certiorari Petition "Jurisdiction"
paragraph B.6.:
"... [1997] Senate imposed conditions, 'then and
thereafter', on USA becoming a signatory to
any international agreement on greenhouse
gas emissions under UNFCC:
"... United States should not be a
signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, [1992 (UNFCCC)] at
negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997 or
thereafter which would:
(1) mandate new commitments to limit
or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the
Annex 1 Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing
8
Country Parties within the same compliance
period; or
(2) result in serious harm to the U.S.
economy"
and
"6.
Respondents Biden and Kerry are well
aware (because both voted 'yea' for below cited
`S. Res 98') that, during 1997, the Kyoto
Protocol:
was proposed via 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). and that protocol
suggested "developed countries" have greater
responsibility to act and greater financial
burden than "developing countries", and
was rejected in 1997 by US Senate
resolution 'S. Res 98' by Yea-Nay Vote. 95-0.
This Court may also find 'dead wrong part'
includes other parts of 175-Memo, parts at Pg 5 and
Pg 9 "Mitigation" stating that:
o "Neither sentence of [PCA] Article 4.2 creates
a legal obligation to achieve of implement an
ND C"
In the first sentence, it is clear from the
phrase "it intends to achieve" that there is no
legally binding obligation to achieve
mitigation targets. (The United States
proposed this language early on in the
process, and it was widely disliked precisely
because it made so clear that the targets were
not legally binding.)
9
The second sentence requires a Party to
pursue mitigation measures, but without any
requirement to pursue particular mitigation
measures or to implement or to implement or
achieve the target.
"The obligation in the second sentence of
Article 4.2, "to pursue domestic mitigation
measures" can be implemented by the
Executive Branch under existing authorities"
[Pg 5 Mitigation]
The obligation in Article 7.9 to engage in
adaptation planning, processes and
implementation of action is discretionary ("as
appropriate"). [Pg 9 Mitigation]
Contrast above 175-Memo with Medellin supra
where Chief Justice Roberts writes these thoughts:
"But the responsibility for transforming an
international obligation arising from a nonself-executing treaty into domestic law falls
to Congress, not the Executive." citing Foster
& Elam v. Neilson ,27 US (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
CONCLUSION, PRAYER FOR RELIEF
175-Memo says PCA is not binding for
emissions reductions.
PCA calls for 'nationally determined
commitments' ("NDC"), thus creates an oxymoron if
and when PCA commitments do not bind.
10
UN above cited (App. 5 Items 1 and 3) calls
PCA a binding treaty.
175-Memo then improperly sets out path to
cause PCA compliance by USA with Executive
Branch making PCA 'national determined
commitments' having effect of laws (not just setting
policies), and without Art II Sec 2 Senate
involvement.
Petitioner prays that this Court orders RUVA
to not change non-binding PCA emissions reduction
commitments (not binding on USA) to domestic law
by executive branch mandates to avoid proper checks
and balances for treaty of Art. II Sec 2 Senate two
thirds concurring.
Questions presented and challenges of
corruption causing injury to Petitioner are questions
of law for this Court, not 'political questions'.
But where a specific duty is assigned by
law, and individual rights depend upon
the performance of that duty, it seems
equally clear that the individual who
considers himself injured has a right to
resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy. Marbury supra
Improper corrupt PCA related acts avoiding
Art. II Sec 2, and Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, are not merely "only politically
examinable."
The making by Executive Branch of PCA
`national determined commitments' having effect of
11
laws (not just setting policies) also violate
Youngstown Sheet supra.
Petitioner pleas this Court fashion a remedy
for injury to him caused by RUVA, mindful of UN
Convention Against Corruption and of Federal ethics
rules cited in Certiorari Petition Exhibit 4, Sec 101
"Principles of Ethical Conduct", para 1:
"Public service is a public trust, requiring
employees to place loyalty to the Constitution,
the laws, and ethical principles above private
gain."
In particular, Hamilton's 1788 Federalist No.
75 "Treaty Making Power of the Executive" spoke
more than 230 years ago to concerns of Petitioner's
Complaint, Appeal and Certiorari Petition, [See
Library of Congress, https://guidesloc.gov/federalistpapers/text-71-80#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493467], for
example this excerpt:
"However proper or safe it may be in
governments where the executive magistrate is
an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the
entire power of making treaties, it would be
utterly unsafe and improper to intrust that
power to an elective magistrate of four
years' duration."
"But a man raised from the station of a
private citizen to the rank of chief
magistrate, possessed of a moderate or slender
fortune, and looking forward to a period not very
remote when he may probably be obliged to
return to the station from which he was
taken,night sometimes be under temptations
12
to sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it
would require superlative virtue to withstand."
"An avaricious man might be tempted to
betray the interests of the state to the
acquisition of wealth."
"An ambitious man might make his own
aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign
power, the price of his treachery to his
constituents."
"The history of human conduct does not
warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue
which would make it wise in a nation to commit
interests of so delicate and momentous a
kind, as those which concern its intercourse
with the rest of the world, to the sole
disposal of a magistrate created and
circumstanced as would be a President of the
United States."
"It must indeed be clear to a demonstration
that the joint possession of the power in
question, by the President and Senate, would
afford a greater prospect of security, than
the separate possession of it by either of
them."
175-Memo contradicts above wise limitations
set out in Federalist No. 75.
175-Memo contradicts also Art. II, Sec 2,
instead 175-Memo contains obvious horrible legal
errors that enable misuse of influence, manipulation
and ultra vires conduct.
The 'nationally determined commitments" of
PCA are not determined by an Art II Sec 2 Senate.
13
175-Memo (i) leverages 'not binding warning'
aspects of PCA to avoid Art II Sec 2 Senate
concurrence check-and-balance for signing (ii) then
sets out a false pretense as excuse for Executive
Branch mandates.
The Executive Branch alone then erroneously
mandate PCA 'nationally determined commitments"
for USA and unilaterally mandate compliance by
Executive Orders having same effect as making
domestic law, violating Youngstown Sheet supra.
Petitioner prays for this Supreme Court to
admonish and restrain Respondents' ultra vires
conduct, with restraint consistent with above with
Federalist No. 75 cautions and current USA legal
principles of trust, loyalty, and ethics.
In closing, by signing below, Petitioner
assures this Court that his Petition contains his
concerns which raise serious Constitutional
questions and his concerns are not frivolous.
Petitioner attaches signed Rule 44 certificate.
Respectfully submitted,
/ s / Kenneth A. Pruitt,
Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se
Trailer Village RV Park
16580 N. US Hwy 59
Garrison, Texas 75946
(936) 714-3811
kap8063@yahoo.com
January 4, 2022
14
RULE 44 CERTIFICATE OF PETITIONER,
PRO SE
I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing is
presented in good. faith and not for delay, and that it is
restricted to the grounds specified in Supreme Court
Rule 44.2 for intervening circumstances of a substantial
or controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not
previously presented..
Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se
Trailer Village RV Park
16580 N. US Hwy 59
Garrison, Texas 75946
(936) 714-3811
kap8063@yahoo.com
January 4, 2022
No. 21-562
In The
ipupreme Court of ttje
iptatet
Kenneth A. Pruitt,
Petitioner,
v.
Joseph Robinette Biden Jr., acting alone, or in concert, in a
purported official capacity; John Forbes Kerry, acting alone
or in concert, in a purported official capacity; United States
(U.S.) Department of Treasury, acting alone, or in concert;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, acting alone, or in
concert; U.S. National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences; acting alone, or in concert; Michael Regan, head of
EPA; Richard Woychik, head of NEIHS, and Janet Yellen,
head of USDT; Heads of USDT, EPA, and NIEHS unnamed
for 2021 and later due election transition, said heads named
individually in his/her official capacity and when not acting in
his/her official capacity but acting ultra vires, acting either
alone or with unknown and unnamed other persons
improperly causing violations of U.S. domestic law referenced
within 2006 U.S. entry to 2003-31-OCT MERIDA UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
(UNCAC) and/or violate UNCAC,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review denial
by Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
of a colorable constitutional claim
APPENDIX
Kenneth A. Pruitt, pro se
Trailer Village RV Park
16580 N. US Hwy 59
Garrison, Texas 75946
(936) 714-3811
kap8063@yahoo.com
APPENDIX
Exhibit 7: Respondents' "Memorandum of Law"
Subject: Circular 175: Request for authority to sign
and accept the Paris [Climate] Agreement" [PCA]
("175-Memo").
App. 1
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Subject: Circular 175: Request for authority to sign
and accept the Paris Agreement
The accompanying memorandum from the
Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change
(SECC) requests authority to sign and deposit an
instrument of acceptance to join the Paris
Agreement ("Agreement"), a multilateral agreement
negotiated under the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change ("the Convention"). The United
States is a party to the Convention, having been one
of the first States to submit its instrument of
ratification. The Agreement will be open for
signature as of April 22, 2016, at UN Headquarters
in New York. In addition to signing, the United
States would subsequently deposit its instrument of
acceptance in order to join the Agreement. For the
reasons below, I conclude that there is no legal
objection to signing the Agreement and depositing
an instrument of acceptance (i.e., meaning that the
Agreement may be concluded as an executive
agreement).
The Agreement, among other things:
establishes a long-term temperature goal of "well
below" 2 degrees Celsius, as well as a corresponding
greenhouse gas emissions aim of global peaking as
soon as possible;
provides mechanisms to promote achievement of
the goal and aim, including, e.g., a collective
stocktake every five years of progress in
implementing the Agreement and the subsequent
App. 2
submission by Parties of their next round of
emissions targets;
provides for Parties' emissions targets to be
"nationally determined," as opposed to negotiated or
allocated through some kind of agreed formula;
raises the profile of adaptation to climate change
impacts;
approaches "differentiation" among Parties in a
manner that stands in marked contrast to the Kyoto
Protocol , which contained commitments only for the
so called "Annex I" Parties (largely developed
countries); and
establishes a robust transparency framework that
improves upon the existing system, including by
being substantively more rigorous in terms of
developing country reporting on emissions
inventories, reporting on implementation, and
review.
Legal Nature of the Agreement
As a whole, the Paris Agreement is a "treaty"
within the meaning of that term in international
law. This international law conclusion, however,
does not answer the separate question, addressed
later in this Memorandum, of whether joining the
Agreement would require the advice and consent of
the Senate. The individual provisions of the
Agreement are of a mixed legal nature. While some
provisions are legally binding, many are not , and
some (such as those in which the Parties "recognize "
X or "are encouraged " to do Y) read more like
recommendations or exhortations found in a UN
resolution than the provisions of an international
agreement. (As an example, the entire adaptation
App. 3
article (Article 7) contains only one provision setting
forth a legally binding obligation on Parties.)
This "hybrid" approach was necessary to bring all
countries on board and was actively supported by the
United States, including where legally binding
obligations would have been impossible for the
United States to fulfill without additional
legislation.
As ultimately adopted, the Agreement does
contain certain legally binding obligations that
would apply to the United States. As discussed
below, most involve the submission of information
(reporting, communicating) or are otherwise within
the control of the Executive Branch (such as
accounting for the emissions target). Some are
already U.S. obligation s under the Convention (such
as finance). Importantly, there is no legal obligation
to either achieve or implement emissions targets.
The United States strongly supported this approach,
in the interest of promoting both greater ambition
(which might be suppressed by targets of a legal
nature) and broad participation, including that of
major developing countries. (China and India would
not have accepted legally binding targets.) The
approach was in stark contrast to the approach
taken when negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, an
agreement also under the Convention but one that
included emissions targets that were both legally
binding and not applicable to developing countries.
Relationship to the Convention
According to the negotiating mandate agreed
by the Convention's Conference of the Parties in
Durban, South Africa, in 2011 (known as the
App. 4
"Durban Platform"), the resulting agreement was to
be adopted "under the Convention." Paragraph 1 of
the cover decision used to adopt the Agreement
reiterates this point.
While there is no definition of "under the
Convention," the Convention contains three
provisions of relevance to any "related legal
instrument," a phrase that would include the
Agreement:
Article 2 of the Convention, which sets forth the
Convention's objective, provides that the objective
applies to any related legal instrument. Consistent
with that directive, Article 2 of the Agreement sets
out a global temperature goal ("[h]olding the
increase in the global average temperature to well
below 2°C") that gives greater specificity to the
Convention objective's reference to avoiding
"dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system."
Article 7 .2 of the Convention provides that the
Conference of the Parties ("COP") is to "keep under
regular review" the implementation of any related
legal instrument it may adopt. As this directive
applies to the Convention's COP, it did not need to
be reflected in the Agreement.
Article 14 of the Convention, related to dispute
settlement, provides that its provisions apply to any
related legal instrument, unless that instrument
provides otherwise. While it was not legally
necessary to reference the Convention's dispute
settlement procedures in the Agreement in order for
them to apply, the Agreement nevertheless expressly
provides in Article 24 for their application mutatis
mutandis to the Agreement.
App. 5
Beyond the three provisions noted, the
Convention does not address the terms of any legal
instrument thereunder. Some Parties asserted that
an agreement "under the Convention" required, for
example, the use of the Convention's Annexes (which
set forth lists of Parties responsible for certain
commitments) or a bifurcated approach to the
provisions of the agreement (e.g., that "developed
country Parties" have different commitments from
"developing country Parties"). Such assertions were
strongly opposed by many other Parties, particularly
the United States, and were unsuccessful. The
Agreement contains no references to the Annexes
and, with the exception of the provisions related to
financial support, does not take a bifurcated
approach to commitments.
It should also be noted, while there was an
effort to call the Agreement a "protocol" and to adopt
it expressly pursuant to Article 17 of the Convention,
this effort was not successful. The instrument is
titled "Agreement," and the authority of the
Convention's COP for its adoption is unspecified. In
the U.S. view, the COP's authority was provided in
Article 7 .2(m) of the Convention, which accords the
COP residual authority necessary to achieve the
objective of the Convention.
There was also an effort at one stage,
principally by China, to call the agreement an
"implementing agreement" under the Convention.
China noted that the U.S. proposal for an agreement
in 2009 was called an "implementing agreement,"
and they hoped to use that term for the agreement to
be adopted in Paris. This approach, which the
United States opposed, was not adopted. Thus,
while, as noted below, the legally binding provisions
App. 6
of the Agreement can be traced to, and elaborate,
various provisions of the Convention, it is not, as a
formal matter, an "implementing agreement" under
the Convention.
Domestic Form of the Agreement
The Supreme Court has consistently
recognized the authority of the President to conclude
international agreements without the advice and
consent of the Senate where the President's own
constitutional authority, authority derived from
Congressional action, or some combination of them,
provides support for the President 's actions. See
Weinberger v. Rossi, 256 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982);
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682-83
(1981); Belmont v. United States, 301 U.S. 324 , 33031 (1937); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224
U.S. 588,60 1 (1912). As detailed below, the
President's independent authority under Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution, together with the
authority given to him by statute, treaty, and other
indicia of Congressional support , as well as past
practice concerning similar agreements, provide the
President with ample authority to conclude the
Agreement as an executive agreement. If approved,
the Department of State will deposit an instrument
of acceptance signed by the Secretary of State to join
the Agreement; it would enter into force for the
United States, according to the Agreement's terms ,
thirty days after at least 55 States representing 55%
of global greenhouse gas emissions (as counted in
accordance with paragraph 104 of the decision
accompanying the Agreement) have deposited their
instruments.
App. 7
1. Authority to Implement U.S. Obligations
under the Agreement
All U.S. legal obligations under the
Agreement can be implemented under existing
authority. As elaborated below, nearly all of them
can be implemented pursuant to the President's
constitutional authority, as exercised by the
Secretary of State. Most obligations involve the
communication of information and discretionary
actions related to domestic action ( e.g., adaptation
planning) or international cooperation ( e.g., public
education, technology). For those that require
legislative authority for implementation, such
authority already exists.
The core of the Agreement is not legally
binding, i.e., there is no legal obligation on Parties to
either achieve or implement their emission targets
("nationally determined contributions"). There is also
no legal requirement regarding the type/stringency
of Parties' targets.
The Agreement's provisions that are legally
binding on the United States are as follows:
Mitigation:
Article 4.2 requires each Party to prepare,
communicate, and maintain successive nationally
determined contributions ("ND Cs" i.e., emissions
targets) over the course of the Agreement.
Article 4.2 also requires Parties to "pursue
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of
achieving the objectives" of their NDCs.
o Neither sentence of Article 4.2 creates a legal
obligation to achieve or implement an NDC.
In the first sentence, it is clear from the phrase "it
intends to achieve" that there is no legally binding
App. 8
obligation to achieve mitigation targets. (The United
States proposed this language early on in the
process, and it was widely disliked precisely because
it made so clear that the targets were not legally
binding.)
The second sentence requires a Party to pursue
mitigation measures, but without any requirement
to pursue particular mitigation measures or to
implement or achieve the target.
Article 4.8 requires each Party to provide the
information necessary for clarity, transparency, and
understanding, when communicating its NDC.
Article 4.9 requires each Party to communicate an
NDC every five years.
o Because the provision states that such
communication shall be made "in accordance with"
the decision of the Parties taken in Paris, paragraph
25 of the adopting decision, in which the Parties
decide that Parties "shall submit" future NDCs nine
to twelve months in advance of the relevant meeting
of Parties , is also legally binding.
Article 4.13 requires Parties to account for their
NDCs so as to promote environmental integrity and
avoid double counting.
Article 4.15 requires Parties to take into
consideration in the implementation of the
Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies
most affected by the impacts of response measures.
Adaptation:
Article 7.9 requires each Party, as appropriate, to
engage in adaptation planning processes and the
implementation of actions.
App. 9
Support:
Article 9.1 requires developed country Pa lties to
provide financial resources to assist developing
country Parties with both mitigation and adaptation,
in "continuation of their existing obligations under
the Convention." (This commitment is a "collective"
one, as was made clear in the memorandum of law to
sign the Convention, as well as the transmittal
package to the Senate. Further, in the Convention
context, it has consistently been interpreted by the
United States and other Parties as a collective, not
individual , commitment.)
Article 10.2 requires Parties (collectively) to
strengthen cooperative action on technology
development and transfer. Article I 0.2, as well as
Article 12 described below, are obligations to
cooperate and thus are indeterminate obligations for
which Parties cannot be held to specific results.
Reporting/Review:
Article 13. 7 requires each Party to regularly
provide a greenhouse gas inventory and the
information necessary to track progress in
implementing and achieving its nationally
determined contributions.
Articles 9.5, 9.7, and 13.9 require developed
country Parties to communicate various types of
information concerning financial, technology
transfer, and capacity-building support.
Article 11.4 requires all Parties to regularly report
on any actions or measures they take to enhance the
capacity of developing countries to implement the
Agreement.
Article 13.11 requires each Party to participate in
a facilitative, multilateral consideration of, inter
App. 10
alia, the implementation/achievement of its
mitigation target.
Other:
Article 12 requires Patties (collectively) to
cooperate to enhance climate education, training,
public awareness, public participation , and public
access to information. As is the case with Article 10.2
described above, this is an indeterminate obligation.
The United States would be in a position to
implement each of these legally binding obligations
under the Agreement under existing domestic
authority:
Eight of the obligations (Article 4.2, sentence one;
Article 4.8; Article 4.9; Article 11 .4; Article 13. 7;
Article 9.5, Article 9.7; Article 13.9) are procedural
and involve the repotting/submission/communication
of information by the Executive Branch. These
obligations do not require legislative authority but
rather can be carried out under the President 's
authority to conduct foreign affairs under Article II
of the Constitution, as exercised by the Secretary of
State under 22 U.S.C. 2656.
o The United States already has substantial
reporting requirements under the Convention, as
elaborated by decision s of the Convention 's
Conference of the Parties. Article 12 of the
Convention in particular requires reporting, inter
alia, on mitigation (greenhouse gas inventories,
mitigation policies and measures) and on actions
taken with respect to finance and technology support
to developing countries. One example of reporting
under Article 12 is the recently submitted 2016 U.S.
Biennial Report. The Agreement 's reporting
requirements elaborate upon these
App. 11
existing obligations.
The United States would implement any additional
reporting requirement s under the Agreement
pursuant to the same authorities.
The obligation in the second sentence of Article
4.2, to "pursue domestic mitigation measures," can
be implemented by the Executive Branch under
existing authorities. o This obligation is already
being implemented , given that it is an existing
U.S. obligation under Article 4.1(b) of the
Convention. ("All Parties ... shall. .. [f]ormulate ,
implement , publish and regularly update
national. .. programmes containing measures to
mitigate climate change .... ")
Statutory authorities include, e.g., the Clean Air
Act ( 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.) and the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6291-6317) , and
regulations thereunder.
There is ample existing regulatory authority to
pursue mitigation measures, as evidenced by the
numerous regulatory actions that have already been
taken to control U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,
including, e.g.:
Under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
7521), EPA adopted standards controlling CO2,
N20, and CH4 for light-duty vehicles for model
years 2012-2025 and for heavy-duty vehicles for
model years 2014-2018.
Acting pursuant to its authority in 49 U.S.C.
32902, the Department of Transportation has
adopted fuel economy standards for passenger cars
and light trucks, as well as for medium- and
heavy- duty vehicles. The authority to regulate the
former types of vehicles was provided in the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (1975) and to regulate
App. 12
the latter types was provided in the Energy
Independence and Security Act (2007).
Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42
U.S.C. 629 1-6317), the Department of Energy has
finalized multiple measures addressing building
sector emissions, including energy conservation
standards for 29 categories of appliances and
equipment.
Under Section 612 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
767 1k), through the Significant New Alternatives
Policy program (SNAP), EPA has approved more
climate-friendly alternatives to ozone depleting
substances for use in lieu of high global warming
potential HFCs in certain applications . Further, it
has listed certain high GWP HFCs as unacceptable
in specific applications.
Similar to the repolting obligations, the obligation
in Article 4.13 to "account" for NDCs so as to
promote environmental integrity/avoid double
counting (e.g., count emissions/removals in specified
ways) can be carried out by the Executive Branch
without the need for additional authority. As under
the Convention, the Executive Branch will submit
periodic reports on the progress the United States is
making towards achieving its emissions target. It
will include /exclude emissions and removals of
greenhouse gas in a manner that is reflective of any
binding rules agreed pursuant to this provision.
The obligation in Article 4.15 to take into
consideration the concerns of Parties with economies
most affected by the impacts of response measures,
particularly developing country Parties, is
discretionary and can be implemented by the
Executive Branch without the need for additional
authority.
App. 13
This obligation is nearly the same as existing U.S.
obligations under Articles 4.8 and 4.10 of the
Convention:
Article 4.8 of the Convention provides: "In the
implementation of the commitments in this Article ,
the Parties shall give full consideration to what
actions are necessary under the Convention,
including actions related to funding, insurance and
the transfer of technology, to meet the specific needs
and concern s of developing country Parties arising
from ... the impact of the implementation of response
measures ... . "
Article 4.10 of the Convention provides: "The
Parties shall...take into consideration ... the
situation of Parties, particularly developing country
Parties, with economies that are vulnerable to the
adverse effects of the implementation of measures to
respond to climate change."
The obligation in Article 7.9 to engage in
adaptation planning processes and implementation
of actions is discretionary ("as appropriate"). It can
be implemented by the Executive Branch under
various existing statutory and Executive Branch
authorities, e.g., the Coastal Zone Management Act
(Pub. L. 92-583); the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.
1251 et seq.); E.O. 13653: Preparing the United
States for the Impacts of Climate Change; E.O.
13690: Establishing a Federal Flood Risk
Management Standard and a Process for Further
Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input ; E.0 .
13689: Enhancing Coordination of Federal Efforts in
the Arctic; and E.O. 13677: Climate-Resilient
International Development.
This obligation is nearly the same as the existing
U.S. obligations under Article 4.1 of the Convention.
App. 14
Article 4.1 (b) of the Convention provide s: "All
Parties ... shall ... formulate, implement, publish and
regularly update national and, where appropriate,
regional programmes containing ... measures to
facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change .... "
Article 4.1(e) of the Convention provides: "All
Parties ... shall ... [c]ooperate in preparing for
adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop
and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for
coastal zone management, water resources and
agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation
of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought
and desertification, as well as floods .... "
Article 9 .1 provides: "Developed country Parties
shall provide financial resources to assist developing
country Parties with respect to both mitigation and
adaptation in continuation of their existing
obligations under the Convention." This obligation is
not only unquantified but, as noted above, applies
collectively to developed country Parties (i.e., not
individually to the United States). While not
required, U.S. support will be carried out through a
variety of means, including, e.g., direct bilateral
foreign assistance and contributions to various
multilateral trust funds managed by international
financial institutions. Legal authority for such
support varies depending on the specifics of the
support, but may include relevant appropriations
acts and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
o By linking the provision of financial resources to a
continuation of "existing obligations under the
Convention," the provision makes clear that the
obligation of the United States (which, as noted, is
part of a collective obligation) goes no fuilher than
App. 15
existing U.S. financial obligations under the
Convention.
o Existing financial obligations under the
Convention are contained in Articles 4.3, 4.4, and, to
an extent, 4.5.
Article 4.3 of the Convention provides: "The
developed country Parties ... shall provide new and
additional financial resources to meet the agreed full
costs incurred by developing country Parties in
complying with [certain reporting obligations]. They
shall also provide such financial resources ... needed
by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed
full incremental costs of [certain mitigation
measures]."
Article 4.4 of the Convention provides: "The
developed country Parties ... shall also assist the
developing country Parties that are particularly
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in
meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects."
Article 4.5 of the Convention provides: "The
developed country Parties ... shall take all
practicable steps to promote, facilitate, and finance,
as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to,
environmentally sound technologies and know-how
to other Parties .... "
The obligation in Article 13.11 to participate in a
facilitative, multilateral consideration of the
implementation/achievement of its nationally
determined contribution can be implemented by the
Executive Branch pursuant to the President's
constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs, as
exercised by the Secretary of State.
The obligations in Articles 10.2 and 12 involve
unspecified collective "cooperation" with respect to
technology and public education, etc., respectively,
App. 16
and can be implemented by the Executive Branch
under existing authorities, e.g., Section 204 of the
International Cooperation in Global Change
Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-606 (Title II);
Section 102 (e) of the Global Change Research Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-606; National Climate Program
Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2904 (d); the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 USC
Sections 1442 (a) and (b); Section 103 of the Clean
Air Act, as amended, and Section 102(2)(F) of the
National Environmental Policy Act (which authorize
EPA to engage in and support various cooperative
technology transfer activities); the Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq. (which
provides NOAA authority to conduct a program of
technical assistance and management-oriented
research in coastal zone management in connection
with possible sea-level rise); and the Weather
Bureau Act, 15 U.S.C. 313a (which authorizes the
development of an international basic meteorological
reporting network in the Westrn Hemisphere and
the Arctic, including cooperative programs in and
with other countries).
It should be noted that the Agreement
includes several provisions that, while written in
mandatory teams ("shall "), do not apply to Parties
(either individually or collectively). Some apply to
institutions, e.g., directions to the Warsaw
Institutional Mechanism (Article 8), to the
Secretariat (Article 4.12), or to the COP meeting as
the Parties to the Paris Agreement (throughout).
Others are written to provide an assurance in one
article that a particular issue is addressed in one or
more other articles, e.g. , Artic le 4.5 ("[s]upport shall
be provided ... ").
App. 17
2. Statutory and Congressional Support
In addition to the President's constitutional
authority, his authority to conclude the Agreement
as an executive agreement derives support from
statute and other Congressional actions. As
discussed above, multiple statutes provide the
authority necessary to implement many of the
obligations contained in the Agreement. In addition,
Congress has expressed support for international
engagement on environmental protection and on
climate change in a number of laws and other
actions detailed below.'
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
contains a specific directive from Congress that, "to
the fullest extent possible," "all agencies of the
Federal Government ... shall recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of
1 Congressional authorization for the President's conclusion of
an international agreement may be either explicit or implicit.
As observed by a leading Congressional study of treaties and
international agreements conducted by the Congressional
Research Service for the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations , "Congress has enacted statutes providing authority
in advance for the President to negotiate with other nations on
a particular matter. This authority may be explicit, or, in the
case of agreements concluded in conformity with a generally
enunciated congressional policy, implied from the terms of the
enactment. " Treaties and Other International Agreements:
The Role of the United States Senate , 106th Con., 2d Sess., S.
Prt. 106-7 1 (2001), at 69. Sec also Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law, Section 303, cmt. E (Congress may
enact legislation that requires. or fairly implies the need for an
agreement to execute the legislation ."); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 , 668 ( 1981 )( When the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress,
he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by
Congress." )
App. 18
environmental problems and , where consistent with
the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and
programs designed to maximize international
cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline
in the quality of mankind 's world environment." 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(F).
The Global Climate Protection Act of 1987
(amended in 1993), expresses strong Congressional
support for U.S. international engagement on
climate change, including, e.g., that U.S. policy
should seek to "work toward multilateral
agreements."
The Senate unanimously approved the Convention
in 1992. The Paris Agreement was adopted under
the Convention, and its purpose is directly linked to
the Convention. Specifically, Article 2 of the
Agreement makes clear, as an overarching matter ,
that the Agreement is "enhancing the
implementation of the Convention , including its
objective." Further, the specific provisions of the
Agreement are substantially similar to (in some
cases, extending Convention provisions that apply
only to developed countries to all countries),
elaborate, and/or cross-reference various provisions
in the Convention:
o Article 4.2 of the Agreement, which calls for the
periodic communication of nationally determined
contributions (i.e., mitigation targets or other
measures), is substantially similar to Articles 4.1(b)
and 4.2(a) of the Convention . Article 4.1 (b) calls for
all Parties to formulate, implement, publish, and
regularly update, mitigation measures. Article
4.2(a), which applies only to developed country
Parties , calls for adopting mitigation measures and
App. 19
communicating detailed information on such
measures.
Article 4.8 of the Agreement calls for all Parties to
provide clarity in communicating their mitigation
targets /other measures. Article 4.2(b) and Article 1
2.2(a) of the Convention, which apply only to
developed country Parties, call for a "detailed"
description of such measures.
Article 4.9 of the Agreement calls for all Parties to
communicate their mitigation targets /measures
every five years. This makes more specific the
obligation in Article 4.2 of the Convention (which
applies only to developed countries) to "periodically "
communicate their mitigation measures.
Article 4.13 of the Agreement , which calls for
Parties to account for their mitigation targets
/measures, elaborates Articles 4.2(b) and 12.2 of the
Convention, which calls for developed country
Parties to communicate detailed information on their
mitigation measures.
As explained above, Article 4.15 of the Agreement
is substantially similar to Articles 4.8 and 4.10 of the
Convention.
As explained above, Article 7.9 of the Agreement is
substantially similar to Articles 4.1(b) and 4. 1(e) of
the Convention.
As explained above, Article 9.1 of the Agreement ,
which calls for financial support from developed
country Parties , by its terms goes no further than
existing financial obligations under Article s 4.3, 4.4,
and 4.5 of the Convention.
Article 10.2 of the Agreement, which calls for
Parties to strengthen cooperative action on
technology development and transfer, is
substantially similar to Article 4.5 of the
App. 20
Convention, which calls for developed country
Parties to take all practicable steps to promote the
transfer of technologies, as well as to support the
development of technologies of developing countries.
Article 11.4 of the Agreement , which calls for all
Parties that are enhancing the capacity of
developing country Parties to communicate on these
actions, is substantially similar to Article 12.3,
which calls for developed country Parties to
communicate details of measures taken into
accordance with Alticle 4.5 (which includes
developing the capacity of developing countries). •
Article 12 of the Agreement, which calls for Palties
to cooperate in relation to climate change education
and public awareness, is substantially similar to
Articles 4.1 (i) and 6 of the Convention, which,
respectively, call for Parties to promote and
cooperate on education, training , and public
awareness related to climate change, and lay out
specifics with respect to the implementation of
Article 4.1 (i).
Article 13.7 of the Agreement , which calls for all
Parties to regularly provide information on their
greenhouse gas inventories and on their progress in
implementing and achieving their mitigation targets
/measures , is substantially similar to Articles 4.1 (a)
and 12.1 (a) of the Convention (which call for the
communication of greenhouse gas inventories) and
Articles 4.2(b) and Article 12.2 (which, for developed
country Parties, call for the communication of
information on the implementation of mitigation
measures).
Articles 9.5, 9.7, and 13.9 of the Agreement, which
call for developed country Parties to communicate
information on their provision and mobilization of
App. 21
support to developing country Parties, elaborate
Article 12.3 of the Convention, which calls for
developed country Parties to communicate details of
measures taken to implement Articles 4.3, 4.4, and
4.5 (which address financial and other forms of
support to developing country Parties).
o Article 13.11 of the Agreement, which calls for
Parties to participate in a facilitative, multilateral
consideration of its implementation, elaborates
Article 10 of the Convention, which provides for the
Subsidiary Body on Implementation's consideration
of information communicated by developed country
Pa lties concerning their implementation of
mitigation measures.
Finally, it should be noted that, while the
presence of legally binding emission targets would
not necessarily trigger the need for Senate advice
and consent (e.g., the Administration's proposal in
2009 for an agreement with binding targets was
made in the context of having the U.S. international
target track the domestic emissions cap under the
anticipated Waxman-Markey bill), the absence of
legally binding targets here is significant. The legal
character of emission targets was at the heall of the
Senate's consideration of the Convention in 1992.
The Senate sought reassurance from the Executive
Branch that the emissions "aim" in the Convention
was not legally binding and expressed the view that
any future decision of the Convention's Conference of
the Parties that included legally binding "targets
and timetables" would need to be submitted to the
Senate for advice and consent (Exec. Rept. 1 02-55, p.
14). During the ratification process, the Executive
Branch stated, in response to a question whether it
App. 22
would submit a "protocol" with "targets and
timetables" (understood in that context to mean
legally binding targets) to the Senate , that it
"expected " to send to the Senate any future
agreement with such targets and timetables (S.
HRG. 102-973 , p. 106).
While this ratification history would not
legally compel Senate advice and consent even if the
Paris Agreement did contain legally binding target s,
the history indicates that the Senate had a
particular focus in terms of its role vis-a-vis future
agreements under the Convention. This focus is
bolstered by the complete absence of calls from the
Senate to have a role in the approval of the
Copenhagen Accord, which contained non-legally
binding targets. The fact that the Agreement does
not contain legally binding targets - and this does
not appear to be contested, even by those advocating
Senate approval - supports the appropriateness of
concluding the Agreement as an executive
agreement.
3. Past Practice/Precedent
The President's authority to conclude the
Agreement as an executive agreement finds further
support in past practice with respect to similar
agreements. The Supreme Court has cited Congress'
acquiescence in the President's entry into prior
agreements as executive agreements as a relevant
consideration establishing his authority to enter into
subsequent similar agreements. See Dames & Moore,
453 U.S. at 682 ; American Insurance Assn. v.
Garamendi , 539 U.S. 396, 45 (2003).
App. 23
In terms of past climate agreements, the
Executive Branch sent the Convention to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification. (The
memorandum of law in the Circular 175 package to
sign the Convention declares that the Convention
will be concluded in this manner, but without
analyzing whether Senate approval was legally
necessary.) The Executive Branch did not send the ,
Kyoto Proto co 1 to the Senate after its adoption
because of, inter alia, the absence of commitments
for developing countries. (Even if the Executive
Branch had sent the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate, it
would be distinguishable from the Paris Agreement ,
given, among other things, the highly legally binding
nature of the Protocol, including its legally binding
emission targets.) The Copenhagen Accord, a
political rather than legal instrument, was not sent
to the Senate.
There are numerous examples of international
environmental agreements with legally binding
obligations - including obligations similar to those
contained in the Paris Agreement- having been
concluded as executive agreements, including, e.g
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution ("LRTAP"); the NOx Protocol to LRTAP;
the Heavy Metals Protocol to LRTAP; the MultiPollutant Protocol to LRTAP ; the U.S.-Canada Air
Quality Agreement; the OECD Decision of 2001 on
the control of transboundary movements of
hazardous wastes , and, most recently, the
Minamata Convention on Mercury:
o There is no perfectly analogous precedent to the
Paris Agreement. Among other things (such as that
the Agreement elaborates an existing treaty, as
App. 24
discussed above), the precedents actually contain far
more substantive commitments than does the Paris
Agreement.
In contrast to the Agreement, the LRTAP
Protocols, the Air Quality Agreement, and the
Minamata Convention all contain legally binding
constraints on emissions.
The LRTAP Protocols contain specific, legally
binding emission limits on pollutants, as well as
legally binding obligation s with respect to, e.g.,
research, technology, and monitoring.
The Air Quality Agreement contains specific,
legally binding reduction targets for emissions of
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, as well as
legally binding obligations with respect to,
e.g., environmental impact assessment and
compliance monitoring.
The Minamata Convention contains not only
legally binding limits on mercury emissions but also
legally binding obligation s with respect to, inter
alia, the mining of mercury, the import and export of
mercury , the manufacture of mercury, and the
treatment of mercury waste.
The OECD Decision contains legally binding
obligations regarding the export and import and ,
specified hazardous waste.
o As noted above, the main obligations in the Paris
Agreement (setting aside those that repeat
Convention obligations or call for unspecified
forms of cooperation) involve reporting. The above
agreements all contain legally binding reporting
requirements , e.g., Article 21 of the Minamata
Convention, Article VII of the Air Quality
Agreement, and Article 7 of the LRTAP MultiPollutant Protocol.
App. 25
While there are several examples of
environmental agreements having gone to the
Senate, many are distinguishable in terms of the
nature of their legally binding provisions and/or the
need for new legislation to implement U.S.
obligations. For example, the Basel Convention on
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal, the Rotterdam Convention on the
Prior Informed Consent Procedures, and the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants all contained extensive substantive legal
obligations and required new legislative authority to
carry out U.S. obligations. Moreover, unlike the
Paris Agreement, these agreements were not
concluded under existing treaties to which the
Senate had already given its advice and consent.
In sum, there is ample precedent for treating
an agreement such as the Paris Agreement as an
executive agreement. Congress' acquiescence in this
past practice provides further support for the
President's authority with respect to entering into
the Paris Agreement.
4. Counter-Arguments on Domestic Form
The arguments that have been advanced in
support of the necessity for Senate approval are
unpersuasive:
It has been argued, for example, that the inclusion
of any legally binding provisions in an agreement
means it requires Senate approval.
o This is of course erroneous. There is no
constitutional basis for the assertion and, in fact, the
Executive has routinely entered into executive
App. 26
agreements with legally binding provisions
throughout U.S. history.
It has been argued that the Agreement sets up an
expectation that the United States will undertake
more and more ambitious targets indefinitely and
that, even if such expectation is not legally binding ,
the Senate should be a part of the decision to create
such an expectation.
Political expectations are often set in motion by
instruments that do not require Senate approval,
e.g., the Helsinki Accords, the Copenhagen
Accord, and the Washington Nuclear Security
Summit Communique.
It has been argued that Article 4.3 of the
Agreement legally binds Parties to take on more and
more ambitious targets over time, which in turn
requires the Agreement to get Senate approval.
Article 4.3 provides: "Each Party's successive
nationally determined contribution will represent a
progression beyond the Party's then current
nationally determined contribution and reflect its
highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities, in the light of different national
circumstances."
The provision in question is not legally binding.
While the United States sometimes uses the verb
"will" in its practice to signify a binding obligation
and seeks to avoid its use in non-binding situations
to avoid confusion, there was no intent in this case to
create a binding obligation.
Not only do most countries generally consider
"will" to be non-binding, but, in this particular
context, the negotiating States were almost
uniformly opposed to a legally binding obligation.
App. 27
They were confused about the exact meaning of
"progression," which made them nervous about what
they would be undertaking; in addition, they were
concerned that a binding obligation to "progress"
targets over time would result in suppression of
ambition. We do not have to reach the issue here
whether a legally binding provision to "progress"
targets would affect the need for Senate approval.
It has been asserted that the Executive Branch
committed to send up any future agreement with
"targets and timetables."
As noted above, the phrase "targets and
timetables" had the meaning at the time of legally
binding targets. Further, as noted, the
Administration at the time did not commit to
sending up a future agreement, even it if had been a
"protocol" that contained "targets and timetables."
It has been asserted that the Convention was
approved by the Senate and that, therefore, this
Agreement needs to be a treaty as well.
This is not accurate as a matter of law. Just
because an agreement was approved by the Senate
does not mean that any agreement thereunder needs
to be a treaty; it depends upon its form and content.
The fact that the Senate has already approved an
agreement can, as in this case, actually provide
support for the conclusion of an executive agreement
because the subsequent agreement is within the
scope of, and advances the object and purpose of, the
original agreement.
Conclusion
Based on the above, there is no legal objection
to signature of the Agreement. Further, the United
App. 28
States may join the Agreement as an executive
agreement (as opposed to a treaty requiring the
Senate's advice and consent) as a matter of domestic
legal form. If approved, the Department of State
would deposit an instrument of acceptance to join
the Agreement. It would enter into force for the
United States, according to Alticle 21 of the
Agreement, on the thirtieth day after 55 Parties to
the Convent ion accounting in total for at least an
estimated 55% of total global GHG emissions have
deposited their instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession.
/s/ Brian J.Egan
Legal Advisor
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.