Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Chestnut, Petitioner v. Charles Canady, et al.

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No. 21-

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“FILED

SEP 2 7 2021

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Supreme Court of tfje Hmtrtr i»tate£

CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT,

Petitioner,

v.

JUSTICE CHARLES CANADY, ET AL.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Christopher M. Chestnut

Petitioner Pro Se

18 NW 8th Avenue

Gainesville, FL 32601

(352)256-6151

CHRISTOPHERCHESTNUT@GMAIL.COM

September 27,2021

SUPREME COURT PRESS

♦

(888) 958-5705

♦

Boston, Massachusetts

/

RECEIVED

SEP 2 9 2021

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court may abstain from

exercising its jurisdiction to enjoin an ongoing state

bar disciplinary proceeding, pursuant to the Younger

Abstention Doctrine, where the plaintiff, a member

of a protected class, invoked the original jurisdiction

of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

2. Whether the plaintiff, a member of a protected

class, invoking the original jurisdiction of the district

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, must also allege

an exception under the Younger Abstention Doctrine

to prevent the district court from abstaining from the

exercise of its jurisdiction to intervene in an ongoing

state bar disciplinary proceeding.

3. Whether Congress’s power to enact 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343 establishing the district court’s original jurisdic­

tion to enjoin ongoing state bar disciplinary proceedings

on due process and equal protection grounds, as an

exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283 the Federal Anti-Injunc­

tion Statute, is preempted by the judicially created

Younger Abstention Doctrine.

11

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner

•

Petitioner Christopher Chestnut was the

plaintiff in the district court proceedings and

appellant in the court of appeals proceedings.

Respondents

•

Justice Charles Canady

•

Justice Ricky Polston

•

Justice Joe Labarga

•

Justice C. Alan Lawson

•

Justice Carlos Muniz

•

Hon. Robert Luck

•

Hon. Barbara Lagoa, and

•

John A. Tomasino (Clerk of the Supreme

Court of Florida)

In late 2019 the Hon. Barbara Lagoa and the

Hon. Robert Luck were respectively elevated

from justices on the Florida Supreme Court and

commissioned as judges to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; not­

withstanding, both judges were state actors and

signors to the state court orders causing the

unconstitutional taking and due process viola­

tions complained of by Plaintiff in the district

court complaint.

Ill

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

Christopher Chestnut v. Charles Canady et. al.,

No. 20-12000, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit. Final Opinon date April 28, 2021. Judgment

entered May 27, 2021.

Christopher Chestnut v. Charles Canady et. al.,

No.: 4:19-cv-271-RH-MJF, United States District

Court for the Northern District of Florida, Talla• hassee, Division. Judgement entered April 14, 2020.

The Florida Bar v. Christopher Chestnut, No.:

SC16-797, SC16-1480, SC17-307, The Supreme Court of

Florida. Judgement/Order to Disbar entered May 3,

2019.

The Florida Bar v. Christopher Chestnut, No.:

SC18-1614, The Supreme Court of Florida. Judgment/

Order to Permanently Disbar entered August 22, 2019.

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED....................................

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS......................

u

LIST OF PROCEEDINGS.......................................

in

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................... Vll

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.........

l

OPINIONS BELOW................................................

l

JURISDICTION........................................................

l

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED...............................

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................

4

A. Legal Background.........................................

6

B. Factual Background...................................... 10

C. Procedural History........................................ 12

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT............. 14

I.

The Court Should Settle Whether a

District Court May Abstain Under

Younger Where a Protected Class

Member Files a § 1983 Claim Invoking

§ 1343 Original Jurisdiction..................... 15

II. The Misapplication of Younger to

Supersede a Federal Statute Will Result

in Excessive Legal Error on § 1983

Federal Court Jurisdictional Rulings

and Incite a Split Amongst the Circuits ..17

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

III. This Case Is the Perfect Vehicle for

the Court to Resume Where It Left Off

in Mitchum, by Declaring the Proper

Application of § 1343 and the Effect of

Exception to the Anti Injunction Act to

Abstention by Younger............................... 20

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 22

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions and Orders

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit (April 28, 2021)............... la

Judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

(May 27, 2021)........................................................ 9a

Order of Dismissal Northern District of Florida

Tallahassee Division (April 14, 2020).............. 10a

Judgment of the District Court for the

Northern District of Florida Tallahassee

Division (April 15, 2020)..................................... 14a

Other Documents

Second Amended Complaint for Prospective

Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Against

State Officials in Their Official Capacities

(December 31, 2019)...................... :..................... 15a

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Botany Mills v. Unties States,

278 U.S. 282 (1929)...................... :.............

9

Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org.,

441 U.S. 600 (1979)......................................

7,8

Chicot Cty. v. Sherwood,

148 U.S. 529 (1893)......................................

10

District of Columbia v. Carter,

409 U.S. 418(1973)......................................

16

Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. 339 (1880)......................................

7,8

Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects &

Surveyors v. Flores De Otero,

426 U.S. 572 (1976)......................................

8, 16

Jett v. Dallas Indep. Scho. Dist.,

491 U.S. 701 (1989)......................................

9

Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works,

261 U.S. 387 (1923)....................... f..............

19

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,

405 U.S. 538 (1972)...................................... 5, 7, 16

Maine v. Thiboutot,

448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980)............

16

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden

State BarAss’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)........

12

Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225 (1972)................................ passim

Monroe v. Pape,

365 U.S. 167 (1961)................................

16

Vlll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

New Orleans Pb. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New

Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989)....................

9

State ex. Pel. v. Bd. Of Control,

83 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1955)...............................

11

Sweat v. Painter,

338 U.S. 865 (1949).....................................

11

Trainor v. Hernandez,

431 U.S. 434, 97 S. Ct. 1911,

52 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1977)..............................

21

TVA v. Hill,

437 U.S. 153 (1978).....................................

17

Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971)....................................... passim

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Fla. Const., Art. 5, § 15..........................

3

U.S. Const, amend. V.............................

2

U.S. Const, amend. XIV.........................

passim

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 13...........................

2

IX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

STATUTES

28U.S.C. § 1254.............................................

1

28 U.S.C. § 1331........................................... 5, 13, 17, 21

28 U.S.C. § 1343............................................. .......passim

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)................................... ...3, 6, 8, 10

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4)...........................:...... ;.. 3, 7, 8, 10

28 U.S.C. §2283.............................................

passim

42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil Rights Act of 1871

passim

OTHER AUTHORITIES

F. Frankfurter & J. Landis,

The Business of the Supreme Court

(1928).......................................................

7

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Christopher Chestnut, respectfully

petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgement

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit in case number: 20-12000.

♦

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision by the court of appeals is not

published but is attached hereto. (App.la) The decision

of the district court of appeals is not published but is

attached hereto. (App.lOa)

♦

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the court of appeals was entered

on April 28, 2021. (App.la). This petition is timely

filed within 150 days of this opinion, with the allow­

ance for filing on the next business day if the deadline

falls on a weekend. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on

28U.S.C. § 1254.

2

♦

CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A.

United States Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 13

All courts shall be open, and every person for an

injury done him, in his lands, goods, persons, or

reputation, shall have remedy by due course of

law.

U.S. Const, amend. V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present­

ment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in

cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in

the Militia, when in actual service in time of

War or public danger; nor shall any person be

subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself,

nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law; nor shall private property be

taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law;

3

nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

B.

State Constitutional Provisions

Florida Constitution, Article 5, Section 15

The Supreme Court of Florida shall have exclusive

jurisdiction to regulate the admission of person

to the practice of law and the discipline of

persons admitted.

C.

Statutory Provisions

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)3 & 4

The district court shall have original jurisdiction

of any civil action authorized by law to be

commenced by any person: (3) To redress the

deprivation, under color of any State law, statue,

ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any

right, privilege or immunity secured by the

Constitution of the United States or by any Act

of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens

or of all persons with the jurisdiction of the

United States; (4) To recover damages or to

secure equitable or other relief under any Act of

Congress providing for the protection of civil

rights, including the right to vote.

28 U.S.C. § 2283

A court of the United State may not grant an

injunction or stay proceedings in a State court

except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,

or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to

protect or effectuate its judgments.

4

42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871

Every person, who under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District

of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person

with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party inured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proceeding for redress, except

that in any action brought against a judicial

officer form an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Court should grant this writ to resolve that

28 U.S.C. § 1343 falls within the “expressly authorized”

exception to the Anti Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2283, therefore when it . is invoked by a protected

class member in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for injunctive

relief, district court jurisdiction is absolute, cannot

be abdicated to another court, and is exempt from

abstention doctrines such as Younger. In Mitchum v.

Foster, the Court held that § 1983 claims for injunctive

relief fall within the “expressly authorized” exception

to § 2283 (Anti Injunction Statute) precluding district

court dismissal under the Younger Abstention Doctrine.

5

However, the Court was silent as to whether § 1343

as a companion to § 19831 was also an “expressly

authorized” exception and immune to Younger

abstention in injunctive relief claims.

. .

Equally, in Younger v. Harris, where the court

announced the Younger abstention doctrine it was

silent as to whether the doctrine applied to § 1343

jurisdiction, as the jurisdiction invoked in Younger

was 28 U.S.C. § 13312. Consequently, the need for

clarity on this unsettled issue is substantial as

evidenced by the error of the Eleventh Circuit, sub

judice, in affirming district court abstention under

Younger, when the undisputed record reflects Petitioner

Chestnut invoked § 1343 original jurisdiction in his

§ 1983 claim for injunctive relief. This error is a

canary in the coal mine signaling significant frus­

trations amongst lower courts and prejudice to the

public if not corrected by this Court hereto.

This unsettled issue of § 1343 jurisdiction versus

abstention in § 1983 injunctive relief claims causes

the following frustrations for the Court: (1) invites

lower court error, as evidenced sub judice, where the

lower courts will either misapprehend or exploit the

Court’s silence on § 1343 in § 1983 injunctive relief

claims to errantly abstain from jurisdiction even

1 The common origin of §§ 1983 and 1343 in § 1 of the 1871 Act

suggests that the two provisions were meant to be, and are,

complementary. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S.

538, 543 n. 7 (1972) .

2 § 1331 is unlike § 1343. In that § 1343 applies only to alleged

infringements upon rights under the color ... of state law”,

whereas § 1331 confers jurisdiction where there is federal

question. See Lynch u. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538,

547 (1972).

6

when § 1983 is invoked; (2) creates a hierarchal inter­

governmental dispute as to whether congressionally

conferred jurisdiction under § 1343 is subordinated to

judicially created abstention doctrine under Younger-,

(3) actively restricts access to courts for plaintiffs,

like Petitioner Chestnut here, who are subject to

state action in the state court tribunal and rely solely

• on § 1343 for access to a fair and impartial tribunal

in the federal district court; (4) invites inconsistency

amongst the circuits as the circuits composed of

southern states who have historically been predisposed

to “states rights” especially on civil rights, will trend

toward abstention, whereas other circuits who

historically abide by federal law will follow the

statute in upholding jurisdiction; and, (5) invites

recurrence of the havoc under Rooker-Feldman, where

application of judicially created doctrine is far more

obtuse than its acute intent.

This case is ripe with unsettled issues important

to the federal courts and the public seeking escape

from state action via § 1343. Moreover, this is an

ideal opportunity for the Court to expound upon the

Mitchum holding in declaring that § 1343 as the

companion to § 1983 in injunctive relief claims is

likewise precluded from abstention under Younger.

A.

Legal Background

Under § 1343(a)(3) Congress has created federal

jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to

redress the deprivation under color of state law “of any

right, privilege or immunity secured by the ConstiV tution of the United States or by any Act of Congress

providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons

7

within the jurisdiction of the United States.3 Under

§ 1343(a)(4) Congress expressly conferred district

court jurisdiction to “recover or secure equitable

relief under any Act of Congress provide for the

protect of civil rights”. The Reconstruction Congress

enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act/Civil Right Act of 18714

as codified by § 1983 to enforce and protect rights

guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.5

That statute contained not only the sub­

stantive provision protecting against “the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution” by

any person acting under color of state law,

but, as well, the jurisdictional provision

authorizing a proceeding for the enforcement

of those rights “to be prosecuted in the

several district or circuit courts of United

States.” Jurisdiction was not independently

defined; it was given simply to enforce the

substantive rights created by the statute.

§ 1983 and § 1343, were deemed to coincide.

3 Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612-12

(1979).

4 The act of 1871 was an expansion of national authority over

matters that before the Civil War, had been left to the States.

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 548 (1972)

citing, F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, THE BUSINESS OF THE

Supreme Court 65 (1928).

3 “The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal

courts between the states and the people, as guardians of the

people’s rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action

under the color of stat law, ‘whether that action be executive,

legislative, or judicial’Mitcham v. Foster, 407 225, 242 (1972),

citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).

8

Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects &

Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572,

581-82 (1976).

Under § 1343(a)(3) Congress has created federal

jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to

redress the deprivation under color of state law “of

any right, privilege or immunity secured by the

Constitution of the United States or by any Act of

Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of

all person within the jurisdiction of the United States.6

Under § 1343(a)(4) Congress expressly conferred district

court jurisdiction to “recover or secure equitable

relief under any Act of Congress provided for the

protection of civil rights”. The Reconstruction Congress

enacted the Civil Right Act of 1871 as codified by

§ 1983 to enforce and protect rights guaranteed under

the Fourteenth Amendment.? The Reconstruction

Congress codified § 1343 jurisdiction in response to

state court tribunals in southern former slave states,

including Florida, proving to be incompetent and

unwilling to enforce and protect the civil rights of

Blacks as a protected class of people.8

8 Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612-12

(1979).

? ‘The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts

between the states and the people, as guardians of the people’s

rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under

the color of stat law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative,

or judicial’.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), citing,

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880).

8 Sen. Thurman says in debate of § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights

Act, “I believe the true remedy lies chiefly in the United States

district and circuit courts. If state courts had proven themselves

competent... we should not have been called upon to legislate

9

'

Thus, to employ the Younger abstention doctrine

to dismiss a civil rights case sending it back to the

very state court tribunal the plaintiff is complaining

is violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights is not

only contrary to the plain language of the statute, it

serves to nullify § 1343.9 However, this Court remains

unwavering in it is undisputed constitutional principle

that congress, not the judiciary, defines the scope of

the federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally

permissible bounds. 1° Congress since codifying § 1343

in 1871 has never repealed the statute or mitigated

the jurisdiction conferred, thus, the lower courts have

no authority to expand a judicially created abstention

doctrine like Younger, to effectively truncate by

nullification § 1343 a federal statute conferring federal

court jurisdiction.

Contrarily, this Court has long supported “the

proposition that federal courts lack the authority to

abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has

been conferred.”!! The courts of the Unite States are

bound to proceed to judgement and to afford redress

to suitors before them in every case which their

upon this subject [Black Codes, and Civil Rights of Blacks in

the South] at all. But they have not done so.” See Jett v. Dallas

Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 726 (1989) .

.9 See Botany Mills v. Unties States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)

(When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode,

it includes the negative of any other mode).

10 See New Orleans Pb. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,

491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989).

11 See New Orleans Pb. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,

491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989).

10

jurisdiction extends. 12 The district court’s jurisdiction

is absolute where the elements of § 1343 are met and

it is invoked.

B.

Factual Background

It is undisputed that Chestnut invoked § 1343

(a)3-4 in his complaint for declaratory and injunc­

tive relief to the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Florida. (See App.l5a). Chestnut named

the Justices of the Supreme Court individually in their

professional capacity and the Clerk of the Supreme

Court of Florida in his individual capacity, avoiding

Eleventh Amendment immunity by seeking equitable

relief and no money damages. The federal complaint

detailed disqualification of multiple presiding judges

for colluding with the prosecuting attorney, deprivation

of meaningful discovery, preclusion from presenting

a defense at trial, illegal exclusion of evidence, order of

guilt entered'without jurisdiction, disparate treatment

in right to contract, disparate treatment in method and

severity of discipline and bias by the court based in

part or whole on ethnicity.

The attorney disciplinary proceedings before the

Supreme Court of Florida do not procedurally provide

for interlocutory appeal on constitutional issues.

Chestnut raised the due process and constitutional

issues in a post trial appeal but the Supreme Court

of Florida refused to hear or rule on the appeal. Based

on the totality of circumstances, Chestnut alleged in

the federal complaint an inability in state court to

receive a fair trial before an impartial tribunal based

upon repeated and systemic due process and equal

12 Chicot Cty. u. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893) (Internal

citations omitted).

11

protection violations by the Supreme Court of Florida

and the Clerk as state actors. As an example, Chest­

nut alleged due process and equal protection violations

by the Supreme Court of Florida after Judge Ohlman,

the Referee/District Court Judge appointed to preside

over of one of the attorney disciplinary cases and

recommend guilt, was technically disqualified 30 days

after, on day 2 of a 4-day trial, in which he was on

the record coaching the prosecuting attorney on eviden­

tiary matters. The trial never resumed after day 2

and Chestnut was not afforded an opportunity to put

on a case in chief defense. Notwithstanding, after

losing jurisdiction Judge Ohlman entered a report and

recommendation of guilt as though there had been a

trial, and the Supreme Court of Florida used the void

order as a basis to disbar Chestnut. See App.32a.

The Supreme Court of Florida has a history of

hostility and Fourteenth Amendment violations invol­

ving protected class members and the practice of law;

in fact, it went so far as to defy a mandate issued by

this Court to integrate the University of Florida

College of Law in admitting, Virgil Hawkins to the

University of Florida Law School. 13 The Supreme

Court of Florida’s historical conduct in violating the

constitution, acting as state actors to subjugate

protected class members in the practice of law, and

the absence of procedural laws allowing for interloc­

utory appeals to raise constitutional challenges is

precisely why the Reconstruction Congress enacted

§ 1983 and § 1343 as companions to offer plaintiffs

like Chestnut access to a fair tribunal via the federal

13 See State ex. Rel. v. Bd. Of Control, 83 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1955);

see also Sweat v. Painter, 338 U.S. 865 (1949).

12

district court, and precisely why no subsequent con­

gress has repealed the provisions or mitigated the

§ 1343 jurisdictional provision as the lower courts

erroneously did, sub judice.

C.

Procedural History

1. 11th Circuit Proceedings

On May 27, 2021 a final judgment was entered by

the 11th Circuit. The 11th Circuit issued an unpub­

lished opinion on April 28, 2021 affirming that the

district court was proper to abstain and dismiss

Petitioner’s § 1983 complaint. The circuit court held

that although Petitioner had invoked original district

court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, “Younger

and its progeny are only implicated after the district

court has concluded it has jurisdiction.” The court

reasoned, “It is the nature of the state proceedings,

not the district court’s jurisdiction, that a court

analyzes when determining if it should abstain under

Younger ... As such, the statute that granted the

district court jurisdiction of this case does not alter

our Younger analysis.” The circuit court also held that

the bad faith exception to Middlesex did not apply

because, “Chestnut has provided no evidence that the

disciplinary proceedings against him were brought

without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a finding

of guilt. Lastly, the circuit court concluded that all

three requirements for Younger were metl4.

14 The three requirements for Younger abstention are: (1) there

was an ongoing state proceeding that (2) implicated an

important state interest and (3) those proceedings provided

adequate opportunity for Chestnut to be heard. See. App.6a See

also, Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,

457 U.S. 423, 423 (1982).'

13

2. U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Florida Proceedings

On April 14, 2020, Judge Robert Hinkle, U.S.

District Judge for the Northern District of Florida

entered an order granting the State of Florida’s Motion

to Dismiss, filed by the Attorney General of Florida

on behalf of the Justices and Clerk for the Supreme

Court of Florida. The district court reasoned: “Whether

viewed as a challenge to a state-court proceeding

that was ongoing when this federal action was filed—

a challenge barred by Younger—or as a challenge to

a state-court proceeding that had ended when this

federal action was filed barred by Rooker-Feldman—

the result is the same. This action must be dismissed.”

See, App.l3a.

Chestnut’s case is highly distinguishable from

Middlesex. The lower courts relied upon Middlesex

for justifying abstention sub judice, however Middlesex

is highly distinguishable from the case sub judice.

First, Middlesex sought federal court intervention

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdic­

tion as opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 original district

court jurisdiction; federal question jurisdiction is subject

to the Younger abstention doctrine, original district

court jurisdiction is not. Second, although the plaintiff

in Middlesex was black as is Chestnut, the Plaintiff in

Middlesex alleged First Amended violations or privilege

and immunity, whereas Chestnut alleged race based

Fourteenth Amendment violations of fundamental

rights. Third, the Plaintiff in Middlesex was afforded

adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional

challenge at the state court level having been provided

a two day hearing explicitly for proffering evidence in

support of his First Amendment violation allegations,

14

whereas the Supreme Court of Florida never afforded

Chestnut an evidentiary hearing on his Fourteenth

Amendment violations.

The plain language and legislative intent of 28

U.S.C. § 1343 is exclusive federal court intervention

into state court proceedings where the state court

tribunal is violating the Fourteenth Amendment, it is

undisputed that Chestnut invoked § 1343 jurisdiction,

and the lower court’s reliance on Younger and its pro­

geny to justify abstention, is legally wrong, divergent

from precedence, usurping congressionally conferred

jurisdiction, and oppressive to accessibility of the

federal court for the intended class.

♦

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should grant this writ of certiorari to

protect the congressional spirit and intent of § 1343

district court original jurisdiction for § 1983 claims

brought to redress fundamental right violations by

state court actors in state court tribunals, and to

prevent an unconstitutional precedent of further

expanding application of the Younger doctrine to

include judicially created federal court abstention in

§ 1983 claims brought under § 1343, where congress

expressly codified original district court jurisdiction.

15

I.

The Court Should Settle Whether a

District Court May Abstain Under Younger

Where a Protected Class Member Files a

§ 1983 Claim Invoking § 1343 Original

Jurisdiction.

The Court should grant this writ, to preserve and

further qualify the precedent in Mitchum. In Mitchum,

this Court held that § 1983 injunctive relief claims fall

within the “expressly authorized” exception to § 2283,

Anti Injunction Statute. The expressly authorized

exception to § 2283 specifically states that a federal

court may not intervene in an ongoing state proceeding

unless expressly authorized by an Act of Congress. 15

As established and reiterated supra, § 1 of the 1871

Ku Klux Klan Act/Civil Rights Act is an Act of Congress

enacted expressly to provide a federal remedy under

§ 1983 and confer federal jurisdiction under § 1343 to

“interpose” the federal court between a plaintiff partic­

ularly of a protected class and a state court tribunal

where a plaintiff alleges state court action violating a

plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights, like due

process and equal protection as was alleged by Peti­

tioner Chestnut sub judice.

The Court is unwavering in it position that § 1983

and § 1343 both emanate from a common Act of

Congress, § 1 of the Act of 1871, with common purpose

to provide remedy for the same class of persons.

We have stated, for example, that a major

purpose of the Civil Rights Acts was to

“involve the federal judiciary” in the effort

to exert federal control over state officials

15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

16

who refused to enforce the law. District of

Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S., at 427.

Congress did so in part because it thought

the state courts at the time would not

provide an impartial forum. See id., at 426429. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.

167, 174-183 (1961); Developments in the

Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv.

L. Rev. 1133, 1150-115 (1977). Tims,.Congress

elected to afford a “uniquely federal remedy,”

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972),

that is, a “‘federal right in federal courts.”’

District of Columbia v. Carter, supra, at

428, quoting Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 180

(emphasis added). Four Terms ago, we

considered the origins of § 1343 (3) and

§ 1983 and concluded that “the two provisions

were meant to be, and are, complementary.”

Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.,

at 583; see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,

405 U.S., at 543, n. 7. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448

U.S. 1, 20-21, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2513 (1980).

Even though the Court stopped short of applying

the holding in Mitchum to § 1343 in deciding that

abstention is precluded in § 1983 injunctive relief

claims, considering that § 1343 is the jurisdictional

counterpart to § 1983, it is axiomatic' that this Court

would hold and a reasonable mind would infer that

abstention is precluded in § 1343 claims as well

when a protected class member invokes § 1343 in a

§ 1983 injunctive relief action from state court violations

of due process and equal protection. After all, where

is the logic in precluding abstention for a § 1983

injunctive relief claim alleging state action, but

17

permitting abstention for the companion jurisdictional

provision § 1343; said abstention not only nullifies

both provisions but also completely undermines the

precedent of this Court as established in Mitchum. In

addition granting this writ to protect this Court’s pre­

cedent on abstention preclusion in § 1983 injunctive

relief from state action claims, they Court must also

move in haste to protect the constitutional provisions

empowering Congress.

Furthermore, there is no authority citing other­

wise, as Younger and its progeny invoke jurisdiction

under § 1331 not § 1343. Thus, where the plain lan­

guage, supported by consistent judicial interpretation, is

as strong as it is here, ordinarily “it is not necessary

to look beyond the words of the statute.”!6

II. The Misapplication of

Younger to

Supersede a Federal Statute Will Result in

Excessive Legal Error on § 1983 Federal

Court Jurisdictional Rulings and Incite a

Split Amongst the Circuits.

This Court is unwavering that Congress not the

judiciary determines district court jurisdiction. This

Court is also well rooted in the notion that where

federal a federal statute like § 1343 and a judicially

, created doctrine like the Younger abstention doctrine

conflict, the statute prevails. However, the ruling sub

judice by the Eleventh Circuit and the lower court

directly contravene these constitutional and higher

court principals. Granting this writ is the immediate

and decisive response to curtail the imminent confusion

from the lower court obstinance on the well settle

16 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, n. 29 (1978).

18

law precluding abstention where § 1343 is invoked.

This Court should act here to thwart an onslaught of

lower court dismissals under the Younger abstention

where § 1343 jurisdiction has been invoked. The hyper

polarized politicization of state courts that prioritize

concentration of power by state action over following

the black letter law where equal protection and due

process are concerned, promises that the trafficking

in § 1343 is soon to reflect the demands of the recon, struction era when it was originally codified. The

Eleventh Circuit and the Northern District of Florida

have boastfully signaled an intent to disregard § 1343

along with the rights and remedies for the plaintiffs

invoking that jurisdiction, and without this Court

intervening via this writ to tame the trend before it.

starts, this Court is likely to be saddled with the

same havoc in the misapplication of the Younger

abstention doctrine that it experienced in lower courts

errant expansion of Rooker-Feldman doctrine that

was just recently tamed after decades of abuse and

misapplication.

More importantly, granting this writ will allow

the Court to preempt an imminent and inevitable

split amongst the circuits regarding § 1343 jurisdiction.

Although the Eleventh Circuit opinion sub judice is

unpublished, it is certain to circulate in the circuits

comprised of southern former slave states who are

, likely to emulate the Eleventh Circuit’s erroneous

ruling sub judice and abstain from § 1343 actions

under the guide of federalism and comity. Unlike the

Eleventh Circuit, many circuits will follow the plain

language of § 1343, § 1983, and § 2283 and preclude

Younger abstention from applying to due process and

equal protection claims for injunctive relief from state

19

action as alleged by a protected class member. The

result is a conflict amongst the circuits about a statute

that has no ambiguity in application, just select

courts manufacturing expansion of a judicially created

doctrine to unlawfully nullify a statute congress has

consciously decided not to repeal since its inception

in the 1870s.

This Court should grant this writ of certiorari to

preemptively safeguard against an imminent cascade

of judicially created expansion and misapplication of

Younger and its progeny by lower courts to abstain

from section 1983 claims brought under 1343 to redress

state action by state court tribunals violating individual

fundamental rights in contravention to the equal pro­

tection, and the Fourteenth amendment.

The misapplication of Middlesex by the lower

courts sub judice to dismiss a race based § 1983 claim

brought under § 1343 is a judicial expansion of Younger

creating an unconstitutional usurping of a federally

enacted statute codified expressly to bestow original

federal court jurisdiction in equity claims where a

Plaintiff seeks equitable redress from state action by

a state court tribunal, original district court jurisdiction

as congressionally codified in 1343 precedent for district

court abstention in direct contravention to the express

intent spirit and intent.

Principal among the considerations of this

Court in deciding to grant a Writ of Certiorari

is importance to the public of the federal

issue to be resolved. See Layne & Bowler

Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U.S. 387,

393 (1923). Congress not the judiciary defines

the scope of federal jurisdiction,' thus, it is

incumbent upon this Court to grant this writ

20

to cure the unconstitutional expansion of

This lower court has no authority to judicially

modify or expand federal court jurisdiction in

§ 1983 injunctive claims, particularly where

congress has conferred abstention Judicially

Created Doctrine should not supersede con­

gressional law.

Furthermore, this Court is the appropriate author­

ity to review the inherent unconstitutionality of the

attorney disciplinary proceedings in the Supreme

Court of Florida where the Supreme Court of Florida

has an appalling history of disregard for civil rights

. and even disregard of this Court’s mandates on civil

rights of lawyers, the Florida rules deprive an attorney

defendant adequate opportunity to raise federal claims

at the state court level, and the Florida rules neither

contemplate or provide access to a fair and impartial

tribunal when a defendant alleges state action by the

Supreme Court of Florida as the state actor when the

Supreme Court of Florida oversees attorney admission

to the bar, initiates and prosecutes attorney disciplin­

ary actions, and is the sole arbiter of guilt and sanction

for an accused attorney in disciplinary actions.

III. This Case Is the Perfect Vehicle for the

Court to Resume Where It Left Off in

Mitchum, by Declaring the Proper Applica­

tion of § 1343 and the Effect of Exception

to the Anti Injunction Act to Abstention by

Younger.

A federal district court errs when it holds that,

because of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, it is without power in

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enjoin proceeding

pending in state court under any circumstances what­

soever. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S. Ct. 2151,

21

32 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1972). 42 U.S.C. § 1983, authorizing

suit in equity to redress deprivation, under color of

. state law, of federal constitutional rights, constitutes

“expressly authorized” exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283

prohibiting federal courts from granting injunctions

staying state court proceedings “except as expressly

authorized by Act of Congress.” Id. Civil rights action

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, authorizing suit in

equity to redress deprivation, under color of state

law, of federal constitutional rights, is express statutory

exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Trainor v. Hernandez,

431 U.S. 434, 97 S. Ct. 1911, 52 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1977).

There is no doubt that action under Civil Rights Act

of 1871 falls within exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283,

thus Younger is precluded.

It is also important for this Court to underscore

what the lower courts sub judice misapprehended in

distinguishing § 1331 from § 1343. The lower courts

cited extensively to prior rulings where this court has

abstained from intervention in attorney disciplinary

proceedings before a state court tribunal. However,

all of those cases invoked jurisdiction under § 1331

federal question jurisdiction to bring a § 1983 claim.

Reiterating the boundaries of Younger is likely timely

based upon the rulings of the lower court sub judice.

This writ should be granted because it is a case of

first impression in that the fact pattern expands upon

the § 1983 claim in Mitchum, as this case involves a

black attorney—a member of a protected class, raising

due process and equal protection complaints against

the highest state court of Florida as a state actor and

. seeking district court injunctive relief for a fair

tribunal. The facts of this case are squarely in line

with the legislative intent for remedy for state action

22

pursuant to § 1983, the legislative intent for conferring

district court jurisdiction pursuant to § 1343 and the

precedent of this Court in Mitchum logically applied

to § 1343.

♦

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Christopher M. Chestnut

Petitioner Pro Se

18 NW 8th Avenue

Gainesville, FL 32601

(352)256-6151

christopherchestnut@gmail. com

September 27,2021