Reply Brief — Brian Fierro, Petitioner v. United States

No. 21-5457

In The Supreme Court Of The United States

Brian Fierro, Kacy Sapp, Damir Vucic, Bailey Aaron Hall, and Mati Sefo,

v.

Petitioners,

United States of America,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Reply Brief for the Petitioners

RENE L. VALLADARES

Federal Public Defender

*Wendi L. Overmyer

*Lauren B. Torre

*Aarin E. Kevorkian

Assistant Federal Public Defenders

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Wendi_Overmyer@fd.org

Lauren_Torre@fd.org

Aarin_Kevorkian@fd.org

*Counsel for Petitioners

Dated: November 2, 2021

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... ii

Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... iii

Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari.......................................................... 1

I. The Hobbs Act robbery statute’s plain language is overbroad. ...................... 2

II.

This Court’s recent interpretation of the physical force clause in Borden

further demonstrates the need for review. ...................................................... 4

III. The government does not dispute that proper interpretation of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c) is of exceptional, national importance. .................................. 6

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 7

Appendix

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Table of Authorities

Federal Constitution

Page(s)

U.S. Const. amend. V ................................................................................................... 1

Federal Cases

Borden v. United States,

141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) ..................................................................................... 4, 5, 6

Descamps v. United States,

570 U.S. 254 (2013) ................................................................................................. 3

Izumi v. U.S. Philips Corp.,

510 U.S. 27 (1993) ................................................................................................... 4

Mathis v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) ............................................................................................. 3

United States v. Davis,

139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) ......................................................................................... 1, 3

United States Dominguez,

954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020),

pet. for cert. pending, No. 20-1000 (filed Jan. 21, 2021) ................................ 2, 3, 4

United States v. García-Ortiz,

904 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2018) ................................................................................... 5

United States v. Gray,

260 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................... 6

United States v. Grisel,

488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) ............................................................... 2, 3

United States v. Stitt,

139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) ............................................................................................... 3

United States v. Taylor,

979 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020),

cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 2882 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (No. 20-1459) .......................... 3

Federal Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 924 .................................................................................................... passim

18 U.S.C. § 1951 ............................................................................................... 1, 3, 4, 6

iii

18 U.S.C. § 3559 ........................................................................................................... 6

18 U.S.C. § 3583 ........................................................................................................... 6

Supreme Court Rules

Supreme Court Rule 24.1(a) ........................................................................................ 4

Other

Brief for the United States in Opposition,

Steward v. United States, No. 19-8043 (U.S. May 21, 2020) ......................... 2, 3, 5

Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions,

§ 8.143A Hobbs Act—Robbery (Mar. 2021) ............................................................ 5

U.S. Sent. Comm’n,

Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Firearms Offenses (May 2021) ........................... 6

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Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari

Petitioners Brian Fierro, Kacy Sapp, Damir Vucic, Bailey Aaron Hall, and

Mati Sefo have jointly petitioned for a writ of certiorari as to whether the federal

Circuits now interpret Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), too narrowly and

against its plain language by requiring violent physical force as an offense element.

This question is pressing given this Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 139

S. Ct. 2319 (2019), which holds 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s residual clause is

unconstitutionally vague, violating the Due Process Clause, and which the

government does not dispute is retroactive to cases on collateral review like

Petitioners’. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Government’s Memorandum in Opposition

(Gov. Mem.).

Because only the physical force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) remains, Circuits

now interpret offenses that used to be caged within the residual clause, such as

Hobbs Act robbery, to make them “fit” within the physical force clause. The

resulting unprecedented narrowing of Hobbs Act robbery to include only violent

physical force—which the Circuits did not require of Hobbs Act robbery before

Davis—requires review by this Court. The federal circuit consensus that Hobbs Act

robbery necessarily requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent

physical force conflicts with the plain language of 18 U.S.C § 1951. It is imperative

this Court decide the proper interpretation of Hobbs Act robbery, so defendants are

not mandatorily incarcerated for firearms offenses that do not truly fit the § 924(c)

statutory definition.

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I.

The Hobbs Act robbery statute’s plain language is overbroad.

Hobbs Act robbery plainly encompasses causing fear of future injury to

property—either tangible or intangible. See Petition for Certiorari (Pet.) at 16-23.

In response, the government instead relies on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United

States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251, 1260 (9th Cir. 2020), pet. for cert. pending, No.

20-1000 (filed Jan. 21, 2021)) that Hobbs Act robbery nonetheless constitutes a

crime of violence under § 924(c)’s physical force clause. See Gov. Mem. at 2

(incorporating Brief for the United States in Opposition, Steward v. United States,

No. 19-8043, at 8-12 (U.S. May 21, 2020) cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 167 (2020) (“Gov.

Steward Brief”)). The government specifically relies on the erroneous finding that

there is no “realistic scenario in which a robber could commit Hobbs Act robbery by

placing his victim in fear of injury to an intangible economic interest.” See Gov.

Mem. at 2 (incorporating Brief for the United States in Opposition, Steward v.

United States, No. 19-8043, at 8-12 (U.S. May 21, 2020) cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 167

(2020) (“Gov. Steward Brief”)).

But the government, like the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dominguez,

misapplies the categorical approach. When a “statute explicitly defines a crime

more broadly” than the crime of violence definition, “no ‘legal imagination’ is

required to hold that a realistic probability [of prosecution] exists”—the “statute’s

greater breadth is evident from its text.” United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850

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(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt, 139

S. Ct. 399 (2018).

Dominguez does not bind this Court. And Dominguez was also wrongly

decided, conflicting with both this Court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s precedent. Pet. at

19-23 (citing, among other cases, Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 265

(2013), and Grisel, 488 F.3d at 850). In addition, the “rule of lenity’s teach[es] that

ambiguities about the breadth of a criminal statute should be resolved in the

defendant’s favor.” Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2333.

Here, Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) is overbroad because it

can be committed by causing “fear of injury” to intangible property, rather than

requiring the violent physical force necessary under § 924(c)’s physical force clause.

Pet. at 16-18. The government, moreover, does not claim that Hobbs Act robbery is

divisible. See Gov. Mem.; Gov. Steward Brief at 6-12. An overbroad, indivisible

offense cannot categorically be a crime of violence. Mathis v. United States, 136 S.

Ct. 2243, 2251-52 (2016).

The defendant in Dominguez has requested review of the Ninth Circuit’s

attempted Hobbs Act robbery holding relative to § 924(c)’s physical force clause—an

issue upon which this Court recently granted review in United States v. Taylor, 979

F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2882 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (No. 201459) (oral argument scheduled for Dec. 7, 2021). Gov. Mem. at 3. But review of

attempted Hobbs Act robbery under § 924(c)’s physical force clause does not

foreclose review of substantive Hobbs Act robbery here. And this Court may grant a

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writ of certiorari in Dominguez on any question presented by the record and law,

even if not raised by a petitioner. Izumi v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 32-33

and n.6 (1993) (noting that a question presented “does not limit our power to decide

important questions not raised by the parties”) (listing cases); see also Sup. Ct. R.

24.1(a) (“At its option, however, the Court may consider a plain error not among the

questions presented but evident from the record and otherwise within its

jurisdiction to decide.”).

The Ninth Circuit’s error in Dominguez and in the other Circuits as to

substantive Hobbs Act robbery under § 924(c)’s physical force clause remain binding

on the courts below, and the Petitioners present this Court the opportunity to

correct those errors here. Because Hobbs Act robbery is both overbroad and

indivisible, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 cannot qualify as a predicate offense

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s physical force clause. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary

holding is legally erroneous and requires correction by this Court.

II.

This Court’s recent interpretation of the physical force clause in Borden

further demonstrates the need for review.

Whether a predicate offense qualifies under § 924(c)’s physical force clause is

a question that must be examined under the law in place today—including this

Court’s recent clarification that the force clause requires the intentional use of force.

Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021).

In Borden, this Court held the use of force must be intentional for an offense

to qualify under a physical force clause—settling a circuit split on this issue.

Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1826. Relying on its pre-Borden briefing in Stewart, the

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government does not address whether Hobbs Act robbery requires the intentional

use of force required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Gov. Mem. at 2-4; Gov. Steward Brief at

6-12.

Hobbs Act robbery lacks the specific intent to use force, thus failing to qualify

as a crime of violence under Borden. Borden explains it is insufficient under the

physical force clause’s mens rea requirement for an offense to merely require

intentional performance of a particular act. 141 S. Ct. at 1826. Both the Borden

plurality and concurring opinions agreed that, to satisfy the physical force clause,

the offense elements must require a specific intent to harm another. Id. at 182527 (plurality opinion), 1834 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, Borden requires

intentional use of force—there must be a “conscious object (not the mere recipient)

of the force.” Id. at 1826. What is dispositive under the physical force clause, the

plurality underscored, is not that a defendant’s prior actions did cause harm, but

that–when he acted–he intended to harm another. Id. at 1831 & n.8. Justice

Thomas, supplying the fifth vote, agreed with the plurality on that critical point:

the elements clause only captures intentional conduct “designed to cause harm” to

another. Id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Hobbs Act robbery, however, lacks Borden’s specific intent requirement.

Hobbs Act robbery requires only the general intent to take money or property from

a person or in the person’s presence. Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury

Instructions, § 8.143A Hobbs Act—Robbery (Mar. 2021); see also United States v.

García-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting Hobbs Act robbery

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includes “an implicit mens rea element of general intent”); United States v. Gray,

260 F.3d 1267, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a requirement of specific intent to

commit Hobbs Act robbery). Hobbs Act robbery requires no specific intent to harm

another person or property.

Given Borden, this Court’s review is necessary as Hobbs Act robbery can be

violated with unintentional force. It does not require that force, attempted force, or

threatened force to be intentionally directed against another person or property.

III.

The government does not dispute that proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c) is of exceptional, national importance.

Because of the Circuits’ misapplication of categorical analysis to the elements

of Hobbs Act robbery, Petitioners remain in prison serving mandatory sentences

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Petitioner Vucic will complete his mandatory sentence on

December 5, 2021, and all Petitioners will serve longer supervised release terms

than would otherwise be imposed, due solely to the § 924(c) convictions. 1

And § 924(c) convictions continue unabated nationwide. Pet. at 23-24 (citing

U.S. Sent. Comm’n, Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Firearms Offenses (May 2021)).

Given the vast numbers of defendants’ lives affected by the Circuits’ interpretation

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), this Court’s intervention is necessary. Petitioners ask this

1 Petitioners’ convictions under § 924(c) led to higher supervision terms than

would have been imposed for Hobbs Act robbery. Because 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) carries

a statutory imprisonment maximum of life imprisonment, it is a Class A felony with

a five-year maximum supervised release term. In contrast, Hobbs Act robbery, with

a 20-year imprisonment statutory maximum, is a Class C felony and carries a

three-year maximum supervised release term. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); 18 U.S.C.

§ 3559(a) (felony classifications); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (authorized terms of

supervised release).

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Court to review the Circuit’s misapplication of the categorical approach to the

Hobbs Act robbery statute to ensure compliance with the Constitution and Supreme

Court post-Davis precedent.

Conclusion

Petitioners request the Court grant this joint petition for a writ of certiorari.

Dated: November 2, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

RENE L. VALLADARES

Federal Public Defender

/s/ Wendi L. Overmyer

Wendi L. Overmyer

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Wendi_Overmyer@fd.org

/s/ Lauren B. Torre

Lauren B. Torre

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Lauren_Torre@fd.org

/s/ Aarin E. Kevorkian

Aarin E. Kevorkian

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Aarin_Kevorkian@fd.org

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