Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adir International, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Starr Indemnity and Liability Company

Supreme Court briefOct 8, 2021

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

APPENDIX

1a

APPENDIX A

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

————

No. 19-56320

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04352-R-PLA

————

ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, DBA Curacao,

FKA La Curacao, a Delaware Limited Liability

Company; RON AZARKMAN, an individual,

Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellants,

v.

STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY COMPANY,

a Texas Corporation,

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.

————

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

————

Argued and Submitted December 11, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed April 15, 2021

————

OPINION

————

2a

Before: N. Randy Smith and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit

Judges, and Matthew F. Kennelly,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Lee

————

SUMMARY**

————

California Insurance Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary

judgment in favor of Starr Indemnity and Liability

Company in a diversity insurance-coverage action.

California’s Attorney General sued Adir International, LLC for violating state consumer protection

laws. After initially agreeing to provide coverage,

Adir’s insurer, Starr Indemnity, said it would no

longer pay for Adir’s defense pursuant to California

Insurance Code § 533.5(b), which forbids insurer

coverage in certain consumer protection cases brought

by the state.

The panel held Cal. Ins. Code § 533.5(b) did not

facially violate the due process right of insurance

holders to fund and retain the counsel of their choice

in the civil context. The panel also rejected Adir’s

statutory argument that section 533.5 applied to

actions involving only monetary relief. The panel

further held that under the plain text of the statute, it

applied to actions that seek injunctive relief along with

monetary relief.

*

The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, sitting by designation

from the Northern District of Illinois

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.

It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the

reader.

3a

Because Starr Indemnity had no duty to defend nor

to indemnify, the panel affirmed the district court’s

determination that Starr Indemnity was entitled to

reimbursement of defense costs under the explicit

language of the insurance policy.

COUNSEL

Joseph S. Klapach (argued), Klapach & Klapach

P.C., Sherman Oaks, California, for PlaintiffsCounter-Defendants-Appellees.

Kevin F. Kieffer (argued) and Ryan C. Tuley,

Troutman Sanders LLP, Irvine, California, for

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee.

David L. Abney, Ahwatukee Legal Office P.C.,

Phoenix, Arizona, for Amicus Curiae United Policyholders.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Nicklas A. Akers,

Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michele Van

Gelderen, Supervising Deputy Attorney General;

Michael Reynolds and Rachel A. Foodman, Deputy

Attorneys General; Office of the Attorney General,

San Francisco, California; for Amicus Curiae State of

California.

OPINION

LEE, Circuit Judge:

This case raises the question of whether a party has

a due process right to retain and fund counsel through

insurance proceeds. California’s Attorney General sued

Adir International for violating state consumer protection laws. To defend itself, Adir asked its insurance

carrier to pay its legal fees. The insurer agreed, but

the Attorney General warned that California Insurance Code § 533.5(b) forbids it from providing cover-

4a

age in certain consumer protection cases brought by

the state. The insurer reversed itself and said it would

no longer pay for Adir’s legal defense. Adir challenged

the law’s constitutionality, arguing that the state

unfairly stripped it of insurance defense coverage

based on unproven allegations in the complaint.

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Adir’s

challenge. California Insurance Code § 533.5(b) — which

nullifies an insurance company’s duty to defend —

does not facially violate a party’s due process right

to retain counsel. In civil cases, courts have recognized

a denial of due process only if the government actively

thwarts a party from obtaining a lawyer or prevents

it from communicating with counsel. Adir has made

no such allegation. While it cannot tap into its insurance coverage, Adir has managed to obtain and communicate with counsel. We also reject Adir’s statutory

argument that section 533.5 applies to actions involving only monetary relief. Under the plain text of the

statute, it applies to actions that seek injunctive relief

along with monetary relief.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Adir operates a retail chain called Curacao with

stores in California, Nevada, and Arizona. In 2017,

the California Attorney General sued Adir and its

Chief Executive Officer, Ron Azarkman,1 for unfair

and misleading business tactics that allegedly exploit

Curacao’s mainly low-income, Spanish-speaking

customer base. The complaint alleged violations of

1

Technically, both Adir and Azarkman are appellants, but

this Opinion will refer to both appellants as “Adir” for the sake of

simplicity.

5a

California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False

Advertising Law (FAL), and sought restitution, civil

penalties, costs of suit, and other equitable relief. Relevant for this appeal, the complaint sought injunctive

relief permanently enjoining Adir from making any

false or misleading statements in violation of the

FAL and engaging in unfair competition in violation of

the UCL.

Meanwhile, Adir had bought an insurance policy

from Starr Indemnity. The policy provided that Starr

would defend and indemnify Adir and its executives

for losses arising from certain claims alleging wrongful acts. When the California Attorney General sued,

Adir tendered the complaint to Starr and asked it to

defend Adir against the lawsuit. Starr acknowledged

that it would defend the action under a reservation of

rights, and then became actively involved in the

defense of that action.

This all halted in March 2019 when Starr received a

written warning from the California Attorney General’s Office. In the letter, the Attorney General’s

Office explained that Starr violated California Insurance Code § 533.5. (Adir also apparently received a

copy of the same letter.) Section 533.5 provides:

(a) No policy of insurance shall provide, or

be construed to provide, any coverage or

indemnity for the payment of any fine, penalty, or restitution in any criminal action or

proceeding or in any action or proceeding

brought pursuant to [the UCL or FAL] by

the Attorney General . . . notwithstanding

whether the exclusion or exception regarding

this type of coverage or indemnity is expressly

stated in the policy.

6a

(b) No policy of insurance shall provide, or

be construed to provide, any duty to defend,

as defined in subdivision (c), any claim in

any criminal action or proceeding or in any

action or proceeding brought pursuant to [the

UCL or FAL] in which the recovery of a fine,

penalty, or restitution is sought by the Attorney General . . . notwithstanding whether the

exclusion or exception regarding the duty to

defend this type of claim is expressly stated

in the policy.

(c) For the purpose of this section, “duty to

defend” means the insurer’s right or obligation to investigate, contest, defend, control

the defense of, compromise, settle, negotiate

the compromise or settlement of, or indemnify

for the cost of any aspect of defending any

claim in any criminal action or proceeding or

in any action or proceeding brought pursuant

to [the UCL or FAL] in which the insured

expects or contends that (1) the insurer is

liable or is potentially liable to make any payment on behalf of the insured or (2) the

insurer will provide a defense for a claim even

though the insurer is precluded by law from

indemnifying that claim.

(d) Any provision in a policy of insurance

which is in violation of subdivision (a) or (b)

is contrary to public policy and void.

Cal. Ins. Code § 533.5.

A few weeks after receiving the letter from the

Attorney General’s Office, Starr informed Adir that it

would “stop making any payments for defense costs”

7a

and reserved “its rights to seek reimbursement of all

amounts paid to date.”

II. Procedural Background

After several rounds of correspondence about

whether section 533.5 applied, Adir sued Starr in state

court, and Starr removed to federal court under 28

U.S.C. § 1332. In August 2019, Starr filed a motion for

summary judgment, while Adir cross-moved for

partial summary judgment.

In September 2019, the district court granted

Starr’s motion for summary judgment and denied

Adir’s motion for partial summary judgment. The district court did not address Adir’s constitutional challenge to the statute’s defense prohibition, and instead

focused on the statutory construction issue. Addressing first the duty to defend, the district court explained

that subsection (b) — the defense provision — “clearly

and explicitly establishes that there was no potential

for coverage and, consequently, no duty to defend in

the underlying action.” Specifically, the district court

noted that subsection (b) “unambiguously precludes

an insurer’s duty to defend not only a UCL or FAL

claim for the recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution,

but also any claim brought pursuant to the UCL or

FAL in an action in which the Attorney General or

another state prosecuting authority seeks such fine,

penalty, or restitution.”

As for the duty to indemnify under subsection (a),

the district court held that because “there is no duty

to defend, there can be no duty to indemnify.” The

district court also noted that subsection (a) “explicitly

precludes indemnification for any fine, penalty, or restitution in any action brought under the UCL or FAL

by the Attorney General or another state prosecuting

8a

authority.” Finally, the district court held that Starr

was entitled to reimbursement of defense costs because

the insurance policy itself explicitly provided for a

right to reimbursement. Later that month, the district

court amended the final judgment to specify that Adir

owed Starr over $2 million in restitution. This appeal

followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Baker v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 143

F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1998). The court “must

determine, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are

any genuine issues of material fact and whether the

district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Id. Similarly, we review de novo a challenge

to the constitutionality of a statute. Gray v. First

Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1567 (9th Cir. 1993).

The same applies to the district court’s interpretation

of a state statute. Wetzel v. Lou Ehlers Cadillac Grp.

Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 646

(9th Cir. 2000).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Adir challenges both the indemnification

and the defense provisions of California Insurance

Code § 533.5. (As a reminder, subsection (a) is the

indemnity provision, while subsection (b) is the defense

provision). Adir challenges subsection (b) on the basis

that it violates an insurance holder’s due process right

to retain and fund the counsel of its choice. Adir also

asserts statutory challenges to both subsection (a) and

subsection (b), arguing that the district court went

beyond the bounds of the statute by interpreting both

subsections to prohibit coverage of the injunctive relief

9a

(rather than monetary relief) portion of the underlying

action. To Adir’s way of thinking, the provisions

cover only “fines, penalties, and restitution” and thus

do not apply to injunctive relief. Finally, Adir challenges the district court’s ruling on Starr’s right to

reimbursement. We affirm the grant of summary

judgment for Starr.

I. California Insurance Code § 533.5(b) does not

facially violate the due process right of insurance holders to fund and retain the counsel of

their choice in the civil context.

Adir challenges the constitutionality of California

Insurance Code § 533.5(b), which bars insurance companies from paying legal defense fees for certain consumer protection lawsuits brought by the state. Adir

argues that it violates the Due Process Clauses of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it interferes with an insured’s ability to fund and retain the

counsel of its choice. As Adir points out, California has

stacked the deck against defendants facing these

lawsuits filed by the state: Although the Attorney

General has yet to prove any of the allegations in his

lawsuit, he has invoked the power of the state to deny

insurance coverage that Adir paid for to defend itself.

In the civil context, courts have limited the reach of

the Due Process Clause to cases in which the government has actively prevented hiring or communicating

with counsel. Adir has not alleged such impingements

by the state. There is also no allegation that Adir

cannot afford competent counsel absent coverage under

10a

the policy. We thus reject Adir’s facial constitutional

challenge to California Insurance Code § 533.5(b).2

A. Courts have recognized a very limited due

process right to retain and fund counsel in

the civil context.

To start, this court has long held that there is “no

constitutional right to counsel in a civil case.” United

States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated

in Klickitat Cty., Washington, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th

Cir. 1986) (cleaned up). Unlike in criminal cases that

implicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, civil

litigants who cannot afford counsel are not constitutionally guaranteed the appointment of a lawyer.

Adir, though, correctly points out that courts have

generally acknowledged a civil litigant’s Fifth Amendment due process right to retain and fund the counsel

of their choice. See Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co.,

609 F.2d 1101, 1117 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that

“the right to retain counsel in civil litigation is implicit

in the concept of fifth amendment due process”). “If in

any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court

were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel,

employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may

not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of

a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the

constitutional sense.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,

68 (1932). Put another way, “there is no right of subsidized access” in civil cases like there is in the Sixth

Amendment context, but if a civil litigant “hires a

2

The district court did not address Adir’s constitutional

arguments, even though Adir raised it in its briefing. We can

affirm the district court’s ruling on any ground in the record. Atel

Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2003)

(per curiam).

11a

lawyer,” then certain protections kick in. GuajardoPalma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 2010)

(cleaned up).

So, what are the contours of a civil litigant’s due

process right to retain counsel? For one, a court “may

not refuse to accept filings” from a civil litigant’s

retained lawyer. Id. In addition, the right to retain

counsel might be violated if a trial court prohibits a

civil litigant from communicating with his or her

retained counsel during breaks and recesses during a

trial. Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1119. A civil litigant also

probably cannot be denied the opportunity to consult

with retained counsel about settlement terms. Mosley

v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1981).

And one sister circuit held that a trial court erred in

refusing to give a civil litigant extra time to retain new

counsel after the original counsel withdrew before

trial. Anderson v. Sheppard, 856 F.2d 741, 748 (6th

Cir. 1988).

Beyond that, though, courts have construed the due

process right to retain counsel very narrowly. For

example, our court has suggested that the right to

retain counsel does not require the release of frozen

assets so that a civil defendant can hire an attorney

or otherwise defend his claim. See CFTC v. Noble

Metals Int’l, Inc., 67 F.3d 766, 775 (9th Cir. 1995). “A

district court may . . . forbid or limit payment of

attorney fees out of frozen assets.” Id. (recognizing,

however, that a district court must still exercise

“discretion”).

Other circuits have similarly refused to adopt an

expansive reading of the due process right to retain

counsel. The Third Circuit, for instance, has held that

the right appears to go “no further than preventing

arbitrary dismissal of a chosen attorney.” Kentucky W.

12a

Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n,

837 F.2d 600, 618 (3d Cir. 1988) (cleaned up). Along

those lines, the First Circuit has suggested that as

long as a trial court does not affirmatively prevent a

civil litigant from retaining counsel, no constitutional

violation occurs, even if the civil litigant still cannot

hire a lawyer. Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,

792 F.2d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 1986) (no violation of due

process right where court postponed trial to give civil

litigant time to retain counsel, but litigant was unable

to do so).

In sum, the due process right to retain counsel in

civil cases appears to apply only in extreme scenarios

where the government substantially interferes with a

party’s ability to communicate with his or her lawyer

or actively prevents a party who is willing and able to

obtain counsel from doing so. This narrow scope of

the due process right to retain counsel — as opposed

to the much more robust Sixth Amendment right to

counsel — finds support in the original public meaning

of the term “due process.” As the Supreme Court long

ago explained, the Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause is rooted in the Magna Carta. Murray’s Lessee

v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276

(1856). See also Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 Const. Comment.

339 (1987). At the time of the Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the framers construed “due process of law” to

mean the same thing as “the law of the land,” which

was traditionally understood to impose a “restraint on

the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial

powers of the government.”3 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S.

3

The Magna Carta provides that: “No freeman shall be taken,

or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free

customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed;

13a

at 276. See also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

331–32 (1986) (discussing the “traditional and commonsense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was ‘intended to secure the

individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers

of government.’” (cleaned up)).

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has characterized

“the law of the land” as “a law which hears before it

condemns.” Powell, 287 U.S. at 68 (cleaned up). That

makes sense because “[t]he fundamental requisite of

due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). This is

where the right to counsel comes into play. “Historically and in practice, [a hearing] has always included

the right to the aid of counsel when desired and

provided by the party asserting the right.” Powell, 287

U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).4 Thus, due process historically did not establish a broad or unfettered right

to counsel in civil cases, but rather provided limited

protection against the government preventing a party

from being heard in court. And as a practical matter,

that means due process bars the government from

nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful

judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” See 1 Edward

Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 45

(1797).

4

Indeed, as the Potashnick court noted, the English system

had long “recognized the right to retain civil counsel,” and it was

only because the English practice was to deny representation to

felony defendants that the framers “specifically provided for a

right to retain counsel in criminal prosecutions” by way of the

Sixth Amendment. Potashnick, 609 F.2d at 1117 (cleaned up). See

also Powell, 287 U.S. at 60 (“Originally, in England, a person

charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel . . . .

At the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of

misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of counsel.”).

14a

actively preventing a party from obtaining counsel or

communicating with his or her lawyer in civil cases.

B. The limited right to retain counsel does not

include the indirect right to fund and retain

counsel through an insurance policy.

With this framework in mind, the question then

becomes: Is there any way to fit Adir’s proposed

right — which really boils down to an indirect right

to fund and retain the counsel through an insurance

contract — into the existing due process right? We

see no reason to enlarge the limited due process right

to retain counsel to include a constitutional right to

use insurance proceeds to pay for legal fees. While Adir

complains that California Insurance Code § 533.5(b) is

unfair, the statute does not actively prevent Adir from

obtaining counsel or communicating with its lawyers.

Adir relies heavily on United States v. Stein, 541

F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) and Luis v. United States, 136

S. Ct. 1083 (2016). In Stein, the Second Circuit held

that prosecutors violated the criminal defendants’

Sixth Amendment right to counsel — which encompasses a “right to use wholly legitimate funds to hire

the attorney of his choice” — when they pressured the

defendants’ lawyers to stop paying their legal fees.

Stein, 541 F.3d at 155 (cleaned up). Similarly, in Luis,

the Supreme Court articulated that “the pretrial

restraint of legitimate, untainted assets needed to

retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment.” Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1088.

But Stein and Luis were both criminal cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Adir,

for its part, argues that the Sixth Amendment at least

offers “guidance” for the scope of a civil litigant’s due

process right to counsel. But “guidance” does not mean

15a

that the two rights are equivalent. The Sixth Amendment’s explicit guarantee of counsel in criminal cases

is broader than the judicially constructed right under

the Due Process Clause. And for good reason: While a

civil lawsuit may implicate large sums of money or

restrictions on business practices, a criminal case may

lead to the loss of liberty or life. See Potashnick, 609

F.2d at 1118 (stating that “an analogy can be drawn

between the criminal and civil litigants’ respective

rights to counsel” but also emphasizing that “[a] criminal defendant faced with a potential loss of his personal liberty has much more at stake than a civil

litigant asserting or contesting a claim for damages,

and for this reason the law affords greater protection

to the criminal defendant's rights”).

At the end of the day, California’s law only makes it

harder, though not necessarily impossible, for a civil

litigant to retain the counsel of their choice. Adir has

not alleged that the government actively thwarted it

from obtaining counsel, or that the law precluded it

from communicating with counsel. Indeed, Adir

appears to have obtained an able and competent

counsel — without the use of insurance proceeds — for

this appeal.5 We thus rule that California Insurance

Code § 533.5(b) does not impinge on a due process

right to retain counsel.

5

Adir stated at oral argument that it was bringing both a

facial challenge and an as-applied challenge. But the briefing

appears to set forth a facial challenge only because Adir has not

alleged how the law has impaired its ability to retain counsel. We

thus need not address whether Adir can raise an as-applied

challenge.

16a

II. California Insurance Code § 533.5(b) prohibits a

duty to defend in an underlying action even if

the attorney general seeks injunctive relief.

We next address Adir’s statutory challenge to

California Insurance Code § 533.5(b). Adir argues that

the statutory language bars defense coverage for

actions seeking damages only and does not extend to

claims seeking injunctive relief. It maintains that

district court adopted a too-broad interpretation in

ruling that the statute prohibits Starr from defending

the injunctive relief portion of the underlying action.

We reject Adir’s strained reading of subsection (b).

A. The text of subsection (b) forecloses a duty

to defend for actions in which monetary

relief is sought, even if injunctive relief is

also sought.

We start, as we must, with the statutory text. Mt.

Hawley Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 779

(Ct. App. 2013). Section 533.5(b) states that there can

be no “duty to defend . . . any claim . . . in any action

or proceeding brought pursuant to [the UCL or FAL]

in which the recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution

is sought by the Attorney General . . . .” Cal. Ins. Code

§ 533.5(b). To begin, the parties appear to agree that

the phrase “duty to defend” attaches to “any claim.”

The key question posed here is whether “any claim”

encompasses (1) claims that only seek monetary relief

or (2) all claims that seek monetary relief, even if it

also demands injunctive relief.

Adir argues the former, contending that “any claim”

only encompasses claims for monetary relief alone. To

arrive at that conclusion, Adir necessarily makes two

unwarranted assumptions about the text of the statute. First, Adir assumes that the phrase “in which the

17a

recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution is sought”

must be read to mean “in which only the recovery of a

fine, penalty, or restitution is sought.” Second, Adir

assumes that “any claim” can be bifurcated into a

claim for monetary relief and a claim for injunctive

relief. We disagree with both assumptions.

1. The phrase “any claim . . . in which the

recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution

is sought” is not limited to claims in

which only monetary relief is sought.

To start, there are plenty of textual clues that the

phrase “any claim . . . in which the recovery of a fine,

penalty, or restitution is sought” does not mean the

same thing as the phrase “any claim . . . in which

only the recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution is

sought.” Most obviously, the word “only” is absent

from this section of the statute. Adir’s interpretation

would require the court to impermissibly read that

extra word into the statute. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee,

540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (declining to “read an absent

word into the statute”). Along those same lines, the

phrase “in which” merely communicates that the claim

seeks monetary relief, but beyond that, “in which” does

not at all imply that only monetary relief is sought. As

Starr points out, Adir’s interpretation essentially

replaces “in which the recovery of a fine, penalty, or

restitution is sought” with the more restrictive modifier “for the recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution.”

That reading goes against the plain text of the

statute.6

6

Additionally, the phrase “in which the recovery of a fine,

penalty, or restitution is sought,” also modifies “any criminal

action or proceeding.” Mt. Hawley, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 794. Thus,

an interpretation limiting a claim to monetary relief would create

18a

2. A “claim” cannot be bifurcated into a

“claim” for monetary relief and a “claim”

for injunctive relief for insurance defense

purposes.

Adir reads “claim” to mean “relief” or “remedy” to

contrive a UCL or FAL “claim” for monetary relief as

distinct from a UCL or FAL “claim” for injunctive

relief. But Adir does not offer any authority for that

reading of the word “claim.” Nor does Adir’s reading

make sense given the statute’s inclusion of the phrase

“in any action or proceeding,” which seems to refer to

the entire lawsuit as a whole. If “action or proceeding”

refers to the entire lawsuit, then it would follow that

the word “claim” refers to the individual causes of

action within the lawsuit, which, in this case, would

be the UCL claim and the FAL claim. With that

framework in mind, the statute’s reference to “duty to

defend . . . any claim” seems to most naturally refer

to coverage (or not) for particular causes of action

within a larger “action or proceeding.”

Further supporting this conclusion is the definition

of “duty to defend,” which precludes an insurer from

“indemnify[ing] for the cost of any aspect of defending

any claim . . . in any action or proceeding brought

pursuant the [UCL or FAL].” Cal. Ins. Code § 533.5(b),

(c) (emphases added). Subsection (c) makes it clear

that an insurer is precluded from defending any action

brought under the UCL or FAL regardless of the relief

sought.

an absurd result. Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., 471 P.3d

1001, 1004 (Cal. 2020) (“If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation

would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not

intend.”).

19a

But even so, Adir argues for bifurcating the UCL or

FAL claim into monetary and injunctive relief components. Adir cites Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of

California, 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) for the proposition

that the injunctive relief “claim” can be severed from

the broader UCL or FAL claim. But Broughton’s

holding is much more limited than Adir makes it out

to be. In that case, the California Supreme Court

explained that it was “concerned not with distinct

arbitrable and inarbitrable claims, but with arbitrable

and inarbitrable remedies derived from the same statutory claim.” Broughton, 21 Cal. 4th at 1088 (emphases added). The court then concluded that the damages action should be sent to arbitration, while the

injunctive relief action could proceed in a judicial

forum, citing “the strong policy in both federal and

state law for arbitrating private disputes, and given

the inherent unsuitability of arbitration as a means of

resolving plaintiffs’ action for injunctive relief under

the CLRA.” Id.

There is nothing in Broughton’s reasoning to suggest that UCL and FAL claims should likewise be

bifurcated by remedy for insurability purposes. Unlike

in the arbitration context, the “strong policy” in this

case arguably cuts the other way — that is, against

insurability for UCL and FAL claims. And even if the

UCL or FAL claim could somehow be severed into

the injunctive relief and the monetary relief components to determine insurability, the text does not

support doing so here; the statute refers only to “any

claim,” rather than “the portion of any claim.”

Further, the statutory framework does not support

a bifurcation of injunctive relief and civil penalties.

Government officials may “seek redress through

the bringing of civil law enforcement cases seeking

20a

equitable relief and civil penalties” for violations of the

UCL and FAL. Mt. Hawley, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 794;

see also Cal. Bus. & Professions Code § 17206. Equitable remedies (injunctive relief, restitution, and civil

penalties) are the only remedies available under

California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200–

17210. See Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Alameda Cty., 462 P.3d 461, 469 (Cal. 2020);

see also In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 29 (Cal.

2009) (“To achieve its goal of deterring unfair business

practices in an expeditious manner, the Legislature

limited the scope of the remedies available under the

UCL” to “equitable” damages such as “injunctive

relief and restitution.”). “The primary form of relief

available under the UCL to protect consumers from

unfair business practices is an injunction.” McGill v.

Citibank, N.A., 9 393 P.3d 85, 89 (Cal. 2017) (cleaned

up).

In light of the statutory framework as a whole, it

would be illogical to conclude that the legislature

intended to carve out an exception to allow for the

defense for the primary form of equitable relief

(injunctions) but not the others (fine, restitution, or

civil penalty). See Los Angeles Cty. Metro. Transportation Auth. v. Alameda Produce Mkt., LLC, 264 P.3d

579, 583 (Cal. 2011) (“We must harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the context of

the statutory framework as a whole.”).

B. Our interpretation of subsection (b) does

not render the duty to defend narrower than

the duty to indemnify.

Alternatively, Adir urges the court to interpret subsection (b) with an eye toward subsection (a), which

prohibits “coverage or indemnity for the payment of

any fine, penalty, or restitution . . . in any action or

21a

proceeding brought pursuant to [the UCL or FAL].”

Cal. Ins. Code § 533.5(a). The relationship between

the two provisions matters, Adir reminds us, because

it is “well settled” under California law that “the duty

to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.”

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior

Court, 16 P.3d 94, 103 (Cal. 2001). Adir asserts that

because subsection (a) does not bar indemnity for the

payment of injunctive relief costs, then it would make

no sense to read subsection (b) to prohibit defense

coverage in the same context. That would improperly

render the duty to indemnify broader than the duty to

defend.

We disagree. The insurance policy does not cover

the costs of injunctive relief in the first place. Nor do

there appear to be any real costs7 associated with the

injunctive relief sought here.

The text of the policy defines “claim” to encompass

a “written demand for monetary, non-monetary, or

injunctive relief.” But “claim” is not the same thing

as “coverage.” We know this because the policy also

states that the insurer shall pay “the Loss arising from

a Claim . . . .” The word “Loss” is in turn defined to

include “damages” but to exclude “any amounts paid

or incurred in complying with a judgment or settlement for non-monetary or injunctive relief, but solely

as respects the Company.” This indicates no coverage

for the costs of injunctive relief under the policy. To

be fair, this could still leave open the possibility of

coverage for any costs that Azarkman incurs in his

individual capacity in complying with the injunctive

relief in this case. But it is not clear what costs those

7

Any defense costs would be precluded under section 533.5(c).

22a

would be, given the injunctive relief being requested

by the Attorney General.

Even if the insurance policy did cover the costs of

complying with injunctive relief, the injunctive relief

sought does not appear to impose any monetary costs.

The California Attorney General appears to seek only

(1) an order permanently enjoining Adir and its agents

“from making any false or misleading statements in

violation of” the FAL, and (2) an order enjoining Adir

and its agents from engaging in unfair competition in

violation of the UCL. Adir does not articulate how it

will incur monetary costs to comply with an order to

make truthful representations.

Thus, it is unnecessary to resolve on appeal whether

subsection (a) prohibits Starr from indemnifying the

costs of injunctive relief in the underlying action

here. The insurance policy itself makes clear that the

answer is no. We are also not persuaded that there

even are any actual monetary costs attached to the

injunctive relief sought in this case. So we leave the

interpretation of subsection (a) for another day.

In any event, given (1) the premise in California law

that the duty to defend is always broader than the

duty to indemnify and (2) because there is no duty to

defend any criminal or civil proceeding under the UCL

or FAL (including this action), there would be no

reason to suggest a duty to indemnify in this action

under subsection (a) of the statute.

Lastly, because indemnity for restitution and indemnity for an injunction are both equitable relief, there

is no reason for this court to construe the statute

differently for one type of equitable relief. As the

California Court of Appeal held,

23a

When the law requires a wrongdoer to disgorge money or property acquired through a

violation of the law, to permit the wrongdoer

to transfer the cost of disgorgement to an

insurer would eliminate the incentive for

obeying the law. Otherwise, the wrongdoer

would retain the proceeds of his illegal acts,

merely shifting his loss to an insurer.

Bank of the W. v. Superior Ct., 833 P.2d 545 (Cal.

1992).

* * * *

To sum up, the plain meaning of the statutory text

of California Insurance Code § 533.5(b) forecloses

defense coverage for any claim in an UCL or FAL

action in which the state seeks monetary relief. Here,

the state seeks (among other things) monetary relief

against Adir under the UCL and FAL. The statute

thus bars defense coverage for Adir.

III. The text of the insurance policy explicitly provides for a right to reimbursement of defense

costs.

Finally, Adir challenges the district court’s ruling

that Starr has a right to the reimbursement of the

defense costs advanced in the underlying action.

Unfortunately for Adir, the insurance contract appears

to contain an express reservation of rights: “In the

event and to the extent that the Insureds shall not be

entitled to payment of such Loss under the terms and

conditions of this policy, such payments by the Insurer

shall be repaid to the Insurer by the Insureds . . . .”

And the word “Loss” in turn includes defense

costs. Because it turns out that there is no duty to

defend nor to indemnify, we affirm the district court’s

24a

determination that Starr is entitled to reimbursement

under the explicit language of the insurance policy.

Adir makes several arguments in response, but none

of them can overcome this express contractual language. For instance, Adir relies on Buss, but that

case only says that an implied right of reimbursement

must be explicitly reserved. Buss, 939 P.2d at 776 n.13.

Buss does not apply when there is already an express

in-policy right to reimbursement; the express language controls. Adir also argues that Starr, “acting

under a reservation of rights,” is entitled to reimbursement only if it “prophylactically financed the defense

of claims as to which it owed no duty of defense.” But

all that requires is that an insurer continue to finance

a defense while acting under a reservation of rights.

See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV Transp., 115 P.3d 460,

470 (Cal. 2005) (“The insurer should be free, in an

abundance of caution, to afford the insured a defense

under a reservation of rights, with the understanding

that reimbursement is available if it is later established, as a matter of law, that no duty to defend ever

arose.”). There does not seem to be any requirement,

as Adir suggests, that the insurer do anything extra

on top of acting under a reservation of rights. Indeed,

the whole idea seems to be to incentivize insurers to

be generous with the duty to defend. Id.

Lastly, Adir’s estoppel argument also fails. The

standard here is whether Adir reasonably relied on

Starr’s conduct to Adir’s detriment. Chase v. Blue

Cross of California, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 188 (Ct. App.

1996). But “failure to retain separate counsel does not

by itself show any detriment.” State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co. v. Jioras, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 845 (Ct. App. 1994).

More importantly, Adir does not explain how its reliance could have been reasonable given the insurance

25a

policy’s express reservation of rights, not to mention

the fact that Starr signaled its doubts about coverage

from the very beginning, when it at first denied

coverage in November 2017, before agreeing to provide

coverage under a reservation of rights. Thus, we affirm

the district court’s ruling that Starr is entitled to a

reimbursement of defense costs.

CONCLUSION

The district court’s order granting summary judgment for Starr is AFFIRMED.

26a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Filed September 10, 2019]

————

Case No. 2:19-cv-04352-R-PLA

————

ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.

v.

STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY COMPANY, et al.

————

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

————

Present: The Honorable R. GARY KLAUSNER,

United States District Judge

————

Christine Chung,

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder:

Not Reported

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff:

Not Present

Attorneys Present for Defendant: Not Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order re: Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 19) and Plaintiffs’

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 24)

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 14, 2019, Plaintiffs Adir International,

LLC and Adir’s CEO, Ron Azarkman, (“Plaintiffs”)

filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

against Defendant Starr Indemnity and Liability

27a

Company (“Defendant”) asserting claims for (1)

declaratory judgment—duty to defend, (2) breach of

contract—duty to defend, (3) declaratory judgment—

duty to indemnify, and (4) breach of contract—duty

to indemnify. On May 24, 2019, in response to the

original complaint, Defendant filed a Counterclaim

for (1) declaratory relief—no duty to defend pursuant

to California Insurance Code Section 533.5; (2) declaratory relief—no duty to indemnify pursuant to Section

533.5; (3) declaratory relief—no duty to defend pursuant to the terms, conditions, and exclusions of the

Policy; (4) declaratory relief—no duty to indemnify

pursuant to the terms, conditions, and exclusions of

the Policy; (5) declaratory relief—reimbursement under

the Policy; and (6) reimbursement—restitution/unjust

enrichment.

Presently before the Court are Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment (DE 19) and Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 24). Defendant’s

Motion seeks Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s entire

FAC and partial Summary Judgment on Defendant’s

Counterclaim. Plaintiff’s Motion seeks Summary Judgment on the first and second claims in the FAC and on

the first, third, fifth, and sixth counts in Defendant’s

Counterclaim.

For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and

DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff issued Insurance Policy No. 1000620507171

(the “Policy”), which provides Directors’ and Officers’

liability coverage to Plaintiff for the period running

from October 1, 2017 through October 1, 2018. The

28a

Policy provides defense and indemnity coverage for

non-employment “Wrongful Acts” alleged against individual directors and officers of the “Company,” (Adir)

as well as “Wrongful Acts” alleged against the “Company,” so long as the “Claim” is made and reported

to Defendant during the policy period or within 60

days after the Policy’s expiration. The Policy imposes

a duty on Defendant to defend “Insured Persons”

(including Azarkman) and/or the “Company” against

“Claims” that are reported to Defendant during the

Policy’s coverage period. In general, both Plaintiffs

qualify for coverage under the Policy.

On October 19, 2017, during the Policy’s coverage

period, the California Attorney General, on behalf

of the People of the State of California, filed a complaint against Plaintiffs in Los Angeles County Superior Court (the “underlying action”) asserting claims

under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)

and False Advertising Law (“FAL”) and seeking (1)

orders permanently enjoining Plaintiffs from conduct

in violation of the UCL and FAL, (2) restitution of

money or other property acquired by such conduct, (3)

civil penalties for each violation, and (4) any further

relief the court deems just and proper. Plaintiffs

provided notice to Defendant of the underlying action

on October 26, 2017.

Initially, Defendant denied coverage in the underlying action on November 20, 2017. However, in

response to a letter from Plaintiffs, Defendant withdrew the denial and, by letter dated December 15,

2017, agreed to provide a defense to Plaintiffs in the

underlying action, subject to a full reservation of “all

rights and defenses under the Policy, at law and/or

in equity, whether or not specifically referenced.”

29a

By letter dated March 8, 2019, the California

Attorney General’s Office (“AGO”) advised Defendant

that California Insurance Code Section 533.5 prohibited coverage for Plaintiffs in the underlying action.

Section 533.5 provides:

(a) No policy of insurance shall provide, or

be construed to provide, any coverage or

indemnity for the payment of any fine,

penalty, or restitution in any criminal action

or proceeding or in any action or proceeding

brought pursuant to [the UCL or FAL] by the

Attorney General, any district attorney, any

city prosecutor, or any county counsel, notwithstanding whether the exclusion or exception regarding this type of coverage or indemnity is expressly stated in the policy.

(b) No policy of insurance shall provide, or

be construed to provide, any duty to defend,

as defined in subdivision (c), any claim in any

criminal action or proceeding or in any action

or proceeding brought pursuant to [the UCL

or FAL] in which the recovery of a fine,

penalty, or restitution is sought by the

Attorney General, any district attorney, any

city prosecutor, or any county counsel, notwithstanding whether the exclusion or

exception regarding the duty to defend this

type of claim is expressly stated in the policy.

(c) For the purpose of this section, “duty to

defend” means the insurer’s right or obligation to investigate, contest, defend, control

the defense of, compromise, settle, negotiate

the compromise or settlement of, or indemnify

for the cost of any aspect of defending any

claim in any criminal action or proceeding or

30a

in any action or proceeding brought pursuant

to [the UCL or FAL] in which the insured

expects or contends that (1) the insurer is

liable or is potentially liable to make any

payment on behalf of the insured or (2) the

insurer will provide a defense for a claim even

though the insurer is precluded by law from

indemnifying that claim.

(d) Any provision in a policy of insurance

which is in violation of subdivision (a) or (b) is

contrary to public policy and void.

On March 29, 2019, Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s

counsel in the underlying action, stating that based

on the March 8 letter from the AGO, Defendant would

stop paying defense costs for Plaintiff and that Defendant continued to reserve its express right under the

Policy to seek reimbursement of all amounts already

paid. On April 5, 2019, Plaintiff responded by letter to

Defendant arguing that Section 533.5 does not apply

to the underlying action because (1) the AGO seeks

injunctive relief in the underlying action in addition to

“a fine, penalty, or restitution,” (2) the purpose and

public policy behind Section 533.5 is not implicated by

the underlying action, and (3) the UCL cause of action

includes allegations that statutes other than the UCL

and FAL were violated. The first argument is the

primary basis for Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

On April 12, 2019, Defendant’s counsel sent a letter

to the AGO seeking clarification regarding the AGO’s

position as to the application of Section 533.5 to the

underlying action. On April 17, the instant action

against Defendant was initiated in state court. On

May 13, 2019, the AGO issued a letter confirming

and clarifying its position that Section 533.5 “clearly

31a

prohibits any defense or indemnity coverage for [the

underlying action], even though injunctive relief is

sought and even though the complaint alleges other

statutory violations as predicate unlawful acts under

the UCL cause of action.” Subsequently, on May 17,

2019, Defendant, through counsel, issued a letter to

Plaintiff advising that it agreed with the AGO’s

determination that Section 533.5 precluded Defendant

from providing a defense or indemnification to Plaintiff in the underlying action and further advising

that Defendant would seek a judicial determination

confirming the accuracy of its position. On May 20,

2019, Defendant removed the case to this Court, and

on May 24, 2019, Defendant filed its Counterclaim.

III. JUDICIAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court

may grant summary judgment only where “there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court may grant summary

judgment on all or part of the claim, as appropriate.

See id. Facts are “material” only if dispute about them

may affect the outcome of the case under applicable

substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact

is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Id.

“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. To defeat a summary

judgment motion, the nonmovant must affirmatively

32a

present specific admissible evidence sufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at

323-24. The nonmovant may not merely rely on its

pleadings or on conclusory statements. Id. at 324.

In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court

should accept the nonmovant’s evidence as true and

draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovant’s

favor. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014).

The court may not determine credibility of witnesses

or weigh the evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. To

grant summary judgment, the court should find the

evidence “so one-sided that [the movant] must prevail

as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

IV. DISCUSSION

The parties agree that California substantive law

governs each of their respective claims and counterclaims. California law prescribes a three-step approach

to statutory interpretation, starting with the plain

meaning of the statutory language, then looking at

its legislative history and finally the reasonableness

of a party’s proposed construction. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co.

v. Lopez, 215 Cal. App. 4th 1385, 1396 (2013).

A. Duty to Defend

Under California law, to trigger the duty to defend,

“the insured need only show that the underlying claim

may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must

prove it cannot.” Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior

Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287, 300 (1993) (emphasis in original). As a result, “[i]f any facts stated or fairly inferable in the complaint, or otherwise known or discovered by the insurer, suggest a claim potentially

covered by the policy, the insurer’s duty to defend

arises and is not extinguished until the insurer

33a

negates all facts suggesting potential coverage.”

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV Transp., 36 Cal. 4th 643, 655

(2005). Where the potential for coverage exists, the

insurer’s duty to defend continues until the underlying

litigation concludes “unless the insurer sooner proves,

by facts subsequently developed, that the potential

for coverage which previously appeared cannot possibly materialize, or no longer exists.” Id. at 657.

Here, the language of California Insurance Code

Section 533.5(b) clearly and explicitly establishes that

there was no potential for coverage and, consequently,

no duty to defend in the underlying action. The evidence indicates that Defendant chose to advance

defense costs for Plaintiff in the underlying action

until the applicability of Section 533.5 to the entire

underlying action became clear. The AGO’s March 8

and May 13, 2019 letters to Plaintiff resolved any

remaining uncertainty regarding the potential for coverage and, therefore, gave Plaintiff adequate grounds

to terminate its defense of Defendant in the underlying action and to later seek reimbursement of all

amounts already paid.

Section 533.5(b) provides: “No policy of insurance

shall provide, or be construed to provide, any duty to

defend, as defined in subdivision (c), any claim . . .

in any action or proceeding brought pursuant to [the

UCL or FAL] in which the recovery of a fine, penalty,

or restitution is sought by the Attorney General . . . .”

Cal. Ins. Code § 533.5(b) (emphasis added). Subdivision (c) defines the “duty to defend” as “the insurer’s

right or obligation to investigate, contest, defend,

control the defense of, compromise, settle, negotiate

the compromise or settlement of, or indemnify for the

cost of any aspect of defending any claim in any criminal action or proceeding or in any action or proceeding

34a

brought pursuant to [the UCL or FAL] in which the

insured expects or contends that (1) the insurer is

liable or is potentially liable to make any payment on

behalf of the insured or (2) the insurer will provide a

defense for a claim even though the insurer is precluded by law from indemnifying that claim.” Id.

§ 533.5(c) (emphasis added). Subdivision (b), relying

on the definition in subdivision (c), unambiguously

precludes an insurer’s duty to defend not only a UCL

or FAL claim for the recovery of a fine, penalty, or

restitution, but also any claim brought pursuant to

the UCL or FAL in an action in which the Attorney

General or another state prosecuting authority seeks

such fine, penalty, or restitution. In other words, the

existence of a claim under the UCL or FAL for the

recovery of a fine, penalty, or restitution precludes the

duty to defend with respect to any such claim no

matter what form of relief is sought.

Plaintiff essentially concedes that there would be

no duty to defend if the AGO sought only fines, penalties, and/or restitution under the UCL or FAL. Plaintiff argues, however, that there is coverage, or at the

very least potential coverage, in the underlying action

because the AGO also seeks injunctive relief. Neither

the plain meaning of the statutory language nor case

law interpreting that language provides any support

for this position. Moreover, even if the statutory language did not unambiguously establish that there is

no duty to defend in any case in which a fine, penalty,

or restitution is sought under the UCL or FAL, the

legislative history shows that Plaintiff’s proposed

interpretation is unreasonable. Section 533.5 was

enacted with several goals in mind, including (1) alleviating the problem of public entities being forced to

litigate against insurance companies rather than the

business or individual whose conduct violated the law;

35a

(2) facilitating the settlement of UCL and FAL claims,

which was virtually “impossible” before the statute;

and (3) “hold[ing] individuals personally accountable

for behavior [that] constitutes an unfair business practice or false and misleading advertising.” Lopez, 215

Cal. App. 4th at 1402-03 (citations omitted). Allowing

insurance coverage to extend a duty to defend to the

injunctive relief component of a UCL or FAL claim

while precluding such coverage to the extent a fine,

penalty, or restitution is sought under the same cause

of action would clearly undermine these legislative

goals.

In sum, there is no genuine issue with respect to

whether Defendant has or ever had a duty to defend

Plaintiffs in the underlying action, and Defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the first and

second claims of Plaintiff’s FAC and the first count of

Defendant’s Counterclaim.

B. Duty to Indemnify

“The insurer’s duty to indemnify runs to claims that

are actually covered, in light of the facts proved. It

arises only after liability is established.” Buss v.

Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35, 46 (1997). Where there

is no duty to defend, there can be no duty to indemnify.

“It is . . . well settled that because the duty to defend

is broader than the duty to indemnify,’ a determination that ‘there is no duty to defend automatically

means there is no duty to indemnify.’” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court, 16 P.3d

94 (Cal. 2001) (quoting State of N.Y. v. Blank, 745 F.

Supp. 841, 844, aff’d, 27 F.3d 783 (2d Cir. 1994).

As discussed above, Defendant had no duty to

defend Plaintiff in the underlying action. Accordingly,

there can be no duty to indemnify. Moreover, Section

36a

533.5 explicitly precludes indemnification for any fine,

penalty, or restitution in any action brought under the

UCL or FAL by the Attorney General or another state

prosecuting authority. Thus, Defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the third and fourth

claims of Plaintiff’s FAC and the second count of

Defendant’s Counterclaim.

C. Right to Reimbursement

“Where there is not even the potential for coverage

because the claims do ‘not even possibly embrace any

triggering harm of the specified sort with the policy

period caused by an included occurrence,’ then the

insurance company does not have a duty to defend,

and any costs advanced may be recouped.” Millennium

Labs., Inc. v. Allied World Assur. Co. (U.S.), Inc., 165

F. Supp. 3d 931, 936 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting

Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV Transp., 36 Cal. 4th 643, 655

(2005)), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 571 (9th Cir. 2018).

Plaintiff contends that even if Defendant had no

duty to defend in the underlying action, Defendant has

no right to reimbursement of defense costs already

paid because Defendant’s December 15, 2017 reservation of rights letter did not specifically reserve its right

to seek reimbursement under the Policy and because

the letter did not mention Section 533.5’s applicability

to the underlying action. However, Plaintiff ignores

the fact that the Policy itself expressly provides that

“[i]n the event and to the extent that [Plaintiff] shall

not be entitled to payment of [] Loss under the terms

and conditions of this policy, such payments by

[Defendant] shall be repaid to [Defendant] by

[Plaintiff].” (DE 1-2, at 24). “Loss” is defined by the

Policy to include “Defense Costs” (DE 1-2, at 32),

which in turn are defined as, among other things,

“reasonable and necessary fees, costs, charges or

37a

expenses resulting from the investigation, defense or

appeal of a Claim.” (DE 1-2, at 20).

As discussed in detail above, Defendant never had a

duty to defend or indemnify Plaintiff in the underlying

action. Defendant nevertheless accepted Plaintiff’s

defense subject to a reservation of rights and paid

Plaintiff’s defense costs, as defined under the Policy,

in the underlying action. Because Plaintiff was not

entitled to payment of any defense costs, Defendant is

entitled to reimbursement pursuant to the explicit

language of the Policy.

Buss v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35 (1997), cited

by Plaintiffs, does not change this conclusion since

that case concerned an “implied” right of reimbursement, which must be explicitly reserved. Id. at 61 n.27.

Although Defendant’s December 15, 2017 letter did

not explicitly reserve the right to reimbursement, that

right was already explicit in the policy; it is not merely

implied. In fact, the Buss court itself acknowledged

the distinction between an implied-in-law right and an

express-in policy right, noting that “[t]he former renders the latter unnecessary.” Id. at 51 n.13.

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant has no right to

reimbursement since Plaintiff relied to its detriment

on Defendant’s tender of defense without an explicit

reservation of Defendant’s right to reimbursement.

“An insurer is estopped from asserting a right, even

though it did not intend to mislead, as long as the

insured reasonably relied to its detriment upon the

insurer’s action.” Chase v. Blue Cross of California, 42

Cal. App. 4th 1142, 1157 (1996). However, any such

reliance by Plaintiff would not have been reasonable

given that (1) the express language of Section 533.5

38a

precludes coverage in the underlying action,1 (2) the

Policy explicitly provides a right of reimbursement for

uncovered Loss, and (3) Defendant made its doubts

regarding coverage clear as early as November 20,

2017, when it initially denied coverage.

In sum, there is no genuine issue with respect to

whether Defendant is entitled to reimbursement

under the Policy of defense costs paid in the underlying action. Defendant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on the fifth and sixth counts of Defendant’s Counterclaim.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 19) and

DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (DE 24).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1

“As a general rule of construction, the parties are presumed

to know and to have had in mind all applicable laws extant when

an agreement is made. These existing laws are considered part of

the contract just as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated.” Pilimai v. Farmers Ins. Exch. Co., 137 P.3d 939, 942 (Cal.

2006) (citation omitted).

39a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Filed September 10, 2019]

————

Case No.: 2:19-cv-4352-R-PLA

————

ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a Delaware Limited

Liability Company, DBA CURACAO (formerly known

as La Curacao); and RON AZARKMAN, an individual,

v.

Plaintiffs,

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY and

DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY and

DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Counter-Claimant,

v.

ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a Delaware Limited

Liability Company, DBA CURACAO (formerly known

as La Curacao); and RON AZARKMAN, an individual,

Counter-Defendants.

————

JUDGMENT

Upon consideration of Defendant Starr Indemnity &

Liability Company’s (“Starr”) Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiffs Adir International and Ron

Azarkman’s (collectively, “Adir”) First Amended Complaint and as to Starr’s Counterclaim, the concur-

40a

rently filed Starr’s Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, and all other

documents and materials before the Court, and because

the Court finds there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and that Starr is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law, it is hereby ORDERED that Starr’s

Motion is GRANTED.

The Court finds that, under California Insurance

Code § 533.5, Starr does not have and never had a duty

to defend or to indemnify Adir in connection with the

underlying action under the Resolute Portfolio for

Private Companies Policy No. 1000620507171 (the

“Policy”). The Court additionally finds that, because

the Policy expressly provides Starr a right to reimbursement by Adir for payments of uncovered loss,

Starr is entitled to reimbursement from Adir for

amounts paid in connection with defending the underlying action.

Accordingly, the Court grants Summary Judgment

in favor of Starr as to Adir’s FAC and Starr’s Counterclaim. As the prevailing party, Starr is entitled to its

costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.

This 10th day of September, 2019.

/s/ Gary Klausner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

41a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[Filed November 8, 2019]

————

Case No.: 2:19-cv-4352-R-PLA

————

ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a Delaware Limited

Liability Company, DBA CURACAO (formerly known

as La Curacao); and RON AZARKMAN, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY and

DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY and

DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,

Counter-Claimant,

v.

ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.,

Counter-Defendants.

————

Hon. Manuel L. Real

————

AMENDED JUDGMENT

————

42a

TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP

Kevin F. Kieffer, Bar No. 192193

kevin.kieffer@troutman.com

Ryan C. Tuley, Bar No. 198249

ryan.tuley@troutman.com

5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400

Irvine, CA 92614-2545

Telephone: 949.622.2700

Facsimile: 949.622.2739

Michael L. Huggins, Bar No. 305562

michael.huggins@troutman.com

580 California Street, Suite 1100

San Francisco, CA 94104

Telephone: 415.477.5700

Facsimile: 415.477.5710

Attorneys for Defendant and Counter-Claimant

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY

————

AMENDED JUDGMENT

Upon consideration of Defendant Starr Indemnity

& Liability Company’s (“Stan”) Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiffs Adir International, LLC and

Ron Azarkman’s (collectively, “Adir”) First Amended

Complaint and as to Starr’s Counterclaim, the concurrently filed Stan’s Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, and all other

documents and materials before the Court, and

because the Court finds there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that Starr is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, it is hereby ORDERED

that Starr’s Motion is GRANTED.

The Court finds that, under California Insurance

Code § 533.5, Starr does not have and never had a

43a

duty to defend or to indemnify Adir in connection with

the underlying action under the Resolute Portfolio for

Private Companies Policy No. 1000620507171 (the

“Policy”). The Court additionally finds that, because

the Policy expressly provides Stan a right to reimbursement by Adir for payments of uncovered loss,

Stan is entitled to reimbursement from Adir for the

$2,085,364.53 Starr paid in connection with defending

the underlying action.

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment

in favor of Starr as to the Adir’s FAG and Starr’s

Counterclaim. The amount of the judgment in Stan’s

favor on its Counterclaim is $2,085,364.53. As the prevailing party, Stan is entitled to its costs pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.

This 8th day of November, 2019.

/s/ Gary Klausner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

44a

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[Filed May 28, 2021]

————

No. 19-56320

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04352-R-PLA

————

ADIR INTERNATIONAL,

v.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

STARR INDEMNITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

————

ORDER

Before: N.R. SMITH and LEE, Circuit Judges, and

KENNELLY,* District Judge.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel

rehearing filed by the appellant. Judge Lee has voted

to deny the petition for rehearing en banc filed by the

appellant, while Judges Smith and Kennelly have

recommended denying the petition. The full court has

been advised of the petitions for rehearing en banc and

no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the

matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35. The petition for

panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc

are DENIED.

*

The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, sitting by designation

from the Northern District of Illinois.

45a

APPENDIX F

STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY COMPANY

399 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10022 •

Tel. (646) 227-6377

RESOLUTE PORTFOLIOSM

For Private Companies

POLICY NUMBER: 1000620507171

RENEWAL OF: 1000056959161

NOTICE (Applicable to all Coverage Sections Other

Than the Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section):

EXCEPT TO SUCH EXTENT AS MAY OTHERWISE

BE PROVIDED HEREIN, THE COVERAGE OF THIS

POLICY IS GENERALLY LIMITED TO LIABILITY

FOR ONLY THOSE CLAIMS THAT ARE FIRST

MADE AGAINST THE INSUREDS DURING THE

POLICY PERIOD AND REPORTED IN WRITING TO

THE INSURER PURSUANT TO THE TERMS

HEREIN.

NOTICE (Applicable to all Coverage Sections Other

Than the Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section): THE

LIMIT OF LIABILITY AVAILABLE TO PAY

JUDGMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS SHALL BE

REDUCED BY AMOUNTS INCURRED FOR

DEFENSE COSTS. AMOUNTS INCURRED FOR

DEFENSE COSTS SHALL BE APPLIED AGAINST

THE RETENTION AMOUNT.

NOTICE (Applicable to all Coverage Sections Other

Than the Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section): THE

INSURER HAS NO DUTY TO DEFEND ANY CLAIM

UNDER THIS POLICY EXCEPT WITH RESPECT

TO ANY CLAIM FOR WHICH THE POLICY

SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT DUTY TO DEFEND

COVERAGE IS PROVIDED.

46a

NOTICE (Applicable to All Coverage Sections):

PLEASE READ THIS POLICY CAREFULLY AND

DISCUSS THE COVERAGE HEREUNDER WITH

YOUR INSURANCE AGENT OR BROKER.

DECLARATIONS

ITEM 1:

PARENT COMPANY:

ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

ADDRESS: 1605 Olympic Blvd., Suite 600

Los Angeles, CA 90015

ITEM 2: POLICY PERIOD:

From: October 01, 2017 To: October 01, 2018

(12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address stated in

Item 1)

ITEM 3: COVERAGE SECTIONS

This policy provides coverage only for the following

Coverage Sections if purchased by the Insured and

indicated by an X.

Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section Yes  No 

Derivative Demand Coverage

Employment Practices Liability Coverage

Section

Third-Party Liability Coverage

Fiduciary Liability Coverage Section

Voluntary Compliance Program Coverage

HIPAA Claim Coverage

Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section

Yes  No 

47a

ITEM 4: LIMITS OF LIABILITY

The Limits of Liability of this policy apply solely to

the Coverage Section(s) for which a corresponding

limit of liability amount is set forth below.

A. AGGREGATE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR EACH

SEPARATE COVERAGE SECTION OTHER

THAN THE CRIME AND FIDELITY COVERAGE

SECTION

(i)

Separate Coverage Section: Directors & Officers

Liability

N/A

Sublimit of Liability for Derivative Demand

Coverage

N/A

(ii)

Separate Coverage Section: Employment Practices

Liability

Sublimit of Liability for Third-Party Liability

Coverage

(iii)

Separate Coverage Section: Fiduciary Liability

Sublimit of Liability for Voluntary Compliance

Program Coverage

Sublimit of Liability for HIPAA Claim

Coverage

Each Sublimit of Liability set forth in Item 4 A.

above is part of, and not in addition to, the Limit of

Liability for the corresponding Separate Coverage

Section.

48a

B. AGGREGATE LIMIT OF LIABILITY FOR EACH

COMBINED COVERAGE SECTION OTHER

THAN THE CRIME AND FIDELITY COVERAGE

SECTION

(i)

Combined Coverage Section: Directors &

Officers Liability / Employment Practices

Liability / Fiduciary Liability

$10,000,000

Sublimit of Liability for Derivative Demand

Coverage

$150,000

Sublimit of Liability for Third-Party Liability

Coverage

$10 000 000

Sublimit of Liability for Voluntary

Compliance Program Coverage

Sublimit of Liability for HIPAA Claim

Coverage

(ii)

Combined Coverage Section: Directors & Officers

Liability / Employment Practices Liability / Fiduciary

Liability

N/A

Sublimit of Liability for Derivative Demand Coverage

N/A

Sublimit of Liability for Third-Party Liability Coverage

N/A

(iii)

Combined Coverage Section:

N/A

Directors & Officers Liability / Fiduciary Liability

N/A

Sublimit of Liability for Derivative Demand Coverage

N/A

Sublimit of Liability for Voluntary Compliance

Program Coverage

N/A

49a

(iv)

Combined Coverage Section: Employment Practices

Liability / Fiduciary Liability

Sublimit of Liability for Third-Party Liability

Coverage

Sublimit of Liability for Voluntary Compliance

Program Coverage

Sublimit of Liability for HIPAA Claim Coverage

Each Sublimit of Liability set forth in Item 4 B.

above is part of, and not in addition to, the Limit of

Liability for the corresponding Combined Coverage

Section.

The Limits of Liability set forth in Item 4 A. and B.

above are the maximum limits of liability for all Loss

including Defense Costs, under the applicable

Coverage Section(s).

C. AGGREGATE POLICY LIMIT OF LIABILITY

$10,000,000

The above Limit of Liability set forth in Item 4 C.

above is the maximum limit of liability for all Loss,

including Defense Costs, for all Coverage Sections

purchased other than the Crime and Fidelity Coverage

Section.

D. PER OCCURRENCE LIMIT OF LIABILITYCRIME AND FIDELITY COVERAGE SECTION

The Limits of Liability of this policy apply solely to

the Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section(s) for which

a corresponding limit of liability amount is set forth

below.

50a

Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section:

(i) Insuring Agreement A, Employee

Theft

(ii) Insuring Agreement B, Forgery or

Alteration

(iii) Insuring Agreement C, Inside the

Premises — Loss of Money and

Securities

(iv) Insuring Agreement D, Inside the

Premises - Robbery or Safe Burglary of

Other Property

(v) Insuring Agreement E, Outside the

Premises

(vi) Insuring Agreement F, Computer

Fraud

(vii) Insuring Agreement G, Funds

Transfer

(viii) Insuring Agreement H, Money

Orders and Counterfeit Money

(ix) Insuring Agreement I, Credit, Debit,

Charge Card Forgery

(x) Insuring Agreement J, Clients’

Property

(xi) Insuring

ITEM 5: RETENTION OR DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNTS

RETENTION AMOUNTS

A. Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section:

(i) Insuring Agreement A.

$0

(ii) Insuring Agreement B, and C.

$100,000

(iii) Insuring Agreement D.

$0

B. Employment Practices Liability Coverage Section:

(i) Insuring Agreement A. - Employment

Practices Liability Coverage

(ii) Insuring Agreement B. - Third-Party

Liability Coverage

51a

C. Fiduciary Liability Coverage Section:

(i)Insuring Agreement A. - Fiduciary

Liability Coverage All Claims, except

HIPAA Claims HIPAA Claims

(ii) (ii) Insuring Agreement B. Voluntary Compliance Program

Coverage

DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNTS

D. Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section:

(i) Insuring Agreement A,

Employee Theft

(ii) Insuring Agreement B, Forgery or

Alteration

(iii) Insuring Agreement C,

Inside the Premises — Loss of Money

and Securities

(iv) Insuring Agreement D, Inside the

Premises - Robbery or Safe Burglary of

Other Property

(v) Insuring Agreement E, Outside the

Premises

(vi) Insuring Agreement F, Computer

Fraud

(vii) Insuring Agreement G, Funds

Transfer

(viii) Insuring Agreement H, Money

Orders and Counterfeit Money

(ix) Insuring Agreement I, Credit, Debit,

Charge Card Forgery

(x) Insuring Agreement J, Clients’

Property

(xi) Insuring

ITEM 6:

52a

PENDING OR PRIOR DATE

A. Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section:

(i) Insuring Agreement A

October 01, 2005

(ii) Insuring Agreement B. and C.

October 01, 2005

B. Employment Practices Liability Coverage Section:

(i) Insuring Agreement A - Employment

Practices Liability Coverage

(ii) Insuring Agreement B. - Third-Party

Liability Coverage

C. Fiduciary Liability Coverage Section

(i) Fiduciary Liability Coverage

D. Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section: xxxxxxxxx

ITEM 7: Premium

A. Directors & Officers Liability

coverage section:

$37,720

B. Employment Practices Liability

Coverage Section:

C. Fiduciary Liability Coverage Section:

D. Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section:

E. Total Policy Premium:

ITEM 8: DISCOVERY PERIOD (APPLICABLE TO

ALL COVERAGE SECTIONS OTHER THAN CRIME

AND FIDELITY)

A. One Year: 100% of the applicable premium

B. Two to Six Years: Premium to be determined

53a

ITEM 9: ADDRESS OF INSURER AND ITS

AUTHORIZED CLAIMS AGENT FOR NOTICES

UNDER THIS POLICY

A. Claims-Related Notices

STARR ADJUSTMENT SERVICES, INC.

399 PARK AVENUE, 9TH FLOOR

NEW YORK, NY 10022

e-mail: StarrFLPLClaims@starrcompanies.com

B. All Other Notices To The Insurer:

STARR

INDEMNITY

&

LIABILITY

COMPANY

ATTN: FINANCIAL LINES DEPARTMENT

399 PARK AVE. 8TH FLOOR

NEW YORK, NY 10022

In Witness Whereof, the Insurer has caused this

policy to be executed and attest. This policy shall not

be valid unless countersigned by a duly authorized

representative of the Insurer.

/s/ Charles H. Dangelo

Charles H. Dangelo, President

/s/ Nehemiah E. Ginsburg

Nehemiah E. Ginsburg, General Counsel

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

54a

STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY COMPANY

RESOLUTE PORTFOLIOSM

For Private Companies

General Terms & Conditions Section

In consideration of the payment of the premium and

in reliance upon the Application, as applicable to

each Coverage Section, which shall be deemed to be

attached to, incorporated into, and made a part of this

policy, and subject to this General Terms & Conditions

Section and any applicable Coverage Section(s), if

purchased by the Insured as indicated in Item 3 of the

Declarations, STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY

COMPANY (the “Insurer”) and the Parent Company,

on behalf of all Insureds, agree as follows:

1. TERMS & CONDITIONS

The terms and conditions set forth in this General

Terms & Conditions Section shall apply to all applicable Coverage Sections of this policy. The terms appearing

in this General Terms & Conditions Section, which are

defined in a Coverage Section, shall have the meaning

provided for such terms in such Coverage Section for

purposes of coverage under such Coverage Section.

All defined terms used in this Policy, whether defined

in Clause 2, below, or in a Coverage Section, appear

in this Policy in boldface and initial-capitalized. The

terms and conditions of each Coverage Section apply

only to that particular Coverage Section. If any term

or condition in this General Terms & Conditions

Section is inconsistent or in conflict with the terms and

conditions of any Coverage Section, the terms and

conditions of such Coverage Section shall control.

55a

2. GENERAL DEFINITIONS

(a) “Application” means all signed applications,

including any attachments and other materials provided therewith or incorporated therein, submitted in

connection with the underwriting of this policy or for

any other policy of which this policy is a renewal,

replacement or which it succeeds in time. Application

shall also include, and incorporate, all publicly available documents.

(b) “Cleanup Costs” means expenses (including but

not limited to legal and professional fees) incurred in

testing for, monitoring, cleaning up, removing, containing, treating, neutralizing, detoxifying or assessing

the effects of Pollutants.

(c) “Company” means:

(1) the Parent Company;

(2) any Subsidiary of the Parent Company; and

(3) the Parent Company or any Subsidiary as a

debtor, a debtor-in-possession or equivalent status;

provided, however, that this Definition (c) (3) shall

not apply to the Fiduciary Liability Coverage

Section.

(d) “Defense Costs” means:

(1) reasonable and necessary fees, costs, charges

or expenses resulting from the investigation,

defense or appeal of a Claim;

(2) premium for an appeal, attachment or similar

bond, but without any obligation to apply for and

obtain such bond;

(3) reasonable and necessary fees, costs, charges

or expenses incurred in response to any extradition

56a

or similar proceeding brought against an Insured in

connection with a Claim; and

(4) any fees, costs, charges or expenses incurred

by the Insured at the specific request of the Insurer

to assist the Insurer in the investigation, defense or

appeal of a Claim.

“Defense Costs” does not include: (i) amounts

incurred prior to the date a Claim is first made and

reported to the Insurer, pursuant to the terms of the

applicable Coverage Section; and (ii) compensation

or benefits of any Insured Person or any overhead

expenses of the Company.

(e) “Financial Impairment” means the Company

becoming a debtor-in-possession, or the appointment

of a receiver, conservator, liquidator, trustee, rehabilitator or similar official to control, supervise, manage

or liquidate the Company.

(f) “Management Control” means: (1) owning

interests representing more than 50% of the voting,

appointment or designation power for the selection of

a majority of: the board of directors of a corporation;

the management committee members of a joint

venture; or the Members of the management board of

a limited liability company; or (2) having the right,

pursuant to written contract or the by-laws, charter,

operating agreement or similar documents of a

Company, to elect, appoint or designate a majority of:

the board of directors of a corporation; the management committee of a joint venture; or the management

board of a limited liability company.

(g) “Manager” means a person serving in a

directorial capacity for a limited liability company.

57a

(h) “Member” means an owner of a limited liability

company represented by its membership interest, who

also may serve as a Manager.

(i) “Parent Company” means the entity named in

Item 1 of the Declarations.

(j) “Policy Period” means the period from the

inception date shown in Item 2 of the Declarations to

the earlier of the expiration date shown in Item 2 of

the Declarations or the effective date of cancellation of

this policy. If one or more Coverage Sections have

different inception, expiration or cancellation dates

from those shown in Item 2 of the Declarations, the

Policy Period for those Coverage Sections shall be set

forth in an endorsement to this Policy.

(k) “Pollutants” means any substance located

anywhere in the world exhibiting any hazardous

characteristics as defined by, or identified on, any list

of hazardous substances issued by the United States

Environmental Protection Agency or any foreign,

state, county, municipality, or locality counterpart

thereof. Such substances shall include, without limitation, nuclear material or waste, any solid, liquid,

gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, or smoke,

vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals or waste

materials. Pollutants shall also mean any other air

emission, odor, waste water, oil or oil products, infectious or medical waste, asbestos or asbestos products

and any noise.

(l) “Pollution” means the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release, escape, seepage,

transportation, emission, treatment, removal or disposal of Pollutants into or on real or personal property,

water or the atmosphere. Pollution also means any

Cleanup Costs.

58a

3. LIMITS OF LIABILITY

The Aggregate Limit of Liability For Each Separate

Coverage Section, as set forth in Item 4 A. of the

Declarations, is the maximum limit of liability of the

Insurer for all Loss, including Defense Costs, from

all Claims first made during the Policy Period (or

Discovery Period, if applicable) and reported to the

Insurer in accordance with the terms of this policy, for

each applicable Separate Coverage Section.

The Aggregate Limit of Liability For Each Combined Coverage Section, as set forth in Item 4 B. of the

Declarations, is the maximum limit of liability of the

Insurer for all Loss, including Defense Costs, from all

Claims first made during the Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if applicable) and reported to the Insurer

in accordance with the terms of this policy, for all of

the Coverage Sections that comprise the applicable

Combined Coverage Section. Any Loss paid under one

of the Coverage Sections that comprises a Combined

Coverage Section will reduce, and may exhaust, the

limit of liability available under the other Coverage

Section(s) that comprise(s) such Combined Coverage

Section.

Any Sublimit(s) of Liability, whether set forth in

Item 4 of the Declarations or as otherwise provided

under the terms of this policy, shall be part of, and

not in addition to, the applicable Aggregate Limit of

Liability set forth in Item 4 A. or 4 B. of the Declarations. Each Sublimit of Liability is the maximum

limit of liability of the Insurer for all Loss, including

Defense Costs, from all Claims first made during the

Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if applicable) and

reported to the Insurer in accordance with the terms

of this policy, to which the Sublimit(s) of Liability

applies.

59a

The Aggregate Policy Limit of Liability, as set forth

in Item 4 C. of the Declarations, is the maximum limit

of liability of the Insurer for all Loss, including

Defense Costs, from all Claims first made during the

Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if applicable) and

reported to the Insurer in accordance with the terms

of this policy, for all Coverage Section(s) combined.

If any Aggregate Limit of Liability as set forth in

Item 4 A. or 4 B. of the Declarations is exhausted by

the payment of Loss, all obligations of the Insurer

under this policy as respects the applicable Coverage

Section(s) will be completely fulfilled and the Insurer

will have no further obligations under this policy of

any kind as respects the applicable Coverage Section(s)

and the premium as respects the applicable Coverage

Section(s) as set forth in Item 7 of the Declarations will

be fully earned.

Any payment of Loss under any Aggregate Limit of

Liability as set forth in Item 4 A. or 4 B. of the

Declarations shall reduce and may exhaust the Aggregate Policy Limit of Liability as set forth in Item 4 C.

of the Declarations. If the Aggregate Policy Limit of

Liability is exhausted by the payment of such Loss, the

Insurer will have no further obligations of any kind as

respects this policy and the applicable premium set

forth in Item 7 of the Declarations will be fully earned.

Defense Costs are part of, and not in addition to, the

Aggregate Limit of Liability as set forth in Item 4 of

the Declarations for each applicable Coverage Section,

other than the Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section,

and payment by the Insurer of Defense Costs shall

reduce and may exhaust such Aggregate Limit(s) of

Liability. Defense Costs are subject to the Aggregate

Policy Limit of Liability set forth in Item 4 C. of the

Declarations.

60a

If a Discovery Period is purchased by the Insured

pursuant to Clause 8 of this General Terms &

Conditions Section, the Limit of Liability for the

Discovery Period shall be part of, and not in addition

to, the applicable Limits of Liability as set forth in

Item 4 of the Declarations.

The Limit of Liability applicable to the Crime and

Fidelity Coverage Section is set forth in Clause 4 of

that Coverage Section.

4. RETENTION CLAUSE

Subject to all other terms and conditions of this

policy, the Insurer shall only be liable for the amount

of Loss arising from a Claim which is in excess of the

applicable Retention amount as set forth in Item 5 of

the Declarations for each Insuring Agreement of the

applicable Coverage Section(s). A single Retention

amount shall apply to all Loss alleging the same or

related Wrongful Acts. The Retention amount shall be

borne by the Insureds and remain uninsured.

The application of a Retention to Loss under one

Insuring Agreement shall not reduce the Retention

that applies to Loss under any other Insuring Agreement. If different Retention amounts apply to different

parts of a single Loss, the applicable Retention shall

be applied separately to each part of the Loss and the

sum of such Retention amounts shall not exceed the

largest of the applicable Retention amounts as set

forth in Item 5 of the Declarations.

If the Company is required or permitted to indemnify an Insured Person for any Loss pursuant to law,

contract or the charter, bylaws, operating agreement

or similar documents of a Company and does not do so

for any reason, the Insurer shall not require payment

of the applicable Retention by the Insured Person.

61a

However, the Company hereby agrees to reimburse

the Insurer for the full amount of such applicable

Retention, unless the Company is unable to do so

because of Financial Impairment.

Provided, however that this Clause No. 4, shall not

apply to the Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section.

5. NOTICE OF CLAIM

The Insureds) shall, as a condition precedent to

the obligations of the Insurer under this policy, give

written notice of a Claim made against an Insured or

an Occurrence, as applicable under the appropriate

Coverage Section, to the Insurer at the address set

forth in Item 9 of the Declarations. If mailed, the date

of mailing shall constitute the date that such notice

was given and proof of mailing shall be sufficient proof

of notice.

With respect to the Directors & Officers Liability

Coverage Section, the Insured(s) shall, as a condition

precedent to the obligations of the Insurer under this

policy, give written notice to the Insurer pursuant to

this Clause 5, of a Claim made against an Insured as

soon as practicable after the Company’s general counsel or risk manager (or individuals with equivalent

responsibilities) becomes aware of the Claim; however,

in no event shall such notice be provided later than

sixty (60) days after the expiration of the Policy Period

(or Discovery Period, if applicable).

With respect to the Employment Practices Liability

Coverage Section and the Fiduciary Liability Coverage

Section, the Insured(s) shall, as a condition precedent

to the obligations of the Insurer under this policy, give

written notice to the Insurer pursuant to this Clause

5, of a Claim made against an Insured as soon as

practicable after any Insured Person becomes aware of

62a

the Claim; however, in no event shall such notice be

provided later than thirty (30) days after the expiration of the Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if

applicable).

With respect to all Coverage Sections, except the

Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section, if written notice

of a Claim has been given to the Insurer pursuant to

this Clause 5, then a Claim which is subsequently

made against an Insured and reported to the Insurer

pursuant to this Clause 5, alleging, arising out of,

based upon or attributable to the facts alleged in the

previously noticed Claim, or alleging the same or

related Wrongful Act alleged in the previously noticed

Claim, shall be considered related to the previously

noticed Claim and shall be deemed to have been made

at the time notice of the previously noticed Claim was

provided to the Insurer.

With respect to all Coverage Sections, except the

Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section, if during the

Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if applicable) an

Insured becomes aware of any circumstances which

may reasonably be expected to give rise to a Claim

being made against an Insured, the Insured may provide written notice to the Insurer’s authorized agent of

such circumstances. This written notice shall include

the Wrongful Act allegations anticipated and the

reasons for anticipating a Claim, with full particulars

as to dates, persons and entities involved. If a Claim is

subsequently made against such Insured and reported

to the Insurer arising out of, based upon or attributable to the previously noticed circumstances, such

Claim shall be considered first made at the time notice

of such circumstances was provided to the Insurer.

63a

6. DEFENSE OF CLAIM AND SETTLEMENT

The Insurer has the right and duty to defend any

Claim against any Insured covered under this policy,

even if such Claim is false, fraudulent or groundless;

however, the Insurer shall not have the right or duty

to defend any Claim under: (1) Insuring Agreement D.:

Derivative Demand Coverage of the Directors &

Officers Liability Coverage Section; or (2) Insuring

Agreement B: Voluntary Compliance Program Coverage of the Fiduciary Liability Coverage Section.

With respect to Insuring Agreement D.: Derivative

Demand Coverage of the Directors & Officers Liability

Coverage Section, the Company, and not the Insurer,

has the duty to investigate and evaluate the Derivative Demand. The Insurer shall have the right to

effectively associate with the Company in such process.

With respect to Insuring Agreement B: Voluntary

Compliance Program Coverage of the Fiduciary Liability

Coverage Section, the Company, and not the Insurer,

has the duty to investigate and evaluate the Voluntary

Compliance Program Loss. The Insurer shall have the

right to effectively associate with the Company in such

process, including the negotiation of any settlement as

respects the Voluntary Compliance Program Loss.

The Insureds) shall not admit or assume any liability,

incur any Defense Costs, enter into any settlement

agreement or stipulate to any judgment without the

prior written consent of the Insurer. Any Loss incurred

by the Insured(s) and/or any settlements or judgments

agreed to by the Insured(s) without such consent shall

not be covered by this policy. However, the Insurer’s

consent is not required for the Insured to settle a

Claim for a Loss amount within the applicable

Retention.

64a

Each and every Insured shall give the Insurer full

cooperation and such information as it may reasonably

require relating to the defense and settlement of any

Claim and the prosecution of any counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party claim, including without limitation the assertion of an Insured’s indemnification or

contribution rights.

The Insurer shall have the right to investigate and

conduct negotiations and, with the Insured’s consent,

which shall not be unreasonably withheld, enter into

the settlement of any Claim that the Insurer deems

appropriate. In the event the Insured refuses to

consent to a settlement acceptable to the claimant in

accordance with the Insurer’s recommendation, the

Insurer’s liability for Loss on account of such Claim

shall not exceed: (1) the amount for which the Insurer

could have settled the Claim; plus (2) any Defense

Costs incurred up to the date the Insured refused to

settle such Claim; plus (3) eighty percent (80%) of

covered Loss, other than Defense Costs, in excess of

the amount for which the Insurer could have settled

the Claim. However, in no event shall the Insurer’s

liability exceed the applicable Limit of Liability as set

forth in Item 4 of the Declarations.

The Insurer shall pay Defense Costs prior to the

final disposition of any Claim, excess of the applicable

retention and subject to all other terms and conditions

of this policy. In the event and to the extent that the

Insureds shall not be entitled to payment of such Loss

under the terms and conditions of this policy, such

payments by the Insurer shall be repaid to the Insurer

by the Insureds, severally according to their respective

interests.

65a

7. ALLOCATION

In the event the Insured(s) incurs Loss that is both

covered and not covered by this policy, either because

the Claim includes both covered and uncovered

matters or because the Claim includes both insured

and uninsured parties, the Insured and the Insurer

agree to use their best efforts to determine a fair and

appropriate allocation between covered and uncovered

Loss based upon the relative legal and financial

exposures of the parties to such matters. In the event

of a settlement of such Claim, the allocation shall also

be based upon the relative benefits to the Insureds

from such a settlement.

If an allocation of Loss cannot be agreed to by

the Insurer and the Insured: (1) the Insurer shall

pay those amounts which it believes to be fair and

equitable until an amount shall be agreed upon or

determined pursuant to the provisions of this policy;

and (2) there will be no presumption of allocation of

Loss in any arbitration, suit or other proceeding.

8. DISCOVERY CLAUSE

With respect to all Coverage Sections, except the

Crime and Fidelity Coverage Section, if the Company

or the Insurer refuses to renew one or more Coverage

Sections of this policy, or if this policy is terminated by

the Insurer for any reason (except for non-payment of

premium), or if an Organizational Change as defined

in Clause 13 occurs, the Insured(s) shall have the

right to purchase a Discovery Period of up to six years

following the effective date of such non-renewal, termination or Organizational Change. In the event of

the non-renewal of one or more Coverage Sections of

this policy, the Insured may purchase a Discovery

66a

Period solely as respects the Coverage Section(s) that

has been non-renewed.

The Insured’s right to purchase a Discovery Period

shall lapse unless written notice of election to purchase such Discovery Period and the additional

premium for such Discovery Period is received by the

Insurer or its authorized agent within sixty days after

such non-renewal, termination or Organizational Change.

The additional premium for a Discovery Period of one

or two years is set forth in Item 8 of the Declarations

and shall be determined by multiplying the applicable

percentage set forth in Item 8 of the Declarations by

the premium for each applicable Coverage Section(s)

as set forth in Item 7 of the Declarations. The

additional premium for a Discovery Period of more

than two years shall be determined by the Insurer.

During such Discovery Period, the Insured may

provide the Insurer with written notice, pursuant to

Clause 5 of this policy, of Claims made against an

Insured solely with respect to Wrongful Acts occurring

prior to the effective date of the non-renewal or

termination of the policy or the effective date of the

Organizational Change and otherwise covered by this

policy.

The Limit of Liability for the Discovery Period shall

be part of, and not in addition to, the applicable Limits

of Liability set forth in Item 4 of the Declarations.

The Discovery Period premium shall be fully earned

at the inception of the Discovery Period. The Discovery

Period is non-cancellable.

9. OTHER INSURANCE

The insurance provided by this policy shall apply

only as excess over any other valid and collectible

67a

insurance whether such other insurance is stated to be

primary, contributory, excess, contingent or otherwise,

unless such other insurance is written specifically as

excess insurance over the applicable Limit of Liability

provided by this policy. This policy shall specifically be

excess of any other valid and collectible insurance

pursuant to which any other insurer has a duty to

defend a Claim for which this policy may be obligated

to pay Loss. This policy shall not be subject to the

terms and conditions of any other insurance policy.

In connection with any covered Claim made against

an Outside Entity Insured Person, a leased employee,

or an Independent Contractor, and subject to all other

terms and conditions herein, this policy shall apply

specifically excess of any indemnification and any other

insurance coverage available to an Outside Entity

Insured Person, a leased employee or an Independent

Contractor. In the event such other insurance coverage available to an Outside Entity Insured Person, a

leased employee or an Independent Contractor is provided by the Insurer (or would be provided except for

the application of any retention, exhaustion of a limit

of liability or failure to submit notice of a claim) then

the Insurer’s maximum aggregate limit of liability for

all Loss combined in connection with a Claim covered,

in whole or in part, by this policy and such other

insurance policy, shall be the greater of (1) the Limit

of Liability of the applicable Coverage Section(s) of

this policy; or (2) the limit of liability of such other

insurance policy.

10. REPRESENTATIONS AND SEVERABILITY

It is agreed that the Insurer has relied upon the

information contained in the Application, as applicable to each Coverage Section, in issuing this policy. In

regard to the statements, warranties, representations

68a

and information contained in the Application, no

knowledge of any Insured shall be imputed to any

other Insured for the purpose of determining whether

coverage is available under this policy for any Claim

made against such Insured. However, the knowledge

possessed by any Insured Person who is a past or

current chairman of the board, chief executive officer,

president or chief financial officer of the Company

shall be imputed to the Company.

11. COVERAGE EXTENSIONS

This policy shall cover Loss arising from any Claims

made against the estates, heirs, or legal representatives of any deceased person who was an Insured

Person at the time the Wrongful Acts upon which such

Claims are based were committed; provided, however,

that this extension shall not afford coverage for any

Claim for any actual or alleged Wrongful Act by or on

the part of any such estates, heirs, or legal representatives, but shall apply only to Claims arising out of any

actual or alleged Wrongful Acts of an Insured Person.

This policy shall also cover Loss arising from any

Claims made against the legal representatives of any

incompetent, insolvent or bankrupt person who was

an Insured Person at the time the Wrongful Acts upon

which such Claims are based were committed; provided, however, that this extension shall not afford

coverage for any Claim for any actual or alleged

Wrongful Act by or on the part of any such legal

representatives, but shall apply only to Claims arising

out of any actual or alleged Wrongful Acts of an

Insured Person.

This policy shall also cover Loss arising from any

Claims made against the lawful spouse or domestic

partner (whether such status is derived by reason of

69a

statutory law, common law or otherwise of any applicable jurisdiction in the world or any formal program

established by the

Company) of an Insured Person for all Claims

arising solely out of his or her status as the spouse or

domestic partner of an Insured Person, including a

Claim that seeks damages recoverable from marital

community property, property jointly held by the

Insured Person and the spouse or domestic partner, or

property transferred from the Insured Person to the

spouse or domestic partner; provided, however, that

this extension shall not afford coverage for any Claim

for any actual or alleged Wrongful Act by or on the part

of the spouse or domestic partner, but shall apply only

to Claims arising out of any actual or alleged Wrongful

Acts of an Insured Person.

The coverage extensions set forth in this Clause 11

are subject to all other terms and conditions of this

policy.

12. CANCELLATION AND NON RENEWAL CLAUSE

This policy, or any applicable Coverage Section(s),

may be cancelled by the Parent Company by sending

written prior notice to the Insurer or its authorized

agent as set forth in Item 9 of the Declarations stating

when thereafter the cancellation of the policy, or the

applicable Coverage Section(s), shall be effective. The

policy, or the applicable Coverage Section(s), terminates at the date and hour specified in such notice.

This policy may also be cancelled by the Parent

Company by surrender of this policy to the Insurer or

its authorized agent as set forth in Item 9 of the

Declarations. The policy terminates as of the date

and time of surrender. The Insurer shall retain the

70a

customary short rate proportion of the premium,

unless stated otherwise herein.

This policy, or any applicable Coverage Section(s),

shall not be cancelled by or on behalf of the Insurer

except by reason of non-payment of the premium set

forth in Item 7 of the Declarations. The Insurer may

cancel the policy by delivering to the Parent Company

or by mailing to the Parent Company, by registered

mail, or by courier at the Parent Company’s address

set forth in the Declarations, written notice stating

when, not less than twenty (20) days thereafter, the

cancellation shall be effective. The mailing of such

notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice.

In the event of such cancellation, the policy will be

deemed terminated as of the date indicated in the

Insurer’s written notice of cancellation to the Parent

Company.

Payment or tender of any unearned premium by the

Insurer shall not be a condition precedent to the

effectiveness of cancellation, but such payment shall

be made as soon as practicable. If the period of

limitation relating to the giving of notice is prohibited

or made void by any law controlling the construction

thereof, such period shall be deemed to be amended so

as to be equal to the minimum period of limitation

permitted by such law.

The Insurer shall have no obligation to renew this

policy or any applicable Coverage Section. In the event

the Insurer decides to non-renew this policy or any

applicable Coverage Section, it shall deliver or mail to

the Parent Company, as identified in Item 1 of the

Declarations, written notice of such decision at least

sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the Policy

Period.

71a

13. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

If during the Policy Period:

(1) the Parent Company shall consolidate with,

merge into, or sell all or substantially all of its assets

to any other person or entity or group of persons or

entities acting in concert; or

(2) any person or entity or group of persons or

entities acting in concert shall acquire more than 50%

of the Parent Company,

(any events described in (1) or (2) are referred to

herein as an “Organizational Change”) then this policy

shall continue in full force and effect as to Wrongful

Acts occurring prior to the effective time of an

Organizational Change. However, there shall be no

coverage afforded by this policy for any actual or

alleged Wrongful Act occurring after the effective time

of the Organizational Change. This policy shall be

non-cancellable and the entire premium shall be

deemed fully earned upon the effective time of the

Organizational Change. The Insureds) shall also have

the right to purchase a Discovery Period described in

Clause 8 in the event of an Organizational Change.

The Parent Company shall give the Insurer written

notice of the Organizational Change as soon as practicable, but no later than thirty days after the effective

date of the Organizational Change.

14. AUTHORIZATION AND NOTICES

The Parent Company shall act on behalf of all

Insureds with respect to all matters as respects this

policy including: (1) giving of notice of Claim; (2) giving

and receiving of all correspondence and information;

(3) giving and receiving notice of cancellation; (4) payment of premiums; (5) receiving of any return

72a

premiums; (6) receiving and accepting of any

endorsements issued to form a part of this policy; and

(7) the exercising of any right to a Discovery Period.

15. VALUATION AND CURRENCY

All amounts stated in this policy are expressed in

United States dollars and all amounts payable under

this policy are payable in United States dollars. If a

judgment rendered or settlement entered into under

this policy are stated in a currency other than United

States dollars, then payment under this policy shall be

made in United States dollars at the rate of exchange

published in the Wall Street Journal on the date the

final judgment is rendered or the settlement payment

is established.

16. TERRITORY

This policy extends to Wrongful Acts taking place,

Occurrences, or Claims made anywhere in the world

to the extent permitted by law.

17. ASSIGNMENT

POLICY

AND

CHANGES

TO

THE

This policy and any and all rights hereunder are not

assignable without the prior written consent of the

Insurer.

Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any

agent or person acting on behalf of the Insurer, other

than the Insurer’s authorized agent as identified in

Item 9 of the Declarations, will not result in a waiver

or change in any part of this policy or prevent the

Insurer from asserting any right under the terms and

conditions of this policy. The terms and conditions of

this policy may only be waived or changed by written

endorsement signed by the Insurer or its authorized

agent.

73a

18. BANKRUPTCY

Bankruptcy or insolvency of any Insured shall not

relieve the Insurer of any of its obligations hereunder.

It is understood and agreed that the coverage

provided under this policy is intended to protect and

benefit the Insured Persons. Further, if a liquidation

or reorganization proceeding involving the Company

is commenced (whether voluntarily or involuntarily)

under Title 11 of the United States Code (as amended),

or any similar state, local or foreign law (collectively

“Bankruptcy Law”) then, in regard to a covered Claim

under this policy, the Insureds shall:

a. waive and release any automatic stay or injunction to the extent it may apply in such proceeding to

the policy or its proceeds under such Bankruptcy Law;

and

b. agree not to oppose or object to any efforts by the

Company, the Insurer or any Insured Person to obtain

relief from any such stay or injunction.

In the event the Company becomes a debtor-inpossession or equivalent status under such Bankruptcy

Law, and the total covered Loss under this policy

exceeds the available applicable Limit of Liability, the

Insurer shall:

a. first pay the Loss allocable to Wrongful Acts

that are actually or allegedly caused, committed, or

attempted prior to the Company becoming a debtor-inpossession or some equivalent status, then

b. pay any remaining Loss allocable to Wrongful

Acts that are actually or allegedly caused, committed,

or attempted after the Company became a debtor-inpossession or some equivalent status.

74a

19. SUBROGATION

In addition to any right of subrogation existing at

law, in equity or otherwise, in the event of any

payment by the Insurer under this policy, the Insurer

shall be subrogated to the extent of such payment to

all of the Insured(s)’ rights of recovery. The Insureds)

shall execute all papers required (including those

documents necessary for the Insurer to bring suit or

other form of proceeding in their name) and do

everything that may be necessary to pursue and

secure such rights.

20. ACTION AGAINST THE INSURER

No action may be taken against the Insurer unless,

as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have been

full compliance with all material terms of this policy

and the amount of the Insured’s obligation has been

fully determined either by judgment against the

Insured after actual trial, or by written agreement of

the Insured, the claimant and the Insurer.

No person or entity shall have any right under this

policy to join the Insurer as a party to any action

against any Insured to determine such Insured’s liability nor shall the Insurer be impleaded by such

Insured or legal representatives of such Insured.

21. CONFORMITY TO STATUTE

Any terms of this policy which are in conflict with

the terms of any applicable laws construing this policy,

including any endorsement to this policy which is

required by any state Department of Insurance, or

equivalent authority (“State Amendatory Endorsement”),

are hereby amended to conform to such laws. Nothing

herein shall be construed to restrict the terms of any

State Amendatory Endorsement.

75a

In the event any portion of this policy shall be

declared or deemed invalid or unenforceable under

applicable law, such invalidity or unenforceability

shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any

other portion of this policy.

22. HEADINGS

The descriptions in the headings and any subheading of this policy (including any titles given to any

endorsement attached hereto) are inserted solely for

convenience and do not constitute any part of this

policy’s terms or conditions.

76a

STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY COMPANY

RESOLUTE PORTFOLIOSM

For Private Companies

Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section

In consideration of the payment of the premium and

in reliance upon the Application, which shall be

deemed to be attached to, incorporated into, and made

a part of this policy, and subject to the General Terms

& Conditions Section and this Coverage Section, if

purchased by the Insured as indicated in Item 3 of the

Declarations, STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY

COMPANY (the “Insurer”) and the Parent Company,

on behalf of all Insureds, agree as follows:

1. INSURING AGREEMENTS

A. The Insurer shall pay on behalf of any Insured

Person the Loss arising from a Claim first made

during the Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if

applicable) against such Insured Person for any Wrongful

Act, and reported to the Insurer in accordance with the

terms of this policy, except if the Company has

indemnified the Insured Person for such Loss.

B. The Insurer shall pay on behalf of the Company

the Loss arising from a Claim first made during the

Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if applicable)

against any Insured Person for any Wrongful Act, and

reported to the Insurer in accordance with the terms

of this policy, if the Company has indemnified the

Insured Person for such Loss.

C. The Insurer shall pay on behalf of the Company

the Loss arising from a Claim first made during the

Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if applicable)

against the Company for any Wrongful Act, and

77a

reported to the Insurer in accordance with the terms

of this policy.

D. The Insurer shall reimburse the Company for

the Derivative Costs incurred by the Company in

response to a Derivative Demand first made during

the Policy Period (or Discovery Period, if applicable)

for any Wrongful Act of any Executive, and reported to

the Insurer in accordance with the terms of this policy.

This Insuring Agreement D. shall apply only if purchased by the Insured as indicated in Item 3 of the

Declarations and is subject to the Sublimit of Liability

set forth in Item 4 of the Declarations which is the

Insurer’s maximum limit of liability under this Insuring Agreement D. for all Derivative Costs arising from

all Derivative Demands. The Sublimit of Liability for

Derivative Costs shall be part of, and not in addition

to, the Limit of Liability applicable to this Coverage

Section. This Insuring Agreement D. shall not provide

coverage for any civil proceeding that is based upon or

arises from a Derivative Demand.

2. DEFINITIONS

(a) “Claim” means any:

(1) written demand for monetary, non-monetary

or injunctive relief made against an Insured;

(2) judicial,

administrative

or

regulatory

proceeding, whether civil or criminal, for monetary,

non-monetary or injunctive relief commenced

against an Insured, including any appeal therefrom,

which is commenced by:

(i) service of a complaint or similar pleading;

(ii) return of an indictment, information or

similar document (in the case of a criminal

proceeding); or

78a

(iii) receipt or filing of a notice of charges;

(3) arbitration proceeding commenced against an

Insured by service of a demand for arbitration;

(4) formal civil, criminal, administrative or

regulatory investigation of an Insured Person,

which is commenced by the filing or issuance of a

notice of charges, formal investigative order or

similar document identifying such Insured Person

as a person against whom a proceeding identified in

(2) or (3) above may be commenced;

(5) written request to toll or waive the applicable

statute of limitations relating to a potential Claim

against an Insured for a Wrongful Act; or

(6) Derivative Demand, solely under Insuring

Agreement D. if purchased by the Insured.

(b) “Derivative Costs” means the reasonable and

necessary fees, costs, charges, or expenses incurred by

the Company, its board of directors or any committee

of its board of directors, solely in response to a

Derivative Demand and do not include any settlements, judgments or damages, nor any compensation

or benefits of any Insured Persons, or any overhead

expenses of the Company. Derivative Costs shall be

reimbursed by the Insurer sixty (60) days after the

Company provides written notice to the Insurer of its

final decision not to bring a civil proceeding against an

Executive.

(c) “Derivative Demand” means a written demand

by one or more shareholders of the Company upon the

Company’s board of directors to bring a civil proceeding on behalf of the Company against any Executive

for a Wrongful Act.

79a

(d) “Employee” means:

(1) any person who was, now is, or shall become a

full-time, part-time, seasonal, or temporary employee

of the Company, other than an Executive, but only

while that person is acting in the capacity as such;

(2) any person leased to the Company so long as

this person is working solely for the Company and

only for conduct within his or her duties as such, but

only if the Company indemnifies such leased person

in the same manner as the Company’s employees;

and

(3) any volunteer whose labor and service is

engaged and directed by the Company, but only

while that person is acting in the capacity as such.

(e) “Executive” means any:

(1) past, present or future duly elected or

appointed director, officer, trustee, governor,

management committee Member or Member of the

board of managers;

(2) past, present or future person in a duly elected

or appointed position in an entity which is organized

and operated in a foreign jurisdiction that is

equivalent to an executive position listed in item (1)

above; or

(3) past, present or future general counsel and

risk manager (or equivalent position) of the

Company.

(f) “Insured” means the Company and any Insured

Person.

(g) “Insured Person(s)” means any:

(1) Executive;

80a

(2) Employee; or

(3) Outside Entity Insured Person.

(h) “Loss” means:

(1) damages, settlements or judgments;

(2) pre judgment or post judgment interest;

(3) costs or fees awarded in favor of the claimant;

(4) punitive, exemplary or the multiplied portion

of any multiple damages awards, but only to the

extent that such damages are insurable under the

applicable law most favorable to the insurability of

such damages;

(5) Derivative Costs, solely under Insuring

Agreement D. if purchased by the Insured; and

(6) Defense Costs.

“Loss” does not include:

(i) any amounts for which the Insureds are not

legally liable;

(ii) any amounts which are without legal

recourse to the Insureds;

(iii) taxes;

(iv) fines and penalties, except as provided for

in Definition (h) (4) above;

(v) matters which may be deemed uninsurable

under applicable law; or

(vi) any amounts paid or incurred in complying

with a judgment or settlement for non-monetary

or injunctive relief, but solely as respects the

Company.

81a

(i) “Outside Entity” means: (1) any not-for-profit

entity which is exempt from taxation under Section

501(c)(3), (4) or (10) of the IRS Code, as amended, or

any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder; or

(2) any other entity listed as such by endorsement to

this policy, for which an Executive acts as a director,

officer, trustee or governor (or the equivalent thereof)

at the written request of the Company. Any such

person shall be referred to herein as an “Outside

Entity Insured Person”, but only while that person is

acting in the capacity as a director, officer, trustee or

governor (or the equivalent thereof) of an Outside

Entity.

(j) “Securities Claim” means a Claim, other than an

administrative or regulatory proceeding against the

Company or an investigation of the Company, made

against any Insured:

(1) alleging a violation of any foreign, federal,

state or local regulation, rule or statute regulating

securities, including, but not limited to, the

purchase or sale, or offer or solicitation of an offer to

purchase or sell securities which is:

(i) brought by any person or entity alleging,

arising out of, based upon or attributable to the

purchase or sale, or offer or solicitation of an offer

to purchase or sell, any securities of the Company;

or

(ii) brought by a security holder of the

Company with respect to such security holder’s

interest in securities of such Company; or

(2) brought derivatively on behalf of the Company

by a security holder of such Company.

82a

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Securities Claim

shall include any formal administrative or regulatory proceeding against the Company, but only if

and only during the time that such proceeding also

constitutes a Securities Claim commenced and continuously maintained against an Insured Person.

The Insurer shall not assert that a Loss incurred

in a Securities Claim alleging violations of Section

11 or 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended,

constitutes uninsurable loss and, subject to all other

terms and conditions of this policy, shall deem that

portion of such Loss as constituting Loss under this

policy.

(k) “Subsidiary” means any privately-held for-profit

entity (except a partnership) of which the Parent

Company:

(1) has Management Control (“Controlled

Entity”) before the inception of the Policy Period,

either directly or indirectly through one or more

other Controlled Entities;

(2) first acquires Management Control during the

Policy Period, either directly or indirectly through

one or more other Controlled Entities, if such

entity’s annual revenue totals less than 25% of the

consolidated revenue of the Parent Company as of

its latest fiscal year; or

(3) first acquires Management Control during the

Policy Period, either directly or indirectly through

one or more other Controlled Entities, if such

entity’s annual revenue totals 25% or more of the

consolidated revenue of the Parent Company as of

its latest fiscal year, but only if the Parent Company

provides the Insurer with full particulars of the new

Subsidiary within ninety (90) days after its creation

83a

or acquisition and pays any additional premium

with respect to such entity within thirty (30) days

after being requested to do so by the Insurer;

provided, however, that Subsidiary as defined in

items (2) and (3) above shall not mean any entity

which is a financial institution, including but not

limited to a bank, insurance company, insurance

agent/broker, securities broker/dealer, investment

advisor, mutual fund or hedge fund, unless such entity

is included in the definition of Subsidiary by specific

written endorsement attached to this policy.

“Subsidiary” also means any not-for-profit entity

which is under the exclusive control of the Company.

With respect to a Claim made against any

Subsidiary or any Insured Person thereof, this policy

shall only apply to Wrongful Acts committed or

allegedly committed after the effective time such

entity becomes a Subsidiary and prior to the effective

time that such entity ceases to be a Subsidiary.

(l) “Wrongful Act(s)” means:

(1) with respect to an Insured Person, any actual

or alleged act, error, omission, neglect, breach of

duty, breach of trust, misstatement, or misleading

statement by an Insured Person in his or her capacity as such or any matter claimed against an Insured

Person by reason of such capacity;

(2) with respect to an Outside Entity Insured

Person, any actual or alleged act, error, omission,

neglect, breach of duty, breach of trust, misstatement, or misleading statement by a person in his or

her capacity as an Outside Entity Insured Person or

any matter claimed against such Outside Entity

Insured Person by reason of such capacity; or

84a

(3) with respect to the Company, any actual or

alleged breach of duty, neglect, error, misstatement,

misleading statement, omission or act by the

Company.

3. EXCLUSIONS

This policy shall not cover any Loss in connection

with any Claim:

(a) arising out of, based upon or attributable to the

gaining of any profit or advantage or improper or

illegal remuneration if a final judgment or adjudication establishes that such Insured was not legally

entitled to such profit or advantage or that such

remuneration was improper or illegal;

(b) arising out of, based upon or attributable to any

deliberate fraudulent act or any willful violation of law

by an Insured if a final judgment or adjudication

establishes that such act or violation occurred;

(c) arising out of, based upon or attributable to the

purchase or sale by an Insured of securities of the

Company within the meaning of Section 16(b) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and any amendments

thereto or similar provisions of any state statutory law

if a final judgment or adjudication establishes that a

violation of Section 16(b) occurred;

In determining the applicability of Exclusions (a),

(b) and (c), the facts pertaining to, the knowledge

possessed by, or any Wrongful Act committed by, any

Insured shall not be imputed to any other Insured;

however, the facts pertaining to, the knowledge

possessed by, or any Wrongful Act committed by, an

Insured Person who is a past or current chairman of

the board, chief executive officer, president or chief

85a

financial officer of the Company shall be imputed to

the Company.

(d) alleging, arising out of, based upon or

attributable to any facts or circumstances of which an

Insured Person had actual knowledge or information

of, as of the Pending or Prior Date set forth in Item 6

of the Declarations as respects this Coverage Section,

and that he or she reasonably believed may give rise

to a Claim under this policy;

(e) based upon, arising from, or in consequence of

any actual or alleged liability of any Insured under any

express contract or agreement, except to the extent

that such Insured would have been liable in the absence

of such contract or agreement; provided, however, that

this exclusion shall apply only to any Claim under

Insuring Agreement C.;

(f) alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to, as of the Pending or Prior Date set forth

in Item 6 of the Declarations as respects this

Coverage Section, any pending or prior: (1) litigation;

or (2) administrative or regulatory proceeding or

investigation of which an Insured had notice, including any Claim alleging or derived from the same or

essentially the same facts, or the same or related

Wrongful Act(s), as alleged in such pending or prior

litigation or administrative or regulatory proceeding

or investigation;

(g) alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to the same or essentially the same facts alleged,

or to the same or related Wrongful Act(s) alleged or

contained in any Claim which has been reported, or in

any circumstances of which notice has been given,

before the inception date of this policy as set forth in

Item 2 of the Declarations, under any policy, whether

86a

excess or underlying, of which this policy is a renewal

or replacement or which it may succeed in time;

(h) alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to any actual or alleged act or omission of any

Insured Person serving in any capacity other than as

an Executive or an Employee or an Outside Entity

Insured Person:

(i) brought by or on behalf of any Insured, other

than an Employee; provided, however, that this

exclusion shall not apply to:

(i) any Claim brought by an Insured Person that

is in the form of a cross-claim or third-party claim

for contribution or indemnity which is part of, and

results directly from, a Claim which is not otherwise

excluded under the terms of this Coverage Section;

(ii) a shareholder derivative action, but only if

such action is brought and maintained without the

solicitation, approval, assistance, active participation or intervention of any Insured;

(iii) any Claim brought by any Executive who

has not served in such capacity, nor has acted as

a consultant to the Company, for at least three (3)

years prior to the Claim being first made;

(iv) any Claim brought against an Insured Person

arising out of or based upon any protected activity

specified in any “whistleblower” protection pursuant

to any foreign, federal, state or local law;

(v) any Claim brought by any Executive of a

Company formed and operating in a foreign jurisdiction against such Company and any Insured Person

thereof, provided that such Claim is brought and

maintained outside the United States, Canada or

87a

any other common law country (including any

territories thereof); or

(vi) any Claim brought or maintained by or on

behalf of a bankruptcy or insolvency trustee, examiner,

receiver or similar official for the Company or any

assignee of such trustee, examiner, receiver or

similar official.

(j) alleging, arising out of, based upon, attributable

to, directly or indirectly resulting from, or in consequence of, or in any way involving, Pollution; provided,

however, that this exclusion shall not apply to any

Claim under Insuring Agreement A. or any Securities

Claim, except for Loss constituting Cleanup Costs;

(k) alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to any actual or alleged violation of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, the Fair

Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations

Act, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification

Act, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, any rules

or regulations of the foregoing promulgated thereunder, and any amendments thereto, or any similar

foreign, federal, state or statutory law or common law;

(l) alleging, arising out of, based upon, attributable

to, or in any way involving, directly or indirectly any

public offering of securities by the Company or an

Outside Entity, or alleging a purchase or sale of such

securities subsequent to such public offering; provided, however, that this exclusion shall not apply to:

(i) any purchase or sale of securities exempted

pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of

1933. Coverage for such purchase or sale transaction shall be conditioned solely upon the Company

giving the Insurer written notice of any such public

88a

offering, including all details thereof, as soon as

practicable, but not later than thirty days after the

effective date of such offering; or

(ii) any public offering of securities, other than an

offering described in paragraph (i) above, as well as

any purchase or sale of securities subsequent to

such public offering. Coverage for such transaction

shall be conditioned upon, within thirty days prior

to the effective time of such public offering, the

Company: (a) giving the Insurer written notice of

such offering, including all details thereof, and any

underwriting information required by the Insurer;

and (b) accepting such terms, conditions and additional premium required by the Insurer for such

coverage. Coverage provided pursuant to this

paragraph is also subject to the Company paying

such additional premium when due. The Insurer

shall provide the Company with a quote for such

coverage if the Company gives written notice of the

offering as required in this paragraph.

(m) for any Wrongful Act arising out of any Insured

Person serving as a director, officer, trustee or

governor of an Outside Entity if such Claim is brought

by the Outside Entity or by any director, officer,

trustee or governor thereof; or which is brought by

any securities holder of the Outside Entity, whether

directly or derivatively, unless such securities holder’s

Claim is instigated and continued totally independent

of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance

of, or active participation of, or intervention of, the

Outside Entity, any director, officer, trustee or governor thereof, an Executive or the Company; provided,

however, that this exclusion shall not apply to:

(i) any Claim brought by any director, officer,

trustee or governor of an Outside Entity in the form

89a

of a cross-claim or third-party claim for contribution

or indemnity which is part of, and results directly

from, a Claim which is not otherwise excluded under

the terms of this Coverage Section;

(ii) any Claim brought or maintained by or on

behalf of a bankruptcy or insolvency trustee,

examiner, receiver or similar official for the Outside

Entity or any assignee of such trustee, examiner,

receiver or similar official;

(iii) any Claim brought by any director, officer,

trustee or governor of an Outside Entity who has not

served in such capacity, nor acted as a consultant to

the Outside Entity, for at least three (3) years prior

to such Claim being first made; or

(iv) any Claim brought by any director, officer,

trustee or governor of an Outside Entity, formed

and operating in a foreign jurisdiction against any

Outside Entity Insured Person of such Outside

Entity, provided that such Claim is brought and

maintained outside the United States, Canada or

any other common law country (including any

territories thereof);

(n) for bodily injury, sickness, mental anguish,

emotional distress, libel, slander, oral or written

publication of defamatory or disparaging material,

violation of any right of privacy, disease or death of

any person, or damage to or destruction of any tangible

property, including the loss of use thereof; provided,

however, that this exclusion shall not apply to any

Securities Claim;

(o) alleging, arising out of, based upon, or attributable to any actual or alleged: (i) violation of the

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, any rules or

regulations of the foregoing promulgated thereunder,

90a

and any amendments thereto, or any similar foreign,

federal, state or statutory law or common law; (ii)

payments, commissions, gratuities, benefits or other

favors for the direct or indirect benefit of any officials,

directors, agents, partners, representatives, principal

shareholders, or owners of the Company or employees

of any customers of the Company; or (iii) political

contributions;

(p) alleging, arising out of, based upon, or attributable to any actual or alleged discrimination, harassment, retaliation, wrongful discharge, termination or

any other employment-related or employment practice

claim, including but not limited to any wage-hour

claim or any third-party discrimination or harassment

claim; provided, however, that this exclusion shall not

apply to any Securities Claim;

(q) alleging, arising out of, based upon, or attributable to the ownership, management, maintenance,

operation and/or control by the Company of any

captive insurance company or entity, including but not

limited to any Claim alleging the insolvency or bankruptcy of the Company as a result of such ownership,

management, maintenance, operation and/or control;

(r) alleging, arising out of, based upon, or attributable to based upon, arising from, or in consequence of

any actual or alleged plagiarism, infringement or violation of any copyright, patent, trademark or service

mark or the misappropriation of intellectual property,

ideas or trade secrets; provided, however, that this

exclusion shall apply only to any Claim under Insuring

Agreement C.;

(s) alleging, arising out of, based upon or attributable to the rendering or failure to render any

professional service to a customer or client of the

91a

Insured; provided, however, that this exclusion shall

not apply to any Securities Claim, but only if such

Securities Claim is instigated and continued totally

independent of, and totally without the solicitation of,

or assistance of, or active participation of, or

intervention of, the Company or any Insured Person.

4. ORDER OF PAYMENTS

In the event of Loss arising from a covered Claim for

which payment is due under the provisions of this

Coverage Section, the Insurer shall in all events:

(1) first, pay Loss for which coverage is provided

under this Coverage Section for any Insured Person

under Insuring Agreement A.;

(2) second, only after payment of Loss has been

made pursuant to item (1) above, with respect to

whatever remaining amount of any Limit of Liability

applicable to this Coverage Section is available, pay

the Loss for which coverage is provided under this

Coverage Section for the Company under Insuring

Agreement B.; and

(3) third, only after payment of Loss has been made

pursuant to items (1) and (2) above, with respect to

whatever remaining amount of any Limit of Liability

applicable to this Coverage Section is available, pay

the Loss for which coverage is provided under this

Coverage Section for the Company under Insuring

Agreement C. and D.

5. NON-RESCINDABLE CLAUSE

The Insurer irrevocably waives any right it may

have to rescind coverage available under Insuring

Agreement A. of this Coverage Section, in whole or in

part, on any grounds.

92a

REDACTED

93a

Endorsement No.: 1

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

CALIFORNIA AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement modifies insurance coverage

provided under the RESOLUTE PORTFOLIO FOR

PRIVATE COMPANIES INSURANCE POLICY.

COVERAGE PART: GENERAL TERMS AND

CONDITIONS SECTION

It is understood and agreed:

A. The second paragraph of Clause 12. CANCELLATION AND NON RENEWAL CLAUSE is amended

by the addition of the following:

Notice of cancellation shall also be sent to the

producer of record, if applicable, provided that the

producer of record is not an employee of the Insurer.

B. The last paragraph of Clause 12. CANCELLATION AND NON RENEWAL CLAUSE is deleted and

replaced by the following:

The Insurer shall have no obligation to renew this

policy or any applicable Coverage Section. In the event

the Insurer decides to non-renew this policy or any

applicable Coverage Section, or to condition renewal

upon a reduction of the Policy’s Limit of liability, an

elimination of coverage or an increase of more than

twenty-five percent (25%) of the current policy’s premium, the Insurer shall deliver or mail to the Parent

Company, as identified in Item 1 of the Declarations,

94a

written notice of such decision at least sixty (60) days,

but not more than one hundred twenty (120) days,

prior to the expiration of the Policy Period. The notice

shall state the reason for non-renewal.

C. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the

definition of Loss in any liability Coverage Section

purchased by the Insured, punitive damages are not

insurable in California.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10107 PV (02-09)

95a

Endorsement No.: 2

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

OFAC EXCLUSION

(all Coverage Sections)

It is understood and agreed that Clause 3,

EXCLUSIONS, of all applicable Coverage Sections is

amended by adding the following exclusion:

This policy shall not cover any Loss in connection

with any Claim in the event that such coverage would

not be in compliance with any United States of America

economic or trade sanctions, laws or regulations, including but not limited to the U.S. Treasury Department’s

Office of Foreign Assets Control, or any similar

foreign, federal, state or statutory law or common law.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10005 PPVNP (07/08)

96a

Endorsement No.: 3

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item I of the Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

100% ALLOCATION DEFENSE COSTS

I. It is understood and agreed that Clause 7.

ALLOCATION of the General Terms & Conditions

Section is deleted and replaced by the following:

7. ALLOCATION

(a) If both Loss covered under this policy and

loss not covered under this policy are incurred by

the Insureds on account of any Claim because

such Claim against the Insureds includes both

covered and non-covered matters and/or parties,

then coverage under this Coverage Section with

respect to such Claim shall apply as follows:

(i) Defense Costs: One hundred percent (100%)

of reasonable and necessary Defense Costs

incurred by the Insured on account of such

Claim will be considered covered Loss; and

(ii) Loss other than Defense Costs: All

remaining loss incurred by the Insured on

account of such Claim shall be allocated by the

Insurer between covered Loss and non-covered

loss based on the relative legal and financial

exposures of the parties to such matters and, in

the event of a settlement in such Claim, also

based on the relative benefits to the Insureds

from such settlement.

97a

(b) If an allocation of Loss cannot be agreed to

by the Insurer and the Insured:

(i) the Insurer shall pay those amounts which

it believes to be fair and equitable until an

amount shall be agreed upon or determined

pursuant to the provisions of this policy; and

(ii) there will be no presumption of allocation

of Loss in any arbitration, suit or other

proceeding.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10837 PPVNP (4/10)

98a

Endorsement No.: 4

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item I of the Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

FULL NUCLEAR EXCLUSION

(D&O Coverage Section)

It is understood and agreed that Clause 3,

EXCLUSIONS, of the Directors & Officers Liability

Coverage Section is amended by adding the following

exclusion:

This policy shall not cover any Loss in connection

with any Claim alleging, arising out of, based upon

or attributable to nuclear fission, nuclear fusion,

radioactive contamination or the hazardous properties of any nuclear materials.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10175 PPV (07/08)

99a

Endorsement No.: 5

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

AMEND I V I FINANCIAL IMPAIRMENT

(Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section)

It is understood and agreed that Clause 3.

EXCLUSIONS (i) of the Directors & Officers Liability

Coverage Section of the policy is amended by adding

the following:

(vii) Any Claim brought against an Insured Person

by the Company while the Parent Company is in

Financial Impairment; or

(viii) Any Claim brought against an Insured Person

by an Outside Entity while such Insured Person is

serving in his capacity as such for an Outside Entity

while such Outside Entity is in Financial Impairment.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL Manuscript PV (1/13)

100a

Endorsement No.: 6

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

EMPLOYED LAWYERS COVERAGE EXTENSION

(D&O Coverage Section)

It is understood and agreed that the Directors &

Officers Liability Coverage Section is amended by

adding the following:

1. This policy shall include coverage for Employed

Lawyers but solely with respect to Wrongful Acts (as

defined below) by an Employed Lawyer acting in the

capacity as such and subject to the terms and conditions of this endorsement.

2. The coverage provided by this endorsement is

specifically excess of any other valid and collectible

lawyers professional liability insurance, legal malpractice or errors and omissions insurance and shall

drop down and provide primary insurance only in the

event of the exhaustion of such other insurance due to

the payment of losses thereunder.

3. In determining whether the Retention amount

for the Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section

as stated in Item 5 of the Declarations applies to a

Claim under this endorsement, it is presumed that the

Company shall indemnify the Employed Lawyer to the

fullest extent permitted by statutory or common law

or the charter, by-laws, operating agreement or

similar document of the Company.

101a

4. The Definition of “Insured Person(s)” is amended

to include any Employed Lawyer.

5. Solely with respect to the coverage provided by

this endorsement, this policy shall not cover any Loss

in connection with any Claim made against an

Employed Lawyer:

(a) alleging, arising out of, based upon or

attributable to any Wrongful Act which occurred at a

time when the Employed Lawyer was not employed as

a lawyer by the Company;

(b) alleging, arising out of, based upon or

attributable to any Wrongful Act if, as of the Pending

or Prior Date set forth below, an Employed Lawyer

knew or could have reasonably foreseen that such

Wrongful Act could lead to a Claim; or

(c) alleging, arising out of, based upon or

attributable to any activities or conduct of the

Employed Lawyer as an officer, director or governor of

any entity other than the Company.

6. Solely with respect to this endorsement, the

following defined terms apply:

“Employed Lawyer” means any employee of the

Company who is admitted to practice law and who is

employed, or was employed, at the time of the alleged

Wrongful Act as a full-time lawyer for, and salaried by,

the Company.

“Pending or Prior Date” means, for each Employed

Lawyer, the later of October 01, 2005 or the first date

that such person became an Employed Lawyer.

“Wrongful Act” means any act, error, or omission by

an Employed Lawyer in the rendering or failure to

render professional legal services for the Company,

but solely in his or her capacity as such. “Wrongful

102a

Act” shall not mean any act, error, or omission in

connection with such activities by such Employed

Lawyer: (i) which are not related to such Employed

Lawyer's employment with the Company; (ii) which

are not rendered on behalf of the Company at the

Company’s written request; or (iii) which are performed by the Employed Lawyer for others for a fee.

7. The Sublimit of Liability for the coverage

provided by this endorsement shall be $1,000,000.

This Sublimit of Liability shall be part of, and not in

addition to, the Limit of Liability applicable to the

Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section as set

forth in Item 4 of the Declarations.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10172 PPV (07/08)

103a

Endorsement No.: 7

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

AMEND NON-RESCINDABLE CLAUSE &

REPRESENTATIONS AND SEVERABILITY

CLAUSE – INSURING AGREEMENTS A. AND B.

ARE NON-RESCINDABLE

It is understood and agreed that Clause 5, NONRESCINDABLE CLAUSE, of the Directors & Officers

Liability Coverage Section is deleted in its entirety

and replaced by the following:

5. NON-RESCINDABLE CLAUSE

The Insurer irrevocably waives any right it may

have to rescind coverage available under Insuring

Agreements A. and B. of this Coverage Section, in

whole or in part, on any grounds.

It is further understood and agreed that solely with

respect to the Directors & Officers Liability Coverage

Section, Clause 10, REPRESENTATIONS AND

SEVERABILITY, of the General Terms & Conditions

Section is deleted in its entirety and replaced by the

following:

10. REPRESENTATIONS AND SEVERABILITY

It is agreed that the Insurer has relied upon the

information contained in the Application in issuing

this policy. In regard to the statements, warranties,

representations and information contained in the

Application, no knowledge of any Insured shall be

104a

imputed to any other Insured for the purpose of

determining whether coverage is available under

this policy for any Claim made against such Insured.

However, in the event the statements, warranties,

representations or information is not accurately and

completely disclosed in the Application, no coverage

shall be afforded for any Claim alleging, arising out

of based upon, attributable to or in consequence of

any incomplete or inaccurate statements, warranties or representations under:

(i) Insuring Agreement A., with respect to any

Insured Person who knew of such inaccurate or

incomplete

statements,

warranties,

representations or information; and

(ii) Insuring Agreement B., with respect to any

Company to the extent it indemnifies any Insured

Person referenced in (i) above; whether or not

such person knew that such facts were not

accurately and completely disclosed in the

Application.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10820 PV (04/10)

105a

Endorsement No.: 8

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

Amend Claim — Extradition Proceeding

(D& O Coverage Section and GTC Section)

1. It is understood and agreed that the Directors &

Officers Liability Coverage Section of the policy is

amended as follows:

A. Section 2. DEFINITIONS (a) Claim is amended,

where permitted by law, by adding the following:

Claim shall also mean any official request for

Extradition of any Insured Person or the execution

of a warrant for the arrest of an Insured Person

where such execution is an element of Extradition.

B. For purposes of the coverage provided under

this endorsement only, Section 2. DEFINITIONS is

amended by adding the following:

“Extradition” means any formal process to determine if an Insured Person located in any country is

surrendered to any other country to stand trial for

any criminal offense arising from any Wrongful Act

the Insured Person is alleged to have committed.

2. It is further understood and agreed that the

General Terms and Conditions Coverage Section of the

policy is amended as follows:

106a

A. Section 2. DEFINITIONS (d) “Defense Costs”

is amended by adding the following:

Defense Costs shall also mean reasonable and

necessary fees, costs and expenses incurred through

legal counsel and consented to by the Insurer in

connection with an Extradition or similar proceeding brought against an Insured in connection with a

Claim, including but not limited to fees, costs and

expenses for:

(a) opposing, challenging, resisting or defending against any request for or any effort to obtain

the Extradition of that Insured Person; or

(b) appealing any order or other grant of

Extradition of that Insured Person.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

, /s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10838 PPV (5-10)

107a

Endorsement No.: 9

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

AMEND DEFINITION OF “OUTSIDE ENTITY” —

INCLUDES ANY NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENTITY

(Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section)

It is understood and agreed that Definition (i)

“Outside Entity”, in Clause 2. DEFINITIONS of the

Directors & Officers Liability Coverage Section is

deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

(i) “Outside Entity” means: (1) any not-for-profit

entity; or (2) any other entity listed as such by

endorsement to this policy, for which an Executive

acts as a director, officer, trustee or governor (or the

equivalent thereof) at the written request of the

Company. Any such person shall be referred to

herein as an “Outside Entity Insured Person”, but

only while that person is acting in the capacity as a

director, officer, trustee or governor (or the

equivalent thereof) of an Outside Entity.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10862 PV (4-10)

108a

REDACTED

109a

Endorsement No.: 12

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

AMEND DEFINITION OF “SUBSIDIARY” –

CHANGE REVENUE THRESHOLD

(D&O Coverage Section)

It is understood and agreed that Definition (k),

“Subsidiary” of the Directors & Officers Liability

Coverage Section is amended by changing the

automatic subsidiary threshold in items (2) and (3) of

such Definition from 25% to 35%.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10088 PV (07/08)

110a

REDACTED

111a

Endorsement No.: 14

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

AMEND DEFINITION OF “COMPANY” TO

INCLUDE SPECIFIED ENTITIES WITH PENDING

OR PRIOR LITIGATION DATES

(General Terms & Conditions Section)

It is understood and agreed that General Definition

(c), “Company”, of the General Terms & Conditions

Section is amended to include any entity listed below;

however, such entity is a Company only with respect

to the entity’s corresponding Coverage Section(s) and

the entity’s corresponding Pending or Prior Date listed

below. The Pending or Prior Date(s) listed below apply

solely to Exclusion (d) of the Directors & Officers

Liability Coverage Section, Exclusion (c) of the

Employment Practices Liability Coverage Section and

Exclusion (e) of the Fiduciary Liability Coverage

Section.

ENTITY

COVERAGE

SECTION

PENDING OR

PRIOR DATE

Adir Services Corp. Directors & Officers October 01, 2014

Hold Co.

Liability

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10676 PPV (02/10)

112a

Endorsement No.: 15

This endorsement, effective: October 01, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address of the

Named Insured as shown in Item 1 of the

Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: ADIR International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

AMEND DEFINITION OF COMPANY

(General Terms & Conditions)

It is understood and agreed that Definition (c),

“Company”, of the General Terms & Conditions

Section is amended to include the following:

It is further understood and agreed that this

endorsement shall apply solely to the following

Coverage Section(s):

- Curacao Ltd

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10187 PPV (07/08)

113a

Endorsement No.: 16

This endorsement, effective: October 1, 2017

(at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time at the address stated in

Item 1 of the Declarations)

Forms a part of Policy No.: 1000620507171

Issued to: Adir International, LLC dba La Curacao

By: Starr Indemnity & Liability Company

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES EXCLUSION

(D&O Coverage Section)

It is understood and agreed that Clause 3,

EXCLUSIONS, of the Directors & Officers Liability

Coverage Section is amended by adding the following

exclusion:

This policy shall not cover any Loss in connection

with any Claim alleging, arising out of, based upon or

attributable to the rendering or failure to render any

professional service to a customer or client of the

Insured.

ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS REMAIN

UNCHANGED.

/s/ [Illegible]

Authorized Representative

CVS FL 10735 PPV (3/10)

114a

POLICYHOLDER DISCLOSURE NOTICE OF

TERRORISM INSURANCE COVERAGE

Coverage for acts of terrorism is included in your

policy. You are hereby notified that under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, as amended in 2015, the

definition of act of terrorism has changed. As defined

in Section 102(1) of the Act: The term “act of terrorism”

means any act or acts that are certified by the

Secretary of the Treasury—in consultation with the

Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney

General of the United States—to be an act of terrorism; to be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to

human life, property, or infrastructure; to have resulted

in damage within the United States, or outside the

United States in the case of certain air carriers or

vessels or the premises of a United States mission;

and to have been committed by an individual or

individuals as part of an effort to coerce the civilian

population of the United States or to influence the

policy or affect the conduct of the United States

Government by coercion. Under your coverage, any

losses resulting from certified acts of terrorism may be

partially reimbursed by the United States Government under a formula established by the Terrorism

Risk Insurance Act, as amended. However, your policy

may contain other exclusions which might affect

your coverage, such as an exclusion for nuclear events.

Under the formula, the United States Government

generally reimburses 85% through 2015; 84% beginning on January 1, 2016; 83% beginning on January 1,

2017; 82% beginning on January 1, 2018; 81% beginning on January 1, 2019 and 80% beginning on

January 1, 2020, of covered terrorism losses exceeding

the statutorily established deductible paid by the insurance company providing the coverage. The Terrorism

Risk Insurance Act, as amended, contains a $100

115a

billion cap that limits U.S. Government reimbursement as well as insurers’ liability for losses resulting

from certified acts of terrorism when the amount of

such losses exceeds $100 billion in any one calendar

year. If the aggregate insured losses for all insurers

exceed $100 billion, your coverage may be reduced.

The portion of your annual premium that is attributable to coverage for acts of terrorism is $0, and does

not include any charges for the portion of losses covered by the United States government under the Act.

© Includes copyrighted material of the National

Association of Insurance Commissioners

CVS FL 11440 (1/17)

116a

APPENDIX G

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

————

Case No. BC680425

————

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ADIR INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a Delaware limited

liability company, also doing business as

CURACAO and LA CURACAO; LA CURACAO, a

California corporation; RON AZARKMAN,

an individual; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

————

COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION,

CIVIL PENALTIES, RESTITUTION, AND OTHER

EQUITABLE RELIEF

(BUS. & PROF. CODE, §§ 17200 et seq., 17500 et seq.)

[VERIFIED ANSWER REQUIRED PURSUANT

TO CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

SECTION 446]

————

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

NICKLAS A. AKERS

Senior Assistant Attorney General

MICHELE VAN GELDEREN

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA K. HANCOCK (SBN 240566)

SHANAIRA U. BANERJEE (SBN 236187)

MICHIYO MICHELLE BURKART (SBN 234121)

117a

MARISOL LEON (SBN 298707)

TIMOTHY D. LUNDGREN (SBN 254596)

Deputy Attorneys General

300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

Telephone: (213) 269-6342

Fax: (213) 897-4951

E-mail: Alicia.Hancock@doj.ca.gov

Attorneys for Plaintiff, the People of the

State of California

[EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES PURSUANT TO

GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 6103]

Plaintiff, the People of the State of California

(“Plaintiff’ or the “People”), by and through Xavier

Becerra, Attorney General of the State of California,

alleges the following on information and belief:

INTRODUCTION

1. For years, Defendant Adir International, LLC,

dba Curacao, a retail store chain, and its co-founder

Ron Azarkman, have preyed upon Curacao’s Latino

customer base. While Curacao touts its commitment

to the Latino community, the company actually takes

advantage of its customers, many of whom are lowincome, monolingual Spanish-speaking immigrants

who lack access to traditional credit to purchase basic

big-ticket household necessities from other retailers.

Curacao victimizes consumers through a variety of

unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices,

including the following: misleading advertising; unwanted contract add-ons; illegal sale of warranties;

failure to honor warranties; failure to clearly post

return policies; refusal to honor returns; illegal debt

collection practices; and violating consumers’ rights

when suing them in small claims actions.

118a

2. Curacao’s unlawful business practices are pervasive. They begin even before a consumer walks into a

store—through misleading advertisements—and may

not end until months or years after the consumer’s

original purchase—often in a small-claims judgment

obtained by violating court rules. Targeting Latino

immigrants who lack credit, Curacao lures consumers

into its stores by advertising easy credit and low prices

on merchandise ranging from electronics to furniture

to appliances. Once in the store, however, consumers

discover that they can only purchase merchandise at

the advertised price if they agree to buy “add-ons” such

as warranties, installation services, and/or accessories. In some instances, Curacao adds these items

without consumers’ knowledge or consent, or tells

consumers that items are free when, in fact, consumers are charged for them. Curacao conceals these

contract add-ons by having consumers sign credit or

retail installment contracts electronically without first

showing them an itemized receipt, or by giving monolingual Spanish-speaking consumers English-language

contracts, which they cannot read or understand.

When consumers try to return items that were added

without their consent, they are often told that

Curacao’s return policy—which was not disclosed to

consumers—prevents Curacao from accepting the

return. When consumers try to use their warranties

(many of which are Curacao-backed warranties sold

illegally and without the proper financial backing),

Curacao often denies them service or forces them to

wait months to have their merchandise repaired or

replaced. All the while, Curacao expects consumers to

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.